Choosing our friends wisely Criteria for engagement with Muslim groups Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton Policy Exchange is an independent think tank whose mission is to develop and promote new policy ideas which will foster a free society based on strong communities, personal freedom, limited government, national self-confidence and an enterprise culture. Registered charity no: 1096300. Policy Exchange is committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development. We work in partnership with academics and other experts and commission major studies involving thorough empirical research of alternative policy outcomes. We believe that the policy experience of other countries offers important lessons for government in the UK. We also believe that government has much to learn from business and the voluntary sector. Trustees Theodore Agnew, Richard Briance, Camilla Cavendish, Richard Ehrman, Robin Edwards, Virginia Fraser, George Robinson, Andrew Sells, Tim Steel, Alice Thomson, Rachel Whetstone and Simon Wolfson. About the authors Shiraz Maher is a Senior Fellow at Policy Martyn Frampton is a Research Fellow at Exchange. He took a First Class degree in Peterhouse, Cambridge. He was educated History from the University of Leeds and at Jesus College, Cambridge, where he was awarded a distinction for his MPhil in took a Starred First in History. He also Imperial History from the University of holds an MPhil in International Relations Cambridge. He previously worked as a and a doctorate in History. His academic journalist for some of the BBC’s flagship interests include Modern European, current affairs programmes including British and Irish history and terrorism. His Newsnight , Panorama and Radio 4, and book, The Long March: The Political was the first British journalist to interview Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981-2007 was pub - members of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabian ‘de- lished in 2009 by Palgrave Macmillan. He radicalisation’ centres. He has also been a is the co-author (with John Bew and Iñigo guest columnist for the Times , and Sunday Gurruchaga) of Talking to Terrorists: Times , and is a regular contributor to the Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the New Statesman , Prospect and Standpoint . Basque Country (C. Hurst & Co; forth - From 2002-2005 he was a member of coming 2009). Hizb-ut-Tahrir, becoming a regional offi - cer for north-east England before resigning as a matter of conscience. © Policy Exchange 2009 Published by Policy Exchange, Clutha House, 10 Storey’s Gate, London SW1P 3AY www.policyexchange.org.uk Designed by SoapBox, www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk 2 Contents Executive Summary 5 Foreword by Rt Hon Ruth Kelly MP 9 Introduction 12 1 The Challenge: Islamists in Britain 17 What is Islamism? Who are the Islamists? 18 The Muslim Brotherhood 19 Islamists in Britain I 20 Jamaat-e-Islami 22 Islamists in Britain II 22 Ineffective Communalism 24 2 The Prevent Strategy: Aims, Priorities, and Existing Criteria 26 The Prevent Strategy 26 Existing Criteria 28 The Channel Project 30 The Community Leadership Fund 31 Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation Programme 31 Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund (FCCBF) 33 Preventing Violent Extremism – Pathfinder Fund (PVE-PF) 33 3 The Problem of Prevent I: The Local Authorities’ Dilemma 36 Picking Partners: Who should councils work with? 36 The Enigma of Prevent: What is it for? 39 Delivery and Accountability: Localism supreme 44 Conclusion 46 4 The Problem of Prevent II: The Role of the Police 48 Picking Partners: The policing imperative 48 The Enigma of Prevent: What is it for? 52 Delivery and Accountability 58 Conclusion 61 5 Defeating Non-Violent Extremism: Lessons from the Labour Party and MI5 64 Labour and the Example of Militant 64 The Security Service (MI5) 68 6 Future Criteria for Engagement 69 What is Engagement? 69 Principles Governing the Selection of Criteria 70 The Proposed Criteria 71 Conclusion 74 www.policyexchange.org.uk • 3 Choosing Our Friends Wisely 7 Case Study: The Global Peace and Unity (GPU) Event 75 8 Implementing the Criteria 78 Preventing Extremism: Recasting PVE as PE 78 Creating Transparency 79 Creating Accountability: Putting MPs at the heart of Prevent 81 Making Assessments: Creating a Due Diligence Unit (DDU) 81 Securing and Monitoring Change 82 Conclusion 84 9 Conclusion 85 Annex: Technical Definition of Some Criteria 89 Glossary of Terms 91 Bibliography 93 Acknowledgements 97 4 Executive Summary Introduction cred’ to control angry young Muslims. Preventing Violent Extremism, or PVE as Genuine Muslim moderates are regularly it is known, is a key strand of the govern - dismissed by key authority figures as ‘spoken ment’s counter-terrorism strategy. It aims for’, and thus marginalised. to channel resources to those organisations Non-violent extremists have conse - and individuals within Britain’s Muslim quently become well dug in as partners of communities able to divert youngsters national and local government and the away from dangerous militancy. A great police. Some of the government’s chosen deal of money has been invested in PVE – collaborators in ‘addressing grievances’ of at least £90 million over three years – and angry young Muslims are themselves at the in official circles many reputations are rid - forefront of stoking those grievances ing on its success. against British foreign policy; western The concept behind PVE is a sound social values; and alleged state-sanctioned one: the authorities cannot afford to adopt ‘Islamophobia’. a laissez-faire attitude while extremists PVE is thus underwriting the very target young British Muslims for indoctri - Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, nation and recruitment as foot soldiers in a intolerant and anti-western world view. misconceived ‘clash of civilisations’. The Political and theological extremists, acting government deserves praise for recognising with the authority conferred by official this fact, and acting upon it. recognition, are indoctrinating young The problem is that PVE – however well people with an ideology of hostility to west - intentioned – isn’t working. Not only is it ern values. This strategic error on the part of failing to achieve its stated objectives, in officialdom is born of a poverty of aspira - many places it is actually making the situ - tion: the belief of the authorities that they ation worse: a new generation is being cannot reasonably ask angry Muslims for radicalised, sometimes with the very funds much more than a pledge not to use that are supposed to be countering radical - violence in Britain. The effect has been to isation. empower reactionaries within Muslim This document demonstrates how PVE communities and to marginalise genuine is backfiring. Furthermore, it explains moderates, thus increasing inter-commu - why, because of flaws in both theory and nity tensions and envenoming the public practice, this is happening. Finally, it space. proposes a series of measures to recalibrate The linkage between non-violent and PVE, allowing it to achieve its proper violent extremism is habitually under - objectives. played in official documents produced by central government, local government and the police. Even MI5 publicly affirms that Flawed in theory it does not currently deal with non-violent The central theoretical flaw in PVE is that it subversive threats. accepts the premise that non-violent extrem - In addition, PVE is characterised by an ists can be made to act as bulwarks against excessive veneration of the local – and this violent extremists. Some within government lack of central oversight means the author - and the police service believe that only non- ities are often ‘flying blind’ at a grassroots violent radicals – otherwise known as ‘polit - level. Even when PVE partner groups ical Islamists’ – possess the necessary ‘street transgress the boundaries of acceptability, www.policyexchange.org.uk • 5 Choosing Our Friends Wisely there appears to be no elaboration of the vague and open-ended as to be almost mean - criteria for determining the circumstances ingless – terms such as ‘respect for others’ whereby funds or advisory roles might be and ‘the rule of law’ are used. Strangely, cut or terminated. given the Prime Minister’s commitment to reinvigorating Britishness, there is almost no reference in PVE documents to the national Flawed in practice narrative. In fact, there is a distinct lack of The two key front-line delivery mecha - willingness to set the terms of trade in deal - nisms for picking Muslim partners under ing with Muslim groups. PVE – local government and the police – are unsuited to that task. Both are tradi - tionally apolitical public services. As such, Mistakes are being made they often have great difficulty in making at all levels sophisticated ideological and theological The implementation of PVE has been choices. Local councils and police forces beset with errors at all levels. Serious mis - have made many mistakes in selecting takes have been made. These include: PVE partners. Funds have too often been granted to groups claiming to ‘represent’ Prevent schemes such as the Faith Muslims without gold-plated efforts to Communities Capacity Building Fund check their credentials or affiliations. (FCCBF) being used to provide funding When selecting recipients of PVE fund - to Islamist-influenced organisations, ing and recognition, many officials confuse such as the United Kingdom Islamic form with content. Exotically-clad Abu Mission, the Muslim Council of Britain Hamza-style ranters are unlikely to be and the Islamic