Choosing Our Friends Wisely Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups

Choosing our friends wisely Criteria for engagement with Muslim groups

Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton

Policy Exchange is an independent think tank whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas which will foster a free society based on strong communities, personal freedom, limited government, national self-confidence and an enterprise culture. Registered charity no: 1096300.

Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with academics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy outcomes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. We also believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector.

Trustees Theodore Agnew, Richard Briance, Camilla Cavendish, Richard Ehrman, Robin Edwards, Virginia Fraser, George Robinson, Andrew Sells, Tim Steel, Alice Thomson, Rachel Whetstone and Simon Wolfson. About the authors

Shiraz Maher is a Senior Fellow at Policy Martyn Frampton is a Research Fellow at Exchange. He took a First Class degree in Peterhouse, Cambridge. He was educated History from the University of Leeds and at Jesus College, Cambridge, where he was awarded a distinction for his MPhil in took a Starred First in History. He also Imperial History from the University of holds an MPhil in International Relations Cambridge. He previously worked as a and a doctorate in History. His academic journalist for some of the BBC’s flagship interests include Modern European, current affairs programmes including British and Irish history and terrorism. His Newsnight , Panorama and Radio 4, and book, The Long March: The Political was the first British journalist to interview Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981-2007 was pub - members of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabian ‘de- lished in 2009 by Palgrave Macmillan. He radicalisation’ centres. He has also been a is the co-author (with John Bew and Iñigo guest columnist for the Times , and Sunday Gurruchaga) of Talking to Terrorists: Times , and is a regular contributor to the Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the New Statesman , Prospect and Standpoint . Basque Country (C. Hurst & Co; forth - From 2002-2005 he was a member of coming 2009). Hizb-ut-Tahrir, becoming a regional offi - cer for north-east England before resigning as a matter of conscience.

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2 Contents

Executive Summary 5

Foreword by Rt Hon Ruth Kelly MP 9

Introduction 12

1 The Challenge: Islamists in Britain 17 What is Islamism? Who are the Islamists? 18 The Muslim Brotherhood 19 Islamists in Britain I 20 Jamaat-e-Islami 22 Islamists in Britain II 22 Ineffective Communalism 24

2 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities, and Existing Criteria 26 The Prevent Strategy 26 Existing Criteria 28 The Channel Project 30 The Community Leadership Fund 31 Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation Programme 31 Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund (FCCBF) 33 Preventing Violent Extremism – Pathfinder Fund (PVE-PF) 33

3 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma 36 Picking Partners: Who should councils work with? 36 The Enigma of Prevent: What is it for? 39 Delivery and Accountability: Localism supreme 44 Conclusion 46

4 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police 48 Picking Partners: The policing imperative 48 The Enigma of Prevent: What is it for? 52 Delivery and Accountability 58 Conclusion 61

5 Defeating Non-Violent Extremism: Lessons from the Labour Party and MI5 64 Labour and the Example of Militant 64 The Security Service (MI5) 68

6 Future Criteria for Engagement 69 What is Engagement? 69 Principles Governing the Selection of Criteria 70 The Proposed Criteria 71 Conclusion 74

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7 Case Study: The Global Peace and Unity (GPU) Event 75

8 Implementing the Criteria 78 Preventing Extremism: Recasting PVE as PE 78 Creating Transparency 79 Creating Accountability: Putting MPs at the heart of Prevent 81 Making Assessments: Creating a Due Diligence Unit (DDU) 81 Securing and Monitoring Change 82 Conclusion 84

9 Conclusion 85

Annex: Technical Definition of Some Criteria 89 Glossary of Terms 91 Bibliography 93 Acknowledgements 97

4 Executive Summary

Introduction cred’ to control angry young Muslims. Preventing Violent Extremism, or PVE as Genuine Muslim moderates are regularly it is known, is a key strand of the govern - dismissed by key authority figures as ‘spoken ment’s counter-terrorism strategy. It aims for’, and thus marginalised. to channel resources to those organisations Non-violent extremists have conse - and individuals within Britain’s Muslim quently become well dug in as partners of communities able to divert youngsters national and local government and the away from dangerous militancy. A great police. Some of the government’s chosen deal of money has been invested in PVE – collaborators in ‘addressing grievances’ of at least £90 million over three years – and angry young Muslims are themselves at the in official circles many reputations are rid - forefront of stoking those grievances ing on its success. against British foreign policy; western The concept behind PVE is a sound social values; and alleged state-sanctioned one: the authorities cannot afford to adopt ‘Islamophobia’. a laissez-faire attitude while extremists PVE is thus underwriting the very target young British Muslims for indoctri - Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, nation and recruitment as foot soldiers in a intolerant and anti-western world view. misconceived ‘clash of civilisations’. The Political and theological extremists, acting government deserves praise for recognising with the authority conferred by official this fact, and acting upon it. recognition, are indoctrinating young The problem is that PVE – however well people with an ideology of hostility to west - intentioned – isn’t working. Not only is it ern values. This strategic error on the part of failing to achieve its stated objectives, in officialdom is born of a poverty of aspira - many places it is actually making the situ - tion: the belief of the authorities that they ation worse: a new generation is being cannot reasonably ask angry Muslims for radicalised, sometimes with the very funds much more than a pledge not to use that are supposed to be countering radical - violence in Britain. The effect has been to isation. empower reactionaries within Muslim This document demonstrates how PVE communities and to marginalise genuine is backfiring. Furthermore, it explains moderates, thus increasing inter-commu - why, because of flaws in both theory and nity tensions and envenoming the public practice, this is happening. Finally, it space. proposes a series of measures to recalibrate The linkage between non-violent and PVE, allowing it to achieve its proper violent extremism is habitually under - objectives. played in official documents produced by central government, local government and the police. Even MI5 publicly affirms that Flawed in theory it does not currently deal with non-violent The central theoretical flaw in PVE is that it subversive threats. accepts the premise that non-violent extrem - In addition, PVE is characterised by an ists can be made to act as bulwarks against excessive veneration of the local – and this violent extremists. Some within government lack of central oversight means the author - and the police service believe that only non- ities are often ‘flying blind’ at a grassroots violent radicals – otherwise known as ‘polit - level. Even when PVE partner groups ical Islamists’ – possess the necessary ‘street transgress the boundaries of acceptability,

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there appears to be no elaboration of the vague and open-ended as to be almost mean - criteria for determining the circumstances ingless – terms such as ‘respect for others’ whereby funds or advisory roles might be and ‘the rule of law’ are used. Strangely, cut or terminated. given the Prime Minister’s commitment to reinvigorating Britishness, there is almost no reference in PVE documents to the national Flawed in practice narrative. In fact, there is a distinct lack of The two key front-line delivery mecha - willingness to set the terms of trade in deal - nisms for picking Muslim partners under ing with Muslim groups. PVE – local government and the police – are unsuited to that task. Both are tradi - tionally apolitical public services. As such, Mistakes are being made they often have great difficulty in making at all levels sophisticated ideological and theological The implementation of PVE has been choices. Local councils and police forces beset with errors at all levels. Serious mis - have made many mistakes in selecting takes have been made. These include: PVE partners. Funds have too often been granted to groups claiming to ‘represent’ Prevent schemes such as the Faith Muslims without gold-plated efforts to Communities Capacity Building Fund check their credentials or affiliations. (FCCBF) being used to provide funding When selecting recipients of PVE fund - to Islamist-influenced organisations, ing and recognition, many officials confuse such as the United Kingdom Islamic form with content. Exotically-clad Abu Mission, the Muslim Council of Britain Hamza-style ranters are unlikely to be and the Islamic Society of Britain. favoured, but plausible and well-mannered West Midlands Police indulged an radicals, often representing themselves as extremist preacher in the hope that the ‘moderate’, are welcomed with open arms, promotion of his fundamentalist however hard-line their underlying philos - version of Islam might act as a safety ophy. valve for young men who might other - By giving the complex and crucial task wise be attracted to terrorism. of selecting PVE partners to local govern - Subsequent investigations by Channel ment and the police without providing the 4 revealed that he was preaching an tools to do proper due diligence, the incendiary message against the West, government risks plunging these agencies women and homosexuals. into controversy when they embrace The Metropolitan Police selecting sectarian partners whose values are at vari - advisers with Islamist agendas – includ - ance with the stated ethos of the public ing one who supports the creation of an sector. The police are particularly vulnera - Islamic state and is the subject of an ble here since their principal concern is Interpol ‘red notice’. short-term security. They are therefore The government inviting Islamist pres - often indiscriminate in the partners they sure groups such as the Muslim seek, providing there is a lowest-common- Council of Britain and the Muslim denominator commitment to avoiding Association of Britain to help run the terrorist attacks. Mosques and Imams National In part, this reflects flaws in government’s Advisory Board (MINAB). own stated criteria for engagement with Tower Hamlets Council awarding a Muslim groups for the purposes of funding substantial grant to the Cordoba and ministerial endorsements. These are so Foundation, an Islamist pressure group,

6 Executive Summary

which in turn offered a platform to Hizb- ping chains of command – a case of ‘too ut-Tahrir, a group Tony Blair vowed to many cooks …’ – but decision-making is ban after 7/7, to promote the message left largely to council officials and police that democracy is forbidden in Islam. officers rather than elected politicians. The The City of Bradford Metropolitan most representative groups of all, MPs, District Council granting a significant have been almost completely bypassed as share of PVE-PF monies to a project to what is done under PVE in their own that was organised in partnership with constituencies. This represents a power the Islamic Society of Britain. shift away from the elected to the Authorities in Lambeth engaging in unelected state. For example, a key Prevent activity in partnership with a element on the Prevent Oversight Board hard-line Salafist from Brixton Mosque for the Metropolitan Police Service is the in the belief that this constituted the best controversial Muslim Safety Forum. Why antidote to violent extremism. were they chosen, and by what criteria? Redbridge Council working with a Police Authorities also show a marked former press officer from the Islamist- unwillingness to challenge decisions by local influenced MCB as consultant PVE constabularies: indeed, the Metropolitan Project Manager. Police Authority could not cite a single instance in which it had persuaded the Metropolitan Police to terminate a relation - Change is now required urgently ship with an unsuitable Muslim partner. If There are signs that influential elements the police are to lead on this highly political within central government are waking up and controversial terrain, traditional notions to PVE’s shortcomings and negative con - of ‘operational independence’ (which apply sequences, but there is little evidence that to their law enforcement functions) will have this has percolated down to grassroots to be reviewed. level where key functions of PVE are delivered. Despite the best efforts of some minis - Recommendations ters, such as Hazel Blears, the current 1. The recasting of Preventing Violent Communities Secretary, there are still too Extremism to Preventing Extremism. few rewards for good behaviour and too 2. The creation of a short, sharp, inde - little punishment for bad behaviour − as pendent inquiry to examine where exemplified by the government’s silence funds have been allocated, and to what over the Muslim Council of Britain’s deci - end, under PVE. sion to resume its boycott of Holocaust 3. The new criteria for engagement Memorial Day. should be adopted across government PVE is characterised by opaque and and the public sector, creating a jargon-filled language – employing terms consistent and coherent framework that are too often left undefined. Key docu - across institutional lines. ments speak of a search for ‘mainstream 4. The PVE strategy should be simplified voices’ and ‘trusted community leaders’ and made more transparent. without ever explaining how terms such as 5. Single group funding should be the ‘mainstream’ and ‘trusted’ are measured and exception rather than the rule. Where arrived at. it is awarded, funding allocation Accountability for decisions taken should be clearly explained. under PVE remains rudimentary. Not only 6. All Prevent-related activity must be are there incomprehensible and overlap - subjected to rigorous ‘Equality Impact

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Assessments’, which consider the 3. Government must not engage with activity by their impact on society as a people or groups that call for or whole. condone the destruction of UN 7. Members of Parliament must be put member states. into the heart of the decision-making 4. Government must not engage with process for Prevent and given over - people or organisations that give a sight positions which allow them to platform to, deny, or are apologists for adequately audit its delivery. crimes against humanity, including 8. Government must create a cross- genocide. departmental Select Committee with 5. Government must not engage with responsibility for auditing, accounting groups or individuals who support or and overseeing the Prevent strategy. condone terrorism anywhere in the 9. The Department for Communities world. and Local Government must establish 6. Government must not engage with an in-house Due Diligence Unit groups or individuals that present a which will develop an open source threat to rights and freedoms central information resource on the protected by the ECHR and discrim - array of different groups operating inate or advocate discrimination on around the country. the basis of religion, religious sect, 10. The government must promote and race, sexual orientation or gender in incentivise good behaviour – and any aspect of public life or public disincentivise bad behaviour. policy. 7. Government must not engage with organisations that oppose Armed Forces’ New Criteria for Engagement recruitment because they selectively 1. Government must not engage with oppose wars that the state, under the organisations or individuals that authority of the democratically elected support or condone the deliberate parliament, is currently fighting. targeting of civilians (as defined by the Geneva Conventions) anywhere in the Where decisions are made to engage world. with a group: 2. Government must not engage with individuals or organisations that call 8. Government should only engage with for, or condone, attacks on British organisations that declare any and all soldiers and their allies anywhere in sources of foreign funding. the world or against any forces acting 9. Government should only fund incor - under a UN mandate. porated associations.

8 Foreword by Rt Hon Ruth Kelly MP

There are some issues that are always going have been de-radicalised and by to be controversial. How to prevent consciously reaching out to women and extremism and win the hearts and minds younger people as well as established of young Muslims is always likely to be one community leaders. of those. They were issues at the forefront of Tony Blair’s mind when, as Prime “ This vacuum of leadership had left the door open to a Minister, he came to create a new depart - generation of charismatic, but insidious hate-preachers, ment for Communities and Local and to individuals and groups who created the conditions Government and charged me as its first in which resentment and hatred could thrive. Secretary of State with the task of creating ” communities ‘able to challenge robustly the ideas of those extremists who seek to undermine our way of life’ . Almost all of the people I talked to It was a challenge I took seriously from believed that on the whole Britain was a the start. One that appeared to me to strike good place to be a Muslim. It is a country at the very essence of who we are as a where all have the opportunity to practise community and a country. What we stand their religion freely – whether Christian, for. What we believe. Muslim, Jew, Sikh or Hindu – and where I inherited little government resource or people of all backgrounds and faiths live architecture for the task. The Faith Unit at overwhelmingly side by side in peace and the Home Office which transferred over to harmony. the new department consisted of a very I came to believe that the significance of small, if dedicated, team, consisting of just foreign policy in the process of radicalisa - one director, two senior civil servants and tion was often overstated; that instead some support staff. As far as I am aware, there was generally a mix of personal, reli - none had been asked to work exclusively gious and political causes. It also became on the Prevent strand of the government’s clear to me that traditional Muslim leaders counter-terrorism strategy known as were failing in any sense to reach out to the Contest. It was imperative that the new young. This vacuum of leadership had left department’s expertise on preventing the door open to a generation of charis - extremism be built up so that it was fit for matic, but insidious hate-preachers, and to purpose. individuals and groups who created the But during my time at Communities and conditions in which resentment and hatred Local Government I personally also spent a could thrive. considerable amount of time thinking both I decided early on that our approach about the nature of the threat we face and to Muslim communities had to change what shape our response should take. radically. I did this by talking to representatives First, there needed to be a clearer from different Islamic traditions, to conceptual distinction between policies Muslims from different countries of origin, designed to prevent extremism and those to people who had been members of to build community cohesion − even if organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir who some of the vehicles and levers for change

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might overlap. Indeed, some genuinely society have a broader role: that the deal - well-motivated attempts to foster a sense ings government has with both individuals of belonging in British society by glossing and groups can act to ‘legitimise’ or ‘dele - over differences of outlook or ideology gitimise’ those individuals or groups. were in danger of fostering attitudes Not only did we need to tackle the radi - which could lead to more rather than less cals, we needed to address the underlying extremism. This challenge was particu - conditions encouraging radicalisation. To larly acute at local authority level, where create a framework within which there many leaders and chief executives of local were incentives to ‘behave’ well and disin - councils were initially reluctant to single centives for the reverse. out and challenge the ideology of one As I set out in October 2006, it was not group of people living in their commu - ‘good enough merely to sit on the sidelines nity. We needed to be clear about the or pay lip service to fighting extremism’. purpose of any intervention, dialogue or We needed to ‘rebalance’ our relationships funding and evaluate them against clear with Muslim communities significantly criteria. towards those organisations that were Second, we needed to develop a new taking a proactive leadership role in tack - kind of engagement with Muslim and ling extremism and defending our shared other minority ethnic communities. values. It was only by defending our values Given the failure of traditional religious – upheld staunchly by the vast majority of institutions and organisations to connect moderate Muslims − that we would with young people and deal with their prevent extremists radicalising future sense of alienation from British society, generations of terrorists. the state could not in any sense rely on This led to an attempt to draw up some what Policy Exchange has described as basic rules of engagement which could be ‘gatekeeper’ organisations to speak for observed across government and serve as a Muslim communities. template for other tiers of government too. This didn’t mean that we should not engage with Muslims on the basis of their faith; but that our engagement should be “ Developing ‘rules of engagement’ was always going to ‘values based’, helping young Muslims to be a difficult and controversial task, as the rules were construct a positive sense of what it means designed to send a clear signal about the sort of society to be Muslim in Britain today. Britain is and about what is considered acceptable and Developing ‘rules of engagement’ was unacceptable. always going to be a difficult and contro - ” versial task, as the rules were designed to send a clear signal about the sort of society Britain is and about what is considered These beliefs were confirmed and acceptable and unacceptable. enriched by the contributions of Policy The guidelines which were set out for Exchange and others who provided much departments to follow inevitably generated stimulating and thought-provoking material. much comment and debate within govern - As a society we already drew a clear line ment. They were never intended as a final between people promoting violence, plan - statement or a definitive view, more as a ning or implementing violent attacks and starting point for debate and an aide for the decent law-abiding majority. But the decision-makers. They will inevitably insight of writers from Policy Exchange evolve over time, as our knowledge and was that government − at all levels − and experience of tackling and preventing

10 Foreword

extremism increases. This pamphlet is I have been hugely impressed by the an important contribution to that courage shown by my successor at CLG, debate. Hazel Blears, in seeing through and The success of any guidelines, and the developing the approach I initiated success on any more sophisticated while at the department. version in the future, however, will Courage will be sorely needed if the depend less on their finality and more threat of terrorism is to be defeated. on the wisdom, judgement and courage of the decision-makers involved. Bolton, March 2009

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Before 9/11, the government was largely chosen? These are amongst the hardest indifferent to Muslims in Britain. After 7/7 questions the British state has to face it became obsessed. Councils, panels, today. working groups and advisory task forces Although the current violent threat is proliferated. At the same time an alphabet Islamist in form, the deeper, more funda - soup of bodies with representative-sound - mental difficulty revolves around the ing names emerged, each claiming to speak ability of liberal parliamentary democracy on behalf of British Muslims and to stand to resist the propagation of illiberal ideol - as a barrier to violent extremism. ogy by non-violent means. The task is Trying to distinguish between these complicated when that illiberal ideology is groups can seem an impossible task, and it used to justify terrorism – at least overseas is worth making a brief point about termi - in the name of ‘resistance’ or ‘defensive nology at this stage. This study is jihad ’. This raises the prospect, tempting concerned with Islamism, a term which to those whose main interest is security, of refers to the politicised form of the Muslim using the non-violent extremists against faith. The religion of Islam, its rituals, spir - their violent cousins. ituality and adherents are not the focus of Curiously, non-violent Islamists have our inquiry. Islamism is a broad concept been seen by elements within the British covering a spectrum of different groups state as the solution to al-Qaeda violence, from the avowedly violent terrorists of al- as if the cure lies in the ideological poison Qaeda to those groups which pursue itself. The practical effect of this has been almost exclusively political means to to engage and empower non-violent expo - achieve their ideological goals. It is a shared nents of this ideology who, while belief in those ideological ends that unites expressing opposition to the terrorism of all Islamists (for a more detailed definition bin Laden and his cohorts, hold values and see pages 18-19). The distinction between views that are antithetical to mainstream Islam and Islamism is often poorly under - British society. stood, adding to the apprehension of many This tendency is exemplified by the term, to discuss an already difficult subject. ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, the banner under which the government’s counter-radi - calisation process currently operates. As this “ Who are the real bulwarks against radicalisation and name suggests, a premium is placed on who are the bogus ones? And by what criteria should ensuring that there is no violence on British shores. The manner in which this objective is those partners be chosen ? ” achieved has been deemed to be of little or no importance. The result is that Islamists – who may not advocate violence against the All of this raises several key issues: who British state but whose views are none the should be the government’s Muslim part - less extreme and often in conflict with the ners? To which groups should ministers values of our liberal democracy – have been and officials accord recognition? Which are enlisted as official, public partners in the worthy recipients of taxpayer funding? hope that their co-operation might reduce Who are the real bulwarks against radicali - the terrorist threat. sation and who are the bogus ones? And by Yet on whose terms, and at what price, what criteria should those partners be is the assistance of Islamists being sought?

12 Introduction

Is it right that the state should engage with Organisers like Anas Altikriti, who those whose values would otherwise be believes in boycotting Holocaust deemed abhorrent? And where should the Memorial Day. Or speakers like Azzam line be drawn between those with whom Tamimi, who has sought to justify suicide we can ‘do business’ and those with whom bombing. Or exhibitors like the govern - we cannot? ment of Iran ... e organisers were trying These issues were dramatically spotlighted to inﬂuence the audience in certain direc - in the summer of 2008 by a significant intra- tions. And by refusing to legitimise the governmental row. Secretary of State for event for these speciﬁc reasons, we would Communities and Local Government Hazel hope to isolate and expose the extremists Blears was presented with a dilemma. Several and ensure they were not part of the event Labour colleagues, including Shahid Malik, next year. Our policy is designed to MP for Dewsbury and then a junior minis - change behaviour. 3 ter at the Department for International Development, sought to attend the In adopting this view, Blears was support - IslamExpo event at Olympia, billed as ed by two leading Labour Muslim MPs, ‘Europe’s largest celebration of Islamic Khalid Mahmood and Sadiq Khan. She culture’, with up to 50,000 visitors in atten - also obtained support from the then Chief dance. Whip and the Cabinet Secretary. Although IslamExpo claimed to be Ultimately, Blears was successful in invok - moderate, its directors included Azzam ing Cabinet Office guidelines on engage - Tamimi, who had stated his desire on BBC ment with Islamic groups: ministers were television, to be a suicide bomber, 1 and not permitted to attend IslamExpo. Anas Altikriti, founder of the Cordoba Blears’ decision was not merely coura - Foundation, an Islamist pressure group. 2 geous – it was also invested with profound The debates and lectures at IslamExpo political and ideological significance. She focused almost exclusively on the promo - was indicating that opposition to al-Qaeda tion of political Islam and igniting passions and al-Qaeda-inspired violence, as over Palestine and Iraq. Obviously, not expressed by many of the organisers of everyone who attended IslamExpo would IslamExpo and the speakers at the confer - have sat through the round-table discus - ence, was not enough. Nor was it enough sions and talks, some no doubt preferring to be against violence in the UK. A new the art workshops and poetry recitals, but precedent was established, drawing a line those who did so would have imbibed an against ostensibly ‘non-violent extremists’ Islamist-inspired worldview intent on radi - or ‘political Islamists’ as well as against the calising Muslims. violent extremism of al-Qaeda. 1. Tim Sebastian, ‘Dr Azzam Al- For these reasons, Blears argued that The importance of taking a stance Tamimi’, BBC HardTalk, 5 IslamExpo was not a platform any govern - against non-violent extremism is some - November 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/progr ment minister should endorse through his thing that the Conservative leader, David ammes/hardtalk/3985403.st or her participation. Later, in a speech at Cameron, has also emphasised. In a speech 2. Cordoba Foundation website. Policy Exchange in July 2008, Blears to the Community Security Trust in 2008, http://www.thecordobafoundatio n.com/about_us.php. explained her reasons for advising against he raised the issue of the suitability of 3. Policy Exchange seminar led involvement in IslamExpo: certain Muslim organisations to be in by Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears MP, Secretary of State for receipt of government funding, ostensibly Communities and Local I was clear that because of the views of in order to tackle extremism: Government, on ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: the some of the organisers, and because of the Government’s Approach ’, 17 nature of some of the exhibitors, this was One of the organisations [government] July 2008. http://www.policy exchange.org.uk/Events.aspx?id an event that no minister should attend. has given thousands of pounds to is a =688.

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front for the Muslim Brotherhood called for deciding whether an individual should the Cordoba Foundation ... Even the enter the country could be used. These crite - most basic research would reveal that the ria were originally issued by the then Home Cordoba Foundation has close connec - Secretary Charles Clarke following the 7/7 tions to people with extremist views, terrorist attacks. Clarke had announced the including Azzam Tamimi, the UK repre - creation of a list of ‘unacceptable behaviours’ sentative of Hamas. In the weeks ahead I which would be used to guide the Secretary will be making proposals to isolate of State when deciding whether to deport or extremists and make certain they cannot exclude a foreign national whose behaviour obtain public grants or get invited to sit was judged to be ‘not conducive to the on public bodies. public good’. 7 This list had not granted the e message should be clear: to those Home Secretary new powers in addition to who reject democracy; to those who those already in existence to prohibit the preach hate; to those who encourage entry of undesirable foreign nationals into violence; you are not part of the main - the UK. It was, none the less, illustrative of stream. You will not get public funding. the kinds of behaviour judged unacceptable You are not a welcome part of our society. by those seeking to enter the country. Since We will only defeat the extremist mindset the list’s creation, 79 people have been if we understand and confront it. 4 excluded from the UK. The decision to bar al-Qaradawi in February 2008 was simply a 4. David Cameron speech to the Cameron’s speech to the Community more high-profile example of a wider trend. 8 Community Security Trust, 3 March 2008. Security Trust had been preceded by fierce Clarke’s criteria for ‘unacceptable behav - 5. Parliamentary Debates , House exchanges in the House of Commons ear - iour’ that can lead to exclusion include, of Commons, 30 January 2008, Columns 307-308. lier in the year, when he had pressed but are not limited to, individuals who use 9 6. Baroness Neville-Jones Gordon Brown on whether the govern - any means or medium such as: speech to Counter Terror Expo ment would allow the Qatar-based cleric, 2009, ‘Society ’s Role in Preventing Terrorism ’, 10 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to visit Britain. Writing, producing, publishing or February 2009. http://www. Cameron told the Prime Minister, ‘This distributing material conservatives.com/News/ Speeches/2008/12/Pauline_Nevil guy wants to come to our country, and we Public speaking including preaching le-Jones_Societys_Role_in_ do not think that he should be allowed in Running a website Preventing_Terrorism.aspx . ... Let me explain what this man, Yusuf al- Using a position of responsibility such 7. ‘ Tackling Terrorism- Behaviours Unacceptable in the Qaradawi, believes. He thinks that gay as teacher, community or youth leader UK ’, Home Office Press Release, 24 August 2005. http://press. people should be executed, and encourages homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releas - people to turn their bodies into bombs.’ 5 to express views which: es/Tackling_Terrorism- Behaviours_Un?version=1 Cameron’s robust stance has been echoed Accessed on 17 September by his shadow security spokesperson, Foment, justify or glorify terrorist 2008. Baroness Neville-Jones, who recently said violence in furtherance of particular 8. Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 7 February 2008, that the Conservative Party believes, ‘It is beliefs Column 1390W. See also: Jenny necessary to tackle extremism itself.’ 6 She Seek to provoke others to terrorist acts Booth, ‘Muslim outrage as Yusuf al-Qaradawi refused UK visa ’, correctly identified that our understanding Foment other serious criminal activity The Times , 7 February 2008; John Stevens, Not for the faint of who and what an extremist is will or seek to provoke others to serious hearted (London, 2006) p 359. inevitably shape the way we meet this chal - criminal acts 9. For the original list of ‘unac - lenge. Foster hatred which might lead to ceptable behaviours ’ see, ‘Tackling Terrorism-Behaviours Partly in response to yet another furore intercommunity violence in the UK Unacceptable in the UK ’, Home over the proposed admission of al-Qaradawi, Office Press Release, 24 August 2005. http://press.homeoffice. it was announced in late 2008 by the Home On 28 October 2008 Jacqui Smith told gov.uk/press-releas - Secretary, Jacqui Smith, that the government the House of Commons that these criteria es/Tackling_Terrorism- Behaviours_Un?version=1. would toughen the way in which the criteria were to be strengthened and that hence -

14 Introduction

forth they would ‘create a presumption in that in this regard there is a ‘clarity deficit’ favour of exclusion’ when considering in government and official circles. those whose behaviour is caught by the Welcome as Hazel Blears’ decision on existing guidelines. 10 She also stated that a IslamExpo was, it is worth noting that the ‘presumption to inform the public’ 11 grounds on which she took it remain far would exist in cases where an individual from obvious: what were the Cabinet had been excluded, marking a significant Office guidelines that Blears invoked in and commendable shift towards greater order to make her case against participa - transparency. tion? They certainly do not appear to have In announcing this shift towards a more been well understood beforehand by open, yet also more stringent policy, Jacqui ministers. Indeed, to this day they have not Smith effectively confirmed her tilt been published. Some say that the guide - towards a more robust approach to the lines are not an established list of criteria, preventing extremism debate. Further just a loose collection of principles and confirmation of this was provided at the aims, open to a variety of interpretations. annual Prevent Conference held in The Department for Communities and December 2008, when she talked of the Local Government, the Home Office and need to oppose an ‘anti-democratic ideolo - the Foreign and Commonwealth Office gy’ and also emphasised the importance of have only offered vague utterances on the challenging ‘extremists’, not just ‘violent criteria and they have yet to explain their extremists’. 12 operation in detail. Why should so much The positions outlined by Hazel Blears, secrecy surround such a vital part of the Jacqui Smith and David Cameron are government’s work? powerful ones – and all the more striking Perhaps one reason for this is that the because the three of them are very different government as a whole has not come to a politicians. Their shared outlook has noth - settled view on this subject; it does not speak ing to do with ‘criminalising’ different with one mind and is riven with different opinions or Islamist political perspectives. viewpoints. The debate within government They are simply saying that if the state is to is far from over. Instead, the matter remains fund and partner Islamic or any other highly contentious and it is clear that not all groupings, thus bestowing legitimacy upon ministers or senior officials were happy with them, then the state has the right to ask Blears’ IslamExpo decision. whether those bodies uphold the core When it was announced that another values of British society. Islamist event, the Global Peace and Unity In this context, legality should not be (GPU) conference, was to be held in late confused with legitimacy . Legality is an October 2008, there was a massive ‘push - essentially neutral term, primarily back’ by some senior Cabinet ministers concerned with the strict operation of the against the line Blears took on IslamExpo. letter of the law; whereas legitimacy Jack Straw questioned Blears’ assertions 10. Home Office Exclusions connotes value, worth and even approval. about the views held by some of the invited Review , 28 October 2008. When it comes to conferring legitimacy on speakers − and was supported in this by http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/d ocuments/wms-exclusions- groups, the British state is entitled to David Miliband. Indeed, Straw and review?view=Binary. impose a far higher set of standards. Miliband chose to turn a blind eye to 11. Ibid.

Recognition of this principle inevitably many of the public utterances of some of 12. Home Secretary Jacqui raises the question of what those standards those involved in GPU. On this occasion, Smith ’s speech at the Conference on Preventing should be – and of the criteria to be Blears lost the argument and some govern - Violent Extremism, 10 December 2008. http://press.homeoffice. applied when judging engagement with an ment ministers, together with gov.uk/Speeches/hs-speech-vio - individual or organisation. It is striking representatives of the other main political lent-extremism.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 15 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

parties, attended the GPU event. Blears with close scrutiny of the current mecha - retreated to fight another day, but as a nisms for delivering the wider Preventing parting shot she set a new series of bench - Violent Extremism initiative, and the lack marks, seeking reassurances from the of transparency under which it operates. organisers that no extremist exhibitors or In addition, an attempt is made to materials would be allowed. As we examine develop a new set of criteria that could be below, she was right to be concerned (see used to help identify genuinely progressive pages 75-7). partners for official engagement, allowing It is in the context of this continuing government to find their way through the debate as to who our Muslim partners ‘grey areas’. They still give ministers and should be that this pamphlet considers the officials considerable flexibility: they tie no government’s strategy for engagement. The one’s hands, but they do constitute a start - existing situation is considered and possi - ing point for injecting some much needed ble problems identified. This is coupled clarity and rigour into the debate.

16 1 The Challenge: Islamists in Britain

Within the British state a significant body in the political process is pointless because of opinion holds that non-violent political mass immigration and multiculturalism Islamists can be a useful – and sometimes will continue whichever major political necessary – bulwark against terrorism. The party is in office – the state turned to non- idea is that only they have the ‘street cred’ violent ‘political’ fascists for help, needed to prevent young men from including the most prominent of these, the embracing violence. Some even go as far as British National Party and its leader, Nick to suggest that radical politics might actu - Griffin. Officials might be impressed by ally be desirable, acting as a kind of safety Griffin’s growing ‘maturity’. He does not valve, dissipating otherwise violent ener - advocate violence on these shores, instead gies. To understand the fallacy of this view encouraging his angry young white and its potentially devastating conse - supporters to participate in the political quences, it is worth considering the follow - process in order to stop mass immigration. ing analogy. Precisely because of his previous racist Imagine if members of the violent neo- pronouncements, officials might reckon Nazi group Combat 18 were to begin a that he possesses the ‘street cred’ needed to terrorist campaign against the state and appeal to those drawn to terrorism. But Britain’s ethnic minorities. what price might Griffin demand in order How would the British state respond? By to charm angry young recruits away from arresting and imprisoning members of Combat 18? What ‘narrative’ would the Combat 18, refusing to tolerate the burning British state encourage him to peddle in of mosques, synagogues and other institu - order to achieve success? tions. The state would also rebut Combat Would the Department for 18’s most purist conceptions — including Communities and Local Government the idea that Britain could ever revert to begin funding Griffin and assorted white being a ‘pristine white homeland’. But ‘community’ groups to bolster their non- imagine if, in order to bring this campaign violent message? Would they start ‘capacity of white neo-Nazi violence to an end, the building’ initiatives in white neighbour - state decided to co-opt an element of the hoods? Griffin might demand substantial white nationalist movement, precisely policy changes such as more ‘white history’ because its ‘grievance’ narratives were widely being taught at schools and universities by believed amongst the white population. ‘suitably qualified’ white teachers. He Broad swathes of Whitehall, not least the would obviously insist on dramatic reduc - Security Service and police, would argue tions in immigration and an end to that ‘alienated’ and ‘excluded’ white youth multiculturalism, the ‘root causes’ of white must be persuaded that they, too, can enjoy ‘alienation’. Griffin could also stipulate a stake in the political system. that the government must not show Imagine further that in order to rebut ‘double standards’ in its foreign policy by Combat 18’s narrative – that participation overthrowing regimes in Afghanistan and

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 17 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

Iraq while ignoring the plight of white modation between Islamism and liberal farmers in Zimbabwe. Perhaps at Griffin’s democracy so difficult. The individualism behest, the Foreign Office could start a and pluralism that lie at the heart of the series of ‘roadshows’ led by foreign ‘schol - latter run counter to the notion of a ars’ such as David Duke. This might be discrete communal-faith bloc that must be supported by a new inter-departmental preserved, and for this reason Islamists government body, the Research, often reject liberal democratic principles. Information and Communications Unit Muslims are presumed to be members of (RICU), which addresses grievances and a de-territorialised, globalised ummah , in rebuts Combat 18’s conspiracy theories, which allegiance is defined through the but often in white nationalist terms. fraternity of faith alone. 13 Islamists suggest that Muslims are under constant attack, and it is this perceived perpetual danger “ The enemy is defined quite narrowly as al-Qaeda that drives the Islamist narrative of victim - without fully appreciating the divisive ideology that inspires hood and grievance. The practical consequences of such an the group’s action s ” outlook are varied, differing from group to group. It is true that, for the most part, it is linked to a belief that Shari‘a (Islamic Ridiculous? Yes, but this far-fetched law) should be implemented, either within scenario parallels much of the govern - existing nation-states or in the context of a ment’s existing policy for tackling Islamist pan-Islamic theocracy (often referred to as violence. If the word ‘Muslim’ is substi - the ‘Caliphate’). The absence of a purist tuted for ‘white’ then the above scenario Islamic state is judged to be responsible for serves as a fairly close summary of the the current problems of the Muslim world, government’s current strategy. The enemy and only if such an entity is re-established, is defined quite narrowly as al-Qaeda with - it is argued, will the Muslim world be out fully appreciating the divisive ideology restored to global pre-eminence. that inspires the group’s actions. The Furthermore, the conception of Shari‘a law British government, in its desperation to venerated by such groups typically calls for prevent violence, has ended up legitimising a return to what is imagined to be a literal - the very ideas that fuel it. ist, ‘puritanical’ and unchanging Islam, based on the earliest generations of Islamic history. What is Islamism? On neither count is this exclusively the Who are the Islamists? case; there is no single ‘mode’ of Islamist Islamism (or ‘Political Islam’) is a world - expression. The manner in which different view which teaches its adherents that Islam strands of Islamism seek to achieve their is a comprehensive political ideology and aims is subject to significant variation. must be treated as such. Some, clearly, are violent; but equally Its proponents believe that Islam must clearly Islamist movements are not always be placed at the centre of an individual’s – or even mainly – terrorist in nature. And identity, as either the overriding or the non-violent Islamism is represented by only source of that identity. The Islamist individuals and organisations of widely outlook is one that essentially divides the differing hues. So while there are those world into two distinct spheres: ‘Muslims’ groups that engage in political activity and 13. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: and ‘the rest’. Crucially, it is this binary wish to gain political power to achieve The Search for a New Ummah, (London, 2006). division of the world that makes accom - their aims, there are others that reject such

18 The challenge: Islamists in Britain

political engagement and instead pursue Although the movement originated in grassroots community work. For the latter, Egypt, most of its leading members fled to an Islamic identity is to be promoted from Saudi Arabia during the late 1950s when the bottom up, via education and prose - Gamal Abdel Nasser’s administration lytisation, rather than being imposed from cracked down on their activities. This the top down, through the application of influx of Muslim Brothers served as a state power. Both variants, though, are useful bulwark for the House of Saud’s subsumed within the designation of conservative version of Islam against ‘Islamism’ offered here. Nasser’s ambitious plans for pan-Arab Almost always, Islamists project their socialism. view of Islam as the ‘true Islam’ and pass In 1961, the Islamic University of off disputed theology as uncontested truth. Madinah was created with the assistance of They presume to constitute the whole of Jamaat-e-Islami founder Maulana Abu al- the faith, rather than just a faction within A’la al-Mawdudi (see below), who ‘played a it. Yet, it is of paramount importance to part’ in its inception. 17 Months later Saudi distinguish between the two – Islam and Arabia founded the Muslim World League, Islamism – particularly when far-right ‘the first coherent and systematic institu - political parties such as the BNP seek to tion whose avowed intent was to deny this distinction and conflate all “Wahhabise” Islam worldwide and thereby Muslims with Islamists, stoking the fears of negate the influence of Nasser’s Egypt. The an apprehensive population. 14 league was managed by members of the Broadly speaking, Islamist groups Saudi religious establishment, working currently operating in Britain originate with other Arabs who either belonged to from two major revivalist networks that the Muslim Brothers or were close to them, emerged in the early twentieth century: the along with ulemas from the Indian subcon - Muslim Brotherhood, which started in tinent connected to the Deoband schools Egypt, and the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose or to the party founded by Mawdudi.’ 18 origins lie in colonial India. Both are They succeeded in projecting their extremist and anti-western in orientation. message across the world as the university attracted increasing numbers of foreign students, who constituted nearly 85 per 19 The Muslim Brotherhood cent of the student body in the 1980s. 14. Liam Fox, the Conservative The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist Interaction with students from beyond the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, recently drew attention revivalist movement, founded in 1928 in Middle East was important in broadening to this during a debate in the Egypt by a schoolteacher, Hassan al- the horizons of the Brotherhood, exposing House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates , House of Banna. One of the group’s main ideologues them to a wider range of Islamist causes. Commons, 10 December 2008, was Sayyid Qutb, author of Milestones , a Today, the Muslim Brotherhood is an Column 638. 15. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, short, crisp call-to-arms for Islamist radi - international movement with an estab - (New Delhi, 2007). calism, analogous to The Communist lished presence in most of the Muslim 16. He employs the term Manifesto .15 He argued that because world, as well as parts of Europe and North jahiliyya , a term used to describe pre-Islamic Arabia, usually trans - Muslim governments failed to implement America. Like many Islamist movements, lated as ‘period of ignorance ’ or sufficiently strict forms of Shari‘a law they it did not initially conceive a vision for its ‘barbarism ’. became as illegitimate as the pre-Islamic activist work in the West, believing that its 17. Syed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the making of Arabian rulers overthrown by efforts would be primarily focused in the Islamic Revivalism, (Oxford, Muhammad. 16 He implored Muslims to Levant before targeting the wider world for 1996). 18. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the trail replace those governments with new Islamist conversion. That plan changed of political Islam, (London, 2002).

Islamic theocracies, first in the Middle with the large-scale migration that brought 19. Al-Jazeera, 7 September East, and then elsewhere. many immigrants of Muslim background 2001.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 19 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

to Europe in the second half of the twenti - and a stable Islamic Movement led by the eth century. As increasing numbers of Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Islamists found themselves exiled from the Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, Arab world in the late 1980s they devel - and which works to expand the observant oped strategies to further their aims within Muslim base and aims at unifying and western society. directing Muslims’ efforts.’ 23 This is to be An insight into the ultimate objective of done by creating ‘Islamic centres’ to be the the Muslim Brotherhood’s cadres in the ‘axis’ of the movement in each city. The West has been provided by recent evidence movement is to act as a hub for ‘organisa - presented in a US court case. In November tions that are connected with our

20. US Department of Justice, 2008, a US Federal Court in Dallas movement and which fly in our orbit and ‘Federal Jury in Dallas Convicts convicted members of the Holy Land take orders from our guidance. The docu - Holy Land Foundation and Its Leaders for Providing Material Foundation, an Islamic charity based in ment provides a list of organisations – Support to Hamas Terrorist North America, of providing material assis - political, educational, media and social – all Organization ’, Press Release, 24 20 November 2008. http://www. tance to terrorism. During the trial, the named either innocuously, or as if they usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/Novemb Department of Justice submitted as were organisations representing all types of er/08-nsd-1046.html. evidence a document purportedly authored Muslims and not just the Muslim 21. Department of Justice Exhibit GX 3-85, ‘An explanatory by the Brotherhood in 1991 which revealed Brotherhood faction. They are called things memorandum on the general 21 strategic goal for the group in their political strategy. Significantly, the like ‘The American Organisation for North America ’, 22 May 1991. judge accepted the document’s authenticity, Islamic Political Action’, ‘the Muslim Official court translation into English accepted as evidence. satisfied that it met the required standard Attorneys Society’, the ‘Islamic Foundation

22. Ibid. for admissibility of evidence in a Federal for Defense [sic] of Muslims’ rights’ and so

23. Ibid. trial. The ‘explanatory memorandum on the on. It also names a number of American

24. Ibid. All quotes in this para - general strategic goal for the group in North Muslim organisations under the heading ‘A graph from the ‘Explanatory America’ urges: list of our organisations and the organisa - Memorandum. ’

25. Mahan Abedin, ‘How to Deal tions of our friends’, adding, ‘Imagine if with Britain’s Muslim Extremists? e Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] they all march according to one plan.’ 24 An Interview with Kamal Helbawy ’, Spotlight on Terror, must understand that all their work in Vol 3, Issue 7, 8 August 2005. America is a kind of grand Jihad in elim - http://www.jamestown.org/single /?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords inating and destroying the Western Islamists in Britain I ]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576 civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ In the UK, the former European spokesman 261ae3e&tx_ttnews[exact_searc h]=how%20to%20deal%20with their miserable house by their hands and for the Muslim Brotherhood, Kemal el- %20britain%27s%20muslim&tx_ the hands of the believers so that it is Helbawy, helped to establish the Muslim ttnews[tt_news]=539&tx_ttnews[ 25 backPid]=7&cHash=6579924364 eliminated and God’s religion is made Association of Britain (MAB) in 1997. Peter 26. Peter Bergen and Paul victorious over all religions. 22 Bergen, Osama bin Laden’s biographer, Cruickshank, ‘The Unraveling: The jihadist revolt against bin described the MAB in a sympathetic article as Laden, The New Republic, 11 The language here may be hyperbolic, but a ‘Muslim Brotherhood group’. 26 Others have June 2008 . http://www.tnr. com/politics/story.html?id=702bf this does not make the document any less described the MAB as an ‘offshoot of the Arab 6d5-a37a-4e3e-a491- credible; revolutionary movements tend to Muslim Brotherhood’. 27 Azzam Tamimi is a fd72bf6a9da1 . express themselves in such terms. They former spokesman. 28 He currently serves as 27. Richard Phillips, ‘Standing together: the Muslim Association understand that the change they want is sub - director of the Institute for Islamic Political of Britain and the anti-war stantial and will take a long time to come Thought and is the founder of al-Hiwar movement ’, Race and Class , Vol 50, No 2, p 101. about. But they also believe that God, or his - (‘Dialogue’) TV which broadcasts to the Arab 28. Azzam Tamimi ‘The right to tory, is on their side and are therefore community in London. 29 And, as has already rule ourselves’, 7 January 2005, http://ww.guardian.co.uk/world/2 undaunted by the scale of the task. been mentioned (see above, pages 13-14), 005/Jan/07/iraq.comment The Muslim Brotherhood’s explanatory another former spokesman for the MAB, 29. Institute of Islamic Political memorandum states that their goal in the Anas Altikriti, now heads the Cordoba Thought website. http://www.ii- pt.com/. United States is to establish ‘an effective Foundation.

20 The challenge: Islamists in Britain

30. ‘ British Muslim Initiative demo ’, Another group is the British Muslim attempted to show some independence 22 July 2006. http://www. bmini - tiative.net/BMI/EN/ Initiative (BMI). In the past the BMI helped from the Muslim Brotherhood abroad. Details.aspx?ID=5&table=sub . organise demonstrations against Israel’s 2006 During Al-Tikriti’s tenure as President, the 31. ‘ National Demonstration war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, 30 and MAB released a statement that said: Manchester ’, organised by BMI, Stop the War Coalition, CND, 23 31 called for western forces to leave Iraq. When September 2006. http://www. the government opted to prevent Sheikh [e] MAB reserves the right to be proud bminitiative.net/BMI/EN/Details. aspx?ID=11&table=sub . Yusuf al-Qaradawi from entering the UK, of the humane notions and principles of the 32. ‘ BMI regards Government ban because of his extremist views (as criticised by Muslim Brotherhood, who has proven to be of Al Qaradawi a “Disgusting and Outrageous ”’. http://www.bminit David Cameron amongst others), the BMI an inspiration to Muslims, Arab and other - iative.net/bmi/en/details_home.aspx described this decision as ‘disgusting and wise for many decades. We also reserve the ?ID=261&table=sub . outrageous’. 32 right to disagree with or divert from the 33. ‘ National Demonstration: End the Siege of Gaza ’, 24 January The BMI, together with the MAB, opinion and line of the Muslim 2009. http://mabonline.net/?p= recently played a role in co-ordinating Brotherhood, or any other organization, 240. ‘BMI and British Organisations call for a National Demonstration ’, 3 33 37 protests against Israel’s Gaza offensive. Muslim or otherwise on any issue at hand. January 2009.http://www.bminitiat Significantly, in an interview with an ive .net/BMI/EN/details_home.aspx? ID=287&table=sub.

Egyptian newspaper, Kemal el-Helbawy, Yet it is clear that groups like the MAB 34. ‘ Former leader in the one of the MAB’s founding members, has consider themselves to be in step with a International Organisation reveals the co-ordination between the confirmed that the international organisa - broader movement, which adheres to Brotherhood and Jewish move - tion of the Muslim Brotherhood played a Islamist ideology. ments in the Gaza demonstrations ’, Al-Masry al-Youm , (Egypt), 1 key role in planning the Gaza rallies in Furthermore, this strand of political February 2009. http://www.almasry London, including the protests directed at Islamism has struck a chord in certain quar - -alyoum.com/printerfriendly.aspx ?ArticleID=197210 . the Israeli embassy. 34 ters in the West. According to this line of 35. Richard Phillips, ‘Standing tog- The exact nature of the relationship reasoning there is now a ‘moderate Muslim ether: the Muslim Association of Br- between the MAB and the BMI is Brotherhood’ with whom the West can do itain and the anti-war movement ’, Race & Class , Vol 50, No 2 (2008), unclear. 35 Anas Altikriti, who is involved in business. 38 Robert Leiken and Steven p 109. both (and is also the Chief Executive of the Brooke have argued that because some 36. Anas Al-Tikriti, ‘Live Dialogue ’, IslamOnline , 5 May 2008. Cordoba Foundation), has described the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood reject 37. ‘ MAB Responds To Vile Attack ’, two organisations (and his own position violence and are consequently condemned 13 August 2004. http://www.ihrc. within them), in the following terms: by jihadists, this presents ‘a notable oppor - org.uk/show.php?id=1216. tunity for engagement’ for policymakers in 38. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, ‘The Moderate Muslim 39 e MAB is a grassroots organisation the West. One former MI6 Officer, Brotherhood ’, Foreign Affairs established almost 11 years ago, and I March/April 2007. http://www. Alastair Crooke, has also spoken of the foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay had the honour of being amongst its importance of dealing with ‘those groups or 86208/robert-s-leiken-steven-bro oke/the-moderate-muslim-brother - founding members. I am a member of individuals who have legitimacy, credibility hood.html.

MAB and was its president in 2004, and influence’ and argued that the West 39. Ibid.

although I no longer hold a leading post should engage in dialogue with the 40. See, for example ‘Should the within it. BMI is a political organisation Brotherhood on that basis. 40 Central to such West dialogue with Islamists? ’, Alastair Crooke interviewed by founded by a group of activists in 2006. a belief is the notion that government Abdullah Faliq, The Cordoba It does not have a membership, nor does should deal with political Islamists who, Foundation, October-December 2006. http://conflictsforum. it cover aspects of a British Muslim’s life despite not sharing the methods of violent org/2007/should-the-west-dia - beyond politics (such as MAB does). I jihadists, share their aims. Even respected logue-with-islamists/. 41. Lawrence Wright, ‘The rebellion am one of the founding members, and authors on al-Qaeda such as Lawrence within: an al-Qaeda mastermind currently spokesman for BMI. 36 Wright have suggested that a ‘new’ form of questions terrorism ’, The New Yorker , 2 June 2008. http://www political Islam is emerging and that Osama .newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06 This is not to say, it should be stressed, that bin Laden’s terror network is now ‘unravel - /02/080602fa_fact_wright . For a critical reply see: Shiraz Maher, ‘The groups such as the BMI and the MAB fol - ling’ under the weight of its own internal future of unholy war ’, Standpoint low orders from an Islamist equivalent of dissent. 41 The future, on this reading, Magazine , November 2008. http://standpointmag.com/the- the Comintern. Indeed, the MAB has belongs to the political Islamists. future-of-unholy-war-november.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 21 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

Jamaat-e-Islami regardless of the rule of which nation is Approximately two-thirds of British undermined in the process of the estab - 42. Census, April 2001, Office Muslims have their origins in the Indian lishment of an ideological Islamic state. for National Statistics; Focus on religion (ethnicity). http://www. subcontinent, making the presence of Islam requires the earth − not just a statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget. Islamist movements from South Asia par - portion, but the entire planet − not asp?id=957. ticularly relevant to the lives of the Muslim because the sovereignty over the earth 43. ‘The Founder’, Jamaat-e- 42 Islami. http://www.jamaat. community here. The most significant should be wrested from one nation or org/overview/founder.html Islamist movement to have emerged in the group of nations and vested in any one 44. Sayyid Abul A ’la Maududi, Indian subcontinent is the Jamaat-e-Islami particular nation, but because the whole ‘The Islamic Law’, The Islamic Law and Constitution , trans. (known as Jamaat), a revivalist group creat - of mankind should beneﬁt from Islam, Khurshid Ahmed, (Lahore, 1969), and its ideology and welfare programme. 47 p140. See also: http://www. ed by Maulana Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi jamaat.org/overview/founder.html. (1903-1979). 43 Mawdudi spent the early 45. Jihad Fi Sabilillah (Jihad in part of his life as a journalist, and later Since the 1960s a number of groups influ - Islam ), translated by Khurshid Ahmad. http://www.ukim. became a religious leader after founding enced by his teachings have emerged in org/dawah/jihad.pdf. the Jamaat in 1941. He was also a trustee Britain, of which the Islamic Foundation (IF) 46. Ibid. at the Islamic University of Madinah (see in Leicester is among the most important. 48 47. Ibid. above page 19) and it is hardly surprising 48. A number of Mawdudi ’s works are available for purchase that his Jamaat movement shares goals from the Islamic Foundation ’s similar to those of the Muslim Islamists in Britain II online bookshop. Several of these are published by the IF Brotherhood, particularly in its call for an Established by members of Jamaat to serve as itself. Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, Islamic state. 44 a quasi-autonomous hub for their activities, Let Us Be Muslims (Islamic Foundation, 1985). Mawdudi held to a politicised view of promoting Islamist ideas throughout the http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/A Islam, which he described as not being a West and providing support for the Jamaat’s ppdata/build/paltop.asp? 45 49 GoForFeature=Store&GoForActi religion in the ‘accepted (western) sense’. global political activism, the Islamic on=DETAIL&Product_Id=267&W_ Instead, he argued that Islam was Foundation remains linked to the organisa - ID=1&P_ID=3; Abul Ala 50 Mawdudi, Islam A Historical tion. Perspective (Islamic Foundation, a revolutionary ideology which seeks to 1978). http://sitecreator.siteberry Professor Khurshid Ahmad is currently .com/Appdata/build/paltop.asp? alter the social order of the entire world chairman of the Islamic Foundation board GoForFeature=Store&GoForActi 51 on=DETAIL&Product_Id=274&W_ and rebuild it in conformity with its of trustees. He is also the Vice-President ID=1&P_ID=3; Abul Ala own tenets and ideals. ‘Muslims’ is the of the Jamaat in Pakistan and a senator for Mawdudi, The Islamic Way of Life (Islamic Foundation, 1986). title of that ‘International Revolutionary the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/A Party’ organized by Islam to carry out its Pakistani Islamist coalition of which the ppdata/build/paltop.asp? GoForFeature=Store&GoForActi revolutionary programme. ‘Jihad’ refers Jamaat is a part. When the MMA took on=SEARCH&W_ID=1&P_ID=3& to that revolutionary struggle and power in the North West Frontier CurrentPage=2&txtSearch=maw dudi&CAT_SUB_ID=-1. utmost exertion which the Islamic Province, the International Crisis Group 49. Vali Reza Nasr, The vanguard Nation/Party brings into play in order to described it as ‘vowing to Islamise state and of the Islamic revolution: The 46 52 Jama ’at-i Islami of Pakistan achieve this objective. society through Taliban-like policies’. (London, 1994) p. 61-62. See Four years later, Human Rights Watch also: http://www.jamaat.org /overview/facts.html According to Mawdudi, Islam was to be concluded that it had largely lived up to

50. Gilles Kepel, Allah in the understood as a universal political ideology: these promises: ‘[it] does not appear to West: Islamic movements in believe in basic freedoms such as equal America and Europe (Stanford, 1997), p 133. Islam wishes to do away with all states and rights for women, freedom to worship 51. http://www.charity-commis - governments which are opposed to the according to one’s conscience, or freedom sion.gov.uk/ShowCharity/Registe 53 rOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees ideology and programme of lslam. e of expression.’ While the MMA was in .aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the power, Professor Ahmad wrote a number =263371&SubsidiaryNumber=0. See also: http://www.senate. basis of this ideology and programme, of robust defences of its political agenda. gov.pk/ShowMemberDetail.asp? regardless of which nation assumes the He argued on a website that, ‘[To] target in MemberCode=431&CatCode=0& CatName=. role of standard-bearer of Islam, and the name of condemning theocracy [the]

22 The challenge: Islamists in Britain

Islamic way of life, its law, its social values, ‘instrumentalist’ approach to the provision 52. International Crisis Group, political commands, economic regulations of Islamic studies. It envisages universities Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, Asia Report No 49 , 2 0 and the cultural limits and targets, and to as de facto transmission belts, communicat - March 2003. http://www.crisis say that religion was a private affair, is no ing aspects of Islam that are ‘relevant to group.org/home/index.cfm?id=1 628&l=1 . simple deviation; it is open rebellion.’ 54 contemporary faith’. 62 One goal of this is to 53. Human Rights Watch, Clearly, not everyone was convinced by improve the ‘quality of Muslim leadership Commentary: Pakistan ’s Ahmad’s arguments. In the 2008 elections within the country’. 63 The report also Musharraf is Playing with Fire , 13 March 2006. http://www.hrw. the voters of the NWFP, perhaps the most suggests that universities be tasked with org/en/news/2006/03/13/pakista conservative province in Pakistan, removed raising ‘public awareness among non- ns-musharraf-playing-fire . 64 54. Khurshid Ahmad, Isharat the MMA from office. Muslims about Muslims’. Siddiqui argues from Tarjumaan-ul-Quraan: Today, the British organisation with this can ‘provide a service to a faith Musharraf, Taliban and Implementation of Shariah Bill in which Khurshid Ahmad is involved, the community, and help empower their NWFP, Jamaat-e-Islami website, Islamic Foundation, is the main translator growth’. 65 July 2003. Accessed 24 November 2008. and publisher of Mawdudi’s works in the While the report states that Islamic http://www.jamaat.org/Isharat/is UK. Indeed, the French academic Gilles study should be undertaken ‘without loss h0703.html. Kepel has suggested that the Institute’s of academic rigour’, 66 through a ‘critical 55. Kepel, Allah in the West, p.133. See also, the Islamic influence is not just limited to Britain and and rigorous’ process, this message is not Foundation ’s online bookshop, 67 which stocks the work of Sayyid that in the 1990s it became ‘one of the its dominant theme. Instead, the report Qutb and Hassan el-Banna. most important centres for the propaga - advocates the spreading of knowledge http://sitecreator.siteberry.com/A 68 ppdata/build/paltop.asp? tion of militant Sunni thinking in the about Islam to Muslims, as Muslims. GoForFeature=Store&GoForActi world’. 55 Thus it argues ‘the upcoming young on=SEARCH&W_ID=1&P_ID=3& CurrentPage=2&txtSearch=qutb The Foundation operates the Markfield Muslims in this country need to relate to &CAT_SUB_ID =-1; http://site Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) their religious and cultural heritage…’ 69 creator.siteberry.com/Appdata /build/paltop.asp?GoForFeature which offers postgraduate degrees in and therefore ‘need access to the unifying =Store&GoForAction=DETAIL&Pr Islamic studies accredited by the University and diverse legacy of Islam’. 70 oduct_Id=443&W_ID=1&P_ID=3. of Loughborough, 56 and is essential to To this end, the report recommends 56. The website states that ‘MIHE represents the latest aca - helping the Foundation develop the that universities appoint ‘competent demic project of the Islamic 57 Foundation ’. http://mihe.org.uk Jamaat’s political ideas. Khurshid Ahmad scholars’ who are ‘trained in traditional /html/islamicfoundation.htm. 71 states on his official Pakistani senatorial Islamic routes’. It seems Siddiqui is 57. Nasr, The vanguard of the website that he is the current rector of the referring here to were those who have Islamic revolution, p..61-.2 MIHE. 58 undergone a traditional madrassah -style 58. Current positions held by Khurshid Ahmad. http://www. In 2007 the then Department for education, focused solely on the Qur’an senate.gov.pk/ShowMember Education and Skills (DfES) overlooked and Prophetic traditions (the Sunnah ). Detail.asp?MemberCode=431&C atCode=0&CatName= .

Britain’s many professors of Islamic studies The report also suggests that universities 59. ‘ Preventing Violent at the UK’s top universities, and appointed ‘connect’ with these and other Muslim Extremism – winning hearts and minds ’, DCLG, 5 April 2007, p 6. Dr Ataullah Siddiqui, Director of the institutions so the former can provide http://www.communities.gov.uk/ MIHE 59 and a Senior Research Fellow at ‘quality assurance’ and accreditation to publications/communities/pre ventingviolentextremism. the Islamic Foundation 60 to advise the the latter. 72 This is a somewhat curious 60. Ataullah Siddiqui, Islam at Government on Islamic studies at British recommendation, given that Siddiqui universities in England: meeting universities. Were his recommendations to acknowledges elsewhere in the report that the needs and investing in the future , 10 April 2007. be followed, his report Islam at Universities madrassahs typically present Islam ‘in an http://www.islamic-founda - in England 61 would appear partially to shift atmosphere of reverence, not critical scep - tion.org.uk/pdfs/siddiqui_report2 007.pdf . 73 university Islamic studies departments, ticism’. 61. Ibid. from traditional western institutions of This is an educational approach that 62. Ibid p. 14. See also, p. 63. academic inquiry for everyone’s benefit, to seems to be somewhat removed from 63. Ibid p 6, 2 2. vehicles for propagating specific views of conventional western approaches centred 64. Ibid p 11.

Islamic doctrine to Muslim students. on social context and textual criticism. It is 65. Ibid p 38. The report effectively calls for an rather like asking universities to promote 66. Ibid p.20.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 23 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

the study of Christianity by employing that Siddiqui did not have connections to lecturers educated in extremely conserva - the Jamaat and was, in any case, appointed tive seminaries and Bible colleges. purely in his personal capacity. 77 That might Certainly, it is a world away from the defi - be so, but what was the process by which nition of Islamic studies given by Neal Rammell reached this conclusion? Should it Robinson, a Professor in Islamic Studies not be put in the public domain? and one of the UK’s leading authorities on Islam: Ineffective Communalism As is the case with all religious traditions, In the British context, there must be a the academic study of Islam requires a concern that the authorities have too balanced combination of empathy and often allowed themselves to be deceived critical distance. e easiest and best way into accepting the agenda of political to achieve this is by Muslims and non- Islamists as the authentic voice of Islam. Muslims studying together under the Distinguishing between real Muslim pro - guidance of scholars who are aware of the gressives and those who present them - problems and strive to overcome them by selves as such is a difficult task. The result using approaches to the subject that are as is that the British state has, on occasion, far as possible religiously neutral. In any ended up, whether by accident or design, case, in publicly-funded universities in the giving support (often financial) to some UK, lecturers and professors of Islamic of the more reactionary elements from Studies should be appointed on the basis within the Muslim community in the of their track record as teachers and UK. 67. Ibid p 29. researchers without reference to their Even more important to Islamists than 68. Ibid p 32-4. personal religious beliefs or aﬃliation. government funding is the need to estab - 69. Ibid p 36. Well-tried approaches to the subject lish themselves as legitimate arbiters of 70. Ibid p 62. include history, philology, literary criti - what Muslims want and need. Both the 71. Ibid p 14, 36, 63. cism, sociology, anthropology, political Muslim Association of Britain and 72. Ibid p 7, 9-10, 37, 42. science and the phenomenology of reli - Muslim Council of Britain ensured that 73. Ibid p 9, 26. gion − all of which are rigorous academic they were involved in official consulta - 74. Neal Robinson interview with Policy Exchange, 3 March 2009. disciplines. In most parts of the Muslim tions over the creation of the Mosques 75. Ataullah Siddiqui, Islam at world, they have as yet had little impact and Imams National Advisory Board universities in England: meeting on the study of Islam. In madrassahs in 78 the needs and investing in the (MINAB), a body created after 7/7 to future , 10 April 2007. particular the emphasis is placed instead regulate mosques. Despite protests by two http://www.islamic-founda - tion.org.uk/pdfs/siddiqui_report2 on the so-called traditional sciences in Conservative MPs, the Shadow Minister 007.pdf. accessed on 21/09/08 which putative facts are transmitted on for Communities and Local Government, 76. This department was split in religious authority. 74 Paul Goodman, and David Heathcoat- two by Gordon Brown in June 2007. The Department for Amory, these groups continue to Children, Schools and Families Dr Siddiqui’s report seemed to suggest a comprise two of MINAB’s four stake - and the Department for 79 Innovation, Universities and departure from the basic academic princi - holders in the scheme. Participation in Skills took over its responsibili - ple of disinterested academic inquiry, and this scheme gives them an unrivalled abil - ties.

77. Parliamentary Debates , implicitly called for the marginalisation of ity to influence the future of British House of Commons, 25 May non-Muslims in the study of Islam at mosques and imams in line with their 2006, column 1761W. British universities. 75 The then Minister of own particular brand of Islam, far in 78. MINAB founders. http://www.minab.org.uk/informa State at the Department for Education and excess of their current support among tion/founders. Skills, 76 Bill Rammell, welcomed the British Muslims. 79. Parliamentary Debates , report’s findings last year. Furthermore, At the heart of the Islamist strategy is a House of Commons, 20 May 2008, column 155. Rammell assured the House of Commons clear agenda: to mould the future direc -

24 The challenge: Islamists in Britain

tion of British Islam and the Muslim community in Britain. They tell govern - ment that only they can reach the “ The lessons for government are urgent. It must find ‘disenfranchised’; that they have ‘respect’ new ways to engage these Muslims without the and ‘credibility’ among the youth; that intermediary of Islamist-infused ‘gatekeeper’ organisations they are recognised leaders. But polling which reinforce separatist communal identities conducted for Policy Exchange by Populus ” in 2007 revealed how a mere 6 per cent of Muslims thought the Muslim Council of Britain represented them, while 51 per This raises the question: what consti - cent said that no Muslim institution does tutes a real ‘community leader’? When so. 80 An Ipsos MORI poll in November David Cameron visited Birmingham in 2007, 81 commissioned by Ken 2007, he was advised to visit the Livingstone, revealed that Muslims in Birmingham Central Mosque and its London consider crime reduction, clean chairman, Dr Mohammed Naseem. But streets, education and affordable housing who does Dr Naseem actually represent? 80. Munira Mirza, Living Apart to be their primary concerns − issues far In the 2005 election he ran as a Respect Together: British Muslims and removed from the Islamist obsessions of candidate in Birmingham Perry Barr the paradox of multiculturalism (London, 2007). http://www. Palestine and Iraq. It demonstrated the hoping to capitalise on anger over the Iraq policyexchange.org.uk/ unremarkable fact that the majority of war against the Labour incumbent Khalid images/libimages/246.pdf . 81. 'Muslim attitudes - the real Muslims have ordinary, essentially secular Mahmood, who campaigned on an story', Ipsos-MORI. http://www. hopes and fears. The lessons for govern - impeccably non-sectarian platform. In the ipsos-mori.com/content/muslim- attitudes-the-real-story.ashx. ment are urgent. It must find new ways to event, Mahmood retained his seat by See also, Riazat Butt, 'Muslims engage these Muslims without the inter - securing 47 per cent of the vote, while more proud of local area, says poll', The Guardian, 13 82 mediary of Islamist-infused ‘gatekeeper’ Naseem received a mere 5.6 per cent. By November 2007. http://www organisations which reinforce separatist this most significant measure of political .guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/nov/ 13/religion.london. communal identities. Their aspirations are legitimacy in a democratic society, 82. Birmingham Perry Barr, not the same as those of the constituents Naseem had failed to establish himself as a General Election, 2005. http://politics.guardian.co.uk/hoc they claim to represent. leader of his community. /constituency/0,,-720,00.html.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 25 2 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

83. Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom ’s The Prevent Strategy stated aim is to lead a ‘community-based Strategy (July 2006) Cmnd.6888. At present, the government’s framework response to violent extremism’. 87 84. For an analysis of this aspect, see Frank Gregory, ‘The for meeting the challenge posed by the ter - Under its first Secretary of State, DCLG UK ’s Domestic Response to rorist threat is known as the Contest strat - worked to achieve a ‘fundamental rebal - Global Terrorism: Strategy, 83 Structure and Implementation egy, which has four main components: ancing’ of the government’s relationship with Special Reference to the with Muslim organisations. From October Role of the Police ’, Real Instituto Elcano, 18 June 2007. Prevent 2006, Kelly asserted that the authorities http://www.realinstitutoelcano.or g/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Conte Pursue would only work with groups and individ - nt?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ Protect uals that accepted and promoted a set of Elcano_in/Zonas_in /International 88 +Terrorism/DT+27-2007. Prepare ‘non-negotiable values’. This resulted in a

85. See for example the reasons move away from working solely with given for why radicalisation Of these, the last three are more concerned national ‘gatekeeper’ groups, such as the occurs in Countering International Terrorism: The with what might be termed ‘hard’ power Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which United Kingdom ’s Strategy (July responses to immediate security issues. 84 government had previously hoped would 2006), p 10. ‘Prevent’, by contrast, represents an act as a bulwark against Muslim radicalisa - 86. ‘ Letter from Prime Minister to Ruth Kelly ’, 9 May 2006. attempt by the government to deploy ‘soft’ tion. Ruth Kelly indicated that on these http://www.communities.gov.uk/ archived/general-con - power in the struggle against a violent issues the government was no longer tent/corporate/388681/prime- threat. convinced of the MCB’s fidelity. The turn - minister-letter. In its earliest conceptions, the Prevent ing point followed the discovery of a plot 87. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in strand of the Contest strategy revealed a to blow up several transatlantic airliners in England; Stopping people conspicuous lack of innovative thinking August 2006. Within days of the arrests in becoming or supporting terror - ists and violent extremists , June about the causes of radicalisation. Indeed, that case, the MCB, together with other 2008. the first overall exposition of the Contest Islamist-oriented organisations and indi - 88. Toby Helm, ‘Back British val - ues or lose grants, Kelly tells strategy downplayed the role of ideology viduals, sent an open letter to Downing Muslim groups ’, Daily Telegraph , as a factor in the spread of extremism. 85 Street calling for ‘urgent’ changes to British 12 October 2006. http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne Today, responsibility for the implemen - foreign policy – held by them to be the ws/1531226/Back-British-val - tation of the Prevent strategy lies primarily principal cause of Muslim radicalisation. 89 ues-or-lose-grants,-Kelly-tells- Muslim-groups.html. with the Department of Communities and The MCB was felt to have endorsed a

89. ‘ Muslim plea over foreign Local Government (DCLG). This was narrative of victimhood and grievance that policy ’, BBC News Online, 12 created in May 2006 as a successor to the fed into the motivations underpinning August 2006. http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4785893.stm; Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Islamist violence, and new questions were Inayat Bunglawala, ‘It’s undeni - sections of the Home Office, with Ruth therefore raised about its position. As a able: British foreign policy is endangering all of us ’, The Kelly appointed as the first Secretary of result, Ruth Kelly sought to reach over the Times, 12 August 2006. http:// www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com State. The Prime Minister explained that heads of groups like the MCB, creating a ment/columnists/guest_contribut DCLG’s principal role in this sphere is to new approach which emphasised local, ors/article606726.ece ; ‘ Full text: Muslim groups’ letter ’, BBC enable ‘[local communities] to challenge rather than national, organisations. News Online, 12 August 2006. robustly the ideas of those extremists who In April 2007 DCLG announced a ‘new http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/47 86 86159.stm . seek to undermine our way of life’. Its action plan to step-up work with Muslim

26 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

communities to isolate, prevent and defeat challenging the violent extremist ideol - violent extremism’. 90 A document called ogy and supporting mainstream voices Preventing violent extremism – Winning disrupting those who promote violent hearts and minds , was released to explain extremism and supporting the institu - the four key pillars on which this policy tions where they are active was based: 91 supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of Promoting shared values violent extremism Supporting local solutions increasing the resilience of communi - Building civic capacity and leadership ties to violent extremism Strengthening the role of institutions addressing the grievances that ideo - and leaders logues are exploiting

The essence of the new strategy, as launched by Ruth Kelly, was that it looked In its earliest conceptions, the Prevent strand of the to local authorities to take the lead in pre - “ Contest strategy revealed a conspicuous lack of venting violent extremism. This shift in approach has been maintained and innovative thinking about the causes of radicalisation ” expanded under Kelly’s successor at DCLG, Hazel Blears, who was appointed by Gordon Brown in June 2007. The latest and most authoritative state - To this are added two ‘cross-cutting work ment on Prevent is The Prevent Strategy: A streams’ which tie in to the five strands list - Guide for Local Partners in England , which ed above: was released in June 2008. It defines Prevent as a ‘long-term programme of developing understanding, analysis and work’ to tackle ‘violent extremism’, with information the latter said to be caused by a combina - strategic communications tion of factors: 92 Taken together, these objectives, the so- an ideology which justifies terrorism by called ‘five plus two’ formula, constitute manipulating theology as well as the government’s Prevent strategy as it cur - history and politics rently stands. radicalisers and their networks which Work targeted at achieving these objec - promote violent extremism through a tives cuts across a range of government variety of places, institutions and departments including, among others: media Communities and Local Government; the individuals who are vulnerable to the Home Office; the Foreign and messages of violent extremists Commonwealth Office (FCO); the 90. Preventing Violent Extremism communities, which are sometimes Department for International - Winning hearts and minds , Department for Communities poorly equipped to challenge and resist Development (DfID); the Department for and Local Government, 5 April violent extremism Innovation, Universities and Skills 2007. grievances, some genuine and some (DIUS); and the Department for 91. Ibid . perceived, and some of course directed Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). 93 92. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in very specifically against government It was partly for this reason that a new England; Stopping people Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism becoming or supporting terror - ists and violent extremists , June On this basis, the five ‘key strands’ of the (OSCT) was created in July 2006. Under 2008. Prevent strategy are defined as follows: its current Director-General, Charles Farr, 93. Ibid .

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 27 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

94. ‘ Appointment Of Director General Of The Office For OSCT develops, coordinates and oversees Service had been given funds to recruit Security & Counter-Terrorism ’, the UK counter-terrorist strategy and four chief inspectors to act as Prevent co- Home Office Press Release, 6 98 July 2007. http://press.home operates across government departments ordinators. Now the government has office.gov.uk/press-releas - and agencies. 94 Its real achievement has provided significant additional funding – es/appointment-dir-general. been to impart, not just to the machinery in 2008-09 alone this amounts to over 95. Philippe Naughton, ‘Brown orders NHS review after failed of Whitehall, but to the public services £18 million, specifically targeted at the 24 bomb attacks ’, The Times , 4 July 2007. http://www.times more generally, a sense of greater urgency forces with areas most at risk from ‘violent online.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article20 and purpose in their approach towards extremism’. 99 Over the course of the three 25887.ece; Michael Evans, Philip Webster and Richard Ford, ‘MI5 counter-terrorism issues. Although the years for which funding has been asked to check foreign medical situation is not perfect, the OSCT has provided, the money will be used chiefly workers ’, The Times , 5 July 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/n succeeded in altering the ‘nothing to do to create more than 300 dedicated ews/uk/crime/article2028724.ece . with me, Guv’ culture that previously Prevent officers. 100 These will be responsi - 96. The Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears MP, reigned supreme on these matters. This ble for ‘community engagement and ‘Preventing Extremism: Strengthening Communities ’, was demonstrated most dramatically in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer speech to the Preventing 2005 after the 7/7 terrorist attacks when roles’. 101 Extremism Conference, 31 October 2007. http://www.communities. government asked universities to monitor Finally, in June 2008, the Home gov.uk/speeches/corporate/prevent ingextremism. See also, ‘Major extremist activity on their campuses more Secretary also revealed that a further £12.5 increase in work to tackle violent closely. Vice-chancellors initially seemed to million was being made available by the extremism ’, Department for Communities and Local resist the move, saying it would infringe Home Office in 2008-09 ‘to support more Government, 31 October 2007. academic freedoms and free speech. projects in local communities, prisons, http://www.communities.gov.uk/ne 102 ws/corporate /529021. Similar attitudes were evident when it schools and youth justice system’. This

97. Ibid. emerged that an NHS doctor was involved announcement was made in conjunction 98. ‘ MPS Prevent delivery strate - in the plot to bomb targets in London and with the release of the official ‘Guidance’ for gy ’, Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 July 2008. http://www.mpa.gov Glasgow in 2007. The Prime Minister local authorities on the Prevent strategy. .uk/committees/mpa/2008/080724 insisted on tougher checks for foreign These major increases in energy and /08.htm doctors entering the country, but was not funding on the part of the government, 99. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in fully supported in this regard by NHS offi - although well-intentioned, raise crucial England; Stopping people cials. 95 new questions about the way in which becoming or supporting terror - ists and violent extremists, June One of Hazel Blears’ first steps as taxpayers’ money is being spent. Which 2008, p 49. See also, ‘£ 12.5 mil - Secretary of State for Communities and groups and individuals are benefiting from lion to tackle radicalisation and help prevent extremism in com - Local Government was to announce that the the increase in Prevent funding? What munities ’, Department for Communities and Local original level of financial support for tack - criteria are being applied to the allocation Government, 3 June 2008. ling extremism would be increased. £25 of government grants? How are results and http://www.communities.gov.uk/ news/corporate/827570. million is therefore being made available for performance assessed?

100. ‘ Home Secretary Jacqui national schemes aimed at this goal from More broadly, it is worth asking how the Smith: “Prevent strategy: back - April 2008 to March 2011. 96 Over the same British state decides with whom it should ground and next steps – speech to the BCU Commanders ’ period £45 million will also be provided to engage – on any number of levels – within Conference ”’ , Home Office Press local partnerships to tackle extremism. 97 the Muslim community. What are the Release, 16 April 2008. http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Sp In addition to this, in April 2008 the criteria for engagement? What should the eeches/bcu-conference-speech . Home Secretary announced that extra parameters for such engagement be? And 101. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in resources were being made directly avail - how can the state ensure that its engage - England; Stopping people becom - able to police forces in the wake of the ment cultivates only genuine moderates, ing or supporting terrorists and vio - lent extremists, June 2008, p 51. Comprehensive Spending Review process rather than extremists?

102. ‘£ 12.5 million to tackle radi - for 2008-11. Already, police forces were calisation and help prevent expected to contribute to Prevent-related extremism in communities ’, Department for Communities activities from their existing police grant Existing criteria and Local Government, 3 June and, following the 2007 Comprehensive At present there are no very precise guide - 2008. http://www.communities. gov.uk/news/corporate /827570. Spending Review, the Metropolitan Police lines across Whitehall explaining how gov -

28 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

ernment should pick its partners from can show that its affiliated within the Muslim community. Individual members or groups to which it departments seek to retain a large measure is affiliated meet these criteria of responsibility for establishing their own yardsticks. 2. The organisation defends and upholds The June 2008 document, The Prevent shared values including: Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in respect for the rule of law England , goes into considerable detail freedom of speech about emerging structures for countering equality of opportunity the threat of violent extremism and respect for others emphasises the importance of working responsibility towards others only with ‘those groups who uphold our The document also lists a number of indi - shared values of tolerance, respect and cators which it says will help local partners equality and who reject and condemn judge how well an organisation meets these violent extremism’. 103 However, a mere two criteria. These may include: three pages are devoted to explaining how the government proposes that its ‘local its stated aims partners’ should pick those with whom the nature of its work they work from among Muslim communi - public statements made by its ties − and even then this information is representatives or members relegated to the appendix. 104 the consistency with which this What is said there confirms that, rather is evident in its internal prac - than having a clear and precise framework tices and its engagement with for engagement, the government continues wider society to employ a vague set of aims, open to a variety of interpretations which are poorly What these minimalistic criteria reveal is the understood by some ministers. extent to which the government, despite The current criteria for government its professed determination to tackle ide - engagement are: 105 ology, continues to focus on means rather than ends. In other words, it accentuates 1. The organisation actively condemns the importance of finding those who can and works to tackle violent extremism. contribute to the preventing of violent Factors to consider as part of this extremism, as opposed to extremism over - criterion include whether the organi - all. Ideology is judged important, in so far sation: as it pertains to violence in the UK. Those publicly rejects and condemns who eschew such violence, but who none violent extremism and terrorist the less purvey a radical message, are not acts, clearly and consistently placed beyond the pale by such an can show evidence of steps approach. taken to tackle violent extrem - On the contrary, the existing criteria ism and support for violent effectively create a space in which the extremism mistakes that were made at national level can point to preventing violent – and which Prevent was meant to correct 103. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in extremism events it has sup - – are now being repeated locally. England; Stopping people ported, spoken at or attended The government’s published list does becoming or supporting terror - ists and violent extremists , June can show that its actions are not assist it with deciphering the ideologi - 2008, p 14. consistent with its public state - cal persuasion of its potential partners. 104. Ibid p 59. ments This is crucial, because those operating at 105. Ibid p 60.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 29 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

the local level, whether local authorities or strands of the Prevent agenda yields little police, are being asked to make the most in the way of further criteria; these are sophisticated of decisions about who is a listed below in alphabetical order, rather suitable ‘partner’. Moreover, these are deci - than under the lead department via which sions with the potential to tip the balance funds for them are allocated. of power within communities in one direc - tion or another, because the adoption of a group or individual as an official partner The Channel Project almost invariably bestows legitimacy and The Channel Project is a multi-agency ini - respectability on it. It can therefore serve as tiative designed to promote early identifi - a crucial tool of empowerment or, indeed, cation and intervention in the case of vul - disenfranchisement. nerable individuals. Although it involves This makes Prevent the most deeply ‘partnership working’ between police political and ideological strand of the forces, local authorities and local commu - Contest strategy. Despite this, it has been nities, primary responsibility for the imple - given wholly insufficient direction from mentation lies with the police. 106 The government. Many of its criteria, such as scheme was awarded £600,000 for 2007- ‘responsibility towards others’ and ‘respect 08, when it was piloted in two areas in for the rule of law’, are simply too vague to London and Lancashire. The Home Office be meaningful. Others are inadequately allocated a further £1 million to expand explored or left open to interpretation. the project in 2008-09, rolling it out over There is very little about loyalty to the an additional eight areas in West Yorkshire, British state. This ambiguity is remarkable the Midlands, London and Bedfordshire. 107 given that Gordon Brown insisted that the Channel relies on local and community- idea of ‘Britishness’ would be a cornerstone based referrals; when individuals begin to of his premiership. And it is this impreci - associate with extremists or adopt their sion that creates discord across government ideas, joint risk assessments are made and gives rise to the kind of ambiguity that between the police and whichever local divided ministers over IslamExpo and the partner (for example a school or youth GPU event. service) made the referral before an inter - Despite this, the criteria listed above vention strategy is created. This can be provide the most comprehensive informa - implemented either by local partners or tion publicly available on this vital aspect the police, depending on the circum - of the government’s counter-terrorism stances. 108 agenda. It is as if the government, having The integration of the police with local awoken late to the importance of an ideo - and community partners for delivery of logically-driven focus, continues to lack this project necessitates a rigorous assess - confidence in what it is trying to achieve. ment of just who those partners should The limited and tentative nature of its be. At present, however, the Channel pronouncements on this subject betrays its Project comes under the government’s broader uncertainty. In line with this, it is Prevent strategy and the suitability of 106. Ibid p 28. perhaps significant that the June 2008 partners is therefore only assessed against 107. Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 22 July Prevent strategy guidance devoted so little the vague and ineffective criteria under 2008, Column 1373W. space to the question of ‘criteria for which it currently operates. This can pose 108. The Prevent Strategy: A engagement’ and, furthermore, that the serious problems to the project, which Guide for Local Partners in England; Stopping people information was relegated to one of the relies critically on community partners to becoming or supporting terror - appendices of the document. make that first referral after identifying a ists and violent extremists, June 2008, p 28. An examination of the various sub- vulnerable individual. Indeed, what is it

30 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

that these partners are being told to look Countering Terrorism and out for? In their analysis of Channel, a Radicalisation Programme report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of The Countering Terrorism and Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Radicalisation (CTR) programme is an ini - Commission found that, ‘the focus is on tiative funded by the Foreign and preventing radical beliefs escalating to Commonwealth Office through its Strategic violent extremism and not on preventing Programme Fund (SPF). Initially conceived individuals, groups or places from in 2003, 114 the SPF was launched to ‘support expressing radical or extreme views or the government’s international goals’, which behaviour.’ 109 Thus, the potential link is includes ‘counter terrorism, weapons prolif - not made between violent jihad and the eration and their causes’. 115 This policy goal ideology that underwrites it. involves all aspects of the Contest strategy, although the FCO concedes that ‘a large bal - ance of resources will lean towards projects The Community Leadership that fit into preventing extremism’. 116 The Fund (CLF) CTR has therefore been established as the The Community Leadership Fund was primary delivery mechanism for achieving launched in June 2007 under the Preventing those goals and has had at least £20 million Violent Extremism agenda. It is a relatively allocated to it for project funding during small national grants programme (only 2008-09. 117 110 £650,000 was allocated to it in 2007-08), A number of these projects currently take 109. Preventing Violent Extremism which is administered centrally and focuses place in ‘priority regions’ which the FCO Learning and Development Exercise: Report to the Home 118 on building ‘the capacity of individuals, lists as: Office and Communities and organisations and communities to take the Local Government , October 2008, p 46. lead on tackling violent extremist influ - Middle East and North Africa 110. Background to PVE, 111 ences’. East and Horn of Africa Improvement and Development Guidance notes on the Community South East Asia Agency. http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/ Leadership Fund list eligibility criteria for South Asia page.do?pageId=7946870. potential applicants, but only stipulate the 111. ‘ Community Leadership Fund ’, DCLG. http://www.comm practical and legal requirements needed to The specific aims the FCO hopes to achieve unities.gov.uk/communities make an application, including the need through its Prevent programme are to devel - /preventingextremism/com munityleadershipfund/. for organisations to have a legal personal - op: 119 112. Preventing Violent ity, constitution and management Extremism: Community committee. 112 There is nothing, however, civil society Leadership Fund Guidance, DCLG, April 2008. about the values these groups should be good governance 113. Ibid. explicitly promoting. education 114. It then operated under the A brief description of the kind of projects human rights name ‘Global Opportunities Fund ’. that might be funded through the CLF rule of law 115. ‘ Strategic Programme scheme talks only of ‘mechanistic’ rather platforms for challenging extremists’ Fund ’, Foreign and than ‘substantive’ criteria. In other words, narratives Commonwealth Office. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about- there is reference to the need to improve the ... in key countries where the lack of the-fco/what-we-do/funding- ‘tools and skills’ of imams, to enable them to these areas creates grievances that drive programmes/strat-progr-fund/. ‘participate fully within their immediate radicalisation. 116. Ibid. communities’ and ‘communicate particu - 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. larly with young people’. 113 But nothing is To achieve this, the FCO has published on 119. ‘ Preventing extremism ’, said about the worldview of these imams its website a list of criteria that it considers FCO. http://www.fco.gov.uk that will better help them integrate on the when assessing the suitability of potential /en/fco-in-action/counter-terror - ism/counter-terrorism/preve right terms in this country. projects for either funding or partnership. nting-extremism/.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 31 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

A successful project must meet one or The scheme consists of a travelling ‘road- more of the following objectives which show’ of Islamic scholars who tour the echo the overall Prevent strategy: 120 country to challenge ‘violent extremist ideol - ogy’. It is hoped they will provide ‘platforms challenge extremist ideology and for mainstream Islamic voices in the UK’. 126 support mainstream voices In the first instance, the Radical Middle Way disrupt the ideologues and strengthen was concentrated in areas judged to be espe - vulnerable institutions cially vulnerable to extremism: London, support individuals who are being Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, targeted Kirklees, Leicester and Luton. Beyond its increase the resilience of communities domestic role, the RMW is also tasked with against violent extremists speaking to Muslim communities abroad in address the grievances which ideo - order to promote a better image of the UK. logues are exploiting such as a lack of In December 2006 Kim Howells, human rights and rule of law Minister of State at the FCO, confirmed in improve our understanding of the the House of Commons that, ‘The Radical 120. Ibid. causes of radicalisation Middle Way initiative ha[d] received fund - 121. ‘ Strategic Programme Fund communicate our aims and work ing totalling £350,000, of which £250,000 - Countering Terrorism & Radicalisation (CTR) was provided by the Foreign and Programme ’ http://www.fco. gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/what- In workign towards these ends, the FCO’s Commonwealth Office and £100,000 by we-do/funding-programmes remit is not limited to international proj - Home Office.’ 127 This confirms the broader /strat-progr-fund/strat-pro-fund- terrorism . ects, and it declares that, ‘some projects role being played in domestic affairs by the

122. Preventing Extremism originate from organisations based in the FCO under the aegis of Prevent. Together: Working Group UK’. 121 One of its most high-profile Furthermore, this in turn raises a Report , August-October 2005. domestic projects is called the Radical number of questions about how the 123. Ibid. Middle Way (RMW). Creating the RMW Prevent strategy is currently operating, and 124. ‘ Partners and Supporters”, The Radical Middle Way. was one of the key recommendations to more specifically, the RMW’s role in it. For http://radicalmiddleway. co.uk/partners_supporters.php . emerge from the ‘Preventing Extremism example, why is a project supposedly See also, ‘About Us’, The Together’ review process held immediately aimed at young British Muslims so reliant Radical Middle Way. 122 http://www.radicalmiddleway.co. after 7/7. Its guiding impulse was that on ‘importing’ foreign clerics? Indeed, at uk/about_us.php . there needed to be: 123 least 19 of the 27 speakers listed on the 125. Preventing Extremism RMW are from outside the UK. 128 In what Together: Working Group Report , August-October 2005. A national campaign involving inﬂuen - way are they best suited to ‘connect’ with 126. The Prevent Strategy: A tial international and national young British Muslims? Guide for Local Partners in mainstream scholars and thinkers – run England; Stopping people More troubling is the fact that a number becoming or supporting terror - by Muslim youth organisations – to of the speakers invited by the RMW are ists and violent extremists, June 2008. theologically and intellectually tackle connected to organisations opposed to

127. Parliamentary Debates , extremist interpretations of Islam. many – if not all – of the FCO’s openly House of Commons, 4 stated goals for its Countering Terrorism December 2006, Column 196W. The RMW pilot project was launched in and Radicalisation Programme. For exam - 128. Radical Middle Way web - site. http://www.radicalmid late 2005 with support from the Home ple, one of the RMW’s guest speakers last dleway.co.uk/scholars.php. Office, the FCO and DCLG, together year was Kemal el-Helbawy, who was Document1 124 129. For more on Helbawy see with Muslim ‘community organisations’. previously a spokesman for the Muslim above, p.2o; ; also see The organisations given responsibility for Brotherhood. 129 Another invited guest was http://radicalmiddleway.com/eve nts.php?id=2&art=8. the RMW were the Muslim newspaper, Q- Catherine Heseltine, who describes herself

130. Catherine Heseltine, News , the Young Muslim Organisation and as the ‘National Campaigns Manager’ for Radical Middle Way. the Federation of Islamic Student Societies the Muslim Public Affairs Committee-UK http://www.radicalmiddleway.co. 125 130 uk/scholars.php?id=1&art=27. (FOSIS). (MPACUK). The Report of the All-

32 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti- The Preventing Violent Semitism found that MPACUK is one of Extremism-Pathfinder Fund (PVE-PF) ‘a minority of Islamist extremists in this The ‘Preventing Violent Extremism country [who] do incite hatred towards Pathfinder Fund’ (PVE-PF) was launched in Jews’. 131 The National Union of Students October 2006 by DCLG. 136 It is at the heart (NUS) has deemed the MPACUK’s of the government’s Prevent strategy and message to be so aggressive and intimidat - forms the centre-piece of the ‘Preventing ing that it has banned the organisation Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and from college campuses. 132 On what basis Minds’ action plan that was launched in were these speakers deemed suitable for April 2007 (see above, page 27). 137 participation in conferences designed to The aim of the fund is ‘to support prior - 131. See ‘Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Enquiry into Anti- curb radical sentiments? How exactly were ity local authorities in developing Semitism ’, All-Party these people chosen? By whom? And to programmes of activity to tackle violent Parliamentary Group against Anti-Semitism, September 2006, 138 what end? extremism at the local level’. The scheme p 30. http://thepcaa.org/ was initially awarded £5 million for the Report.pdf . financial year, 2007-08, although this was 132. Ibid. p 29. Faith Communities Capacity subsequently increased to £6 million, 133. Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 16 July Building Fund (FCCBF) funding projects in 70 different local 2008, column WA156. See also 139 ‘Faith, Cohesion and Community The FCCBF ran from 2006 to 2008 and authorities around the country. In July Development’, Community is no longer active. None the less, it 2007 it was announced that a further £45 Development Foundation. http://www.cdf.org.uk/POOLED/ played an important role during the early million would be made available for the articles/bf_docart/view. phases of Prevent and is worth consider - years 2008-11. 140 asp?Q=bf_docart_307765 ing in that regard. The fund’s purpose The strategic objectives for PVE-PF are 134. Ibid. (see annex A). See also, http://www.cdf.org.uk/ was to build capacity within local groups, to develop communities in which SITE/UPLOAD/DOCUMENT/Proj encouraging them to engage more broad - Muslims: 141 ects/Round1LONDONregion.pdf; http://www.cdf.org.uk/SITE/UPL ly with society and the authorities, and OAD/DOCUMENT/Projects/Roun d1WESTMIDLANDSregion.pdf; promoting community cohesion. The identify themselves as part of a wider http://www.cdf.org.uk/SITE/UPL promotion of interfaith work was anoth - British society and are accepted as such OAD/DOCUMENT/Projects/Roun d1EASTMIDLANDSregion.pdf; er integral part of FCCBF in the hope of by the wider community http://web.archive.org/web/2007 encouraging understanding and respect. reject violent extremist ideology and 0325031613rn_1/www.communit ies.gov.uk/pub/495/FaithCommu A total of 140 Muslim groups were actively condemn violent extremism nitiesCapacityBuildingFundlistof awarded government funding amounting isolate violent extremist activity, and organisations_id1508495.pdf. to £13 million over two separate funding support and co-operate with the police 135. Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 2 June 133 rounds. Among those who received and Security Service 2008, column 541W. funding were the East London Mosque develop their own capacity to deal with 136 . Preventing Violent Extremism – winning hearts and and London Muslim Centre, the Islamic problems where they arise and support minds, DCLG, 5 April 2007.

Foundation in Leicester, the UK Islamic diversionary activity for those at risk 137. Ibid.

Mission and the Muslim Council of 138. Preventing violent extrem - Britain. 134 It remains unclear why these To this end, local authorities were urged to ism pathfinder fund 2007/08: Case studies , April 2007. groups were chosen by the government. ‘involve local partners, particularly the 139. Ibid.

Furthermore, in response to a written police, and local communities’ to produce 140. Parliamentary Debates , parliamentary question asked on 2 June detailed programmes that would con - House of Commons, 29 2008, the then Under Secretary of State at tribute to efforts to combat violent November 2007, column 679W. 141 . Preventing Violent 142 the Department of Communities and extremism. Such programmes, it was Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Local Government, Parmjit Dhanda, stated, ‘must make clear how they will Guidance Note for Government Offices and Local Authorities in stated that with regards to the FCCBF, specifically tackle violent extremism England , February 2007, p 7. 143 ‘The Government will not be reviewing [emphasis in original]’. Yet, beyond such 142. Ibid. p 3. 135 the allocation of funding.’ vague injunctions, no concrete instruction 143. Ibid. p 6.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 33 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

was provided as to what local authorities definitions for how scores are to be awarded. were expected to do. Neither were detailed For example, the guidelines state that for the criteria laid down, stipulating those first objective which measures ‘understanding groups and individuals who were to be of, and engagement with, Muslim communi - engaged under the new scheme. This ties’, a score of 1 will apply where: 147 deficit was not remedied in the subsequent document of project ‘case studies’ that was Community [is] engaged on an ad hoc produced. 144 As we have seen, this paucity basis and through wider faith/minority of advice was not dramatically improved groups. Mechanisms and engagement upon by the June 2008 launch of The is/are not self sustaining or productive. Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners Understanding of the make-up of the in England , a document not produced local Muslim community is limited and until a year and a half into the operation superficial. of PVE-PF. Although, this did articulate specific ‘criteria for engagement’, these A score of 5 applies in cases of: 148 were so vague as to be virtually meaning - less. A self-sustaining, dynamic and commu - Grants made through PVE-PF were nity driven engagement which takes initially ring-fenced to prevent local coun - place on a number of different levels and cils from spending them in other areas of in a number of different ways, with their work. To qualify for PVE-PF, partici - innovative approaches to communica - pating local authorities were required to tion and engagement of all groups. adopt a performance indicator – National Sophisticated understanding of local Indicator 35 (NI:35) – which monitored Muslim communities is used to drive the way these funds were spent. 145 policy development and engagement. At a practical level, NI:35 aims to meas - ure local resilience to violent extremism However attempts to safeguard the integri - and lays out four criteria for doing this ty of PVE-PF through ring-fencing the

144. Preventing violent extrem - which broadly relate to the seven core funds and tying them to NI:35 in this way ism pathfinder fund 2007/08: objectives of Prevent. These criteria are appear to have failed. Several councils have Case studies, April 2007. used to assess the effectiveness of local been extremely reluctant to adopt the indi - 145. The Prevent Strategy: A 146 Guide for Local Partners in authorities and are: cator as intended because they believe that England; Stopping people becoming or supporting terror - monies obtained under the banner of ists and violent extremists, pp. Understanding of, and engagement ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ are some - 52-4. with, Muslim communities how tainted. This includes local authorities 146. Ibid. p 55-8. Knowledge and understanding of the in key target areas such as Luton, Bradford, 147. Ibid. drivers and causes of violent extremism Oldham, Calderdale, Kirklees, Wakefield 148. Ibid. and the Prevent objectives and Leeds. 149 149. ‘ Fears over extremism role ’, Local Government Chronicle , 6 Development of a risk-based prevent - The recent ‘mapping exercise’ of PVE-PF March 2008. http://www.lgcplus .com/News/2008/03/fears_over_ ing violent extremism action plan, in projects for 2007-08, carried out by DCLG, extremism_role.html support of delivery of the Prevent reveals a ‘concern among some [councils] 150. Preventing Violent objectives that the receipt of PVE funding could be Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of project activities Effective oversight, delivery and evalua - perceived as negative, and could create a 2007/08 , p 54. tion of projects and actions backlash against Muslims’. 150 For some coun - 151. Preventing Violent Extremism cils, to accept PVE-PF is to invite Learning and Development 151 Exercise: Report to the Home For each of these points, performance is stigmatisation. Office and Communities and Local Government, October, 2008, p 11, scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, and The creation of the Reading Muslim 50. each of the four criteria above have separate Preventing Violent Extremism Crisis Group,

34 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities and Existing Criteria

in response to a decision by the local council widely. As a result, money that was supposed to accept PVE-PF funds, demonstrates the to be focused solely on preventing violent kind of hostile response that can follow. 152 extremism can now be spent in broader areas The Reading group says it wants to expose such as ‘community cohesion’. ‘the dangers that this misguided [PVE-PF] When asked about this in parliament, agenda poses to community relations’. 153 the Leader of the House, Harriet Harman, In an attempt to circumvent these prob - confirmed this was the case, claiming that lems, the government announced that from the government had shifted its position to 152. Reading Muslim PVE Crisis 2008 there would be a change to the way in ‘allow [local authorities] more power to Group. http://pvecrisisgroup .com/initial-rmpve-cg-commit - which PVE-PF would be paid. Payments are make decisions about the way in which tee/ . now being administered through the ‘Area they spend resources locally’. 155 153. Reading Muslim PVE Crisis Group. http://pvecrisisgroup. Based Grant’ which is part of the wider allo - Yet this new regime means that accept - com/about/. cation of funding that local authorities ance of NI:35 is no longer a precondition 154. Leading the preventing vio - receive from central government after nego - for the receipt of PVE-PF. Indeed, the lent extremism agenda: engag - ing, supporting and funding tiating their Local Area Agreements Conservative Shadow Minister for community groups , November (LAAs). 154 Communities and Local Government, 2008, p 35. In practice, this means that PVE-PF Paul Goodman, has asserted that this 155. Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 6 March monies will no longer be ring-fenced, development marks the collapse of the 2008, column 1920. thereby allowing them to be spent more PVE-PF scheme as originally conceived. 156 156. Ibid.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 35 3 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

157. Preventing Violent The substantial commitment of resources Mosque (ELM). 159 The ELM is home to Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note for Government and energy to the Prevent strategy reflects several leading activists from the Muslim Offices and Local Authorities in the government’s awareness of the impor - Council of Britain (its Secretary-General, England , February 2007, p 3. tance of this subject. The aim is clear: to Muhammad Abdul Bari is Chairman of 158. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund reduce the threat from violent extremism. the mosque) and has been described by Ed 2007/8 (List of Groups Funded) . However, as some Prevent practitioners have Husain, author of The Islamist , as being 159. ‘ Frequently Asked Questions ’, East London recognised, this goal is not one that is easily dominated by British affiliates of the radi - Mosque and London Muslim achieved. Without question, mistakes have cal South Asian Islamist party, the Centre. http://www.eastlondon 160 mosque.org.uk/?page=faqs. been made and many of these raise questions Jamaat-e-Islami. Despite this, the

160. Ed Husain, The Islamist about the entire viability of the Prevent London Muslim Centre has been provided (London, 2007); The Charity agenda as currently in operation. with money to establish ‘schools confer - Commission also lists Mohammed Abdul Bari as a ences’ and a ‘Muslim Youth Council’. trustee of the East London Mosque and the Muslim Council Another group funded by Tower Hamlets of Britain Charitable Foundation. Picking Partners: is the Cordoba Foundation. 161 As David http://www.charity-commis - sion.gov.uk/ShowCharity/Registe Who should councils work with? Cameron observed in his speech to the rOfCharities/ContactAndTrustees The Preventing Violent Extremism- Community Security Trust, this organisa - .aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber 162 =1122613&SubsidiaryNumber=0 Pathfinder Fund (PVE-PF) is the flagship tion is headed by Anas Altikriti. Shortly &TID=1316309. scheme of the government’s Prevent strategy, after the Cordoba Foundation was awarded 161. Preventing Violent with the onus placed on local authorities to £19,000, it held a public seminar at which Extremism Pathfinder Fund 2007/8 (List of Groups Funded) . develop programmes of activity that will one of the invited speakers – Dr. Abdul 162. David Cameron Speech to ‘specifically tackle violent extremism and Wahid, UK Chairman of Hizb-ut-Tahrir the Community Security Trust, 3 March 2008. show a clear link to the overarching objective (HuT) – told the audience that ‘political 163 163. ‘ Has Political Participation of creating a situation where Muslim com - participation has failed British Muslims’. Failed British Muslims? ’ 26 munities reject and actively condemn violent HuT is a group the government pledged to February 2008, Cordoba Foundation. extremism and seek to undermine and iso - ban after 7/7 and, although this has not yet http://www.thecordobafoundatio late violent extremists’. 157 happened, the situation remains under n.com/events.php?id=1&art=15. Serious questions must be asked, ‘constant review’. Indeed, Martin Bright’s 164. Martin Bright, When Progressives Treat with however, about the way the scheme has study of leaked government documents Reactionaries: The British State ’s flirtation with Radical Islam , performed thus far, especially in relation to show that it is deeply divided over the issue Policy Exchange, 2006, p. 28 some of the groups and individuals who of what to do next. 164 Whatever the govern - and p 70. have been engaged as a result of it. ment’s final view, it is perverse that public 165. ‘ Controversial Hizb ut-Tahrir debate to go ahead after all ’, In the London Borough of Tower funds – particularly those earmarked for East London Advertiser , 22 Hamlets, for example, one of the partner - Prevent initiatives – should be used in this February 2008. http://www.east londonadvertiser.co.uk/content/ ship groups involved in PVE-PF projects way to provide a platform for the extremists towerhamlets/advertiser/ funded by the local council was the of HuT. 165 news/story.aspx?brand=elaonlin 158 e&category=news&tBrand=northl London Muslim Centre. This vast build - Though less sensational, there are ondon24&tCategory=newsela&it ing was built with the aid of money from numerous other examples of questionable emid=WeED22%20Feb%202008 %2017%3A37%3A39%3A153. Saudi Arabia and adjoins the East London awards being made by local authorities. In

36 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

Luton, for example, one body working Alam, then Assistant Secretary-General of with the Council under PVE-PF is the the MCB and the chair of the MCB’s Muslim Education Forum. 166 This is an Education Committee. 175 Interestingly, independent grassroots organisation set up Alam is also a trustee of the al-Hijrah by local women in 2005 to tackle the Trust. 176 The al-Hijrah School, which is a ‘disengagement of Muslim youth’. It cate - subsidiary of the al-Hijrah Trust has also 166. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund gorically states that it is not affiliated to been a PVE-PF partner of Birmingham 2007/8 (List of Groups Funded). 167 177 any political or religious organisation. city council. 167. ‘ About Us ’, Muslim Education Forum, http://www That might be so, but one of its current The 2008 national co-ordinator for the .muslimeducationfo - projects seeks to implement some of the ISB’s Islam Awareness Week was Tahmina rum.com/about/index.html. MCB’s proposed national guidelines for Saleem. 178 Saleem is the Secretary of the 168. ‘ Our Projects ’, Muslim Education Forum, http://www. schools called Meeting the Needs of Muslim ‘Redbridge Forum against Extremism and muslimeducationforum.com/ Pupils in State Schools .168 The integrity or Islamophobia’ and a consultant Preventing about/projects.html. See also, ‘Guidelines for Schools’, Muslim character of the MEF is not at stake here, Violent Extremism (PVE) Project Manager Education Forum. http://www. however that organisation does appear to with Redbridge Council. 179 Previously, muslimeducationfo - rum.com/schools/guidelines.html endorse an agenda that is, in some respects, Saleem was a press officer for the MCB. 180 169. Report of the Deputy Chief not far removed from that of the Islamist- All this demonstrates, therefore, the Executive to the meeting of the Executive to be held on 11 infused MCB. extent to which PVE-PF, judged by its own November 2008: City of Bradford The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) is terms of reference as first defined by Ruth Metropolitan District Council. http://councilminutes.bradford.gov another group that has benefited from Kelly and then Hazel Blears, is falling short .uk/council_minutes/docs/executiv partnership arrangements with local of the mark. It was set up to break the e/Exec11NovDocBK.pdf. authorities under PVE-PF. In Bradford, for monopoly of the MCB, its leaders, and 170. ‘Announcement: Dr. Zahoor Qurashi’, Islamic Society of example, the ISB was engaged in a project other national ‘gatekeeper’ organisations. Britain. http://www.isb.org. that received £38,500 of Prevent funding By looking beyond them, the government uk/docs/Z%20Qurashi%20- %20ISB%20announcements2.pdf. to create a programme to ‘actively engage hoped it would empower a new set of For Qurashi’s membership of the Central Working Committee of the with young people to discuss their identity voices. This has not materialised as Kelly or MCB, see ‘CWC Members’, and to become active role models in local Blears would have hoped, largely because a Muslim Council of Britain. http:// 169 www.mcb.org.uk/comm_details.p and national democratic institutions’. range of Islamist organisations have been hp?heading_id=105&com_id=1.

At present the Acting President of the able to adapt their modus operandi to capi - 171. ‘List of Affiliates’, Muslim ISB is Ahtsham Ali; he succeeded the talise on the new emphasis on localism. Council of Britain. http://www. mcb.org.uk/affiliates.php. outgoing president, Zahoor Qurashi, There are other problems too. These 172. Husain, The Islamist. member of the Central Working arise in cases where it seems that local 173. ‘Activities’, Islamic Society of Committee of the MCB, who resigned in councils have actively sought out some of Britain. http://www.isb.org.uk/ 170 pages06/activities.asp. See also, November 2008. The ISB, as a group, is the more extreme elements of the Muslim ‘About IAW’, Islam Awareness an affiliate of the MCB, 171 and the organi - community in a belief that they can deliver Week. http://www.iaw.org.uk/ about-iaw. sation was one of those identified by Ed results. 174. ‘Understanding Islam’, Islam Husain as being in some way imbued with In Lambeth money has been given to Awareness Week. http://www. Islamist ideology. 172 the STREET project, founded by Abdul iaw.org.uk/islam-in-britain/what- and-why-islam. Furthermore, the ISB is, according to its Haqq Baker, who is also the Managing 175. ‘2008 Events’, Islam 181 website, the group behind Islam Awareness Director of the project. STREET stands Awareness Week. http://www. iaw.org.uk/this-years-theme/2008 Week (IAW), an initiative launched in for ‘Strategy to Reach, Empower, and events-1. See also, ‘Tahir Alam: 1994 to ‘raise awareness and remove Educate Teenagers’ and the scheme aims to Profile’, Comment is Free. http://commentisfree.guardian.co. misconceptions surrounding Britain’s help those young Muslims who may be uk/tahir_alam/profile.html. 173 second largest faith group’. The IAW’s susceptible to violent extremism. In early 176. ‘Al-Hijrah Trust’, Charity website states, ‘There is no concept of the 2009, STREET won the Preventing Commission website. http://www.charity-commission. 174 182 secular in Islam.’ Among the events held Violent Extremism Innovation Award. gov.uk/ShowCharity/RegisterOfCh under the IAW’s aegis in 2008 was a talk Yet why did Lambeth Council approve the arities/ContactAndTrustees.a spx?RegisteredCharityNumber=10 entitled ‘Shared Values’ given by Tahir award of funding to a man like Baker? 18850&SubsidiaryNumber=0.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 37 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

Baker is Chairman of the Brixton which is the orthodox Islam. He was Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre, 183 happy that we weren’t going to be feeding 177. ‘About Us’, al-Hijrah 187 Secondary School. which is committed to propagating ‘the him rhetoric or erroneous beliefs.’ http://www2.al-hijrah.org/secon true call of understanding Islam, through Clearly, then, Reid’s experience of the dary/about_us.html. ‘History of Al- Hijrah’, Al-Hijrah School. the Quraan and Sunnah of the Prophet Salafist brand of thinking did not steer http://www.alhijrahschool.co.uk/vi (sallallahu alayhi wassalam) upon the him away from the path of jihadi terror - sion_history.php. See also, Preventing Violent Extremism understanding of our pious predeces - ism; his encounter with non-violent Pathfinder Fund 2007/8 (List of sors’. 184 In other words, the ethos of the extremism failed to defuse his potential Groups Funded) mosque is Salafist: it encourages an for violent extremism. 178. ‘Guest CV: Tahmina Saleem’, IslamOnline. http://www.islam emulation of the spirit and ways of ‘ al- For these reasons, it seems clear that in online.net/LiveDialogue/English/ Guestcv.asp?hGuestID=7PO37z. Salaf al-Salih ’ (the ‘pious predecessors’). some areas the PVE-PF programme has

179. Ibid. For an example of an Typically, Salafists advocate one of the not functioned as intended. In particular, event organised by the most austere and literalist forms of Islam there appears to be a risk that mistakes Redbridge Forum Against Extremism and Islamophobia, and a range of values that are not always previously made nationally are now being see the website of Mike Gapes compatible with liberal democracy. repeated at the local level. Indeed, when MP: ‘Tackling Extremism and Islamophobia’, Mike Gapes MP, The significance of this in relation to Hazel Blears was asked about this in the 21 October 2007. http://www. Preventing Violent Extremism has been House of Commons, she was unable to mikegapes.org.uk/?p=126. laid out by Abdul Haqq Baker himself in confirm that PVE-PF funds had not 180. Tahmina Saleem, ‘The Muslim community has increas - a 2008 article for the magazine Criminal fallen into the hands of separatists or ingly more effective leadership’, 188 The Guardian, 30 November 2004. Justice Matters in which he acknowledged extremists. This is something Blears http://www. that, ‘Salafist ideology is considered by herself has been very worried about and guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/nov/30/isl amandbritain. many to be one of the significant contrib - raises serious questions about the way

181. ‘Community Safety Project utory causes to violent extremism.’ He PVE-PF – and the Prevent strategy more scoops prestigious award’, went on to state that, ‘Adherents of this broadly – has operated to date. How London Borough of Lambeth website, 18 February 2009. particular branch of Islam’ – which as the much control do ministers really have? http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/public comment above indicates, includes Who are the plethora of groups and sites/cScape.Lambeth.GenericTe mplates/PressReleaseHTML.aspx himself – ‘consider their practices main - consultants in receipt of PVE money? ?NRMODE=Published&NRNODE GUID=%7B2A5BC55D-41ED- stream, away from the extreme spectrums At the heart of all this is the critical 4D3A-9F2F-91F0E323913B% of both liberalism and violent extrem - issue of who local authorities are deciding 7D&NRORIGINALURL=%2FNews 185 %2FPressReleases%2F180209C ism.’ Was Baker therefore judged to be to work with, and this, in turn, says much ommunitySafetyProjectScoopsPre an appropriate partner precisely because about the government’s current ‘criteria stigiousAward.htm&NRCACHEHI NT=NoModifyGuest. of his commitment to Salafism? for engagement’ when picking partners.

182. Ibid. See also, Christopher Some policemen are clearly thinking The fact is that, by placing local Warren, ‘Award for Street Project’, along such lines. One supporter of this authorities at the centre of the Prevent Streatham Guardian, 23 February 2009. http://www.yourlocal kind of approach, Robert Lambert, has strategy, government is asking municipal guardian.co.uk/news/local/streath amnews/4146782.Award_for_Stre argued, ‘Salafis and Islamists often have worthies to take the lead role in making et_project/. the best antidotes to al-Qaida propaganda extremely sophisticated decisions about 183. ‘Brixton Mosque and Islamic once it has taken hold.’ 186 Yet, as Baker has ideological questions relating to the strug - Cultural Centre’, Charity Commission. http://www.charity- admitted, their ability to administer this gle against radical Islamism. Not only are commission.gov.uk/Show ‘antidote’ in practice is not necessarily they tasked with the job of rooting out Charity/RegisterOfCharities/Conta ctAndTrustees.aspx?RegisteredCh proven. In an interview with CNN about extremists in the absence of a complete arityNumber=1064768&Subsidiary Richard Reid, the would-be ‘shoe- ‘intelligence’ picture, but they are also Number=0. bomber’ who had worshipped at the meant to identify genuine moderates with 184. ‘The Mosque’, Brixton Mosque and Islamic Cultural Brixton Mosque, Baker stated, ‘He came whom they can work. Centre. http://www.masjidit. co.uk/index.php?page=1. because he said that we were teaching the One initiative that did aim to tackle

185. Abdul Haqq Baker, ‘A view pure form of Islam and that we should the problems faced by local authorities in from the inside’, Criminal Justice show him the straight and narrow sort of this regard involved the creation of Matters , 73, September 2008, p. 24. view of Islam and practice of Islam – Improvement and Development Agency

38 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

(IDeA) accredited ‘peers’. 189 These were to mean. Who are these people? Who be specialist advisers, who could assist defines ‘credible and respected’? On what councils to make informed decisions basis are these decisions made? And who about who they should or should not be is making the selection? working with or funding. The idea was The report also refers to the impor - that a group of volunteers would be tance of authorities developing ‘a rigorous trained to act as ‘consultants’ to those process of evaluating bids’ for PVE-PF local authorities in receipt of PVE-PF funding, but there is no description as to monies and advise them on how best to what this might entail. 192 utilise the funds. The IDeA peer scheme, It is not always Whitehall that exhibits however, adopted a purely technocratic this noticeable lack of clarity. A glossy approach to the issue of training the document produced by the Local would-be mentors. In other words, people Government Association (LGA), entitled were not given the necessary skills to Leading the preventing extremism agenda: a make informed decisions about the way role made for councillors , points to the key PVE-PF is being used. They were taught role that can be played by local council - the mechanics of how the process oper - lors in forging ‘strong links between local 193 ated, but there was little or no training on authorities and community groups’. 186. Robert Lambert, ‘Ignoring the lessons of the past’, Criminal the issue of who constituted suitable part - But there is little explanation of what is Justice Matters , 73, September ners for local authorities. meant by the phrase ‘community groups’. 2008, p. 23. Instead, reference is made to ‘local part - 187. ‘London Mosque leader recalls bomb suspect’, CNN.Com, ners’ and ‘key community organisations’ 26 December 2001. The Enigma of ‘Prevent’: without any serious description of what http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WO RLD/europe/UK/12/26/baker.cnna 194 What is it for? these mean. A similar pattern emerges /index.html. 195 The original guidance documents pro - across several LGA publications. 188. Parliamentary Debates , duced to accompany the launch of the As with the HMIC-Audit Commission House of Commons, 15 January 2008, column 771.

Prevent strategy were long on rhetoric report, councils are told by the LGA that 189. ‘ Support for councils and and short on substance. The motivating they should ‘avoid the inadvertent practitioners ’, Improvement and Development Agency. spirit was that local authorities must engagement with or support provided to http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/ engage, while the mechanics of what this inappropriate organisations’. The LGA page.do?pageId=79 46996. meant in practice were left markedly also states that if a mistake is made, then 190. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and open-ended. The government’s more ‘it is important that local authorities are Development Exercise: Report to recent pronouncements continue to offer able to take prompt action to withdraw the Home Office and Communities and Local little in the way of clarity on this vital funding or terminate funding agree - Government, October 2008, p 5. issue. ments,’ 196 yet there is no description of 191. Ibid. p 5, 10, 31, 32, 37, 39, A report produced by Her Majesty’s how this termination process might 43, 46, 57. 192. Ibid. p 19. Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), occur. Similarly, there is no direction on 193. Leading the preventing vio - together with the Audit Commission, in what an organisation must do to be lent extremism agenda: a role the wake of the ‘Learning Development disqualified from this funding: what made for councillors , Local Government Association, Exercise’ they conducted into Prevent, is makes a group ‘inappropriate’? November 2008, p 13. replete with the language of ill-defined One of the most extraordinary aspects 194. Ibid. p 9, 10. ‘faith leaders and trusted community of the various LGA documents is the 195. Preventing Violent 190 Extremism Learning and leaders’. The report states that ‘commu - advice they give on how to select such Development Exercise: Report to nity leaders’ are to be ‘credible and ‘community groups’. The reader is the Home Office and Communities and Local respected’, ‘influential and respected’, directed to the main Prevent criteria Government , October 2008, p 5.

‘key community representatives’ and ‘key (listed above on page 29) and to an 196. Leading the preventing vio - individuals’. 191 But there is almost no accompanying leaflet, Leading the prevent - lent extremism agenda: a role made for councillors , November exploration of what such terms might ing violent extremism agenda: engaging, 2008, p 37.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 39 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

supporting and funding community 33-4). With regards to the latter, DCLG’s group s. 197 The latter states that, when mapping exercise report states that, of the considering requests for funding, in the four main themes under which projects first instance ‘local authorities should could be categorised, most – some 64 per consult their police partners and trusted cent – could be classed as being about community partners on the suitability of ‘promoting shared values’. 201 Yet in the groups or individuals tendering to receive document there is no discussion of how Prevent funding or support.’ 198 But who such values are to be defined. Elsewhere are these ‘trusted community partners’? it is noted that one of the strategic objec - By what process, and against what meas - tives of the programme was to develop a ure, were they elevated to this position? community in which Muslims ‘identify Paradoxically, it seems as though the liter - themselves as a welcome part of a wider ature is suggesting that local authorities British society’, but, again, there is little should ask ‘trusted community partners’ discussion of what this means in prac - to advise them on who their ‘trusted tice. 202 community partners’ should be! On this point, the documents The HMIC-Audit Commission report produced by the LGA look to the creation appears to confirm this: ‘Councils and the of a ‘shared future vision and sense of police at the LDE [learning and develop - belonging’. 203 The reader is also directed ment exercise] sites place great value upon to the 2007 report by the Commission on individuals within communities who are Integration and Cohesion, Our Shared knowledgeable about the Prevent Future . Beyond that, however, there is no approach and who can provide advice on elaboration on what this language actually 197 . Leading the preventing vio - effective community engagement.’ 199 means. Furthermore, the Commission on lent extremism agenda: engag - ing, supporting and funding The report produced by DCLG in the Integration and Cohesion’s document community groups, November 2008. wake of its ‘mapping exercise’ of the itself displays an enormous reluctance to

198. Ibid. 2007-08 Pathfinder programme, also discuss the composition of British values.

199. Preventing Violent Extremism reflects the continuing uncertainty that Talk of ‘shared values’ does not move Learning and Development exists within government on this key issue beyond vague platitudes, with talk of Exercise: Report to the Home Office and Communities and of engagement. That document concedes ‘civility, social capital and meaningful Local Government , October 2008, that the central authorities still do not contact’. 204 p 32. fully appreciate how relationships are There is never any elaboration of what 200. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund forged at the grassroots and suggests that government understands these shared 2007/08: Case studies , April 2007, p 7. ‘further research is required to identify values to mean. Yes, there are references to

201. Preventing Violent how partnerships are forged on the ideas such as ‘respect for the rule of law’ Extremism Pathfinder Fund: ground’. 200 and ‘respect for others’ scattered across Mapping of project activities 2007/08 , December 2008, p 8. The significance of all this emerges the different publications – but what does

202. Ibid. p 13. more fully when one asks the straightfor - any of this mean in practice? What exactly

203. Leading the preventing vio - ward, but far from simple, question: what are the government’s ambitions in this lent extremism agenda: a role is Prevent for? What do local authorities regard? Significantly, the HMIC-Audit made for councillors , November 2008, p 15. understand this programme of work to be Commission report criticises the govern - 204. Commission on Integration about? What is the purpose of Prevent ment in this regard, noting its lack of an and Cohesion: Our Shared 205 Future , June 2007, p 111. See according to the government? overarching narrative. also, p 64, 66, 86. The government’s guidance on this Against this imprecise background, it is 205. Preventing Violent Extremism crucial issue is strikingly unclear. The clear that a range of activities have fallen Learning and Development Exercise: Report to the Home broad objectives of the strategy have been within the remit of Prevent to this point – Office and Communities and noted above (see page 27); so too, the and the value of many of these is open to Local Government , October 2008, p 10. aims of PVE-PF specifically (see pages serious debate.

40 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

Consider how the HMIC-Audit play within their communities? 210 What if Commission report recommends that women do not want to play such a role? councils might promote ‘Islamic aware - Can they be citizens outside their Muslim ness among Muslim communities and communities? What is the Prevent strat - local communities more widely’, or egy doing for those who do not wish to ‘culture, citizenship, faith and identity define themselves by their faith? More activities with Muslim communities’. 206 broadly, why should it be the job of Again, it is far from clear what is meant government to ‘support and nurture civic by this. However an accompanying case and theological leadership[emphasis study describes how Birmingham City added]’? 211 Council has been working with local madrassahs to provide ‘citizenship educa - tion’. It states that staff in 72 madrassahs Why is it not explicitly the duty of councils to promote have been trained in ‘teaching and deliv - “ Britishness, and even loyalty to the Crown? ering the Islamic syllabus’. 207 A number of ” questions arise from this: what is the content of this ‘citizenship education’? 208 In light of the vagueness that permeates In truth, this is typical of the way in most of the official publications on this which a number of Prevent projects have subject, how is a good citizen defined? now been diluted into the wider (and not Moreover, who is training the madrassah always related) agenda of ‘community 206. Preventing Violent Extremism staff? What does this entail? And who was cohesion’. It means that many of the Learning and Development responsible for delivering it? Above all, schemes initially launched to combat Exercise: Report to the Home Office and Communities and specifically why is it the duty of local violent extremism are no longer sharply Local Government , October 2008, authorities to promote ‘Islamic citizen - focused on achieving that goal. Indeed, in p 57, 15. ship’? Why is it not explicitly the duty of its ‘mapping exercise’ DCLG conceded 207 Ibid. p 16. 208. The DCLG Mapping Exercise councils to promote Britishness, and even that ‘very few projects engaged with indi - report notes that amongst the loyalty to the Crown? viduals or groups glorifying or justifying largest projects currently being funded by the PVE-PF (under - Another frequently-invoked project is violent extremism’. In fact, there were only stood to mean programmes in the scheme to promote the ‘training of seven projects across the entire country receipt of £20,000 and more) are ‘an education programme pro - 209 imams in English language’. But to which did so, just 3 per cent of the moting good citizenship ’. Again, what end? Were not clerics like Abu national total. This point was later rein - the question of how this is defined is left unanswered. See Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed and forced again when it was baldly revealed Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of proj - Sheikh Faisal able to exploit their fluent that, ‘There appeared to be a wide range of ect activities 2007/08 , December English to win recruits? In fact, the provi - activities under way around community 2008. p 39. sion of English-language training to cohesion, citizenship, understanding 209 Ibid. p 21-2; also see, p. 32. imams with scant regard to what they different faiths etc, but relatively few proj - 210. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development might later say may actually help dissem - ects tackling the more sensitive issues of Exercise: Report to the Home inate the kind of extremist ideas that the extremism and terrorism.’ 212 The HMIC- Office and Communities and Local Government , October 2008, government wants to curb. Audit Commission report also reached a p 57, 16. A broader question worth asking is: similar conclusion, stating: ‘The majority 211. Ibid p 57. why does the government only try to of PVE-PF activities have helped Muslim 212. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: ‘engage’ with its Muslim citizens prima - communities to engage in cohesion activ - Mapping of project activities rily through faith-based initiatives? What ity, particularly that involving young 2007/08, December 2008 , p 54. is the logic behind subsidising people and women.’ 213 213. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development ‘Muslimah’ projects in Birmingham or There is therefore an ongoing uncer - Exercise: Report to the Home Wycombe that purport to empower tainty within local authorities as to the Office and Communities and Local Government, October 2008, women by ‘strengthening’ the role they purpose of the funds they receive under the p 15.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 41 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

Prevent strategy. As the HMIC-Audit ture, role models and leadership’ as a factor Commission report avers, ‘Most councils driving radicalisation. position the Prevent approach within their All this reveals the serious downplaying cohesion strategy. This tends to focus on of ideology – to the point where it is building resilience within communities almost neglected entirely – and the atten - rather than explicitly addressing the dant ‘foregrounding’ of factors such as vulnerability of those who may become ‘social exclusion’, which inevitably work to engaged in violent extremism.’ 214 a ‘community cohesion’ agenda. This is not As to why this should be so, it is worth to suggest that this is not a valid agenda in re-examining the guidance produced by and of itself, but the whole point of the the Local Government Association. This Prevent strategy is that it was meant to be declares that the point of the Prevent strat - geared towards different objectives. As the egy is to avert radicalisation, defined as ‘the HMIC-Audit Commission report and that act of moving towards violent extrem - of DCLG’s own mapping exercise reflect, ism’. 215 This only confirms the extent to however, it is clear that many local author - which radicalisation, in and of itself, is ities have simply not understood the deemed unimportant; extremism only distinction. appears on the radar if it is violent. This failure of understanding, as the LGA What causes this ‘violent extremism’? guidance literature illustrates, leads towards According to the LGA, there is no ‘single some very troubling conclusions. A classic radicalisation pathway’ but rather a ‘range example comes from the following invoca - of factors’ leading to it. The first of those tion: ‘Councillors and local authorities will mentioned is ‘social exclusion’, which is want to work with mosques to help ensure said to include, amongst other things, that the management structure of mosques unemployment, underemployment, ‘real allow for the participation of women and or perceived grievances ... about aspects of young people.’ 220 Why should local councils government policy (particularly foreign be doing this kind of thing? The aim here, it policy)’, and discrimination, racism and would seem, is to bind individuals into faith lack of social mobility. 216 Next, there is community structures, but with no reference reference to ‘identity/citizenship-based as to the basis upon which this will occur, or factors’ – by which is meant the problem of indeed, whether this is a suitable basis on people (particularly the young) not feeling which to proceed. Again, why should young part of British society, or harbouring or female Muslims be treated as only being 214. Ibid p 4; see also, p 17. ‘distrust of political structures’. 217 The next capable of fulfilment through the mosque? 215. Leading the preventing vio - ‘factor’ on the list is ‘international rela - A crucial subject here is language. lent extremism agenda: a role made for councillors , November tions’ – and it is said that radicalisers Government has clearly spent significant 2008, p 19. distort events ‘to build a global extremist amounts of time considering both the tone 216. Ibid. narrative’ that supports violence. 218 At this and language of its publications. The Local 217. Ibid. p 21. point, there is a reference to ‘theological Government Association even dedicates a 218. Ibid. p 25. On this point, it distortions’ as a cause of ‘violent extrem - section in one of its publications to language is said that “Local authorities need to acknowledge the impact ism’ – the closest the guidance comes to and its role in the community. It suggests that international and national events can have within local any discussion of ideology. But even then it that communities and should, where is simply to say that the extremists are possible, take proactive steps towards easing community ten - misinterpreting what Islam means: ‘The terms such as Islamism, for example, have sions ”. Again, the obvious ques - word “Islam” itself means peace and most such varied meanings that it becomes tion is, what exactly does this mean. Muslims interpret Islam as a force for diﬃcult to use them eﬀectively in serious 219 219. Ibid. p 25. dialogue and co-operation.’ Finally, the contexts. Terms such as extremism and 220. Ibid. p 26. guidance points to ‘community infrastruc - radicalisation also have their limitations as

42 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

many historical radicals are now praised in Commission. 227 Indeed, as has already been classrooms as brave shapers of civil society. discussed, it was precisely this kind of reser - It must be made clear that the threshold is vation that made some local councils crossed when extreme and radical views reluctant to sign up for PVE in the first place. are expressed or threatened to be expressed To remedy this, the LGA suggests that through violence. 221 local authorities should ‘work with their communities to determine acceptable This is an extraordinary passage. Not only phrases and definitions for the Prevent agen - does it accentuate the distinction between da’, but this should remain ‘broadly in line radicalism and violent radicalism, but this with the overarching Prevent objectives’. 228 also gives rise to a further series of questions: Such an approach, however, is likely to push why, for example, is the LGA issuing direc - Prevent further into the wider, more tives on such matters? When was it decided ambiguous and distinctly different terrain of that ‘Islamism’ is a dangerous term, given ‘community cohesion’. In fact, the HMIC- that former (and indeed some current) Audit Commission report has already Islamists use the term themselves? And how discovered that many local authorities prefer was this set of value judgments arrived at? to couch the language of Prevent in seem - The Local Government Association told ingly more ‘neutral’ terms, stressing ideas

Policy Exchange that ‘the text for this part of like ‘citizenship’, ‘safer and sustainable 221. Ibid . p 31. the document was supplied by our contrac - communities’, ‘a sense of belonging’, ‘toler - 222. Email from Local tor: Dilwar Hussain’. 222 In fact, Hussain was ance’, ‘resilience’ or ‘empowering Government Association to Policy Exchange, 2 February contracted by the LGA to write the entire communities’. In practice, this has resulted 2009. guidance document which it then issued to in the dilution of the urgent and specific 223. ‘ Preventing Violent 223 Extremism – Handbook for the local councils. Dilwar Hussain is head of needs of Prevent. Local Government Association ’, the Policy Research Centre based at the The real problem in all this is that central Policy Research Centre. http://www.policyresearch.org.uk 224 Islamic Foundation (IF). Why was this government does not offer enough concrete /research.php#lga. component of the IF, a parent body with a direction. This has resulted in Prevent initia - 224. ‘ About Us ’, Policy Research not uncontroversial history, deemed to be tives largely stagnating in many parts of the Centre, http://www.policy research.org.uk/about_us.php. the authoritative interpreter of what is country. One council chief executive For more on the Islamic linguistically and ideologically acceptable for observed that with all the added pressure Foundation see p. 22-3; 225. Email exchanges between local government? After all, he who controls placed on them by Prevent and its specific Policy Exchange and the LGA, language is half-way towards winning the focus on eradicating extremism in Muslim 11 February 2009. ideological battle. He who offers guidance communities, ‘people are worried about 226. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: on language is well on the way towards seiz - saying the wrong thing and being labelled Mapping of project activities ing control of the commanding heights of racist’. 229 This situation stems, in part, from 2007/08 , December 2008, p 54. the culture. When questioned by Policy the increasing demands being made on local 227. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development Exchange, LGA officials repeatedly refused authorities without adequate guidance. Exercise: Report to the Home Office and Communities and to elaborate on the process by which This view is further bolstered by the Local Government , October 2008, Hussain was appointed, demonstrating the HMIC-Audit Commission report which p 11, 50. difficulty of obtaining accurate information found: ‘In some places we heard that the 228. Leading the preventing vio - lent extremism agenda: a role about the engagement strategy pursued by national narrative and the guidance from made for councillors , November some key agencies. 225 government departments is not always clear 2008, p 32. Sensitivities surrounding language were or easy to understand.’ 230 The same report 229. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development also noted the in the DCLG ‘mapping exer - also said that in 2007-08 some councils had Exercise: Report to the Home cise’ which found that some local authorities complained of being given ‘insufficient and Office and Communities and Local Government , October 2008, 231 expressed a dislike of the term “Preventing late guidance’. In light of the ambitious p. 40. Violent Extremism”’. 226 Similar concerns scale and importance of Prevent, it is unsur - 230. Ibid. p 10. were noted too by the HMIC-Audit prising that local councils are requesting 231. Ibid. p 17.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 43 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

some definitive guidance from central responsibilities councillors can sometimes be government. So far, this has not been forth - prone to taking too restrictive a view of what coming. is needed; MPs, by contrast, are inherently better placed to consider the broad breadth of perspectives among their different Delivery and accountability: communities. localism supreme The reduced role for elected officials also The current delivery mechanisms for means that too much of Prevent is being Prevent rely heavily on local councils, which carried out under a veil of secrecy by the enjoy greater ‘on-the-ground’ proximity unelected state at national, regional and local than officials in Whitehall. Too often, how - levels (quite apart from the classified roles for ever, this has been used as a pretext by parts the police and MI5 under Prevent). of the unelected, permanent state to shape Consider the difficulties in obtaining infor - the strategic vision of Prevent without the mation related to it. During her 2008 input of parliamentarians. MPs seem to have presentation at Policy Exchange, Paul been largely excluded from the process con - Goodman asked Hazel Blears whether she cerning which groups in their constituencies would send him a copy of the government’s are funded – a concern shared across party ministerial guidelines on engagement. lines by Khalid Mahmood and John Spellar Assurances were given that she would do so, (while still a backbencher), from Labour, but it was later suggested to Policy Exchange along with the Conservative Shadow by senior officials that the criteria are Minister for Communities and Local ‘restricted’ documents. When Goodman Government. The latter, Paul Goodman, is later requested to see the list of groups who the MP for Wycombe, a constituency in were funded through PVE-PF, DCLG took which Muslims make up almost 11 per cent almost six months to reply. A similar request 232. Paul Goodman MP, Queen’s Speech debate, 15 November of the electorate, and so represents more from Goodman in 2009 elicited no greater 2006. http://conservative Muslim voters than any other Conservative sense of urgency. 235 This lack of transparency home.blogs.com/torydiary/2006/ 232 11/islamism_and_th.html . MP. Yet he was not even consulted about can create real problems in the delivery of

233. Leading the preventing vio - PVE funds being spent in his constituency. Prevent initiatives and often defies a desire lent extremism agenda: a role This inversion of priorities is typified by for greater clarity from those concerned. 236 made for councillors , November 2008. See also, Leading the pre - the Local Government Association which In its current form PVE is characterised venting violent extremism agen - states that Prevent is ‘a role made for coun - by a touching faith in the prestige and effi - da: engaging, supporting and 233 funding community groups, cillors’. Unsurprisingly, parliamentarians cacy of local government. But all too November 2008. are not mentioned once in any of the LGA’s frequently, it would seem, an adherence to 234. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in publications on Prevent. But even in the vast local expertise has meant an obeisance to England; Stopping people recesses of the government’s own lengthy local standards. Because central government becoming or supporting terror - ists and violent extremists, June documents on Prevent, MPs are only ever is unwilling to create a values-based 2008. given fleeting consideration – if at all. 234 This approach for Prevent, municipalities are 235. Private information. represents a notable democratic deficit in the afforded too much space to inflect their own 236. The HMIC-Audit current structure and delivery of Prevent local values at local level. This is regularly at Commission report found that ‘[Community groups and the vol - initiatives. the expense of national values which define untary sector] wanted more transparency on the strategic Yet MPs are supposed to be the most British society as a whole, and which only decisions made by councils and representative of all. In a typical constituency national government can take the lead in police partners in selecting proj - ects for Prevent funding. ’ See, they usually represent up to 80,000 people, projecting across the country. When this is Preventing Violent Extremism whereas councillors can be responsible for as coupled with a reluctance from Whitehall to Learning and Development Exercise: Report to the Home few as 8,000 constituents − often over - clearly identify and name the Islamist ideol - Office and Communities and whelmingly from just one ethnic or religious ogy to which it is opposed, this confusion is Local Government, October 2008, p18. group. Because of the narrower remit of their accentuated further. As a result, local coun -

44 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

cils are essentially being asked to prevent the What are their terms of reference? Most violent extremism of an undefined enemy by importantly, to whom is the West London promoting vague and ambiguous values and Alliance accountable? Similarly, what is the language. ‘West Midlands Prevent Board’? 242 Who are This raises the question: if so much its members? What role, if any, is reserved responsibility for Prevent is being hived off for MPs? Despite requests for information, to local authorities, just how is Prevent at the time of publication Birmingham City monitored and controlled? To whom are Council had not replied to our questions those municipalities accountable? regarding this. The current regime of assessment is It is vital that clear lines of accountability largely concerned with only the methodol - be established, particularly as there are ogy and process of Prevent (measured moves to add yet more layers of bureaucracy through NI:35 – see above, page 34), rather to the government’s overall counter-terror - than actual results. The HMIC-Audit ism strategy, known as Contest. These Commission report finds that ‘outcomes include the creation of regional Contest and were mostly measured by monitoring spend Prevent oversight boards. In this regard, one against budget and the timeliness of the proposal coming from the HMIC-Audit completion of projects. We found few Commission report is for the establishment performance or success measures to judge of a ‘Prevent Programme Board’ in each the outcomes and achievements from PVE- region whose ‘members should be drawn PF projects.’ 237 Government is therefore from the council, police, community groups neglecting to account properly for the effec - and voluntary sector’. 243 Notably, however, tiveness of its projects and is instead MPs appear to be overlooked yet again and preoccupied with ‘quantitative input meas - there is no reassurance that space reserved for ures … such as the number of participants at ‘community groups’ will not end up being events and whether projects were completed dominated by the very people whose on time and within budget’. 238 The HMIC- message the government is seeking to under - Audit Commission report also found that mine. government is too busy measuring the The ‘Contest Boards’ in existence in some wrong things, obsessing about ‘the Prevent regions scarcely seem to have inaugurated a delivery process rather than assessing the new approach. The role of MPs, and indeed outcome’. 239 As a result of this startling reve - that of locally elected officials, remains lation, it concluded that, ‘assessing the greatly diminished in favour of unelected success of Prevent activity is a significantly groups and officials. under-developed area. It is difficult to meas - The situation in the North-West region ure and define what works in preventing offers a useful case study of the various over - violent extremism.’ 240 This must be urgently sight structures in place – and their addressed. shortcomings. At present, all the existing documents and At the sub-regional level, each area within official guidance on Prevent fail to clearly the North-West has its own Contest or 237. Ibid. p 17. establish the precise lines of accountability. Prevent Steering Group. 244 For example, the 238. Ibid.. p 49. The HMIC-Audit Commission report Greater Manchester PVE Steering Group 239. Ibid. p 50. makes reference to the ‘West London includes senior level Government Office, 240. Ibid. p 6. Also see, p 49. Alliance’ responsible for co-ordinating and police and Police Authority representation, 241. Ibid. p 32. overseeing PVE-PF funding across six differ - together with local authority PVE Officers. 242. Ibid. p 33. ent boroughs. 241 Yet no information is It reports to the Association of Greater 243. Ibid. p 33. 244. North West Region CON - offered about what this alliance is. Who are Manchester Authorities and upwards to the TEST Group Proposal for its members and how were they selected? regional Contest board (see below). It is Regional CONTEST Board.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 45 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

striking that little space is reserved for elected local authorities operating in the North- local authority members. 245 Instead the West, although their presence would still boards are constituted almost solely of civil constitute only a minority of the board’s servants, the police service and other related overall composition. 248 Thus ‘elected agencies such as the Prison Service and UK member representation’ is referred to, but as Border Agency. One group most definitely only one component among many. not mentioned is MPs. Furthermore, sources from inside the North- Alongside these Steering Groups, local West Prevent team have confirmed that authority Prevent Co-ordinators (usually elected member involvement in this work is senior policy officers or assistant Chief sporadic, with little appetite for any expan - Executives on a local council), are brought sion of their role. Once again, MPs are together via a regional ‘PVE Co-ordinators noticeable for their absence from these struc - Group’ run by the regional Government tures. Office. However it seems clear that the primary purpose of both the Steering Groups and the Co-ordinator Group is to Conclusion ensure the harmonisation of Prevent work The creation of the Prevent initiative, and in rather than to subject it to serious external particular of PVE-PF, was motivated by and independent political scrutiny. The noble instincts. As Ruth Kelly, the Secretary North-West Prevent team has confirmed to of State who oversaw the scheme’s introduc - Policy Exchange that there is no dedicated tion, noted, ‘Too often in the past, regional oversight body for Prevent Whitehall has tried to provide all the solu - work. 246 tions. It cannot. It is local communities who A ‘CONTEST Regional Leadership understand their areas best. And it is local Group’ (Contest Board) has been created by authorities and their local partners, includ - the Government Office for the North-West ing the police, who have the experience, to ‘co-ordinate delivery across regional expertise and tools to tackle the problems at Government bodies and partner organisa - a local level.’ 249 Prevent became defined tions of the four strands of the CONTEST through the mantra: ‘local solutions to local Strategy’. The aim of this body, which meets problems’. 250 quarterly, is to serve as a link both upwards, This strategy was born out of Kelly’s belief to Whitehall, and downwards, to the local in the need to displace the MCB as the sole authorities. Yet beyond vague references to gatekeeper to the Muslim community. By 245. Association of Greater Manchester Authorities its ‘advisory and challenge role’, the precise recognising a broader spectrum of voices, Executive Strategy Group, 5 character of its oversight capabilities is far she hoped to empower ‘the silent majority’ at December 2008, p 4. from clear. This is particularly so in relation the grassroots, reaching over the heads of 246. Private Information. to Prevent, because the group’s terms of groups like the MCB to local representatives 247. PSA 26 CONTEST Regional Leadership Group: Terms of reference state, ‘For delivery of PURSUE in the hope of bolstering them and their Reference . and the police elements of PREVENT, position. In this regard she was perhaps 248. Association of Greater governance and accountability will continue overly optimistic, but not for the reasons Manchester Authorities , Executive Strategy Group, 5 to reside with regional ACPO [Association many people suspect. The new dispensation December 2008, p 3. See also: 247 North West Region CONTEST of Chief Police Officers]’. It is therefore offered by Kelly still played into the hands of Group Proposal for Regional not obvious how much of a say this group Islamists. There are several reasons for this. CONTEST Board . can have on PVE matters. Alternative Muslim groups did not always 249. Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Moreover, the membership of this board materialise at the local level as she might Guidance Note for Government confirms a shortfall in democratically have hoped. Islamists turned out to be more Offices and Local Authorities in England , p 1. mandated representation. Space is reserved capable than progressives of operating at the 250. Ibid. p 4. for one representative from each of the five grassroots, partly because they are better

46 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma

funded. After all, Charles Allen has noted in To sum up, there are a number of key his study of Wahhabism that since the 1970s problems with Prevent. These exist because: the Saudi Kingdom has spent more than $70 billion on promoting its austere and Prevent has concerned itself largely with narrow version of Islam – and this has had a the prevention of violent extremism, massive impact on Muslim communities rather than extremism per se . across Europe. 251 There are more obvious Many within local authorities have little reasons too. Large sections of the Muslim idea how to identify genuinely moderate community simply do not define their polit - groups and individuals. ical identity through religion alone and have Central government has not produced little interest in engaging with the state on any serious or meaningful guidelines on those terms. Islamists, however, see them - criteria for local partners to use when selves only in those terms, leaving them best assessing which groups or individuals to placed to continue capitalising on the work with. A lack of conceptual and opportunities currently offered under linguistic clarity in this regard has further Prevent. complicated matters. In many cases, the The lack of clarity from central govern - ambiguity of phrases which have encour - ment shows just how fiercely contested the aged working with ‘community leaders’ terrain remains. Certainly, some progress has has ended up empowering the very been made. Compared with a few years ago, people Prevent was supposed to under - there is now a greater willingness to accept mine. that ‘ideology matters’ − although the precise An excessive veneration of localism has contours of that struggle remain largely meant acquiescing to the implementa - unexamined. The space afforded to the tion of local standards in local areas, Muslim Council of Britain, which operates rather than developing national stan - as an umbrella body for mainly Islamist dards which are reflected across the groups, has been greatly reduced. However, country. a number of its affiliates – such as the Islamic There are no clear lines of accountability Foundation, FOSIS and the Islamic Society for any of the different Prevent strands. of Britain – continue to enjoy official recog - This means that taxpayers and parlia - nition. 252 mentarians are completely overlooked If central government has found it diffi - and left unable to scrutinise the effi - cult to grasp this, what hope for worthy ciency of Prevent projects. aldermen? Yes, local councils enjoy on-the- 251. Charles Allen, God’s ground expertise. But what kind of expertise The result is that on a subject as critical as Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and is it? Can councillors and council officials Prevent, where the greatest possible clarity is the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (London: Abacus, 2006). properly distinguish between different required from government, in terms of pur - See also: Evgenii Novikov, ‘The Muslim groups, all with mainstream and pose, practice and oversight the status quo is World Muslim League: Agent of Wahhabi Propagation in Europe ’, representative-sounding names? Who trains defined only by its opacity. Jamestown Foundation , Volume them to do so? Above all, why are those Before considering how this situation 3, Issue 9, 6 May 2005. http://www.jamestown.org/single people with the broadest mandate and there - might be improved, it is worth first examin - /?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_new fore greatest legitimacy – Members of ing how the Prevent agenda is also thrusting s]=472 . 252. ‘ List of Affiliates ’, Muslim Parliament – not being put at the heart of new roles and responsibilities on to the Council of Britain. http://www. Prevent activity? police. mcb.org.uk/affiliates.php .

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 47 4 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

The police have been given a key role in Picking Partners: delivering the Prevent strategy. This much The Policing Imperative has been made clear by the Home The requirement for police forces to be Secretary, Jacqui Smith, and the involved in community engagement work Association of Chief Police Officers is entirely in keeping with the require - (ACPO). 253 To this end, government has ments of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 given the police significant extra resources – the legal manifestation of Tony Blair’s and also the funds to create dedicated best known slogan, ‘tough on crime, tough Prevent positions. These include oversight on the causes of crime’. This foregrounded posts such as the Metropolitan Police the importance of ‘partnership’ work and Service’s Prevent Co-ordinators (see above, placed a statutory duty on police to work 253. ‘ Home Secretary Jacqui page 28) and new Prevent Engagement with ‘a range of other local public, private, Smith: “Prevent strategy: back - ground and next steps – speech Officers (PEOs) who are to operate at community and voluntary groups and with to the BCU Commanders ’ 256 Conference ”’ , Home Office grassroots level. These posts have already the community itself’. Press Release, 16 April 2008; come into existence in certain police forces In some ways, this means that Prevent PREVENT: The Policing Response to the Prevention of – for example, Thames Valley Police − and can be seen as merely an extension and Terrorism and Violent Extremism the Met are in the process of creating a reinforcement of the commitment to work Strategy & Delivery Plan , April 254 2008. ‘PEO network’. with various partners at local level. But one

254. ‘ Prevent Engagement Prevent has now become such an essen - effect of this is that the Prevent strategy Officers ’, Thames Valley Police. tial part of the police’s role that the Prevent documents focus heavily on ‘community http://www.thamesvalley.police.u k/yournh/yournh-about-nh- Delivery Plan issued by ACPO’s Terrorism engagement’ – effectively as a goal in itself pol/yournh-about-nh-pol- peo.htm; ‘Delivery of Prevent: and Allied Matters (TAM) ‘Business Area’ – and give less consideration to what the Report by Assistant says that its ‘overall vision will be to main - terms of this engagement should be. As a Commissioner Robert Quick on behalf of the Commissioner ’, stream counter-terrorism PREVENT result, many of the problems associated Metropolitan Police Authority, 29 functions into everyday policing’. 255 with Prevent delivery by local councils are January 2009, p 1. With all the extra burdens associated with replicated by the police. 255 . ‘ Police Prevent Strategy – Partners briefing ’, Association of integrating Prevent into everyday policing The ACPO Prevent Delivery Plan Chief Police Officers (Terrorism come a series of new and important ques - reveals much about the indistinct nature of and Allied Matters) , p 8. Also, see PREVENT: The Policing tions, which have not yet been adequately the police’s corporate understanding of Response to the Prevention of explored by government. In particular, these what Prevent requires. ACPO’s contribu - Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy & Delivery Plan , April considerations return to the question of tion to this subject reiterates the kind of 2008. ‘criteria for engagement’. Who does the vague language seen elsewhere, with refer - 256. Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 17 . http://www. police work with? How does it pick its part - ences to ‘Key Individual Networks’, crimereduction.homeoffice.gov ners? And to what end? ACPO’s 2008 ‘Independent Advisory Groups’ and .uk/legislation26.htm . Prevent Delivery Plan is less than reassuring ‘community representatives’. 257 Again, 257. PREVENT: The Policing Response to the Prevention of on these crucial issues and – much like other these terms are not adequately explored; Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevent documents – raises almost as many nor is any guidance offered about how Strategy & Delivery Plan , April 2008, p 10, 25, 39. questions as it answers. such partners should be identified. In the

48 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

same document, the police do recognise as others suggested that, while they do exist, their first objective the need to undermine they do not constitute a ‘rigid’ set of crite - extremist ideology. Yet this is followed by ria that must always be followed. 264 Instead, the usual oblique references to ‘mainstream key decisions seem to be made by senior voices’ and the promotion of ‘alternative officers on a case by case basis – too often narratives/messages’. 258 There is no discus - with little reference even to the minimalis - sion of what comprises a ‘mainstream’ or tic criteria set out by the government. an ‘alternative’ voice: are these meant to be In line with this, senior police sources ‘mainstream’ in relation to Muslim have stressed that Prevent should not entail communities, or ‘mainstream’ in relation drawing a ‘firm line’ between those with to British society as a whole? Nor is there whom the authorities should and should any discussion of the manner in which not engage. It is claimed that the situation these people should be engaged. And while is not ‘black and white’, but one charac - it is stated that ‘Preventing violent extrem - terised by ‘shades of grey’. This is at odds ism includes prevention of the funding of with Hazel Blears’ recent call for ‘moral ideologues,’ the question of who, or what, clarity’ and a ‘clear dividing line between defines an ideologue is left unanswered. 259 what we consider acceptable, and what we Even the Commanders Guidance issued consider beyond the pale’. 265 to Basic Command Units (BCU), which is Furthermore, this attitude seems to be at supposed to ‘provide Police leaders at the variance with the police’s general preference rank of Superintendent or Police Staff for a clear-eyed focus on legality/illegality. equivalent with the relevant skills and It also reflects the extent to which the knowledge to ensure delivery of the police fail to understand the profound PREVENT agenda’, says nothing on the political effect of decisions about whom vital question of criteria for engagement. 260 they judge to be an appropriate partner. This kind of imprecision is also evident These decisions can alter the balance of in other documents, such as the report power within communities – and impede produced by the Metropolitan Police the effort to integrate Muslim populations 258. Ibid. p 10. For similar lan - Authority (MPA) following a consultation and induct them into the norms and values guage, see also appendix 4 of process called ‘Counter Terrorism: The of British society. MPS Prevent Delivery Strategy: Report by Assistant 261 London Debate’. There too, the The MPA has further intimated that, in Commissioner Specialist language is of ‘community engagement’ via so far as they are in place, the criteria take Operations on behalf of the Commissioner , Metropolitan ‘vetted community members’ and ‘trusted their cue from the Security Service, which Police Authority, 24 July 2008. community contacts’ (with whom it is vet individuals and groups as required. Yet, 259. PREVENT: The Policing Response to the Prevention of recommended that the Metropolitan the Security Service have a narrow remit (see Terrorism and Violent Extremism Police Service (MPS) share intelligence on page 68), focusing on the prevention of Strategy & Delivery Plan , April 2008, p 13. forthcoming counter-terrorism operations violence against the British State. This 260. Ibid. p 27; Also see, BCU 262 in order to prevent a backlash). But hardly seems an appropriate yardstick for Commanders Guidance. almost inevitably, there is no discussion of the police to use when assessing the suitabil - 261. Counter-Terrorism: The how such individuals might be selected. lity of its potential partners, as it sets a very London Debate, February, 2007 The MPA have informed Policy high threshold for unacceptable behaviour 262. Ibid. p 8, 43, 44. Exchange that the Metropolitan Police and means that groups which espouse values 263. Private Information. Service does have a set of criteria that antithetical to those of our society and way 264. Private Information. 265. Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP, 263 govern its engagement policy. However it of life could be deemed legitimate, public, ‘Many Voices: understanding the is far from clear how well-defined these partners of the police service. debate about preventing violent extremism ’, London School of criteria actually are. When asked about When asked which groups the MPA Economics, 25 February 2009. them, some senior police officers professed would deem it unacceptable for the MPS http://www.communities.gov.uk/ speeches/corporate/ to be unaware of their existence, while to work with, the only firm benchmark manyvoices.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 49 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

given was that the organisation should not Lokahi Foundation. 273 This is ‘a advocate violence. When pushed as to programme to provide university students whether this meant violence in the UK, or and staff with a wide range of knowledge, all violence, it was said that this was a skills and advice to support activities and ‘movable feast’, which appeared to indicate engagement in matters of their faith’. On a willingness, in certain circumstances, to the question of what factors fuel extrem - work with groups that might promote ism, the Campusalam website lists a violence abroad, if not in the UK. 266 number of things, including: ‘anger over At best, it might be said that much foreign policy’; a ‘sense of grievance or continues to be unclear about this process victimisation from treatment by the of engagement. Senior police sources argue media’; ‘social exclusion and economic that their experience to date has shown marginalisation’; and the ‘experience of that this is ‘not an exact science’ and has prejudice and hostility from outside the involved substantial ‘trial and error’. 267 community: Islamophobia or discrimina - It is clear that there has been some tion’. Notably, Islamist ideology is not consideration of the problems that might mentioned. 274 Indeed, elsewhere on their flow from this and of ways in which the website, it is stated: police might be better prepared to fulfil their commitments under Prevent. For Ideological or religious orientation does

266. MPA interview with Policy example, the ACPO document emphasises not necessarily determine whether the Exchange, 22 January 2009. the importance of ‘training of staff in faith overall impact of people’s interactions 267. Senior Police Source. and cultural skills’. 268 Alongside this, there are constructive, or whether the people 268. PREVENT: The Policing are references to ‘Intelligence and are ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ Those who Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism Community Engagement’ training. 269 are not Muslim and lack experience and Strategy & Delivery Plan , April 2008, p 22. However this training is not designed to expertise in understanding Islamic

269. Ibid. p 10, 24. help police forces make decisions about thinking, belief and contemporary

270 . Ibid. p 24 their strategic partnerships. trends should not attempt to make

271. The Prevent Strategy: A Equally significant is the question of judgments about the orientation of Guide for Local Partners in who the police service uses to train its offi - Muslim students or staff based on what England; Stopping people becoming or supporting terror - cers. The ACPO Prevent Strategy Delivery they hear or observe. Judgments based ists and violent extremists, June on ideology, or fundamentals of Islamic 2008, p 39. report merely concludes that, ‘experience

272. ‘ Case Studies ’, Lokahi shows that training should be delivered behaviour or practice, can also miss the Foundation, http://www.lokahi locally by staff who know their communi - mark of serious potentially violent .org.uk/case; ‘Report of the 270 Chief Constable: Exercise Nicole ties’. Meanwhile evidence of the kind of activity … Some individuals who wish Feedback ’, Hampshire Police groups being brought in from the outside to bring about a Caliphate in this coun - Authority, 4 November 2008. http://209.85.229.132/search?q= to conduct such training, raises yet further try may have political aspirations that cache:sIVOrPu2Tq8J:www3.hant issues. could be deemed ‘radical’. However, so s.gov.uk/item_8_-_exer - cise_nicole_feedback.doc+%22l For example, Operation Nicole is a does the Socialist Workers’ Party. Mere okahi+foundation%22&hl=en&ct police training event for Prevent recom - aspirations do not entail the intention =clnk&cd=22&client=opera.. 271 273. Campusalam. mended by ACPO. The project has been to engage in violent acts for religious http://www.campusalam.org/ developed jointly by ACPO’s National and political motivation … Trying to 274. ‘ How does it happen? ’, Community Tension Team and the Lokahi make blunt judgments based on ideol - Campusalam. http://www.camp 272 usalam.org/cs/knowledge_centra Foundation. However Lokahi’s under - ogy or fervour of religious practice can l/knowledge_about_extr/14u78tt standing of the issues that surround the lead both to over-diagnosis and under- zu.html . threat from extremism seems to under-rate diagnosis, simultaneously casting 275. ‘ How can I tell if it’s a prob - lem? ’, Campusalam. http://www. the role played by ideology. This much can suspicion on innocent people and miss - campusalam.org/cs/knowledge_ ing those with serious intent to commit central/knowledge_about_ be gleaned from an examination of the extr/1yaypg4rz.html . ‘Campusalam’ project also run by the violence. 275

50 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

For an organisation that currently plays a profoundly political and ideological ques - role in educating police forces about their tions? responsibilities under Prevent, this is a striking statement. If this is the kind of thing that police are being taught, then it “ Decisions taken by the police often influence other would point to an approach to Prevent that agencies similarly tasked with delivering Prevent initiatives is markedly out of step with recent govern - and can therefore tilt the balance in municipalities ment pronouncements. considering their engagement strategy In this context it is worth considering ” what guidance ACPO has offered on the rationale underpinning Prevent. Once more, there is clear synergy, as one would A cautionary tale in this regard is expect, with the language (and problems) provided by the recent controversy of the wider Prevent strategy. For exam - surrounding the decision of Sgt Amar ple, one objective is for police to ‘increase Shakoor of Strathclyde Police to sign an the resilience of communities to engage open letter on behalf of the Strathclyde with and resist violent extremists’. To this Muslim Police Association condemning end, ACPO calls on them to help the Israel’s actions in Gaza. 280 As Professor creation of ‘social structures’ that ‘exist Tom Gallagher of Bradford University’s with strong leadership and civic engage - Peace Studies Department has observed, ment, articulating shared values, isolating ‘However diligent a search in the annals violent extremists and those who provide of Glasgow police history, I doubt if it them with support’. Yet, typically, there is will be easy to discover a precedent for a no description of what these ‘shared serving officer taking such an overt polit - values’ might be. 276 Elsewhere it is stated ical stand.’ 281 As Gallagher noted, the that the police should take care to use danger of such actions is that it may lead ‘appropriate language’ when working on to a serious loss in confidence in the Prevent matters. 277 Again, the content of impartiality of the police, with the result this language is not defined – nor is it that ‘Glasgow´s investment in anti-sectar - clear who defined it for the police. ian work’ will go ‘up in smoke’. 282 Even more opaque is the call for the This episode underscores the dangers police to ensure that ‘genuine grievances arising from the absence of clear direction that contribute to violent extremism are from government about what is expected addressed effectively and perceived griev - from the police. 278 ances rebutted’. The document does add The effects of this can be far-reaching. 276. PREVENT: The Policing that, ‘Grievances that are global or political Decisions taken by the police often influ - Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in nature are not amenable to police inter - ence other agencies similarly tasked with Strategy & Delivery Plan , April vention.’ But it also r eaffirms that ‘The delivering Prevent initiatives and can 2008, p 1 7. police do have a role, however, in under - therefore tilt the balance in municipalities 277. Ibid. p 21. See also, p. 39. standing and addressing community considering their engagement strategy. 278. Ibid. p 18. grievances.’ And there is a reference to One Westminster councillor told Policy 279. Ibid. 280. ‘ Scottish figures unite on their taking ‘substantive action’ to this Exchange that councillors frequently ask action for Gaza ’, Scottish Islamic end. 279 All this raises the question of what the police about their view on questionable Foundation, 29 December 2008. http://www.scottishislamic.org/in is meant here. What constitutes a ‘griev - groups and individuals. The police’s dex.php?go=news&id=256 ance’ that the police should be acting to concern with violent extremism alone 281. Professor Tom Gallagher, resolve? What are the limits on the means that groups which should not be Unpublished letter to the Scottish Herald , supplied to police’s action? More broadly, why does it adopted as Prevent partners regularly ‘slip Policy Exchange. fall to the police force to tackle such through the net’ and dissenting voices at 282. Ibid.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 51 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

the local level are consequently overlooked. and progressive. But to what end? They It means the police can sometimes be the usually do so in order to present them - weakest link in the chain. selves as interlocutors for British Muslims In this respect, the involvement of the and to make sectarian demands on our police in Prevent, particularly in relation liberal democracy, arguing we should to addressing grievances, is a charter for become less liberal and less free in order the politicisation of the police on to accommodate them. matters which are beyond their compe - One result of such beliefs was that it tence. It is emblematic of the increasing took years to arrest the notorious hate pressures being placed on the police preacher, Abu Hamza. At his trial for solic - without any clear direction in policy iting murder, Hamza’s defence counsel, coming from government. Edward Fitzgerald, QC, told the court how an officer from the Metropolitan Police had previously given the defendant The Enigma of Prevent: the all-clear: ‘You have freedom of speech. What is it for? You don’t have anything to worry about so After the police were attacked for enlisting long as we don’t see blood on the streets.’ 285 the support of Islamists, former Assistant The police and Security Service made a Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ‘pragmatic’ judgement. They left preachers Andy Hayman, argued: ‘The very people like Abu Hamza alone and used them as who are best placed to advise on how to ‘clerical honeypots’ to gather intelligence reach those in the community who are on their movements, supporters and most susceptible to extremism are those networks. Quite a few believed that, in whose own backgrounds may present a many cases, these groups were not really security risk. This is where the dilemma that dangerous, but were instead led by sits. The most valuable advisers are those loud-mouthed hotheads, buoyed by the likely to fail the vetting process and be cocksure exuberance of youth. The ranti - barred from Scotland Yard.’ 283 Robert ngs of Abu Hamza were even deemed by Lambert, one of the founders of the some senior officers of the era as a ‘safety Muslim Contact Unit in the Metropolitan valve’ for letting off steam. Police, goes further and advocates ‘partner - The police and Security Service were

283. Andy Hayman, ‘Comment: ship with Muslim groups conventionally wrong. Among those who studied under The risk of good policing intelli - deemed to be subversive to democracy; Abu Hamza at the old Finsbury Park gence ’, The Times ,16 December 2008. http://www.timesonline. and negotiation by those groups with Mosque are Zacarias Moussaoui, the co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5 Muslim youth drawn to Al Qaeda terroris - ‘twentieth hijacker’ who pleaded guilty to 348490.ece. m’. 284 This approach has come to define conspiring to fly a plane into the White 284. Robert Lambert, ‘Empowering Salafis and much of the outreach work currently being House on 9/11; Richard Reid, who tried to Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case done by the Metropolitan Police Service blow up a flight from Paris to Miami using Study ’ in PS: Political Science & (MPS). a bomb concealed in his shoes; Djamel Politics , Vol.41, No. 1, January 2008, p 31-5. At first glance it might seem attractive Beghal, who pleaded guilty in France to

285. The Times , 8 February to enlist such groups in the fight against planning a suicide attack on the US 2006. http://www.timesonline. al-Qaeda. After all, a number of groups embassy; and Nizar Trabelsi, once a profes - co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/g uest_contributors/article728330. that could be classed as ideologically sional footballer in Germany, who was ece . Islamist condemn terrorism in the UK convicted in Belgium for planning a 286. The case study of all these 286 men connected to Hamza is list - and encourage their members to partici - suicide attack against a NATO base. ed in Sean O ’Neill and Daniel pate in the democratic process. They Clearly, Abu Hamza was not the harmless McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury often want to participate in the political radical many thought he was – nor was he Park Mosque (London, 2006). mechanisms of the state, appearing open the only one to enjoy a degree of tolerance

52 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

on the part of the British state. This acqui - elements within our society, in the belief escence partly stemmed from the belief that that only they can deliver security. a ‘covenant of security’ would prevent terrorists attacking the UK, while their rage was directed abroad. Indeed, the situation “ many police forces are prepared to co-operate with, became so bad that the former head of the and occasionally even support, some of the most sectari - Metropolitan Police’s Counter-Terrorism an elements within our society, in the belief that only they Command, Peter Clarke, revealed at the can deliver security. inaugural Colin Cramphorn memorial ” lecture at Policy Exchange in 2007, that, ‘By and large, in 2003, the UK was a net exporter of terrorism.’ 287 At some level this approach might The belief endures, in Whitehall and in sound reasonable, but it has profound many police forces, that radicals can be implications for the nature of our democ - controlled, and that they, in turn, can racy. Consider the bizarre and damaging control angry young men. It was precisely consequences that this policy produced this kind of thinking that led to the when West Midlands Police decided to creation of the Muslim Contact Unit report Channel 4 to Ofcom, the broadcast - (MCU) by the Metropolitan Police ing regulator, over fears that its Service, shortly after 9/11. The purpose of investigation into hate preachers in some 287. ‘ Learning From Experience – Counter Terrorism in the UK the MCU was to foster new relationships British mosques might have harmed since 9/11 ’, The Colin with the Muslim community, and its work ‘community cohesion’. Cramphorn Memorial Lecture delivered by Deputy Assistant has continued to be shaped by the belief In January 2007 Channel 4 broadcast Commissioner, Peter Clarke, 24 that there is a value in working with non- ‘Dispatches: Undercover Mosque’, which April 2007. 288. Lambert, ‘Empowering violent extremists. Robert Lambert has showed the results of a covert investigation Salafis and Islamists Against Al- even argued that the police should adopt ‘a into sermons delivered in British mosques. Qaeda: A London Counter- terrorism Case Study ’, p 32. non-judgmental approach [to] persuade It captured one imam, Abu Usama, preach - 289. Lambert cited in Seumas young Muslims that al-Qaeda propaganda ing a message of vicious sectarianism, Milne, ‘We need to listen to the is wrong’. 288 discrimination and intolerance at the Green man from special branch ’, The Guardian , 14 February 2008. It is a view whose advocates urge the Lane Mosque in Birmingham. During one http://www.guardian.co.uk/com state to refrain from making value-judge - meeting he told the congregation that mentisfree/2008/feb/14/uksec urity.terrorism. ments about the nature of political Osama bin Laden is ‘better than a million 290. Ibid.

Islamists and their beliefs, in the hope that George Bushes and a thousand Tony 291. Parliamentary Debates , this trade-off will deliver security. The Blairs’. 292 He described all non-Muslims as House of Commons, 22 July 2008, Column 1373W. logic, as argued by Lambert, is that ‘pathological liars’ and in other sermons 292. ‘ C4’s Dispatches reported 293 genuine Muslim moderates have ‘neither described women as ‘deficient’. Abu to Ofcom ’, Channel 4 News, 8 religious nor political credibility’. 289 As a Usama also said, ‘Take that homosexual August 2007. http://www. chan - nel4.com/player/v2/player.jsp?sh 294 result, he declares: ‘Let’s be clear who it is man and throw him off the mountain.’ owId=82 36; ‘ Dispatches report - that can keep London safe in the run-up to Undercover filming elsewhere revealed that ed to Ofcom ’, Channel 4 News, 8 August 2007. http://www. the Olympic Games.’ 290 the London Central Mosque (also known as channel4.com/news/articles /arts_entertainment/film_tv/ The apotheosis of this approach has the Regent’s Park Mosque) was selling a dispatches+reported+to+ been the Channel Project, which aims to video by Sheikh Feiz, a Saudi-trained cleric, ofcom/660762; see also, Transcript from ‘Undercover promote the early identification of, and who told his congregation that Jews are pigs Mosque , Hardcash Productions, intervention with, vulnerable individuals and will have to be killed. ‘They [Jews] will January 2007. at local level (see above, pages 30-1). 291 To be (snorting), all of them, every single one 293. Transcript from ‘Undercover Mosque , Hardcash Productions, 295 this end, many police forces are prepared of them.’ January 2007. to co-operate with, and occasionally even After the programme was broadcast, 294. Ibid. support, some of the most sectarian Roger Godsiff, Labour MP for Sparkbrook 295. Ibid.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 53 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

and Small Heath in whose constituency ‘What you have to understand is that Abu some of the featured mosques are located, Usama is the last person young Muslim wrote to the Chief Constable of West men meet before they go off the deep Midlands Police and the Director of Public end.’ 302 Therefore, to ensure that people Prosecutions, urging them to investigate don’t ‘go off the deep end’, it would appear the preachers whose extremist views had that preachers like Abu Usama at the been uncovered. 296 Green Lane Mosque were more than just West Midlands Police (WMP) looked tolerated. It is a policy which suggests that into the matter, but later abandoned its it is precisely the most reactionary investigation, claiming that it had insuffi - elements in the Muslim community that cient grounds for prosecution. Remarkably, should be engaged with – because only the WMP then switched the focus of its they can ‘deliver’ security. If this is the case, attention from the preachers identified by does it mean that we now have a form of the programme to the programme-makers state-sanctioned bigotry for what the themselves. There followed a new investiga - police believe are security reasons? tion into whether the broadcaster could be Was this part of a quite deliberate policy prosecuted for showing material likely to undertaken by West Midlands Police, 296. Jasbir Authi, ‘MP urges stir up racial hatred. Finally, when this too under PVE, to show local Muslims that it probe over extremists mosques: Call to police after hardline failed to uncover sufficient evidence for was ‘impartial’? Was it intended as a preachers exposed on TV ’, Birmingham Mail , 17 January prosecution, West Midlands Police made a conciliatory gesture towards elements in 2007. formal complaint to Ofcom over the editing the community, after West Midlands 297. Adam Sherwin, ‘Muslim of the programme. 297 An accompanying Police had only a few months before, outrage at Channel 4 film prompts new inquiry by watch - complaint from the Crown Prosecution uncovered a terrorist plot to behead a serv - dog ’, The Times , 9 August 2007. Service (CPS) claimed that the documen - ing Muslim soldier in Birmingham − thus http://entertainment.timesonline. co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment tary had been a ‘heavily edited television allegedly placing the community under /tv_and_radio/article2224728.ec programme’, which had taken ‘out of pressure? But whose advice did the West e. ‘ C4 “distorted ” mosque pro - gramme ’, BBC News Online , 8 context aspects of speeches’ and thereby Midlands Police take, either within August 2007. http://news.bbc presented a ‘completely distorted’ picture of Birmingham City Council or the regional .co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlan ds/6936681.stm . what the speakers had actually said. 298 West Prevent team? Did they believe there was a 298. Ibid . Midlands Police stated the material broad - need to ‘even up the score’? When Policy 299. Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin , cast by Channel 4 had been ‘sufficient to Exchange sought clarification from the Issue 97, November 2007. 299 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/obb/ undermine community cohesion’. West Midlands Police Authority on these prog_cb/obb97/issue97.pdf. In November 2007 Ofcom cleared matters, they said they were ‘unable to 300. ‘ Police apologise to Channel 4 of any wrong-doing. Given the comment’. 303 mosque film crew ’, Channel 4 News, 15 May 2008. damage done to its reputation, Channel 4 So what lessons did West Midlands http://www.channel4.com/news/ articles/uk/police%20apologise then announced it would sue the Crown Police derive from this affair? In evidence %20to%20mosque%20film%20 Prosecution Service and West Midlands given to the Home Affairs Select crew/2199452. Police for libel. In May 2008 the case was Committee in November 2008, by Deputy 301. The Macpherson report was published in 1999 after an resolved out of court when the CPS and Chief Constable Phil Gormley (who had inquiry into the Metropolitan police agreed to issue a full apology and earlier carried out a review of the Police Service ’s handling of the 300 Stephen Lawrence murder paid £100,000 in damages. ‘Undercover Mosque’ controversy), he investigation. The report So, how did this extraordinary sequence largely declined to go into detail. He accused the Metropolitan Police Service and policing in general of events come to pass? admitted that the police had ‘got it wrong’ of ‘institutional racism ’ and led It is easy to dismiss all this as an exam - and lessons had been learnt. But to this to a raft of wide-ranging reforms.

302. Private information. ple of ‘political correctness gone mad’, a point it remains indeterminate precisely

303. Email exchanges between tabloid caricature of British police forces in what the police understand their ‘mistakes’ Policy Exchange and the West a post-Macpherson world. 301 However, a to be – and therefore, what lessons they have Midlands Police Authority, 23 February 2009. serving officer has told Policy Exchange: learned. Indeed, the only substantive

54 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

comment offered by Gormley hitherto in four-year period the MPS has provided this regard was the view that the joint press sponsorship of approximately £26,500 to release issued by the CPS and the WMP – at GPU and senior Met officials have the time of Channel 4’s referral to Ofcom – attended and spoken at the conference. 308 had been an error. 304 In other words, the As the case study below (pages 75-77) corporate view seemed to be that what was demonstrates, GPU featured several indi - problematic was the way things were done, viduals and groups that have put forward rather than the actions themselves. extreme Islamist sentiments. Despite this, This entire episode is all the more worry - it was deemed a suitable organisation with ing when set against the broader policing which the MPS should work. And when ethos that would appear to condone – Hazel Blears wanted to advise ministers indeed to favour – non-violent extremism as against participating in the 2008 GPU (see useful in the battle against violent extrem - above, pages 15-16), the fact that the ism. A senior officer typified this belief when police were attending was used against her he told a policing conference: ‘Isn’t radicali - by colleagues and civil servants who sation a good thing? Surely what matters is wanted to attend. A decision taken by the when it becomes violent radicalisation? Isn’t MPS to support an event can therefore it a good sign young people want to become sometimes make it difficult for even senior engaged and change the world?’ 305 He saw elected politicians to say no. radicalism, even when its content is hate- filled and reactionary, as constructive: it operates as a safety valve, discharging anger “ the police are being placed in a very difficult situation and stabilising otherwise volatile young by what they are being asked to do under the aegis of men. Prevent The MPA’s report into counter-terror - ” ism policing in London similarly noted: ‘We were reminded that radicalism in students can be a good thing, and that it is So how is it that an organisation such as important again to distinguish rigorously the Metropolitan Police Service, which in between students on the one hand getting its standard email disclaimer disavows politicised, organised and mobilised, and, ‘racist, homophobic, sexist, defamatory, 304. Police and the Media: Second Report of Session 2008- on the other, being recruited into terror - offensive, illegal or otherwise inappropriate 09 , House of Commons, Home 306 Affairs Select Committee, 16 ism.’ It continued: ‘We heard from material’, can allow itself publicly to December 2008, p 12-3, Ev. 8-10. students of literature disseminated on endorse individuals and groups diametri - 305. Private information. campus which incited racial hatred – cally opposed to several of its own openly 306. Counter-Terrorism: The mostly virulently anti-Semitic propaganda stated values? 309 Why is it that the MPS, London Debate , p 60. – but none which overtly solicited terror - which has to make ‘Equality Impact 307. Ibid. p 61. ism.’ 307 Little attention is paid in this Assessments’ (EIAs) of its actions – partic - 308. Global Peace and Unity Conference , MPS briefing sent respect to the connection between non- ularly in relation to counter-terrorism to MPA members, 9 February violent and violent extremism. Not only is activity – does not consider the ‘impact’ on 2009. 309. This sentence is part of the the symbiotic relationship between the two other minority communities of policies disclaimer used by the totally ignored, but the former is also seen that lead to the toleration of those who Metropolitan Police Service at the bottom of all their standard 310 as a constructive phenomenon which can advance bigoted and offensive opinions? emails. be positively enlisted against the latter. Significantly, when Policy Exchange raised 310. For an example of this pre - Perhaps it was these considerations that this possibility, senior MPS figures occupation with ‘Racial and Equality Impact ’ assessments, led the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) responded with blithe indifference to the see Counter-Terrorism to act as an official partner to the Global idea that Prevent might have an impact on Governance Update: Report by the Chief Executive , Metropolitan Peace and Unity (GPU) event. Over a community relations more generally. To Police Authority, 24 July 2008.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 55 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

conduct such EIAs of Prevent on non- community, 317 and in 2006-07 it was given Muslim communities would, it was at least £35,000 of taxpayers’ money. 318 But asserted, be ‘a bureaucratic nightmare’. 311 on what basis, if any, was the MSF deemed The result of this unwillingness to suitable for this role? consider the broader impact of its policies The MSF is certainly not an uncontrover - is that men like Abu Usama are seen to be sial body, and lists both the Muslim enjoying the patronage of the police. As Association of Britain and the Muslim the result of a quite deliberate policy, they Council of Britain among its members. 319 311. Private Information are endowed with the legitimacy that stems Perhaps more worrying are the revelations 312. Richard Kerbaj & Dominic from being quasi-official partners of the surrounding Azad Ali, a trustee and former Kennedy, ‘Terrorism adviser to Met is on wanted list ’, The police. chairman of the MSF, who also sits on the Times , 15 December 2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ The recent controversy over Metropolitan Police’s Strategic Stop and news/uk/crime/article5342730.ec Mohammed Ali Harrath raises similar Search Committee and Police Use of e. For the Interpol notice see: http://www.interpol.int/Public/Da issues. Harrath had been appointed by the Firearms Group, as well as the IPCC’s ta/Wanted/Notices/Data/1992/85 MPS’ Muslim Contact Unit as an adviser Community Advisory Group and the Home /1992_27585.asp. on preventing extremism, but in Office’s Trust and Confidence Community 313. Richard Kerbaj & Dominic 320 Kennedy, ‘Nothing criminal December 2008 The Times revealed that Panel. Ali has recently published a series of about trying to establish an Interpol has issued a ‘red notice’ against incendiary articles on the internet fuelled by Islamic state’, The Times , 15 December 2008. http:// him, a request by the Tunisian government his outrage over Israeli military activity in www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ uk/crime/article5342766.ece. for his arrest and extradition on terrorism Gaza. In one article he pours scorn on 312 314. ‘ History ’, Muslim Safety charges. Whatever the truth of these alle - moderate Muslims, calling them ‘self-serving Forum. http://muslimsafet gations, Harrath is quite open about his vultures, feeding on the dead flesh of the forum.org/about-us/history.html. political views: he supports the establish - Palestinians’. 321 On what basis, then, was 315. Private Information. ment of an Islamic state. 313 On what basis someone with Azad Ali’s views, or an organ - 316. ‘ History ’, Muslim Safety Forum. http://muslimsafety then, was he judged by the Metropolitan isation such as the MSF, judged to be an forum.org/about-us/history.html. Police Service to be an authoritative inter - appropriate partner for the Metropolitan 317. Private Information. preter of Islam? What is the MPS looking Police and other official organs? Why, even 318. Neil Millard & Jack Lefley, ‘“ Police give £35,000 taxpayers ” for in its Muslim counsellors? now, does the Metropolitan Police not money to a Muslim organisation These same questions might also be regard him as beyond the pale? formerly headed by the civil ser - vant suspended over anti-British asked of the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF). When pressed on this matter, senior remarks ’, Evening Standard , 19 Created after 9/11, the MSF is a key advi - police sources seemed uncertain whether January 2009. http://www. thisis - london.co.uk/standard/article- sory body to the Metropolitan Police any systematic process of ‘due diligence’ is 23622454-details/Police+ Service on Islam and also has some powers routinely carried out on those with whom give+%A335,000+taxpayers%27 314 +money+to+group+headed+by+ to scrutinise police actions. It was set up they work. As with the broader question of anti-British+Muslim/article.do to give the MPS a ‘finger on the pulse’ of ‘criteria for engagement’ (see above, page 319. ‘ MSF Members ’, Muslim 315 Safety Forum, http://muslim the Muslim community. To this end, a 29), the decision appeared to be devolved safetyforum.org/msf-mem - number of national organisations were to the subjective assessment of those bers.html. asked to send representatives to meetings within the police responsible for the actual 320. ‘ Muslim-Government Relations in Changing Security with the police. This ad hoc arrangement engagement. In other words, it was a ‘judg - Contexts: Prospects for later evolved so that the MSF developed its ment call’ in which there were few ‘hard Transformation – Participant 322 Biographies ’, SOAS, 5-7 June own constitution and became an inde - and fast rules’. 2008. http://www.soas.ac. pendent body. Today, it holds monthly While the police are tasked with ‘address - uk/politics/events/muslimgovtco nf/participants/participants-biog - meetings with ‘with senior representatives ing grievances’ under Prevent, it is worth raphies.html#AzadAli . of ACPO, the MPS, the MPA, Home considering whether its choice of partners 321. Azad Ali, ‘We are the Resistance II ’, Between the Office and the IPCC [Independent Police such as Azad Ali and Mohammed Ali Lines , 15 January 2009. Complaints Commission]’. 316 Sources in Harrath has actually accentuated, rather http://blog.islamicforumeurope.c om/?p=139. the MPA describe it as the ‘main mecha - than damped down, grievances? Of perhaps

322. Private Information. nism of consultation’ with the Muslim greater concern is that the police turn to

56 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

such advisers when trying to establish what immediate security challenge. The fact is grievances it should be addressing. that the police have a different set of prior - All of this highlights the extent to which ities from local councils and government as the police are being placed in a very diffi - a whole. Their focus is therefore very much cult situation by what they are being asked on preventing violent extremism, rather to do under the aegis of Prevent. Already, than all extremism. Britain’s police forces have certain statutory obligations to engage in partnership and engagement activities, and this has been ‘engagement’ has become a sacred cow to be pur - reinforced by the localist agenda emanat - “ sued and preserved at all costs ing from the government on Prevent. ” The result of this is two-fold. First, there is the obsession with engagement for engagement’s sake. In the context of a In line with this, the ACPO Prevent policing culture that cherishes ‘commu - Strategy Delivery Plan looks towards the nity partnership’ and ‘neighbourhood creation of ‘risk-based’ action plans to policing’ as absolute priorities, ‘engage - prevent violent extremism at local level. 324 ment’ has become a sacred cow to be It is envisaged that Prevent strategies will pursued and preserved at all costs. An be tailored according to the locality, to example of this was again provided by the make them proportionate to the level of decision of the MPS to attend the GPU ‘risk’ in each area. Obviously, there is some conference. A senior member of the MPA sense in this. But there are serious prob - has defended this move on the basis that, lems arising from such an approach, when irrespective of the questionable views of it is placed in the wider context of the some participants, participation in GPU police’s current attitude to Prevent. An gave the police access to a large number of ACPO source has confirmed to Policy Muslims. Even more striking is the way in Exchange that in those areas of the greatest which, despite the debate on this very ‘risk’, it can mean that local police forces subject within government, some senior are more inclined to take chances with MPS officers seem barely to have regis - regards to engagement strategy. In a frame - tered the possibility that attendance at work where the only constraint is the need such an event might be controversial. In to stop a terrorist incident, it is supposed their view there was never any question that ‘bad guys’ are the very people that that the police should be involved with an need to be engaged. 325 As a result, a lower event like GPU, because it provided an ‘threshold’ is applied for those with whom opportunity to ‘get the Met’s message the police might work. The problem, of out’. 323 course, is that this has the potential to In other words, it is the very process of create a self-fulfilling prophecy. engagement – in and of itself – that is Moreover, there is a conflation of stan - prized. The quality or nature of that process dards here between what is appropriate is deemed less significant. The only brake for the covert cultivation and recruitment on potentially damaging acts of engagement of human sources and what should surely appears to be the fear of external objections be the higher threshold of behaviour 323. Private Information. (for example, a media row), rather than the expected from public partners under the 324. PREVENT: The Policing use of any objective guidelines. Prevent programme. The latter has the Response to the Prevention of Moreover, to the extent that issues of potential to shift the balance within Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy & Delivery Plan , April quality are considered, they are viewed Muslim communities and send the most 2008, p 41. through a very narrow lens: that of the powerful message about who is – and, 325. Private Information.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 57 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

crucially, who is not – an acceptable voice national level and the Basic Command within both British Muslim communities Unit Commanders at the local level) and a and wider society. In this respect, Prevent ‘national co-ordination team’ within the is (and should be seen as) a world away ACPO (TAM) ‘business area’. 330 This latter from the ‘classic’ Special Branch approach body, the ACPO National Prevent of back-channel talks on the margins. It Delivery Unit, now incorporates the instead entails the public legitimisation of National Community Tension Team and is those deemed worthy of respect. This said to provide a ‘co-ordination’ role for distinction, however, appears not to be Prevent. 331 It is not entirely clear, though, fully appreciated by the police. who sits on this board, nor to whom it is accountable. Neither is it clear whether it holds any actual accountability functions, Delivery and Accountability or whether it is merely intended as an The problems surrounding accountability administrative entity. Thus the question of of the police on Prevent-related matters are who oversees and holds responsibility for, similar to those discussed in the previous the process is left unanswered. chapter. In normal circumstances there are As with other aspects of police work, it is quite clear lines of accountability on mat - clear that the police authorities have a key ters such as the abuse of powers or of sus - role to play in terms of oversight and pects in custody, most of which are judici - accountability of Prevent-related policing. ary led. 326 There is also a system operated To this end, the Association of Police by the Independent Police Complaints Authorities (APA) has indicated that it will Commission (IPCC) for making com - employ a new APA Prevent National plaints against the police. In relation to Manager to provide guidance and advice to Prevent, however, there are no clear guide - police authorities in the delivery of Prevent 326. Robert Reiner, The Politics 332 of the Police (Oxford, 2001), p lines. If members of the public have a locally. The APA has also produced a 183-4. problem with an aspect of the police’s Strategy for Police Authorities for Preventing 327. PREVENT: The Policing approach to Prevent, it is far from obvious Violent Extremism. This document, Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism what recourse they would have. More however, merely recycles the same vague Strategy & Delivery Plan , April broadly, there is no easily understood sys - language in evidence elsewhere (supporting 2008, p 35-7. tem that ensures accountability over ‘mainstream voices’; utilising ‘key individual 328. Police PREVENT Programme Board. Document Prevent is maintained. networks’; and working with ‘community supplied to Policy Exchange by 333 ACPO. For example, the Prevent Strategy and leaders’). In addition, the action it advo -

329. Diagram provided to Policy Delivery Plan produced by ACPO refers to cates for police authorities is largely Exchange by ACPO. the creation of a ‘Police Prevent organisational in form, concerned primarily 330. PREVENT: The Policing Programme Board’, which will be respon - with ensuring that certain structures and Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism sible for ‘ensuring the [Prevent] strategy is methods are in place. There is, therefore, a Strategy & Delivery Plan , April implemented nationally’. 327 This body is call for police authorities to ensure that there 2008, p 35-7. chaired by the Chief Constable of West are ‘regular community mapping process - 331. ACPO National Prevent 334 Delivery Unit . Yorkshire Police, Sir Norman Bettison, and es’. Other suggestions include 332. PREVENT: The Policing reports to ACPO (TAM). 328 ACPO (TAM) guaranteeing that a ‘vulnerability index is Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism evaluations are in turn fed into the utilised’, that there are ‘dedicated police Strategy & Delivery Plan , April National Prevent Sub Board, which then authority consultation processes’ in place, or 2008, p 35-7. reports to the overall Contest Board that ‘a consequence management strategy’ is 333. Preventing Violent 329 Extremism: A Strategy for Police headed by Charles Farr. developed. There is, however, no values- Authorities (Draft v4), Alongside these structures there are also based discussion of what the Prevent strategy Association of Police Authorities, January 2009, p 13, 14. regional ‘Prevent Delivery Managers’ (who is aiming to achieve, or how the police 334. Ibid. p 14. form the link between ACPO at the should be navigating through the difficult

58 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

waters of picking allies in local Muslim sight group for police authorities, to over - communities. This silence on such crucial see the national counter-terrorist questions is made all the more noticeable by, network. 341 Since 2007 this network has for instance, the fact that analysis of the been reorganised with the creation of four police authorities’ role on Prevent produced Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs), hosted 335. Prevent Policing: Report of the Director of Performance and by the Humberside Police Authority specifi - in key forces: West Midlands, Greater Resource, Humberside Police Authority – Protective Services cally lists their responsibility for ‘securing the Manchester, West Yorkshire and the Committee , 9 September 2008, co-operation of communities’. 335 The princi - Metropolitan; a fifth CTU is being created p 2. ples on which such co-operation is to for Thames Valley. 342 In each of these 336. It is increasing from 41police officers/staff posts in proceed are not defined, and it is far from regions the respective forces have estab - 2008/9 (at a cost of £2.2m), to clear precisely what is being accounted for by lished their own oversight committees; and 93 in 2010/11 (at a cost of £5.8m). See, ‘MPS Prevent the authorities. there is also now the MPA-led combined Delivery Strategy: Report by The situation concerning the oversight body – the Joint Counter- Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf Metropolitan Police Service is a useful case Terrorism Unit Oversight Group of the Commissioner ’, 343 Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 study that further reveals the problems (JCTUOG). This group is meant to July 2008. with the existing system. The resources scrutinise the national counter terrorism 337. Metropolitan Police dedicated by the MPS to supporting the programme and allow liaison between the Authority, http://www.mpa. gov.uk/default.htm. delivery of Prevent are set to double over CTU authorities and also the smaller, 338. The first of these meetings 336 the next couple of years. It is the role of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit was held in November 2008. the 23-person Metropolitan Police (CTIU) authorities. Its membership ‘Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-committee meet - Authority to scrutinise and hold to includes representatives of the CTU and ing ’, Metropolitan Police account the MPS. 337 And it has recently CTIU authorities, as well as delegates from Authority, 27 November 2008. http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committe established a four-person ‘Counter- the APA and the Home Office. In April es/ctps/2008/081127/default.htm Terrorism and Protective Services 2007 this oversight body delegated the 339. ‘ Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub- Sub-Committee’, which will meet every six MPA to be ‘the lead Police Authority for Committee – Terms of weeks to oversee all counter-terrorism community engagement on counter- Reference ’, appendix 1 to ‘Counter-Terrorism and 338 344 related matters, including Prevent. terrorism in 2007-08’. Protective Services Sub- This sub-committee’s terms of reference There seems to be a shortfall between Commtitee ’, Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 November 2008. permit it to ‘ensure effective MPA over - the theory behind such accountability 340. APA Plenary Paper, April sight of MPS CT activity including the structures for Prevent and their practical 2007. co-ordination of CT activity across MPS implementation. The MPA has told Policy 341. Ibid. See also: ‘Counter- Terrorism Governance Update: business groups’. In addition to this, it is Exchange that there have been no cases Report by the Chief Executive ’, meant to ‘work with the MPS to ensure where they have asked the MPS to remove Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 July 2008. improved transparency to the delivery of or disengage from an organisation which 342. Ibid. CT activity (as far as is practicable), and to was shown to have espoused distasteful 343. ‘ Counter-Terrorism 345 improve the mechanisms in place to views. This, despite the fact that senior Governance Update: Report by engage effectively with London’s diverse police officers admit that Prevent is a new Chief Executive ’, Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 July 2008, p 1. communities’, and to ‘monitor progress sphere of work for the police and mistakes 344. ‘ MPA Update on “Counter- against the four CONTEST strands’. 339 have been made. The MPA’s approach is all Terrorism: The London Debate ”: Report by the Chief Executive The situation is complicated by the fact the more striking given that it is a body and Clerk ’, Metropolitan Police that the Metropolitan Police Service takes with wide-ranging powers over the MPS. Authority, 28 June 2007, p 3. the lead nationally in relation to counter- On ‘hard power’ issues such as the MPS’s 345. MPA email to Policy Exchange. terrorism matters. So while ‘oversight and use of ‘Stop and Search’ powers under 346. ‘ Review of Police Use of engagement priorities at local levels are a section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, or Counter-Terrorism Stop and responsibility for all police authorities’, the desire to bring in Taser weapons, the Search Powers in London: Report by AC Specialist some counter terrorism responsibilities are MPA has proven itself willing and able to Operations on behalf of the 340 346 Commissioner ’, Metropolitan also overseen by the MPA. As a result, challenge the actions of the police. This Police Authority, 31 May 2007; the MPA has established a national over - same rigour has been lacking where Private Information.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 59 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

Prevent is concerned. On this most politi - ties assessing the performance of the MPS in cal of subjects, the MPA seems reluctant to relation to Prevent? assert itself − and serious questions there - In this context, it is telling that one fore remain about its effectiveness in senior figure on the MPA has described to scrutinising Prevent. Policy Exchange their incomprehension The Metropolitan Police Service, of over the particular competencies of this course, is part of the wider structures for smorgasbord of bodies. Those tasked with overseeing counter-terrorism policy. Here running the system seem far from sure as too, however, the efficacy and value of to who is doing what, and to what end. what is being done is less than clear. On The MPS’ internal Oversight Board on the one hand, the MPS, because of its Prevent raises further important issues. national role in combatting terrorism, has Again, it is worth asking why groups like representatives on the national Contest the MSF were deemed suitable for the role and Prevent boards as well as on the over - they have been given. On what basis was it all Police Prevent Programme Board. At decided that they could speak for the the same time it is part of the Contest Muslim community? Senior sources within (London) Board and also the London the MPS have described the MSF as Prevent Board (both chaired by the providing an authentic voice for ‘angry Government Office for London), which young Muslims’. 350 How did this view – pull together chief executives from local and, indeed, the characterisation of young authorities and other statutory bodies on a Muslims as ‘angry’ – come to be accepted? quarterly basis to scrutinise the policies of A similar issue arises from the ‘Police the police and other national agencies. Prevent Programme Board’ mentioned Internally, meanwhile, since July 2008 above (page 58), which oversees police there has been an MPS Counter-Terrorism Prevent work at the national level. Strategic Delivery Board under the chair - Alongside the various Chief Constables, manship of the Assistant Commissioner Chief Executives and members of police Specialist Operations (ACSO), which authorities, a member of the National brings together the four senior MPS offi - Association of Muslim Police (NAMP) sits cers who have been identified to take a lead on this board. 351 Yet the chairman of the role in the delivery of each strand of the NAMP, Zaheer Ahmad, has indicated an 347 347. ‘ Counter-Terrorism Update: Contest strategy. An MPS Counter- aversion to some Muslim groups by direct - Report by Assistant Terrorism Strategic Partnership Board has ing seemingly hostile criticism at Ed Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the also been formed to ensure that ‘key strate - Husain, director of the Quilliam Commissioner ’, Metropolitan gic partners’ are effectively engaged. 348 Foundation, which bills itself as a ‘counter Police Authority, 24 July 2008. 352 348. Ibid. Finally, a Prevent Oversight Board has also extremism think tank’. Ahmad wrote in 353 349. ‘ Delivery of Prevent: Report been created for the MPS comprising Jane’s Police Review : by Assistant Commissioner representatives from the Association of Robert Quick on behalf of the Commissioner ’, Metropolitan Muslim Police (AMP), Muslim Safety It seems that some of our most senior Police Authority, 29 January Forum (MSF), the MPA and an oﬃcers have been seduced by Mr 2009, p 2. Independent Advisory Group (IAG). 349 Husain’s celebrity status and have been 350. Private Information. The existence of this myriad of structures taken in by the stereotypical image of 351. Email from ACPO (TAM) to Policy Exchange, 5 February for accountability and oversight – relating Islam he portrays in his book (e 2009. to the Metropolitan Police Service alone – Islamist). is is an image they probably 352. ‘ Quilliam Foundation ’, www.quilliamfoundation.org. raises all manner of questions. Most obvi - feel comfortable with, but is a million

353. Zaheer Ahmad, ‘Personal ously, what is the inter-relationship between miles from reality. Mr Husain has few view - Million miles from reality ’, these different groups and committees? And supporters within the Muslim Jane ’s Police Review , 19 March 2008. by what benchmarks are the respective enti - Community.

60 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

Since when did the NAMP become involved in political judgements about vital questions about the police’s Prevent work are which ‘image’ of Islam is the correct one, “ being left unanswered or about the representativeness of Ed ” Husain? Moreover, why have only Muslim groups been engaged to date in the task of overseeing MPS Prevent work? This focus Overall, the picture in relation to on the Muslim community, to the exclu - Prevent accountability for the sion of all others, is replicated elsewhere in Metropolitan Police Service is far from the MPS’ approach. 354 bright. At best, the situation can be said to The assumption that underpins this be characterised by serious confusion, with approach holds that ‘those most affected’ a tangle of different accountability struc - by Prevent-related policies must be the tures. At worst, it is clear that there are people consulted on, or given scrutiny of, serious problems with the way the task is its operation. It is worth considering the being approached at present. In July 2008, problems created by such a narrow the Chief Executive of the MPA admitted outlook. For by focusing on one commu - that ‘police authority scrutiny of counter- nity alone, is there not a danger that one terrorist policing was rudimentary until ends up with an emphasis on the lowest two years ago’. 357 Unfortunately, where common denominator within that Prevent is concerned too little in the way of community? And by treating that commu - meaningful progress appears to have been nity as distinct from society as a whole, is a made since then – and the suspicion must sense of separation not reinforced? be that what is true for the MPS is equally A further problem, closely related to true for other forces. this, concerns the continued marginalisa - tion of elected members in relation to Prevent accountability. Even as those Conclusion groups and individuals with a narrow Prevent represents a radical new departure perspective are being empowered in this for the police − and because of this it sphere, those who enjoy a wider, demo - requires new and effective oversight mech - cratic mandate and legitimacy are anisms. At present there seems to be a sidelined. In terms of structures, for exam - dearth of such structures. Instead, such ple, the elected component of the MPA’s accountability bodies as exist appear to 354. See, for example, ‘Delivery ‘Counter-Terrorism and Protective produce more heat than light. As a result, of Prevent: Report by Assistant Services Sub-Committee’ comprises only vital questions about the police’s Prevent Commissioner Robert Quick on behalf of the Commissioner ’, 25 per cent of the body. Elsewhere the work are being left unanswered: how are Metropolitan Police Authority, 29 MPA report of 2007 has stated that the bad partnership decisions taken under January 2009, p 3. In the con - text of assessing the ‘Racial and ‘police tend to ignore democratically Prevent accounted for? What redress is Equality Impact ’ of Prevent, this elected councillors in their community there for members of the public in relation document states, ‘We are devel - oping attitudinal based survey engagement, even though they are usually to decisions taken by police in Prevent work that will specifically survey the Muslim community around the only people with an objective mandate, matters? To whom exactly must the police confidence based Prevent however low the turn-out or however slim answer? Is there a danger that successive issues. ’ their majority’. 355 The result was acknowl - Home Secretaries have perhaps been too 355. Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate , p 39. edged to be a ‘democratic deficit’. 356 Again, passive in holding the police to account on 356. Ibid. London MPs – the most high profile and these vital issues? 357. ‘ Counter-Terrorism representative elected figures in the capital In this context it is worth observing that Governance Update: Report by after the Mayor himself − seem scarcely to despite the above-noted admission from the Chief Executive ’, Metropolitan Police Authority, 24 feature. senior police sources that Prevent work has July 2008.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 61 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

been a process of ‘trial and error’, those latitude will clearly be afforded to groups same sources are unable to cite even a than might otherwise be deemed appro - single instance in which a group that has priate. Indeed, references to the success of been engaged by the police has been later Operation Trident, an MPS initiative to judged unacceptable and therefore ‘dis- combat gun crime in black communities, engaged’. 358 have become the favoured cliché of Metropolitan Police officers who too often engage uncritically with Islamist “ in their pursuit of a pragmatic process, the police have groups. Such a view represents the been forced to make some deeply political decisions triumph of British pragmatism run amok. Without government more clearly defin - about the state’s engagement with Islamism ” ing what it expects and requires from the police on Prevent, the pressing concerns of immediate security considerations will Yet, remarkably, the government currently continue to dominate its thinking on the has more tools for overseeing the police serv - matter. ice than ever before. Indeed, one leading The readiness of government to assert analyst, Professor Robert Reiner, beleives itself in this sphere must run beyond the that HMIC, the Audit Commission and realm of rhetoric. While the recent shift in ACPO have all helped to extend the govern - emphasis from ministers like Hazel Blears ment’s powers over the police. 359 This, along and Jacqui Smith is welcome, with increased with other changes in recent years, has attention paid to a broader conception of fundamentally altered the relationship what Prevent is about, senior police sources between local government and Chief have confirmed to Policy Exchange that such Constables, who are less accountable today governmental speechifying often makes little to local representatives than they have been or no difference to the practical realities of in the past: lines of accountability for Chief everyday policing. Instead, the police Constables now tend to run directly to continue to act according to their own prior - central government. 360 Despite this, there ities, which stress law enforcement and strict appears to be little interest at Westminster in security concerns over and above everything establishing clear lines of accountability on else. 362 matters connected with Prevent. Ironically, in their pursuit of a pragmatic Politicians are instead keen to promote a process, the police have been forced to make fluid, pragmatic approach which can at some deeply political decisions about the times prove problematic. Speaking at the state’s engagement with Islamism – particu - BCU Commanders conference in April larly at a local level. The example of West 2008, Jacqui Smith said: ‘It’s about using the Midlands Police and Channel 4 cited above specialist knowledge available to work in (see pages 53-55) is just one illustration of 358. Private Information.

359. Reiner, The Politics of the partnership with our communities, and it’s this. But if the police are forced to pick Police, p 191. about knowing what works.’ 361 This empha - ‘winners’ from within the Muslim commu - 360. Ibid. p 167. Also see, pp. sis on practicality and doing ‘what works’ nity, the potential implications of this for the 189-95. reveals much about the pragmatic sub- future operational independence and 361. Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, ‘Prevent strategy: back - culture that has come to define the police’s integrity of the police are worrying. ground and next steps - speech approach to Prevent. There has also been a failure to under - to the BCU Commanders Conference ’, 16 April 2008. The key issue is what is meant by ‘what stand that ‘what works’ with regards to one http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/S works’? If only a narrow set of aims are problem may not work for another. So peeches/bcu-conference- speech. identified which centre on the notion of while the MPS can rightly claim that its 362. Private Information. stopping ‘bombs going off’, then greater engagement strategy with black communi -

62 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police

ties in London helped tackle the problem means that government is already afforded of ‘yardie’ gang violence, it does not follow the luxury of ‘steering’ but not ‘rowing’. 363 that a similar approach will yield similar This is an important distinction and govern - results with regards to the Islamist threat, ment must consequently use its legitimate which is often tied to a global ideological powers to set clear guidance for the police project. about what its specific role under Prevent is, This is where government must intervene and how its objectives are to be met in this and provide some long-overdue guidance. regard. Reiner explains, ‘The police are free Of course, the British police enjoy opera - to “row” in any way they decide, so long as it tional independence. But Prevent is is in the direction “steered” by the Home different. It is an inherently political Secretary.’ 364 programme entailing substantial ideological With this being the case, why is govern - and even theological judgements. It takes the ment not asserting itself more on matters police into novel terrain. In consequence, relating to Prevent? Why does it allow the the traditional functions of police accounta - police forces to ally themselves with bility may not be sufficient. Islamists, rather than setting a strong 363. Reiner, The Politics of the Robert Reiner has described how the values-led approach which they would Police , p. 196. growing centralisation of British policing then have to follow? 364. Ibid, p. 197.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 63 5 Defeating Non-violent Extremism: Lessons from the Labour Party and MI5

Yes, many British Islamists of the Muslim themselves to Labour. The Soviet leader Brotherhood and Jamaat do want to ‘inte - was encouraged by the freedom already grate’ into British society. In a very narrow afforded to the British Socialist Party sense, they are accurate. But they want to (BSP) which was founded in 1911 and ‘integrate’ in the same way that the promoted the socialist values of the Second Militant Tendency wanted to ‘integrate’ International. The BSP affiliated itself to into the Labour Party. ey wanted to do Labour the following year and ran its own it on their own terms and in their own press within the Labour Party, which did way — to dictate the party’s future in line not limit itself to the kind of robust debate with their own sectional aims. 366 that sustains parties seeking to evolve Professor Neal Robinson policy, but was openly hostile to the then at Policy Exchange, July 2006 367 Labour leadership and sought to assume control for itself. 368 The existence of a large number of working-class activists organ - Labour and the Example of Militant ised through an administrative mechanism What are the precedents for dealing with called ‘Labour’ which potentially failed to non-violent subversive threats in the UK? control its affiliates presented an enticing This challenge is perhaps most familiar to prospect to Lenin. ‘It might seem a politi - members of the Labour Party. The party’s cal party, [but] is nevertheless obliged to origins lie in a meeting at London’s grant its members complete latitude ... In Memorial Hall in 1900 when an assort - such circumstances, it would be a mistake ment of left-wing groups, mainly trade not to join this party,’ he concluded. 369 unions and co-operatives, came together to However the Labour Party spotted the form the Labour Representation danger and, despite sustained and vigorous

365. PREVENT: The Policing Committee (LRC), with Ramsay attempts by CPGB members, prevented Response to the Prevention of MacDonald as its secretary. The LRC went Communists from affiliating. Labour did Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy & Delivery Plan , April on to become the Labour Party, but at this this in 1933 by creating a list of proscribed 2008,, p. 38. stage it had no individual members, only groups ineligible for affiliation. A group 366. These remarks were made at the launch of Martin Bright ’s affiliated organisations, which gave collec - was prohibited from joining Labour if: pamphlet, ‘When Progressives tive political expression to their members Treat with Reactionaries’, at Policy Exchange in July 2006. through a central administration. This it had its own separate propaganda and 367. Professor Neal Robinson is made the new body particularly vulnerable a distinctive programme and policy one of the leading British to external influences. it had its own branches in the experts on the Qur’an.

368. Lenin ’s Collected Works When the Communist Party of Great constituencies (Moscow, 1965) Vol.31, p 260. Britain (CPGB) was formed two decades it promoted [its own] parliamentary or 369. Ibid. later, Lenin advised its members to affiliate local government candidates

64 Defeating Non-violent Extremism: Lessons from the Labour Party and MI5

it owed allegiance to any foreign organ - those groups with the opportunity to use isation 370 Labour’s infrastructure to project their message to a wider audience, along with It is beyond the scope of this pamphlet to the hope that, as more like-minded groups consider the merits of these criteria, but it affiliated to the party, they could ultimate - is worth examining their significance and ly shape its future direction. operation. What is beyond doubt is that The NEC’s proscribed list proved the emerging Labour Party considered invaluable to Constituency Labour Parties these protective measures to be essential to (CLPs) because they could rely on the its future. NEC’s ability to pool resources and intelli - Under Labour’s constitution, the gence at the centre, which built a national National Executive Committee (NEC) was picture of subversive groups. It provided given powers to take ‘any action it deems committees with the knowledge they necessary’ to fulfil its obligation of preserv - needed to act against the local agents of ing the party’s rules and constitution. 371 The proscribed groups, who would otherwise creation in 1933 of the list of proscribed have been too well embedded to be organisations gave the NEC teeth. Through removed. This is significant because a combination of its own research and liai - banned parties often sought legal redress son with local constituencies and party against CLPs that barred their affiliation, agents, the list was assembled and main - regularly browbeating them into submis - tained despite various groups changing their sion. With the NEC’s backing, however, names to avoid detection. Unsurprisingly, CLPs could now rely on the moral and many of the organisations, including the financial support of the central party for Labour Research Department, British locally taken decisions. Soviet Friendship Society, British Peace While the reasoning behind the Committee and the Union Movement, proscribed list was sound, its operation was were connected to the Communist Party. not, excluding only groups whose names The list typically held the names of 30-40 featured on the list. As old groups proscribed groups which were renewed at morphed into new ones and their leaders the annual party conference. A statement moved on, it proved increasingly difficult explaining the need to renew the list at the to maintain a definitive and authoritative 1972 conference said: list. The implication was that any group not on the list was automatically eligible Many organisations which were, or are, for affiliation. As new groups emerged, 370. Labour History Archive and subsidiaries of the Communist Party, were often with formidable cross-constituency Study Centre (People’s History Museum/University of Central of short life, became merged into other organisation and resources, the list became Lancashire), Labour Party organisations, or changed their title. is unsustainable. That the list remained in Archives LP/WG - LP/SCW - ref. LP; also see Paul McCormick, has caused some confusion, and many existence for 40 years is proof of its vital ‘The Labour Party: Three unno - Constituency and Local Labour Parties, role in guiding the Labour Party through a ticed changes ’ in British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. and their members, have been induced to crucial period in its early development. 3 (July 1980), p 381.

give support to these organisations which However, allegations that the list promoted 371. Ibid; Labour Party have attractive titles, without a full appre - ‘McCarthyism’ and ‘witch-hunts’ embold - Constitution 1974, clause VIII (2C). 372 ciation of their origin. ened the Bennite broad left and Militant, 372. Ibid; Renewing the pro - causing the list to be scrapped in 1973. 373 scribed organisations, Labour annual conference 1972. Multiple groups were created in order to Militant was ostensibly a newspaper 373. For the foremost account of overwhelm the NEC’s machinery, allowing created in 1964 by members of a clandes - Militant and its battle with the some to slip through the net and affiliate to tine organisation, the Revolutionary Labour Party see, Michael Crick, The March of Militant (London, the Labour Party. Affiliation provided Socialist League, which was formed just 1986).

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 65 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

under a decade earlier. Its members preached action against Militant. He did so with the a Trotskyist message and favoured an entry - support of Neil Kinnock, previously consid - ist approach, seeking to infiltrate the Labour ered part of the Labour Party’s ‘soft left’, but Party and use its mechanisms to project someone who regarded the group as trying themselves into power. They were revolu - to promote ‘democratic centralism’, a tionary in intent and anti-democratic in method for furthering Leninist aims from practice, and over time those associated with within the party. Although Foot had hith - Militant became known as ‘the Militant erto resisted attempts to purge the party of Tendency’. From the mid-1960s, a key focus its Trotskyist influences, he was stirred into for Militant was Labour Party Young action after Militant’s influence continued to Socialists and by 1970 it had effectively grow unchecked. He appointed Ron taken control of that body. 374 From there, it Hayward, the party’s General Secretary, and sought to establish itself in the wider Labour David Hughes, who succeeded Underhill as Party. National Agent, to investigate whether Militant’s success prompted those Militant was compatible with Labour’s opposed to its ideology and methods to constitution. begin to take it more seriously. ‘Reg’ When the Hayward-Hughes report was Underhill, the party’s National Agent, published in 1982, it gave those elements presented a report to the NEC in November within the party that wanted to move against 1975 expressing his concern at the promo - Militant the impetus they needed. The tion earlier that year of Andy Bevan, a report was laden with caveats making it clear known Militant sympathiser, to a key posi - that the party did not wish to return to the tion as the party’s youth officer. Underhill’s proscription lists and expulsions of the past. report also revealed that as early as 1964 over Hayward-Hughes argued instead for the half of the Young Socialists’ national creation of a ‘Register of Non-Affiliated committee were under Trotskyist influence. Groups’, which would allow some non-affil - Yet Underhill’s dossier was shelved, with no iated groups to remain legitimately within action taken despite leaked copies finding the Labour Party. Still, the members of their way into the hands of the press, which Militant ’s editorial board saw the Hayward- declared that Militant had created a ‘party Hughes inquiry as a threat and vowed to within a party’. take legal action if they were expelled from The implication of Underhill’s report was the party. In order to avoid an embarrassing clear: association with Militant was not legal defeat, careful thought had to be given compatible with membership of the Labour to the precise shape and form the register Party and contravened its constitution. But should take. The Labour Party employed a at the time little effective action was taken to leading QC, Derry Irvine, and his young combat the tendency. 375 A 1977 NEC report protégé, Tony Blair, to study the party’s into Militant’s activities eschewed discipli - constitution and devise a solution which was nary measures, concluding that, ‘Trotskyist equitable, but also safeguarded the party. 377

374. Ibid. p 61-4. views cannot be beaten by disciplinary Irvine and Blair ensured that the register

375. In the mid-seventies, a key action.’ Instead, the focus was to be on operated in a much more robust manner opponent was the Clause 4 education and providing better explanation than the earlier proscribed list. To ensure the group in the National Organisation of Labour Students of the Labour Party’s ‘democratic social - register was more rigorous, groups were only and the Labour Party ’s National 376 Agent, Reg Underhill. See Crick, ism’. This proved futile, however and deemed eligible for entry if they could The March of Militant, p. 95. Militant continued to grow in size and influ - demonstrate their compatibility with Clause 376. Ibid. p 111. ence. 2 of Labour’s constitution, which stated that 377. Kenneth Morgan, Michael After Michael Foot became leader of the everyone within Labour must ‘accept the Foot: A Life (London, 2007) p 424. Labour Party he finally decided to take programme, policy and principles of the

66 Defeating Non-violent Extremism: Lessons from the Labour Party and MI5

party [and] agree to conform to the constitu - leadership had previously accepted the view tion and standing orders of the party’. 378 that the way to defeat Militant was by Militant was ultimately deemed ineligible persuasion and education, Kinnock was for inclusion on the register and the five adamant that it had to be broken using disci - members of its editorial board identified by plinary means. Others within his party the Hayward-Hughes report were expelled argued that Militant should be ‘engaged – in February 1983. 379 debated and overcome by force of argu - Even at this point, however, Militant’s ment’, but Kinnock insisted that the very act opponents were far from pleased with the of sharing a platform with Militant (even if outcome. While the paper’s editors had been the Trotskyites were defeated) lent unwar - ejected, they had managed to protect their ranted legitimacy and credibility to the Labour Party parliamentary candidates and Militant tendency. wider support network. One Labour In keeping with this belief, Kinnock was Shadow Cabinet Minister observed that, determined to re-take control of the ‘Militant had won – game, set and match’. 380 Labour Party’s youth section and destroy Michael Foot was opposed to mass expul - Militant’s influence in the wider party. At sions and this worked to Militant’s the 1985 Labour Party conference, advantage. Kinnock famously repudiated Militant and Militant built its base away from London, its ‘gesture-generals … [and] tendency- preferring decaying Liverpool, where the tacticians’ playing ‘politics with people’s group would later reach its high water mark jobs’. 385 In February 1986, after an inquiry in 1983 after winning control of the City lasting several months, the Labour Party’s Council. 381 Sixteen of the 51 Labour coun - NEC voted to expel sixteen members of cillors elected were identified as belonging to Militant from Liverpool. Eventually, seven Militant; and one of their number, the people, including Hatton, were expelled media-friendly Derek Hatton, was elected from the party. 386 deputy leader of the council. 382 At the heart of Labour’s battle to under - Unsurprisingly, this caused real consterna - mine the influence of Militant and its tion among ordinary members of the leadership’s subversive plans was the ques - Labour Party. Even those who were not tion of what the Labour Party stood for — members of Militant often had to toe the its purpose and role in British political life. line of this highly cohesive groupuscule. Winning that struggle against political Unease with Militant’s activities led entryists was a protracted endeavour, fraught several CLPs to expel members associated with frustration and litigation. Labour MP with the tendency, and those opposed to it Frank Field recalled, 378. Ibid. p 426; Also see Labour Party Archives LP/BAB - were given new encouragement by the 1983 LP/JKH and LP/HART - LP/W1 - election as Labour leader of Neil Kinnock, For what seemed like an eternity, the ref. LP. who had been resolutely hostile to the group NEC simply equivocated on countering 379. Crick, The March of Militant , pp. 208-10. since his student days. 383 the Trotskyist takeover bid. When Neil 380. Ibid. p 211.

Defeating Militant and its predecessors Kinnock ﬁnally had an executive with 381. Morgan, Michael Foot, proved to be a long and tortuous process. the bottle, it took action. 387 p.419. Militant denied its existence as a movement 382. Crick, The March of Militant , p 225. and operated through the use of front organ - Taking action against those who wanted to 383. Ibid. p 267. isations such as the Youth Trade Union subvert the Labour Party may have been 384. Ibid. p 273-4. Rights Campaign or the School Students fraught with difficulty, but it was a vital 385. Ibid. p 277. 384 Union. Kinnock, however, was increas - step in making Labour a natural party of 386. Ibid. p 283-95. ingly convinced of the need to tackle the government again. Furthermore, it pointed 387. Frank Field, The Guardian , Militant threat directly. Whereas the Labour the way towards a resolute, value-led 10 June 2003.

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approach in which the challenge of parliamentary democracy or the British extremism is confronted head-on. economy.’ 392 Despite that disclosure, the Security Service also suggests the threat is now The Security Service (MI5) ‘negligible’ and goes on to make the During the Cold War, the British state well remarkable admission that, ‘We do not understood that the Soviet and currently investigate subversion.’ 393 Communist threat was not solely military. Instead, it would seem that today’s intelli - It recognised that non-violent subversive gence services – unlike their historical activity also posed a threat. So too did predecessors – have confined themselves to political parties − notably Labour. a much narrower target: terrorist violence In March 1948 the Prime Minister, against the British state. Clement Attlee, announced that the The Security Service’s concentration on Security Service would introduce a vetting violent threats owes much to the habits system for its officers. He was alarmed by and modes of thought that arose during the growth of the Communist Party of the Troubles in Northern Ireland; it does Great Britain and also by the support for not draw as much as it might on British fascists, deciding that both posed a subver - experiences during the Cold War. The sive threat and should be excluded from state developed a clear understanding work ‘vital to the security of the state’. 388 about what subversion meant during the Such individuals, Attlee decided, ‘would be Cold War when it was linked to a ‘hard prepared to endanger the security of the power’, conventional threat from the State in the interests of another Power’. 389 Soviet Union. With the IRA, however, the Attlee also introduced a vetting procedure main issue for the state was how it could for ministers on the advice of MI5 in bring a terrorist campaign/armed insur - 1951. It was a drastic measure created in gency to an end. Superficially, of course, response to the defection to the Soviet the threat of al-Qaeda bears a greater Union earlier that year of Guy Burgess and resemblance to the IRA: both are non- Donald Maclean, two senior Foreign state actors. None the less, there are Office officials. 390 lessons from the Cold War that are still Nearly four decades later, the 1989 relevant. While the Soviet Union Security Service Act placed MI5 on a statu - presented a substantial conventional mili - tory footing for the first time, to tary challenge, it also proved itself capable investigate subversion. Although the Act of mobilising a formidable subversive

388. Christopher Andrew, Secret does not provide a definition of ‘subver - threat. The British state therefore Service: The Making of the sion’, it does afford MI5 the widest prepared both its ‘hard power’, as well as British Intelligence Community (London, 1985). possible construction of it, by allowing it ‘soft power’, capabilities to meet those 389. ‘ Security Service: MI5 ’, to investigate any ‘actions intended to challenges. The challenge posed by politi - http://www.securityservice.gov.u k/output/Page243.html. overthrow or undermine parliamentary cal Islamists who ostensibly eschew

390. Anthony Glees, The Secrets democracy by political, industrial or violence cannot therefore be considered of the Service: A Story of Soviet violent means’. 391 solely through the prism of the British Subversion of Western Intelligence (New York, 1987). The Security Service publicly acknowl - state’s comparatively narrow experiences

391. Security Service Act 1989, edges that a subversive threat remains. On in Northern Ireland. We should ask s.1(2). its website, MI5 observes that a number of whether the intelligence services need to 392. ‘ Domestic extremism ’, MI5 website. https://www.mi5.gov.uk extremist groups ‘currently aspire to recover some of their intellectual inheri - /output/Page25.html. mount terrorist attacks against targets in tance in relation to developing a 393. ‘ Subversion ’, MI5 website, the UK. Some extremist groups also have a definition of ‘subversion’ fit for the chal - http://www.mi5.gov.uk/textonly/ Page53.html. subversive agenda, seeking to undermine lenges of the twenty-first century?

68 6 Future Criteria for Engagement

What is engagement? opportunity to voice disagreements. It also ‘Engagement’ is a vague, slippery word. establishes the organisers as acceptable Too often it has been used as a euphemism leaders by acknowledging them as appro - to explain away policies that confer legiti - priate interlocutors for grassroots macy and credibility on extremists, and it ‘community engagement’ of the sort is urgently necessary to develop precise cri - demanded by Prevent. teria for engagement with Muslim bodies For the authorities, meanwhile, the across the public sector. decision whether or not to engage with Proponents of a broad engagement Islamist-run events can be a difficult one. strategy often accuse those who adopt a With some of the events mentioned more cautious approach of refusing to talk attracting up to 50,000 visitors, the to people they don’t like. This, of course, is government and other official bodies are a straw man. Taxpayers do not object to often torn about whether the benefits of behind-the-scenes contact or tactical attendance outweigh the harm. There are alliances with groups and individuals very real concerns that, by not attending judged to be objectionable. In fact, it is such gatherings, the government is missing expected that the Security Service and a vital opportunity to communicate its police will build private networks and rela - message to a mass audience. The sizeable tionships with distasteful characters in the number of visitors who attend the annual hope that it will yield vital intelligence. IslamExpo and GPU events can therefore For the purposes of these criteria, be an alluring prospect for politicians keen ‘engagement’ is therefore defined as apply - to engage young Muslims. ing to those cases where groups and event To make such a narrow assessment is to organisers are clearly seeking funding, an fall into the predictable trap of seeing endorsement or enhanced reputation Muslims only through the prism of their through visible public association with religious identity. For those who preach government ministers or other state actors. the importance of reaching out to people Given the vast resources and financing at grassroots level, there is simply no available to Islamist movements, it is reason why this need be done through hardly surprising that some of the largest Islamist-sponsored events. Alternatives annual Muslim events hosted in Britain, exist. Why, for instance, has government such as IslamExpo and GPU, promote given no serious thought to reaching out Islamist ideals. through cultural events such as the For Islamists, the benefits of ministerial Bradford Mela, a massive celebration of engagement are obvious. Any official pres - South Asian culture which last year ence immediately lends credibility to their attracted 120,000 visitors, more than views by suggesting that the government twice the number who attended 394. ‘ Bradford Mela ’ Bradford regards them as both legitimate and valid, IslamExpo? 394 The Bradford Mela is not a City Council. http://www.brad ford.gov.uk/bradford_mela/bradf even if the official representative uses the religious event, but one promoting music, ord_mela.htm.

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food and arts from the Indian subconti - The Prime Minister offering a message nent. However a significant proportion of of support for the event those who attend are Muslim, with large The Prime Minister making a speech at numbers coming from precisely those the event and taking questions deprived communities in the north of England that the government is so keen to In this instance, each step of the ladder connect with. By engaging them through could be matched by pressure on the event a neutral platform of this type, govern - organisers to offer guarantees on a) litera - ment sends a clear message – that it does ture available at the event; b) the stall- not consider Muslims’ religious affiliation holders present; c) the nature of fringe or observance to be the most important events/speakers; and d) platform speakers, thing about them in public life. all of which can be measured against the Government must therefore consider not selection criteria proposed below. only who it is aiming to engage with, but Such an arrangement allows ministers also what the nature of such engagement and their departments to be flexible by should be. permitting them to contract out of the Clearly, the term ‘engagement’ in this criteria by explaining their reasons for context covers a great deal and there are doing so. There may be instances where, in three broad ‘types’ to consider: the interests of achieving specific, short- term goals this might be necessary. The ministerial attendance or endorsement criteria allow for this by creating the envi - financial assistance ronment where decisions to contract out of official partnership and consultancy the criteria must be explained. The thresh - old for contracting out must, however, be Within each category, it might be possible high: the civil service, local government, to taper the level of engagement, according the police and the Security Service should to how fully a would-be partner complies account to ministers as to why enduring with the criteria. For instance, when asked values should be sacrificed for the sake of to attend an event such as IslamExpo or short-term objectives under Prevent. They GPU, a spectrum of engagement could be must also explain what specific goals they said to exist. This would cover: hope to achieve and how the engagement strategy used to achieve those short-term ‘Neutral’ agencies such as the NHS or aims will not also become the long-term teacher-training agency having a stall at status quo. the event When assessing the suitability of a Officials attending the event, in the prospective official partner, we propose audience that the group in question, its affiliates, Officials attending the event, making a leaders and all other agents authorised to speech act or speak on its behalf are collectively Officials attending the event, taking measured against these criteria. Successful part in a debate bodies would need to satisfy all the criteria Ministers sending messages of support before being accepted as partners. for publicity materials (such as websites) Ministers attending, but not speaking Principles Governing the Ministers attending, making a speech Selection of Criteria Ministers attending, taking part in a It is important that the criteria are proper - debate ly defined – too narrow, and the state

70 Future Criteria for Engagement

would be prevented from dealing with and kind of society envisaged by extremists supporting genuinely progressive groups compatible with parliamentary democ - and individuals; too broad, and the state racy? Finally, some are concerned with the gives aid and comfort to those who seek to consistency of state policy: are extremists undermine or subvert it. It is often suggest - advocating changes that would prevent the ed that in a liberal state it is only necessary state exercising its duties towards its people to say, ‘Groups are free to do what they or the peoples of other countries it has like, so long as they remain within the law.’ agreed to help? But these proposed criteria do not address On this basis, the following principles criminality. They are concerned with those were applied: legal groups and bodies that government actively chooses to promote, support and the criteria should be general – fund. concerned with political and social This goes to the heart of the tensions values, not with specific policy; and which modern democracies face when the criteria should be universal and trying to curb the terrorist threat and objective, legally defined whenever preserve civil liberties. That is not some - possible. thing at which the British political system has been particularly successful in recent decades. Pragmatism is the order of the day “ These criteria avoid being overly prescriptive but also in our post-ideological age. And though replace the current ambiguity. They offer a new bench - pragmatism is a quintessentially British mark in the standards expected from official partners and virtue, it cannot, by definition, be an end could send a clear message to those who fall short in itself. Saying ‘we do what works’ raises ” the question of what is meant by ‘works’? If by ‘works’, one means a reduction in the number of al-Qaeda attacks, perhaps it The Proposed Criteria makes sense to bolster non-violent The criteria below ask several questions of Islamists against violent Islamists − as it prospective groups when assessing whether would to bolster the BNP against Combat they are appropriate for official engage - 18. It is not surprising that security officers ment – does a group really oppose terror - whose job it is to keep us safe, and who are ism, or does it hide behind the hoary eva - assessed on their ability to ‘manage down’ sion that ‘one man’s terrorist is another the risk of terrorism, should come to such man’s freedom fighter’? Does it seek to decisions. But politicians must take a wider undermine the liberal principles of British view. They must question that judgement parliamentary democracy? Does it reject and decide how best to protect, not just the essential elements of civilised interna - our lives, but also our way of life. tional behaviour, codified by international Such considerations helped define the treaties? And does it seek to prevent the criteria which follow. What are the funda - state from taking the steps necessary to ful - mental values of our political community? fil the first duty of government, to protect In what ways do extremist groups violate its citizens? them or seek to replace them with other These criteria avoid being overly ones? prescriptive but also replace the current Some of the criteria relate to the method ambiguity. They offer a new benchmark in of political change: when is political the standards expected from official part - violence justified, and against which kind ners and send a clear message to those who of targets? Others are about aims: is the fall short. They are as follows:

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1. It has become common for some be made a litmus test for Muslim part - groups to make vague, often misleading ners. To be clear, it is not proposed that statements condemning attacks on being pro-Israeli is a precondition for ‘innocent civilians’. This is inadequate. engaging with government. Indeed, The term ‘innocent’ is too often used as many groups and organisations oppose a red herring, and apologists for terror - the policies of foreign states. However, ism invent forms of equivocation to too much latitude has been afforded by designate civilians as ‘legitimate the British state to vitriolic Islamist targets’. We do not accept that some groups who are hostile to the very exis - societies are organised in a way that tence of Israel. Clearly, nobody should denies their civilian population the be made to support Israel or Israeli poli - protection of the laws of war, nor do we cies. However the state is also entitled think it sufficient that someone only not to engage with groups who are opposes attacks on civilians in the UK. against the very existence of Israel (or All civilians should be considered hors indeed of any other country), thus de combat , wherever they are. We take continuing to plunge that region into our definition from the Geneva further instability. Convention (see annex pages 89-90). The government should stand firm Therefore government must not in defence of the principle that UN engage with organisations or individuals member states are legitimate and enti - that support or condone the deliberate tled to exist, and therefore should not targeting of civilians (as defined by the engage with people or groups that call Geneva Conventions) anywhere in the for or condone the destruction of UN world. member states.

2. It would be perverse for the state to 4. It is a regrettable but unavoidable fact endorse groups that support attacks that states and non-state actors are some - against the British armed forces or their times capable of committing great allies. Moreover, the UK has a United violence in pursuit of their aims. The Nations (UN) Security Council veto twentieth century was witness to atroci - and therefore consents to all deploy - ties on a previously unimaginable scale. ments of force under a UN mandate. In an attempt to stem such atrocities the As a result, the government should UN agreed upon definitions of very seri - not engage with individuals or organi - ous and systematic ‘crimes against sations that call for, or condone, humanity’ including genocide (see annex attacks on British soldiers and their for definition pages 89-90). Although allies anywhere in the world or against statute cannot prevent such crimes, it is a any forces acting under a UN necessary and vital tool in holding leaders mandate. to account on the gravest of charges. Thus, Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan 3. It is an inalienable and universal value Karadzic were brought to trial. The pres - that all sovereign states and their peoples ident of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, whose enjoy the right to existence. This is country supports the Janjaweed militia in

395. Report of the International something the government has been Darfur, has similarly been indicted by the Committee of Inquiry on Darfur particularly reluctant to assert in recent new International Criminal Court. An to the United Nations Secretary General, pursuant to UNSCR years. Some might suggest this has more official UN report for the Security 1564, 25 January 2005. to do with Israel than the UK and ques - Council described the situation in Darfur http://www.un.org/news/dh/suda 395 n/com_inq_darfur.pdf. tion whether support for Israel should as being ‘as serious as genocide’.

72 Future Criteria for Engagement

It is essential that government does not undermine efforts to hold those The government must therefore not engage with groups who perpetrate crimes against human - “ or individuals who support or condone terrorism anywhere in ity to account. It must consequently not engage with people or organisa - the world ” tions that give a platform to, deny, or are apologists for crimes against humanity including genocide. None the less, some Islamist groups argue that this liberal climate goes 5. The application of indiscriminate against their faith, and sometimes take violence – often targeted against civil - steps to prevent British Muslims from ians – to achieve political change is an exercising their full rights or taking unfortunate but increasingly common advantage of the opportunities they are phenomenon of the modern world. It entitled to in the UK. It would be wrong is a challenge that affects people of all for the authorities to betray their nations, races and religions. Those who commitments to gender, sexual, racial perpetrate such violence do not act in a and religious equality for the sake of ill- vacuum, but rely on a network of defined notions of ‘community supporters and cheerleaders who often engagement’. create the moral imperatives for their The government must not therefore actions. engage with groups or individuals that The government must therefore not present a threat to rights and freedoms engage with groups or individuals who protected by the ECHR and discrimi - support or condone terrorism anywhere nate or advocate discrimination on the in the world. basis of religion, religious sect, race, sexual orientation or gender in any 6. Recent decades have witnessed tremen - aspect of public life or public policy. dous progress towards equality in Britain. Social and legislative changes 7. The state should rightly be concerned have given ethnic minorities, women about groups that try to dissuade and gay people rights previously denied young Muslims from joining the armed to them. The government has integrated forces or the police. Muslims are the European Convention of Human currently under-represented in both, Rights (ECHR) into British Law and it should encourage, not discour - through the Human Rights Act. The age Muslims to join. Supporting ECHR lists many of the inalienable, groups or individuals who dissuade fundamental and basic rights of man. Muslims from joining the police or These are values the government has a armed forces vitiates the policy of duty to preserve. It must, of course, allow increasing the representation of ethnic for debate and disagreement over how and religious minorities in those insti - these rights are best enshrined in law. But tutions. Provisions must be made for these should not serve to mask those conscientious objectors, but only in whose own value system is antithetical to cases where an individual believes that the EHCR. Furthermore, Britain has a all wars are wrong. fine tradition in ensuring that genuine Government must not engage with opportunity accompanies those rights organisations that oppose armed forces’ and can claim greater success in this recruitment because they selectively regard than its European counterparts. oppose wars that the state, under the

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 73 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

authority of the democratically elected Therefore, government should only parliament, is currently fighting. fund incorporated associations (see annex for definition). 8. Some foreign governments, such as Saudi Arabia, have established extremely well- funded programmes to promote their Conclusion forms of Islam across the world. It is What, then, are the aims and goals of these frequently alleged, but not possible to criteria? At their core, they are there to prove, that hard-line Muslim organisa - send a clear message about what the British tions receive funding from Saudi Arabia. public space stands for. They allow govern - Of course the government cannot ment to create a values-led narrative about compel private associations to publish the kind of behaviour it expects from its their accounts, but it would be a serious official partners. But they have wider error of government policy to provide implications too. These criteria also seek to supplementary funding to outfits already empower genuinely progressive forces from in hock to foreign institutions. within the Muslim community by exclud - Accountability is essential. ing from official patronage those whose Therefore government should only views are inconsistent with liberal demo - engage with organisations that declare cratic social values. The aim of the above is any and all sources of foreign funding. to offer a starting-point for the govern - ment and authorities which can lead to a 9. Finally, good governmental practice new process of engagement with Muslim should ensure that taxpayers’ money partners – one that will empower progres - can be properly accounted for. sives, not reactionaries.

74 7 Case Study: The Global Peace and Unity (GPU) Event

GPU describes itself as ‘an annual cultural glorifying the Palestinian terror group event and Islamic conference’ held in Hamas. A picture on the shirt depicted London. Representatives from the three a group of Hamas fighters marching main political parties attended the event with the words ‘Stop! Hamas Time’ in 2008, while the Conservative Mayor, daubed across it. 400 Boris Johnson, sent a letter of support to the organisers. 396 Over the last for years the CRITERION 2: Government must not Metropolitan Police Service has also pro - engage with individuals or organisations vided approximately £26,500 in sponsor - that call for, or condone, attacks on ship to GPU. 397 Application of the above British soldiers and their allies anywhere criteria to the speakers and exhibitors who in the world or against any forces acting attended this year’s GPU event, reveals under a UN mandate. that several of them fall short on various The exhibitor ‘e-bizaar’ sold a shirt at points: GPU which glorified the killing of American soldiers in Iraq. It displayed a 396. ‘ Global Peace and Unity ’. http://www.theglobalunity.com/0 CRITERION 1: Government must not caricature of an insurgent wearing a 8/text_pdfs/Global%20Peace%2 engage with organisations or individuals knuckle duster with the word Iraq writ - 0and%20Unity%20Event%20- %20Message%20of%20Suppor that support or condone the deliberate tar - ten on it, punching an American. t.pdf. geting of civilians (as defined by the Geneva Across the top of the cartoon were the 397. Global Peace and unity Conference, MPS briefing sent Conventions) anywhere in the world. words ‘Iraqi Resistance’. On the back to MPA members, 9 February A speaker at GPU, Mohammed Ijaz ul- of the shirt was an adulterated version 2009 (given to Policy Exchange Haq, when Pakistan’s Religious Affairs of the American flag displaying the by MPA). 398. David Batty and Peter Minister, suggested that the Queen’s stars as bullet holes and the stripes as Walker, Rushdie knighthood ‘jus - decision to award Salman Rushdie a streams of blood pouring down the tifies suicide attacks’, The Guardian, 18 June 2007. 401 knighthood in 2007 was enough to shirt. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world justify Muslims carrying out suicide /2007/jun/18/books.religion. bombings. He was reported by a CRITERIA 4: Government must not 399. ‘ Wearaloud.com ’. http://wearaloud.com/shop786/i number of UK newspapers to have engage with people or organisations that ndex.php?cPath=20&sort=2a&p said: ‘If someone exploded a bomb on give a platform to, deny, or are apologists age=5. 400. T-shirt and digital recording his body he would be right to do so for crimes against humanity, including of merchandise being sold now unless the British government apolo - genocide. in Policy Exchange ’s posses - sion. gises and withdraws the “sir” title.’ 398 The founder and former CEO of the 401. T-shirt and digital recording An exhibitor called ‘Wearaloud’, which Muslim Public Affairs Committee of merchandise being sold now describes itself as an Islamic clothing (MPACUK), Asghar Bukhari, was in Policy Exchange ’s posses - sion. retailer, sells shirts that glorify the invited to speak at a ‘workshop’ session 402. Jamie Doward, ‘Muslim Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. 399 at GPU on ‘how to create democratic leader sent funds to Irving ’, The Observer, 19 November 2006. Another clothing retailer at GPU, ‘e- political change’. In the past, Bukhari http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/200 bizaar’, sold shirts at the event has donated money to David Irving, 6/nov/19/secondworldwar.religion.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 75 Choosing Our Friends Wisely

the discredited and controversial histo - report of the All-Party Parliamentary rian who denied the Holocaust took Group against anti-Semitism found a place, during his court case. Bukhari repeated pattern of anti-Semitic behav - told him, ‘You may feel like you are on iour by MPACUK and its members. 409 your own but rest assured many people It found that the group had promoted are with you in your fight for the the idea of a worldwide Zionist truth.’ 402 Making a donation of £60, conspiracy and displayed material on Bukhari wrote, ‘Here is the cheque I its website from neo-Nazi, white promised. Good luck, if there is any nationalist, and Holocaust denial other way I can help please don’t hesti - websites. 410 In 2004 the National tate to call me. I have also asked many Union of Students banned MPACUK Muslim websites to create links to your from all UK university campuses own and ask for donations.’ 403 because of its anti-Semitic stance. 411 Another exhibitor, Books Plus, sold a CRITERION 6: Government must not number of extreme and separatist publi - engage with groups or individuals that cations including an eight-volume present a threat to rights and freedoms edition of Fatawa Islamiyah (Islamic 403. Ibid. protected by the ECHR and discriminate fatwas). Volume 1 of this series gives the 404. Muhammad Alshareef, or advocate discrimination on the basis following verdict on how Muslims ‘Why the Jews Were Cursed ’, 17 February 2001. of religion, religious sect, race, sexual ori - should interact with non-Muslims: http://www.sunnahonline.com/il entation or gender in any aspect of public ‘There is absolutely no brotherhood m/jihaad/0006.htm. life or public policy. between the believer and the disbeliever. 405. Mansoor Abul Hakim, Women who deserve to go to One of the guest speakers at GPU, Indeed, it is incumbent upon the Hell (Karachi, 2004). Sheikh Muhammad Alshareef argues believer not to take the disbeliever as a 406. Ibid. that the Jews are divinely cursed and friend.’ 412 It continues: ‘It is necessary to 407. Ibid. urges Muslims not to take them as avoid mixing with non Muslims, 408. ‘ Azhar Academy ’, 404 http://www.azharacademy.com/s friends or allies. because mixing with them causes the cripts/prodView.asp?idproduct= The Azhar Academy, an exhibitor at loss of one’s religious zeal from the heart 1021. the GPU event, sold copies of a book and may even lead to affection and love 409. ‘ Report of the All-Party 413 Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti- called Women who Deserve to Go to Hell for them.’ In volume 5 the author says Semitism ’, All-Party by Mansoor Abul Hakim. 405 The that if a Muslim woman marries a non- Parliamentary Group against Anti-Semitism, September 2006, author argues that the women’s rights Muslim, then ‘she deserves to be p 29-30. http://thepcaa.org /Report.pdf. movements during the last century chastised as does [sic] the guardian, the 414 410. Ibid. were ‘launched with the basic objective witnesses and the registrar.’ The

411. Ibid. of driving women towards aberrant author also suggests that if someone 406 412. Fatawa Islamiyah – Islamic ways’. The book provides a list of renounces their belief in Islam, ‘his head Verdicts, volume 1, Abdul ‘Aziz women whom the author believes should be chopped off’. 415 bin ‘Abdullah bin Baz, Muhammad bin Saleh al- deserve to go to hell, including women Uthaimin, Abdullah bin Abdul who: (1) ‘Complain against their Rahman Al-Jibreen (Dar-us- Salam, 2001). husband now and then’; (2) ‘adorn’ Conclusion 413. Ibid. themselves; (3) are arrogant; (4) and are Hazel Blears sought assurances from the 414. Fatawa Islamiyah – Islamic ‘quarrelsome’. 407 This publication is also organisers that no extremist speakers or Verdicts, volume 5, Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdullah bin Baz, available on the Azhar Academy’s material would be present at Global Peace Muhammad bin Saleh al- website. 408 and Unity. In the event, representatives Uthaimin, Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman Al-Jibreen (Dar-us- Asghar Bukhari, who founded the from the three main parties attended. In Salam, 2001). Muslim Public Affairs Committee and addition, the Mayor’s office and 415. Ibid. Video of the books being sold is in posession of is its former CEO, was invited to speak Metropolitan Police both officially sup - Policy Exchange. at a GPU ‘workshop’ session. The ported the event as well. This raises the

76 Case Study: The Global Peace and Unity (GPU) Event

vital question: what criteria, if any, were events if their participation continued. In used when assessing the suitability of GPU particular, Grieve described William for endorsement. Rodriguez, a survivor of 9/11 who believes The case study above reveals how a the event was orchestrated by the US number of the invited speakers and government, 416 and Sheikh Yasir Qadhi, exhibitors at this year’s GPU fell short of who has denied the Holocaust, as ‘mad’. 417 our criteria – and clearly support some An examination of the list of speakers and views which are inconsistent with the exhibitors invited to previous GPU events normative values of British society. These demonstrates that this is a regular pattern are not views which MPs or other official and cannot therefore be dismissed as a ‘one representatives of the state should be off’. So it is worth asking whether Blears 416. ‘ Website of William Rodriguez ’. http://www.911 endorsing. During his speech at the GPU was right and whether GPU was the kind keymaster.com/. event, the then Shadow Home Secretary of event which the government of a liberal 417. A recording of Dominic and Shadow Attorney General, Dominic democracy should have engaged with, Grieve ’s speech at the Global Peace and Unity Conference, Grieve, criticised some of the invited speak - thereby endorsing and endowing it with 2008, is in Policy Exchange ’s ers, suggesting he would not attend future credibility as ‘moderate’. possession.

www.policyexchange.org.uk • 77 8 Implementing the Criteria

The current Prevent strategy has brought have been established between such groups in its train a major growth in the power of and statutory authorities. the unelected, permanent British state. One of the key issues arising out of this, as emphasised above, is that of accountability. Preventing Extremism: How can government strategy be moni - Recasting PVE as PE tored and evaluated in a serious way? The existing Prevent programme is symp - tomatic of the government’s overall tone. It behaves as though it cannot set normative The criteria discussed here only scratch the surface of a social values. Instead it only makes mini - “ malistic demands – asking partners to much wider change that is needed within government ” refrain from engaging in or supporting ter - rorism in the UK. Ernest Bevin once sug - gested of the British working classes that This question goes to the heart of how their greatest problem was their ‘poverty of these criteria should be implemented. aspiration’. 418 Much the same might be said They will only be effective when supported of the current Prevent strand of Contest. by a wider infrastructure which is able to The government’s apparently minimal - realise the aims they are there to achieve. istic approach, only asking people to Therefore, before considering how the refrain from violence on these shores, criteria might be implemented and greater derives partly from apparently successful transparency achieved, it is important to foreign precedents. In countries such as first examine their philosophical aims. Jordan or Saudi Arabia, appeals to young As a starting point for reassessing and men and women not to engage in violent reforming both the purpose and operation jihad are obviously couched in religious of Prevent, it is crucial that its performance terms. Thus the Saudi Kingdom has initi - 418. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin (London, 2002). to date be audited. Prevent in its current ated the ‘Care Programme’ to reform

419. See, ‘The Perks of form is complex and controversial, and members of al-Qaeda in lavish Penance ’, BBC News Online, 9 government must therefore set up an inde - ‘compounds’ that can only be described as July 2008. http://news.bbc. 419 co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/74 pendent inquiry into how money for PVE ‘Betty Ford Clinics for jihadists’. It is 96375.stm;and Shiraz Maher, ‘A can be used to maximum advantage. This easy to see why senior civil servants with a Betty Ford clinic for jihadis ’, The Times, 6 July 2008. http:// enter - should be a short, sharp inquiry lasting no history of working alongside allied intelli - tainment.timesonline.co.uk /tol/arts_and_entertainment/tv_a longer than three months and led by one gence services abroad have been impressed nd_radio/article4275042.ece. individual supported by staff drawn from by initiatives of this kind. But this See also, Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, ‘The unraveling: the National Audit Office. Its remit should approach comes at a price. The Saudi state the jihadist revolt against bin also include a detailed analysis of those does not challenge the ideology of the Laden ’, The New Republic, 11 June 2008.http://www.tnr. Muslim groups that have already benefited jihadists, but instead wants to control their com/politics/story.html?id=702bf from Prevent funding − what they stand ideas by re-establishing the state as the 6d5-a37a-4e3e-a491- fd72bf6a9da1. for, what they do and what relationships authoritative interpreter of Islam.

78 Implementing the Criteria

Effectively, they seem to be telling young drive them forward. 421 Surveying almost two jihadists: ‘We share your views of the centuries of terrorism, from Sergei Nechaev Kuffar (unbelievers). But you had no right and the Fenians to Carlos the Jackal and to declare jihad on your own.’ As such, the Ayman al-Zawahiri, Burleigh shows how message of the Saudi authorities is as much terrorism cannot be isolated from its disciplinary and organisational as it is ideo - surrounding ideological environment. logical. This approach might make sense in Government must therefore urgently 99 per cent Muslim societies − but to research the causal link between non- adopt kindred approaches in modern violent extremism and violent extremism, Britain is to traduce the principles on exploring the role ideology and ideological which our parliamentary democracy is cheerleaders play in motivating terrorists. founded. Islam is not, nor should it be, the In addition to this research, the govern - main framework of reference through ment must recast the ‘Preventing Violent which the British state or its representa - Extremism’ initiative to simply ‘Preventing tives appeal to those of its citizens who Extremism’ − marking an important prac - happen to be Muslim. tical and psychological shift in its In this respect, the criteria discussed here ambitions. only scratch the surface of a much wider change that is needed within government. In its latest publication on Prevent, the Creating transparency government suggests that Islamist ideology For central government, the task of identi - is ‘never the only factor and seldom the fying the right groups from within the most important’ in the radicalisation of Muslim community has at times been an young men. 420 No explanation is offered almost Sisyphean task. It has proven about how this conclusion was reached − extremely difficult to wade through the nor is there any mention of whether the alphabet soup of supposedly representative veracity of that assertion might be kept Muslim bodies that all too often have a real under constant reappraisal. Indeed, amidst a flavour of Monty Python’s Judean People’s wide range of topics listed in the Prevent Liberation Front and the People’s guidelines as possibilities for ongoing Liberation Front of Judea. More broadly, research, it is significant that there is no as has already been discussed, Whitehall mention of exploring the relationship officials remain fiercely divided amongst between non-violent and violent extremism. themselves over the precise nature of the Yet it would be most unusual if there were ideological threat that we face. Some not a link between Islamist extremism and progress has been made in this respect Islamist terrorism. It is as if Palestinian since 7/7, but there is still a long way to go. nationalism did not motivate Yasser Arafat; If this task has been challenging for Irish nationalism had no role in persuading government, it has been almost impossible Martin McGuinness to join the IRA; and for local authorities. Municipalities cannot Marxism was irrelevant to Andreas Baader place an emphasis equal to that of central and Ulrike Meinhof. The historical record government on developing the level of intel - provides plentiful evidence that calls the ligence and expertise required to distinguish 420. The Prevent Strategy: A government’s conventional wisdom into between the myriad of different groups out Guide for Local Partners in question. Michael Burleigh’s recent synthe - there. That should not be their role. They England; Stopping people becoming or supporting terror - sis of much existing scholarship on need assistance, badly. ists and violent extremists, June terrorism in Blood and Rage demonstrates It is therefore proposed that these crite - 2008, p 17. that terrorists need, and leech off, a wider ria be adopted across government and the 421. Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of set of cultural and moral imperatives to public sector, creating a consistent and Terrorism (London, 2008).

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coherent framework across institutional Preventing Violent Extremism-Pathfinder lines. The adoption of a single list for all Fund has been that it ‘has the potential to public agencies will facilitate this and instil alienate both Muslim communities, which greater confidence in the decision making may feel unfairly stigmatised, and non- process by introducing a level of trans - Muslim communities, which may perceive parency which is currently lacking. an unfair distribution of local resources’. 424 In line with the CIC’s recommendations, therefore, it seems entirely right that ‘Single “ when reading through the existing Prevent documents, Group Funding’, defined as that which is it can feel as if one is reading another languag e ‘awarded on the basis of a particular identity, ” such as ethnic, religious or cultural’, should be ‘the exception rather than the rule’ for government. 425 At the moment, PVE is The HMIC-Audit Commission report perhaps the ultimate in ‘single group fund - into the existing Prevent strategy found ing’ – aimed almost exclusively at the that, ‘Community groups and the volun - Muslim community and only existing tary sector wanted more transparency on because of the challenge of violent Islamism. the strategic decisions made by councils As the CIC noted, however, one of the and police partners in selecting projects for dangers of ‘single group funding’ is that it Prevent funding.’ 422 It is incumbent on has the ‘potential to increase insularity and a government to respond to this understand - sense of separation where the project funded able concern. On occasion, when reading is only or mainly for the group in ques - through the existing Prevent documents, it tion’. 426 Furthermore, it was said to be can feel as if one is reading another something of a ‘hangover from old identity language – replete with its own vocabulary politics – with groups encouraged to shout and syntax. The maze of authorities and loudly about their own individual needs, acronyms – NI:35, LSPs, LAAs, CAAs, rather than being encouraged to come APACS, BCUs, KINs, AIGs – can be together to access funding for shared activi - utterly bewildering. Speaking plain ties enabling bridging and interaction.’ 427 For English and making the operation of these reasons, it seems hard to disagree with Prevent more transparent can only help to the CIC’s conclusions: ‘The presumption improve efficiency and delivery. should be against Single Group Funding In cases where the language of Prevent unless there is a clear reason for capacity was simplified for local partners, the building within a group or community,’ and 422. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and HMIC-Audit Commission report found where ‘Single Group Funding is awarded, Development Exercise: Report to that, ‘community groups said that they feel the reasons behind that award should be the Home Office and Communities and Local more involved and consequently more clearly publicised to all communities in the Government, October 2008, p 18. signed up to the Prevent approach.’ 423 local area.’ 428 423. Ibid. p 19. More generally, this would also help Furthermore, in order to ensure that 424. Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development members of the public feel a stronger sense proper analysis of any Prevent-related Exercise: Report to the Home of involvement and ownership with activities can be made, it is crucial that the Office and Communities and Local Government, October 2008, Prevent, which could, in turn, ensure that police and local authorities evaluate their p. 11. its initiatives receive popular support. likely impact upon equality issues. At pres - 425. Commission on Integration No less important is what the ent public bodies such as the police are and Cohesion - Our Shared Future, June 2007, p 1 60. Commission on Integration and Cohesion required to conduct such assessments. This

426. Ibid. p 161. (CIC) calls ‘single group funding’. As the must be extended to all work, across all 427. Ibid. p 162. HMIC-Audit Commission report streams of government, which falls under 428. Ibid. p 163. observed, one of the difficulties with the the bracket of the Prevent strategy.

80 Implementing the Criteria

Crucially, the issue of ‘equality’ must be not a characterisation of ministerial considered from the perspective of society as responsibility that many members of the a whole. Too often, where Prevent is Commons would immediately recognise. concerned, the authorities and police have Therefore, while MPs currently play a sought only to judge how their activities negligible role in Prevent, responsibility for might affect Muslim communities. Little much of it is hived off to entirely anony - thought is given to the broader impact on mous local and regional Prevent Boards. communal relations. There is, for instance, This cannot continue. MPs must now be no consideration of how engagement with put not just into the decision making certain sectarian organisations or individu - process for Prevent but also into key over - als, might affect non-Muslim communities. sight positions which allow them to This needs to change. To this end, Prevent adequately audit its delivery. work must be subjected to rigorous Equality The lack of an active role for MPs also Impact Assessments that analyse such means that the public are losing sight of matters in relation to society as a whole. where their taxes are being spent and they are unable to scrutinise decisions about how and why certain projects have been Creating accountability: funded, or to ask questions about their putting MPs at the heart of Prevent performance. A revolution is taking place in local gov - Just as the OSCT operates across ernment in which municipalities are enjoy - departmental lines, so government must ing ever-increasing powers and being asked create a Select Committee operating across to do more and more. But, the implemen - departmental lines with responsibility for tation of the Prevent strategy on the auditing, accounting and overseeing the ground represents a substantial shift in Prevent strategy. This committee should power away from elected politicians to the work, wherever possible, on an open permanent state. source basis and publicly explain both its However there is real concern among findings and conclusions. some that giving increased representation Though the ‘soft power’ initiatives of to elected officials at the local level could political Islamists command less attention result in advocates of sectarian or Islamist from the public and politicians than actual politics gaining unprecedented control terrorist attacks, Prevent is arguably the over Prevent matters. The narrow, and most important pillar of the government’s often monocultural wards in which some counter-terrorism strategy in the long councillors operate, makes this a possibil - term. It is also the least understood. This ity. Yet councillors are not best placed to must be urgently redressed to enlist popu - take strategic decisions on Prevent and lar support both within the Commons and spaces reserved for elected representatives the country. must therefore be allocated to MPs. They enjoy a much broader mandate across a wider constituency, often composed of Making assessments: several different ethnic groupings. creating a Due Diligence Unit Aneurin Bevan, the founder of the (DDU) National Health Service, once famously The practice hitherto of giving local declared that, ‘When a bedpan is dropped authorities near-independent decision- on a hospital floor its noise should resound making powers on local Prevent partner - in the Palace of Westminster.’ 429 In light of ships has too often resulted in local knowl - 429. Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan: 1945-60 , v. 2 (London, the prevailing culture on Prevent, this is edge being translated into local standards. 1975).

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However local authorities can take an and the public sector on who their part - excessively restrictive view, reacting only to ners should be with some much needed the impulses and prevailing climate in their consistency. locality. Therefore localised groups operat - A Due Diligence Unit is also more likely ing within these narrower parameters can to spot Islamist organisations who reinvent exert a disproportionate pull. Instead, themselves, create ‘front groups’ or operate a these groups and local authorities need to carousel of leaders. This kind of resource is be responding to a much larger values led almost impossible to operate in a meaningful initiative from the centre. What is needed way at local level and enhances its integrity is local knowledge, national standards . by building a national picture of behaviour and activity. Why should DCLG take the lead on this, What is needed is local knowledge, national standards as opposed to other government depart - “ ” ments? Because only it has the potential to be a values-based institution, making it quite different to the Home Office and the police. Consequently, the Department for Inevitably, their concern is to stop the next Communities and Local Government bomb from going off − and they are often (DCLG) must establish an in-house Due prepared to pay a high price to do so. They Diligence Unit (DDU) which will develop cannot be expected to mould the public a central database resource on the array of sphere in line with a values-based approach different groups operating around the which outlines what government believes our country. This will inevitably require it to society should be about. work closely with local councils when In light of the Prime Minister’s ongoing identifying those groups; but it must and legitimate emphasis on British values, increasingly take the lead in making deci - it is surprising how little the concept of sions and assessing the suitability of ‘Britishness’ appears in Prevent-related potential partners. This centralised Due documents – illustrating a lack of confi - Diligence Unit would create an environ - dence. This is an urgent priority. And the ment where local knowledge responds to creation of a Due Diligence Unit would be national standards. an important step in the right direction. It is proposed that this unit works with The immediate demands, however, of open source material looking at: guarding against the hard edge of terrorism, will clash with a unit of this kind which 1. Public pronouncements (such as those prioritises the more slow moving needs of expressed in publications, speeches or community cohesion − the ‘urgent’ versus the internet) the ‘important’. There will be inevitable 2. Pronouncements made primarily to tensions here between long-term and short- selected audiences (such as those term Prevent goals. DCLG must, however, uncovered by Channel 4’s Dispatches assert itself in taking the lead on this agenda in its investigation of preachers in some and creating a robust values based approach, British mosques) helping set the normative values of the British public sphere. Operating at the heart of government, a unit of this kind will be uniquely placed to create a coherent policy across institu - Securing and Monitoring change tional lines which can advise Whitehall The current government strategy, as revealed departments, local councils, the police by Hazel Blears to Policy Exchange, is to pur -

82 Implementing the Criteria

sue an approach which encourages changes that exist between long-term concerns in organisational behaviour. Achieving that against short-term objectives. means promoting and incentivising good behaviour. Therefore, whenever government refuses to engage with an individual or group, “ when it is suggested that a behavioural change has or refuses to attend an event such as occurred, it is vital that this assertion be held up to IslamExpo or GPU, it should publicly scrutiny explain its reasoning – thereby hoping to pro - ” mote change. Of course, if government is seeking to promote change by rewarding pos - itive behaviour, this naturally merits some More recently, the head of Equalities and consideration of how we assess change. Diversity for Birmingham City Council, It is important that the government is Mashuq Ally, told a council scrutiny open to the possibility that individuals and committee that the Green Lane Mosque, groups can alter course. Yet, when it is where Channel 4 filmed Abu Usama preach - suggested that a behavioural change has ing an incendiary message as part of its occurred, it is vital that this assertion be Dispatches programme, has now reformed. held up to scrutiny – and set against the The mosque is supposed to have re-written criteria outlined here. its constitution and launched a ‘proper Thus, it has been suggested that the recruitment process’ for new Imams. 432 The Islamic Foundation in Leicester has shaken committee was also told that Birmingham off many of its difficult associations from Central Mosque is ‘depoliticising’. 433 the past with groups like Jamaat-e-Islami. It would be interesting to know what the For example, Dilwar Hussain, head of the exact evidence for these claims is. After all, policy research centre at the Islamic the Green Lane Mosque was hailed as a Foundation, recently said that Muslims ‘moderate’ institution long before Channel 4 had not done enough to challenge extrem - originally uncovered evidence of wrongdo - ism and frequently ‘did not challenge ing. What new assurances have Birmingham strongly enough the preachers of hate and City Council now received? What safeguards the peddlers of simplistic, yet nihilistic, have been put in place to ensure that extrem - solutions’. 430 ist preachers like Abu Usama can no longer Such comments would appear to signal a enjoy a platform in the mosque? What is now welcome departure for the Islamic available through public and open sources to Foundation. But what other evidence is there demonstrate that the Green Lane and the of such change? Central mosques have undergone meaning - Senior government officials have ful changes? Despite repeated requests for suggested to Policy Exchange that clarification, at the time of publication, 430. Zaki Cooper and Guy Lodge, Faith in the Nation: Hussain’s positive comments represent a Birmingham City Council had not replied to Religion, identity and the public realm in Britain today (IPPR: gradual, generational shift within the Policy Exchange’s questions. December, 2008) p 41. 431 Islamic Foundation. In some senses, they Clearly, government must reward posi - 431. Private sources. consider themselves to be ‘tilting the tive changes in organisational behaviour by 432. ‘ Birmingham Muslims balance’ in favour of moderation inter - acknowledging them when they occur. It ‘made to feel guilty’ about Western lifestyles ’, Birmingham nally, within the IF. That might be so, but must also ensure, however, that such Post, 12 December 2008. on whose terms is this apparent shift changes represent a broad and genuine http://www.birminghampost.net/ news/west-midlands- happening? And how far will this reforma - shift towards the liberal democratic values news/2008/12/12/birmingham- tion go? While this remains uncertain, the of the British state which these criteria aim muslims-made-to-feel-guilty- about-western-lifestyles-65233- current hopes expressed by some over these to promote. Therefore, when assessing 22 465617/. first signs of change represent the tensions change, the burden of proof must rest with 433. Ibid.

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those parties who claim to have repudiated it is awarded, funding allocation previously distasteful views. should be clearly explained. 6. All Prevent-related activity must be subjected to rigorous ‘Equality Impact Conclusion Assessments’, which consider the activ - In order to ensure that the criteria pro - ity by their impact on society as a whole. posed here can be implemented in an 7. Members of Parliament must be put effective and accountable way, the follow - into the heart of the decision-making ing suggestions have been made: process for Prevent and given over - sight positions which allow them to 1. The recasting of Preventing Violent adequately audit its delivery. Extremism to Preventing Extremism. 8. Government must create a cross- 2. The creation of a short, sharp, inde - departmental Select Committee with pendent inquiry to examine where responsibility for auditing, accounting funds have been allocated, and to what and overseeing the Prevent strategy. end, under PVE. 9. The Department for Communities 3. The new criteria for engagement and Local Government must establish should be adopted across government an in-house Due Diligence Unit and the public sector, creating a which will develop an open source consistent and coherent framework central information resource on the across institutional lines. array of different groups operating 4. The PVE strategy should be simplified around the country. and made more transparent. 10. The government must promote and 5. Single group funding should be the incentivise good behaviour – and exception rather than the rule. Where disincentivise bad behaviour.

84 9 Conclusion

In Identity and Violence, the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen points out that every individual has a vast array of ‘identi - “ If the government only engages with Muslims by ties’, such as gender, sexuality, race, faith, appealing to their faith, rather than through other channels, parental background, profession, residency then why should Muslims see their political identity as being or age, that he or she might choose to informed by anything other than Islam? emphasise. 434 Faith is just one of those, and ” only for relatively few people is it the most important. It follows that each individual must make a choice between these compet - The criteria outlined in this pamphlet ing identities and decide how much weight seek to change this status quo. They offer a to give them in his or her own life. new gold standard for engagement across Sen asks, ‘Why should a British citizen the public sector and insert MPs into the who happens to be Muslim have to rely on decision-making process. In doing so, the clerics and other leaders of the religious proposals outlined here are designed to community to communicate with the Prime reconstitute the Prevent initiative as Minister?’ 435 Such a policy is counter- currently conceived − not to end it. productive to promoting integration and a ‘Contest’ is the right strategy for meeting progressive national identity because it the terrorist threat that we face, of which encourages Muslims to see themselves as Prevent is a critical part. It must remain so semi-detached Britons. If the government and, in the long term, will be the most only engages with Muslims by appealing to important aspect of the government’s work their faith, rather than through other chan - in this area. Only by preventing people nels, then why should Muslims see their from embracing extremist ideas can we political identity as being informed by hope to fatally and decisively undermine anything other than Islam? And should we the nihilism of al-Qaeda. Although then be surprised if their views are later Prevent must endure, it is in urgent need expressed through Islamist politics? of being recast if its ambitious aims are to For too long, government has only be realised. This invariably involves viewed Muslims through the narrow prism government adopting a more rigorous of their communal, faith-based identity. approach towards its philosophical and The existing framework for Prevent rein - ideological aspects, rather than just its forces this, at best because local authorities technocratic dimensions. and their partners are unsure of what they In this respect, these criteria are about are meant to be doing, at worst because much more than simply picking partners. they actively regard political Islamists, and They help the government define what the more importantly their message, as a British public sphere stands for, and there - necessary bulwark against violent extrem - fore, what it is we are seeking to protect ism. The problems with the prevailing from the threat of Islamism. Ideology is an 434. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny policy have been elaborated upon at length integral part of this, and Prevent must (London, 2006). in the preceding chapters. endeavour to undermine the intellectual 435. Ibid.

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framework that creates the moral impera - the Islamic Party of Iraq, which was virtu - tives for terrorism. ally wiped out, along with the Shi’ite party associated with the firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose share of the vote 437 At the heart of all this lies the question about what kind dropped from 11 to just 3 per cent. It “ means that Islamist parties will no longer of society we want to build for the future ” be able to run any of the provincial coun - cils, on which they have been replaced by a new and secular movement that is indige - Government must therefore recast the nously Iraqi. Where do such developments ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ initiative leave those commentators who have as simply ‘Preventing Extremism’. This insisted we pay patronage to Islamists means ending the current arrangement because they are ‘the coming force’? whereby groups and individuals hostile to At the heart of all this lies the question the basic tenets of our liberal democracy about what kind of society we want to are often accommodated in the belief that build for the future. After Ruth Kelly they can ‘deliver’ young men from the path began the important process of distancing of violence. government from some of its traditional More generally, government and the Islamist partners, Azzam Tamimi was public sector must also abandon the prac - quick to criticise those who were newly tice of ‘picking winners’. The threat of empowered. He suggested the government ‘home-grown’ terrorism has intensified the had chosen some Sufi partners ‘because desire of many within officialdom to these [Sufi] orders generally encourage the uncover an Islamic ‘silver bullet’ that can separation between life and religion’. 438 eliminate the danger. It is hoped that ‘gate - More recently, the spokesman for the keepers’ might somehow ‘deliver’ Muslim Muslim Council of Britain – Inayat communities away from the path of Bunglawala – said that Policy Exchange violence. This is an exercise in futility. ‘has consistently tried to promote an Muslims are not ‘deliverable’ as a commu - apolitical version of Islam’. 439 nal faith bloc. Would this be such a bad thing? It may How can anyone claim to know ‘what be bad news for Azzam Tamimi and Inayat Muslims want’ − either at home or abroad? Bunglawala, but why would it be bad news 436. ‘ The tenacity of hope’, The Economis t, 30 December 2008. In this context, consider the outcome of for Britain? Do we really want more reli - http://www.economist.com/worl the elections in Bangladesh last December. gion in politics? Do we want to see more d/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id =12855437&fsrc=rss. The poll resulted in the virtual elimination people adopting faith-based political iden - 437. William Shawcross, of the Jamaat-e-Islami as a political force – tities? Ultimately, do we want progressive, ‘Democratic dawn in Iraq’, The 436 Guardian , 3 February 2009. which won just two out of 300 seats. non-sectarian politics in this country, or do http://www.guardian.co.uk/com While Jamaat’s British allies continue to we want to accommodate ourselves to mentisfree/2009/feb/03/ comment-iraq-elections. claim they speak for British Muslims, their sectarian ‘realities’?

438. Ahmed Ibrahim, ‘Britain’s ‘mother party’ has been decisively rejected Of course, none of this is about the Sufism ’, IslamOnline, 26 August at the ballot box. Is it not time that the government trying to ‘reform’ Islam or 2008. http://www.islamonline. net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C British government matched the determi - ‘silence dissent’. This is a point that needs &cid=1219723024580&pagenam nation of the Bangladeshi people and to be stressed, not least because this is how e=Zone-English- News/NWELayout. emphatically set aside the Jamaat? These Islamists will attempt to portray any move 439. Andy Beckett, ‘What can developments in the Indian subcontinent to dethrone them. But the state cannot be they be thinking? ’, The Guardian, 26 September 2008. were matched in Iraq, during provincial held to ransom by their threats; and it http://www.guardian.co.uk/politi elections there in January 2009. All the should have a more expansive vision of the cs/2008/sep/26/thinktanks.cons ervatives. Islamist parties lost ground, particularly role it can play in positively influencing the

86 Conclusion

social behaviour of its partners – without towards creating greater clarity in policy, descending into authoritarianism. The and allow the British state to once again simple act of sidelining those who reject reassert itself as the authoritative allocator our social values can be a powerful tool for of values. prompting changes in organisational To achieve this, much greater clarity will behaviour. The Muslim Council of be needed about those values and how they Britain’s decision (sadly now reversed) to should be reflected across the country. abandon its boycott of Holocaust Reports about the imminent publication of Memorial Day was a notable example of a refreshed counter-terrorism strategy, this. 440 After being removed from its posi - known as ‘Contest 2’, suggest that official tion of near monopoly as ‘the sole thinking on these matters is far from legitimate representative of the Muslim settled. It seems that wide swathes of offi - people of the UK’, the group had agreed to cialdom – especially in local government attend the event, hoping to be drawn back and the police – are still reluctant to adopt into Whitehall’s good books in the process. a robust values-led initiative that challenges The MCB’s U-turn infuriated Anas extremist ideology itself. A recent publica - Altikriti, who lambasted them for reneging tion from the Department for Innovation, on their ‘principled stand’ – a disagreement Universities and Skills (DIUS), gives an that in itself exposes the broader tactical insight into this continuing stasis. In his advantages that our criteria might offer. 441 foreword, Minister of State, David Lammy, More pragmatic elements prefer reform to makes a series of welcome statements about radicalisation − and as different move - the need to ‘resist extremist influence’ and ments choose different paths this will challenge ‘extremist tendencies’. 443 Lammy’s create fissures and opportunities for the pronouncements marked an important state to exploit in the long term. This is shift in tone and language, building on the entirely consistent with the approach sentiments first expressed by Jacqui Smith outlined by Hazel Blears when she spoke at at the Prevent Conference in December 440. ‘ MCB Decision on Holocaust Memorial Day ’, MCB News, 3 Policy Exchange about pursuing policies 2008. However, the core of the DIUS December 2007. http://www.mcb. which are ‘designed to change behav - document reveals that, despite the apparent org.uk/article_detail.php?article=a nnouncement-693. 442 iour’. shift in emphasis to encompass extremism, 441. Anas Altikriti, Forgetting to Hazel Blears has proven herself to be a this is still being done only where extremist Remember’, The Guardian , 4 December 2007. http://www. worthy successor to Ruth Kelly at the activity risks spilling over into violent guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/20 Department for Communities and Local action. The overriding focus on violent 07/dec/04/forgettingtoremember. Government. She has continued much of activity has not changed and the need to 442. Policy Exchange seminar led by Rt. Hon. Hazel Blears MP, the good work initiated by her predecessor challenge extremist ideas per se , to Secretary of State for on Prevent, setting clear moral boundaries denounce them and make it clear that they Communities and Local Government on ‘Preventing and rewarding progressive, rather than have no legitimate place in our liberal Violent Extremism: the Government’s Approach ’, 17 reactionary ideology. However this kind of democracy, remains conspicuously absent. July 2008. http://www.policy principled approach requires consistent And even Hazel Blears, who has taken a exchange.org.uk/Events.aspx?id application to make its message meaning - clear and principled lead on these matters, =688. 443. The role of further educa - ful to those communities whose revealed the enduring ‘grey areas’ surround - tion colleges in preventing vio - co-operation we require in the long term. ing Contest 2 when speaking at the lent extremism: next steps, February, 2009. In that sense, it is not enough to simply London School of Economics. 444 444. Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP, have a policy in place, but also the will to This lack of clarity has international ‘Many Voices: understanding the see it through and the recognition that it is significance, too. One very senior govern - debate about preventing violent extremism ’, London School of our democratic British state, not the ment source has told Policy Exchange that Economics, 25 February 2009. http://www.communities.gov.uk/ Islamists, which holds the cards. These the Prime Minister hopes to persuade the speeches/corporate/ criteria mark an important first step new US administration to ‘take Prevent manyvoices.

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global’ because ‘the US is the only country exists. Prevent is a most necessary part of that can replicate Prevent on an industrial Contest: but the too often indiscriminate scale’ across the world. Yet as this study and promiscuous embrace of reactionary shows, there are still many serious problems Islamist elements risks discrediting the entire – political, philosophical and organisational enterprise. It is time for a major change in − with the Prevent programme as it currently approach.

88 Annex: Technical Definition of Some Criteria

Interpretation of the points above will be Definition of ‘genocide or crimes the responsibility of those bodies which against humanity’. choose to adopt them although for the sake The legal definition of genocide as out - of clarity we have expanded on some lined in the Convention on the Prevention points below to explain terms which might and Punishment of the Crime of appear legally ambiguous. Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 (which came into effect in January 1951) Definition of ‘attacks on civilians’ will apply. It states: The definition of ‘attacks’ in these criteria will be taken from the Geneva Convention Article 2 (Protocol 1, Additional to the Geneva In the present Convention, genocide Conventions, 1977, PART IV: CIVILIAN means any of the following acts commit - POPULATION) which states: ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or reli - Article 49: Definition of Attacks and gious group, as such: Scope of Application Killing members of the group ‘Attacks’ means acts of violence against Causing serious bodily or mental the adversary, whether in offense or in harm to members of the group defence. Deliberately inflicting on the group The definition of ‘civilian’ here will be conditions of life calculated to bring taken from the Geneva Convention about its physical destruction in (Protocol 1, Additional to the Geneva whole or in part Conventions, 1977, PART IV: CIVILIAN Imposing measures intended to pre - POPULATION) which states: vent births within the group Forcibly transferring children of the Article 50: Definition of Civilians and group to another group Civilian Population A civilian is any person who does not The term ‘crimes against humanity’ has belong to one of the categories of persons passed into common usage to denote any referred to in Article 4 A 111, lIl, (31 and serious atrocity committed on a large scale. 161 of the ird Convention and in This remains too vague to be effective and Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of does not reflect either the technical or legal doubt whether a person is a civilian, that status of the term. The concept of crimes person shall be considered to be a civilian. against humanity was first given effect in the e civilian population comprises all 1907 Hague Convention preamble, which persons who are civilians. codified the customary law of armed con - e presence within the civilian popula - flict. Following the Second World War and tion of individuals who do not come within the creation of tribunals at Nuremberg the definition of civilians does not deprive where Nazi members were tried for their the population of its civilian character. crimes, the need to develop a precise inten -

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tional agreement for the prosecution of war tion, before or during the war; or perse - criminals arose to facilitate proceedings at cutions on political, racial or religious the International Military Tribunal (IMT). grounds in execution of or in connection It defined crimes against humanity as: with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation Article 6 of the domestic law of the country [...] where perpetrated. e following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be Definition of incorporated and individual responsibility: unincorporated associations. [...] An incorporated association is treated for War crimes: namely, violations of the legal purposes like a person. This allows the laws or customs of war. Such violations entity to own and dispose of property and shall include, but not be limited to, the right to enter into and enforce contracts. murder, ill-treatment or deportation to This creates the situation where the body can slave labour or for any other purpose of have perpetual succession, outliving its direc - civilian population of or in occupied tors and shareholders (if any). Its existence territory, murder or ill-treatment of pris - only ends when it is wound up pursuant to oners of war or persons on the seas, the Companies Acts. The current notes to killing of hostages, plunder of public or PVE Community Leadership Fund already private property, wanton destruction of stipulate this as a requirement for groups, cities, towns or villages, or devastation though only in cases where funding is being not justiﬁed by military necessity; sought. 445 We propose that this principle is extended to groups seeking any kind of offi - Crimes against humanity: namely, cial engagement to promote greater institu - murder, extermination, enslavement, tional transparency and accountability, allow - 445. Preventing Violent Extremism: Community deportation, and other inhumane acts ing external parties to make an informed Leadership Fund Guidance (April, 2008 ) p.9 committed against any civilian popula - decision about the organisation’s character.

90 Glossary

ACPO – Association of Chief Police Officers ACPO (TAM) – Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) ACSO – Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations (in the MPS) AMP – Association of Muslim Police (here of the MPS) APA – Association of Police Authorities APACS – Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (performance indicator) BCU – Basic Command Units (of the police) BMI – British Muslim Initiative BNP – British National Party BSP – British Socialist Party CAA – Comprehensive Area Agreement CIC – Commission on Integration and Cohesion CLF – Community Leadership Fund CLP – Constituency Labour Party CPGB – Communist Party of Great Britain CPS – Crown Prosecution Service CTIU – Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit CTR – Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation programme (at the FCO) CTU – Counter Terrorism Unit DCSF – Department for Children, Schools and Families DCLG – Department of Communities and Local Government DfID – Department for International Development DIUS – Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills EIA – Equality Impact Assessment ELM – East London Mosque FCCBF – Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office (or just ‘Foreign Office’) FOSIS – Federation of Islamic Student Societies (FOSIS) GPU – Global Peace and Unity (Conference) HMIC – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary HuT – Hizb-ut-Tahrir IAG – Independent Advisory Group (to the police) IDeA – Improvement and Development Agency IF – Islamic Foundation IPCC – Independent Police Complaints Commission JCTUOG – Joint Counter Terrorism Unit Oversight Group KIN – Key Individual Network (for the police) LAA – Local Area Agreement LDE – Learning and Development Exercise LGA – Local Government Association LRC – Labour Representation Committee LSP – Local Strategic Partnership MAB – Muslim Association of Britain MCB – Muslim Council of Britain MCU – Muslim Contact Unit

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MIHE – Markfield Institute of Higher Education MINAB – Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board MMA – Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (Pakistani Islamist coalition) MPAC-UK – Muslim Public Affairs Committee (UK) MPA – Metropolitan Police Authority MPS – Metropolitan Police Service MSF – Muslim Safety Forum NAMP – National Association of Muslim Police NEC – National Executive Committee (of the Labour Party) NI:35 – National Indicator 35 NPIA − National Police Improvement Agency NUS – National Union of Students NWFP – North-West Frontier Province (in Pakistan) OSCT – Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism PVE – Preventing Violent Extremism PVE-PF – Preventing Violent Extremism-Pathfinder Fund RICU – Research, Information and Communications Unit RMW – Radical Middle Way SPF – Strategic Programme Fund (at the FCO) WMP − West Midlands Police WMPA − West Midlands Police Authority YMAG – Young Muslim Advisory Group YMO – Young Muslim Organisation

92 Bibliography

Official documents (published) All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism (September, 2006) An Unquiet World Submission to the Shadow Cabinet National and International Security Policy Group Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (2006) Cmnd. 6888 Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate (Metropolitan Police Authority: February, 2007) Home Office Exclusions Review (October 2008) Leading the preventing violent extremism agenda: a role made for councillors (November, 2008) Leading the preventing violent extremism agenda: engaging, supporting and funding commu - nity groups (November, 2008) Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, December 18, 2003, column 1763 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, May 25, 2006, column 1761W Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, May 25, 2006, Column 1961W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, Dec 4, 2006, Column 196W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, November 29, 2007, column 679W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, January 15, 2008, column 771 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 February 2008, Column 1390W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, March 6, 2008, column 1920 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, May 20, 2008, column 155 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, Jan 30, 2008, Column 307 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, June 2, 2008, column 541W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, July 16, 2008, column WA156 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, July 22, 2008, Column 1373W Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, Dec 10, 2008, Column 638 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, January 12, 2009, column 21 Prevent Strategy: background and next steps - speech to the BCU Commanders Conference (speech by Jacqui Smith, Home Secretary, on 16 April 2008) Preventing Extremism Together: Working Group Report (August-October 2005) Preventing Violent Extremism: Community Leadership Fund Guidance (April, 2008) Preventing Violent Extremism Learning and Development Exercise: Report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government (October, 2008) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Guidance Note for Government Offices and Local Authorities in England (February, 2007) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of project activities 2007/08 (December, 2008) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: 2007-08: Case studies Preventing Violent Extremism – winning hearts and minds Report of the International Committee of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, pursuant to UNSCR 1564 (25 January 2005) The Commission on Integration and Cohesion: Our Shared Future (June, 2007) The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom Security in an interdependent world (March, 2008) Cmnd. 7291 The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England; Stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists (Ref: 288324) May 2008 The role of further education colleges in preventing violent extremism: next steps , February 2009

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United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, United States of America V. Mousa Mohamed Abu Marzook and others (No.03 CR 978)

Official documents (unpublished) An explanatory memorandum on the general strategic goal for the group in North America (May, 22, 1991) APA Plenary Paper (April 2007) Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) ‘Police Prevent Strategy – Partners briefing’ (March 27, 2008) Association of Greater Manchester Authorities , Executive Strategy Group (5 December 2008) BCU Commanders Guidance Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-committee meeting (27 November 2008) Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-Committee – Terms of Reference, appendix 1 to Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-Commtitee, Metropolitan Police Authority (24 November 2008) Counter-Terrorism Update: Report by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner , Metropolitan Police Authority (24 July 2008) Counter-Terrorism Governance Update: Report by Chief Executive , Metropolitan Police Authority (24 July 2008) Delivery of Prevent: Report by Assistant Commissioner Robert Quick on behalf of the Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Authority (29 January 2009) Humberside Police Authority – Protective Services Committee, Prevent Policing: Report of the Director of Performance and Resource (9 September 2008) MPA Update on “Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate”: Report by the Chief Executive and Clerk, Metropolitan Police Authority (28 June 2007) MPS Prevent Delivery Strategy: Report by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Authority (24 July 2008) North West Region CONTEST Group Proposal for Regional CONTEST Board Police PREVENT Programme Board PREVENT: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy & Delivery Plan Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Police Authorities (Draft v4) , (Association of Police Authorities, January, 2009) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund 2007/2008 (list of groups funded) PSA 26 CONTEST Regional Leadership Group: Terms of Reference Review of Police Use of Counter-Terrorism Stop and Search Powers in London: Report by AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner , Metropolitan Police Authority (31 May 2007)

Books and monographs Abbas, Tahir ‘Ethno-Religious identities and Islamic political radicalism in the UK: A Case Study’ in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs , Vol. 27, No. 3, December 2007. Allen, Charles God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (London, 2006) Andrew, Christopher Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985)

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Bergen, Peter and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: the jihadist revolt against Al Qaeda” The New Republic Besson, Sylvain La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes (Paris, 2005) Boggs, Carl and David Plotke, Politics of Eurocommunism (London, 1980) Bright, Martin When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s Flirtation with Radical Islamism (Policy Exchange, 2006) Bullock, Alan Ernest Bevin (London, 2002) Burleigh, Michael Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism (London, 2008) Carrillo, Santiago Eurocommunism and the State (1977) Cooper, Zaki and Guy Lodge, Faith in the Nation: Religion, identity and the public realm in Britain today (IPPR: December, 2008) Crick, Michael The March of Militant (London, 1986) Foot, Michael Aneurin Bevan: 1945-60 v. 2 (London, 1975) Glees, Anthony, The Secrets of the Service: A Story of Soviet Subversion of Western Intelligence (New York, 1987) Harik, Judith Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism (London, 2005) Husain, Ed The Islamist (London, 2007) International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military , Asia Report No 49, 20 March 2003 Jaber, Hala Hezbollah: Born with a vengeance (London, 1997) Kepel, Gilles Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe (Stanford, 1997) Lambert, Robert ‘Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study’ in PS: Political Science & Politics , Vol.41, No. 1, Jan 2008, pp 31-35 Leiken, Robert ‘The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood’ in Foreign Affairs March/April 2007 Lenin’s Collected Works (Moscow, 1965) Vol.31 Levitt, Matthew Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (Yale, 2007) Mark Exworthy, Martin Powell, and John Mohan, ‘The NHS: Quasi-market, quasi-hier - archy and quasi-network?’ in Healthcare systems: Major themes in health and social welfare (London, 2005) Mates, Michael The secret services: is there a case for greater openness? (London, 1989) Mirza, Munira Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism (Policy Exchange, 2007) Maududi, Sayyid Abul A’la The Islamic Law and Constitution Morgan, Kenneth Michael Foot: A Life (London, 2007) Murad, Khurram Muslim Youth in the West: Towards a New Educational Strategy (Leicester, 1986) Muslih, Mohammed The Foreign Policy of Hamas , Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1999) Nasr, Vali Reza The vanguard of the Islamic revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan (London, 1994) Nasr, Syed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the making of Islamic Revivalism, (Oxford, 1996) Neumann, Peter and Brooke Rogers Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe: A study carried out by King’s College London for the European Commission Norton, Augustus Hezbollah: a short history (Princeton, 2007) Nüsse, Andrea Muslim Palestine: The ideology of Hamas (Amsterdam, 1998) Phillips, Richard ‘Standing together: the Muslim Association of Britain and the anti-war movement’ in Race & Class , Vol. 50, No. 2 (2008), pp.101-113

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Powell, Jonathon Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (New York, 2008) Reiner, Robert The Politics of the Police (Oxford, 2001) pp. 183-4. Roy, Olivier Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London, 2006) Sen, Amartya Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny (London, 2006) Siddiqui, Ataullah Islam at universities in England: meeting the needs and investing in the future (10 April 2007) Stevens, John Not for the faint hearted (London, 2006) Taji-Farouki, Suha (ed) Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an (Oxford, 2004) Qutb, Sayyid Milestones (New Delhi, 2007)

96 Acknowledgements

We are extremely indebted to Dean patiently helped with the copy-editing, for Godson for his encouragement and sup - which we are indebted. port while we wrote this pamphlet, and for Finally, we are grateful to all those from affording us the space to explore the sub - across Government, the police and local ject matter as we thought best. We are also authorities who spoke to us on and off the grateful to him for saving us from making record, giving background briefings and a number of errors and for pushing us to sharing their insights wherever possible. raise the quality and standard of work pre - These include the Association of Chief Police sented here. Officers, Association of Police Authorities, A debt of gratitude is owed to Alex Department for Communities and Local Hitchens, whose diligent research and Government, Foreign and Commonwealth assistance allowed us to compile this Office, Greater Manchester Police, Her pamphlet faster than would otherwise have Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, been possible. Garvan Walshe also made Home Office, Local Government valuable contributions. In addition, we Association, Mayor of London’s Office, must thank Professor Neal Robinson, Dr. Metropolitan Police Authority, Metropolitan Eric Shaw and Charles Turnock for kindly Police Service, National Police Improvement offering us their time, expertise and assis - Agency, West Midlands Police, and the West tance. Stephen Hayward and Leah Samuel Midlands Police Authority.