IMAGING SERVICES NORTH Boston Spa, Wetherby West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ www.bl.uk TEXT CUT OFF IN THE ORIGINAL 232 6 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE Between 1983 and 1989 there were a series of important changes to Party organisation. Some of these were deliberately pursued, some were more unexpected. All were critical causes, effects and aspects of the transformation. Changes occurred in PLP whipping, Party finance, membership administration, disciplinary procedures, candidate selection, the policy-making process and, most famously, campaign organisation. This chapter makes a number of assertions about this process of organisational change which are original and are inspired by and enhance the search for complexity. It is argued that the organisational aspect of the transformation of the 1980s resulted from multiple causes and the inter-retroaction of those causes rather than from one over-riding cause. In particular, the existing literature has identified organisational reform as originating with a conscious pursuit by the core leadership of greater control over the Party (Heffernan ~\ . !.. ~ and Marqusee 1992: passim~ Shaw 1994: 108). This chapter asserts that while such conscious .... ~.. ,', .. :~. pursuit was one cause, other factors such as ad hoc responses to events .. ,t~~" ~owth of a presidential approach, the use of powers already in existence and the decline of oppositional forces acted as other causes. This emphasis upon multiple causes of change is clearly in keeping with the search for complexity. 233 This chapter also represents the first detailed outline and analysis of centralisation as it related not just to organisational matters but also to the issue of policy-making. In the same vein the chapter is particularly significant because it relates the centralisation of policy-making to policy reform as it occurred between 1983 and 1987 not just in relation to the Policy Review as is the approach of previous analyses. Once again this broadens, the transformation temporally, allowing for the augmentation of the causal processes involved in that transformation. The important reform of OMOV is also dealt with. Previous analyses have tended to present the disputes over OMOV as largely a split between right and left or leadership and left (Shaw 1994: 31; Minkin 1991: 247) within the Party at least (of course, within the wider movement the issue is presented differently). In keeping with the method of multiplication as an aid to the search for complexity, this chapter presents evidence which shows that views on OMOV were multiple and changed over time. In particular, it is shown how many figures on the soft left had a diverse, fragmented and variable attitude to OMOV between 1983 and 1989. The chapter also challenges the idea presented by Hughes and Wintour (1990: 7-8) that after the OMOV debacle of 1984, Kinnock radically improved his management style and that thus, his defeat over OMOV at that time was a crucial cause of the success of further change. This view is, of course, a function of the particularly rational and personal approach ,(see chapter three) to explaining change that Hughes and Wintour take. Rather it is suggested here that Kinnock's management style was always very mixed - sometimes effective, sometimes not - and that the success of his moves need to be seen as the result a far greater confluence of 234 many factors rather than largely in terms of a conscious, rational response to one particular event. The chapter also deals with OMOV from an original angle, not dealt with in the other literature, by treating it not solely as an effect of leadership decisions to carry-out reform but also seeing OMOV as one element in an inter-retroactive causal process which at its most basic level means that OMOV must also be treated as a cause of change itself In this respect it is argued that OMOV played a significant role in shaping the identity of Kinnock's agenda and the soft left. And that in this context the democratic appeal and content to Party members of Kinnock's agenda, of the soft left, and of OMOV itself resulted from an inter-retroactive relationship between the various elements. Furthermore, it is argued that the radical left was further isolated by failing to appreciate this democratic appeal ofOMOV, preferring instead to react to it as though it were simply an attempt by the moderate wing to destroy the radical wing of the Party. As a whole the chapter tries to place organisational reform in a more complex context both as an effect of multiple factors and as a cause of multiple others, as well as regarding it as playing an inter-retroactive role. This contrasts with previous analyses which tend to portray organisational change as largely the result of conscious decision-making on the part of the leadership with the simple effect of enhancing Party centralisation. CENTRALISATION AND AUTHORITARIANISM In many ways the centralisation and authoritarianism of the Party are the classic inter­ retroactive factors. The concentration of power in the leader's office was made possible by the 235 weakening of the forces that might have opposed such a shift, while the increasing concentration further weakened just those forces. The combined effect of this centralisation and of the weakening of oppositional forces allowed the Kinnockite reforms to be pursued in areas spatially distinct from organisation such as policy and ideology. But the combined effect also allowed further reform in spatially similar areas (i.e. further centralisation and further assaults on the opposition to Kinnock). However, as was mentioned in chapter three, this actual inter-retroactive process itself was highly variable and uneven involving relatively successful periods of resistance and hostility to centralisation, the effects of which were rarely straightforward and on occasion actually enhanced, rather than limited, the power of the leader's office. Such an awareness of this inter-retroactive process is extremely enlightening because it deepens and complexifies our understanding of this aspect of the Party which has often been treated in a highly simplistic way by existing analyses. In particular, Heffernan and Marqusee­ who identify the centralisation of the Party as the most significant aspect of the transformation and as the prime condition of the other aspects of the transformation - regard the concentration of power in the leader's office as exclusively the effect of the core leadership's conscious decision to implement such a concentration and, secondarily, of the soft left's acquiescence in, and even active support of, such centralisation (1992: passim). While Shaw, although he largely regards centralisation as resulting directly from "goals consciously pursued by the leadership", does acknowledge that wide support did exist for some organisational reforms (1994: 108). However, what an inter-retroactive approach will display is that a wide variety of factors contributed to the centralisation that go beyond the simple rational, goal-oriented behaviour of the core leadership. In particular, it can be seen how 236 much of the centralisation occurred as a result of ad hoc responses to specific events, without any actual reform of the Party constitution and through the use of existing powers. Ad Hoc Reforms As was mentioned in chapter four, limited attempts were made in the earliest days of Kinnock's leadership to unify two central aspects of the Party's activity under singular bodies. Joint Policy Committees were established to oversee the policy process, while the Campaign Strategy Committee was to decide campaigning priorities and strategies. However, while both of these bodies caused some consternation at the time about centralisation and the withdrawal of powers from the conference and the NEC, their actual activity was limited by the more pressing issues of the 1984-1985 period which materialised only weeks after the bodies had been established. In the following years, actual formal reforms by the core leadership designed to concentrate power and limit internal opposition were minor and usually ad hoc responses to specific events effecting an incremental process of centralisation. These reforms only began to occur after the 1985 conference when Kinnock felt himself to be in a marginally stronger position with regards to passing less popular motions through the Party's ruling bodies (Interview with Kinnock 1994a). In February of 1986, stricter rules of commons attendance were introduced by the whip's office after embarrassingly low tum-outs by MPs at crucial votes whose morale was extremely low in the face of the large government majority (Interview with Haworth 1995; Interview with Davies 1994~ The Times, 5 February 1986). And in June of 1988, the percentage of Labour MP's nominations necessary for a leadership contest to be launched was raised in response to the Campaign Group and Prescott challenge (The Independent, 24 June 237 1988; see chapter eight). However, most of the ad hoc reforms which further centralised the Party arose directly out of the conflict with Militant. This conflict is a narrative of incremental centralisation and the increasingly habitual use of central power to marginalise the Tendency. It is worthwhile briefly recounting the narrative of the Militant expulsion to display just how ad hoc and contextual was the process of centralisation. Following Kinnock's success at the 1985 conference, Ken Cure, Chairman of the Appeals and Mediations Committee, announced that he would ask the NEC to set-up a full inquiry into Militant infiltration (The Times, 4 December 1985). The inquiry actually produced two reports by the end of February 1986. Alongside the majority report, Margaret Beckett and Audrey Wise produced a minority version. Both reports agreed that there had been intimidation by Militant in Liverpool, that Party rules had been abused and that the Liverpool DLP needed to be re-organised. However, on the question of expulsions the reports differed.