683 Part 236—Rules, Standards, And
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NSG 604 Indicators and Signs
This is an uncontrolled copy. Before use, make sure that this is the current version by visiting www.railsafe.org.au/nsg NSG 604 signals and signs Indicators and signs General To describe the types of indicators and signs used in the Network. ............................................................................................... NOTE The Figures in this Rule show examples of the indicators and signs used in the Network. White or lunar white lights are shown in blue . ............................................................................................... Clearance posts Clearance posts may be located between two converging lines to show the clearance limit. Some clearance posts have: • a reflective background, or • a white light that must be illuminated at night or in conditions of low visibility. White reflective post forms Illuminated post form FIGURE 1: Examples of clearance posts ............................................................................................... NETWORK RULES MARCH 2019 V10.0 © SYDNEY TRAINS 2019 PAGE 1 OF 38 This is an uncontrolled copy. Before use, make sure that this is the current version by visiting www.railsafe.org.au/nsg NSG 604 signals and signs Indicators and signs Dead end lights Dead end lights are small red lights to indicate the end of dead end sidings. The lights display STOP indications only. If it is possible for a dead end light to be mistaken as a running signal at STOP, a white light above the red light is used to distinguish it from a running signal. FIGURE 2: Examples of dead end lights ............................................................................................... NETWORK RULES MARCH 2019 V10.0 © SYDNEY TRAINS 2019 PAGE 2 OF 38 This is an uncontrolled copy. Before use, make sure that this is the current version by visiting www.railsafe.org.au/nsg NSG 604 signals and signs Indicators and signs Guard’s indicator If it is possible for the signal at the exit-end of a platform to be obscured from a Guard’s view, a Guard’s indicator is placed over the platform. -
Identification and Localization of Track Circuit False Occupancy Failures Based on Frequency Domain Reflectometry
sensors Article Identification and Localization of Track Circuit False Occupancy Failures Based on Frequency Domain Reflectometry Tiago A. Alvarenga 1 , Augusto S. Cerqueira 1 , Luciano M. A. Filho 1 , Rafael A. Nobrega 1 , Leonardo M. Honorio 1,* and Henrique Veloso 2 1 Electrical Engineering Department, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora 36036-900, MG, Brazil; [email protected] (T.A.A.); [email protected] (A.S.C.); luciano.ma.fi[email protected] (L.M.A.F.); [email protected] (R.A.N.) 2 MRS Logística, Juiz de Fora 36060-010, MG, Brazil; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] Received: 15 October 2020; Accepted: 9 December 2020; Published: 18 December 2020 Abstract: Railway track circuit failures can cause significant train delays and economic losses. A crucial point of the railway operation system is the corrective maintenance process. During this operation, the railway lines have the circulation of trains interrupted in the respective sector, where traffic restoration occurs only after completing the maintenance process. Depending on the cause and length of the track circuit, identifying and solving the problem may take a long time. A tool that assists in track circuit fault detection during an inspection adds agility and efficiency in its restoration and cost reduction. This paper presents a new method, based on frequency domain reflectometry, to diagnose and locate false occupancy failures of track circuits. Initially, simulations are performed considering simplified track circuit approximations to demonstrate the operation of the proposed method, where the fault position is estimated by identifying the null points and through non-linear regression on signal amplitude response. -
RAIB Report: Freight Train Derailment at Angerstein Junction on 3 June 2015
Oliver Stewart Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and Recommendation Handling Telephone 020 7282 3864 E-mail [email protected] 4 June 2020 Mr Andrew Hall Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents Cullen House Berkshire Copse Rd Aldershot Hampshire GU11 2HP Dear Andrew, RAIB Report: Freight train derailment at Angerstein Junction on 3 June 2015 I write to provide an update1 on the action taken in respect of recommendation 3 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 1 June 2016. The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding the recommendation. The status of recommendation 3 is ‘Implemented’. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again. We will publish this response on the ORR website on 5 June 2020. Yours sincerely, Oliver Stewart 1 In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005 Annex A Recommendation 3 The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the derailment risk at Angerstein Junction is adequately controlled. Network Rail should review and, if appropriate, alter the infrastructure configuration on the line between Angerstein Junction and Angerstein Wharf sidings to reduce its contribution to the derailment risk in the immediate vicinity of the 851A trap points. This review should include, but not be limited to, consideration of: • the wagon types and loads normally using the line; • the layout of the check rail; • the speed and braking profiles of trains using the line; • the locations and operation of signalling equipment; and • the location of the trap points, or the provision of alternative risk mitigation measures ORR decision 1. -
Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2006-24 CSX Transportati
Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Headquarters Assigned Accident Investigation Report HQ-2006-24 CSX Transportation (CSX) Richmond, Virginia April 22, 2006 Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-2006-24 FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. CSX Transportation [CSX ] CSX R000022015 2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 2a. Alphabetic Code 2b. Railroad Accident/Incident N/A N/A N/A 3.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: 3a. Alphabetic Code 3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. CSX Transportation [CSX ] CSX N/A 4. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number 5. Date of Accident/Incident 6. Time of Accident/Incident Month Day Year 04 22 2006 05:19:00 AM PM 7. Type of Accident/Indicent 1. Derailment 4. Side collision 7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other (single entry in code box) 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative) 3. Rear end collision 6. Broken Train collision 9. Obstruction 12. Other impacts 01 8. Cars Carrying 9. HAZMAT Cars 10. Cars Releasing 11. People 12. Division HAZMAT Damaged/Derailed HAZMAT Evacuated 0 0 0 0 FLORENCE 13. Nearest City/Town 14. -
Report on Railway Accident with Freight Car Set That Rolled Uncontrolledly from Alnabru to Sydhavna on 24 March 2010
Issued March 2011 REPORT JB 2011/03 REPORT ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT WITH FREIGHT CAR SET THAT ROLLED UNCONTROLLEDLY FROM ALNABRU TO SYDHAVNA ON 24 MARCH 2010 Accident Investigation Board Norway • P.O. Box 213, N-2001 Lillestrøm, Norway • Phone: + 47 63 89 63 00 • Fax: + 47 63 89 63 01 www.aibn.no • [email protected] This report has been translated into English and published by the AIBN to facilitate access by international readers. As accurate as the translation might be, the original Norwegian text takes precedence as the report of reference. The Accident Investigation Board has compiled this report for the sole purpose of improving railway safety. The object of any investigation is to identify faults or discrepancies which may endanger railway safety, whether or not these are causal factors in the accident, and to make safety recommendations. It is not the Board’s task to apportion blame or liability. Use of this report for any other purpose than for railway safety should be avoided. Photos: AIBN and Ruter As Accident Investigation Board Norway Page 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS NOTIFICATION OF THE ACCIDENT ............................................................................................. 4 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 4 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT ..................................................................... 6 1.1 Chain of events ................................................................................................................... -
US Army Railroad Course Railway Track Maintenance II TR0671
SUBCOURSE EDITION TR0671 1 RAILWAY TRACK MAINTENANCE II Reference Text (RT) 671 is the second of two texts on railway track maintenance. The first, RT 670, Railway Track Maintenance I, covers fundamentals of railway engineering; roadbed, ballast, and drainage; and track elements--rail, crossties, track fastenings, and rail joints. Reference Text 671 amplifies many of those subjects and also discusses such topics as turnouts, curves, grade crossings, seasonal maintenance, and maintenance-of-way management. If the student has had no practical experience with railway maintenance, it is advisable that RT 670 be studied before this text. In doing so, many of the points stressed in this text will be clarified. In addition, frequent references are made in this text to material in RT 670 so that certain definitions, procedures, etc., may be reviewed if needed. i THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. ii CONTENTS Paragraph Page INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 1. TRACK REHABILITATION............................................................. 1.1 7 Section I. Surfacing..................................................................................... 1.2 8 II. Re-Laying Rail............................................................................ 1.12 18 III. Tie Renewal................................................................................ 1.18 23 CHAPTER 2. TURNOUTS AND SPECIAL SWITCHES........................................................................................ -
Rtd Light Rail Design Criteria
RTD LIGHT RAIL DESIGN CRITERIA Regional Transportation District November 2005 Prepared by the Engineering Division of the Regional Transportation District Regional Transportation District 1600 Blake Street Denver, Colorado 80202-1399 303.628.9000 RTD-Denver.com November 28, 2005 The RTD Light Rail Design Criteria Manual has been developed as a set of general guidelines as well as providing specific criteria to be employed in the preparation and implementation of the planning, design and construction of new light rail corridors and the extension of existing corridors. This 2005 issue of the RTD Light Rail Design Criteria Manual was developed to remain in compliance with accepted practices with regard to safety and compatibility with RTD's existing system and the intended future systems that will be constructed by RTD. The manual reflects the most current accepted practices and applicable codes in use by the industry. The intent of this manual is to establish general criteria to be used in the planning and design process. However, deviations from these accepted criteria may be required in specific instances. Any such deviations from these accepted criteria must be approved by the RTD's Executive Safety & Security Committee. Coordination with local agencies and jurisdictions is still required for the determination and approval for fire protection, life safety, and security measures that will be implemented as part of the planning and design of the light rail system. Conflicting information or directives between the criteria set forth in this manual shall be brought to the attention of RTD and will be addressed and resolved between RTD and the local agencies andlor jurisdictions. -
Conceptual Railway Signaling Online Live Training
CONCEPTUAL RAILWAY SIGNALING ONLINE LIVE TRAINING MASTER TRAINER: NARAYAN PARVATIKAR RAILWAYACADEMY [email protected], +91 9810989077 Program Brief This program is a concept-based program and will usually be carried out in live mode delivered online by trainer. It shall cover the theory- based Principles of Railway Signaling and students will undergoing the course shall learn concepts of railway signalling and control systems in Indian Railway Context. Duration 30 sessions of 45 min live training classes in live group interaction with Railway Expert after each module Target Audiences • Fresh Engineering graduates looking for employment in Railway Sector • Working Professionals sponsored by Industry to upgrade skills • Self Sponsored working professionals looking for career in railways telecommunications Fee • INR 36,000/- (INR Thirty Six Thousand only) to paid in three installments) inclusive of GST o 1st installment: at the time of registration: Pay online https://imjo.in/PzM6eQ o 2nd installment: Before 9th class o 3rd installment: Before 15th class • One Time Payment Offer: INR 27,000/- (INR Twenty Seven thousand only) inclusive of GST: Pay online https://imjo.in/kAA3hs Trainer Profile: Narayan Parvatikar Railway Signal Engineer with 37+ years of experience with Indian Railways and other MNCs. More than 23 years of experience in Training. Program Syllabus Sl No Contents 1 • General information • Contents and self-introduction • Why separate signaling for railways • Topics covered • Takeaway • Feedback and queries 2 • Railway -
HOW to REDUCE the IMPACT of TRACK CIRCUIT FAILURES Stanislas Pinte, Maurizio Palumbo, Emmanuel Fernandes, Robert Grant ERTMS Solutions/Nxgen Rail Services
S. Pinte, M. Palumbo, E. Fernandes, R. Grant HOW TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF TRACK CIRCUITS FAILURES ERTMS Solutions/NxGen Rail Services HOW TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF TRACK CIRCUIT FAILURES Stanislas Pinte, Maurizio Palumbo, Emmanuel Fernandes, Robert Grant ERTMS Solutions/NxGen Rail Services Summary Every year, thousands of track circuit failures are reported by railway infrastructure managers in Europe and worldwide, resulting in significant delays which can also lead to substantial economic costs and penalties. For this reason, the ability to detect and diagnose the health of track circuits to prevent or provide a fast response to these failures, can generate a significant benefit for infrastructure managers. In many countries, a process of periodic manual inspection of wayside assets (including track circuits) is in place, but the benefits of this strategy are limited by several factors related to safety, the time required to perform the inspection, and difficulties associated with making manual measurements. With the purpose of minimizing economic loss and operational delay, as well as offering railway infrastructure managers a tool that can provide an automated and effective maintenance strategy, ERTMS Solutions has designed the TrackCircuitLifeCheck (TLC). The TrackCircuitLifeCheck is a track circuit measurement instrument that can be installed on track inspection or commercial trains to automatically diagnose AC, DC, and pulsed track circuits, thus enabling a preventive maintenance strategy, based on the analysis of multi-pass data from each track circuit over time, and the application of standard deviation analysis. KEYWORDS: Track Circuits, Preventive Maintenance, Train Detection, Train Protection, In-Cab Signaling, UM-71, TVM, TrackCircuitLifeCheck. INTRODUCTION This paper presents a high level functional and architectural description of track circuits, with a In order to detect the presence of trains on a special focus on AC track circuits. -
Signal Box Register Series
Signal Box Registers Publication schedule and current state of play as at 10th July 2019 Item Publication dateStatus 1. Great Western PB: 22 December 2007 Out of Print HB: 28 December 2007 Out of Print 1. Great Western PB: 10 May 2011 Published (Revised Edition) HB: 24 May 2011 Published 2. Midland Railway latest draft is version E22 dated Substantially complete. 18th September 2017 Publication expected 2020-2021 3. LNER (Southern Area) PB: 29 May 2012 Published. HB: 6 Nov 2012 Published. 4. Southern Railway PB & HB: 23 April 2009 Published 5. LNWR (includes NSR, Sources include NSR (1998), No work started yet. MCR, FR and L&Y) LNWR (240-599), L&Y (1999). 6. Scotland PB: 31 Oct 2012 Published. HB: 7 Nov 2012 Published. 7. North Eastern Region Work in hand (includes H&B) 8. London Transport PB: 12 Jul 2019 Published. HB: 26 Jul 2019 Published. 9. Ireland PB & HB: 3 August 2015 Published CD-ROM CD: 1 January 2008 Includes Volume 1 CDROM updates #1: 2 February 2008 Corr. Sht 1 & updated vol. 1 GW. #2: 16 September 2008 Corr. Sht 2 & updated vol. 1 GW. #3: 23 April 2009 Plus Volume 4 Southern Railway #4: 24 May 2011 Plus corr. sheet 3 & the GW register (revised edition) #5: 21 June 2012 As above plus correction sheet 4 and volume 3 LNER (Southern) #6: 15 Nov 2012 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 5 and volume 6 Scotland #7: 25 Jul 2013 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 6 #8: 31 May 2014 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 7 #9: 3 Aug 2015 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 8 #9: 3 Aug 2015 (CD-ROM) Volume 9 Ireland & Isle of Man #10: 21 Nov 2015 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 9 #11: 10 Jul 2019 (DVD-ROM) As above plus correction sheet 10 Volume 8 London Transport Correction sheets 1: 16 January 2008 Amended vol. -
Operating Manual for Indian Railways
OPERATING MANUAL FOR INDIAN RAILWAYS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS (RAILWAY BOARD) INDEX S.No. Chapters Page No. 1 Working of Stations 1-12 2 Working of Trains 13-14 3 Marshalling 15-18 4 Freight Operation 19-27 5 Preferential Schedule & Rationalization Order 28 6 Movement of ODC and Other Bulky Consignment 29-32 7 Control Organisation 33-44 8 Command, Control & Coordination of Emergency Rescue Operations on the open line 45-54 9 Marshalling Yards and Freight Terminals 55-67 10 Container Train Operation 68-72 11 Customer Interface and Role of Commercial Staff 73-77 12 Inspections 78-83 13 Interlocking 84-92 14 Station Working Rules and Temporary Working Order 93-102 15 Non-Interlocked Working of Station 103-114 16 Operating Statistics 115-121 17 FOIS 122-146 I.C.M.S - Module in ICMS - System - Data Feeding 147-148 - - MIS Reports 18 C.O.A 149 19 ACD 150 20 Derailment Investigation 151-158 21 Concept of Electric Traction 159-164 Crew link, loco link & power plant 165-166 Electric Loco maintenance schedule Diesel Loco maintenance schedule 167-169 Features of Electric Locomotives Brake power certificate 170 Various machines used for track maintenance 171 WORKING OF STATIONS (Back to Index) Railway Stations, world wide, are located in prime city centres, as railways were started at a time when expansion of cities was yet to start. Railway station continues to be the focal point of central business district in all cities in the world. All description of rail business is transacted at the station, passengers start journey or complete it, outward parcels are booked and inward parcel consignments received and kept ready for delivery. -
Network Safeworking Rules and Procedures
Network Safeworking Rules and Procedures Clipping Points Procedure Number: 9000 Version 1.0, 31 March 2016 Clipping Points Procedure Number: 9000 Document Control Identification Document title Number Version Date 9000 – Clipping Points 1.0 31 March 2016 Document History Reasons for and Publication version Effective date Page(s) affected extent of change(s) 9000 – Clipping Points 4 May 2016 Authorisation Adam Sidebottom Rail Safety Manager Brookfield Rail 31 March 2016 DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: Brookfield Rail maintains the master for this document and publishes the current version of the Brookfield Rail website. Any changes to the content of this publication require the version number to be updated. Changes to this publication must be approved according to the procedure for developing Brookfield Rail products. To view the latest version of this document visit www.brookfieldrail.com 9000 Clipping points, Version 1.0, 31 March 2016 UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Table of Contents Glossary for this Procedure ....................................................................................... 4 Purpose ......................................................................................................... 5 General .......................................................................................................... 5 Fitting a Points Clip ........................................................................................... 6 3.1. Competent Worker ...................................................................................................