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Financial Crises and Policy Responses Financial Crises and Policy Responses A MARKET-BASED VIEW FROM THE SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEE, 1986–2015 ROBERT LITAN NOVEMBER 2016 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Financial Crises and Policy Responses A MARKET-BASED VIEW FROM THE SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEE, 1986–2015 ROBERT LITAN NOVEMBER 2016 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2016 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional posi- tions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................................................................... v I. Financial Crises and Challenges: The Origins of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee ..... 1 II. A Brief 30-Year History of Finance ..................................................................................................................... 5 III. The S&L Crises of the 1980s ................................................................................................................................. 7 IV. The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Policy Responses .............................................................................. 11 V. Deposit Insurance and Safety-Net Reform .................................................................................................... 17 VI. Banking Regulation in the 1990s and 2000s—Until the Financial Crisis .............................................. 22 VII. Enhanced Competition in Financial Services ............................................................................................... 26 VIII. The Importance of Transparency: Financial Reporting and Credit Ratings ........................................ 34 IX. Trading in Financial Instruments: Securities and Derivatives ................................................................ 39 X. Pension Guaranty Issues ..................................................................................................................................... 46 XI. Housing Policy Issues .......................................................................................................................................... 48 XII. Insurance Issues .................................................................................................................................................... 55 XIII. The Financial Crisis of 2008 ............................................................................................................................... 58 XIV. International Financial Issues ........................................................................................................................... 67 XV. A Counterfactual Financial History ................................................................................................................. 73 XVI. The Role for Market-Based Financial Policy in the Future ...................................................................... 80 Appendix: Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statements ..................................................................... 89 About the Author .............................................................................................................................................................. 99 iii Preface his is an unusual book. It is the history of both an of Rochester), Robert Eisenbeis (University of North Torganization—the Shadow Financial Regulatory Carolina), Paul Horvitz (University of Houston), Ed Committee—and an epoch in the history of finance, Kane (Ohio State), and George Kaufman (Loyola Uni- mostly in the United States: 1986 to 2015. versity of Chicago). The five had previously known As most readers will know, these years have been each other well and had generally similar views about often turbulent, marked by financial crises originating public policy’s role toward banks: namely, that market from different sources and evoking different kinds of principles should guide public policy, as long as the policy responses. But for the most part, the reactions outcomes enhance economic welfare. have moved in one direction: more rules, more legal By 1986, the five colleagues had built on their pro- prescriptions, and more prohibitions aimed at pre- fessional and personal relationships and decided to venting the crisis that just occurred. follow in the steps of the Shadow Open Market Com- Yet as most of us also know, every crisis is differ- mittee, which was formed earlier by Professors Karl ent, and rules aimed to prevent the last one—like Brunner and Alan Meltzer to provide a regular inde- military technologies deployed to fight the last war— pendent assessment of the Federal Reserve’s mone- often prove to not be up to the task when the next tary policies. The five financial economists invited crisis comes along. But still, after each crisis, the Meltzer, along with other banking experts from the rule-making cycle continues. private sector, to join the new Shadow Financial Regu- In large part, this pattern flows from false choices latory Committee: Richard Aspinwall (Chase Manhat- that policymakers offer and the media report about tan); Lawrence Connell, a private banking attorney; the causes of and solutions to financial crises: either academic banking experts Franklin Edwards (Colum- write more rules, or take them away and rely on the bia University) and Kenneth Scott (Stanford Univer- market alone to discipline bad actors and behavior. sity and previously general counsel of the Federal Rarely is the right answer at the extremes or so black Home Loan Bank Board); and John D. Hawke, one of and white. the nation’s leading banking lawyers, who had previ- The reality is that both markets and governments ously served as general counsel to the Federal Reserve alone often fail to produce ideal outcomes, and policy and later went on to become undersecretary of the must take account of both facts. This reality helped treasury for domestic finance and then comptroller of motivate the formation of the US Shadow Financial the currency in the Clinton administration. Connell Regulatory Committee (the “Shadow Committee,” and Kaufman served as the Shadow Committee’s first “Committee,” or “SFRC”), whose activities, as well as co-chairs. Connell later resigned, and the Commit- the financial history to which they apply, are the sub- tee has had other co-chairs serve alongside Kaufman, ject of this book. who remained in the co-chair’s post throughout the The SFRC was an outgrowth of a 1980s task force Committee’s history. on the future of American banking, comprised of five The Committee’s membership turned over leading US academic scholars on the banking industry from time to time throughout its three-decade life. and convened by the American Bankers Association. Although most members came from academia, The task force’s work was later published as a book in many had private-sector and policymaking experi- 1986.1 The scholars were George Benston (University ence, which helped inject political realism into the v FINANCIAL CRISES AND POLICY RESPONSES Committee’s discussions and formal statements. For American readers who are football fans, a foot- Multiple benefactors funded the Committee at var- ball analogy may be useful here. As with any orga- ious points, including the Mellon Foundation, the nized game, someone sets the rules of play, specifies Richard Scaife Foundation, the Smith Richardson the field size, and has referees to enforce the rules. Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute, Applied to the banking industry, in which banks are to which the Shadow Committee members have been owned by private shareholders, the “game” is com- and continue to be grateful. petition among the banks and other financial insti- The SFRC operated in much the same manner as tutions; Congress and the executive branch set the its monetary policy counterpart, the Shadow Open rules, sometimes modified or rejected by the courts; Market Committee. The SFRC convened quarterly in and regulators (and again, sometimes the courts) are Washington, DC, meeting for a full day (and oftentimes the “referees” who enforce the rules. Contrast this well into the early evening) on Sunday and then Mon- three-part system with countries where the govern- day morning. It usually crafted several policy state- ment owns banks or other types of financial institu- ments, which were released at a Monday luncheon tions. To American football fans, this would be like press conference, attended mainly by the financial the referees owning and running the teams. That is media and other interested individuals. The Sunday not our model for finance. meetings generally also included presentations by an Whatever analogy one may choose, the Shadow outside guest, most frequently a current financial gov- members believed that, at a minimum, they could ernment official, who spokeoff-the -record and typi- raise the quality of public debate on financial policy cally provided useful background information. issues. Ideally, they wanted to influence the content The Sunday meetings were intense, lively, and of those policies as well, and in one notable area, they informative for the members, and hopefully the state- actually did. ments they produced were useful for policymak- The Committee applied its principles to multiple ers and the
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