Security in Iraq: Emerging Threats As U.S. Forces Withdraw

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Security in Iraq: Emerging Threats As U.S. Forces Withdraw Research Brief NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Security in Iraq Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Withdraw RAND RESEARCH AREAS fter years of bitter and violent fi ghting, Iraq CHILDREN AND FAMILIES Key fi ndings: EDUCATION AND THE ARTS is fi nally becoming more stable. Th e main ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT partisan political groups—Sunni, Kurd, • The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could bring HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE and Shi’a—are cooperating to confront INFRASTRUCTURE AND consequences that could destroy Iraq’s hard- TRANSPORTATION A common concerns. Th e new, nonviolent politi- won, but still shaky, stability. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS cal order, with the government of Iraq at its core, LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY is winning growing popular support. Extremist • Extremist terrorism is the most likely danger, POPULATION AND AGING groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, lack, at least for but also the least consequential for both Iraqi PUBLIC SAFETY now, the ability to incite factional fi ghting. U.S. and U.S. interests. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND troops have begun their drawdown. HOMELAND SECURITY But the security situation is still shaky, and • The most consequential danger is also a less the end of U.S. occupation could bring conse- likely one: ethnic confl ict between Kurdish quences that could destroy Iraq’s hard-won prog- forces and the Iraqi state. ress. Iraq’s future stability and security depend • To help avert this danger, the United States mainly on two factors: fi rst, whether the main must endeavor to keep mainstream political political groups continue to engage peacefully groups in the Iraqi political system and away in the political process and second, whether the from force. Shi’a-led government of Iraq wields its growing political and military power responsibly. • It should also help Iraq build strong, profes- As the United States departs, a new RAND sional security forces able to coexist peace- monograph, Security in Iraq: A Framework for fully with the Kurdish military wing. Analyzing Emerging Th reats as U.S. Forces Leave, off ers decisionmakers a conceptual model to help assess the risks ahead—particularly of fi ghting among Iraq’s main groups, many of which are their diff erences within the political system suffi ciently well armed to throw the country into a rather than reverting to violence. Th ose fringe This product is part of the RAND Corporation research new cycle of violence. Th e book suggests that the actors who will almost certainly use violence to brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented most likely dangers are not necessarily the most achieve political goals are not suffi ciently strong summaries of published, consequential and points to what the United States to throw the country back into civil war, unless peer-reviewed documents. can do to help guard against a renewed upsurge of they can incite one or more of the major parties Headquarters Campus large-scale factional confl ict that would undercut to resume violent actions. Th e fi gure shows the 1776 Main Street both Iraqi and U.S. interests. foremost political parties and groups today, along P.O. Box 2138 Santa Monica, California with the military wing of each (in parentheses). 90407-2138 The Analytic Model Helps Anticipate It also depicts where they are currently situated TEL 310.393.0411 FAX 310.393.4818 Possible Dangers as the United States within the Iraqi political order. © RAND 2010 Withdraws from Iraq While the basic structure of this model will Th e model portrays Iraq’s political system (see the remain constant, the positions of the groups may fi gure). It illustrates that, although Iraqi political not. Should major players leave the political parties will continue to disagree on signifi cant process—the boundary of which is depicted by issues, the country will remain stable as long as the dotted line—Iraq would be much more likely www.rand.org those parties with sizable military forces resolve to descend back into large-scale violence. – 2 – Model of Iraq’s Political Order Boundary of Political Order Extremist group: Sunnis Mainstream groups al Qaeda in Iraq (Sons of Iraq) Foreign influences Foreign influences Core: Goverment of Iraq (Iraqi Security Forces) Borderline group: Extremist group: Sadrists (JAM) Special groups Kurdistan Democratic Party (Peshmerga) Th e model with this confi guration of actors suggests The Most Consequential Danger Is Less Likely: three principal risks to Iraq’s internal security during the Ethnic Confl ict Between Kurdish Forces and the U.S. withdrawal: Iraqi State • extremist violence Although less probable than extremist violence, armed • use of force by one or more main opposition groups confl ict between any of the mainstream parties in the Iraqi • use of the Iraqi Security Forces to coerce or crush politi- political system carries the most severe consequences for U.S. cal opponents. interests, because it could explode the entire political order. Th e greatest danger in this category is the possibility of an For the meantime, the main opposition groups have cho- ethnic clash between Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi state. sen peaceful participation in the political process to advance Th e U.S. drawdown is creating a window in which the their interests. But Iraq’s future stability also depends on Iraqi Security Forces have not yet eff ectively replaced U.S. what choices the Iraqi government and security forces make. troops and other groups’ forces are still relatively strong, Should the government become authoritarian or the security compared with the government’s. Th is security gap presents forces attempt a coup, the stable political core would frac- a formidable period of uncertainty. Although the Sadrists’ ture, and the strategic calculations of the major parties would militant arm seems already overmatched and the Sons of Iraq change. are quickly losing ground, the Kurdish Peshmerga could still eff ectively counter the Iraqi Security Forces in Iraqi Kurd- Extremist Terrorism Is the Most Likely Danger But istan. Should the Kurds calculate that force off ers a better Also the Least Consequential option than peaceful politics to achieve their goal of a self- Of the three types of danger, extremist terrorism is the most governed Kurdistan in Iraq, they probably have the ability probable: Militant extremist groups have not lost their taste to hold off the Iraqi Security Forces in Kurdistan in the near for violence. But at present, no extremist group in Iraq pos- term. Any event that makes them feel isolated or threatened sesses the physical resources, popular support, or foreign could tip them in that direction—a local incident, loss of backing to perpetrate large-scale violence or instigate fi ghting political leverage in Baghdad, a Sunni-Shi’a coalition lead- among Iraq’s main groups. Because extremist aggression will ing to Kurdish marginalization, or consolidation of power by not be able to tear apart the basic political order, this will be Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Oil wealth is also at stake. the least consequential to U.S. interests of the dangers now Because the Kurds would need to act before the capabili- facing Iraq, even if an appalling one. ties of the Iraqi Security Forces become superior to the Pesh- – 3 – merga’s and the odds shift against them, the main danger • Character: Promote the professionalism, accountability, is in the next few years. Th e consequence, should the Kurds self-discipline, and institutional capacity of the Iraqi take this step, could be the break-up of Iraq. Security Forces and their governing ministries. • Confi dence: Foster transparency and open communica- The United States Must Play Multiple Roles to tion between the government of Iraq’s forces and those of Help Avert the Most Serious Dangers the Kurdistan Regional Government. Abuse of power by the government of Iraq, supported by its military, would likely provoke not only the Kurds but other Doing so will entail embedding within the Iraqi forces opposition groups to respond with force. Even if their mili- well-prepared, relatively senior professionals who promote taries were outmatched, none of these groups would choose responsible behavior in the interests of a unifi ed Iraqi state. At submission. Should the Iraqi Security Forces act indepen- the same time, the United States needs to encourage amity dently in a bid for power, the results would be similar. between the Kurdistan Regional and Iraqi governments. Th is possibility places the United States in a delicate situa- In sum, although extremist violence will continue to tion: While it needs to help Iraq strengthen its security forces to be a threat, U.S. policy should focus on two other, more be able to counter threats to the new state, it also needs to cul- consequential, issues. First, it should aim to keep mainstream tivate restraint and professionalism to keep that strength from groups in the political order and away from force, which being misused. Accordingly, long-term cooperation between would endanger both U.S. personnel and U.S. interests. Sec- the United States and Iraq should simultaneously build ond, it should help Iraq build security forces that are capable, • Capability: Provide the Iraqi Security Forces with train- professional, and able to coexist peacefully with the forces of ing, equipment, advice, and operational support. the Kurdistan Regional Government. ■ This research brief describes work done for the RAND National Security Research Division documented in Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave, by David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, MG-911-OSD (available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG911/), 2010, 96 pp., $21, ISBN: 978-0-8330-4771-7. This research brief was written by S.
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