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INDUSTRIAL CYBER SECURITY Ammar Alzaher USBS BEHAVING BADLY April 18, 2019 HOW TO CONTROL USB USAGE IN OPERATIONAL NETWORKS 2 Which one is safe? Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 3 USB Doppelgangers! USBHarpoon O.MG Cable Rubber Ducky Bash Bunny USBs Behaving Badly Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 4 The State of USB Security The State of USB Security Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 5 Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 6 How likely is: a malicious file trying to enter your site through an ?% USB device? Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 7 This is what we found… Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 8 Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 9 50 4+ 4 Locations Industries Continents Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 10 Potential to cause major disruption to an industrial control system 26% e.g. loss of view or loss of control Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 11 Are well-known threats 15% e.g. Mirai, Stuxnet, TRITON, WannaCry Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 12 The State of USB Security Threats are Changing… Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 13 For example, this: May pretend to be this: 14 SMX Protects Against Advanced USB Threats • Manipulation of USB firmware. BadUSB • USB device will act as a HID - Human Interface Device (e.g. a keyboard), and can execute scripts. • A keystroke injection tool disguised as generic USB drive. • Computer recognizes the USB as a “normal” keyboard and automatically executes Rubber the preprogrammed rubber ducky scripts. Ducky • Execution speed around 1000 words per minute! • A fully featured Linux computer with the ability to execute all Rubber ducky scripts, as well Bash as more complex attacks leveraging data connections (e.g. Ethernet over USB or Bunny Ethernet control model - ECM) • Can also impersonate mass storage or serial devices IncreasingThreatComplexity Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 15 USB Device Attack Categories Visualized TURNIPSCHOOL (COTTONMOUTH-1) Unintended USB USB Killer Autorun exploits channels Attacks on wireless Buffer overflow Driver update USB dongles USBHarpoon 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018+ Cold boot Rubber Ducky RIT attack via USB Thief O.MG Cable USB mass storage PHUKD/URFUKED USBee attack Attack Categories* Smartphone based HID attacks USBdriveby DNS override by Programmable modified USB firmware .LNK Stuxnet/Fanny Evilduino Microcontrollers USB flash drive exploit Keyboard emulation by Default gateway modified USB firmware Data hiding on override Maliciously USB mass storage Hidden partition patch Re-programed USB Backdoor into Peripherals air-gapped hosts Password protection USB port Attacks on bypass patch smartphones Device firmware Not Re-programed upgrade (DFU) Virtual machine Peripherals break-out Root sector virus iSeeYou: Disabling the Electrical MacBook webcam indicator LED * Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 2017 Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 16 USB Device Attack Categories Visualized USB Peripheral Persona of USB Connected Micro-controller Host ATTACK Rubber Ducky ✔ ✔ PHUKD /URFUKED ✔ ✔ ✔ USB driveby ✔ ✔ ✔ Evilduino ✔ ✔ ✔ Unintended USB Channel ✔ ✔ ✔ TURNIPSCHOOL(COTTONMOUTH-1) ✔ ✔ ✔ RIT attack via USB mass storage ✔ ✔ Attacks on wireless USB dongles ✔ ✔ ✔ Default Gateway Override ✔ ✔ Smartphone based HID attacks ✔ ✔ ✔ DNS override by modified USB firmware ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Keyboard emulation by modified USB firmware ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Hidden Partition Patch ✔ ✔ Password protection bypass patch ✔ ✔ Virtual Machine Break-Out ✔ ✔ Boot Sector Virus ✔ ✔ ✔ iSeeYou ✔ ✔ ✔ .LNK Stuxnet /Fanny ✔ ✔ USB Backdoor into air-gapped hosts ✔ ✔ Data hiding on USB Mass Storage drive ✔ ✔ Autorun exploits ✔ ✔ Cold Boot ✔ ✔ Buffer Overflow ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Driver Update ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ USB Thief ✔ ✔ Attacks on smartphones via the USB port ✔ ✔ USBee attack ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ USB Killer ✔ Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 17 What We Learned • Relying solely on the USB Device information is not good enough • What the USB device reports is not definitive!!! What matters is how the OS treats the device - OS decision process is complex, taking into account many factors - The driver the OS chooses may be “OS Standard” or “Vendor Specific”… makes all the difference Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 18 The State of USB Security The Myths of USB Security Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 19 Common Myth “Locked USB Ports” Myth: “We lock down USB ports. This prevents all USB based attacks and USB borne malware.” Reality: • Many advanced USB and human interface device (HID) attacks such as BadUSB, Rubber Ducky and Bash Bunny are designed to circumvent these security measures by disguising as an approved device at the firmware level. Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 20 Common Myth “My AV Will Protect Us” Myth: “We have traditional Anti-Virus (AV) installed onsite. This will catch all inbound malware from USB drives.” Reality: • AV is not a be all end all solution to preventing malware brought in from removable media such as USB drives. • AV also requires the USB to be inserted on the workstation before it can be scanned. This can be problematic. Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 21 Common Myth “I Have AWL, This Will Protect Me From all Inbound Threats” Myth: “I have Application Whitelisting (AWL), this will keep me safe from all inbound malware” Reality: • AWL cannot stop “all inbound malware”, typically AWL will not prevent script/macro attacks embedded in authorized application files. Make sure your USB solution can do this. Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 22 The State of USB Security What Can We Do About It? Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 23 Apply What You Have Learned Today • Next week you should: - Assess existing USB defensive measures, considering all 3 attack types • In the next three months you should: - Complete an inventory of USB devices currently in use - Assess your supply chain: what USB devices are you using? • Within six months you should: - Adjust USB and removable media policies to account for your findings. - Consider technical controls to enforce these policies Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 24 Establish and follow good (USB) security basics 1 2 3 Enforce Monitor and Manage Consider all USB Technical Controls Network Traffic attack types 4 5 6 Patch and Harden Secure the USB device Deploy (and test!) End Nodes supply chain Backup and Recovery Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 25 TRUST (Trusted Response User Substantiation Technology) SMX ST Award winning Portable design Enterprise management capability Enforces USB device authorization Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. 26 Why Customers Choose HON for Industrial Cyber Security End-To-End Solutions • Trusted partner for industrial cyber security • Complete portfolio of industry proven cyber security products, services & solutions • Operational Technology (OT) domain expertise • Vendor neutral solutions for site or enterprise deployments • Global capabilities and local presence Professional Security Managed Cyber Security 3rd Party Integrated Consulting Services Security Services Software Security Products © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. Industry Proven Products, Services & Solutions 27 Thank you! To learn more, visit: http://becybersecure.com And never trust doppelgangers … Honeywell Confidential - © 2019 by Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved..
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