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Cover_Summer 2013 6/26/2013 3:06 PM Page 1 Dædalus coming up in Dædalus:

American Gerald Early, Patrick Burke, Mina Yang, Todd Decker, Daniel Geary, Music Maya Gibson, Charlotte Greenspan, Ellie Hisama, Nadine Hubbs, Dædalus John McWhorter, Ronald Radano, Guthrie Ramsey, David Robertson, Terry Teachout, Sherrie Tucker, and others Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Summer 2013 What Humanists Do Denis Donoghue, Francis Oakley, Gillian Beer, Michael Putnam, Henri Cole, J. Hillis Miller, Patricia Meyer Spacks, Rachel Bowlby,

Karla FC Holloway, James Olney, Ross Posnock, Scott Russell Sanders, Summer 2013: Immigration & the Future of America and others Immigration Douglas S. Massey America’s Immigration Policy Fiasco 5 & the Nancy Foner Immigration Past & Present 16 Growing Pains Elizabeth Perry, Deborah Davis, Martin Whyte, Mary Gallagher, Future of America Charles Hirschman The Contributions of Immigrants to in a Rising China Robert Weller, William Hsiao, Joseph Fewsmith, Ching Kwan Lee, American Culture 26 Barry Naughton, William Kirby, Guobin Yang, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Marta Tienda Latin American Immigration to Mark Frazier, Elizabeth Economy, Benjamin Liebman, and others & Susana M. Sánchez the United States 48 Victor Nee Why Asian Americans plus The Invention of Courts, From Atoms to the Stars &c & Hilary Holbrow are Becoming Mainstream 65 Audrey Singer Contemporary Immigrant Gateways in Historical Perspective 76 Mary C. Waters Immigrants in New York: Reaping the & Philip Kasinitz Bene½ts of Continuous Immigration 92 Helen B. Marrow Assimilation in New Destinations 107 Frank D. Bean, Immigration & the Color Line Jennifer Lee at the Beginning of the 21st Century 123 & James D. Bachmeier Rubén G. Rumbaut Immigration & Language Diversity & Douglas S. Massey in the United States 141 Richard Alba Schools & the Diversity Transition 155 Alejandro Portes Determinants & Consequences & Adrienne Celaya of the Brain Drain 170 Michael Jones-Correa The Illegality Trap: The Politics of & Els de Graauw Immigration & the Lens of Illegality 185 Karen Manges Douglas The Criminalization of Immigrants & Rogelio Sáenz & the Immigration-Industrial Complex 199 Cristina M. Rodríguez Immigration, Civil Rights & the Evolution of the People 228

U.S. $13; www.amacad.org Cherishing Knowledge · Shaping the Future Cover_Summer 2013 6/26/2013 3:07 PM Page 2 Book_Summer 2013_Shinner.qxd 6/18/2013 10:08 AM Page 1

Inside front cover: A naturalization ceremony at Fen- way Park in Boston, September 17, 2008. More than 3,000 people took the oath of citizenship during the ceremony. © AP Photo/Steven Senne/Corbis Images. Book_Summer 2013_Shinner.qxd 6/28/2013 5:41 PM Page 2

Douglas S. Massey, Guest Editor Phyllis S. Bendell, Managing Editor and Director of Publications D Micah J. Buis, Senior Editor and Associate Director of Publications Peter Walton, Senior Editorial Assistant J

Committee on Studies and Publications Jerrold Meinwald and John Mark Hansen, Cochairs; Jesse H. Choper, Denis Donoghue, Gerald Early, Carol Gluck, Linda Greenhouse, John Hildebrand, Jerome Kagan, Philip Khoury, Neal Lane, Steven Marcus, Eric Sundquist

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Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Nineteenth-century depiction of a Roman mosaic labyrinth, now lost, found in Villa di Diomede, Pompeii

Dædalus was founded in 1955 and established as a quarterly in 1958. The journal’s namesake was renowned in ancient Greece as an inventor, scientist, and unriddler of riddles. Its emblem, a maze seen from above, symbol- izes the aspiration of its founders to “lift each of us above his cell in the labyrinth of learning in order that he may see the entire structure as if from above, where each separate part loses its comfortable separateness.” The American Academy of Arts & Sciences, like its journal, brings together distinguished individuals from every ½eld of human endeavor. It was char- tered in 1780 as a forum “to cultivate every art and science which may tend to advance the interest, honour, dignity, and happiness of a free, independent, and virtuous people.” Now in its third century, the Academy, with its nearly ½ve thousand elected members, continues to provide intellectual leadership to meet the critical challenges facing our world. Book_Summer 2013_Shinner.qxd 6/18/2013 10:08 AM Page 4

Dædalus Summer 2013 Subscription rates: Electronic only for non- Issued as Volume 142, Number 3 member individuals–$44; institutions–$123. Canadians add 5% gst. Print and electronic for © 2013 by the American Academy nonmember individuals–$49; institutions– of Arts & Sciences $136. Canadians add 5% gst. Outside the United Latin American Immigration to the United States States and Canada add $23 for postage and han- © 2013 by Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez dling. Prices subject to change without notice. Contemporary Immigrant Gateways in Historical Perspective Institutional subscriptions are on a volume- © 2013 by Audrey Singer year basis. All other subscriptions begin with the next available issue. Editorial of½ces: Dædalus, Norton’s Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge ma 02138. Single issues: $13 for individuals; $34 for insti- Phone: 617 491 2600. Fax: 617 576 5088. tutions. Outside the United States and Canada Email: [email protected]. add $6 per issue for postage and handling. Prices subject to change without notice. Library of Congress Catalog No. 12-30299 Claims for missing issues will be honored free Dædalus publishes by invitation only and as- of charge if made within three months of the sumes no responsibility for unsolicited manu- publication date of the issue. Claims may be scripts. The views expressed are those of the submitted to [email protected]. Members of author of each article, and not necessarily of the the American Academy please direct all ques- American Academy of Arts & Sciences. tions and claims to [email protected]. Dædalus (issn 0011-5266; e-issn 1548-6192) Advertising and mailing-list inquiries may be is published quarterly (winter, spring, summer, addressed to Marketing Department, mit Press fall) by The mit Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cam- Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma bridge ma 02142-1315, for the American Academy 02142-1315. Phone: 617 253 2866. Fax: 617 253 1709. of Arts & Sciences. An electronic full-text version Email: [email protected]. of Dædalus is available from The mit Press. Subscription and address changes should be Permission to photocopy articles for internal addressed to mit Press Journals Customer Ser - or personal use is granted by the copyright vice, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma 02142-1315. owner for users registered with the Copyright Phone: 617 253 2889; u.s./Canada 800 207 8354. Clearance Center (ccc) Transactional Report- Fax: 617 577 1545. Email: [email protected]. ing Service, provided that the per-copy fee of $12 per article is paid directly to the ccc, Printed in the United States of America by 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers ma 01923. Cadmus Professional Communications, Science The fee code for users of the Transactional Press Division, 300 West Chestnut Street, Reporting Service is 0011-5266/13. Submit all Ephrata pa 17522. other permission inquiries to the Subsidiary Newsstand distribution by Ingram Periodicals Rights Manager, mit Press Journals, by com- Inc., 18 Ingram Blvd., La Vergne tn 37086. pleting the online permissions request form at www.mitpressjournals.org/page/copyright Postmaster: Send address changes to Dædalus, _permissions. 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge ma 02142-1315. Periodicals postage paid at Boston ma and at The typeface is Cycles, designed by Sumner additional mailing of½ces. Stone at the Stone Type Foundry of Guinda ca. Each size of Cycles has been sep arately designed in the tradition of metal types. Book_Summer 2013_Shinner.qxd 6/18/2013 10:09 AM Page 5

America’s Immigration Policy Fiasco: Learning from Past Mistakes

Douglas S. Massey

Abstract: In this essay I discuss how and why U.S. policies intended to stop Latin American immigration to the United States not only failed, but proved counterproductive by ultimately accelerating the rate of both documented and undocumented migration from Mexico and Central America to the United States. As a result, the Latino population grew much faster than demographers had originally projected and the undocumented population grew to an unprecedented size. Mass illegality is now the greatest barrier to the successful integration of Latinos, and a pathway to legalization represents a critical policy challenge. If U.S. policy-makers wish to avoid the failures of the past, they must shift from a goal of immigration sup- pression to one of immigration management within an increasingly integrated North American market.

Following the landmark immigration reforms of 1965, which sought to eliminate the taint of racism from U.S. immigration law, America’s immigration and border policies took an increasingly restrictive turn. For the ½rst time, hard numerical limits were imposed on immigration from the Western Hemi- sphere. These limits were tightened in subsequent years, drastically reducing opportunities for legal entry from Mexico, our neighbor and the largest contemporary source of immigrants to the United DOUGLAS S MASSEY . , a Fellow States. Inevitably, these restrictions gave rise to of the American Academy since mass undocumented migration.1 In response to the 1995, is the Henry G. Bryant Pro- fessor of Sociology and Public rising tide of apprehensions, U.S. policy-makers Affairs at Princeton University. increased border enforcement exponentially, scal- His publications include Brokered ing up deportations to record levels. The immigra- Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Iden- tion enforcement industry presently costs the U.S. tity in Anti-Immigrant Times (with government an estimated $18 billion per year; Magaly Sánchez R., 2010), Categor- employs more than 20,000 Border Patrol Of½cers ically Unequal: The American Strat- (an all-time high); and deports an unprecedented i½cation System (2007), and Beyond 2 Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigra - 400,000 undocumented migrants per year. tion in an Age of Economic Integration Despite the astounding enforcement effort of the (with Jorge Durand and Nolan J. past several decades, net immigration from Latin Malone, 2002). America has only accelerated. From 1970 to 2010,

America’s the percentage of foreign-born rose from wrong of racial segregation. The 1964 Immi - 4.7 percent to 13 percent of the U.S. popu- Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination gration Policy lation, the undocumented population in hiring and service provision and put Fiasco rose from a few thousand to a current teeth into school desegregation; the 1965 total of 11 million persons, and Latinos Voting Rights Act guaranteed black suf- climbed from 4.7 percent to 16.3 percent frage and prohibited the various subter - of the total population.3 If the goal of U.S. fuges by which African Americans histor- policy was to limit the number of Latin ically had been disenfranchised; the 1968 Americans living in the United States, it Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimina- clearly failed. Although the 1965 liberal- tion in the rental or sale of housing; and ization of restrictions on Asian, African, the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Southern/Eastern European immi- banned discrimination in mortgage lend- gration generally worked as expected– ing. Within a brief decade, the vestiges of bringing in a diverse array of new immi- racism were purged from the American grants in manageable numbers, many of legal code. whom were highly educated–the tight- In the context of an expanding civil ening of restrictions on immigration rights movement, the provisions within from the Americas back½red. U.S. immigration policy that openly dis- This failure derives from the fact that the criminated against Asians, Africans, and immigration policies implemented in 1965 Southern/Eastern Europeans came to be and thereafter were not founded on any seen as intolerably racist. In 1965, over rational, evidence-based understanding vociferous Southern objections, Congress of international migration. Instead, they amended the Immigration and Nationality were enacted for domestic political pur- Act to create a new immigration system poses and reveal more about America’s that allocated residence visas on the basis hopes and aspirations–and its fears and of skills and family ties to U.S. residents, apprehensions–than anything having to rather than national origins.4 The legisla- do with immigrants or immigration per se. tion initially created separate numerical When policies are implemented for sym- quotas for the Eastern and Western Hemi - bolic political purposes, and massive spheres, but in 1978, the hemispheric caps interventions are undertaken with no were abandoned in favor of a single real understanding of how they might worldwide ceiling of 290,000 visas, with affect a complex social system such as each nation eligible for up to around immigration, the results are not only 20,000 visas per year. Immediate rela- likely to be unanticipated, but counter- tives of U.S. citizens were exempt from productive. And that is exactly what tran- these numerical limits, however.5 spired in North America. The unintended Mexican immigration to the United consequences of U.S. immigration policy States had averaged around 50,000 per- unleashed a chain reaction of events that sons per year prior to 1965. In addition to produced an unprecedented boom in this sizable inflow of legal immigrants, Latin American immigration to the United Mexico enjoyed access to a large tempo- States, despite monumental enforcement rary worker program that, from 1942 to efforts. 1964, enabled short-term visas for work in the United States, mostly in agriculture. Our story begins with the crest of the At the program’s height, some 450,000 civil rights movement in the 1960s, as leg- Mexicans were entering each year as islators pushed to right the historical temporary laborers. As the civil rights era

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gained momentum, however, the pro- migration steadily rose in subsequent Douglas S. gram came to be seen as exploitive and years until, by 1979, it roughly equaled Massey discriminatory, on par with Southern the volume observed in the late 1950s, sharecropping. Congress began to cut only now the overwhelming majority of back the number of work visas in 1960 migrants were “illegal.”8 and unilaterally terminated the program in 1965, despite strong protests from the Although little had changed except the Mexican government.6 documentation of the migrants, the rise The repeal of the discriminatory quo- of illegal migration after 1965 offered tas and the termination of the temporary a golden opportunity for ambitious worker program had been undertaken for bureaucrats and cynical politicians to the laudable goal of ending racism in U.S. garner ½nancial resources and political immigration policy; but in neither case support; for by de½nition, illegal migrants did Congress give any consideration to were “criminals” and “lawbreakers,” and what the consequences might be for the thus readily portrayed as a grave threat to system of Mexican migration, which had the nation. Magazine articles on immi- evolved to become fully institutionalized gration published between 1970 and by 1965. In the late 1950s, the United 2000 were characterized by the rise of a States was admitting a half-million Mex- distinct “Latino threat narrative” that ican migrants per year (all in legal status), framed Latin Americans in general, and roughly 90 percent for temporary work Mexicans in particular, using one of two and 10 percent for permanent residence. threatening metaphors. On the one hand, By 1960, these flows were sustained by migrants from the south were portrayed well-developed social networks that con- as a brown “flood” that would “inun- nected households and communities in date” American culture and “drown” its Mexico to jobs and employers in the society. On the other hand, undocumented United States. Economic expectations migrants were portrayed as “invaders” and structures on both sides of the bor- who “swarmed” across the border in der were adapted to this reality.7 “banzai charges” to overrun “outgunned” What would happen to this deeply Border Patrol Agents who fought vainly entrenched, thoroughly institutionalized to “hold the line” against the “alien inva- flow of migrants once opportunities for sion.”9 legal entry from Mexico were terminated? As the Cold War climaxed, the war on Congress did not address or even seriously drugs accelerated, and the war on terror consider this question; but migration came to dominate public rhetoric, mar- theory and research yield the strong con- tial metaphors overtook marine met - clusion that immigration flows tend to aphors. As the number of border appre- acquire an obdurate momentum once hensions rose each year, press releases, they are supported by an institutional- news articles, and political speeches her- ized social infrastructure of networks, alded the increase as con½rmation of the practices, and expectations, especially ongoing invasion. Although the steady when conditions of labor supply and drumbeat of the Latino threat narrative demand remain unchanged. As a result, inflamed public opinion and pushed it in when opportunities for legal entry disap- a more conservative, restrictionist direc- peared after 1965, the massive inflow from tion,10 from 1965 to 1979, the rise in Mexico simply reestablished itself under apprehensions stemmed from actual undocumented auspices. Undocumented increases in undocumented traf½c at the

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America’s border, because formerly legal temporary without authorization changed little; but Immi - migration was restored under undocu- the sharp upward surge in the costs and gration Policy mented auspices as circular illegal migra- risks of border crossing did alter the Fiasco tion. After 1979, however, the number of behavior of migrants, though not in ways undocumented entries stabilized and the expected by policy-makers. As enforce- rise in apprehensions was pushed for- ment personnel and matériel accumulated ward by the intensifying enforcement in the two busiest border sectors, migra- effort.11 tory flows were diverted away from El The 1976 Reader’s Digest article “Illegal Paso and, especially, San Diego, and Aliens: Time to Call a Halt!”–written by toward the Sonoran desert and new the Commissioner of the U.S. Immigra- crossing points on the Arizona border. tion and Naturalization Service–reflects This shift increased the average cost of the popularized Latino threat narrative. crossing from roughly $500 to $3,000 per In it, the commissioner alleges that his trip and tripled the death rate of undocu- agency is “out-manned, under-budgeted, mented migrants attempting the cross- and confronted by a growing, silent inva- ing. Having been forcibly pushed away sion of illegal aliens” that “threatens to from California, migrants continued on become a national disaster.”12 Through to new destinations, such as North Car- such scare tactics, he and other immigra- olina, South Carolina, Georgia, Nebraska, tion of½cials and their political allies and Iowa, states which in the 1990s came were successful in channeling ever- to house the most rapidly growing Latino greater resources and personnel to com- populations.14 bat the alleged invasion. The number of In addition to changing crossing and apprehensions began to rise in self-feed- destination points, rising border enforce- ing fashion, even though the underlying ment also altered the propensity of traf½c at the border was no longer in - migrants to circulate back and forth. creasing. Each new release of apprehen- Given the rising costs and risks of unau- sion statistics was accompanied by a thorized border crossing, migrants quite demand for more enforcement resources, logically minimized crossing–not by which indeed produced more apprehen- remaining in Mexico, but by settling sions, which justi½ed still more enforce- more permanently in the United States. ment resources. As a result, during the The principal effect of the progressive 1980s and 1990s, border enforcement militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border increased exponentially in a manner that was to reduce the rate of undocumented was completely detached from the actual out-migration back to Mexico; it did not number of undocumented migrants at- lower the rate of undocumented migration tempting to cross the border.13 into the United States.15 The end result From 1980 to 2000, the Border Patrol was a doubling of the net rate of illegal increased from 2,500 to 9,200 of½cers, migration and a sharp increase in undoc- and its budget rose from $83 million to umented population growth through the $1.1 billion. In response, apprehensions 1990s and into the new century. In the surged from 817,000 to 1.7 million, even course of two decades, the North Ameri- though independent estimates indicate can migration system was transformed the volume of undocumented entries was from a circular flow of male workers roughly constant. Despite the massive going to California and a few other states increase in border enforcement, the num- into a settled population of families living ber of migrants entering the United States in all ½fty states. From 1988 to 2008, the

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number of unauthorized residents of the The 1996 legislation, for example, autho- Douglas S. United States grew from 1.9 million to rized removals from ports of entry with- Massey 12 million, while the share residing in out judicial hearings, declared undocu- California dropped from 40 percent to mented migrants ineligible for public 25 percent.16 bene½ts, restricted access of documented migrants to certain means-tested pro- Illegal migration has always been con- grams, granted local agencies the power founded in the public mind with threats to assist in immigration enforcement, to the nation’s security–be they from declared any alien who had ever committed Jacobins, papists, or Communists–and a crime immediately deportable, autho - the 1980s were no exception. In the con- rized the “expedited exclusion” of any alien text of the Cold War and the proxy con- who had ever crossed the border without frontation with the Soviet Union in Cen- documents, granted authority to the State tral America, President Reagan warned Department to designate any organiza- Americans that “terrorists and subver- tion as “terrorist” and render all its mem- sives are just two days’ driving time from bers deportable, added alien smuggling to [the border crossing at] Harlingen, Texas,” the list of crimes covered by the anti-ma½a and in response to such rhetoric, the 1986 rico statute, and severely limited the Immigration Reform and Control Act possibilities for judicial review of all contained a host of provisions enacted to deportations. The 2001 legislation granted manage a potential “immigration emer- executive authorities additional powers to gency.” In another speech, Reagan pre- deport, without presentation of evidence, dicted that extremist groups would “feed any alien–legal or illegal–that the attor- on the anger and frustration of recent ney general had “reason to be lieve” Central and South American immigrants might commit, further, or facilitate acts who will not realize their own version of of terrorism. It also authorized the arrest, the American dream.”17 imprisonment, and deportation of non- With the collapse of the Soviet Union, citizens upon the orders of the attorney illegal immigrants lost their value as a general, again without judicial review.19 trope in the Cold War; however, they were The cumulative result of these actions quickly co-opted symbolically in the war was a massive escalation of roundups in on terror. In response to the 1993 attack immigrant neighborhoods, raids at em- on the World Trade Center and the 1995 ployment sites, “stop and frisk” actions bombing in Oklahoma City, Congress in on city streets, and traf½c stops along 1996 passed the Anti-Terrorism and Ef - public roadways. The end result was an fective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal exponential increase in immigrant de- Immigration Reform and Immigrant tentions and deportations that threat- Responsibility Act. Following the 1998 ened not only undocumented migrants, bombing of the uss Cole in Yemen, the but any foreigner who was not a U.S. citi- 2000 bombings of American embassies zen. From 1990 to 2010, deportations in Kenya and Tanzania, and the cata- from the United States rose from 30,000 strophic attacks of September 11, 2001, to around 400,000 per year. In response, Congress enacted the usa patriot Act. millions of legal immigrants rushed to These measures not only strengthened undertake defensive naturalization: peti- border enforcement, but very deliberately tioning for U.S. citizenship in order to increased pressure on both legal and illegal protect their rights and safeguard their immigrants within the United States.18 ability to remain in the United States.20

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America’s Historically, Latin American and, espe- sands of new entitlements for permanent Immi - cially, Mexican immigrants had displayed resident visas that pushed legal immigra- gration Policy very low rates of naturalization. In the tion well above the statutory cap of Fiasco 1990s, however, citizenship applications 20,000 visas per year. To be sure, the surged in response to the rising tide of exemption offered to citizen relatives internal enforcement and cumulative had long pushed legal immigration from restriction of liberties. Among Mexicans, Mexico above the 20,000 visa limit. Dur- the number of naturalizations had never ing the 1970s, for example, arrivals of exceeded 30,000 per year prior to 1990, Mexican legal residents averaged 63,000 and the total number in the two decades per year despite the cap. By the latter half between 1970 and 1990 stood at just of the 1990s, however, the average more 233,000. However, Mexican naturaliza- than doubled to reach 136,000, and from tions surged to 255,000 in 1996, with 2000 through 2010, it stood at 170,000 plateaus of 208,000 in 1999 and 232,000 per year. Whereas only 5 percent of all in 2008, yielding a cumulative total of 2.1 legal Mexican immigrants entered as rel- million new citizens between 1990 and atives of U.S. citizens in 1990, that ½gure 2010.21 rose to nearly two-thirds by 2010. In its The surge in naturalizations is key to zeal to increase pressure on foreigners in understanding the acceleration of legal the name of the war on terror, Congress immigration from Mexico that has un - inadvertently increased legal immigra- folded in recent years, despite the annual tion from Mexico by a factor of nearly cap of 20,000 visas per country; for as three.22 noted earlier, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are exempt from numerical lim- Up to now I have focused on Mexico, by its. Although legal permanent residents far the leading contributor of migrants to are authorized to petition for the entry of the United States. Since 1970, Mexico their spouses and minor children, these alone has accounted for approximately visas fall under the annual cap, and their 20 percent of documented and 60 per- relatives must wait until a visa becomes cent of undocumented immigrants to the available–which for an oversubscribed United States–and half of all documented country such as Mexico takes years. In and three-quarters of all undocumented contrast, if permanent residents natural- immigrants from Latin America. After ize to become U.S. citizens, their spouses Mexico, the second major source region and minor children are eligible for imme- in Latin America is Central America, which diate entry, along with the immigrant’s accounts for around 15 percent of docu- parents. Moreover, their adult children mented and 20 percent of undocumented and siblings acquire the right to enter, migrants from the region. Immigration subject to numerical limitation. from Central America was minimal prior In sum, each new citizen creates new to 1980, with legal entries totaling just entitlements within the U.S. immigra- 114,000 during the 1970s. But entries by tion system and produces more legal Central Americans grew rapidly there- immigrants down the road. As a result, after, totaling around 325,000 in the when Congress began to strip away the 1980s and around 600,000 in both the rights and privileges of permanent resi- 1990s and 2000s.23 dents and threaten them with deporta- The surge in Central American immi- tion for a growing number of infractions, gration stemmed from the U.S.-Contra it unwittingly created hundreds of thou- intervention, which raised levels of vio-

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lence and social disorder in the region flow of illegal migrants. The increase in Douglas S. and pushed thousands of people north- illegal migration led, in turn, to the rise of Massey ward as refugees. Although Nicaraguans, the Latino threat initiative and a shift escaping a left-wing, pro-Soviet regime, toward increasingly restrictive policies. were readily accepted as refugees and The resultant militarization of the Mexico- ultimately admitted to permanent resi- U.S. border transformed the geography dence, other Central Americans–Sal- of border crossing and led to a prolif- vadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans– eration of new destinations, while at the were labeled “economic migrants,” and same time reducing rates of return were not welcomed. U.S. of½cials relegated migration and accelerating the undocu- these migrants to temporary protected mented population growth. Finally, U.S. status at best, and more commonly un - political and military interventions in documented status, adding a signi½cant Central America during the 1980s gener- Central American component to Ameri- ated outflows of émigrés that further ca’s Latin American population boom.24 augmented Latin American population growth in the United States. As a result, Over the past four decades, the United since 1970, the foreign-born population States has undergone a mass immigra- has quadrupled, the United States became tion not seen since the early twentieth substantially more Latino, national ori- century. The new wave has yielded a pro- gins among Latinos have shifted deci- gressive Latinization of the U.S. popula- sively toward Mexico and Central Amer- tion and a rising prevalence of illegality ica, and the share present without au - among the foreign born. From 1970 to thorization has risen to unprecedented 2010, the foreign-born population rose heights. from 9.6 to 40 million persons, while the The evidence thus suggests that the turn Latino population grew from 9.6 million toward restrictive immigration policies to 50.5 million, now making up 16.3 per- after 1965 was counterproductive, to say cent of the total population. Among Lati- the least. Particularly in the case of Mexico, nos, the foreign-born population rose the contradictions are glaring. In 1994, the from 30 percent to 40 percent, and Cen- United States and Mexico entered into a tral Americans and Mexicans together free trade agreement designed to reduce increased their share of the population barriers to cross-border movements of from two-thirds to three-quarters. (Carib- goods, capital, resources, information, ser- beans fell from 25 percent to about 15 per- vices, and many categories of people. Not cent.) Among Latinos present in 2010, only was free movement of labor excluded nearly a third lacked documents, and from the otherwise integrated North nearly 60 percent of immigrant Latinos American market being established, but were unauthorized.25 that same year, the United States launched For the most part, these developments Operation Gatekeeper to block the flow were unintended consequences of U.S. of migrants through the busiest border immigration and border policies enacted sector–part of a two-decade-long process without regard for realities on the ground. of border militarization. Apparently, the By curtailing opportunities for legal entry contradiction between the stated goal of from the Americas after 1965, the United integrating all factor markets in North States transformed a well-established America and the exclusion of Mexican and largely circular flow of legal migrants labor from participating never occurred into an equally well-established, circular to leaders in Washington.

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America’s The simple reality is that, as a practical ½gure is inflated by new measurement Immi - matter, it is virtually impossible to stop efforts at the border, in 2008, before these gration Policy the movement of people between two new efforts were implemented, the num- Fiasco countries that share a 3,000-mile border, ber of entries stood at 361,000, the largest are linked together in a free trade agree- number since 1959. When added to the ment, are among one another’s largest average of 170,000 Mexicans who entered trading partners, and are bound by a joint each year as permanent residents, we see history of social, economic, and political that substantial opportunities for legal inter-penetration. If one tries unilaterally entry have opened up in the U.S. immi- to block flows of people that are the natu- gration system, with numbers fluctuat- ral outgrowth of broader processes of ing around the half-million level last social and economic integration, more- observed in the late 1950s. Although over, the results are dysfunctional and labor demand in the United States fal- counterproductive, as we have seen. tered in the great recession of 2008, the Rather than seeking to suppress migratory demand that remains is currently being flows that merely reflect the powerful met by legal migration in various cate- forces binding North America together, gories. the alternative is to accept the flows and In Mexico, meanwhile, the conditions seek to manage them in ways that are that have for so long driven immigrants bene½cial to Americans, Mexicans, and northward have shifted. Birth rates have the immigrants themselves. fallen dramatically, the rate of labor force In North America, the stars might ½- growth is rapidly decelerating, and the nally be aligned for such a transition, Mexican population is aging as rural pop- moving away from unilateral repression ulations continue to dwindle. Rural dwel- toward bilateral strategies of manage- lers, long the source of a disproportionate ment. With the conspicuous help of Lati- share of Mexican immigrants, dropped no voters, President Obama won a sec- from 35 percent of the population to ond term and need not worry again about roughly 20 percent today. At the same reelection. In Mexico, meanwhile, new time, real wages have stabilized even as President Enrique Peña Nieto has taken they have fallen in the United States, while charge and is looking for a way forward education levels among younger cohorts on issues with its northern neighbor. have steadily risen and the middle class Should the two presidents seek to coop- has grown.28 The young migrants leaving erate in managing international migra- Mexico today are increasingly well-edu- tion more effectively, they will bene½t cated people of metropolitan origin who from a unique political moment when are migrating in response to the rhythms the pressure is off: undocumented migra- of development in an ever-more integrated tion from Mexico has fallen to a net of North American economy.29 zero and has remained there since 2008. In sum, the conditions that supported Indeed, the net immigration rate may mass undocumented migration in the even be negative.26 past appear to be disappearing, and what One reason for this development is the needs to be done now is to ½nd ways to quiet return of temporary worker migra- better manage the flows that will inev- tion. Whereas only 3,300 Mexicans en- itably occur in the course of North Amer- tered the United States on temporary ican economic integration. We must work visas in 1980, in 2010 the number facilitate the entry and return of the large reached 517,000.27 Though the latter majority of migrants who prefer circula-

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tion to settlement, while opening up op - mothers, 15 percent are to African Ameri- Douglas S. portunities for legal permanent residence cans, and 7 percent are to Asians, making Massey for the minority of migrants who acquire up almost half the total. Our failure to strong social or economic connections to arrange for the legalization of the 11 mil- the United States and wish to remain per- lion persons currently out of status will manently. not change the demographic transition In recent years, politicians in the United under way in the United States; it will States have referred to four “pillars” of only render it more contentious, prob- comprehensive immigration reform: gain lematic, and costly to society. In 2013, the control of the border, create a sizable United States, Mexico, and Canada have guest worker program, increase the quo- a unique opportunity to break with the tas for immigration from Mexico (and failed policies of the past and enter a new Canada), and enact a pathway to legaliza- era of cooperation to manage, rather than tion for undocumented U.S. residents. Of suppress, the ongoing flow of migrants these, three have already been achieved who will inevitably move within the free in de facto terms: illegal migration has trade zone that has been created among been at a net of zero since 2008; tempo- the three countries.30 rary worker entries are at levels not seen since the late 1950s; and through defensive naturalization, Mexicans themselves have in practical terms increased the size of their quotas for legal immigration. Although the current system of temporary worker migration could certainly bene½t from improvements to protect workers from exploitation, the most serious task remaining for immigration re - formers is the legalization of the 11 million persons who are currently unauthorized, especially the 3 million or more persons who entered as minors and grew up in the United States. The lack of legal status constitutes an insurmountable bar - rier to social and economic mobility, not only for the undocumented immigrants themselves, but for their citizen family members. Not since the days of slavery have so many residents of the United States lacked the most basic social, economic, and human rights. The transition to a minority-majority U.S. population is now well under way, and is inevitable in demographic terms. Although the U.S. population is currently 16 percent Latino, 14 percent black, 5 percent Asian, and 3 percent mixed race, among births, 25 percent are to Latino

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America’s endnotes Immi - 1 gration Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (New Policy York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006); and Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Fiasco Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 2 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergoni, Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2013). 3 Yesenia D. Acosta, G. Patricia de la Cruz, Christine Gambino, Thomas Gryn, Luke J. Larsen, Eward N. Trevelyan, and Nathan P. Walters, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012); and Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Ríos-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). 4 Gabriel J. Chin, “The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,” North Carolina Law Review 75 (1996–1997): 279–345. 5 Zolberg, A Nation by Design; and Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990), 2–97. 6 Massey, Durand, and Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors. 7 Douglas S. Massey, Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González, Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico (Berkeley: University of Cal- ifornia Press, 1987). 8 Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Origins of the New Latino Underclass,” Race and Social Problems 4 (2012): 5–17. 9 Leo R. Chavez, Covering Immigration: Population Images and the Politics of the Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Otto Santa Ana, Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Lati- nos in Contemporary American Public Discourse (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002); and Leo R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008). 10 Massey and Pren, “Origins of the New Latino Underclass.” 11 Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Pol- icy: Explaining the Post–1965 Surge from Latin America,” Population and Development Review 38 (2012): 1–29. 12 Leonard F. Chapman, “Illegal Aliens: Time to Call a Halt!” Reader’s Digest, October 1976, 188–192. 13 Massey and Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy.” 14 Massey, Durand, and Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors; and Douglas S. Massey, New Faces in New Places: The New Geography of American Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Founda- tion, 2008). 15 Massey, Durand, and Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors; Massey and Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy.” 16 Ruth E. Wasem, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986 (Wash- ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 17 Quoted in Al Kamen, “Central America is No Longer the Central Issue for Americans,” Austin American Statesman, October 21, 1990. See also, Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (Austin: Cen- ter for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1996). 18 Zolberg, A Nation by Design.

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19 Douglas S. Massey and Magaly Sánchez R., Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Douglas S. Anti-Immigrant Times (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). Massey 20Massey and Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy.” 21 U.S. Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 22 Massey and Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy.” 23 U.S. Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 24 Jennifer H. Lundquist and Douglas S. Massey, “Politics or Economics? International Migra- tion During the Nicaraguan Contra War,” Journal of Latin American Studies 37 (2005): 29–53. 25 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigra- tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 26 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero–and Perhaps Less (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012). 27 U.S. Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 28 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Gobeirno de México, http://www.inegi.org.mx/. 29 Filiz Garip, “Discovering Diverse Mechanisms of Migration: The Mexico-U.S. Stream from 1970 to 2000,” Population and Development Review 38 (2012): 393–433. 30 Douglas S. Massey, “Caution: nafta at Work,” Miller-McCune Magazine 1 (1) (2008): 2–9; and Patricia Fernández Kelly and Douglas S. Massey, “Borders for Whom? The Role of nafta in Mexico-U.S. Migration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610 (2007): 98–119.

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Immigration Past & Present

Nancy Foner

Abstract: Immigration has remade and changed American society since the nation’s founding, and an understanding of the past can help illuminate the immigrant experience in the present. This essay focuses on three central questions: What is new about the most recent immigrant wave? What represents continuity or parallels with the past? And how have migrant inflows in earlier historical periods changed the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts that now greet–and shape the experiences of–the latest arrivals? In examining these questions, the focus is on the last great wave of immigration at the turn of the twentieth century, in which the newcomers were mainly from Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe, and the contemporary inflow, from the late 1960s to the present, which is made up overwhelmingly of people from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean.

To know the past, it is often said, is to better understand the present. Nowhere is this more true than when it comes to immigration. Since the founding of the United States, immigration has been a fundamental feature of the nation’s population, institutions, and identity. Today, as in earlier eras, immigration is transforming the country in profound ways and also changing the lives of the newcomers who have moved here. What is new about the most recent immigrant wave? What represents continuity or parallels with the past? And how have migrant inflows in earlier historical periods changed NANCY FONER , a Fellow of the the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts American Academy since 2011, is that now greet–and shape the experiences of–the Distinguished Professor of Soci- ology at Hunter College and the latest arrivals? Graduate Center of the City Uni- In examining these questions, I focus on the two versity of New York. Her publica- massive immigrations in the period that stretches tions include From Ellis Island to from the end of the nineteenth century to the be- JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of ginning of the twenty-½rst. The last great wave at Immigration (2000), Not Just Black the turn of the twentieth century, from about 1880 and White: Historical and Contempo- to the early 1920s, brought more than 23 million rary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States immigrants to America’s shores, mainly from East- (edited with George Fredrickson, ern, Southern, and Central Europe; the contemporary 2004), and In a New Land: A Com- inflow, from the late 1960s to the present, is made parative View of Immigration (2005). up overwhelmingly of people from Latin America,

Asia, and the Caribbean. By 1910, the na- the special tastes and needs of the ethnic Nancy tion’s population was almost 15 percent market. In what also seems like a timeless Foner foreign born, a height unreached since feature, many newcomers today, as in the then, though it is coming close (13 percent past, cluster in ethnic neighborhoods with in 2010). The numbers are much larger their compatriots, partly owing to eco- now, of course, rising from 13.5 million nomic constraints and prejudice from foreign born in 1910 to an all-time high of established Americans, but also because 40 million in 2010. they seek comfort and security among kinfolk and friends in an environment of In some ways, history is repeating itself. familiar languages and institutions. This is not surprising given the many It is often said that a major distinction similar characteristics between immi- between today’s immigrants and those of grants now and those from a century ago; a hundred years ago is that then they were, the comparable racial and ethnic barriers in the main, white Europeans and today facing newcomers in both eras; and the they are, in signi½cant numbers, people very nature of immigration and the assim- of color. However, prejudice against im- ilation process. Because many contempo- migrants on the basis of race and ethnicity rary immigrants arrive in the United States has a long history. Jewish and Italian im- with low skill levels, do not know English, migrants a century ago were not viewed and are new to the country, they, like their as white in the same way that people with predecessors in the last great wave, often origins in Northern and Western Europe enter the economy on the bottom, taking were: they were seen as belonging to in- low-paid jobs with long hours and un- ferior “mongrel” races that would alter the pleasant working conditions that native- essential character of the United States born Americans generally do not want. and pollute the nation’s Anglo-Saxon or Even some of the jobs are the same. Russian Nordic stock. Jewish and Italian immi- Jewish immigrants in the past worked in grants were thought to have distinct bio- garment sweatshops, just as many Chinese logical features, mental abilities, and innate and Latino immigrants do today; Italians character traits, and many Americans be- in the past dug tunnels and built bridges lieved that they were physically identi½- and roads, while today many Mexicans able: facial features often noted in the case work in construction. of Jews, “swarthy” skin in the case of Ital- The underlying processes of niche devel- ians. Echoing racial views not uncommon opment still operate to create ethnic job in political discourse and the media, soon- concentrations. As before, immigrants to-be President Calvin Coolidge wrote in tend to flock to ½elds where coethnics have a popular magazine in 1921 that “Ameri- established a solid foothold. Lacking infor- cans must be kept American. Biological mation about the broader labor market laws show.. . that Nordics deteriorate when and dependent on the support of their own mixed with other races.”2 The racial attack kind, new arrivals typically learn about and on Southern and Eastern European immi- get help ½nding jobs through personal net- grants was a powerful ideological weapon works in the immigrant community. For of the movement to reduce immigration, their part, employers often prefer appli- helping mobilize public sentiment in favor cants recommended by existing employ- of restrictive federal legislation, which was ees.1 Ethnic businesses are another peren- enacted in the early 1920s.3 nial feature of the American immigrant Not only was it acceptable to speak scene, if only because they emerge to serve about the inferiority of Jews and Italians

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Immigration in newspapers, magazines, and public to a recent study, 88 percent of adult sec- Past & forums, but discrimination against them ond-generation Latinos reported speaking Present was also open and, by and large, legal well English very well (versus about a quarter into the twentieth century. Elite summer of ½rst-generation Latino immigrants). In resorts and private clubs made no bones 2000, among school-age children in new- about shutting out Jews; deed restrictions, comer families, about seven in ten of the that is, clauses in real estate titles limiting Mexican third generation spoke only Eng- the transfer of property to members of cer- lish at home; for Asians, it was 92 percent.4 tain groups, kept them out of desirable neighborhoods; and informal quotas at If there are parallels with the past, that Ivy League colleges set limits on the ad- does not mean we are witnessing a time- mission of Jews, who were a particular less immigrant saga. In many ways, the target given their early educational achieve- experiences of today’s immigrants differ ments. profoundly from those at the turn of the Transnationalism, or maintaining ties to twentieth century given the broad range the home country, is also not new. Many of new contextual features in the United immigrants in the last great wave main- States, from government laws and policies tained extensive transnational ties, send- to widely accepted norms and values. In ing money and letters to relatives left addition, immigrant flows have changed, behind and putting away money to buy with newcomers arriving from different land and houses in the home country. places. A hundred years ago, the over- Russian Jews, fleeing political repression whelming majority of immigrants were and virulent anti-Semitism, were unusual from Europe: a remarkable 87 percent in for their time in the degree to which they 1910. Italians were the largest immigrant were permanent settlers in the United group arriving in the ½rst two decades of States; but many Italians were “birds of the twentieth century, followed by Eastern passage,” going back to their home villages European Jews. In 2010, only 12 percent seasonally or every few years. In general, of the immigrants in the United States immigrants in a variety of groups at that were from Europe. More than four out of time, like immigrants today, often followed ½ve were from Asia, Latin America, and the news about, and sometimes remained ac- Caribbean. Mexicans are by far the largest tively involved in, home-country politics. group, making up about 30 percent of the A common fear is that today’s immi- nation’s immigrant population. grants and their children are not learning Another new development is the large English, and that this is different from number of undocumented now living in the past. But when it comes to language, the United States. A hundred years ago, the similarities with the past stand out. there were so few restrictions on European Research indicates that the standard three- immigration that hardly any European im- generation model of linguistic assimila- migrants were “illegal.” To be sure, spe- tion still holds: the immigrant generation ci½c exclusion laws barred the entry of (arriving as adults) makes some progress Asians–in the case of the Chinese, as but is usually more comfortable and fluent early as 1882. But until the 1920s, there in the mother tongue; the majority of the were no numerical limits on European second generation is pro½cient in English immigration–no immigrant visas or spe- but also speaks an immigrant language; cial papers that had to be secured from and the third generation is to a large ex- the United States. European immigrants tent monolingual in English. According arrived by boat, and most got through the

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ports of entry easily because they already documented born in this country are U.S. Nancy had been screened, mainly for disease, by citizens, with all the rights that this en- Foner steamship companies before embarking. tails, their parents often do not partici- Of the more than 12 million immigrants pate in public programs for which their who landed at Ellis Island, only 2 percent U.S.-citizen children are eligible because were excluded from entry. of fear of authorities.5 Today, if you do not have proper docu- A more positive difference from the past mentation from American authorities, you is that today’s immigrants are more diverse cannot legally live and work in the United in socioeconomic background than Euro- States. There are numerical limits on the pean immigrants at the turn of the twen- number of immigrant visas, and in many tieth century. Yesterday’s newcomers did countries where the demand to come to include a sizable number who had worked the United States is especially strong, there in skilled trades in the old country, but is a long wait to get a visa, even if you have the bulk were low-skilled workers; pro- a family member to sponsor you. (The fessionals and the highly educated were majority of lawful permanent immigrants scarce. Today, many are still poorly edu- –two-thirds in 2010–enter under family cated and low skilled; in 2010, 32 percent reuni½cation provisions of U.S. immigra- of immigrants twenty-½ve years and older tion law.) As a result, many have arrived lacked a high school diploma. However, or remained without proper documents. 27 percent had a bachelor’s degree or high- In 2011, there were an estimated 11.5 million er. Never in the history of U.S. immigration unauthorized immigrants in the United has such a large proportion of new arrivals States, or more than a quarter of the total been so highly skilled and educated.6 foreign-born population; nearly 60 percent Given their educational background, were from Mexico, and another 14 per- many immigrants today arrive ready and cent from Guatemala, El Salvador, and able to ½nd decent, sometimes high-level Honduras. jobs in the mainstream economy. This is Undocumented immigrants have faced another change from the past. So is the fact a host of dif½culties. They are especially that a signi½cant minority are pro½cient vulnerable in the labor market, commonly in English on arrival. This is obviously the working in low-paid jobs with unpleasant, case for the more than one million Eng- sometimes dangerous, conditions. Having lish-speaking Caribbean immigrants, but legal status is not a recipe for success, but also for others–most notably, many from without it, an immigrant has trouble get- India and the Philippines, the third and ting a good job and making a living wage fourth largest immigrant-source countries in the formal economy. The undocument- to the United States. Even those who did ed have been ineligible for most govern- not know English before they emigrated ment social and welfare bene½ts. (Emer- seem to learn it faster than in the past. A gency Medicaid is one exception.) In recent much higher proportion of late-twentieth- years, they have been subject to great hos- century immigrants from the Spanish- tility and, in many places, punitive actions speaking nations of Mexico, the Caribbean, and legislation by local and state govern- and Central and South America spoke ments. The record number of deportations English in their ½rst ½ve years in the United in the United States in recent years– States than was the case with early-twen- about 400,000 in ½scal year 2011–has tieth-century European immigrants.7 heightened fears among undocumented Transnationalism is not a new phenom- immigrants. Although children of the un- enon, but much is new about it today.

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Immigration Given modern technology and commu- nation also continue to create barriers for Past & nications, immigrants can now operate black, Latino, and Asian immigrants. Yet Present more or less simultaneously in the United there have been some positive develop- States and their country of origin–and ments in the last one hundred years. Gone maintain more frequent, immediate, and are the days when mainstream institutions, closer contact with home societies than most notably public schools, sponsored before. At the beginning of the twentieth hard-edged Americanization programs and century, more than a month elapsed be- activities that told immigrants to shed com- tween sending a letter home and receiving pletely their old customs and ethnic iden- a reply. It took about two weeks to get back tities. “There is no such thing as a hyphen- to Italy. Today, immigrants can hop on a ated American who is a good American,” plane to visit their home communities or Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed in a 1915 pick up the phone, or in some cases use speech. “The only man who is a good the Internet, to hear news from relatives American is the man who is American and be involved with those left behind. and nothing else.”9 The notion that Old With a flick of the radio or television dial, World traditions would diminish immi- immigrants usually can hear about news grants’ devotion to America, according to from the homeland. historian Gary Gerstle, “maintained its The ubiquity of cell phones and low- potency through the 1930s.”10 cost phone calls–as well as the growing Today, there is an of½cial commitment use of email, text messages, and Skype– to cultural pluralism and cultural diversity has enabled migrants to stay in close con- in the United States, and Americans are tact and maintain a level of intimacy with comfortable with hyphenated identities, relatives in the country of origin in ways which are embraced (at least some of the that were not possible twenty years ago, time) by long-established Americans as never mind at the beginning of the twen- well as many immigrants and especially tieth century. Modern technology even can their second-generation children. Whereas bring the tastes of home to the United the children of European immigrants of States. Through courier services–paquete- the last great wave were often embar- rias–in Queens, New York, Mexican immi- rassed by their parents’ old country ways, grants can get freshly baked bread or today’s second generation is more at ease mole sauce that has been flown in, made with having both American and ethnic by relatives in the homeland only forty- identities. A study of the young adult eight hours earlier.8 With the growing children of immigrants in the New York number of sending countries allowing area found that they rarely felt ashamed of some form of dual nationality or citizen- their parents’ language and were proud ship, many immigrants no longer have to of their culture of origin, or features of it. give up home-country citizenship after Generally, they had positive feelings about naturalizing in the United States; and their ethnic roots and admired their par- depending on the rules in each case, some ents’ struggles to make a better life for their have the right to vote in home-country families in this country. Nearly all said that elections from abroad. they would try to teach their own children Nativism, hostility toward immigrants about their parents’ culture and help them on the basis of their foreignness, is alive learn the language.11 and well, although today it is heavily fo - Today’s immigrants and their children, cused on the undocumented and, especial- moreover, are making their way at a time ly, Mexicans. Racial prejudice and discrimi- when many legal protections are in place

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that did not exist a hundred years ago. years, legal immigration has continued at Nancy New York State, to mention one exam- high rates for nearly ½ve decades, and a Foner ple, did not pass an anti-discrimination halt like the one seen in the past is unlikely statute until 1945, and a few years later –at least in the near future. In 2010, more the U.S. Supreme Court banned restric- than a third of all immigrants in the United tive covenants that had allowed property States had entered the country since 2000. owners to exclude racial and ethnic Between 2005 and 2010 alone, more than minorities from purchasing homes in a million legal permanent residents were desirable neighborhoods. Perhaps even admitted each year. Ongoing immigration more important, many children of non- contributes to strengthening vibrant ethnic white immigrants are positioned to take communities and cultures and the salience advantage of and pro½t from civil rights– of ethnic identity. Whereas the earlier sec- era institutions and laws of the 1960s, ond generation of European origin growing including policies promoting diversity in up in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s did so in educational institutions and places of a context in which there were hardly any employment–policies that, ironically, newly arrived immigrants in their neigh- were designed to redress injustices suf- borhoods, many children of today’s im- fered by native minority groups.12 While migrants live in places where newcomers most members of the second generation, of all ages–who have strong ties to the as in the past, are making relatively mod- home country, its customs, and its lan- est moves up the socioeconomic ladder guages–are arriving every day. when compared to their parents, a greater proportion are now catapulting into high- The relationship between past and pres- level positions. Contemporary immigrants’ ent concerns not only what is new about class composition is far more heavily immigration but also the way changes in- weighted toward the middle class than was troduced by newcomers in previous eras true a hundred years ago. Also, American influence contemporary immigrants. To society “is more receptive to immigrants’ put it somewhat differently: how do mi- incorporation–in large measure, due to grant inflows in one period, in a dialectical the efforts by earlier groups of outsiders, process, change the context of reception including native-born blacks, to widen that subsequently shapes the experiences access to opportunity.”13 and incorporation of the next wave? One A ½nal contrast should be mentioned. legacy of the last great wave is the impact Contemporary immigrant communities on popular culture, from television pro- are being constantly replenished with new grams that feature the descendants of arrivals in a way that did not happen in Italian and Jewish immigrants (think the last great wave from Europe. After the Seinfeld, Everybody Loves Raymond, and The mid-1920s, there was a halt in mass immi- Sopranos) to food (pizza and bagels, to name gration from Southern and Eastern Europe two items introduced a century ago that owing to legislative restrictions followed have become American mainstays). In by the Great Depression and World War II, addition, some institutions and cultural and mass inflows did not begin again until patterns that were developed or trans- after the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler formed by earlier European immigrants immigration reforms.14 Despite the recent and their children continue to serve or economic downturn in the United States provide a model for current newcomers. and reduced levels of undocumented im- This is especially the case in long-estab- migration from Mexico in the past few lished gateways like New York, Boston,

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Immigration and Chicago, which have been major deep-seated and virulent anti-Catholic Past & immigrant destinations for well over a nativism. Present century. For most of American history, as Gary Today’s immigrants pro½t from the legit- Gerstle has written, Catholicism was de- imacy (and practice) of ethnic politics picted as the enemy of republicanism, dating back to the nineteenth century, standing for monarchy, aristocracy, and when the Irish were able to in½ltrate and other reactionary forces that America take over the helm of big-city Democratic hoped to escape.17 By the mid-twentieth Party politics by mobilizing the ethnic century, however, Catholics and Jews had vote.15 Later-arriving Southern and Eastern been incorporated into the system of Europeans followed suit, using ethnicity to American pluralism. The transformation mobilize their base, attain political repre- of America into a “Judeo-Christian” nation sentation, and contend to be part of gov- –and Protestantism, Catholicism, and erning coalitions. Political machines are Judaism into the three main denomina- no longer what they used to be, and much tions in American religious life–has meant has changed about the structure of urban that post-1965 immigrants enter a more politics; yet ethnic politics is central to religiously open society than their prede- newer immigrants’ political incorporation. cessors did a hundred or a hundred and That long-established European-origin ½fty years ago. Of course, the contempo- groups used “ethnic arithmetic” to pur- rary United States is hardly a paradise of sue their goals and entry into the political religious tolerance. Anti-Muslim prejudice, system in urban America gives legitimacy for one, is all too prevalent. Nevertheless, to similar efforts by politicians of recent Islam and other non-Western religions immigrant origin as they seek to rally vot- have a presence that is widely accepted as ers, build support, and gain influence in legitimate within a pluralistic society. cities today. Successful attempts by Afri- Many present-day immigrants attend can Americans to win of½ce and mobilize churches founded by European immi- support in the wake of the civil rights grants of earlier eras and send their chil- movement and civil rights legislation have dren to Catholic parochial schools that also provided a model for immigrant- have their origins in the mid-nineteenth origin politicians. century, when Catholics established their Contemporary immigrants also bene½t own school system to protect their children from an acceptance of religious pluralism from the overtly Protestant teaching in the resulting from the integration of Catholi- state-supported or public school system. cism and Judaism into mainstream Amer- Since the 1960s, enrollment at Catholic ica.16 At the turn of the twentieth century, schools has been in steep decline. Catholic Protestant denominations prevailed in schools, it has been argued, also underserve the public square, crowding out Catholi- Mexican American youth in the Southwest cism and Judaism, both associated with and California–never regions for heavy disparaged Southern and Eastern Euro- investment in the Catholic educational peans and seen by nativist observers as system, which was most developed in the incompatible with American institutions Northeast and Midwest, regions where and culture. Earlier in the nineteenth Catholic immigrants from Europe pri- century, Irish Catholic immigrants, who marily settled in the past.18 Still, in the when they arrived in the 1830s and 1840s 2011–2012 academic year, about 2 mil- constituted the ½rst mass immigration of lion children nationwide attended some Catholics to America, were the target of 6,800 Catholic elementary and second-

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ary schools; more than a quarter of these struggles of earlier ½rst- and second-gen- Nancy students were racial and ethnic minori- eration Europeans who worked to com- Foner ties–no doubt many immigrants or chil- bat discriminatory barriers that blocked dren of immigrants. progress and integration into the Ameri- Only a small minority of immigrant can mainstream. The story of how these workers are members of labor unions– barriers fell is complicated, involving many about 10 percent nationwide in 2010– factors, yet one element was the orga- but those who are may belong to one nized campaigns in the immediate post– established by European immigrants in World War II years, particularly by many the early twentieth century or that incor- Jewish organizations, for the passage of porated earlier unions, among them the anti-discriminatory legislation and the International Ladies Garment Workers’ elimination of quotas directed at Jews. In Union and Amalgamated Clothing Work- this sense, these earlier struggles against ers of America, both of which, after sev- discrimination helped “change the rules eral mergers in recent decades, became of the game.” Even more signi½cant was part of a broader union (Workers United). the civil rights movement and civil rights A growing number of unionized health legislation, which have made it harder for care workers in the United States belong dominant groups to engage in some of the to a union af½liated with the national exclusionary strategies that were adopted Service Employees International Union; earlier in the twentieth century, and which the health care workers union has its ori- have given more scope and leverage to gins in a small New York City pharmacists’ contemporary outsider immigrant groups local, founded by a Russian-born Jewish to mobilize and make their way in main- immigrant, that began to organize hospi- stream institutions.21 tal workers in the late 1950s. New York City, the nation’s quintessential immigrant It has become a commonplace to say that city then and now, is home to a range of immigration, over time, has remade and organizations and institutions–not only changed American society; but this is the unions, churches, and synagogues but beginning of an inquiry, not the end of it. also settlement houses and social welfare An important element in understanding associations–established by Eastern and these processes of change is appreciating Southern European immigrants in the how immigrants in each era transform the Ellis Island era. These institutions pro- social, economic, political, and cultural vide services and opportunities for many contexts that then provide the setting for new arrivals and, in some cases, give legit- newcomers in the next wave–who, in imacy to contemporary immigrants’ orga- turn, leave their own mark. If the massive nizational efforts and serve as models to inflow of a hundred years ago has helped emulate.19 In general, long-established shape the context of reception for con- immigrant gateways offer newer arrivals temporary newcomers, the immigration of the bene½t of institutions that were set up the last ½ve decades is sure to do the same to aid immigrants in earlier waves; simi- for future immigrant cohorts. Already, lar institutions are absent in places that those currently arriving come to a country until recently have had no need for such that has been transformed by the heavy arrangements.20 recent influx. Hispanics have surpassed A ½nal example concerns a different her- blacks as the largest minority group in itage from the past. Immigrants and their the United States, and to mention another children today reap the bene½ts of the example, programs have been established

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Immigration in many gateway cities, from English lan- present, comparisons with the past make Past & guage learning in schools to translating ser- clear that what seems novel is not always Present vices in hospitals, that were unavailable new, from racial prejudice against new- or less available to immigrants who en- comers to immigrants’ involvement with tered just thirty or forty years ago. If, as is their homelands. likely, high levels of immigration continue Past/present comparisons are more in the near future, newcomers arriving than an academic endeavor. They dispel then will make their own imprint. commonly held popular myths about An examination of past and present immigrant giants of an earlier golden age through a comparative approach provides of immigration, against whom present- additional insights, allowing us to test what day arrivals seem like a pale imitation. are often too easy and unproven assump- And they remind present-day immigrants tions about immigrants in earlier eras– of what they have in common with their assumptions that affect how we view and predecessors. This historical awareness understand the present. We can also better can give them a greater sense of being appreciate what is really new about impart of America as a “nation of immi- migration today. As the historian David grants,” and perhaps also can inspire hope Kennedy reminds us, “The only way we can for the future. As a leader of an immi- know with certainty as we move along grant federation in New York City put it a time’s path that we have come to a gen- few years ago: “We look at the Italian uinely new place is to know something of community, the Jewish community. They where we have been.”22 While much is started out like us or even worse off. . . . –and will continue to be–unique to the Eventually the day will come for us.”23

endnotes 1 Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 2 Quoted in Nancy Foner, In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 15. 3 John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1984), 45. 4 David Lopez and Vanesa Estrada, “Language,” in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 230; Shirin Hakimzadeh and D’Vera Cohn, “English Usage among Hispanics in the United States” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2007); Richard Alba, “Bilingualism Persists, But English Still Dominates,” Migration Information Source, February 2005. 5 Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Immigrants Raising Citizens: Undocumented Parents and Their Young Chil- dren (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011). 6 Elizabeth Grieco et al., “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010,” American Community Survey Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, May 2012). 7 Claude Fischer and Michael Hout, Century of Difference: How America Changed in the Last One Hundred Years (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 42–43. 8 Andrea Elliott, “For Mom’s Cooking, 2,200 Miles Isn’t Too Far,” The New York Times, August 11, 2003. 9 Quoted in “Roosevelt Bars the Hyphenated,” The New York Times, October 13, 1915.

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10 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Nancy Princeton University Press, 2001), 195–196. Foner 11 Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 12 Ibid.; Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, “Immigration and Legacies of the Past: The Impact of Slavery and the Holocaust on Contemporary Immigrants in the United States and Western Europe,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52 (2010): 798–819. 13 Joel Perlmann and Roger Waldinger, “Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Present–A Reconsideration,” International Migration Review 31 (1997): 917. 14 As Tomás Jiménez reminds us, the Mexican-origin population in the Southwest was contin- ually replenished throughout the twentieth century, with consequences for incorporation and ethnic identity formation. See Tomás R. Jiménez, Replenished Ethnicity: Mexican Americans, Immigration, and Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 15 Steven P. Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 16 Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?” International Migration Review 42 (2008): 360–392. 17 Gary Gerstle, “Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Nationalism,” paper presented at Fear and Anxiety over National Identity, a conference held at the Russell Sage Foundation, Decem- ber 9–10, 2011. 18 David Lopez, “Whither the Flock? The Catholic Church and the Success of Mexicans in America,” in Immigration and Religion in America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, ed. Richard Alba, Albert Raboteau, and Josh DeWind (New York: New York University Press, 2009). 19 Nancy Foner, “Immigration History and the Remaking of New York,” in New York and Amster- dam: Immigration and the New Urban Landscape, ed. Nancy Foner et al. (New York: New York University Press, forthcoming). 20 Mary C. Waters and Tomás Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 118. 21 Perlmann and Waldinger, “Second Generation Decline?” 909. 22 David Kennedy, “Can We Still Afford to be a Nation of Immigrants?” Atlantic Monthly, Novem- ber 1996, 68. 23 James Estrin, “Arab Muslims in Brooklyn Find Voting Power,” The New York Times, October 18, 2008.

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The Contributions of Immigrants to American Culture

Charles Hirschman

Abstract: The standard account of American immigration focuses on the acculturation and assimilation of immigrants and their children to American society. This analysis typically ignores the signi½cant contributions of immigrants to the creation of American culture through the performing arts, sciences, and other cultural pursuits. Immigrants and their children are not born with more creative talents than native-born citizens, but their selectivity and marginality may have pushed and pulled those with ability into high-risk career paths that reward creative work. The presence of large numbers of talented immigrants in Hollywood, academia, and the high-tech industries has pushed American institutions to be more meritocratic and open to innovation than they would be otherwise.

The lives of most immigrants are a dialectic between the memories of the world left behind and the day-to-day struggles of learning the ropes of a new society. Mastering a new language, living and working among strangers, and coping with the unfamiliar are only some of the challenges faced by immigrants. It is no wonder that nostalgia has a strong grip on the cultural pursuits of immigrants. Immi- grant communities generally ½nd comfort in familiar religious traditions and rituals, seek out newspapers and literature from the homeland, and celebrate CHARLES HIRSCHMAN , a Fellow holidays and special occasions with traditional of the American Academy since music, dance, cuisine, and leisure-time pursuits. 1998, is the Boeing International Professor of Sociology and Public Yet not all immigrants look solely to the past to Affairs at the University of Wash- ½nd meaning or to express their longings. Some ington. His publications include immigrants, and their children in particular, are The Handbook of International Mi- inspired by the possibility for innovative expression gration (edited with Josh DeWind in American arts, culture, and pastimes. The par- and Philip Kasinitz, 1999), South- tially ½ctionalized biography of the popular enter- east Asian Studies in the Balance: tainer Al Jolson captures this experience. Jolson’s Reflections from America (edited with Charles F. Keyes and Karl story was expressed, somewhat embellished, in the Hutterer, 1992), and Ethnic and 1946 Oscar-winning ½lm The Jolson Story, and was Social Strati½cation in Peninsular foretold in the 1927 ½lm The Jazz Singer, in which Jol- Malaysia (1975). son plays the lead role.1

Asa Yoelson, born in 1886 in Russia, could perform closer to the audience. Charles immigrated to the United States as a The Jolson style did not represent assimi- Hirschman child. He had a beautiful singing voice lation, but rather the creation of a dis- and was groomed to succeed his father as tinctive “American” genre of musical the cantor in a prominent synagogue. performance. Many iconic American However, Asa was torn between family popular singers of the twentieth century, expectations and his desire to become a including Bing Crosby, Tony Bennett, popular singer. After some hesitation, he Judy Garland, Eddie Fisher, and Neil Dia- left home to try his fortune as a singer in mond, report that Jolson’s style was a vaudeville and other venues. Within a formative influence on their careers.3 few years, Asa Yoelson–who adopted the Al Jolson was not an exception. Immi- stage name Al Jolson–achieved fame as a grants, and especially the children and popular singer and stage performer. Dur- grandchildren of immigrants, have played ing the 1920s and 1930s, he was the most a disproportionate role in the develop- highly paid entertainer in the country. ment of the American performing arts. The transition from Asa Yoelson, the They have also made fundamental contri- dutiful son, to Al Jolson, famous enter- butions in many other realms of artistic, tainer, can be interpreted several ways. cultural, culinary, athletic, and scienti½c The Hollywood story of Jolson’s life illus- endeavor. Immigrants and their children trates the popular belief that America is a are not born with more ability than any- land of opportunity for talented and one else. However, an immigrant (out- hardworking immigrants: “Where else on sider) heritage may offer certain creative earth could this sort of thing happen?” advantages to the miniscule fraction of Another interpretation is the clash be - persons possessing extraordinary talents. tween immigrant generations–between These advantages include: a resilience the immigrant parents’ belief in the obli- and determination to succeed, a curiosity gation to maintain tradition and their and openness to innovation born of mar- Americanized children’s desire for broader ginality, and an attraction to high-risk ful½llment. Although initially disowned pursuits (because conventional careers by his father for leaving home and break- are less open to them). The relative opening with tradition, Asa/Al eventually rec- ness of American performing and cultural onciled with his family. arts to outsiders might be explained by a There is an even more important, and variety of factors. The arrival of a very surprising, element to the Al Jolson story. large pool of talented immigrants–some How did an outsider, ethnically and cul- fleeing persecution, others seeking new turally, become the cultural icon whose cultural horizons–was a necessary con- style set the standard for twentieth-cen- dition. Of equal importance was the tury popular musical performance? Jol- rapid growth of competitive entertain- son climbed to the top of the ladder of the ment, cultural, and scienti½c industries American entertainment industry by that fostered an emphasis on talent more rede½ning the role and image of a public so than pedigree. performer.2 He brought the expression- ism and style of jazz to popular audi- In his book on the history of classical ences, his singing connected with stage music in the United States, Joseph and ½lm audiences through his dramatic Horowitz describes the ecstatic reception emotional and physical performance, of the 1893 New York premiere of and he had stage runways built so that he Antonin Dvorak’s From the New World

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The Symphony (popularly known as the New was enthusiastically embraced by Ameri- Contri - World Symphony).4 Dvorak was already a can and international audiences. However, butions of Immigrants well-known Czech composer in 1892 during the ½rst half of the twentieth cen- to American when he was invited to spend a few years tury, jazz and related African American Culture in the United States to direct the National musical traditions were relegated to the Conservatory of Music and to compose margins of American musical perfor - “American” music. In the late nineteenth mance. Music, like all other aspects of century, as perhaps even today, American American society, was deeply segregated. classical music was rigidly Eurocentric. The popular tastes of the public and the Musical achievement, whether in com- professional judgments of composers, position or performance, was recognized performers, and critics dictated that only through imitation of the celebrated most symphony halls, concert stages, icons–mostly Europeans. During his dance halls, and theaters would never short three-year tenure in the United invite black performers or play music States, Dvorak searched for authentic that was created by African Americans. American voices and sounds. He found Jazz, the blues, and other musical expres- them in African American melodies and sions of black America were created and American Indian chants. In the New supported in segregated institutions, World Symphony and in other works com- most famously in night clubs in New posed in America, Dvorak added melodies Orleans, New York, and Chicago and in from black spirituals, including “Swing African American churches. Low, Sweet Chariot,” and American Indian During Jim Crow segregation, only a tom-tom beats inspired by reading Long - small minority of white Americans rec- fellow’s “Song of Hiawatha.” Dvorak’s ognized the originality of African Ameri- fusion of indigenous American music can musical traditions, especially the with classical performance met with pop- vitality and improvisation of jazz. Popu- ular acclaim, and the New World Symphony lar tastes began to shift in the 1930s as has become a recognized classic. Yet the some white band leaders, most notably musical establishment considered it to be Benny Goodman and Artie Shaw, began a heresy, and Dvorak was labeled a to draw inspiration from jazz and to inte- “negrophile” for believing that indige- grate their bands. Both Shaw and Good- nous musical traditions, particularly man were second-generation Jewish from the downtrodden, could be inte- Americans who blended traditional grated with classical music. In his study European musical traditions with the of Dvorak, Horowitz argues that the con- excitement of jazz.6 Perhaps, as the chil- troversy over the New World Symphony is dren of immigrants and minorities, Shaw part of a larger national discussion about and Goodman were less blinded by the American identity.5 racial prejudices of the times and were Two aspects of Dvorak’s contributions more willing to defy taboos to follow to American music are central to our dis- their musical instincts. In his autobiogra- cussion, and both originate from his phy, Shaw wrote that he was drawn to “outsider” perspective. The ½rst is his jazz clubs in Chicago and New York just recognition of African American music to listen and learn. as both culturally important and authen- The other aspect of an outsider per- tically American. After World War II, jazz spective, illustrated by Dvorak, is the was recognized as the major American blending of traditions in musical compo- contribution to the world of music, and it sition and performance. There are few

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genuine “inventions”–new discoveries works that de½ne excellence and tradi- Charles in cultural performance, science, and tions that are to be studied, imitated, and Hirschman other creative ½elds. More often, novelty performed. Knowledge, skill, and reputa- arises from innovation–the transmis- tion gravitate toward cultural continuity; sion of ideas, insights, and techniques rewards as well as popular and critical from one genre or specialization to acclaim are generally given to those who another. The blending of culinary tradi- can reproduce canonical works with tions has created a popular market for ½delity. Outsiders are less bound to con- “fusion cuisine.” In the performing arts, vention. Their mixed culture and unique successful innovation is a dif½cult bal- position tend to give them more possibil- ancing act. Audiences tend to prefer the ities for innovation. And because out- familiar: music, drama, dance, and art siders are already marginal, they have less that resonate with established tastes and status to lose by challenging convention. that are reassuring rather than challeng- Many immigrant composers and per- ing. But occasionally, innovations in formers were, of course, also guardians of artistic performance are so brilliant that established traditions. In his account of popular tastes do change. This appears to European “artists in exile,” Horowitz have been the case with the blending of describes how many immigrant com- European and jazz musical performance posers, conductors, directors, and per- in the 1930s. formers were able to continue their cre- Artie Shaw’s autobiography tells the ative work within the European canon origin story of his “Interlude in B Flat,” because the American cultural establish- the composition that launched his career ment was so Eurocentric.8 The Russian as a bandleader and composer.7 In 1936, revolution and, later, the rise of Nazi Ger- Shaw was a well-regarded clarinetist in many exiled many of the most creative popular dance bands, but he did not yet and talented European artists of the have a national reputation. He was asked twentieth century. Some artists fled for to perform a short interlude at a concert their lives, but many others simply left and was searching for something origi- because of their distaste for the oppres- nal. Drawing on his unique background sive regimes. Many, perhaps most, exiled performing Mozart and Brahms with artists embraced the freedoms and op- string quartets and also playing swing portunities of American society, but they (jazz) clarinet in dance bands, he assem- remained intellectually and creatively bled a small ensemble that blended clas- within the cultural worlds of their ori- sical strings with jazz. The performance gins. Rudolf Serkin, for example, became literally stopped the show–the reaction a celebrated American concert pianist was so overwhelming that Shaw and his and played a founding role in several ensemble had to repeat their perfor - American musical institutions, including mance before the audience would allow the famous Marlboro Festival near his them to leave the stage. Shaw’s national farm in Vermont. But as a concert pianist, reputation was made overnight. Serkin was self-consciously an upholder Although many “insiders” in the Amer - of tradition, the faithful reproduction of ican performing and cultural arts can and the German musical canon. do reach beyond established boundaries However, a number of exiled artists, to make innovative contributions, out- following the example of Dvorak, looked siders are much more likely to do so. to the United States as an opportunity to Every performing art develops its canon– create new cultural forms. Rouben Ma -

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The moulian was one such innovator, arriving ture accurately and sympathetically.12 He Contri - in the United States at age 26 to become spent time in South Carolina and in butions of Immigrants the director of an opera company and the Harlem to learn as much as possible to American Eastman Theatre in Rochester, New about the realities of life in African Culture York.9 Mamoulian was born into a cos- American communities. In spite of the mopolitan family and learned to speak prejudices of the era, Porgy was a critical Armenian, Russian, and Georgian as a success and established Mamoulian’s youth in Tbilisi (then Tiflis). For several reputation and career. years, his family lived in Paris, where he Mamoulian also pioneered the modern attended school and learned French and Broadway musical form with the 1943 other European languages. As a law stu- Broadway production of Oklahoma!13 In dent in Moscow, he acquired an ambition that show, Mamoulian created a fully to become a director through his par - integrated musical in which all elements ticipation in productions of the Moscow (music, lyrics, choreography, set, cos- Art Theatre.10 At age 24, he went to Lon- tumes) were organized into a dramatic don, where he began directing Russian- whole to advance the plot.14 His willing- language plays and soon was active in ness to challenge convention was ex- English theatrical productions. Two years pressed in a 1983 interview with The New later, he accepted the position to direct York Times that was later published in his operas, operettas, and plays at the East- obituary: man Theatre. He was drawn to the United “You must trust your instinct, intuition States in part by his fascination with and judgment. You must do something dif- American culture, cultivated by reading ferent.” He said he had lectured to ½lm stu- Mark Twain, Bret Harte, and O. Henry dents around the country. “Too many of and by hearing stories about Buffalo Bill them,” he said, “slavishly follow authority. and American cowboys.11 A few years after Some of the screen’s best moments were moving to New York, Mamoulian directed realized because a director went against all an all-black cast in the 1927 Broadway reason, all logic. No matter how incredible production of Porgy, a play adapted from a story seems, it can be made credible. If DuBose Heyward’s novel focused on the you feel an insane idea strongly enough, lives of African Americans in Charlestown, you’ve usually got something.”15 South Carolina. Mamoulian later directed the 1935 Gershwin opera Porgy and Bess, as The disproportionate role of immi- well as the original Broadway produc- grants and their children in creating tions of Oklahoma!, Carousel, and many twentieth-century popular music is well Hollywood ½lms. known. Irving Berlin, who was born as In addition to his extraordinary talents, Israel Baline in Russia, wrote “White Mamoulian’s accomplishments may have Christmas,” “Easter Parade,” “God Bless been partially due to his outsider role as America,” and numerous other standards. an immigrant. The New York Theatre Many of the most highly regarded com- Guild was intent on using black actors, posers and playwrights of Broadway were not white actors in blackface, in the 1927 the children of immigrants, including production of Porgy. Numerous estab- George and Ira Gershwin, Richard lished white directors declined to work Rodgers, Lorenz Hart, Jerome Kern, with a black cast. In contrast, Mamoulian Harold Arlen, and Leonard Bernstein.16 accepted the directorship and was deter- These composers and lyricists were mined to portray African American cul- largely second- and third-generation

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Jewish immigrants who were reared in choreography between 1947 and 1973.21 Charles ethnic enclaves; but their work has Kidd achieved fame for his choreography Hirschman de½ned the quintessential American on Broadway (Finian’s Rainbow, Guys and musical culture of the twentieth century. Dolls, Can Can, and many more) and in More than any other twentieth-century Hollywood musicals, including Seven composer, George Gershwin (Jacob Ger- Brides for Seven Brothers (1954).22 Robbins showitz), the child of Jewish immigrants, is perhaps best known for his choreogra- moved easily between the worlds of clas- phy of gang ½ghts in West Side Story; he sical, jazz, and popular music before his received ½ve Tony Awards and a host of death at age 38. “Gershwin signi½ed the other honors during his lifetime.23 best hope to challenge the ‘white’ Euro- centricity of American classical music,” In the early twentieth century, the devel- Horowitz writes. “Comet-like, he illumi- opment of the ½lm industry transformed nates the entire musical landscape.”17 the performing arts. Like many other Immigrants and their children have new sectors of the industrial economy, also been prominent in other realms of the process was decentralized and chaotic. artistic achievement, including ballet Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of new and modern dance. George Balanchine, entrepreneurs tried to produce and mar- born Georgi Balanchivadze in Russia, ket ½lms to the American public. In addi- founded the New York City Ballet in 1948 tion to mastering the technology of pro- and choreographed eighteen Broadway duction, would-be ½lm entrepreneurs had shows and several Hollywood ½lms.18 to challenge the monopolistic claims of Balanchine felt that the United States the Edison Trust (owned by Thomas Edi- offered a fresh canvas for experimenta- son), develop creative content, and dis- tion with ballet and dance: “I wanted to tribute the ½nal product to thousands of go to America; I thought it would be movie houses around the country. more interesting there, something would In this rough and tumble world, the happen, something different.”19 Inspired Hollywood movie industry emerged after by images of Ginger Rogers and Fred many years of trial and mostly error. It is Astaire in Hollywood ½lms, Balanchine somewhat surprising that the magnates, had a vision of a new American tradition who created the “most American” enter- of dance, and he has been credited with tainment industry and an enormously “Americanizing” ballet in the United pro½table sector, were ½rst-generation States in the mid-twentieth century.20 As Eastern European Jewish immigrants.24 with other immigrant artists, Balanchine They were not successful because of their was drawn to the United States because privileged social origins, connections to of the opportunities to create distinctly established elites, or familiarity with the new cultural forms that could challenge performing arts. Rather, they were highly prior traditions and convention. entrepreneurial risk-takers who claimed Several other notable Broadway chore- to know popular tastes from earlier expe- ographers were second-generation immi- riences in retailing and marketing fash- grants, including Michael Kidd (Michael ion to the American public. And they Greenwald), Jerome Robbins (Jerome possessed larger-than-life egos, which Wilson Rabinowitz), and Helen Tamiris allowed them to believe that they could (Helen Becker). These three choreogra- succeed where so many others had failed. phers, all children of Russian immigrants, In contrast to the management of the received one-third of all Tony Awards for major Hollywood studios, the majority of

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The the creative talent in the ½lm industry– States as a young man. He earned his Contri - producers, screenwriters, directors, and directing spurs by turning out a large butions of Immigrants actors–was native-born. Outsiders, it number of successful westerns in the to American was thought, might be at a disadvantage in 1920s, before focusing on more dramatic Culture creating plausible stories and characters movies marked by a perfectionist pursuit that would appeal to American audi- of craft and technique.28 Wyler’s movies ences. This tendency was probably rein- explore deep questions about American forced by attitudes of the movie moguls society and culture, such as the readjust- themselves, who were perhaps overly ment problems faced by veterans after sensitive to their immigrant roots, and World War II and how accusations of who wanted to avoid all signs of foreign- homosexuality could destroy careers and ness in Hollywood.25 Given this context, community. Wyler’s portrayal of charac- it is somewhat surprising that immi- ters allowed the audience to understand grants and the children of immigrants and to empathize with complex human were actually very successful in writing, motives. producing, directing, and acting in Billy Wilder was born in Austria in American ½lms and plays for most of the 1906. He began his career writing scripts ½rst half of the twentieth century.26 The for movies in Berlin before arriving in the majority of Hollywood ½lm directors United States in the early 1930s. He strug- who have won two or more Academy gled at the margins of Hollywood for a Awards were either immigrants or the number of years before his script-writing children of immigrants.27 Not only were and directing led to popular and critical immigrant directors highly overrepre- success. Wilder won two Academy Awards sented at the top of their profession, but for directing (The Lost Weekend in 1945 many created images of American society and The Apartment in 1960), but he also that resonated as classic Americana. wrote and directed a long series of very The ½lms of celebrated immigrant ½lm popular movies from the 1940s to the director Frank Capra helped reinforce 1970s, including Some Like it Hot (1959), beliefs in the American dream. Capra was Stalag 17 (1953), Sunset Boulevard (1950), born in Italy in 1897 and came to the United Double Indemnity (1944), Sabrina (1954), States as a child. He won three Academy and The Fortune Cookie (1966). The char- Awards for directing in the 1930s (It Hap- acters in Wilder’s movies were rarely pened One Night in 1934, Mr. Deeds Goes to heroic; they struggled with real problems Town in 1936, and You Can’t Take It with You complicated by their all-too-human in 1938), but he is best remembered for weaknesses. The sophisticated dialogue in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) and Wilder’s movies–marked by “sardonic It’s a Wonderful Life (1947). Capra’s movies humor” and “droll, biting wit”–gave little often reflect the decency of the common sign that the author learned English as a man and the triumph of good over greed mature adult.29 and evil. A de½ning theme in his work is There is no consistent theme or style in the goodness of the average American the Hollywood movies created by immi- and small-town values. grant writers and directors. Some images William Wyler, who also received three were very reassuring of the goodness of Academy Awards for directing (Mrs. Min- American values (for example, Capra), iver in 1942, The Best Years of Our Lives in while others offered a more cynical view 1946, and Ben Hur in 1959), was born in of human nature (for example, Wilder). Germany and immigrated to the United Immigrant directors were entrusted to

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expose anti-Semitism among the upper- texts where their mother tongue, religion, Charles middle class (Elia Kazan in Gentleman’s and cultural expectations are not the norm. Hirschman Agreement in 1947) and the absurdity of The new experiences–cultural shock, mental hospitals (Milos Forman in One feelings of loss, and uncertainty–are Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest in 1975). The generally uncomfortable, at least until the overrepresentation of immigrants in new culture becomes familiar. Many im - Hollywood is partially due to the push migrants, particularly those who arrive factors in Europe that led to mass immi- as adults, never really feel at home in the gration in general, and to the exile of place of settlement. However, marginality artists in particular. These same forces can also stimulate creativity. Bilingual led to overrepresentation of immigrants persons have more than multiple words in other performing arts, including music for the same object–they often have and dance. multiple interpretations and multiple In some performing arts–for example, subjectivities about emotions, responses, symphonic music, ballet, and Shake- and relationships. Similarly, persons who spearian theater–it is possible to reach have been socialized in two or more cul- the top by reproduction of the classical tures have broader imaginations about canon. The Hollywood ½lm industry, the range of human responses to love, along with modern dance, Broadway death, family, and other aspects of life. musicals, and popular music, is different; Marginality, combined with extraordi- the genre ½rst had to be created and then nary talent and strong artistic sensitivity, marketed to a mass American audience. leads to greater openness to innovation. Here, innovation was central to success. The American ½lm industry was at the Talent is a necessary condition for suc- extreme end of the continuum of innova- cess in the arts, business, and most other tive performing arts. It was a new enter- professions, but it is not always suf - tainment industry that experienced rapid ½cient. Being born into a family that pro- growth in the early decades of the twenti- vides high-quality education, as well as eth century. New industries are, by encouragement and social connections, de½nition, high risk–even more so in the certainly helps. Being in the right place at creation of a new art form. Trial and error the right time–good luck–may be most was the only path to success, and many important. In addition to talent, support, artists were competing to create ½lms that connections, and good luck, some per- would resonate with American audiences. sonality traits, such as perseverance, can In spite of their outsider status, immi- also make a difference. Success rarely grants may have bene½ted from their comes easily, and most people who reach marginality. A biographer of William the top can recount years of rejection and Wyler (who received a record twelve adversity before their talents and contri- Academy Award nominations for ½lm butions were recognized. For every per- directing), observed that Wyler was fas- son who is eventually recognized as a cinated with America and things Ameri- great artist, scientist, or athlete, there are can, and as a foreigner he saw things from probably many more comparably talented the point of view of an interested and individuals who decided the low odds of sympathetic outsider.30 Marginality is success were simply not worth the sac- often considered to be a disadvantage. ri½ces along the way. Migration, upward mobility, and inter- Although the traits of persistence and marriage can bring people into new con- determination to succeed are found in

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The every community and social group, im - were born in countries of the former Contri - migrant families appear to be more suc- Soviet Union.37 butions of Immigrants cessful than others in passing along high In addition to extraordinary talent, to American motivation to their children. Immi- success in national competitions for Culture grants, and long-distance internal mi- chess and spelling bees requires almost grants, are invariably selective relative to superhuman investments of time and non-migrants.31 They expect that the study. For the immigrant families of economic, social, and psychological costs spelling bee champions, this means that of leaving family and friends behind will almost all of family life is organized be compensated by a better future. In around coaching their precocious chil- many cases, the future is not measured by dren. Assuming potential talent is dis- their careers alone, but also by the lives of tributed roughly equally among all their children. The children of immi- groups, the higher representation of grants are socialized with a deep aware- immigrants and the children of immi- ness of the sacri½ces made by their fami- grants in these competitions is almost lies to give them a good start in the new certainly due to a greater willingness of society. Immigrant parents push, cajole, immigrant families to invest the time encourage, and shame their children to (and money) in training their children. study more, practice longer, and try harder The difference between immigrant than others. This appears to lead to higher families and other families is also reflected levels of academic achievement, but in more mundane dimensions. Because these parenting pressures may also lead of the strong push for success by their to higher levels of depression and lower immigrant parents, the second genera- self-esteem.32 tion is less likely to be “at risk” in Ameri- Immigrant children are highly overrep- can schools, especially if socioeconomic resented in a variety of academic, mathe- origins are held constant. Indeed, some matical, scienti½c, and musical competi- recent research reports a “second generations.33 One notable recent achievement tion advantage,” typi½ed by higher grades, is the success ½rst- and second-genera- better conformity to school rules, lower tion Indian immigrant children have had high school drop-out rates, and greater in the National Spelling Bee.34 In a New likelihood of attending college.38 Of York Times story about the craze among course, not all immigrant children are Indian immigrant families for their chil- doing well; there are immigrant youth dren’s success in spelling bees, Joseph gangs, immigrant children who have Berger notes that “immigrant strivers adopted anti-social attitudes, and many have always done astonishingly well in others who struggle with language, alien- national academic contests, not to men- ation, and fear of deportation.39 On aver- tion in school in general.”35 age, however, immigrant youth are doing In 2011, 70 percent of the forty ½nalists much better than expected.40 in the Intel Science Talent Search (known Another sign of immigrant striving is originally as the Westinghouse Awards) the recent increase in foreign-born play- were immigrants or the children of ers in the national pastime of baseball, immigrants.36 Immigrants have also including in the major leagues.41 In the dominated the ranks of top chess players late nineteenth century, foreign-born in the United States in recent years. The players composed about 10 to 15 percent majority of the most highly-ranked play- of the rookie class–about the proportion ers in the United States Chess Federation of foreign-born in the general popula-

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tion. This ½gure dropped in the middle development that enhance the quality of Charles decades of the twentieth century as life in the United States. American eco- Hirschman immigration declined. The ½gure rose in nomic development has been fostered by the 1960s and stabilized in the low teens government investment in scienti½c and until the 1990s, when the ½gure rose technological innovation, but also by the sharply to about 25 to 30 percent.42 For- migration of scientists from other coun- eign-born baseball players, on average, tries as well the high levels of participa- are more likely to play in All-Star games tion of immigrants and the children of than native-born players.43 Foreign-born immigrants in science and engineering. basketball players have also become Albert Einstein, perhaps the preemi- more visible in American professional nent American scientist of the twentieth basketball.44 To be sure, the participa- century, was a refugee from Nazi Ger- tion of foreign-born athletes in American many. There are many other examples of professional sports is as much a story of distinguished scientists, researchers, aca- globalization as immigration. Many pro- demics, and entrepreneurs who arrived fessional athletes are not immigrants in in the United States as students or pur- the classic sense. They are often recruited sued their talents in American universi- by American teams, and only live in the ties and/or industry, including Enrico United States for the duration of the pro- Fermi, Edward Teller, and Hans Bethe fessional sports season. Nonetheless, (the fathers of the atomic age), Elias Zer- there is a parallel between the growing houni (former director of the National presence of international athletes in Institutes of Health), and Andrew Grove, American sports and the image of the Jerry Yang, and Sergey Brin (the engi- striving outsider who struggles to reach neering entrepreneurs who led the Amer- the top. ican transition to the digital age). From The overlap between immigrant striv- 1990 to 2004, over one-third of U.S. sci- ing and international recruitment is also entists who received Nobel Prizes were evident in many competitive American foreign born.45 institutions, such as multinational ½rms, The impact of immigration on the symphony orchestras, and universities. development of science in the United Market forces drive competition for tal- States is more than the story of a relatively ent. Audiences want to watch the best open door for immigrants who are excep- performances, and many organizations, tionally talented scientists and engineers. both for-pro½t and nonpro½t, are locked Over the last four decades, American uni- in intense competition for customers, versities have played an important role in research grants, and prestige. In less training immigrants and the children of competitive environments, native-born immigrants to become scientists. Foreign administrators and managers would students have become increasingly cen- probably prefer to hire people like them- tral to American higher education, par- selves–those with whom they share the ticularly in graduate education in engi- same language, culture, and background. neering and the sciences. After graduat- However, the desire for success generally ing with advanced degrees from Ameri- trumps parochialism. can universities, many foreign students return to their home countries, though a Scienti½c progress is the major source of signi½cant share is attracted to employ- modern economic growth, increasing ment opportunities in American univer- longevity and other features of modern sities, laboratories, and industries. Many

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The of the foreign students who have become secondary. In 2006, American citizens Contri - permanent residents or U.S. citizens go received only 41 percent of all doctoral butions of Immigrants on to make important contributions to degrees in mathematics and 40 percent in to American the development of American science physics. The share of American citizens Culture and engineering. earning Ph.D.s in engineering from In a recent overview of American- American universities declined from 45 trained doctorates working in the sci- percent in 1997 to 30 percent in 2006. ences and engineering sectors in the Only 22 percent of the doctorates in elec- United States (based on National Science trical engineering in 2006 went to Amer- Foundation surveys of doctorate recipi- ican citizens. ents), Paula E. Stephan and Sharon G. The opportunity to pursue graduate Levin found that the share of non-citi- training at prestigious American univer- zens had increased from 8.5 percent in sities, historically considered to be the 1973 to almost 21 percent in 1997 (based best in the world, is a very attractive on citizenship reported at the time of option for students in developing coun- degree).46 These ½gures underestimate tries. International students, including the foreign-born contribution to Ameri- the native-born children of immigrants, can science because foreign students who are generally very competitive in terms of naturalized before receiving their degrees their mathematical and scienti½c qual - were not counted, nor were foreign- i½cations, as measured by gre scores and trained scientists working in American similar tests. International students are universities, labs, and industry. A more also highly motivated and many do very inclusive measure of the birthplace of well in the extremely competitive gradu- workers in scienti½c and engineering ate programs at top American universi- occupations, based on Current Popula- ties. As economists John Bound, Sarah tion Survey data, shows that the foreign- Turner, and Patrick Walsh report, “We born percent of working scientists and suspect that the resources of U.S. re- engineers increased from 14 percent in search universities are a lure for the best 1994 to 24 percent in 2006.47 and brightest across the world.”49 The role of foreign students in gradu- Foreign students, many of whom be - ate-level science programs is even more come American citizens, have clearly striking. According to surveys conducted helped sustain excellence in American by the National Science Foundation, universities and in scienti½c research. almost 46,000 doctoral degrees were Several studies have concluded that for- earned in the United States in 2006–only eign-born scientists and engineers have a slight increase from 43,000 in 1997.48 made exceptional contributions to scien- The share of doctoral degrees earned by ti½c progress, as measured by the number American citizens during the decade of patents awarded to U.S. universities, declined from 66 percent to 59 percent. research centers, and ½rms.50 Foreign- The presence of American citizens remains born scientists are overrepresented among dominant in the ½elds of education, the members of elected honorary societies humanities, and in psychology, where such as the National Academy of Engi- citizens represent 81 percent, 74 percent, neering and National Academy of Sci- and 83 percent of all doctorates, respec- ences, and among the authors of highly tively, with only modest declines over the cited academic papers.51 During the last decade. However, in many scienti½c decades of the twentieth century, immi- ½elds, the role of American citizens is grant entrepreneurs formed a signi½cant

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contingent of all founders of U.S. high- ized chopped beef, formed into a cake Charles technology start-ups.52 A recent study and fried. Hamburgers, hot dogs, and Hirschman estimates that one in four technology other traditional American foods were ½rms started in the United States between popularized in the early twentieth century 1995 and 2005 was founded by foreign- in “diners,” a distinctive restaurant style born entrepreneurs.53 resembling railroad cars. Diners were commonly run by Greeks and other im- More than any other aspect of culture, migrants who found a niche serving low- contemporary American cuisine com- cost food to the American masses.56 bines traditions from almost every population on the planet. Historian Donna All other things being equal, most soci- Gabaccia argues that traditional Ameri- eties, communities, organizations, and can cuisine is a Creole mix that reflects cultures tend to resist change, especially influences from the three major founding from outside sources. The truism that populations of indigenous American “people prefer that which is familiar” is Indians, Europeans, and Africans.54 Over reinforced by persons with authority, the last century, immigrants from Ger- power, and status, who generally shape many, Italy, Greece, Lebanon, China, cultural expectations to revere conformity Japan, and India have all left distinctive more than innovation. This pattern, an culinary marks on what Americans eat in “ideal type” to be sure, is especially com- restaurants and in their homes. Ethnic mon in traditional rural areas, among foods have become American foods, and multigenerational families, and in reli- even American fast foods. gious and cultural organizations. For many, the last refuge of American There are, of course, many exceptions to cooking, with no pretensions of foreign this pattern, especially during eras of rapid influences, is traditional hamburgers and technological and social change, wartime, hot dogs, preferably cooked outside on a and other times of catastrophe. The sim- charcoal grill. This belief in authentic ple proposition of cultural continuity American food has likely inspired the helps explain the generally conservative menus at presidential events, such as nature of intergenerational socialization when President Nicolas Sarkozy of and the ubiquity of ethnocentrism– France visited President George W. Bush beliefs that value insiders and traditional and his family at Kennebunkport in culture more than outsiders. All other August 2007 and when the King and things being equal, immigrants would Queen of England visited President and generally be isolated and stigmatized Mrs. Roosevelt at the White House in because their behaviors and beliefs are 1939.55 Alas, the classical American hot different and therefore challenge existing dog is probably the product of nine- social arrangements and familiar cultural teenth-century German immigration. patterns. “Wiener” and “frankfurter,” synonyms But all other things have not been equal for hot dogs, reflect the geographical ori- throughout American history. The United gins of German sausage-makers: Vienna States has received about 75 million (Wien in German) and Frankfurt. Simi- immigrants since record-keeping began in larly, hamburger is the name for a native 1820. This open door was due to a conflu- of the German city of Hamburg, which ence of interests, both external and inter- must have been the place of origin of the nal. As modernization spread throughout German sausage-makers who popular- the Old World during the eighteenth and

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The nineteenth centuries, the (relatively) ities limited their membership, and many Contri - open frontier beckoned the landless and social clubs and societies only allowed butions of Immigrants those seeking economic betterment. those with the right pedigrees and con- to American These patterns culminated in the early nections to be admitted.59 Barriers to Culture twentieth century, when more than one employment for minorities, especially million immigrants arrived annually–a Jews, were part of the culture of corpo- level that is only being rivaled by contem- rate law ½rms and elite professions.60 In porary immigration rates. American eco- the early twentieth century, many elite nomic and political institutions also private universities were notorious for gained from immigration. Immigrant their quotas for Jewish students and their settlement helped secure the frontier as refusal to hire Jews and other minor - well as provide labor for nation-building ities.61 In some cases, these quotas per- projects, including transportation net- sisted until the 1960s. works of roads, canals, and railroads. Given this history, how were immi- During the era of industrialization, im - grants and their children able to make migrant labor provided a disproportionate such impressive achievements in Ameri- share of workers for the dirty and danger- can science, arts, and culture? Part of the ous jobs in mining and manufacturing.57 solution to this puzzle is that immigrants, Despite its history as an immigrant and especially their children, were pulled society, the United States has rarely into self-employment and new sectors of shown new arrivals a welcome reception. the economy where there was less dis- The conservative backlash against immi- crimination. As noted above, prestigious grants has been a perennial theme in organizations that celebrated tradition American history. During the age of mass tended to be closed to outsiders. Yet the migration, the negative reaction against early twentieth century was an era of immigrants was not simply a response rapid demographic, economic, and tech- from the parochial masses, but also a nological change. This may have created project led by conservative intellectuals. more flexibility and openness. Long before immigration restrictions The market for culture was greatly were implemented in the 1920s, there expanded as cities and urban populations was a particularly virulent campaign grew and disposable income increased. A against the “new” immigrants from East- signi½cant share of the urban population, ern and Southern Europe. Most of these the potential consumers of art and cul- immigrants practiced Catholicism and ture, was of immigrant stock. Perhaps Judaism–religious and cultural tradi- most important, technological change tions that threatened the traditional and entrepreneurial innovation created ascendancy of white Protestants of En - the motion picture industry. In the 1920s, glish ancestry. immigrant risk-takers, and Eastern Euro- As most Northeastern and Midwestern pean Jewish immigrants in particular, cities became dominated by immigrants transformed the fledgling motion picture (both ½rst and second generations) in the industry into the empires that eventually late nineteenth century, many elite old- became the mega-studios in Hollywood. stock American families and communi- Although the new Hollywood moguls ties created barriers to protect their “aris- sought to create movies that appealed to tocratic” status and privilege against mass audiences and ignored any hint of newcomers.58 Residential areas became ethnicity or religion, their presence may “restricted,” college fraternities and soror- have minimized traditional prejudices

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and discrimination in hiring. Comment- for example, there was little emphasis on Charles ing on vaudeville, not cinema, literary earning high grades–a “Gentleman’s C” Hirschman and social critic Irving Howe character- was considered an appropriate goal for a ized the openness of the performing arts well-rounded student.65 Competition (and sports) to talented outsiders: and clear measures of merit do not always lead institutions to search for the best tal- The [entertainment industry] brushed ent through meritocratic processes of aside claims of rank and looked only for admission and hiring. the immediate promise of talent. Just as In spite of these tendencies, many Amer- blacks would later turn to baseball and bas- ican institutions became more open and ketball knowing that here at least their skin meritocratic over the twentieth century. color counted for less than their skills, so in Baseball and other professional sports the early 1900s, young Jews broke into were integrated before most other insti- vaudeville because here too, people asked tutions, including public schooling (both not, who are you? but, what can you do?62 de jure and de facto). American profes- This openness is reinforced in ½elds sional sports have become more global, and professions where talent and accom- with growing participation of talented plishment are clearly visible and easily international players. This trend is driven, recognized. The most obvious example is in large part, by competition. Sports fans sports, where athletic ability is directly want winning teams, and large audiences measured in batting averages, passes increase revenues. The owners and man- completed, and free throw percentages. agement of sports teams respond to mar- The links between athletic ability, games ket pressures by recruiting talented players won, and fan attendance are suf½ciently from other countries. Similar processes high to ensure that meritocracy (of ability are at work in universities and scienti½c and performance) is the primary princi- organizations. More talented researchers ple of hiring in professional sports. This generate more grants, more patents, and generalization might be challenged by more commercial applications of scien- the fact that Major League Baseball did ti½c discoveries. The global search for tal- not allow participation by African Amer- ented graduate students and researchers ican players until 1947.63 This critique has by elite American universities and research also been applied to capitalist markets, organizations is driven by competitive where competition has not necessarily pressures that have accelerated in recent reduced racial and ethnic discrimination decades. Other ½elds where merit is rela- in hiring and promotion. Sociologist tively easy to measure, such as in classical Herbert Blumer noted that if customers music performance, have also become and employees were prejudiced, ½rms part of a global employment market. that hired more quali½ed minorities over There is similar competition for talented less quali½ed majority whites would not employees in many American corpora- necessarily gain an economic advantage.64 tions and businesses, but the degree of If all ½rms are less ef½cient because of openness depends on the pace of techno- non-meritocratic hiring, there is little logical change, market competition, and economic penalty for discrimination. the ability to measure merit. Some tradi- This was the situation in professional tional sectors, such as old mainline baseball prior to 1947, and perhaps in industries, may focus more on continuity, many other ½rms and professions. At advertising, and ef½ciency than techno- most elite colleges prior to World War II, logical innovation. Other sectors, such as

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The the electronic and computing industry, leges and universities still retain legacies Contri - are at the forefront of technological inno- of non-merit-based admission systems, butions of Immigrants vation and international competition (for including programs to privilege the chil- to American example, Silicon Valley). They are more dren of alumni, and there is also evidence Culture likely to be meritocratic and willing to that Asian American students have not hire outsiders–immigrants and foreign been admitted in numbers proportional students who have the necessary skills. to their test scores; these current prac- The same processes of innovation and tices, however, are only a shadow of competition have shaped the evolution of those of earlier times.67 Universities are Hollywood, Broadway, and many other not completely meritocratic, but they American performing and cultural arts. have become more meritocratic with Audience preferences may have tended increasing competition and acceptance toward familiar cultural content, but of talented “outsiders.” there was undoubtedly strong market Greater openness to hiring and promo- pressure for “quality,” however de½ned. tion on the basis of merit has become an There was also considerable room for integral part of many American institu- innovation in artistic and cultural per- tions. The reputation of the United States formance in a pluralistic society with rel- as a land of opportunity for those with atively few cultural touchstones. Immi- ambition and ability–a theme in many grants and their children played important Hollywood movies–made the country a roles in the development of culture and art beacon for prospective immigrants. In in twentieth-century America, just as they addition to raising the international have in science and academic institutions. stature of the United States, the partici- The presence of immigrants and their pation of talented immigrants and their offspring has helped “push” American children has almost certainly made institutions in the direction of increasing American scienti½c and cultural institu- openness and meritocracy. This has not tions more successful than they would always been a smooth or conflict-free have been in their absence. process. When Jewish students appeared in large numbers in leading American For many Americans, there is a deep universities in the early twentieth century, fear that immigrants will change Ameri- they were deemed “rate-busters” who up- can character and identity, presumably set the traditional college student culture, for the worse. These fears are often which emphasized leisure-time pursuits inchoate, perhaps because the de½nition more than study and serious scholarly of American identity is elusive. Unlike inquiry. The implementation of quotas to many other societies, the United States lower the numbers of Jewish students at does not have an identity tied to an Ivy League colleges soon followed. ancient lineage. Given the two wars The growing number of talented Jew- against the British in early American his- ish students, mostly second-generation tory (in 1776 and 1812), the founders of immigrants, certainly raised the academ- the American republic did not make En - ic standards at those universities that did glish origins the de½ning trait of Ameri- not discriminate. As universities began to can identity. Being American was de½ned compete for faculty and graduate stu- as acceptance of the Enlightenment ideas dents during the post–World War II era, expressed in the founding documents of the quota restrictions on student and fac- the Declaration of Independence, the ulty eventually disappeared.66 Elite col- Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.68

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Even though these ideals have been Although immigration has been a de - Charles belied by the continuing stain of slavery, ½ning feature of American history, the Hirschman civic identity, rather than ancestry, has impact of immigration on American cul- been the distinctive feature of American ture is rarely addressed in the literature.71 “peoplehood” from the very start. This The neglect might be partially due to the trait combined with jus soli (birthright dominance of assimilation theory, which citizenship) has slowed, if not stopped, emphasizes the changes in the culture of efforts to de½ne Americans solely on the immigrants, not the changes in American basis of ancestral origins.69 Another rea- institutions and culture in response to son for the broad de½nition of American immigration. Knowledge of the contri- identity is that the overwhelming major- butions of immigrants to American cul- ity of the American population, includ- ture might help recapture the original ing white Americans, is descended from de½nition of American identity as rooted nineteenth- and twentieth-century im- in the civic ideals of the Revolutionary era. migrants. Demographic estimates suggest The impact of immigration on Ameri- that less than one-third of the American can society and culture is a product of population in the late twentieth century several forces, including the sheer size of was descended from the eighteenth-cen- the demographic influx extending over tury American population.70 such a long period of time. The other key Yet there have been recurrent struggles factor is immigrant selectivity, particu- to rede½ne American identity in terms of larly on characteristics that are dif½cult ancestry. The ½rst naturalization law to measure in censuses and surveys, such passed by Congress, in 1790, limited citi- as motivation for success.72 Almost by zenship to whites. The broadening of de½nition, immigrants are risk-takers. American citizenship to include African All migrants, domestic as well as interna- Americans, American Indians, and Asian tional, give up the comforts of home and immigrants has been tumultuous. The familiarity to seek new opportunities. short-lived but remarkably successful But international migrants are a special “Know-Nothing” political movement breed. Most have traveled long distances, called itself the American Party to high- faced bureaucratic barriers, and have light the ancestral origins of its adherents. sometimes even risked life and limb to In the late nineteenth century, as new im - reach their destinations. These charac- migrants from Southern and Eastern teristics mean that they will not be easily Europe were pouring in, some old-stock deterred from their goals. Of course, Americans founded organizations such some migrants do return home. The ones as the Sons of the American Revolution that remain are generally those who have and Daughters of the American Revolu- found a niche that allows them to live, tion to celebrate their ancestral pedigrees work, and contribute to American society. and to distance themselves from recent Perhaps the most important contribu- immigrants. The national-origin quotas of tion that immigrants make to American the 1920s were a clear victory for those who society is their children. Many immi- feared dilution of the white English Protes- grants have made enormous sacri½ces for tant composition of the American popula- their children’s welfare, including the tion. Much of the current anti-immigrant decision to settle in the United States. movement also appears to be based on a Immigrant parents often have to work in de½nition of “Americanness” expressed menial jobs, multiple jobs, and in occu- through ancestry, language, and culture. pations well below the status they would

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The have earned if they had remained at allow for cultural innovation. For exam- Contri - home. These sacri½ces have meaning ple, music that linked African American butions of Immigrants because immigrant parents believe that traditions, including jazz, with classical to American their children will have better educational European traditions has been a speci½c Culture and occupational opportunities in the innovation of outsiders, from Dvorak’s United States than in their homelands. New World Symphony to Gershwin’s Porgy Immigrant parents push their children to and Bess, as well as the integrated big excel by reminding them of their own bands of Artie Shaw and Benny Goodman. sacri½ces. These high expectations for Compared with other societies, the the children of immigrants have a strong United States is generally regarded as impact on academic and worldly suc- unusually competitive, placing a high cess.73 A large body of research shows premium on progress and innovation. that the children of immigrants do This dynamic characteristic may well remarkably well in American schools. arise from the presence of immigrants Holding constant their socioeconomic and their linked evolution with American status, the second generation obtains institutions and identity. The size and higher grades in school and above-aver- selectivity of the immigrant community age results on standardized tests, is less means that immigrants (and/or their likely to drop out of high school, and is children) are competing for entry into more likely to go to college than the chil- colleges, jobs, and access to prestigious dren of native-born Americans.74 positions and institutions. Not all institu- Immigrants and their children are tions have been open to outsiders. In par- overrepresented in a broad range of rare ticular, high-status organizations often achievements, including as Nobel Prize give preference to persons with the right winners, leading scientists, and top per- connections and social pedigree. But forming and creative artists. They have institutions that opened their doors to broadened our cultural outlook and have talented outsiders–namely, immigrants sometimes even de½ned American cul- and their children–eventually gained a ture through literature, music, and art. competitive advantage. Over time, greater Immigrants are, by de½nition, bicultural, openness and meritocratic processes and sometimes multicultural. They can have helped shape the evolution of Amer- navigate multiple languages and under- ican institutions in the arts, sports, sci- stand how people from different back- ence, and some sectors of business. In grounds think and respond. Some sociol- turn, the participation of outsiders has ogists label this phenomenon marginality. reinforced a distinctive American charac- The classic marginal man was supposed ter and culture that values not “who are to be subject to psychological distress, you?” rather, “what can you do?” never knowing if he really ½t in or be - Because immigrants have to work to longed to any society or culture. The flip learn the system, they are intensely curi- side of marginality, however, is creativity. ous about American culture. For the most Persons with multicultural backgrounds talented, this tendency leads to a rich and have multiple frames of reference; they expansive creativity that has left its can see more choices, possibilities, inter- imprint on American music, theater, pretations, and nuance than persons who dance, ½lm, and many other realms of are familiar with only one culture. When artistic endeavor. Finally, American insti- combined with great talent and determi- tutions–schools, universities, businesses, nation, a multicultural perspective may sports teams, and even symphony or-

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chestras–are meritocratic and seek tal- acteristic has been created partly through Charles ent wherever they can ½nd it. The United the presence of immigrants, who push Hirschman States is a competitive society that values the country toward valuing skills and progress and success. This dynamic char- ability over social pedigree.

endnotes Author’s Note: I thank Elizabeth Ackert and Tony Perez for their assistance and comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research has been supported by a grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (hd47289). 1 William Ruhlmann, “Al Jolson Biography,” AllMusic, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/al-jol son-mn0000609215 (accessed July 22, 2012). 2 Larry Stemple, Showtime: A History of the Broadway Musical Theater (New York: W.W. Nor- ton, 2010), 152–153. 3 “Al Jolson: Legacy and Influence,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Jolson (acces - sed July 26, 2012). 4 Joseph Horowitz, Classical Music in America: A History of Its Rise and Fall (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 5–10, 222–231. 5 Joseph Horowitz, Artists in Exile: How Refugees from Twentieth-Century War and Revolution Transformed the American Performing Arts (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 3. 6 Ross Firestone, Swing, Swing, Swing: The Life and Times of Benny Goodman (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); and Artie Shaw, The Trouble with Cinderella: An Outline of Identity (Santa Bar- bara, Calif.: Fithian Press, 1992). 7 Shaw, The Trouble with Cinderella, 293–303. 8 Horowitz, Artists in Exile. 9 Mark Spergel, Reinventing Reality: The Art and Life of Rouben Mamoulian (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1993); and Horowitz, Artists in Exile, 342–365. 10 “In or Of the Broadway Scene: Introducing the Young Russo-Armenian Who Staged an American Negro Play, and a Dancer from Philadelphia,” The New York Times, October 30, 1927. 11 Margaret Case Harriman, “Mr. Mamoulian, of Tiflis and ‘Oklahoma!’” The New York Times, July 25, 1943; and Spergel, Reinventing Reality. 12 Spergel, Reinventing Reality. 13 Stemple, Showtime, 300–312. 14 Robert B. Flint, “Rouben Mamoulian, Broadway Director is Dead,” The New York Times, December 6, 1987. 15 Ibid. 16 Richard Rodgers was the grandson of immigrants. See Andrea Most, Making Americans: Jews and the Broadway Musical (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). 17 Horowitz, Classical Music in America, 470. 18 Horowitz, Artists in Exile, 23–45. 19 Ibid., 30. 20 Ibid.; and Bernard Taper, Balanchine: A Biography (New York: New York Times Book Co., 1984). 21 See the Tony Awards website, http://www.tonyawards.com/p/tonys_search.

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The 22 Patricia Eliot Tobias, “Michael Kidd, Choreographer, Dies,” The New York Times, December Contri - 24, 2007. butions of Immigrants 23 Anna Kisselgoff, “Jerome Robbins, 79, Is Dead: Giant of Ballet and Broadway,” The New York to American Times, July 30, 1998; and http://www.tonyawards.com/p/tonys_search. Culture 24 Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own: How Jews Invented Hollywood (New York: Anchor Books, 1988). 25 Ibid. 26 Paul Buhle, From the Lower East Side to Hollywood (London: Verso, 2004); Horowitz, Artists in Exile, chap. 4; Gene D. Philips, Exiles in Hollywood: Major European Film Directors in America (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 1998); and Mark Winokur, American Laughter: Immigrants, Ethnicity, and 1930s Hollywood Film (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996). 27 Charles Hirschman, “Immigration and the American Century,” Demography 42 (2005), Table 4. 28 Philips, Exiles in Hollywood, chap. 3. 29 Ibid., chap. 6. 30 Ibid., 87. 31 Cynthia Feliciano, “Does Selective Migration Matter? Explaining Ethnic Disparities in Edu- cational Attainment Among Immigrant Children,” International Migration Review 39 (2005): 841–871; and Cynthia Feliciano, “How Do Immigrants Compare to those Left Behind?” Demography 42 (2005): 131–152. 32 Grace Kao, “Psychological Well-Being and Educational Achievement Among Immigrant Youth,” in Children of Immigrants: Health, Adjustment, and Public Assistance, ed. Donald Her- nandez (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1999), 410–477; and Carl L. Bankston and Min Zhou, “Being Well vs. Doing Well: Self Esteem and School Performance Among Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Race and Ethnic Groups,” International Migration Review 36 (2002): 389–415. 33 Titu Andreescu, Joseph A. Gallian, Jonathan M. Kane, and Janet E. Mertz, “Cross-Cultural Analysis of Students with Exceptional Talent in Mathematical Problem Solving,” Notes of the American Mathematical Society 55 (10) (2008): 1248–1260; and Sean Cavanagh, “Immi- grants’ Children Inhabit the Top Ranks of Math, Science Meets,” Education Week 23 (43) (2004): 14. 34 National Spelling Bee, “Champions and Their Winning Words,” http://www.spellingbee .com/champions-and-their-winning-words#00s. 35 Joseph Berger, “Striving in America and in the Spelling Bee,” The New York Times, June 5, 2005. 36 Stuart Anderson, The Impact of the Children of Immigrants on Scienti½c Achievement in America (Arlington, Va.: National Foundation for American Policy, 2011). 37 U.S. Chess Federation, “Top Player Bios,” http://main.uschess.org/content/view/169/203/ (accessed June 21, 2012). 38 Stephanie Ewert, “Student Misbehavior During Senior Year,” Social Science Research 38 (2009): 826–839; Lingxin Hao and Melissa Bonstead-Bruns, “Parent-Child Differences in Educational Expectations and the Academic Achievement of Immigrant and Native Stu- dents,” Sociology of Education 71 (1998): 175–198; Charles Hirschman, “The Educational Enrollment of Immigrant Youth: A Test of the Segmented-Hypothesis,” Demography 38 (2001): 317–336; Grace Kao and Marta Tienda, “Optimism and Achievement: The Educa- tional Performance of Immigrant Youth,” Social Science Quarterly 76 (1995): 1–19; Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008); and Krista Perreira, Kathleen Mullan Harris, and Dohoon Lee, “Making it in America: High School Completion by Immigrant and Native Youth,” Demography 43 (3) (2006): 511–536.

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39 Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation Charles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Robert Courtney Smith, Mexican New Hirschman k York: Transnational Lives of New Immigrants (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 40Michael White and Jennifer E. Glick, Achieving Anew: How New Immigrants Do in American Schools, Jobs, and Neighborhoods (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009). 41 Stuart Anderson and L. Brian Andrew, Coming to America: Immigrants, Baseball, and the Con- tributions of Foreign Born Players to America’s Pastime (Arlington, Va.: National Foundation for American Policy, 2006). 42 Sean Lahman, The Baseball Archive, http://baseball1.com/ (accessed September 8, 2008). 43 Anderson and Andrew, Coming to America. 44 National Basketball Association, “Fifteen Playoff Teams Feature One or More International Players,” http://www.nba.com/global/international_players_playoffs_2007.html, April 19, 2007. 45 William A. Wulf, “Foreign-Born Researchers Are Key to U.S. Prosperity and Security,” The National Academies in Focus 6 (Winter/Spring 2006); and James P. Smith and Barry Edmon- ston, eds., The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Wash- ington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1997), 384–385. 46 National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, “Survey of Earned Doctorates, Doctorates Awarded 1997–2006,” Table 3, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf09311 /content.cfm?pub_id=3861&id=2; and Paula E. Stephan and Sharon G. Levin, “Foreign Scholars in the U.S.: Contributions and Costs,” in Science and the University, ed. Paula E. Stephan and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 154. 47 Mariano Sana, “Immigrants and Natives in U.S. Science and Engineering Occupations, 1994–2006,” Demography 47 (2010): 801–820. 48 National Science Foundation, “Survey of Earned Doctorates, Doctorates Awarded 1997– 2006,” Table 3. 49 John Bound, Sarah Turner, and Patrick Walsh, “Internationalization of U.S. Doctoral Edu- f cation,” Population Studies Center Report 09-675 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2009), 27, http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr09-675.pdf. 50 Gnanaraj Chellaraj, Keith Maskus, and Aaditya Mattoo, “The Contribution of Skilled Immi- gration and International Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3588 (May 2005), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/05/15/000090341_20050515125129/Rendered/ PDF/wps3588.pdf. 51 Sharon G. Levin and Paula E. Stephan, “Are the Foreign Born a Source of Strength for U.S. Science?” Science 285 (1999): 1213–1214; and Paula E. Stephan and Sharon G. Levin, “Excep- tional Contributions to U.S. Science by the Foreign-Born and Foreign-Educated,” Population Research and Policy Review 20 (2001): 59–79; and Stephan and Levin, “Foreign Scholars in the U.S.,” 150–173. 52 AnnaLee Saxenian, “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” in The International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Demand, Supply, and Development Consequences in Sending and Receiving Countries, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Thomas J. Espenshade, and Idean Salehyan (San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2001), 197–234; and Jim McQuaid, Laurel Smith-Doerr, and Daniel J. Monti, Jr., “Expanding Entrepreneurship: Female and Foreign-Born Founders of New England Biotechnology Firms,” American Behavioral Scientist 53 (2010): 1045–1063. 53 Vivek Wadhwa, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Geref½, America’s Immigrant Entre- preneurs: Part I, Duke University Master of Engineering Management Program and UC Berkeley School of Information Research Paper, January 4, 2007, http://people.ischool .berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/Americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs_I.pdf.

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The 54 Donna R. Gabaccia, We Are What We Eat: Ethnic Food and the Making of Americans (Cambridge, Contri - Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). butions of Immigrants 55 U.S. White House Of½ce of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Welcomes French President to American Sarkozy to Walker’s Point,” http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ Culture 2007/08/200708111.html (accessed October 12, 2009); and Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, “The Royal Visit: June 7 to 12, 1939,” http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist .edu/royalv.html. 56 Gabaccia, We Are What We Eat. 57 Charles Hirschman and Elizabeth Mogford, “Immigration and the American Industrial Rev- olution from 1880 to 1920,” Social Science Research 38 (2009): 897–920. 58 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988). 59 E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1964). 60Jerald Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 2. 61 Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment, 336; and Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). 62 Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers: The Journey of Eastern European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976), 557; and Most, Making Americans, 7. 63 Steven Goldman, “Segregated Baseball: A Kaleidoscope Review,” Negro Leagues Legacy, 2009, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_negro_leagues_story.jsp?story=kaleidoscopic. 64 Herbert Blumer, “Industrialization and Race Relations,” in Industrialization and Race Rela- tions: A Symposium, ed. Guy Hunter (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 220–253. 65 Jerome Karabel, “Status-Group Struggle, Organizational Interests, and the Limits of Insti- tutional Autonomy: The Transformation of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1918–1940,” The- ory and Society 13 (1984): 1–40. 66 Karabel, The Chosen. 67 Thomas J. Espenshade and Chang Y. Chung, “The Opportunity Cost of Admission Prefer- ences at Elite Universities,” Social Science Quarterly 86 (2) (2005): 293–305. 68 Philip Gleason, “American Identity and Americanization,” in Harvard Encyclopedia of Amer- ican Ethnic Groups, ed. Stephen Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 31–58; and Rudolph Vecoli, “The Signi½cance of Immigration in the Formation of an American Identity,” The History Teacher 30 (1996): 9–27. 69 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (adopted in 1868) de½nes citizenship thus: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have interpreted the citizenship clause to include the native-born children of foreign nationals. 70 Barry Edmonston and Jeffrey Passel, eds., Immigration and Ethnicity: The Integration of Amer- ica’s Newest Arrivals (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1994), 61; and Campbell Gib- son, “The Contribution of Immigration to the Growth and Ethnic Diversity of the American Population,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 136 (1992): 157–175. 71 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). 72 Randall Akee, “Who Leaves? Deciphering Immigrant Self Selection from a Developing Country,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 58 (2009): 323–344.

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73 Hao and Bonstead-Bruns, “Parent-Child Differences in Educational Expectations and the Charles Academic Achievement of Immigrant and Native Students,” 175–198. Hirschman 74 Andrew J. Fuligni and Melissa Witknow, “The Postsecondary Educational Progress of Youth from Immigrant Families,” Journal of Research on Adolescence 14 (2004): 159–183; and Per- reira, Harris, and Lee, “Making it in America,” 511–536.

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Latin American Immigration to the United States

Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez

Abstract: This essay provides an overview of immigration from Latin America since 1960, focusing on changes in both the size and composition of the dominant streams and their cumulative impact on the U.S. foreign-born population. We briefly describe the deep historical roots of current migration streams and the policy backdrop against which migration from the region surged. Distinguishing among the three major pathways to U.S. residence–family sponsorship, asylum, and unauthorized entry–we explain how contemporary flows are related both to economic crises, political conflicts, and humanitarian incidents in sending countries, but especially to idiosyncratic application of existing laws over time. The concluding section highlights the importance of investing in the children of immigrants to meet the future labor needs of an aging nation.

Both the size and composition of the U.S. foreign- born population have grown since 1960, rising from 9.7 million to nearly 40 million in 2010. Latin Americans have been a major driver of this trend, as their numbers soared from less than 1 million in 1960 to nearly 19 million in 2010.1 The source countries have also become more diverse, especially after 1970, when flows from Central America, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic surged. However, these MARTA TIENDA census-based stock measures, which combine recent , a Fellow of the and prior immigration as well as temporary and American Academy since 1993, is the Maurice P. During ’22 Professor unauthorized residents, reveal little about the path- in Demographic Studies, Professor ways to U.S. residence, the ebb and flow of migrants of Sociology and Public Affairs, from speci½c countries, or the forces that produce and Director of the Latino Studies and sustain those flows. Program at Princeton University. In this essay, we provide an overview of immigra- SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a grad- tion from Latin America since 1960, focusing on uate student in the Sociology De- changes in both the size and composition of the partment and the Population Re- major flows as well as the entry pathways to lawful search Institute at Pennsylvania permanent residence in the United States, with due State University. attention to policy shifts. We describe the deep his- (*See endnotes for complete contributor torical roots of current migration streams and biographies.) explain how these flows are related both to changes

in U.S. immigration policy and to un- ican War (1846–1848), combined with Marta equal and inconsistent enforcement of the Gadsden Purchase, the United States Tienda & Susana M. existing laws in order to spotlight the acquired almost half of Mexico’s land. Sánchez myriad unintended consequences for The signi½cance of the annexation for sending and receiving communities. The contemporary immigration from Mexico concluding section reflects on the impli- cannot be overstated. Not only were social cations of Latin American immigration ties impervious to the newly drawn polit- for the future of the nation, highlighting ical boundary, but economic ties also were the growing importance of the children of deepened as Mexican workers were re- immigrants for the future labor needs of cruited to satisfy chronic and temporary an aging nation. We also note the thwarted labor shortages during the nineteenth and integration prospects of recent and future twentieth centuries–an asymmetrical immigrants in localities where anti- exchange that was enabled by the main- immigrant hostility is on the rise. tenance of a porous border. The Bracero Program, a guest worker program in force Nearly a century before the English between 1942 and 1964, is a poignant founded Jamestown in 1607, Spanish set- example of U.S. growers’ dependence on tlements peppered the Americas. Even as Mexican labor facilitated by legal con- they forged indelible Hispanic imprints tracts combined with growing reliance in large swaths of the American Southwest, on unauthorized workers. Spanish settlers Hispanicized the South Fifty years after the Treaty of Guada- American continent, later joined by the lupe Hidalgo, the United States intervened Portuguese in creating an “Iberian enter- in Cuba’s struggle for independence prise.” Rubén D. Rumbaut, poet and pub- against the Spanish crown, which lost its lic intellectual, describes that process as last colonies in the Americas and the “one of the greatest and deepest convul- Paci½c region. As part of the settlement, sions in history . . . [an] epochal movement the United States acquired Puerto Rico, . . . that poured the occidental nations of Guam, and the Philippines, and was ceded Europe over . . . the New World.”2 As such, temporary control of Cuba. Both the U.S.- Spain began the ½rst wave of migration to Mexican War and the Spanish-American what would become the United States of War established foundations for U.S.- America, and also populated one of its bound migration. Mexico and Cuba have future sources of immigrants. been top sending countries for most of The long-standing power struggle be- the twentieth century and into the twenty- tween Spain and England, which carried ½rst, with the Philippines ranking second over to the Americas, is also relevant for since 1980.3 Notwithstanding intermittent understanding Latin American immigra- travel barriers imposed by the Castro tion to the United States. Although most regime, Cuba was a top source of U.S. Spanish colonies had achieved indepen- immigrants during the last half of the dence by the middle of the nineteenth cen- twentieth century, consistently ranking tury, the newly independent republics were among the top three Latin American weak politically and militarily, vulnerable source countries and among the top ten to external aggression. Given its proximity, worldwide. Mexico proved an easy target for the ex- The underpinnings of contemporary pansionist aspirations of the United States. migration from Latin America are also Under the terms of the Treaty of Guada- rooted in policy changes designed to reg- lupe Hidalgo, which ended the U.S.-Mex- ulate permanent and temporary admis-

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Latin sions, beginning with the Immigration extension of uniform country quotas for American Act of 1924. Although widely criticized for the Western Hemisphere in 1978 was par- Immigration to the establishing a racist quota system designed ticularly consequential for Mexico, with United to restrict migration from Southern and the predictable outcome that unauthorized States Eastern Europe, the 1924 Act is relevant migration climbed. for contemporary Latin American immi- When an exodus from Cuba began in the gration because it explicitly exempted from aftermath of the Cuban revolution, the the quotas the independent countries of United States had not yet established a Central and South America, including comprehensive refugee policy. Although Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Both not a signatory to the un Refugee Con- countries currently are major sources of vention or Protocol, and despite a highly undocumented migration; however, the unbalanced economic and political rela- circumstances fostering each of these tionship with the United States, Cuba has undocumented streams differ. influenced the development and execu- Table 1 summarizes key legislation that tion of U.S. refugee policy in myriad ways. influences Latin American immigration Cuban émigrés instantiated the ideologi- today, beginning with the most recent com- cal war between the United States and prehensive immigration law, the Immi- Castro’s socialist regime, not only forcing gration and Nationality Act of 1952 (ina). the U.S. government to de½ne its refugee Although the ina retained the quota sys- policy, but also beginning a period of tem that limited immigration from East- exceptions to of½cial guidelines. The ern Europe (and that virtually precluded 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (caa) allows immigration from Asia and Africa), the Cuban exiles to apply for permanent resi- legislation established the ½rst preference dence after residing in the United States system specifying skill criteria and imposed for only one year. Unlike Haitians, Domini- a worldwide ceiling. But in the wake of cans, or other Latin Americans, very few the civil rights movement, the 1965 amend- Cubans are repatriated if they land on ments to ina dismantled the overtly racist U.S. soil, even if they enter through land quota system. borders.4 Two aspects of the new visa preference Cubans seeking asylum in the United system are key for understanding contem- States are the main Latin American bene- porary Latin American immigration: the ½ciaries of the 1980 Refugee Act, and they high priority accorded to family uni½ca- have enjoyed preferential admissions and tion relative to labor quali½cations; and generous resettlement assistance both the exemption of spouses, children, and before and since the 1980 Act.5 In response parents of U.S. citizens from the country to a third major Cuban exodus during the caps, which in effect favored groups mid-1990s, the U.S. government negotiated exempted by the 1924 Immigration Act. the Cuban Migration Agreement, which This included Mexican Americans whose revised the caa by establishing what be- ancestors became citizens by treaty and came known as the “wet foot/dry foot” the relatives of braceros who had settled policy. By agreement, Cubans apprehended throughout the Southwest during the at sea (that is, with “wet feet”) would be heyday of the guest worker program; but returned to Cuba (or a third country in over time, it came to include the relatives cases of legitimate fears of persecution); of newcomers who sponsored their rela- those who successfully avoided the U.S. tives after naturalization. The termination Coast Guard and landed on U.S. shores of the Bracero Program coupled with the (with “dry feet”) would be allowed to re-

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Table 1 Marta Major U.S. Legislation Concerning Latin American Immigration, 1952–2001 Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez Legislation Date Key Provisions

Immigration and 1952 Establishes the ½rst preference system Nationality Act Retains national-origin quotas favoring Western Europe (ina) Imposes ceiling of 154K plus 2K from Asia-Paci½c Triangle

Immigration Act 1965 Repeals national-origin quotas (Amendments to ina) Sets a maximum limit on immigration from the Western (120K) and Eastern (170K) Hemispheres Revises visa preference system to favor family reuni½cation Establishes uniform per-country limit of 20K visas for the Eastern Hemisphere

Cuba Adjustment Act 1966 Allows undocumented Cubans who have lived in the United (caa) States for at least one year to apply for permanent residence

Refugee Act 1980 Adopts un protocol de½nition of refugee Creates systematic procedures for refugee admission Establishes resettlement procedures Eliminates refugees from the preference system Institutes the ½rst asylum provision

Immigration Reform 1986 Institutes employer sanctions for hiring undocumented and Control Act immigrants (irca) Legalizes undocumented immigrants Increases border enforcement Establishes “wet foot/dry foot” policy

Cuban Migration 1994– Sets up a minimum of 20K visas annually Agreement (cma) 1995 Conducts in-country refugee processing

Illegal Immigration 1996 Strengthens border enforcement and raises penalties for Reform and Immigrant unauthorized entry and smuggling Responsibility Act Expands criteria for exclusion and deportation (iirira) Initiates the employment veri½cation pilot programs

Nicaraguan Adjustment 1997 Legalizes Nicaraguans and Cubans; later legalizes abc class and Central American members (Salvadorans and Guatemalans) Relief Act (nacara)

Temporary Protected Grants temporary legal status to nationals of countries that Status (tps) experienced an armed conflict or a major natural disaster 1990 Granted to Salvadorans due to civil war (lasted 18 months) 1998 Granted to Hondurans and Nicaraguans due to damages caused by Hurricane Mitch (expires 2015) 2001 Granted to Salvadorans following an earthquake (expires 2013)

Source: Michael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1994); Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990); Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009); Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010); and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/.

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Latin main and, in accordance with the provi- Central Americans displaced by civil wars American sions of the 1966 caa, would qualify for or natural disasters. tps is time-limited; Immigration 6 to the expedited legal permanent residence. does not offer a pathway to permanent United A third major amendment to the ina, resident status; and requires acts of Con- States the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con- gress for extension.9 Once the period of trol Act (irca), in principle marks a shift protection expires, its bene½ciaries are ex- in the focus of U.S. immigration policy pected to return to their country of origin. toward a growing emphasis on enforce- Among those displaced by civil conflict, ment. irca granted legal status to approx- some claim political asylum while others imately 2.7 million persons residing un- lapse into unauthorized status along with lawfully in the United States, including the the thousands denied asylum. special agricultural workers who only were Collectively, the legislation summarized required to prove part-year residence. in Table 1 represents the major pathways Over 85 percent of the legalized popula- to attain lpr status: namely, family uni½- tion originated in Latin America, with cation, employer sponsorship, and human- about 70 percent from Mexico alone.7 itarian protections. Family reuni½cation The rapid growth of unauthorized immi- gives preference to prospective migrants gration post-irca also led to increased from countries with longer immigration enforcement efforts. traditions, like Mexico, because they are The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and more likely to have citizen relatives in the Immigrant Responsibility Act (iirira), United States who can serve as sponsors; which intensi½ed forti½cation of the bor- but over time this pathway has become der, expanded criteria for deportation and more prominent as earlier arrivals natu- made a half-hearted effort to strengthen ralize in order to sponsor their relatives. interior enforcement through the employ- With the exception of Argentineans dur- ment veri½cation pilot programs. More ing the 1960s and Colombians during the than a decade after irca, Congress ap- early 1970s, relatively few Latin American proved another legalization program, the immigrants receive lpr status through Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central Amer- employment preferences. Rather, the ican Relief Act (nacara), which conferred majority of Latin Americans recruited for legal permanent resident (lpr) status to employment enter as temporary workers registered asylees (and their dependents) or through clandestine channels. Neither from Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Gua- unauthorized entry nor tps provides a temala, and nationals of former Soviet direct pathway to legal permanent resi- bloc countries (and their dependents) who dence, but they can evolve into indirect had resided in the United States for at pathways via comprehensive (for example, least ½ve consecutive years before Decem- irca) or targeted (for example, nacara) ber 1, 1995. According to Donald Kerwin, amnesty programs. In the following sec- executive director of the Center for Migra- tion, we use the three pathways to illus- tion Studies, fewer than 70,000 asylees trate how each differs for speci½c countries, were legalized under nacara through and to identify the economic and politi- 2009; but in typical fashion, a patchwork cal forces undergirding changes over time. of solutions for speci½c groups have been enacted since irca was passed in 1986.8 Figure 1 uses data from the decennial Finally, as part of its humanitarian goals, census to portray changes in the U.S. Latin Congress also enacted legislation offering American-born population from 1960 to Temporary Protected Status (tps) for 2010 by region of origin. The graphic rep-

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Figure 1 Marta U.S. Foreign-Born Population (in millions) from Latin America, 1960–2010 Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez

“Caribbean” includes Cuba and the Dominican Republic; “Central America” includes Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama; and “South America” includes Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006); and American Community Survey, One-Year Estimates for 2010.

resentation reveals the regional-origin and has remained at 10 percent since 2000. diversi½cation that accompanied the Over the last ½fty years, the Central Amer- twelvefold increase in the Latin American- ican share of all Latin American immi- born population since 1970. Despite the grants rose from about 6 percent in 1960 to continuing Mexican dominance among around 16 percent since 1990, when about Latin American-born U.S. residents, flow 12 percent of Latin American immigrants diversi½cation resulted in a more balanced originated from South America. subregional pro½le in 2010 compared with Table 2 reports the major source coun- prior decades. The Caribbean share of tries that drove the changes reported in Latin American immigrants peaked at 31 Figure 1. Only countries comprising at least percent in 1970, fell to 20 percent in 1980, 2 percent of the decade total Latin Amer-

142 (3) Summer 2013 53 Book_Summer 2013_Shinner.qxd 6/18/2013 10:10 AM Page 54 inican Republic 2010 Mexico (61.3) El Salvador (6.3) Countries Other Cuba (5.8) 19,115,077 (4.6) Guatemala (14.4) (4.3) Colombia (3.3) 2000 Mexico (63.6) Cuba (6.1) El Salvador (5.7) 14,418,576 (4.8) Colombia Other Countries (13.0) (3.5) Guatemala (3.3) 1990 Mexico (58.2) Cuba (10.0) (6.3) Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Dom 7,385,479 (4.7) Colombia (13.8) (3.9) Guatemala (3.1) Other Countries Table 2 Table 1980 Mexico (57.8) Cuba (16.0) (4.4) 3,801,351 Dominican Republic El Salvador (3.8) El Salvador (13.2) (2.5) Ecuador (2.3) Other Countries Mexico (47.6) Cuba (27.5) 1970 (4.0) Dominican Republic Colombia 1,597,481 (3.8) Argentina (14.3) (2.8) Largest Latin American-Born Populations (by percentage) in the United States, by Country of Origin, 1960–2010 Mexico (73.1) Cuba (10.0) 1960 (2.1) 788,068 Argentina Colombia (14.8) Other Countries Other Other Countries N Countries are presented in descending order for each year. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of United States: Countries are presented in descending order for each year. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics One-Year Estimates for 2010. 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006); and American Community Survey,

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ican-born population are separately re- ugees and asylees. Therefore, to explain the Marta ported, which quali½es a maximum of six ebb and flow of Latin American immigra- Tienda & Susana M. countries after 1970, but only three in 1960. tion over the last half-century, we orga- Sánchez Not surprisingly, Mexicans remain the nize the remainder of this section around dominant group throughout the period, the three sources of immigrants: lprs; but owing to large swings in immigrant refugees and asylees; and unauthorized flows from the Caribbean and Central migrants granted legal status. America, the Mexican share fluctuated Legal Permanent Residents. Table 3 reports from a high of 73 percent in 1960 to a low the number of new lprs from Latin Amer- of 48 percent in 1970. Cubans were the ica over the last ½ve decades, with details second largest group among the Latin for the major sending countries from the American-born population through 2000, Caribbean, Mesoamerica, and South Amer- but their share varied from a high of 27 ica. Since the 1960s, Latin Americans have percent in 1970 to less than 6 percent in made up about one-third of new lprs, with 2010, when Salvadorans edged out Cubans the period share fluctuating between 31 for second place. percent during the 1970s to 41 percent The decade-speci½c pro½le of main during the 1990s. For each period there is source countries also reveals the ascen- high correspondence between the domi- dance of Colombians and Dominicans nant foreign-stock population countries during the 1960s and 1970s, with Central (Table 2) and the number of new lprs Americans following during the 1980s. admitted from those countries (Table 3); Although Argentina ranked among the therefore, we use these nations to orga- top source countries during the 1960s and nize our discussion of speci½c streams. 1970s, when the United States bene½ted Mexicans comprise the largest share of from the exodus of highly skilled profes- legal immigrants from Latin America, typ- sionals from that country, the “brain drain” ically 40 to 45 percent per cohort except was not sustained. Political repression and for the 1980s and 1990s, when the irca economic crises rekindled Argentinean legalization was under way. The vast major- emigration during the late 1970s, early ity of Mexicans granted lpr status–88 1980s, and again at the beginning of the percent in ½scal year 2010, for example– twenty-½rst century, but Spain, Italy, and are sponsored by U.S. relatives; less than Israel were then the preferred destina- 10 percent quali½ed under the employment tions. Today, unlike Colombia, Argentina preferences.10 Mexicans comprised nearly is not a major contributor to U.S. immi- 60 percent of all new lprs from Latin gration. America during the 1980s and 1990s, in part The stock measures reported in Table 2 due to the large number of status adjusters and Figure 1 portray the cumulative impact under irca. Moreover, Mexican immigra- of immigration, but reflect immigration tion would have been higher in each decade trends imperfectly because they conflate if the family-sponsored preferences were three components of change: new addi- not numerically capped. Along with Fili- tions; temporary residents, including the pinos, Chinese, and Indians, Mexicans are bene½ciaries of protection from deporta- greatly oversubscribed in the family- tion; and unauthorized residents. Thus, the sponsored preference categories, and thus foreign-born population based on census thousands of Mexican family members data overstates the immigrant population, wait for years for their visa priority date. which consists of persons granted lpr For example, in 2010 unmarried Mexican status in any given period, including ref- adult children sponsored by U.S. residents

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Latin Table 3 American Number of Latin Americans (in thousands) Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status, 1961–2010 Immigration to the United 1961– 1971– 1981– 1991– 2001– States 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Total 3,321.7 4,493.3 7,338.1 9,095.4 10,501.0 (all countries)

Latin America 1,077.0 1,395.3 2,863.6 3,759.8 3,746.1 (all countries)

Mexico 443.3 637.2 1,653.2 2,251.4 1,693.2

Caribbean Cuba 256.8 276.8 159.3 180.9 318.4 Dominican Republic 94.1 148.0 251.8 340.9 329.1

Central America El Salvador 15.0 34.4 214.6 217.4 252.8 Guatemala 15.4 25.6 87.9 103.1 160.7 Honduras 15.4 17.2 49.5 66.8 65.4

South America Colombia 70.3 77.6 124.4 131.0 251.3 Ecuador 37.0 50.2 56.0 76.4 112.5 Peru 18.6 29.1 64.4 105.7 145.7

Rest of Latin America 111.1 99.2 202.5 286.2 417.0

Source: For decades 1961–1970 and 1971–1980, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984; for decades 1981– 1990, 1991–2000, and 2001–2010, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics from the years 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2010.

had waited eighteen years to receive their professionals with the resources to flee, entry visa.11 but as the internal armed conflict escalated, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are the members of the working classes joined major immigrant-sending nations from the exodus.12 Legal immigration rose 60 South America. Although their initial lev- percent between the 1970s and 1980s, and els of immigration differ, all three countries nearly doubled after 2000. witnessed gradual increases during the Ecuadorian immigration has trebled 1970s, but thereafter their immigration since 1961, rising from 37,000 during the flows diverged. Colombia was the largest 1960s to more than 110,000 during the single source of immigrants from South most recent decade. Demand for Panama America throughout the period. Stimu- hats produced in the provinces of Azuay lated by prolonged political instability, and Cañar triggered the early waves of armed conflict, and drug violence amid Ecuadoran immigrants during the late sporadic economic downturns, Colombian 1950s, but deteriorating economic condi- emigration gained momentum over the tions augmented subsequent flows from latter half of the twentieth century. The these regions, which were facilitated by early waves largely involved upper-class dense social networks established by ear-

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lier waves.13 The collapse of oil prices in Like El Salvador, Guatemala witnessed Marta the 1980s combined with spiraling unem- prolonged civil conflict, which escalated Tienda & Susana M. ployment, wage erosion, and inflation re- after 1978 and initiated a mass exodus of Sánchez kindled emigration, which averaged 17,000 asylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s. annually. Those who arrived before 1982 quali½ed for Following the collapse of the banking status adjustment under irca, but later system in the late 1990s, emigration rose arrivals did not. Although political insta- from approximately 30,000 annually be- bility is credited for the surge in Guate- tween 1990 and 1997 to over 100,000 malan immigration, sociologists Steven annually thereafter.14 However, Spain Alvarado and Douglas Massey claim that replaced the United States as a preferred neither violence nor economic factors destination during the 1990s, hosting predicted the likelihood of out-migration; nearly half of all Ecuadorian emigrants be- rather, they portray Guatemalan emigra- tween 1996 and 2001 compared with about tion as a household decision to diversify 27 percent destined for the United States.15 income streams by sending young, skilled Hyperinflation and massive underemploy- members to join U.S. relatives. Their inter- ment resulting from the 1987 structural pretation is consistent with sociologist adjustment measures also accelerated Jacqueline Hagan’s ethnographic account Peruvian out-migration during the 1990s, that chronicles how establishment of sister more than doubling the number of new communities in U.S. cities enabled fur- Peruvian lprs; but the Peruvian share of ther migration via family uni½cation.16 the Latin American-born population never By 2010, Guatemalans became the fourth reached 2 percent. Except for the modest largest Latin American-born group in the dip between the 1960s and 1970s, immi- United States. The increase in Guatemalan gration from the rest of Latin America legal resident admissions since 2001 also mirrors the Peruvian trend: doubling be- reflects the status adjustments authorized tween the 1970s and 1980s and then con- by nacara. tinuing on an upward spiral that has In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador, exceeded 400,000 since 2001 (Table 3). the rise in Honduran immigration has been Civil wars and political instability trig- more gradual, except for the 1980s, when gered the formidable influx of Salvadorans, it nearly trebled compared to the prior Hondurans, and Guatemalans to the Unit- decade. Unlike Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, ed States. Emigration from El Salvador, and Guatemalans, Hondurans could not the smallest but most densely populated claim asylee status. Rather, skyrocketing of the Central American republics, is par- poverty and unemployment during the ticularly noteworthy because of the sheer 1980s and 1990s is responsible for the surge numbers that received lpr status: more in emigration. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch than 215,000 during the 1980s and an ad- aggravated the country’s economic woes, ditional half-million over the next two leaving hundreds of thousands homeless. decades. That thousands of Salvadorans An estimated 66,000 Hondurans sought arrived seeking asylum largely explains why refuge in the United States and were grant- their lpr numbers exceed the annual caps ed tps, which does not confer a path to for several decades. Hundreds of thousands legal permanent residence. Unless renewed lapsed into undocumented status when in 2015, Hondurans granted tps will join they were denied asylee status, but a large the unauthorized population, which, ac- majority of Salvadoran asylees successfully cording to the Of½ce of Immigration Sta- adjusted to lpr status under nacara. tistics, rose from 160,000 to 330,000 be-

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Latin tween 2000 and 2010.17 Currently, family of the ½rst-wave migrants were profes- American sponsorship is the main pathway to legal sionals, entrepreneurs, and landowners, Immigration to the permanent residence for Hondurans, ac- Cuban émigrés were granted visa waivers United counting for 85 percent of the recent lprs. and parolee status, and were offered a States The last major lpr flow since 1960 is range of services to facilitate their labor from the Dominican Republic. This out- market integration, including certi½cation migration began in the wake of the polit- of professional credentials, a college loan ical upheaval following dictator Trujillo’s program, and bilingual education.21 Partly assassination in 1961; but even after the because they were fleeing a socialist state political scene stabilized, failed economic and partly because they did not ½t the un policies continued to fuel the flow. Since de½nitions of refugee, Cubans enjoyed a 1961, the number of new lprs more than privileged position among the U.S. foreign- trebled, exceeding 330,000 during each of born population. Indeed, the 1966 caa the last two decades. Despite modest eco- put Cubans on a fast track to citizenship. nomic growth during the 1990s and the A second major exodus occurred in April revival of tourism, persistently high un- 1980, when the Cuban government opened employment buttressed by deep social net- the port of Mariel to anyone who wanted works has maintained a steady exodus.18 to leave, including prisoners and lunatics. Dominicans have been taking full advan- About 125,000 “Marielitos” arrived on U.S. tage of the family uni½cation provisions shores in a few short months, joined by of the ina by sponsoring relatives; virtu- 35,000 Haitians.22 Although Marielitos did ally all Dominicans granted lpr status in not formally qualify as refugees accord- 2010 bene½ted from the family sponsoring to the guidelines of the newly enacted ship provisions of the ina.19 Refugee Act and were technically ineligi- Refugees and Asylees. By de½nition, refugee ble for federal funds, they were accorded and asylee flows precipitated by political refugee status by congressional decree, upheavals and natural disasters are un- illustrating yet again the idiosyncratic predictable in both timing and size, but application of U.S. immigration law. the impact they have on immigrant admis- A third migration wave occurred in the sions also depends on the idiosyncratic mid-1990s, when the Cuban government application of U.S. immigration and ref- lifted the ban on departures. Rather than ugee policy. Since 1960, Cubans have extend the welcome gangplank as in prior dominated the refugee flow from Latin years, the U.S. government interdicted America, but armed conflicts in Central Cuban fugitives attempting to circumvent America and Colombia as well as natural legal immigration channels and returned disasters have also contributed to the them to Guantánamo. Within a year, growth of humanitarian admissions in 33,000 Cubans were encamped at Guan- recent decades. The Cuban exodus has tánamo, but in yet another predictable been highly unpredictable owing to bar- exception to immigration law, the majority riers imposed by the Cuban government were paroled and granted lpr status.23 and the level of acrimony between Havana Although accompanied with less media and Washington. fanfare than the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the Cuban emigration began shortly after largest number of Cubans to arrive in a Fidel Castro took up the reins of the island single decade came after 2001; since that nation. By 1974, 650,000 Cubans had left date, nearly 320,000 Cubans have been for the United States.20 Dubbed the granted lpr status. Under the provisions “golden exile” because the vast majority of the wet foot/dry foot agreement,

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Cubans interdicted at sea or apprehended and 229,000 Salvadorans–had bene½ted Marta on land are deportable; but in practice very from tps.26 The status protections accord- Tienda & Susana M. few are returned because they are enti- ed to the victims of Hurricane Mitch and Sánchez tled to request asylum, and most do so. the Salvadoran earthquake are set to expire Central Americans and Colombians also in 2015 and 2013, respectively. In the current have used the humanitarian pathway to political climate, it is uncertain whether acquire legal permanent residence, albeit these temporary protections will be extend- with far less success than Cubans. Salva- ed; if they are not, many will probably join doran and Guatemalan asylee approval millions of others as undocumented resi- rates were less than 3 percent between dents. 1983 and 1990 compared with 25 percent Unauthorized Migration. The growth of for Nicaraguans.24 Alleging discrimination undocumented immigration since 1960 is against Central Americans, religious orga- not only a distinctive feature of the current nizations and immigrant rights advocates wave of mass migration, but also a direct ½led a class action lawsuit on their behalf, consequence of selective enforcement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. As U.S. immigration laws. As of March 2010, part of the 1991 settlement, Congress an estimated 11 million undocumented allowed Central Americans who had been immigrants resided in the United States, denied asylum to reapply for review, and down from a peak of nearly 12 million in they achieved much higher success rates. 2007, but 29 percent higher than the 2000 However, the 1996 iirira made the asy- estimate of 8.5 million.27 Latin Americans lum rules even more dif½cult by adding make up over three-fourths of undocu- provisions to resettle asylum seekers to mented residents, with 60 percent from third countries; by requiring asylees to Mexico alone. The collapse of the housing ½le applications within a year of arrival in and construction industries during the the United States; by precluding appeals great recession fostered the ½rst signi½cant to denied applications; and by imposing decline in the size of the undocumented high processing fees. After 1997, the class population, reversing two decades of con- members in American Baptist Churches v. tinuous growth. Removals from Latin Thornburgh were allowed to adjust their America since 2001 more than quadrupled status through nacara; as a result, ap- relative to the prior decade, which partly proval rates grew to over 95 percent.25 explains the shrinking unauthorized pop- Two major natural disasters rekindled ulation, albeit less than changes in labor asylees from Central America at the turn demand. of the twenty-½rst century, when Hurricane Several factors have fueled the growth Mitch (1998) displaced thousands of Nica- of unauthorized migration from Latin raguans and Hondurans, and a massive America, beginning with the abrupt ter- earthquake (2001) left more than a million mination of the Bracero Program in 1964, Salvadorans homeless. Drawn by a sizable following a 22-year period during which expatriate community, thousands of dis- U.S. growers became dependent on pliable placed Salvadorans made their way to the Mexican labor. In some ways, the 1965 United States. In a humanitarian gesture, amendments to the ina constructed an Congress granted tps to Salvadorans re- illegal immigration system by default be- siding in the United States as of 2001, and cause the disproportionate focus on fam- it has renewed the protection several times. ily visas gave short shrift to labor needs; As of 2010, more than 300,000 individuals because the Texas proviso protected em- –70,000 Hondurans, 3,500 Nicaraguans, ployers who willfully hired undocumented

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Latin workers until irca imposed employer attempt to reduce employment of unau- American sanctions; and because the cap on family thorized workers, the 1996 iirira autho- Immigration to the visas (except for immediate family mem- rized three pilot programs to verify em- United bers of U.S. citizens) produced long wait ployment eligibility, but it protected States lists for countries with established immi- employers from ½nes for declared “good gration traditions. Furthermore, the inte- faith” efforts to comply with veri½cation gration of separate hemispheric ceilings requirements. Not surprisingly, iirira did into a single worldwide total in 1978 dra- little to restrict the unauthorized flow from matically curtailed the number of visas Latin America because interior enforce- available to Mexico, the largest single send- ment remained weak; because the social ing nation. As occurred when the Bracero networks sustaining the flows were already Program ended, unauthorized entry pro- very deeply entrenched; and because the vided an alternative pathway to the United people-smuggling networks and fraudu- States, one greatly facilitated by the exis- lent-document industries developed new tence of strong social networks that were avenues to circumvent the laws. forti½ed over decades of relatively unre- stricted migration. Migration is part of a multiphase demo- Finally, decades of lax and inconsistent graphic response to unequally distributed enforcement enabled millions of persons social and economic opportunities that is to enter without inspection, while shoddy simultaneously determined by micro- and monitoring of temporary visitors permit- macro-level forces. Many of these forces ted hundreds of thousands of legal entrants cannot be predicted, such as sudden flows to overstay their visas. Since 1986, how- triggered by civil wars or natural disas- ever, U.S. immigration policy has been ters, nor can they be rigorously managed dominated by a growing emphasis on through policy measures, as demonstrated border enforcement, with heightened by the failure to seal the U.S.-Mexico bor- penalties for persons who enter without der. Like most nations with long immi- authorization as well as for non-immigration traditions, the United States strives grants who remain in the country after their to balance economic, social, and human- visas expire. Because irca’s employer itarian goals through its admission pref- sanctions provisions were never seriously erences while also ensuring compliance enforced, unauthorized immigration rose with the laws. But an appraisal of Latin during the 1990s, when the housing and American immigration exposes numer- construction industries–both dominated ous instances where extant laws have by unskilled workers–expanded. Weak been systematically disregarded or ap- interior enforcement basically left in place plied in a capricious or discriminatory the lynchpin of unauthorized migration, manner. Striking examples include the namely, employers’ ability to hire unau- preferential treatment accorded to Cuban thorized foreign workers essentially with- émigrés compared with Haitians who out reprisal. arrive on U.S. shores in similar situations; Even as irca’s comprehensive amnesty the explicit protection of employers who program was winding down, unauthorized hire unauthorized workers by not holding migration was on the rise. In fact, during them accountable for violating the law; and the 1990s, between 70 and 80 percent of differential treatment of asylum applicants all new migrants from Mexico were un- according to national origin. Fairness is documented, and this share rose to 85 per- not a de½ning feature of U.S. immigration cent between 2000 and 2004.28 In a feeble policy toward Latin Americans.

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Historically and in the present, Latin growth and dealing with its plague of Marta American immigration has afforded the drug-related violence. Lower fertility Tienda & Susana M. United States myriad economic bene½ts, throughout Latin America also portends Sánchez including lower prices for goods pro- less surplus labor in the years to come. duced in industries that employ immi- Equally uncertain are the integration grant workers, increased demand for U.S. prospects of Latin American immigrants products, and higher wages and employ- and their offspring. The rise of anti- ment for domestic workers. That new im- immigrant sentiment in response to an migrants accounted for half of the growth unprecedented geographic dispersal of in the labor force during the 1990s added Latin American immigrants highlights the signi½cantly to the economic prosperity formidable integration challenges facing enjoyed by average Americans. Neverthe- the nation–challenges that can thwart eco- less, it is doubtful that the current admis- nomic prospects in the years ahead while sion criteria that favor family uni½cation also fomenting ethnic conflict. Several over employment needs are well aligned worrisome trends warrant consideration. with future economic needs of an aging The recent Supreme Court decision up- nation. Suggestions to adjust employment holding a state’s right to empower local visas with fluctuations in labor needs, police to check the immigration status of while intuitively compelling, ignore that anyone suspected of being in the country two-thirds of U.S. immigrants enter under illegally bodes ill for the integration of family preferences and that the momen- Latin American immigrants, particularly tum for future flows is already baked into those with indigenous roots who pose the system in the form of visa backlogs ready targets for racial pro½ling. for Mexicans and others. Beyond imme- Another concern is the persistent diate family relatives of U.S. citizens, how- achievement gap between the offspring ever, it is worth reconsidering the social of Latin American immigrants and their and economic value of maintaining the American-born counterparts. After the extended family preferences, which have year 2000, births outpaced immigration become a key driver of Dominican and as a component of Hispanic population Salvadoran immigration in recent years. growth in the United States; this fact un- Notwithstanding the visa backlogs for derscores the urgency of closing the edu- family-sponsored relatives of Mexicans, cation gap so that the children of Latin there is some evidence that net migration American immigrants can become pro- from Mexico has slowed and may have ductive replacement workers for the aging even reversed.29 Bleak job prospects fol- white majority. Recent trends are not en- lowing the great recession are a key rea- couraging, however. State and local gov- son for the slowdown, but record high ernments have gouged education budgets deportations under the Obama adminis- in the interest of ½scal restraint, which not tration, a militarized border, and stepped only reduces educational investments in up interior enforcement are contributing future workers–large majorities of them factors. Whether this slowdown in Mex- children of immigrants–but also compro- ican migration is a temporary blip or the mises the nation’s competitive advantage beginning of a long-term reversal is yet over the medium and long term. unclear, and likely will depend on both Finally, the unresolved status of 11 mil- the future pace of the U.S. recovery from lion unauthorized immigrants–of which the recession as well as the Mexican gov- three-quarters are from Latin America– ernment’s success in sustaining economic remains a thorny social, political, and

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Latin moral issue. Legal status profoundly affects from status adjustments through several American prospects for economic and social mobility. group-speci½c congressional acts. In the Immigration to the Economists Sherrie Kossoudji and Debo- interest of transparency and uniformity United rah Cobb-Clark estimated wage penalties in the application of immigration laws, a States for unauthorized status at 14 to 24 percent, blanket amnesty will advance U.S. eco- and they ½nd a bene½t of legalization of nomic interests while promoting social 6 percent.30 This represents a formidable cohesion. Another blanket amnesty will economic stimulus that can generate sub- go a long way toward aligning our liberal stantial multiplier effects via consumption. democracy with the realities of Latin Our review of Latin American immigra- American immigration. tion reveals that thousands have bene½ted

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993, is the Maurice P. During ’22 Professor in Demographic Studies, Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, and Director of the Latino Studies Program at Princeton University. Her publications include Hispanics and the Future of America (edited with Faith Mitchell, 2006), Eth- nicity and Causal Mechanisms (edited with Michael Rutter, 2005), and The Hispanic Population of the United States (coauthored with Frank D. Bean, 1987). SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a graduate student in the Sociology Department and the Popula- tion Research Institute at Pennsylvania State University. Her research focuses on the children of Mexican immigrants and health disparities by social class and ethnicity. 1 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). The 2010 estimate is our calculation based on the American Community Survey. 2 Rubén D. Rumbaut, “The Hispanic Prologue,” in A Hispanic Look at the Bicentennial, ed. David Cardús (Houston: Institute of Hispanic Culture of Houston, 1978), 5–22. 3 Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Con- gressional Research Service, 2010), Figure 4. 4 Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009). The difference between asylees and refugees is their physical location when requesting protection: asylees apply after arriving in the United States whereas refugees apply from abroad, often a third country, and request resettlement in the United States. 5 The current annual ceiling for refugee admissions is 80,000 per year, with 5,500 allocated for Latin America and the Caribbean. See Daniel C. Martin and James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Home- land Security, 2012). 6 Furthermore, in an effort to discourage random surges in Cuban migration, the U.S. government set aside a minimum of 20,000 visas (excluding the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens) for Cubans seeking to immigrate and instituted a “visa lottery” to allocate the visas. 7 Marta Tienda, George J. Borjas, Hector Cordero-Guzman, Kristin Neuman, and Manuela Romero, “The Demography of Legalization: Insights from Administrative Records of Legalized Aliens,” Final Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the Depart- ment of Health and Human Services (Chicago: Population Research Center, University of Chicago, September 1991).

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8 See Donald M. Kerwin, More than IRCA: U.S. Legalization Programs and the Current Policy Debate Marta (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, December 2010). Unlike irca, which was a Tienda & comprehensive program, nacara and other population-speci½c programs receive less media Susana M. attention. Sánchez 9 Ruth E. Wasem and Karma Ester, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010). 10 Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), Table 10. 11 Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, Table 4. 12 Alexandria Murnan, “Colombian Immigrants,” in Encyclopedia of Immigration, 2011; available at http://immigration-online.org/441-colombian-immigrants.html (accessed July 6, 2011). 13 Brad Jokisch and David Kyle, “Las transformaciones de la migración transnacional del Ecuador, 1993–2003,” in La Migración Ecuatoriana Transnacionalismo, Redes e Identidades, ed. Gioconda Herrera, Maria Cristina Carillo, and Alicia Torres (Quito, Ecuador: flacso, Plan Migración, Comunicación y Desarrollo, 2005), 57–70; Brad Jokisch, “Ecuador: Diversity in Migration,” in Migration Information Source (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=575 (accessed May 1, 2012). 14 Franklin Ramírez Gallegos and Jacques Paul Ramírez, La Estampida Migratoria Ecuatoriana: Crisis, Redes Transnacionales y Repertorios de Acción Migratoria (Quito, Ecuador: unesco, ciudad: Centro de Investigaciones, 2005), 41–42. 15 Brian Gratton, “Ecuadorians in the United States and Spain: History, Gender and Niche For- mation,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (4) (2007): 581–599. 16 Steven E. Alvarado and Douglas S. Massey, “In Search of Peace: Structural Adjustment, Vio- lence, and International Migration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- ence 630 (1) (2010): 137–161; Jacqueline M. Hagan, Deciding to be Legal: A Maya Community in Houston (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). 17 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigra- tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 18 Ramona Hernández, The Mobility of Workers under Advanced Capitalism: Dominican Migration to the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Peggy Levitt, “Dominican Republic,” in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 399–411. 19 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Table 10. 20 Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Rubén D. Rumbaut and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Family in Exile: Cuban Expatriates in the United States,” American Journal of Psychiatry 133 (4) (1976): 395–399. 21 Portes and Bach, Latin Journey, 86. 22 Lisandro Perez, “Cuba,” in The New Americans, ed. Waters and Ueda, 386–398. 23 Ibid.; and Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States. 24 Sarah J. Mahler, American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 174. 25 Susan B. Coutin, “Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum Seekers,” Law & Social Inquiry 36 (3) (2011): 585. 26 Wasem and Ester, Temporary Protected Status.

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Latin 27 Hoefer et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, American Table 3. Immigration to the 28 Jeffrey Passel, “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population” United (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2005), http://www.pewhispanic.org/ States 2005/03/21/estimates-of-the-size-and-characteristics-of-the-undocumented-population/ (accessed July 10, 2012). 29 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero–and Perhaps Less” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and -perhaps-less/ (accessed July 5, 2012). 30 Sherrie Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, “Coming Out of the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population,” Journal of Labor Economics 20 (3) (2002): 598–628.

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Why Asian Americans are Becoming Mainstream

Victor Nee & Hilary Holbrow

Abstract: In contrast to earlier waves of immigration, the post–1965 Asian immigration to the United States has not spawned an exclusionist backlash among native whites. Rather, the new Asian immigrants and their children are rapidly gaining access to the American mainstream. Whether in integrated residential communities, in colleges and universities, or in mainstream workplaces, Asian Americans’ presence is ever more the rule, not the exception. The success of so many Asian American immigrants suggests that race may not be as decisive a factor in shaping socioeconomic attainment as it was in the American past; civil rights reform has been incorporated in a more inclusive American mainstream. As a group in which those of legal status predominate, Asian Americans have enjoyed more open access to mainstream institutions, paving the way to their rapid assimilation.

Until 1965, immigration from Asia served as the crucible for a politics of exclusion that involved both the legal framework and a social consensus backing a national-origin quota for immigration. In the mid-nineteenth century, the arrival of a sizable Chinese population in communities across the western states provoked widespread nativist sentiment and anti-Chinese hostility. Competition in labor markets spurred union-led protests and vio- lent demands for the government to restrict Chi- nese immigration. The subsequent passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 effectively ended VICTOR NEE is the Frank and immigration from China, while Chinese residing in Rosa Rhodes Professor of Sociology America were barred from naturalized citizenship. at Cornell University, where he is Japanese immigration to the West Coast, which also Director of the Center for the followed the exclusion of Chinese laborers, incited Study of Economy and Society. similar mobilization of nativist sentiment and leg- HILARY HOLBROW is a Ph.D. stu- islative politics, culminating in the Immigration dent in the Sociology Department Act of 1924. This legislation limited free immigra- at Cornell University. tion to the United States to those from Northern (*See endnotes for complete contributor and Western Europe, with restrictive quotas set for biographies.) Southern and Eastern Europeans. Immigration

Why from Asia was closed down, and the rule ico. The debate has focused on the new Asian of exclusion extended to a wide range of immigration from Latin America, the Americans are discriminatory legislation in the western region sending the largest flow of immi- Becoming states designed to drive Asians into ra - grants, many of them unauthorized.1 Mainstream cially segregated enclaves. High-volume Asian immigration to the It took the emergence of a new political United States has now been continuous consensus born in the civil rights move- for nearly a half-century, constituting the ment for the federal government to enact longest lasting legal immigration from the watershed legislation that guided Asia in American history. In an exponen- institutional change and extended equal tial increase over the 1970 census count of rights and opportunities to nonwhite 1.5 million, Asian Americans grew to Americans. This civil rights legislation exceed 17.2 million by 2010, making up af½rmed principles of open access to 5.6 percent of the U.S. population.2 This political and economic institutions for all rapid increase is primarily due to contin- Americans, regardless of race and gender. uous and now accelerating immigration, Concomitantly, Congress passed with bi - such that in 2010, foreign-born Asians partisan support the Immigration Act of outnumbered native-born Asian Ameri- 1965, an international counterpart to the cans by a ratio of two to one. Since 2008, far-reaching Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 40 percent of new immigrants are Asian, Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Immigra- up from 27 percent of new arrivals before tion Act repealed national-origin rules 2005.3 If present population trends con- and opened legal immigration to all tinue, the Asian American population countries. has been estimated to grow to around Once legal immigration was open to all 9.2 percent of the American population countries, documented entry was then by 2050.4 directly connected with access to inclusive Unlike previous waves of the nine- political and economic institutions. Im - teenth and early twentieth centuries, the migrants with appropriate visa documents new Asian immigration has not spawned could enter the United States as perma- reactive nativist social movements and nent residents and, through a sequential politics demanding the exclusion of transition culminating in approved appli- Asians. Rather, Asian immigrants and the cation for naturalized citizenship, could second generation are assimilating into the gain access to mainstream American in - American mainstream more rapidly than stitutions. earlier immigrants to the United States.5 In combination, these sweeping legal Whether in integrated residential com- changes have reshaped American society. munities, in colleges and universities, or Though not anticipated by political elites in mainstream workplaces, Asian Ameri- in the 1960s, the new immigration law cans’ presence is ever more the rule than opened the way for mass immigration the exception. What accounts for their from Asia, and as a very unintended con- success? sequence, from Latin America as well. And in light of the rapidly changing de - It is commonplace to portray Asian mographic composition of the American Americans as a model minority. Socio- population, immigration is once again logical accounts of Japanese American inspiring national debate. There is again assimilation, for example, emphasize that a rising tide of nativist backlash, especially through acculturation, the nisei second in the states that share borders with Mex- generation adopted the cultural attri-

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butes of the Anglo Protestant majority model minority account–it’s much harder Victor Nee group, which then led to their assimila- to cross the ocean than to walk across a & Hilary Holbrow tion into the American mainstream after border. Accordingly, formal rules govern- World War II.6 During that war, Japanese ing immigration have played a far greater Americans responded to racial prejudice role in shaping the flow of Asian immi- and internment by exemplifying the grants and their subsequent experience American creed, evidenced in the patri- than has been the case for immigration otism and sacri½ce of nisei soldiers on the from Mexico and Central America. While battle½elds of Europe. Retelling a variant immigration law speci½es the initial selec- of the model minority story for the new tion mechanisms, entry through formal Asian immigration relies on a ready-made channels also provides immigrants with conceptual template identifying group- the bene½ts and protection of equality of level attributes that enable the group’s rights and other civil laws. acceptance and entry into the main- In a democratic polity governed by the stream.7 Various accounts invoke “Asian rule of law, legal equality matters not values” such as a reverence for learning, only because of, but also despite the persis- emphasis on the family, or dedication to tence of racial prejudice embedded in hard work as the explanation for Asian cultural beliefs, informal norms, social Americans’ high levels of educational and networks, and organizations.10 This is professional attainment. be cause the rule of law is widely accepted What is overlooked in model minority and supported as a bedrock assumption accounts and in narratives of discrimina- by ordinary Americans, despite frequent tion is the fact that institutional mecha- outbursts of partisan politics and con- nisms–the forces that set the rules of the tentious differences over the content of game–play a signi½cant role in explain- speci½c laws. Although most Americans ing differential patterns of socioeconomic may not have agreed with the content of attainment and assimilation of immi- congressional civil rights legislation, grants and their children. In light of the once those initiatives were enacted as law, long history of racial discrimination and institutional mechanisms implemented exclusion of Asians, it took the institu- the changes over time and worked them tional changes of the civil rights era to into the American mainstream. restart high-volume immigration from A centerpiece of the civil rights era leg- Asia, and to extend legal rights to all islative struggle was the passage of Title Americans. This has enabled and moti- VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which vated the economic and social assimilation speci½ed the rules of equal employment of Asian immigrants and their children.8 opportunity to address institutionalized Although Asian immigrants include discrimination in the workplace against many different national-origin, cultural, women and minorities. The law was the and ethnic groups with considerable socio- product of a protracted battle by commit- economic diversity, a shared distinguish- ted social activists that sought equal ing feature of new immigrants from Asia treatment in the American mainstream– is that they have overwhelmingly entered in education, public accommodation, through legal channels. Only an estimated government programs, politics, and other 8 percent are undocumented, in sharp domains of civic life.11 Through a process contrast to nearly 43 percent of the foreign- of cumulative causation, a long-term bat- born from the Americas.9 A geographical tle for equal employment opportunity explanation is more plausible than a induced changes in cultural beliefs that

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Why led to greater corporate and public ac - case for unskilled laborers with little for- Asian ceptance of these laws. Though racial and mal education. Such workers do not risk Americans are gender stereotypes persist and can influ- lower returns on their human capital Becoming ence hiring decisions, a self-reinforcing through undocumented border crossing.13 Mainstream compliance with Title VII in corporations, But low-skilled immigrants face particu- public agencies, and nonpro½t organiza- lar dif½culties in America’s twenty-½rst- tions has helped open mainstream insti- century knowledge-based economy, with tutions to women and minorities.12 far-reaching implications for inequality.14 Studies that contrast differential pat- Second, illegal border entry leaves terns of socioeconomic attainment and immigrants vulnerable to exploitation in outcomes of assimilation without taking informal labor markets, where they can into account the relative proportion of become locked into dead-end and irregu- documented and undocumented new- lar jobs.15 Undocumented immigrants comers in an immigrant group confound typically try to avoid contact with main- the persistent influence of legal–or ille- stream political and economic institu- gal–status with the putative effects of tions and instead concentrate in unregu- discrimination and cultural difference. lated labor markets, controlled by co- Causal factors that influence mode of ethnic labor contractors, in order to incorporation are both complex and sub- lower the risk of discovery by authorities. tle in the manner they interact and com- Accordingly, the wage growth for illegal bine to shape the economic and social immigrants is low compared to that for assimilation of immigrants. But in and of natives or legal immigrants.16 Further- itself, legal–or illegal–status clearly has more, undocumented immigrants lack the potentially far-reaching effects on incor- access to legal recourse that documented poration into U.S. society. immigrants possess. Whereas immigrants who enter the Third, the many disadvantages that United States through legal channels come with undocumented status are in- bene½t from the civil rights era legisla- evitably passed on by immigrant parents tion that extends to racial minorities to their children, adversely influencing equal rights and formal access to eco- the second generation’s prospects for nomic and social institutions of the school ing and assimilation.17 Not only American mainstream, undocumented do the children of poorly educated par- immigrants do not bene½t from the same ents start out their lives at relative disad- open access to these institutions. They vantage com pared to most Americans, are signi½cantly disadvantaged in this but even in households with greater cul- and other respects. tural capital, the constant danger of First of all, in illegal entry, the de facto deportation disrupts children’s school selection mechanism recruits labor mi - and family life. Further, parents’ immigrants particularly likely to have low lev- gration status may block the children’s els of formal schooling and skill. Profes- access to public institutions and re - sional and technical immigrants with sources useful to their education and university education are unlikely candi- well-being. Children of unauthorized dates for entry without a proper visa, for immigrants are much more likely to live they would not be able to ½nd more gain- in poverty, and less likely to have health ful employment without documentation insurance, for example, than children of in the United States than what they could documented immigrants and the native ½nd in their native society. This is not the born.18 Illegal entry thus has a long-lasting

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influence on the second-generation chil- of recent Asian immigrants holding Victor Nee dren. bachelor’s degrees.24 & Hilary Holbrow Lastly, a very high ratio of undocu- These remarkably high levels spring mented immigration casts a long shadow from the selectivity and incentives em - of illegitimacy and stigma on even legal bedded in the rules, guidelines, and pri- immigrants of the same ethnicity.19 orities of U.S. immigration laws, as well Although more than 1 million illegal as the allure of an advanced degree in the immigrants from China, the Philippines, United States. None of the Asian soci- India, South Korea, and Vietnam also eties contributing to the flow of immi- contribute to the Asian immigrant popu- grants have anything close to the percent- lation of more than 17.2 million, the great age of professional and technical workers majority of Asian newcomers enter the with college and postgraduate education United States as legal immigrants, and as foreign-born Asians in the United they de½ne the dominant pro½le of Asian States. Many of the best educated, best immigration.20 Suppose the opposite prepared, and most motivated from these were true, and undocumented Asian countries choose to come to America immigrants by far exceeded the number because of opportunities secured by equal of legal immigrants. This scenario would opportunity laws and the sequential suggest a very different pro½le for the process of work permissions, green cards, immigrant group–in terms of public and naturalization that grants immi- perception, in terms of immigrant char- grants the bene½ts of these legal protec- acteristics, and in terms of opportunity in tions. Outside the framework of legal American society. immigration and the normative regime emerging from the civil rights movement, Asian Americans are the most educated such high levels of educated immigrants ethnic group in the United States, with would be unthinkable. mean education levels that have risen Although Asian Americans make up rapidly over the past decades. In the 1970 only 5.5 percent of the workforce, they census, 20 percent of Asian Americans are disproportionately concentrated in reported that they had earned college the core technological occupations, where degrees, but by the 2010 census, the col- there is a persistent shortage of skilled lege educated rose to 52 percent, includ- labor.25 It is commonplace for high-tech ing both native and foreign born.21 This ½rms to recruit skilled workers and engi- rise is even sharper than that for native- neers from the Asian foreign-student pop- born whites, and demonstrates the scale ulation in American universities. These and impact of human capital immigrants workers are vital to the high-tech sectors from Asia after 1965.22 Of these new where America’s innovative edge creates immigrants, Asian Indians are the best an advantage in the global economy; educated, with a remarkable 70 percent high-tech industry leaders and research of the ½rst generation being university universities constantly lobby for legisla- educated. Chinese, Korean, Japanese, tion that will enable a high flow of and Filipino immigrants also stand out human capital immigrants to meet this with college graduation rates at around demand. 50 percent, still well above the U.S. Asian immigrants are not just valuable mean.23 The trend in recent years is employees–they are also job creators. toward still higher levels of education Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of New among new arrivals, with a full 61 percent York City, called for bipartisan support in

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Why the presidential election season for new their assimilation into the American Asian legislation to make it easier for immi- mainstream.31 Americans are grants to secure visas. He underscored Further, within many Asian ethnic Becoming the selectivity for entrepreneurial talent communities, the sheer volume of human Mainstream linked to immigration, pointing to a new capital immigration has a spillover effect study showing that immigrant entrepre- in the high educational expectations of neurs start up 28 percent of new ½rms in immigrant parents with less formal edu- the United States, which employ one in cation.32 When the ethnic community is ten workers in the American economy.26 well-educated on the whole and when un - Asian entrepreneurs are an important documented immigrants are a small pro- contributor to this total. For example, in portion of the overall immigrant group, Silicon Valley, 17 percent of the high-tech random interactions with coethnics are start-up ½rms in the last two decades of more likely to yield information identify- the twentieth century were led by Chi- ing open-access pathways to legitimate nese immigrant entrepreneurs.27 opportunities for their native-born chil- One comparative advantage of immi- dren.33 grant entrepreneurs in high-tech start- For example, while 50 percent of Chi- ups is that they typically have business nese immigrants have earned at least a know-how and strategic connections in bachelor’s degree, over 17 percent lack their homeland as well as in the United high school diplomas, showing a sub- States.28 Chinese and Indian immigrant group of poor, and in some cases illegal, entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley are bro- working-class immigrants. By the second kers who occupy “structural holes,” bridg- generation, however, Chinese Americans ing gaps between independent regional are among the best educated of the Asian clusters of resources and markets.29 ethnic groups, with 61.5 percent of U.S.- Their language competencies, cultural born Chinese completing college educa- capital, and transnational-network ties tion.34 A study of the immigrant second enable immigrant entrepreneurs to func- generation in New York City reports that tion as “visible hands” in the globaliza- working-class Chinese parents in China- tion of the knowledge-based economy. town, where undocumented immigrants The professional attainments and edu- generally reside, have been surprisingly cational backgrounds of many Asian effective in placing their American-born immigrants provide the second genera- children in good public schools.35 tion with a head start in socioeconomic These young people–the American- attainment and assimilation.30 As par- born children of post-1965 immigrants– ents, they have high educational expecta- are coming of age. They and the generations for their American-born children, tion of Asian Americans who came to and their high socioeconomic status America as children (generation one- means that lateral mobility suf½ces for and-a-half ) are entering the workforce in their children to achieve higher mean ever-larger numbers, well positioned to educational attainment than non-His- meet the growing demand for skilled and panic whites. Not surprisingly, second- professional workers in the U.S. knowl- generation Asian Indian and Chinese edge-based economy.36 Relatively few human capital immigrants are overrepre- are taking the low-skilled service jobs sented in selective colleges and universi- where their immigrant parents some- ties, where they accumulate the cultural times found employment. In New York capital and network ties that fast-track City, the children of Chinese immigrants

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for the most part are not in the low-status not point to discrimination as much as to Victor Nee jobs in Chinatown.37 Instead, with native- subtle human capital differences between & Hilary Holbrow English language competence and cultural immigrants and natives. Poor English capital, second-generation Asian Ameri- skills, lack of connections, insuf½cient cans are moving into occupational ½elds knowledge of U.S. society, and the mis- outside the tech industry, where Asians match between a foreign education and have historically been underrepresented, the expectations of U.S. employers can all including law, media and arts, community adversely affect newcomers’ employ- services, and even the military. Although ment opportunities and wages. When Asian American representation in these immigrants’ place of education is taken occupational ½elds–except for media and into account, the apparent earnings dis- the arts–remains lower than the overall parity vanishes.41 This, along with the Asian share of the workforce, the native- near parity achieved in the second gener- born Asian population is signi½cantly ation, shows that institutional changes in overrepresented in these sectors.38 education and the economy have moved The rapid integration of the second American society away from the histori- generation clearly shows an American cal exclusion of and harsh discrimination mainstream where institutions have against Asian Americans. become more inclusive. In the post–civil rights era, cultural beliefs and norms sup- The assimilation of Asian immigrants is porting diversity in workplaces are be- testament to the institutional changes coming self-reinforcing expectations. that link civil rights and immigration Analysis of earnings likewise demon- reform. On one hand, immigration law strates the far-reaching effects of institu- and policy have enabled millions of well- tional change on employment and the educated Asians to immigrate legally to economy. In the 1950s, U.S.-born Japanese this country; on the other hand, inclusive American and Chinese American men institutions mandated by civil rights leg- respectively earned 37 percent and 44 per- islation have lowered barriers and paved cent less than comparable native whites.39 the way for these immigrants to enter the Today, this historical earnings gap has all mainstream of civil society. The success but vanished. In part because many Asian of Asian immigrants and their children in Americans work in highly remunerative a new era of high-volume immigration ½elds, native-born Asians from the largest suggests that institutional changes of the ethnic groups earn incomes that surpass civil rights era have led to a more inclu- those of whites. This is not only an arti- sive and open American society–at least fact of Asians’ high educational achieve- for those whose legal status enables them ment, but also a reflection of the vast to access mainstream institutions. progress toward equal pay for equal work The legal status of immigrants at the guaranteed under the law. In sharp con- point of entry is signi½cant in explaining trast to the 1950s, native-born Asians’ their socioeconomic attainment and as - incomes are at parity, or nearly so, with similation. To contrast differential pat- whites of similar occupation and human terns of socioeconomic attainment and capital.40 assimilation in immigrant groups without Although ½rst-generation immigrants considering the relative proportion of (with the notable exception of Indians) documented and undocumented immi- earn lower personal incomes on average grants is to confuse the persistent influ- than native-born whites, this fact does ence of documentation, or lack thereof,

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Why with the putative effects of societal dis- which ethnoracial boundaries harden, Asian crimination. “Downward” or “segmented” leading to a balkanized American future. Americans are assimilation should not be attributed But the mainstream success of so many Becoming solely to discrimination and historical Asian American immigrants suggests Mainstream ethnoracial hierarchies, but also to en - that race may not be such a decisive fac- dogenous selectivity in undocumented tor in shaping socioeconomic attainment entry and the attendant economic and as it was in the American past, and that legal barriers that result from violating assimilation still is as characteristic of the rules of the game. the course of contemporary immigration The predominance of nonwhite immi- as it was for earlier immigration from gration since 1965 has led some to focus Europe. In an increasingly inclusive on race as a decisive factor in the incor- mainstream, the signi½cance of race has poration of immigrants and their chil- declined considerably. Rather, patterns dren. In Who Are We?, the late political of legal and illegal entry are more consis- scientist Samuel Huntington conjectured tently determinative of immigrant access that America is becoming a society in to mainstream opportunities.

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: VICTOR NEE is the Frank and Rosa Rhodes Professor of Sociology at Cornell University, where he is also Director of the Center for the Study of Economy and Society. His publications include Capitalism From Below: Markets and Institutional Change in China (with Sonja Opper, 2012), Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Con- temporary Immigration (with Richard Alba, 2003), and The Economic Sociology of Capitalism (edited with Richard Swedberg, 2005). HILARY HOLBROW is a Ph.D. student in the Sociology Department at Cornell University. Her research interests include sociology of immigration, norm diffusion, economic sociology, and East Asian societies. 1 Controversy over immigration is focused on illegal immigration, estimated to involve eleven million people. American national identity and ideology are inexorably linked to cultural beliefs of a nation peopled through immigration. Thus, public support for legal immigration remains strong despite the contentious politics centered on illegal immigration. In 2011, 59 percent of Americans said that immigration is a good thing for America; see Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans’ Views on Immigration Holding Steady,” Gallup Politics, June 22, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148154/Americans-Views-Immigration-Holding-Steady.aspx. 2 This ½gure includes a growing biracial population of 2.6 million. 3 Nathan P. Walters and Edward N. Trevelyan, “The Newly Arrived Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 2010” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, November 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-16.pdf. 4 The U.S. Census Bureau projects 9.2 percent, but in the General Social Survey, Americans already believe that Asians make up 10 percent of the American population; see “An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury” (Washington, D.C.: U.S Census Bureau, August 2008), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb08-123.html; and Richard Alba, Rubén G. Rumbaut, and Karen Marotz, “A Distorted Nation: Perceptions of Racial/Ethnic Group Sizes and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Other Minorities,” Social Forces 84 (2) (2005): 901–919. 5 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contempo- rary Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); John Iceland, Where

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We Live Now: Immigration and Race in the United States (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University Victor Nee of California Press, 2009); and Jennifer Lee and Frank D. Bean, The Diversity Paradox: Immi- & Hilary gration and the Color Line in 21st Century America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). Holbrow 6 Harry H.L. Kitano, Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976). 7 Won M. Hurh and Kwang C. Kim, “The ‘Success’ Image of Asian Americans: Its Validity, and Its Practical and Theoretical Implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 12 (1989): 512–538; Grace Kao, “Asian-Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Perfor - mance,” American Journal of Education 103 (1995): 121–159; and Kimberly Goyette and Yu Xie, “Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths: Determinants and Ethnic Dif- ferences,” Sociology of Education 72 (1999): 22–36. 8 Victor Nee and Richard Alba, “Assimilation as Rational Action in Contexts De½ned by Insti- tutions and Boundaries,” in Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research, ed. Rafael Wittek, Thomas Snijders, and Victor Nee (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013), 355–380. 9 Calculated from U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimates of illegal immigrants and U.S Census Bureau estimates of the foreign-born population; see Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois _ill_pe_2010.pdf; and Elizabeth M. Grieco et al., “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, May 2012), http://www.census.gov/ prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf. 10 Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream. 11 Paul Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 12 Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011). 13 Over 29 percent of illegal immigrants never graduated from high school, compared to 12 percent among legal immigrants; and only 15 percent of illegal immigrants have college degrees, compared to 35 percent among legal immigrants. See Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, April 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/a-portrait-of -unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/. 14 George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 15 Jimy M. Sanders and Victor Nee, “Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy,” American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 745–773; Reynolds Farley, The New American Reality: Who We Are, How We Got Here, Where We Are Going (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), 191; Terry Hum, “A Protected Niche? Immigrant Ethnic Economies and Labor Mar- ket Segmentation,” in Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles, ed. Lawrence D. Bobo, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson Jr., and Abel Valensuela Jr. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000); Edna Bonacich and Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel Industry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000); and Yu Xie and Margaret Gough, “Ethnic Enclaves and the Earnings of Immigrants,” Demography 48 (2011): 1293–1315. 16 Passel and Cohn, “A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States.” 17 Frank D. Bean, Mark A. Leach, Susan K. Brown, James D. Bachmeier, and John R. Hipp, “The Educational Legacy of Unauthorized Migration: Comparisons Across U.S.-Immigrant Groups in How Parents’ Status Affects Their Offspring,” International Migration Review 45 (2011): 348–385. 18 Passel and Cohn, “A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States.”

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Why 19 Douglas Massey shows that the volume of undocumented immigrants entering from Mexi- Asian co increased sharply in the late 1980s and through the 1990s after the passage of the Immi- Americans gration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Consistent with the stigma hypothesis, as the are undocumented immigrant population approached 50 percent of the Mexican American Becoming Mainstream population, the wages for documented and undocumented Mexican immigrants converged; see Douglas S. Massey, “Understanding America’s Immigration ‘Crisis,’” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 151 (September 2007): 309–327. 20 The Department of Homeland Security estimates that in 2011 there were 280,000 illegal immigrants from China, 270,000 from the Philippines, 240,000 from India, 230,000 from Korea, and 170,000 from Vietnam. Together, all undocumented Asian immigrants make up approximately 11 percent of the unauthorized immigrant population. By contrast, an estimated 8.9 million (77 percent) of the total 11.5 million undocumented immigrants were from North America (including Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America). The largest source of undocumented immigrants was Mexico, estimated at 6.8 million, or about 59 percent of the unauthorized immigrant population. See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf. 21 Table 1, “Educational Attainment of the Population 18 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2010” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011), http://www .census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2010/tables.html. 22 Not all ethnicities share these human capital characteristics. Reflecting the legacy of America’s war in Indochina, Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, and Hmong refugees have also settled in the United States. In the ½rst generation, the educational pro½les for these groups are not only lower than those of other Asian immigrants, but also lower than that of the United States as a whole. 23 From authors’ analysis of pums data; Steven Ruggles, J. T. Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2010 [Machine-Readable Database] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010), https://usa.ipums.org/usa/. 24 “The Rise of Asian Americans,” Pew Research Center, June 19, 2012, http://www.pewsocial trends.org/2012/06/19/the-rise-of-asian-americans/. 25 From authors’ analysis of pums data; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 26“Open for Business: How Immigrants are Driving Small Business Creation in the United States,” The Partnership for a New American Economy, August 2012, http://www.renew oureconomy.org/index.php?q=open-for-business. 27 Jennifer Holdaway, “China Outside the People’s Republic of China,” in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 28 AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 29 Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- vard University Press, 1995). 30 Bean et al., “The Educational Legacy of Unauthorized Immigration.” 31 Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream; and Yu Xie and Kimberly Goyette, “Social Mobility and the Educational Choices of Asian Americans,” Social Science Research 32 (2003): 467–498. 32 Goyette and Xie, “Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths.” 33 Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; and Cam-

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bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008); and Clemens Kroneberg, “Ethnic Commu- Victor Nee nities and School Performance among the New Second Generation in the United States: & Hilary Testing the Theory of Segmented Assimilation,” Annals of the American Academy of Political Holbrow and Social Science 620 (2008): 138–160. 34 For foreign-born Asian U.S. residents twenty-½ve and older, from authors’ analysis of pums data; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 35 Kasinitz et al., Inheriting the City. 36 The professional and white-collar jobs left vacant by retiring baby boomers open up vacancy chains; see Richard D. Alba, Blurring the Color Line: The New Change for a More Integrated America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 37 Kasinitz et al., Inheriting the City. 38 From authors’ analysis of pums data; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 39 Arthur Sakamoto, Huei-Hsia Wu, and Jessie M. Tzeng, “The Declining Signi½cance of Race among American Men during the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century,” Demography 37 (2000): 41–51. 40John Iceland, “Earnings Returns to Occupational Status: Are Asian Americans Disadvantaged?” Social Science Research 28 (1999): 45–65; Sakamoto et al., “The Declining Signi½cance of Race among American Men during the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century”; and Chang Hwan Kim and Arthur Sakamoto, “Have Asian American Men Achieved Labor Market Parity with White Men?” American Sociological Review 75 (2010): 934–957. 41 Zhen Zeng and Yu Xie, “Asian-Americans’ Earnings Disadvantage Reexamined: The Role of Place of Education,” American Journal of Sociology 109 (2004): 1075–1108.

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Contemporary Immigrant Gateways in Historical Perspective

Audrey Singer

Abstract: This article focuses on settlement trends of immigrants during the periods that bookend the twentieth century, both eras of mass migration. It compares settlement patterns in both periods, describing old and new gateways, the growth of the immigrant population, and geographic concentration and dispersion. Historically, immigrants have been highly concentrated in a few places. Between 1930 and 1990, more than half of all immigrants lived in just ½ve metropolitan areas. Since then, the share of these few destinations has declined, as immigrants have made their way to new metro areas, particularly in the South and West. During the same period, immigrants began to choose the suburbs over cities, following the decentralization of jobs and the movement of opportunities to suburban areas. There are now more immigrants in U.S. suburban areas than cities.

New immigrant settlement trends have reshaped communities across the United States. The history of immigrant urban enclaves has been fundamentally altered by the post–World War II restructuring of the U.S. economy, the decentralization of cities, and the growth of suburbs as major employment centers. The contemporary immigration “map” has multiple implications for the social, economic, civic, and political integration of immigrants. AUDREY SINGER is a Senior Fellow Similar transformative processes also character- in the Metropolitan Policy Program ized the turn of the twentieth century, when the at the Brookings Institution. She edited Twenty-First Century Gate- United States was shifting from an agrarian to an ways: Immigrant Incorporation in industrial economy, inducing both an exodus from Suburban America (with Susan W. rural areas to cities and mass immigration, mainly Hardwick and Caroline B. Brettell, from Europe. At that time, immigrants signi½cantly 2008) and has authored or co- altered neighborhoods in burgeoning cities, some authored numerous Brookings re- of which are still de½ned by the immigrants who ports, including “The Rise of New settled there during that period. Immigrant Gateways,” “State of Metropolitan America: On the Today, these processes are taking place in new Front Lines of Demographic Trans - geographies and through different industrial tran- formation,” and “The Geography sitions. During both periods, the content and the of Immigrant Skills.” location of working life changed. At the turn of the

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twentieth century, the U.S. economy new gateways, the growth of the immi- Audrey moved from agriculture toward manu- grant population, and geographic con- Singer facturing, and the population shifted centration and dispersion. The rise of from rural to urban areas. The turn of the suburban settlement patterns is exam- twenty-½rst century has been character- ined in the contemporary period. ized by a transition from manufacturing to “new economy” technology and ser - This analysis examines the size and dis- vice jobs, and a population movement tribution of the foreign-born population from urban to suburban and exurban for the period between 1900 and 2010. areas. Much of the analysis focuses on 1900, rep - The historical immigrant settlement resenting the beginning of the twentieth narrative typically begins with immi- century, and 2010, representing the begin- grants arriving at Ellis Island or the ports ning of the twenty-½rst century. County- of California, before making their way to level data from decennial censuses for the ethnic neighborhoods in cities such as years 1900 to 1950 and 1970 to 2000 were New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chi - accessed via the Minnesota Population cago, St. Louis, or San Francisco. As these Center’s National Historical Geographic communities developed, immigrants Information System (nhgis).1 Due to worked in local establishments, started sampling errors noted by the Minnesota their own businesses, sent their children Population Center, data for the year 1960 to local schools, and organized places of were extracted directly from Census worship. Bureau digital uploads of the U.S. Census Building on this history, the contempo- of Population: 1960, vol. 1, Characteristics of rary story entails the arrival of immi- the Population.2 For 2010, American Com- grants to established immigrant gate- munity Survey (acs) 2006–2010 5-year ways with well-de½ned service infra- estimates were accessed from the Census structures and a receptivity that aids the Bureau because comparable data at the integration process. But it also includes a county level are not available from 1-year large number of immigrants streaming to estimates of the acs. newer destinations. These new gateways While “metropolitan areas” as we know have emerged over the past two decades, them today did not exist at the turn of the creating a different context for integra- twentieth century, consistent metropolitan tion and eliciting a mixed response from de½nitions based on 2010 Of½ce of Man- local communities. In some areas, immi- agement and Budget (omb) de½nitions grants have been welcomed, while in oth- are used throughout the analysis in order ers they have stimulated conflict. Rapid to standardize data comparisons. Metro- demographic shifts in the newest gate- politan immigration estimates were con- ways often have an impact on public structed from individual county-level institutions, whose adjustments to the data. Thus, metropolitan area de½nitions changes unfold across immigrant and are applied to data from 1900, even though native-born communities that may be population was heavily concentrated in unprepared for change. This article the cities of those areas, and suburbs focuses on settlement trends of immi- were not yet well developed. Metropoli- grants in the two periods that bookend tan areas are composed of counties or the twentieth century, both eras of mass county equivalents and are ranked accord- immigration. It compares settlement pating to the one hundred most populous terns in both periods, describing old and metro areas of each decade.

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Contem - Two trends emerge from a review of the remaining 266 are the “small metro- porary the share of foreign-born populations politan areas.” The remainder of the pop- Immigrant Gateways residing in the primary urban counties of ulation lives in rural or non-metropolitan in the metropolitan areas with the largest areas. The 100 largest metropolitan areas Historical Perspective immigrant populations. For contempo- are de½ned by the Brookings Metropolitan rary metropolitan areas that developed Policy Program’s State of Metropolitan prior to World War II, the share of the America Indicator Map.3 Primary cities immigrant population in the primary are de½ned as the largest city in each met- urban county is generally high in the ½rst ropolitan area, plus all other incorporat- half of the century. As immigrants began ed places with populations of at least to suburbanize in the second half of the 100,000. Suburbs are designated as the century, this share diminished; St. Louis, remainder of the metro areas outside pri- Baltimore, and Portland, Oregon, follow mary cities. this pattern. For newer metropolitan The terms immigrant and foreign born are areas that experienced development after used interchangeably here to refer to per- the advent of the automobile, the trend sons born outside the United States, tends to be different. The share of immi- excluding those born to American citi- grants in the primary urban county, often zens abroad. Immigrant status is deter- only a small city or town in the early mined by a question about birthplace in twentieth century, is small, reflecting a the census questionnaire. This question more rural foreign-born population. The varies somewhat over the twentieth cen- share of the immigrant population in the tury, but foreign-born population and primary urban county increases over total population were determined for time, as the region surrounding the cities each year at the metropolitan level. becomes denser. This pattern is particularly evident in states such as Texas, During the turn of both the twentieth which shares a border with Mexico, and and twenty-½rst centuries, immigration which has a signi½cant Mexican immi- levels were high, and the share of the grant population, especially in cities such population that was foreign born was at a as Houston and Austin. Areas that tend to peak. In this regard, America at the turn have a consistently low share of immi- of the twenty-½rst century bears some grants residing in the primary urban similarities to America at the turn of the county are those that have recently twentieth century. In 1900, immigrants emerged or reemerged as immigrant made up nearly 14 percent of the U.S. gateways and that have a largely subur- population; in 2010, they composed 13 ban population, such as Salt Lake City, percent of the total. However, in absolute Denver, and Sacramento. terms, the number of immigrants has Currently, the omb de½nes 366 metro- quadrupled, from 10 million in 1900 to politan areas in the United States, all of nearly 40 million today. which are included in this study. Thirty- For several decades prior to 1900, seven percent of U.S. counties (1,168) are immigrants arrived in great numbers. located in metropolitan areas. In this Between 1860 and 1900, the immigrant analysis, “metropolitan area” is used to population grew by more than 6 million describe all urban places, including those persons, growing by 35 percent between at the beginning of the twentieth century. 1860 and 1870 and then varying in growth The 100 largest metropolitan areas in 2010 rates between 12 and 38 percent per constitute “large metropolitan areas”; decade (see Table 1). Between 1900 and

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Table 1 Audrey Foreign-Born Population, including Its Share of the Total Population and Singer Its Change from the Previous Decade, 1860–2010

Change from Previous Decade Foreign Born Share of Total Number Growth Rate 1860 4,138,697 13.2% –– 1870 5,567,229 14.4% 1,428,532 35% 1880 6,679,943 13.3% 1,112,714 20% 1890 9,249,547 14.8% 2,569,604 38% 1900 10,341,276 13.6% 1,091,729 12% 1910 13,515,886 14.7% 3,174,610 31% 1920 13,920,692 13.2% 404,806 3% 1930 14,204,149 11.6% 283,457 2% 1940 11,594,896 8.8% -2,609,253 -18% 1950 10,347,395 6.9% -1,247,501 -11% 1960 9,738,091 5.4% -609,304 -6% 1970 9,619,302 4.7% -118,789 -1% 1980 14,079,906 6.2% 4,460,604 46% 1990 19,767,316 7.9% 5,687,410 40% 2000 31,107,889 11.1% 11,340,573 57% 2010 39,955,854 12.9% 8,847,965 28%

Source: Author’s calculations of 1860–2000 data via Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statis- tics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, February 2006), http://www.census.gov/population/www/ documentation/twps0081/twps0081.html; and 2010 acs 1-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

1910, the immigrant population grew by a between 1970 and 2010. The greatest whopping 3.2 million, a rate of 31 percent, increase came in the 1990s, when more yielding a U.S. population in 1910 that than 11.3 million immigrants arrived, a was nearly 15 percent foreign born. growth of 57 percent. Immigration in the What followed were six decades of 2000s slowed a bit after the recession; much lower immigration levels, as the still, nearly 9 million immigrants arrived, Great Depression and two world wars boosting the U.S. foreign-born popula- curtailed immigration worldwide. This tion to nearly 13 percent, the highest slow and, at times, negative growth of the share since 1920. immigrant population, coupled with During the 1960s and 1970s, changes in restrictive immigration policy and the U.S. admissions policy regarding national mid-century baby boom, rendered a origins as well as political and economic nation that was almost entirely native conditions in sending countries affected born. By 1960, the share of the population the composition of immigrants entering that was foreign born was less than 5 per- the United States.4 Thus, the two periods cent, amounting to fewer than 10 million also differ greatly in the regional origins immigrants. of immigrants. In 1900, the vast majority Between 1970 and 1980, immigration of the 10 million immigrants residing in began to pick up again in earnest, in- the United States were from European creasing steadily over the four decades countries, but by 2010, Europeans made

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Contem - up less than 13 percent of all immigrants metropolitan areas and less than one- porary (see Table 2). At the turn of the twentieth quarter lived in rural areas in 1900. In Immigrant Gateways century, 11 percent of immigrants were contrast, 58 percent of the native-born in from Northern America (in addition to population lived in metro areas and 42 Historical Perspective Canada, this includes Bermuda, Green- percent in non-metropolitan areas. By land, and St. Pierre and Miquelon). Mex- 2010, 95 percent of foreign-born residents ican immigrants then made up only 1 per- lived in metropolitan America, as com- cent of the total, as did immigrants from pared with only 81 percent of the native all Asian countries combined. The re- born. Among the large metropolitan areas mainder of Latin America, Africa, and in 1900, the majority of the foreign born Oceania each contributed less than 1 per- lived in the Northeast (41 percent) and cent of the total. By 2010, however, immi- Midwest (20 percent). Only a small share grants from Mexico had the largest share lived in large metro areas in the South of the total, at 30 percent. The rest of (3 percent) and the West (3 percent), and Latin America contributed 23 percent another 10 percent lived in smaller met- and all Asian countries combined were ropolitan areas (see Figure 2). another 28 percent of the total. Africans By 2010, however, the large metropoli- comprised 4 percent, Northern America tan areas in the Northeast housed only 20 2 percent, and immigrants from Oceania percent of the immigrant population and less than 1 percent. the Midwest dropped to only 9 percent of As the United States has urbanized and the total, reflecting broader population developed, the destinations of immi- shifts to the South and West. Metropoli- grants have shifted. While the United tan areas in the South (25 percent) and States developed from a largely rural to a the West (31 percent) are now home to largely urban society, the number and more than half of all immigrants. Small density of cities increased.5 Eventually, metro areas make up another 10 percent the cities themselves expanded, growing of the total. from dense urban cores to metropolitan areas with large suburban areas extend- Immigrants were drawn to cities that ing outward. were flourishing at the turn of the twenti- Immigrant workers contributed mightily eth century. Indeed, metropolitan immi- to the workforce during the industrial grant settlement was highly concentrated transformation of the U.S. economy. (see Figure 3).7 For most of the century, Sociologists Charles Hirschman and Eliza - just ½ve cities ruled as major settlement beth Mogford estimate that immigrants areas, where half of all immigrants chose and their children held half of all U.S. to live. New York is by far the dominant manufacturing jobs by 1920.6 Thus, the destination, garnering at least one-quarter industrializing cities of the Northeast and of all immigrants for each decade through- Midwest attracted workers to manufac- out most of the century. No other metro- turing jobs in great numbers, and immi- politan area comes close to that share grants played a major role in the process until 1990, when Los Angeles matches of urbanization. Indeed, 67 percent of all New York’s share at 19 percent, or 3.4 mil- immigrants lived in the largest metropol- lion immigrants each. Only New York and itan areas in 1900, as compared to just 44 Chicago make the top-½ve list for every percent of the native born (see Figure 1). decade between 1900 and 2010. New York Including small “metros,” more than is ranked ½rst (with the exception of 1990, three-quarters of immigrants lived in when it shares that rank with Los Angeles)

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Table 2 Audrey Foreign-Born Population by Region or Country of Birth, 1900 and 2010 Singer

1900 2010 Region or Country Number Share Number Share Europe 8,881,548 86.0% 4,817,437 12.1% Asia 120,248 1.2% 11,283,574 28.2% Africa 2,538 <0.1% 1,606,914 4.0% Oceania 8,820 0.1% 216,736 0.5% Latin America (excluding Mexico) 34,065 0.3% 9,512,984 23.8% Mexico 103,393 1.0% 11,711,103 29.3% Northern America 1,179,922 11.4% 806,925 2.0% Total 10,330,534 39,955,673

The table excludes unreported country of birth (1900 only). Source: Author’s calculations of 1860–2000 data via Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, February 2006), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.html; and 2010 acs 1-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

Figure 1 Metropolitan/Non-Metropolitan Residence by Nativity, 1900 and 2010

Source: Author’s calculations of 1900 Decennial Census data accessed via Minnesota Population Center’s National Historical Geographic Information System, http://www.nhgis.org; and 2006–2010 acs 5-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

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Contem - Figure 2 porary Regional Share of Foreign Born in Large Metropolitan Areas, Small Metropolitan Areas, Immigrant and Non-Metropolitan Areas, 1900 and 2010 Gateways in Historical Perspective

Midwest, Northeast, South, and West divisions include the 100 largest metropolitan areas for 1900 and 2006–2010. Source: Author’s calculations of 1900 Decennial Census data accessed via Minnesota Population Center’s National Historical Geographic Information System, http://www.nhgis.org; and 2006–2010 acs 5- year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

and Chicago ranks second all the way mid-century on to assert a large share of through 1960, after which Chicago drops all immigrants living in metropolitan in rank, though all the while gaining im - America. In a similar fashion, albeit with migrants in absolute numbers.8 a smaller share among all metro areas, In the early decades of the twentieth Miami stakes out third place in the last century, industrial Philadelphia main- several decades due to an increase, ½rst, tains a rank in the top ½ve, but by 1940 it in Cuban immigrants and, later, in immi- suffers a net loss of immigrants. Pitts- grants from other Caribbean and Latin burgh, another industrial city, also appears American countries. in the ½rst three decades, only to be The concentration of immigrants after trumped by Detroit, which occupies a top 1990 is especially notable. After seven spot from 1930 to 1960 as job opportuni- continuous decades–between 1930 and ties there expanded. Boston maintains a 1990–when just ½ve metro areas housed continuous presence on the list through about half of all immigrants living in 1960, despite a net decline in the number metropolitan areas, the share declines to of immigrants. San Francisco claims a 45 percent in 2000 and 40 percent in 2010 strong and growing share from 1970 to as immigrant newcomers make their way 2010, reflecting gains in immigrants from to new metro areas, particularly in the the Paci½c Rim. Los Angeles rises from South and West. If growth trajectories of

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Figure 3 Audrey Five Largest Immigrant Populations in Metropolitan Areas as a Share Singer of All Metropolitan Areas, 1900–2010

2010 values represent 2006–2010 5-year estimates. Source: Author’s calculations of 1900–1950 and 1970–2000 Decennial Census data accessed via Minnesota Population Center’s National Historical Geographic Information System, http://www.nhgis.org; 1960 Decennial Census data accessed via U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census of Pop- ulation: 1960, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of½ce, 1963); and 2006–2010 acs 5-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

dispersal continue into the next decade, which all share a manufacturing past and the immigrant population in the ½ve no longer draw immigrants in great num- largest metropolitan areas may only bers. New England also drew immigrants amount to slightly more than one-third to jobs in Worcester, Providence, New of the total. Haven, and Boston. The big magnets of Mapping the largest immigrant popu- Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia lations within metropolitan areas in 1900 attracted large numbers of immigrants. and 2010 reveals just how dispersed the By 2010, the immigration map had foreign-born population has become (see been redrawn. While San Francisco, New Map 1). With the exception of San Fran- York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia cisco, all of the big immigrant destina- are on both maps, more notable are the tions in 1900 were in the Midwest or metro areas in the South and West that Northeast, including cities in the Great have risen to the top. Los Angeles, River- Lakes region such as Buffalo, Detroit, side, Phoenix, Dallas, and Houston are Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee, among the metro areas in the Southwest

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Contem - Map 1 porary Twenty Metropolitan Areas with the Largest Immigrant Populations, 1900 and 2010 Immigrant Gateways in Historical Perspective

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Figure 4 Audrey Percent of Foreign Born in Metropolitan Areas, by Gateway Type, 1900–2010 Singer

Source: Author’s calculations of 1900–1950, 1970–2000 Decennial Census data accessed via Minnesota Population Center’s National Historical Geographic Information System, http://www.nhgis.org; 1960 Decennial Census data accessed via U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of½ce, 1963); and 2006–2010 acs 5-year estimates.

that rank highly, along with Miami, Tampa, Cities such as Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Atlanta in the Southeast. and St. Louis, which had populations with a higher immigrant share than the The body of work that analyzes contem- national average from 1900 to 1970, fol- porary immigrant gateways in historical lowed by a lower share in every decade perspective sheds further light on the since, are former immigrant gateways. stature and composition of today’s desti- New York, Boston, San Francisco, and nations.9 A typology of immigrant gate- Chicago are the quintessential immi- ways reflects the size and geography of grant destinations, having large and sus- immigrant settlement patterns shaped by tained immigrant populations over the industrial histories, economic conditions, entire twentieth century. These are the proximity to immigrant sending countries, “major” continuous gateways responsi- and social networks.10 In the contempo- ble for much higher than average shares rary period, they vary in size and national- of immigrants for every decade of the origin composition, skills distribution, and twentieth century. In addition, the “minor” neighborhood concentration. The share continuous gateways, like their larger of the population that is foreign born, counterparts, have had long histories of aggregated by gateway type, illustrates the immigrant settlement, but the size of long-term patterns of growth and decline the immigrant population is historically within each type (see Figure 4). smaller.

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Contem - There are two groups of minor contin- had small numbers of im migrants. The porary uous gateways, most easily described by immigrant share in emerging gateways Immigrant Gateways their geographies. The ½rst group in - has been higher than the national average in cludes New England metro areas such as since 2000. Historical Perspective Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport Similar to the continuous gateways, the that attracted Europeans in the early part reemerging gateways, including Seattle, of the twentieth century, and that now the Twin Cities, and Baltimore, drew im - receive a mixture of Europeans, Carib- migrants in large numbers in the early beans, and other groups. The other group part of the twentieth century, but experi- of metropolitan areas is primarily located enced low levels of immigration during among border states, which have been the rest of the century. They then had fast long-term settlement areas for Mexican immigrant growth at the very end of the immigrants. These include Bakers½eld and twentieth century and into the 2000s, Fresno in the central valley of California reemerging as signi½cant destinations. and San Antonio and McAllen in Texas.11 Among all the gateways types, foreign- Post–World War II immigrant gate- born shares in the reemerging gateways ways such as Miami, Los Angeles, Hous- most closely mirror the national average. ton, and Washington, D.C., all emerged Other metro areas, such as Nashville, as major immigrant destinations in the Charlotte, and Columbus, have little his- second half of the twentieth century tory of immigration, but recently have (albeit in different decades). Until the seen extraordinary growth in their immi- 1960s, these places had comparatively grant populations. Still relatively small in small immigrant populations making up absolute terms and as a share of the pop- small shares of their total population, but ulation, the rates of growth in these “pre- they grew rapidly thereafter, and now emerging” gateways have been at least include some of the largest contemporary three times the national rate during the gateways. Their populations had lower past two decades. shares of immigrants than the national average for the ½rst six decades of the The newest gateways, designated century, followed by spiking rates up to “twenty-½rst-century gateways” else- the present. where, differ from the more established Due to expanding economic and hous- continuous gateways and the former ing opportunities in several regions–the gateways in that they developed largely Southeast and the Mountain West in par- as auto-dependent metropolises and thus ticular–many metropolitan areas quickly are very suburban in form.13 They tend to drew immigrants to work in construc- be large and sprawling compared to the tion, real estate, health care, and service metropolitan areas with dense cities at sector jobs. Many metropolitan areas their core that received immigrants in the that became new gateways at the turn of early twentieth century. Growth patterns the twenty-½rst century also attracted in areas such as metropolitan Atlanta and domestic migrants in large numbers, out- Washington, D.C., have led to extensive weighing the growth due to immigrants.12 suburbs surrounding comparatively small Atlanta, Las Vegas, and Phoenix lead the central cities. Most of the population, emerging gateways. These places saw im - including immigrants, lives in the sub- migrant growth rates exceed the national urbs. Other new destinations like Phoenix, average during one of the last three decades Charlotte, and Austin are comprised of of the twentieth century, but until then very large central cities resulting from

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Figure 5 Audrey Residence of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1980–2010 Singer

Cities and suburbs are de½ned for the 95 largest metropolitan areas based on the 2010 population. Primary cities are those that are named in metropolitan area title, as well as any incorporated places that had at least 100,000 in total population in 2010. The residual of the metro area is de½ned as suburban. In 5 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas, foreign-born population data at the city level are not available from the acs. Thus, metro areas that are not in the top 95 are classi½ed as “small metros.” Source: Author’s calculations of Decennial Census data; and 2010 acs 1-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

annexation. Here, the of½cial city limits cent were in non-metropolitan or rural encompass vast suburban-like areas. areas, while also growing in absolute terms. Nonetheless, the geography of U.S. im- The list of metropolitan areas with the migrant settlement is now decidedly sub- largest suburban population reflects urban (see Figure 5). Just thirty years ago, divergent trends (see Table 3). Slightly similar shares of immigrants lived in the more than 20 million immigrants–about cities and the suburbs of the largest met- half of all immigrants in the United ropolitan areas in the United States (41 States–live in the suburbs of ten metro- percent and 43 percent, respectively). By politan areas. These ten places include 2010, only 33 percent of U.S. immigrants many of the largest metropolitan areas in lived in central cities of the 100 largest the country; although some are well- metro areas, while 51 percent lived in the established continuous gateways such as suburbs of these cities. All the while, the New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, immigrant population increased nearly others are mid-century gainers such as Los threefold. Throughout this period, about Angeles, Miami, and Houston. Atlanta, a 11 percent of immigrants lived in the gateway that only recently emerged, is smaller metro areas, and another 5 per- also on the list.

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Contem - Table 3 porary Largest Number, Highest Share, and Fastest Growth of Immigrants in Immigrant the Suburbs of the 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 2010 Gateways in Historical Largest Number of Immigrants Living in the Suburbs Perspective Rank Metro Area Immigrants 1 Los Angeles, CA 2,639,567 2 New York, NY 2,330,889 3 Miami, FL 1,893,530 4 Chicago, IL 1,065,839 5 Washington, D.C. 1,055,461 6 San Francisco, CA 815,914 7 Riverside, CA 757,105 8 Houston, TX 726,498 9 Atlanta, GA 682,813 10 Dallas, TX 617,036 All Large Metro Areas 20,401,330

Highest Share of Foreign-Born Population Living in the Suburbs Rank Metro Area Share Foreign Born 1 Atlanta, GA 95.3% 2 Miami, FL 87.4% 3 Orlando, FL 87.0% 4 Detroit MI 86.8% 5 Washington, D.C. 86.3% 6 Birmingham, AL 86.0% 7 Cleveland, OH 85.6% 8 Lakeland, FL 84.0% 9 McAllen, TX 83.0% 10 Dayton, OH 82.7% All Large Metro Areas 60.6%

Fastest Suburban Foreign-Born Growth Rate, 2000–2010 Rank Metro Area Growth Rate 1 Louisville, KY 246% 2 Jackson, MS 159% 3 Knoxville, TN 150% 4 Des Moines, IA 148% 5 Little Rock, AR 141% 6 Indianapolis, IN 141% 7 Birmingham, AL 140% 8 Scranton, PA 136% 9 Cape Coral, FL 133% 10 Austin, TX 124% All Large Metro Areas 27%

Source: Author’s calculations of 2000 Decennial Census data; and 2010 acs 1-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/.

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Atlanta also tops the list of metropoli- As immigrant settlement patterns have Audrey tan areas with the greatest proportion of shifted alongside those of the native- Singer immigrants living in the suburbs: 95 per- born population, immigrant metropoli- cent. This is not surprising due to its small tan settlement trends since 1990 have central city population, as is the case with taken at least two new turns. For most of Washington, D.C., Detroit, and Cleve- the twentieth century, the majority of land, all of which also have vast majori- immigrants were drawn to only a handful ties of the population in suburbs. On of established gateways. But new oppor- average, the metropolitan areas on this tunities in metro areas with little history list have over 80 percent of immigrants of receiving immigrants led to signi½cant residing in their suburbs, compared to an spikes in the foreign-born populations of average of 60 percent across the 100 these places. largest metro areas. In a second shift, immigrants began Not coincidentally, the fastest-growing bypassing cities to settle directly in sub- suburban immigrant populations corre- urban areas. During industrialization in spond to the metropolitan areas with the the early part of the twentieth century, fastest-growing immigrant populations immigrants moved to cities to be close to in the country. Eight of the ten areas with jobs. Now, as jobs have decentralized and suburban immigration growth of at least suburban opportunities have opened up, 124 percent in the last decade were metro there are more immigrants residing in areas whose immigrant populations dou- suburbs than in cities. During the ½rst de - bled during the same period.14 The foreign- cade of the twenty-½rst century, as regions born population grew by 246 percent in experienced sluggish recovery following Louisville’s suburbs, Jackson’s by 159 the recession, immigration to the United percent, and Knoxville’s by 150 percent. States slowed. All of the metropolitan areas on this list These new patterns are not without are newer destinations, or in the case of conflict and stress, especially as major Scranton, reemergent ones. Seven of the institutions in the newest metropolitan ten are in the Southeast. destinations now confront the challenge of how to serve this diverse population. The history of immigration to the United Many areas have yet to recover from the States is intertwined with the American effects of the recession, and immigrants narrative. This story is often cast as the are often viewed as competitors for jobs movement of people in search of eco- and scarce public resources. In some of nomic opportunity, political and reli- the metropolitan areas that recently ex - gious freedom, and a better life for their perienced fast immigrant growth, state and children. These desires have not changed local measures to control immigration, over time, but the U.S. locations where especially unauthorized immigration, opportunity unfolds have been altered by have been proposed or legislated. But industrial restructuring, changes in trans - other areas have welcomed immigrants, portation, and new technology. No longer including places with well-established are immigrants con½ned to urban ethnic foreign-born populations that have been neighborhoods; rather, they are a strong integrating immigrants since mid-century presence in many suburbs. In this way, or prior. Moreover, cities such as Detroit, the history of immigration also parallels Pittsburgh, and Dayton would like to the history of American urbanization. attract and retain immigrants to stem

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Contem - population loss and to stimulate economic receptivity will no doubt yield future porary activity; those regions are putting out the changes to twenty-½rst-century immi- Immigrant Gateways welcome mat for immigrant newcomers. grant settlement patterns. in These distinct and shifting patterns of Historical Perspective

endnotes Author’s Note: I would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Nicole Svajlenka. 1 Minnesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2011), http://www.nhgis.org. 2 U.S. Census Bureau, “Social Characteristics of the Population, for Counties: 1960,” U.S. Census of Population: 1960, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Of½ce, 1963), Table 82. 3 The Brookings Institution, “State of Metropolitan America Indicator Map,” http://www .brookings.edu/research/interactives/state-of-metropolitan-america-indicator map#/?subject =7&ind=70&dist=0&data=Number&year=2010&geo=metro&zoom=0&x=0&y=0. 4 See Nancy Foner, From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000); and Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006). 5 Sukkoo Kim and Robert A. Margo, “Historical Perspectives on U.S. Economic Geography,” in Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 1st ed., vol. 4, ed. J. Vernon Henderson and Jacques-François Thisse (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1986), chap. 66, 2981–3019. 6 Charles Hirschman and Elizabeth Mogford, “Immigration and the American Industrial Rev- olution from 1880 to 1920,” Social Science Research 38 (2009): 897–920. 7 Figure 3 shows “metropolitan areas” for each decade. These are constructed at the county level and are consistent throughout. While metropolitan areas as we know them today did not exist in the early part of the twentieth century, full metropolitan area de½nitions for 2010 are used for the sake of making consistent comparisons. See the earlier methodology section for a more detailed discussion. 8 Data on absolute change not shown. 9 See Audrey Singer, “The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, February 2004), http://www.brookings .edu/~/media/research/½les/reports/2004/2/demographics%20singer/20040301_gateways .pdf; Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds., Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti- tution Press, 2008); and Matthew Hall, Audrey Singer, Gordon F. De Jong, and Deborah Roempke Graefe, “The Geography of Immigrant Skills: Educational Pro½les of Metropolitan Areas” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, June 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/½les/papers/2011/6/immigrants%20singer/ 06_immigrants_singer.pdf. 10 Hall et al., “The Geography of Immigrant Skills.” 11 See ibid. for listing of all metropolitan areas by gateway type.

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12 Singer, “The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways.” Audrey Singer 13 Singer et al., Twenty-First Century Gateways. 14 See Jill H. Wilson and Audrey Singer, “Immigrants in 2010 Metropolitan America” (Wash- ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, October 2011), http:// www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/½les/papers/2011/10/13%20immigration%20wilson %20singer/1013_immigration_wilson_singer.pdf. Only Des Moines and Austin did not double their immigrant populations between 2000 and 2010.

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Immigrants in New York City: Reaping the Bene½ts of Continuous Immigration

Mary C. Waters & Philip Kasinitz

Abstract: Using New York City as an example, this essay examines how American cities that have a long and continuous history of absorbing immigrants develop welcoming institutions and policies for current immigrants and their children. Cities such as Chicago, San Francisco, and New York have been gateway cities for many previous waves of immigrants and continue to absorb new immigrants today. The ethnic conflicts and accommodations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continue to shape the context of reception of today’s immigrants. In contrast to “new destinations,” which in recent years have often been centers of anti-immigrant sentiment and nativist local social policies, New York has generally adopted policies designed to include and accommodate new immigrants, as well as repurposing institutions that served earlier European immigrants and native-born African Americans and Puerto Ricans. The continuing signi½cance of race in the city is counterbalanced in the lives of immigrants by a relative lack of nativism and an openness to incorporating immigrants.

New York . . . is a city in which the dominant racial group has been marked by ethnic variety and all ethnic groups have experienced ethnic diversity. Any one ethnic group can count on seeing its position and power wax and wane and none has become accustomed to long term domination, though each may be influential in a given area or domain. None can ½nd challenges from new groups unexpected or outrageous. While this has not necessarily produced a reservoir of good feeling for groups different from one’s own, the evolving system of inter-group relations permit accommodation, change, and the rise of new groups. MARY C. WATERS, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2006, is –Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 1 the M. E. Zukerman Professor of Beyond the Melting Pot Sociology at Harvard University. PHILIP KASINITZ is Professor of Immigration is a national issue, yet it is experienced Sociology in both the Graduate locally. What sociologists Alejandro Portes and Center and Hunter College at the Rubén Rumbaut term the “context of reception”2 City University of New York. varies greatly by region of the United States, a fact (*See endnotes for complete contributor that has become more important in recent years as biographies.) states, cities, and towns have undertaken constitu-

tionally dubious efforts to craft their own having become signi½cant immigrant Mary C. immigration policies. Local contexts of destinations only since the late 1960s, their Waters & Philip reception are framed by many factors: cultural and institutional infrastructure of Kasinitz demography, the local labor markets, and immigrant reception was largely created the distribution of political power, just to in a post–civil rights context.4 Of course, name the most obvious. They are also these communities do have an immigrant shaped by history. Traditional gateways past. Indeed, several of them were founded greet newcomers with institutions, polit- as Mexican cities and faced their ½rst ical cultures, and social expectations about immigration crisis when an influx of the role of immigrants different than those English-speaking Anglo-Americans trans- of new destinations. Nowhere is this more formed their culture and politics in the obvious than in New York City, home to nineteenth century. Some also received the nation’s largest concentration of im- an influx of Mexican immigrants during migrants. Immigration in New York is a the Mexican revolution, as well as some palimpsest in which the life chances of European immigrants and their children today’s newcomers are shaped by a his- in the mid-twentieth century. Yet only after tory of which they are often only barely the 1960s did these cities become major aware. In this essay, we use New York City gateways for a sizable portion of America’s to explore how ethnic conflicts and accom- new immigrants. Local institutions had modations of the past shape the position little in the way of immigrant-receiving of immigrants today. traditions, and the white European-origin populations were often generations re- Demographer Audrey Singer has divided moved from their own immigrant roots. America’s immigrant-receiving commu- Thus in Los Angeles, for instance, when nities into four broad categories.3 There new immigrants took up styles of politics are former gateways, such as Detroit, Phila- created in part by struggles of the long- delphia, Milwaukee, and Cleveland. These standing Mexican American community, cities, mostly in the Northeast and Mid- issues were often articulated as Mexicans west, all had large and diverse immigrant versus Anglos; immigrant history was a populations at the peak of the mass Euro- source of conflict, not a shared tradition pean migration to United States at the turn and common origin. of the twentieth century. That diversity The third category is made up of what shaped their politics and cultures, at least are now being called new destinations.5 for a while. Today, however, these cities These are communities that received very have mostly lost their allure for newcom- little immigration prior to the 1990s, but ers and natives alike, as evidenced by their where the immigrant population has declining populations. Some of the edu- grown rapidly over the past two decades. cational, social, and cultural institutions The new destinations are mostly suburbs that fostered the incorporation of earlier and small towns, often in the South and immigrants and their children survive, but the Midwest, although the term is also most have fallen by the wayside. sometimes applied to major cities, in- There are also contemporary gateways– cluding Nashville and Las Vegas. They are cities such as Los Angeles, Miami, San home to a relatively small portion of the Diego, and Houston. Having now received nation’s immigrants, yet they are note- large numbers of immigrants for nearly a worthy for the speed with which they half-century, such cities can no longer be have been transformed into diverse com- seen as new immigrant destinations. Yet munities and the virulence of the politics

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Immigrants that has often accompanied this transfor- whites” now make up less than one-third in mation. of the city’s population. Thirty-six percent New York City Finally, there is the handful of major of the city’s population is foreign born– cities that are continuous gateways. These including 27 percent of whites, 32 percent cities have been important immigrant des- of blacks, 41 percent of Hispanics, and 72 tinations for well over a century. Three percent of Asians–and many of the “na- American cities were signi½cant immi- tives” are in fact the young children of grant gateways in 1900, 1990, and 2010: immigrants. Whites are now a minority New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.6 in the city, and the numbers of the “tradi- These cities managed to integrate immi- tional” native minority groups–African grants of European origin and their de- Americans of native parentage and Puerto scendants throughout the twentieth cen- Ricans–are also in decline. Immigrants tury, as well as attracting a much more make up an even larger portion of the diverse immigrant flow during the past city’s young adults, and most of the city’s ½fty years. The origins of the immigrants children have immigrant parents. have changed, but these cities’ role as These young people grow up amidst points of entry into U.S. society has re- many institutions that were built for past mained constant. In such cities, the immi- generations of immigrants and their de- grant population is often highly diverse, scendants. The exclusion and mistreatment as migrants who entered at different times of immigrants in the past led to the cre- were often from different regions. ation of many of the city’s most immigrant- Therefore, the immigrant/native divi- friendly institutions. Catholics and Jews sion does not easily map onto racial cleav- created schools, universities, hospitals, day ages. Because they are not overwhelmingly camps, sports leagues, and nursing homes recent arrivals, the portion of the immi- because they either did not feel comfort- grant population that is undocumented able in or were actively excluded from tends to be lower in states with a contin- established institutions. As the original uous gateway. In New York State, the un- immigrants who needed those institutions documented population is estimated at moved away or assimilated into the middle about 12 percent of all immigrants; in Cali- class and the demography of the neighbor- fornia, it is around 26 percent. By contrast, hoods around those institutions changed, nearly half of all immigrants in Arizona and the institutions began to serve the new- the majority of immigrants in such new comers and their children. In a country destination states as Georgia and North like the United States, which has no fed- Carolina are estimated to be unauthorized.7 eral agency devoted to immigrant assimi- Does the long history of immigrant inte- lation (unlike many immigrant-receiving gration make a difference in the lives of countries), these local institutions and local current immigrants and their children in government actions are resources that fa- these continuous destinations? Do legacies cilitate immigrant integration and social of the past make a difference in current- mobility. day lives? Considering the example of New Catholic elementary and high schools York–by far the largest and most diverse are an example. Many Catholic immigrants of these cities–we think it does. in the nineteenth century did not feel welcome in the Protestant-dominated public New York City today is an advanced out- schools. Over time, and especially during post of the demographic diversity that is the height of immigration at the turn of transforming the nation. “Non-Hispanic the twentieth century, they founded a net-

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work of Catholic schools. By 1920, there largest urban university in the United Mary C. were 1.8 million students in Catholic States but one of the largest concentrations Waters & Philip schools nationwide. New York City was of ½rst- and second-generation immigrants Kasinitz home to many of these Catholic schools, in any institution in the country. The ½rst which educated the children and grand- of its colleges, City College, is widely re- children of Irish, Italian, and Polish im- membered for having provided a free migrants. At their peak enrollment in the university education to many second- 1960s, the Catholic schools had already generation Jewish immigrants who were begun to enroll the African American and excluded from Ivy League institutions be- Puerto Rican children whose parents cause of quotas and anti-Semitism. Today, came to the city seeking the same better cuny enrolls 217,000 degree-credit stu- life. As the third-generation whites began dents who trace their ancestries to 205 to leave the city or chose other forms of countries and speak 189 languages; 43 education, the Catholic schools began to percent of these students are themselves attract the children of the new immi- immigrants, and the vast majority are either grants coming to New York from all over ½rst- or second-generation Americans. the globe. Today, the Archdioceses of The civil rights movement and the urban New York and Brooklyn enroll more than riots of the 1960s also led to the develop- 100,000 children, the majority nonwhite, ment of institutions speci½cally aimed at and at least a quarter of whom are not non-whites: museums celebrating African Catholic, but whose parents scrape to- American history, public colleges designed gether the average $3,500 a year in tuition for and located in Puerto Rican and African for a better education than they believe American communities, and youth pro- the local public schools can provide. grams to socialize young people away from Most children of immigrants attend the crime and toward a better life. As non- city’s public schools, which came into whites, many of the city’s Latino, black, being at the height of immigration and and Asian newcomers can take advantage have a long history of serving immigrant of these institutions as well. Hostos Com- children. One part of the mission of the munity College, founded in 1968 to meet public schools has been to “create” Amer- the demands of Puerto Rican activists for ican citizens. These schools currently an institution of higher education in the serve over a million children, with about South Bronx, now enrolls Dominicans as 150,000 classi½ed as English-language its largest demographic group. Medgar learners. The schools translate basic infor- Evers College, founded in 1970 in the pre- mation, including report cards for parents, dominantly African American community into nine languages: Arabic, Bengali, of Bedford Stuyvesant after pressure from Chinese, French, Haitian-Creole, Korean, community organizations, including the Russian, Spanish, and Urdu. This covers naacp, now enrolls students from all over about 95 percent of the city’s families, and the world, and has thriving clubs for Afri- for the remainder there is a phone trans- can, Latin American, and Haitian students. lation service that allows school personnel New York’s local government has also to speak to parents in 109 languages, generally taken a ½rm pro-immigrant stand including Malagasy, Khmer, Serbian, –a sharp contrast to many local govern- Gujurati, and even Gaelic and Yiddish. ments elsewhere in the country. While After graduation, many of these young Arizona and Alabama have passed laws people enroll in the City University of designed to prevent undocumented peo- New York (cuny), which is not only the ple from getting public services, and to

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Immigrants identify, arrest, and deport them, the New connections with earlier immigrant com- in York City Mayor’s Of½ce of Immigrant munities. In New York City’s West Indian New York City Affairs has given advice to undocumented and Chinese communities, for example, the immigrants about the city services they earliest post-1965 immigrants were some- have a right to receive. The website of the times connected to the smaller but sub- of½ce features the mayor’s Executive stantial coethnic communities of pre-1924 Orders 34 and 31 guaranteeing “privacy” immigrants.9 In other cases, the connec- to immigrants asking for city services and tions are institutional. While many of the ordering city workers to protect the con- approximately 300,000 Jews from the ½dentiality of any immigration-status former Soviet Union who settled in New information they learn about people. York after 1980 were probably related to Interestingly, the other continuous gate- the descendants of pre-1924 immigrants, ways have largely followed New York in few were aware of speci½c connections. bucking the anti-immigrant trend among Almost all, however, bene½ted from reset- American localities. In 2011, Chicago Mayor tlement programs, English language and Rahm Emanuel established an Of½ce of job training programs, educational support, New Americans, similar to the Immigrant as well as ½nancial assistance from com- Affairs Of½ce in New York, and in 2012, munity-based social service organizations he unveiled the “Chicago New Americans run by their co-religionists.10 Plan,” a set of policy initiatives whose The origins of this dense Jewish social goal is to make Chicago “the most immi- service infrastructure can be traced to grant friendly city in the nation.”8 San efforts by the more assimilated German Francisco, long known for its immigrant- Jews to aid Eastern European newcomers friendly policies, is also a “sanctuary city” at the end of the nineteenth century. Over in which local authorities generally limit time, these organizations were taken over their cooperation with federal immigra- by the Eastern Europeans, who would later tion of½cials. turn their attention to aiding Holocaust- While thirty-one states have passed some era refugees and still later to the “new” sort of law requiring that government busi- immigrants from the former Soviet ness be conducted in English, New York Union.11 While the Jewish social service is doing a great deal to accommodate the infrastructure in New York is particularly one-half of New Yorkers who speak a lan- dense, similar church and social service– guage other than English at home, as well based organizations also made connections as the 1.8 million people who have limited between older and newer waves of Polish English pro½ciency. In 2008, the mayor and Greek immigrants. ordered every city agency that has direct Even new immigrant groups with no con- contact with New Yorkers to develop a pol- nection to earlier communities may bene- icy to ensure communication with people ½t from the legacies of previous migrants. who do not speak English. All essential Older groups may serve as “proximal public documents are now translated into hosts” for newer ones.12 Dominican, Mexi- the most commonly spoken languages– can, and Ecuadoran migrants often initially Spanish, Chinese, Russian, Korean, Italian, moved into Puerto Rican neighborhoods, and French Creole–and a phone transla- where they bene½ted from services avail- tion service is available from the city for able in Spanish. Puerto Rican civil rights, these and other far less common languages. social service, and cultural organizations In some cases, post-1965 immigrants have reached out to serve these immigrants and also bene½ted from direct family or other over time often transformed themselves

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into pan-Latino organizations with a and Medgar Evers, or when East Harlem’s Mary C. broadly “Hispanic” agenda. Similarly, Afri- Museo del Barrio shifts its focus from Waters & Philip can American civil rights and social service speci½cally Puerto Rican to broadly Latin Kasinitz groups often found themselves in the American culture. You could see it clearly “immigrant aid” business as the commu- in 2012, when veteran congressman Charles nities they served became home to growing Rangel, whose Harlem seat has been rep- numbers of (usually black) immigrants. resented by an African American since 1945, Elected of½cials and labor union leaders came within a few hundred votes of losing who had come to power representing one his seat to a Dominican immigrant. Still, group also frequently found themselves if New York seems perennially beset by reaching out to newcomers–a strategy small ethnic struggles, its diversity of that in the New York context made more groups, its complex quilt of overlapping sense than an anti-immigrant stance.13 We interests and alliances, and the broad ac- doubt that organizations like the Henry ceptance of the idea that ethnic succession, Street Settlement or the Educational Alli- if not always pleasant, is both legitimate ance, established for earlier generations of and inevitable have generally prevented newcomers, drew Asian and Latino new- city-engul½ng racial or ethnic conflagra- comers to the Lower East Side. Yet the fact tions. that such local groups exist does bene½t Perhaps even more important than the the children of immigrants with services actual terrain of competition and cooper- largely absent in “new” immigrant desti- ation between groups is how immigration nations. is understood and talked about. In New Of course, relations between newer and York, the discussion of immigrant incor- older groups rarely run smoothly in the poration often begins with reference to crowded, competitive city. Established earlier immigrants. Many New York whites groups seldom simply put out the welcome (and a sizable portion of the city’s African mat for newcomers. Ethnic succession Americans who are of Caribbean origin14) struggles have been fought in New York’s see themselves as members of ethnic groups neighborhoods, industries, labor unions, and the descendants of immigrants. This churches, in local politics, and on the is not just because a larger portion of streets since at least the 1840s. Sometimes local whites (and blacks) are descendants reasonable accommodations are reached; of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth- other times things get ugly (remember century immigrants. It is also because New West Side Story). Newcomers often grow York’s traditions, neighborhoods, and eth- impatient with their proximal hosts, and nically concentrated labor force15 encour- old-timers can bitterly resent what they age them to see themselves that way. see as a “take over” of “their” turf. When While cousins who crossed the Hudson the established groups are native African River may have begun to regard themselves Americans and Puerto Ricans, as has often as “un-hyphenated” whites, those who been the case in recent years, rivalries can remained in New York often had reason be particularly bitter, because they add to to continue to de½ne themselves in ethnic the perception that the native minorities terms–even three, four, or ½ve generations are, once again, being surpassed by new past Ellis Island. immigrants, albeit now generally black and Latino ones. The importance of immigration in con- You can hear these resentments in mut- temporary New York City is seen not only terings on cuny campuses such as Hostos in the lives of the immigrants themselves,

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Immigrants but also in those of their American-born The study revealed that by most mea- in children, the “second generation.” When sures, these young people are rapidly New York City we ask what sort of New Yorkers the new- “assimilating” into American society. comers will be–and what sort of New York Language assimilation is particularly dra- they are creating–we often must look to matic, a ½nding that is consistent with this second generation for answers. By research in the rest of the country.18 Nor 2009, this American-born second genera- is there much reason to worry about tion constituted approximately 22 percent divided loyalties. Few children of immi- of the city’s population and 24 percent of grants stay deeply connected to their par- the young adult (aged 18 to 32) population. ents’ homelands. In general, the young Another 11 percent of this age group be- people we spoke to tended to see them- longs to what Rubén Rumbaut has termed selves as Americans and “New Yorkers,” the “1.5 generation”: those who were born albeit ethnic ones. They are more likely abroad but arrived as children and came than other New York residents their age to of age in the United States. Another 23 per- have grown up in the city (many “native” cent migrated as young adults.16 Together, young adult New Yorkers are, in fact, these groups make up more than half of newcomers from other parts of the United all young adult New Yorkers, and they far States), and they often identify strongly outnumber the children of white natives, with the city’s culture and institutions. the group many Americans still think of Yet there are also reasons to be con- as the “mainstream.” cerned about the second generation’s The growth of this population is made future. Racial differences among the all the more important by the aging of the groups we studied are marked, if some- native population and the impending what less so than among the children of retirement of the large baby boom cohort. natives. By most measures of economic For better or worse, the children of immi- and educational achievement, the black grants will play an expanding role in the and Latino children of immigrants, while city’s life in the coming decades. In an effort generally better off than black and Latino to understand the second generation and natives, still lag well behind Asians and the challenges it faces, we (along with our whites. Many of the young people report colleague John H. Mollenkopf ) undertook experiencing discrimination in daily life. a study of young adults whose parents are For dark-skinned children of immigrants, immigrants from around the globe. The negative encounters with the police are “Immigrant Second Generation in Met- common and a source of considerable frus- ropolitan New York” project surveyed tration and alienation.19 Perhaps because about 2,000 young adults of Chinese, of their youth, the second generation also Dominican, Russian-Jewish, South Amer- has yet to enter the city’s political leader- ican (Colombian, Ecuadoran, and Peru- ship proportionate to their numbers, vian), and West Indian immigrant par- although the recent emergence of several entage. For comparative purposes, we also high-visibility second-generation politi- surveyed young adult New Yorkers of cians–congresswoman Yvette Clarke, native black and native white parentage city controller John Liu, and New York’s as well as mainland-born Puerto Ricans. ½rst Asian American congressperson, The survey was supplemented with life Grace Meng, prominent among them– history interviews with about 10 percent suggests that this may be changing. of the respondents and a series of linked Finally, it is worth noting that as New ethnographic projects.17 York’s second generation sets the tone for

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the city’s urban culture, they demonstrated racial inequities often work better for Mary C. a fluid and nuanced approach to the old- immigrants and their children than they Waters & Philip est and most vexing of American social do for the native minorities for whom they Kasinitz divides: race. Much of today’s second gen- were designed.20 Thus, the fact that chil- eration does not ½t easily into American dren of immigrants have come to be cate- racial boxes and categories. Racism con- gorized as members of native “minority tinues to tragically circumscribe many groups” does not mean their experience people’s life chances, but racial boundaries has been the same as that of the native are blurring as the categories become more minorities. They clearly do suffer much complicated. And young people–both the of the same prejudice and discrimination, second generation and those who grow but they do not inherit the scars and hand- up with them–seem more comfortable icaps of a long history of racial exclusion. with that fact than their elders. In a world In post–civil rights America, the heri- where almost everyone’s family is from tage of the African American struggle for somewhere else, ethnicity is a source of racial justice has given young people new everyday banter. One 18-year-old told us strategies, vocabularies, and resources about how often people tried to guess her for upward mobility.21 While the African identity: “I have been asked if I am American experience of discrimination has Egyptian, Cuban, Greek, Pakistani. I say been harsher than that of other groups, no, I am Peruvian, Spanish. I like my cul- the African American civil rights struggle ture and I am proud to be Peruvian, the has also provided a heroic model for Incas and all that.” This is not a world of opposing discrimination. Today’s children balkanized groups huddled within their of immigrants are quick to take up this own enclaves, but rather of hybrids and model. While their immigrant parents are fluid exchanges across group boundaries. often willing to accept unfair treatment, Most of our respondents took it for granted the second generation children are quick that having friendships with people from to challenge discrimination whenever a variety of backgrounds is a good thing, they see it. In the post–civil rights era, that it makes one a better, more fully this is one of the ways in which they are developed person. becoming American. Even for those de½ned as “black,” race They also have the advantage of becom- is not the monolithic barrier it was in the ing American in New York City, where mid-twentieth century. Immigrants and they can feel included even if they experi- their children who are de½ned as black ence discrimination. In this hyper-diverse often do face serious racial barriers. Indeed, world, assimilation (if that is the right many of the victims in the city’s most well- word) seems to happen faster and with known incidents of racial violence–the less angst than in the past. The children of attacks in Howard Beach and Bensonhurst, European immigrants who arrived at the for example, or the police shooting of street beginning of the twentieth century often vendor Amadou Diallo–were in fact felt forced to choose between their parents’ immigrants. At the same time, members ways and those of American society. Many of the second generation have bene½ted were embarrassed when their parents could from the institutions, political strategies, not speak English and even changed their and notions of rights developed as a legacy names to ½t in. As the Italian American of the civil rights movement. Ironically, educator Leonard Covello later recalled, af½rmative action and other policies de- “We were becoming American by learn- signed to redress long-standing American ing how to be ashamed of our parents.”22

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Immigrants By contrast, today’s second generation and ½nance. Upwardly mobile members in is far more at ease with both their Ameri- of the second generation have fewer fa- New York City can and ethnic identities. One woman told milial resources to fall back on than do us that learning Russian from her parents their native white counterparts. And what has been bene½cial for her because “there’s of the very large cohort of second-gener- a certain richness that comes along with ation New Yorkers who had the historical having another culture to fall back on. misfortune to enter the labor force just People are always intrigued. They ask what when the recession hit? Will second- does it mean to be Russian and you feel a generation resilience help them reinvent little special to explain and it adds color themselves in a changing economy? Or to you.” Far from being “torn between will they ½nd themselves locked out of two worlds,” the children of immigrants opportunities by better-established groups, increasingly make use of the second gen- now anxious to safeguard their own posi- eration’s natural advantage: the ability to tion in leaner and meaner times? combine the best of their parents’ culture Even after the present downturn passes, with the best that America has to offer. the need to integrate such a large number Twenty-three-year-old Maria said that of young people from immigrant back- being both American and Colombian was grounds into a twenty-½rst-century labor “the best of two worlds. Like being able force presents profound challenges for the to keep and appreciate those things in my city’s public educational systems. Nothing culture that I enjoy and that I think are could be more vital to the city’s future beautiful, and, at the same time, being than the successful incorporation of the able to change those things which I think children of immigrants; thus, investment are bad.” in education is crucial. Yet the question of how to pay for this investment during The intergenerational progress and rapid a time of austerity and increased popular assimilation of these young people is often reluctance to pay for public goods repre- missed in immigration debates that are sents a serious challenge. focused only on recent arrivals. A more There is also the question of emerging long-term view, one that takes into account differences among various second-gener- the progress of the second generation, ation groups, and between second gener- would do much to inform local and na- ation and native minority groups, in the tional conversations about immigration. degree to which they have been able to Yet, lest we draw too optimistic a portrait successfully make use of the educational about the incorporation of the new second- system. Moves toward greater diversity generation New Yorkers, a few notes of and increased choice in public education caution are in order. at all levels have, on the one hand, guar- The ½rst is economic. Our study was anteed that some students from modest conducted during very good economic backgrounds have access to an excellent times–indeed, toward the end of what education. Yet they have also deepened was, for the city, a remarkable period of inequalities within the system.23 economic growth. Although we do not The children of Asian and former Soviet know how our respondents fared in the immigrants have done extremely well– great recession, it is worth noting that better by most measures than the children many of the most successful were con- of native whites. About 12 percent of the centrated in industries that were partic- city’s population, Asians are now in the ularly hard hit: high tech, construction, majority at the city’s most competitive

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public high schools. The declining num- pected to take advantage of New York’s Mary C. bers of native black and Latino students extensive mass transit system to avail Waters & Philip at these elite high schools and the more themselves of the best opportunities the Kasinitz highly regarded cuny campuses are alarm- huge city has to offer. African Americans ing. Even among blacks and Latinos, real and poorer Latinos, however, are still cleavages are emerging–although the largely educated in neighborhood schools use of racial terms like black and Latino and local charter schools, which sidestep tends to obscure this fact. The children of competitive admissions processes and some Latino immigrant groups (notably discourage students from venturing out South Americans) are doing better than into the big, multicultural city. The most others, and the children of all immigrant competitive of the city’s public schools, groups, including blacks from Africa and usually ranked among the nation’s best, the West Indies, are doing better than na- celebrate the astounding diversity of tive African Americans and Puerto Ricans. their talented students. Yet this “diversity” We urgently need new research to under- obscures the virtual disappearance of native stand the different rates of educational African Americans from these schools. success. Moreover, we should not let the Finally, we should note the effects of legal success of large parts of New York’s sec- status. While New York City has never had ond generation mask the continuing fail- as large a concentration of undocumented ure of the city’s institutions to address the immigrants as communities closer to the poverty and social isolation of parts of southern border, many parents of our the native minority population. One ironic respondents lacked legal status for part of effect of an increasingly choice-based the time while their children were grow- school system is that African Americans ing up. Indeed, it was not uncommon for remain highly segregated in the city’s second-generation New Yorkers to grow schools even while some traditionally up in “mixed status” households, which black residential areas including Harlem include undocumented immigrants, legal and Bedford Stuyvesant have been inte- permanent residents, naturalized citizens, grated by gentri½cation. For all the talk of and birthright citizens. Up until the mid- diversity in the city’s best high schools, 1990s, this diversity of legal status had lit- racial integration has all but disappeared tle impact on the children raised in such from the school reform agenda. Many of households. Deportation was rare and the city’s most celebrated charter schools largely restricted to those with serious take their nearly all-black student bodies criminal records. And while regularizing for granted, even while the growing num- legal status was never easy, opportunities ber of whites and Asians now living within to do so did exist. Eventually most of those their catchment areas travel to schools in who wanted to become “legal” were able other parts of the city. to do so. Although it is rarely acknowledged, the Since the mid-1990s this has no longer Bloomberg administration’s school reform been the case. The United States has been efforts have pursued nearly opposite strate- engaged in what sociologist Robert Court- gies when it comes to educating different ney Smith calls a “cruel natural experi- groups. Among whites (now returning to ment.”24 By restricting the opportunities the system in signi½cant numbers), Asians, of long tolerated, if technically illegal, and better-off Latino immigrants, the immigrants to obtain legal status, we neighborhood school is becoming a thing have created a large population of semi- of the past. High school students are ex- permanent undocumented immigrants

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Immigrants who are part of the city economically, racism represented a unique and deeply in socially, and culturally but not legally or rooted caste-like form of inequality, mi- New York City politically. This is a profoundly troubling gration to the Northern cities would allow situation for a democratic society. Despite blacks to follow a “Northern model” of the strong pro-immigrant stance taken immigrant-like upward mobility. The by city government and the generally boldest statement of this position was pro-immigrant stance of the population, probably Irving Kristol’s 1966 New York the crisis of the undocumented makes clear Times essay, “The Negro Today is Like the that the incorporation of immigrants– Immigrant of Yesterday.”25 Nathan Glazer and of the second generation–is a prob- and Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s classic lem the city cannot solve on its own. Beyond the Melting Pot (1963) provides a more nuanced example of the application, New York City’s attitude toward immi- with some caveats, of the “immigrant” grants highlights a conceptual confusion model to African Americans.26 that marks much of the politics and Recently, observers have been more scholarship about immigration: namely, likely to turn the analogy around. The the conflation of racism and nativism. growing literature on the construction of Racism and nativism are often interrelated, “whiteness” among nineteenth-century of course. Attacks on immigrants in the European immigrants reminds us of both past and present are often made in racial the intensity and the racial–that is to say, terms, and attacks on members of racial pseudo-biological–basis of hostility to- minority groups sometimes emphasize ward Celtic as well as Southern and Eastern their alleged foreignness. Still, the history European immigrants. For these writers, of New York and the other continuing whiteness was a status achieved as the out- gateways–which combine a relatively come of social and political struggles.27 warm welcome for immigrants with fre- Similarly, other groups–Mexican Amer- quent hostility toward African Americans icans most prominent among them–are and other “racial” minorities–reminds increasingly seen as having been “racial- us that nativism and racism are funda- ized”: considered over time to be a mentally different ways of thinking even “racial” minority analogous to African when their victims are actually the same Americans.28 people. New York’s proud history of in- Whatever their historical connections, corporating immigrants stands in sharp it probably makes more sense to see contrast to its history of relations with its racism and nativism as distinct forces in “racial” minorities. At various points in contemporary life. As non-whites, today’s American history, blacks have been sub- immigrants experience some of the best ject to virulent racism, and European im- and the worst legacies of American history migrants were subject to virulent nativism. and intergroup relations. In today’s con- Asians and Hispanics were subject to both, tinuing destination cities, and particularly although the degree to which their exclu- in New York City, nativism, while present, sion and suffering was due to one or the is not particularly strong compared to other is a subject of debate. other parts of the country. The vitality of Scholars sometimes try to understand the city as a global crossroads and the the immigrant experience in racial terms, diversity of its inhabitants are generally and vice versa. Among the New York in- understood as positive, and this ideology tellectuals of the 1950s and early 1960s it affects the politics, policies, and discourse was common to assert that while Southern about immigration in the city.29 Thus,

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nonwhite immigrants enter a city that is stable integration is possible. Hispanics Mary C. relatively welcoming and hospitable to and Asians have moved into previously Waters & Philip immigrants qua immigrants, yet at the all-white neighborhoods without pro- Kasinitz same time not very welcoming to them voking white flight, and they have been qua “non-whites.” followed by African Americans. On the New York City does not provide immu- other hand, whites living in such “diverse” nity to American racism. Its demography neighborhoods can easily look around and and history have entrenched a great deal conclude that they live in a postracial, of racial inequality that shapes the expe- cosmopolitan community; and to an ex- riences of both natives and new immi- tent, this is true. Yet it can also obscure grants. Indeed, an overview of past and the isolation and segregation of a large present conditions points out how com- part of the poor and particularly the native pletely Irving Kristol got it wrong: the African American community, the majority native black, and arguably the Puerto of whom continue to live in segregated Rican, experience has been profoundly census tracts. unlike that of immigrants. Today, despite In light of these ongoing problems, substantial post–civil rights era progress, which affect immigrants of color as well the African American and native Puerto as many native African Americans, some Rican communities in the city are highly will no doubt see our insistence on the segregated from whites, with substandard distinction between nativism and racism schools, high crime rates, aggressive po- as a matter of semantics. Yet this distinc- licing, and high rates of imprisonment, tion matters for the future integration of unemployment, and health inequality. nonwhite immigrants and their descen- Recent research on residential segrega- dants. Race, by de½nition, is immutable. tion shows these conflicting trends. Look- Exclusion based on race creates a perma- ing at the twenty most diverse metropol- nent (or at least very long-lasting) bound- itan areas in the United States, sociologists ary, giving rise to reactive ethnicity and John Logan and Charles Zhang show that societal cleavages. Nativism could have two important trends characterize the the same result, but it does not have to. pattern of racial distribution across neigh- Even during peak periods of nativist sen- borhoods. One trend is the stubbornly timent, anti-immigrant attitudes in our persistent hyper-segregation of blacks from nation of immigrants are always more whites in many cities. The other trend is the ambivalent than racist ones. new growth of stably integrated “global” The current upsurge of nativism under- neighborhoods: census tracts where all lines the degree to which the local context four major racial ethnic groups–blacks, of reception counts. In the new immi- whites, Hispanics, and Asians–live side grant destinations, the combination of very by side. New York, paradoxically, is at the rapid in-migration and a concentration of forefront of both these trends.30 Indeed, unskilled undocumented immigrants has the level of black/white segregation in the created a potent stew of anti-immigrant city has barely changed since 1980. Yet feeling and behavior.31 Immigrants now about a third of whites (35 percent) live in face restrictive local laws that sanction these new global neighborhoods, along landlords who rent to undocumented peo- with 32 percent of Asians, 22 percent of ple, target day laborers gathering in pub- blacks, and 28 percent of Hispanics. lic places, and authorize police to inquire On the one hand, Logan and Zhang con- about legal status and share that informa- clude that these neighborhoods show that tion with federal authorities. These laws

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Immigrants also restrict undocumented immigrants experience in New York City will spread in from any local aid or services.32 In 2010, to the rest of the country, or the intoler- New York City state legislatures around the country con- ance and exclusion that characterizes sidered 1,400 legislative bills targeting other parts of the country will spread to immigration, passing 208 of them.33 places like New York, is an open question. In the continuous destinations, immi- Yet as America comes to grips with the grants and their children are less affected increased diversity of its population, it is by these nativist developments, at least important to pay attention to those places so far. It is almost impossible to imagine where the tradition of managing diversity such negative legislation being enacted in runs deep. New York City’s history of suc- New York, or other contemporary and con- cessful immigrant integration is a resource tinuing gateway cities where the majority for immigrants who settle there. Perhaps of immigrants live (cities such as similarly it could also serve as a resource or model pro-immigrant San Francisco and Chica- for new destinations struggling with the go). Whether the tolerance and accept- complexities of diversity. ance that immigrants and their children

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: MARY C. WATERS, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2006, is the M. E. Zukerman Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. Her publications include Coming of Age in America: The Transition to Adulthood in the Twenty-First Century (edited with Patrick J. Carr, Maria J. Kefalas, and Jennifer Holdaway, 2011), The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective (edited with Richard Alba, 2011), and The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965 (edited with Reed Ueda, 2007). PHILIP KASINITZ is Professor of Sociology in both the Graduate Center and Hunter College at the City University of New York. His publications include Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (with Mary C. Waters, John H. Mollenkopf, and Jennifer Holdaway, 2008), Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation (edited with John H. Mollenkopf and Mary C. Waters, 2004), and The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience (edited with Charles Hirschman and Josh DeWind, 1999). 1 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (1963; Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 1970), xiii. 2 Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Genera- tion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 3 Audrey Singer, “Twenty-First Century Gateways: An Introduction,” in Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America, ed. Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 3–21. 4 Nancy Foner and Roger Waldinger, “New York and Los Angeles as Immigrant Destinations, Contrasts and Convergence,” in New York and Los Angeles: The Uncertain Future, ed. David Halle and Andrew A. Beveridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 5 Douglas S. Massey, ed., New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigra- tion (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010); Helen Marrow, New Destination Dreaming: Immigration, Race, and Legal Status in the Rural American South (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 2011); Patrick J. Carr, Daniel T. Lichter, and Maria J. Kefalas, “Can Immigration Save Small-Town America? Hispanic Boomtowns and the Uneasy Path to Renewal,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 641 (2012): 38; and Daniel T. Lichter, “Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural America,” Rural Sociology 77 (1) (2012): 3–35.

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6 Audrey Singer, “Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban Amer- Mary C. ica,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Waters April 18, 2007. & Philip Kasinitz 7 Steven A. Camarota, “Immigrants in the United States: A Pro½le of America’s Foreign-Born Population” (New York: Center for Migration Studies, August 2012). Note that these estimates are based on the March 2011 Current Population Survey. This national survey does not have a suf½cient sample size to make estimates by city. 8 “Mayor Emanuel Unveils First-Ever Chicago New Americans Plan,” City of Chicago Press Release, December 4, 2012, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/provdrs/ of½ce_of_new_americans/news/2012/dec/mayor_emanuel_unveils½rst-everchicago newamericansplan.html. 9 See Philip Kasinitz, Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); Peter Kwong, Chinatown, N.Y.: Labor and Politics, 1930–1950, rev. ed. (New York: The New Press, 2000). 10 Aviva Zeltzer-Zubida and Philip Kasinitz, “The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York,” Contemporary Jewry 25 (2005): 193–225. 11 Many of these organizations also provide services for non-Jews, including immigrants from other groups and members of native minority groups. 12 David Mittelberg and Mary C. Waters, “The Process of Ethnogenesis among Haitian and Israeli Immigrants in the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (3) (1992): 412–435. 13 See Amy Foerster, “‘Isn’t Anybody Here from Alabama?’: Solidarity and Struggle in a ‘Mighty, Mighty Union,’” and Nicole P. Marwell, “Ethnic and Postethnic Politics in New York City: The Dominican Second Generation,” both in Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation, ed. Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004). 14 Kasinitz, Caribbean New York; and Mary C. Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities (Cambridge, Mass., and New York: Harvard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). 15 See Roger Waldinger, Still the Promised City?: African-Americans and New Immigrants in Post- industrial New York (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988). 16 Rubén Rumbaut, “Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States,” International Migration Review 38 (3) (2004): 1160–1205. 17 For details on the study, see Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jen- nifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 18 Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies; and Van C. Tran, “English Gain vs. Spanish Loss? Language Assimilation Among Second-Generation Latinos in Young Adulthood,” Social Forces 89 (1) (2010): 257–284. 19 Mary C. Waters and Philip Kasinitz, “Discrimination, Race Relations, and the Second Gen- eration,” Social Research 77 (1) (2010): 101–132. 20 See John David Skrentny, ed., Color Lines: Af½rmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Op- tions for America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), in particular the essay by Hugh Davis Graham, “Af½rmative Action for Immigrants?: The Unintended Consequences of Reform.”

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Immigrants 21 Douglas S. Massey, Margarita Mooney, Kimberly C. Torres, and Camille Z. Charles, “Black in Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United New York States,” American Journal of Education 113 (2007): 243–271. City 22 Irvin L. Child, Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict (1943; New York: Russell and Russell, 1970). 23 Sean P. Corcoran, “How New York Students Have Fared Under High School Choice: A Bird’s Eye View,” unpublished paper, New York University, 2011. 24 Robert Courtney Smith, “Mexicans: Civic Engagement, Education, and Progress Achieved and Inhibited,” in One Out of Three: Immigrant New York in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Nancy Foner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 25 Irving Kristol, “The Negro Today is Like the Immigrant of Yesterday,” The New York Times Magazine, September 11, 1966. 26 Interestingly, by 1970, events had convinced Glazer and Moynihan that this analogy was increasingly problematic, as the long essay that introduces their book’s second edition makes clear. 27 See David R. Roedinger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991); Noel Igantief, How the Irish Became White (New York: Rout- ledge, 1995); and Matthew Jacobson and Matthew Frye, Whiteness of a Different Color: Euro- pean Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). However insightful and provocative this literature has been, historians increasingly view its central claims as overstated. While nineteenth-century eugenics and ideas about a hierarchy of races no doubt played a role in reception of European immigrants, no one would argue that the racism these immigrants experienced was remotely close to the virulent forms of racism experienced by blacks. The best empirical investigation of this difference remains Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants since 1880 (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1980). The whiteness literature may also be marred by a certain literal-mindedness in its reading of nineteenth-century materials, which date from a time when the word race was often used more broadly than it is today. 28 See George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Edward E. Telles and Vilma Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 29Nancy Foner, From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000); and Nancy Foner, “How Exceptional is New York? Migration and Multiculturalism in the Empire City,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (6) (Novem- ber 2007): 999–1023. 30 John R. Logan and Charles Zhang, “Global Neighborhoods: New Pathways to Diversity and Separation,” American Journal of Sociology 115 (4) (January 2010): 1069–1109. 31 Mary C. Waters and Tomás Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 105–125. 32 Daniel Hopkins, “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition,” American Political Science Review 104 (1): 40–60. 33 Brooke Meyer, Joy Segreto, April Carter, and Ann Morse, “2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States” (Denver and Washington, D.C.: National Conference of State Legislatures, December 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration -legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx.

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Assimilation in New Destinations

Helen B. Marrow

Abstract: This article outlines a long-term research agenda on immigrant assimilation by calling on scholars to be more explicit about how we model and measure assimilation, and to move away from previously aspatial approaches to the topic. After briefly overviewing the ½eld, I draw on original qualitative data from a new immigrant destination region to highlight several places where I believe we scholars can better clarify de½nitions of and assumptions about assimilation, as well as choices about and interpretations of our data, to foster transparency and facilitate scholarly discovery. I conclude by arguing that scholars working in new immigrant destinations are well poised to examine how legal status–a key structural feature of the context of reception in a host society or locale–shapes assimilation processes and outcomes.

The geographic dispersal of immigrants away from traditional immigrant settlement areas toward an array of new and nontraditional settlement areas has been one of the most surprising trends in recent American immigration patterns.1 By de½ - nition, new destinations are places with little previous experience receiving immigrants. Some, especially in the West and Midwest, are more accurately classi½ed as reemerging destinations, since they harbored large shares of immigrants in the early twentieth century, but saw those shares dwindle by the 1970s, before the forces of geographic dispersal again began to pick up. Other destinations, especially in the South, had little experience receiving European, Asian, or Mexican immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century, and so can be considered HELEN B. MARROW is Assistant true emerging areas of immigrant settlement.2 Professor of Sociology and Latin This article is a discussion of both immigrant American Studies at Tufts Univer- assimilation in these new destinations and the sity. Her publications include New study of immigrant assimilation itself. For the twin Destination Dreaming: Immigration, purposes of encouraging transparency and devel- Race, and Legal Status in the Rural American South (2011) and The New oping a stronger spatial lens within the ½eld, I high- Americans: A Guide to Immigration light several areas where I believe we scholars can since 1965 (edited with Mary C. better clarify de½nitions of and assumptions about Waters and Reed Ueda, 2007). assimilation, as well as choices about and interpre-

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Assimilation tations of our data. Of course, any discus- In their recent resurrection of assimila- in New sion of immigrant assimilation in new tion theory, sociologists Richard Alba Desti - nations destinations is to some degree specula- and Victor Nee de½ne assimilation as “the tive, be cause assimilation, whether con- decline of an ethnic distinction and its sidered a process or an outcome, occurs corollary cultural and social differ- over too long a period of time to be ences.”6 According to them, assimilation assessed accurately today. Though some is the state of having achieved “parity in researchers have focused on the very life chances,” regardless of ethnic back- young second-generation children of for- ground, and they consider immigrants to eign-born immi grants,3 immigrants have have entered the American mainstream not resided in new destinations long once their ethnic background ceases to enough to allow for a de½nitive analysis determine their opportunities and life of intergenerational assimilation. Such chances. However, Alba and Nee clarify an analysis will not be possible until the that immigrants can still maintain an contemporary second generation comes ethnic identity even once part of the of age and produces a third and fourth mainstream, and that factors other than generation. ethnicity (particularly social class) can This discussion is also tentative because, influence life chances. Viewed this way, as sociologists Victor Zúñiga and Rubén assimilation is not only an outcome Hernández-León note, new destinations reflecting some convergence to a mean– exhibit remarkable diversity.4 They range complete when there is no longer any dis- from rural agricultural markets and small cernible gap attributable to ethnicity be - company towns to diverse inner-ring tween immigrants and their descendants suburbs and rapidly developing exurbs, and a mainstream reference group. It is in all regions of the country. Thus, any also a process reflecting movement toward single attempt to analyze the state of convergence to that mean–which may assimilation in new destinations runs an occur over time or over generations, even inevitable risk of overgeneralization and while immigrants and their descendants oversimpli½cation. Clearly, new destina- have not yet reached parity with, or be- tions have increased the variety of eco- come indistinguishable from, the mem- nomic, social, cultural, political, and insti - bers of the mainstream reference group. tutional contexts of reception greeting Viewing assimilation as both an out- immigrant newcomers in the United come of and a process moving toward States today. This is important to recog- convergence to a mean affects the refer- nize because, when combined with im - ence groups that we choose to include in migrants’ own skills and characteristics, our studies of assimilation. For instance, contexts of reception shape different when assessing assimilation as an out- mobility paths for different groups over come of some convergence to a mean, time.5 Nonetheless, this article outlines a scholars typically analyze differences be - long-term research agenda on immigrant tween immigrants and their descendants assimilation in new immigrant destina- and a mainstream reference group, typi- tions in two ways: ½rst, by calling on cally one that is composed of: (a) native- scholars to be more explicit about how born whites of native parentage; (b) we model assimilation in our studies; native-born Americans of the same race and second, by calling on scholars to or Hispanic origin (usually African Amer- move away from our heretofore aspatial icans, but sometimes mainland-born approaches to the topic. Puerto Ricans or later-generation Mexi-

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can Americans); or (c) all native-born group is instead their ½rst-generation Helen B. Americans.7 immigrant parents. This is because the Marrow When assessing assimilation as a pro - former comparison yields a continuing cess moving toward a convergence, how- ethnic distinction in many standard out- ever, scholars typically analyze differ- come variables vis-à-vis native-born ences between immigrants located at dif- whites, while the latter comparison high- fering points on a continuum of spatial lights a process of signi½cant upward and temporal distances from the immi- mobility from the starting point of their grant starting point. They might analyze immigrant parents.10 differences between ½rst-generation im- Likewise, if we compare third-genera- migrants and comparable non-migrants tion children of Mexican immigrants with left behind (an approach borrowed from native-born whites, we might conclude research on migrant selectivity); between that they have experienced less assimila- second-generation children of immi- tion than if we compared them with their grants born in the United States and their second-generation parents. And we would ½rst-generation immigrant parents (re- certainly conclude that they have experi- membering that the latter are typically a enced less assimilation than if we com- highly selected group); between third- pared them with children born in Mexico.11 generation grandchildren of immigrants We might also conclude that second-gen- and both their second-generation parents eration children of Mexican immigrants and ½rst-generation immigrant grand- in San Antonio and Los Angeles have parents; and even, in perhaps the most experienced less assimilation if we ana- novel approach, between second-genera- lyze them according to their generation tion children of immigrants born in the group alone, rather than distinguishing United States and comparable children by historical birth cohort as well.12 The born to non-migrants in the ½rst-genera- former strategy lumps to gether different tion immigrants’ countries of origin.8 cohorts of second-generation Mexican Some scholars have begun to break down Americans into a single second-generation these generational categories further, category–combining, for instance, the comparing them by birth cohort in order children of Mexican immigrants who to account for variations in the historical crossed the border in 1920 with the chil- circumstances under which people of dren of Mexican immigrants who crossed similar generational groups enter the the border in 2000. Such a strategy glosses country and grow up.9 over important differences in the histori- In this way, if we scholars are clearer cal circumstances that have shaped each about the various approaches that we cohort’s trajectory, including the rise in take to study immigrant assimilation, and average level of education of incoming if we appreciate that these approaches ½rst-generation Mexican immigrants, a influence our choices of reference groups, dramatic shift away from Jim Crow– then we can better understand divergent style racism in the Southwest, and deep- outcomes and conclusions already appar- ening forces of globalization and deindus - ent in the literature. For example, if we trialization over the second half of the compare second-generation children of twentieth century.13 Dominican immigrants with native-born Regardless of approach and choice of whites, we might conclude that the second- reference groups, a standard set of objec- generation children have experienced tive measures is typically employed by all less assimilation than if our reference social scientists who study assimilation,

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Assimilation especially by those who undertake quan- lenos and our standard–and perhaps in New titative studies. These measures include: more objective–measures of assimila- Desti - nations (a) socioeconomic status, de½ned as education. However, there are enough interest- tional attainment, occupational special- ing departures to suggest that point of ization, and earnings; (b) spatial concen- view is as important to our analyses of tration, de½ned in terms of suburbaniza- assimilation as are approach and choice tion and dissimilarity in spatial distribu- of reference group. tion; (c) language assimilation, de½ned in To illustrate, we scholars may view sec- terms of English language ability and loss ond-generation immigrant youths who of mother tongue; and (d) intermarriage, pursue self-employment in the arts, de½ned by race or Hispanic origin, and entertainment, and even crime as evi- only occasionally by ethnicity and gener- dence of some lack of assimilation with ation.14 Some of the literature also tracks native-born whites. This judgment as- the “softer” side of assimilation by mea - sumes that assimilation is an outcome- suring expressions of ethnic and racial state dependent on immigrants’ conver- identi½cation or cultural attitudes and gence to standard, upper-middle-class practices, though I do not focus on these measures of occupational specialization measures here. (for example, salaried white-collar em - However, a few innovative scholars ployment), rather than the pursuit of have recently developed a new way of occupations that these immigrants believe looking at immigrant assimilation. Build - can afford them greater dignity, respect, ing on novel scholarship conducted among independence, and self-suf½ciency.17 Sim - second-generation immigrant youth in ilarly, we may view second-generation southern Florida,15 sociologist Min Zhou Mexican immigrant youths who “only” and her colleagues have noted that very graduate from high school or community little research has focused on how immi- college as evidence of some lack of assim- grants and their descendants themselves ilation with native-born whites. But this de½ne, experience, and perceive their is because we consider assimilation to be mobility and success. Zhou has raised the an outcome-state dependent on immi- important question of whether later-gen- grants’ convergence to a standard, upper- eration outcomes are characterized dif- middle-class measure of educational ferently by the subjects of study than by achievement (such as four-year college the scholars doing the analysis.16 Indeed, completion), as opposed to completion most research on assimilation remains of educational programs that immigrants heavily scholar-centered. To address this believe constitute a worthy achievement lacuna, Zhou and her colleagues take and measurable progress relative to that what they call a “subject centered” stance achieved by their parents.18 in their analysis of second-generation Conversely, we may view second-gen- assimilation and mobility in metropoli- eration West Indian and Filipino immi- tan Los Angeles–one that privileges the grant youths who achieve similar rates of second generation’s own lived experi- educational attainment as native-born ences and perceptions, de½nitions, and whites as con½rmatory evidence of as - measures of mobility and success over the similation, even though these youths standard scholarly measures and analysis. may have achieved less education than To be sure, there are observable correla- their immigrant parents.19 And we may tions between the subjective evaluations also view second-generation Chinese, of these second-generation Los Ange- Vietnamese, Korean, and Russian Jewish

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immigrant youths who achieve similar under which assimilation may cause or Helen B. rates of educational and occupational lead to socioeconomic mobility, or vice Marrow attainment as native-born whites as versa.23 Thus, it is important not only to con½rmatory evidence of assimilation, clearly identify our approaches, reference even though these youths often feel groups, viewpoints, and measures, but also “unsuccessful” and as though they are to de½ne our collective dependent vari- not “living up” to the high expectations able of assimilation squarely in terms of of their parents, siblings, and coethnic (dis)similarity–not necessarily in terms friends.20 of mobility, though the two concepts cer- Any serious evaluation of immigrant tainly intertwine. assimilation must tackle all these conceptual and operational concerns simulta- Though solid evaluations of assimila- neously. First, what is the general ap - tion paths and processes will require time proach to, and de½nition of, assimila- and longitudinal and intergenerational tion–is it viewed as an outcome of some data, it can still be a useful analytical convergence to a mean, or as a process exercise to consider how new immigrant toward some convergence to a mean? destinations might alter our understand- Second, what is the reference group ings of the characteristics of both immi- being used to measure assimilation– grants and their potential reference some mainstream reference group (and if groups. It can also be useful to consider so, de½ned as what), or some other group how replacing our scholar-centered points situated at a different spot along the of view with new subject-centered per- immigrant continuum (and if so, where)? spectives might alter the interpretations Third and fourth, what are the measures we draw from our research. To engage of assimilation, and from whose view- creatively in both exercises, I draw on points do they derive–from scholars’ data that I collected between June 2003 purportedly objective views, or from sub- and June 2004 in “Bedford” and “Wilcox” jects’ own perspectives? Counties, pseudonyms I have given to Taken together, these concerns also two new rural destination counties in underscore an important distinction eastern North Carolina. While not repre- scholars often fail to make between the sentative of all new destinations, rural concept of assimilation–which implies Southern destinations are important be - merely similarity, or convergence, with cause they are the farthest away, both cultural or social behaviors and out- geographically and symbolically, from comes–and the concept of intergenera- the traditional immigrant gateways where tional mobility–which implies upward or most studies of immigrant assimilation downward socioeconomic movement.21 have been based. As sociologist Herbert Gans has noted, My data include systematic ½eld notes I immigrants and their descendants can took while engaged in various forms of achieve upward mobility without becom- ethnographic ½eldwork in these two ing culturally or socially akin to main- counties, as well as transcripts derived stream native-born society.22 Likewise, from 129 individual semi-structured inter- immigrants and their children can become views that I conducted with foreign-born culturally or socially more akin to main- Latin American immigrants of varying stream natives by being either upwardly or nationalities, U.S.-born Hispanics, and downwardly mobile. Indeed, many ques- key white and black native-born infor- tions remain regarding the conditions mants, in both Spanish and English.24

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Assimilation Most of the foreign-born respondents in members, these factors correlate with in New the sample hailed from Mexico (55.7 per- low income levels and high poverty rates. Desti - nations cent); had migrated directly to North Finally, quantitative data show that Carolina from abroad, rather than from rural American natives are generally less another part of the United States; and accepting of immigrants than are their lacked legal status (47.1 percent). This urban and suburban counterparts29– pro½le is consistent with the literature, perhaps an unsurprising ½nding given which demonstrates that Mexicans pre- the lingering associations between rurality dominate in North Carolina’s foreign- and cultural isolation, parochialism, tra- born and Hispanic/Latino populations ditionalism, moral and political conser- (at approximately two-½fths and two- vatism, and intolerance for diversity and thirds, respectively); that the internal ambiguity.30 Regardless of whether we migration of Hispanics from other parts are assessing these immigrants’ prospects of the country to North Carolina has for assimilation (to become similar to gradually given way to direct international natives in their social and cultural behav- labor migration; and that as a new desti- iors and outcomes) or socioeconomic nation state, North Carolina has a high mobility, such data give us pause. Many proportion of unauthorized immigrants.25 of these immigrants start off in a position The literature suggests that immigrants of severe socioeconomic disadvantage, in rural new destinations like Bedford with legal and political disadvantages and Wilcox Counties are disadvantaged layered on top, especially for those who not only in terms of their own character- lack legal status. istics, but also by the social and political Immigrants in rural new destinations reception they receive from natives. These also, by de½nition, reside in rural com- immigrants tend to be more heavily Mex- munities where they lack the critical ican and rural in origin than their coun- mass, at least initially, to develop their terparts in urban destinations–even own economies, services, networks, and “new” gateways like Atlanta, Nashville, organizations. Plus, there are fewer com- and Raleigh, where the national origins munity-based services and organizations and socioeconomic statuses of incoming in rural communities through which immigrants are more heterogeneous.26 immigrants can claim government re - Consequently, these immigrants often sources or access assistance and advocacy, have experience working in agriculture, yet compared to what is available in estab- are disadvantaged in terms of their formal lished and new metropolitan destina- levels of education, English-speaking tions.31 There is then a third layer of ability, and experience participating in social and cultural difference between politics.27 They also tend to be heavily rural and urban new destinations: rural concentrated in low-paying jobs in agri- areas not only have fewer immigrant culture, food processing, and manufac- members than urban areas–in 2002, turing and textiles–three rural indus- only 5.7 percent of immigrants lived in tries that have increased their depen - rural areas32–but rural native inhabi- dence on foreign-born labor since the tants also, especially in the South, have 1980s, and that have seen their real wages, weaker and more distant connections to bene½ts, and internal mobility lad ders their own immigrant histories.33 Few erode since the mid-twentieth century.28 Southerners, especially in rural areas, may Combined with their recency of arrival recognize any substantive personal con- and high proportions of unauthorized nection to the immigrant narrative at all.34

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Given these many disadvantages, what In this harsh economic context, and Helen B. are the prospects for assimilation in rural given her lack of a high school diploma, Marrow new destinations? If we take an out- poor English-language skills, unautho- come-based approach that de½nes immi- rized legal status, and visibly “Hispanic” grants as assimilated once their opportu- phenotype, we might see few prospects nities are no longer differentially deter- for personal or intergenerational eco- mined by their ethnicity relative to native- nomic assimilation for Nadia, her daugh- born whites (our most likely reference ter, and their future descendants. However, group), then our answer may well be changing our approach, choice of refer- bleak. It may be no less bleak if we adopt ence group, point of view, or measures a scholar-centered point of view that might alter our interpretations–some- privileges our own evaluations of these times for the better and other times for immigrants’ experiences, and that relies the worse. Even if we kept our approach to on the standard objective measures de - immigrant assimilation outcome-oriented, ½ned in the literature. Concretely, we altering our reference group would affect may see little reason for optimism about our interpretation of how closely Nadia the life chances of Nadia, an unautho- and her daughter resemble the white rized Mexican immigrant and divorced American mainstream. That is, do we wish mother of one who toils, day in and day to compare Nadia’s level of education and out, making repetitive-motion cuts on income against those of all white native- chickens in the cut-up department of a born Americans (using a national average giant rural food processing plant in or mean), against those of only rural Wilcox County, for only $8 an hour. native-born whites, or against only those In 2003, Nadia netted $16,640 in annual of the rural native-born whites who live income, placing her only 30 percent above in Nadia’s particular county or neighbor- the then-of½cial poverty line of $12,490 hood? for a family of two.35 Nadia’s ex-husband This question is important because, on had moved back to Mexico, and she was average, rural Americans have a lower supporting herself and her eight-year-old mean educational level, work in agricul- daughter on her own. As cultural anthro- ture at a higher rate, work in high-skilled pologist Donald Stull and social geogra- professional and technical jobs at a lower pher Michael Broadway have ob served, rate, earn lower wages, and live in poverty even though the typical range of hourly at a higher rate than do urban Americans. wages and gross annual salaries earned Consequently, comparing Nadia with only by American meat and poultry workers rural native-born whites produces a in the late 1990s–$6.80 to $11.20 per smaller observable ethnic gap in our hour, and $14,144 to $23,296 annually–are standard measures of socioeconomic sta- among the highest wages in rural areas tus, and thus a more optimistic interpre- where food processing plants are typically tation of her prospects for assimilation, located, they have also fallen substantially than does comparing her with all native- since the 1960s and remain below the level born whites. Further, comparing her with required for a family of four to participate only rural native-born whites living in in one or more federal assistance pro- Wilcox County produces an even more grams.36 In this way, these industries fail optimistic interpretation, since according to provide workers–many of whom are to U.S. census data, this population fares now foreign born–a living wage suf½cient very poorly by standard measures of to feed, clothe, and shelter their families. socioeconomic status compared to rural

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Assimilation natives nationwide. Indeed, even research tions for our analysis. Using each of these in New on assimilation in traditional destina- reference groups would allow us to com- Desti - nations tions now emphasizes subnational– pare how immigrants in rural new desti- opposed to national–reference groups, nations are faring socioeconomically not including groups that can better account just vis-à-vis whites, but also vis-à-vis the for patterns of selective geographic mo - nation’s historically disadvantaged and bility into and out of selected subnational discriminated racial minority groups. To units.37 illustrate, we might view Nadia’s tenth- Of course, narrowing our reference grade education and $16,640 annual in - group to one that is both rural and local come with less concern if our bench- may have little substantive impact on marks were the comparable ½gures among Nadia’s material well-being. Arguing that native-born blacks living in Wilcox her level of education and socioeconomic County. status more closely resemble those of We might also be more optimistic native-born whites living in rural Wilcox about Nadia’s daughter’s prospects for County than those of native-born whites future economic assimilation if we who live in the city or suburbs of San observe a larger ethnic gap between the Francisco (a traditional immigrant gate- average educational levels of immigrant way) or nearby Charlotte (an emerging and black students, than between immi- immigrant gateway) does not improve grant and white students. Indeed, in sev- Nadia’s life in material terms, nor does it eral elementary schools in Bedford and ensure that her descendants will be better Wilcox Counties, respondents expressed off. Nevertheless, it does reduce the edu- concerns not about a persistent educa- cational and occupational distance that a tional achievement gap between Hispanic- low-skilled immigrant like Nadia and her newcomer and white students, but about descendants have to travel in order to gain an emerging gap between Hispanic-new- entrée, and eventually assimilate, into comer and black students. According to what is considered the local economic them, some Hispanic students are mak- norm or mainstream. Indeed, Nadia’s ing such rapid academic progress that tenth-grade education and $16,640 annual local teachers and administrators have income look much more economically begun to wonder why African American normal in the context of rural Wilcox students–their historical minority group County than they would in that of a well- –are not keeping pace with either native heeled Atlanta suburb or the middle of whites or high-achieving ½rst- and second- Manhattan; in 2000, only 10.5 percent of generation Hispanic students.39 Wilcox County’s population held a bache- Again, altering our reference group to lor’s degree or higher, compared to 39.4 one that includes racial minority groups percent of all residents in the San Fran- may have little substantive impact on cisco-Oakland-Vallejo metropolitan area, Nadia’s material well-being, and if these and 32 percent in the Atlanta metropoli- reference groups are themselves socio- tan area.38 economically disadvantaged, we might Altering our reference group to native- very well end up concerned about both born blacks, native-born Americans of groups’ prospects for upward economic the same race or Hispanic origin as the mobility. However, in terms of economic incoming immigrants, or all native-born assimilation–a concept that denotes one Americans (including racial minorities group’s similarity to another without alongside whites) has additional implica- also implying any improvement in its

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material well-being–it is still important alone–she might appear less socioeco- Helen B. to know whether Nadia’s economic posi- nomically well-off than if we compared Marrow tion looks more similar to that of native- her to her parents in Mexico, or even to her born whites than that of native-born siblings or all Mexicans her age in Mexico. blacks. If it does, and if her daughter’s She would likely also appear less well-off does as well, then our evaluations of their than if we compared her to ½rst-genera- prospects for economic assimilation will tion Mexican immigrants who have set- look brighter than if we rely on compar- tled in East Los Angeles. In fact, the latter isons to native-born whites alone. two comparisons–both of which involve Going further, we could also switch to a other immigrants situated at different spa- process-oriented approach to assimilation, tial and temporal points on the immigrant opening up a host of other possibilities. continuum–might provide evidence that To measure Nadia’s prospects for eco- Nadia and her daughter are dissimilating nomic assimilation, we could compare her away from not only the positions of their educational level, occupational status, family members and other Mexicans in and annual income not only against those Mexico, but also the positions of Mexi- of native-born reference groups, but also can-origin populations who have settled against those of her parents in Mexico, in in the poverty-stricken, inner-city ghet- order to derive an intergenerational mea- tos of traditional immigrant gateways. In sure of the socioeconomic mobility that this process-oriented approach, such ½nd - she has experienced by virtue of migration. ings are promising, even though from an Similarly, we could compare her socio- outcome-oriented approach, scholars economic and educational characteristics would still focus concern on the observ- against those of her siblings in Mexico, or able ethnic differentials in life chances against those of all non-migrant Mexi- between Nadia and native-born whites. cans in her birth cohort, to derive a famil- Finally, we could make a dramatic ial or more general measure of her dis- change in our point of view, adopting a similation from the positions of similarly subject-centered perspective in place of a situated people in Mexico.40 Within the scholar-centered one. Notably, we could United States, we could compare these make this change with regard to any of measures against those of: (a) ½rst-gener- the above comparisons, and in terms of ation Mexican immigrants who have set- sociocultural as well as economic assimi- tled in traditional immigrant gateways or lation, even though I have focused primar - other metropolitan areas; (b) ½rst-genera- ily on the latter so far. By doing this, we tion Mexican immigrants who originally are not only likely to reach new conclu- settled in traditional immigrant gateways sions using similar data, but also to stum- but then moved on, in a secondary process ble upon novel measures of assimilation of internal migration, to rural new desti- and success as de½ned by our subjects nations; or even (c) ½rst-generation Mexi- themselves. Again, consider Nadia’s situ- can immigrants who have immigrated to ation. In economic terms, she might not Wilcox County either before or after look very similar to native-born whites, Nadia. Each comparison would provide a even those living in rural Wilcox County, different perspective on Nadia’s socio - and scholars might be correct to worry economic position in Wilcox County. about her future prospects for upward For example, if we compare Nadia to economic mobility, given her lack of native-born whites–even those in rural human capital and the increasingly new destinations or in Wilcox County unforgiving structure of the low-skilled

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Assimilation American labor market. Yet she and their studies, alongside standard mea- in New many other low-skilled immigrants in sures like education and income levels. Desti - nations my ½eld research viewed their economic But a subject-centered approach provides positions quite differently. They saw a fuller appreciation of what such mea - themselves not simply in situations of sures mean to immigrants and their economic disadvantage relative to native- descendants, and perhaps to natives as born whites, but also in situations of eco- well. This is important when an immi- nomic advantage compared to their family grant like Nadia imbues one of these members and friends back in Latin Amer - measures (such as residence in a rural ica, and even to their fellow coethnics liv- trailer park) with a different meaning than ing in traditional immigrant gateways. scholars typically would. It is also impor- Such interpretations reflect not only tant when a group of natives, such as different reference groups, but different rural Southerners in Bedford County, see measures and interpretations of their economic and educational activities like economic well-being. Early on I found that working in agriculture, getting a ged, or several of my subjects evoked different attending a local community college as measures of socioeconomic achievement symbols of moral competence, dedica- than those on which we scholars typically tion, and success, not as failure to have rely. Because jobs in their home countries, “done better” or “gone farther,” as middle- the American agriculture industry, and class suburbanites may be more apt to do. the low-skilled American service sector Consequently, using a subject-centered can be more precarious by comparison, approach, we may see new measures of many immigrants viewed having a year- what immigrants, not to mention natives, round and full-time poultry processing de½ne as successful or unsuccessful in job as evidence of economic success, not their own terms. In the above example disadvantage. Many also viewed living in (owning a plot of land), we might even a trailer, even in an increasingly concen- stumble upon a key element of what it trated Hispanic mobile home park, as evi- means to settle in a rural new destination dence of economic and social achieve- versus a traditional metropolitan gateway. ment, not segregation from the typical In terms of linguistic, residential, and Americans’ residential condition. Indeed, social assimilation, Nadia also might not many immigrants viewed manufactured look very similar to native-born whites, homes as economic assets, not liabilities, even those living in rural Wilcox County; in part because many local native-born and again, scholars might be correct to whites and blacks in eastern North Caro - worry about her future prospects for social lina live in them, too.41 And many immi- integration, given rural white Southerners’ grants who hailed from rural areas in Latin historical reputation for enforcing both America viewed acquiring a plot of land, formal and informal racial boundaries. not necessarily income or homeowner- But here, too, Nadia and many other low- ship, as the ultimate marker of economic skilled immigrants in my ½eld research success–because a plot of land offers them viewed their social positions differently. emotional comfort and serves as a symbol For example, several immigrants viewed of their economic independence and self- their prospects for learning English to be suf½ciency.42 better in sparsely populated rural new It might be easy for scholar-centered destinations than in traditional immi- analyses of assimilation in new destina- grant gateways: without large coethnic tions to integrate new measures into communities, they felt rural life com-

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pelled them to learn English more quickly. (“Yankees”). It also highlights an unex- Helen B. As Armando, a naturalized citizen from pected yardstick that mainstream rural Marrow Monterrey, Mexico, illustrates be low, a Southerners may be using to evaluate dif- few immigrants even reported being ferent groups of immigrants in their identi½ed as “southern Hispanics” when midst. In fact, Isabel, an immigrant from they traveled to more Hispanic-heavy Buenos Aires, Argentina, reports that she regions of the United States. This is a sure was surprised to learn that rural natives sign of successful local and regional–even of eastern North Carolina consider His- if not national–linguistic and cultural panics/Latinos to be more culturally sim- assimilation: ilar to them than the “Yankees” who migrate internally from the American Armando: I know [Southerners] call the Northeast. ones from New York “Yankees.” I know Thus, despite the fact that standard mea- that they speak differently. I’ve been to sures of socioeconomic status and race New York, and when I talk to people there often lead us to judge “Yankees” as much they can automatically know where I’m better economically and racially assimi- from. But I can’t tell a difference. They’re lated to the mainstream in eastern North like, “You’re from the South.” I’m like, Carolina than Hispanic newcomers, a “Yeah?” And I think that the, the ones from subject-centered approach might suggest the North, they seem to think that they’re the opposite: better than the ones from the South, maybe. I don’t know. Isabel: And something else that surprised me is that people from the South are still Interviewer: Did you get that feeling when resentful to the people from the North, and you went up there? they are calling them “Yankees.” Armando: Um . . . no. I get it from several Interviewer: What do you think about that? people here that are from up there, and that have lived down here. Isabel: That I couldn’t believe! [laughs] One day I was with a good friend from North Interviewer: Why do you think they feel Carolina, and she said, “This Yankee’s this way? from New Jersey.” And I said, “But they are Armando: Gosh! I don’t know. I guess the your same culture.” And she said, “No slang that we use here is, like, not proper to way.” She said, “You [being from Argentina] them. [long pause] They criticize a lot the have more in common with me than a per- way that we talk here and the slang. [laughs] son from New Jersey.” And that’s when I really realized. And I thought, “How can In this way, adopting a subject-cen- you say that?” And she said, “Yeah, [Yan- tered approach offers novel insights kees] are nasty. They are rude. They yell.” about linguistic assimilation that we can- [laughs] not glean from the standard measures (usually close-ended survey questions Even in terms of racial assimilation, measuring self-reported rates of English- Nadia’s visibly Hispanic phenotype and language ability). It not only highlights physical appearance might look distinc- the roles that accent and dialect might tive vis-à-vis whiteness in the context of play in signaling simultaneous cultural rural new destinations; and once again, assimilation toward one mainstream ref- scholars might be correct to worry about erence group (rural Southerners) and her ability to successfully avoid and over- cultural dissimilation away from another come racial discrimination from the white

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Assimilation natives. However, even in this context, buried alongside whites than blacks in in New Nadia and many other low-skilled immi- Southern new immigrant destinations44– Desti - nations grants in my ½eld research viewed their can produce a more optimistic evaluation racial identities and experiences differ- of immigrant prospects for racial conver- ently. All but one of my subjects self- gence with the local white mainstream identi½ed racially using some nonblack than studies based on traditional view- identi½er–usually “Hispanic,” “Latino,” points and measures. “white,” or by national origin–and all but two also reported being identi½ed by Rather than serving as a “state of the rural Southern natives as something non- ½eld” or as an expert endorsement of any black. Even more important, many of one approach, reference group, view- these respondents perceived that blacks point, or outcome measure, this discus- discriminate against them more than sion is intended primarily as a thought whites do. exercise–a way to illustrate how chang- Going by standard measures of socio - ing any one of the above elements has the economic status, this latter ½nding makes potential to alter our interpretations and little sense; there is a much larger gap conclusions about assimilation in new separating the material positions of His- destinations. In this sense, what I am panic immigrants from whites than from advocating is not novel. The varying blacks in the South, and rural black approaches and assumptions identi½ed Southerners are so economically disad- here already exist in the literature but are vantaged that they lack the material rarely made explicit. Consequently, early resources to truly discriminate against research in new destinations has already other groups. Thus, only by taking a sub- begun to exhibit some of the same trap- ject-centered point of view did I learn pings of disputes and clashes evident in that my immigrant respondents con- studies of traditional destinations. While ceived of the discrimination and exclusion some of these are necessary for stimulat- they felt not just in racial terms–wherein ing intellectual debate, others could be white natives can mark them as racial avoided to facilitate scholarly discovery inferiors–but also by language ability, and consensus. Indeed, because we are citizenship, and legal status–wherein still at an early point in the study of new both white and black natives can mark immigrant destinations, making our as - and ostracize them as undeserving civic sumptions and choices more transparent and cultural outsiders.43 now will help us make better sense of Here again, despite the fact that stan- presently incongruous ½ndings, and, more dard measures of socioeconomic status important, develop a more coherent and race might lead us to view Hispanic sense of the ½eld as we move forward. immigrants as economically and racially Moreover, in doing so it is vital to give more similar to native-born blacks than greater attention to spatial variation. to native-born whites in rural Southern Within this agenda, several areas de - new destinations, a subject-centered ap - serve our attention. First, I have focused proach might suggest the opposite. Indeed, primarily on the “hard” side of assimila- coupling such an approach with novel tion. But we also need to be more explicit measures of residential and interpersonal and transparent about our assumptions assimilation–ones showing, for exam- and choices as we address aspects of the ple, that Hispanics more frequently live “softer” side of assimilation in new desti- among, date, get married to, and even get nations, including identity and cultural

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practices.45 Second, as do most studies, I tion, by weakening immigrants’ available Helen B. have focused primarily on assimilation as forms of human, ½nancial, social, and Marrow it plays out among immigrants and their cultural capital49; it also changes the distal descendants. But we also need to pay causal mechanisms underlying assimila- more attention to what is happening tion, by hardening the formal rules and among new destinations’ host popula- laws under which immigrants make their tions and their descendants, in order to everyday decisions about work, educa- build a better knowledge base about the tion, and civic activity. two-way nature of assimilation in such Thus, perhaps we will come to learn locales moving forward.46 Third, as that assimilation works differently for scholars, we need to heed and build into post-1965 immigrants and their descen- our research designs the new insights dants who have settled in new destina- from our colleagues in the larger litera- tions than for their counterparts who ture, as they identify improved methods have settled in traditional destinations, and data for assessing assimilation–for simply because a higher proportion of example, among immigrants and their the former immigrants lack legal status. actual descendents using longitudinal Of course, there may well turn out to be data, among appropriate cohorts of im - similarities in how undocumented immi- migrant generations compared at similar grants experience American workplaces, ages and points in the life course, or bureaucracies, and public life across tra- between immigrants and natives taking ditional and new destinations.50 There into account subnational patterns of in- may also turn out to be similarities in the and out-migration that can signi½cantly intergenerational transfer of the disad- alter notions of our study populations vantages of illegal status across both and their appropriate reference groups.47 types of locales. But larger proportions of Finally, scholars of new destinations undocumented immigrants in new desti- are well poised to focus greater attention nations, coupled with extremely sharp on how legal status–a key structural fea- negative turns in many new destinations’ ture of the context of reception in a host social, institutional, and political contexts society or locale–shapes assimilation of reception after 2005,51 suggest that processes and outcomes. Indeed, given scholars working in new destinations can recent spatial-temporal correlations be- play a leading role in developing a more tween immigrants’ period of entry, legal thorough understanding of how assimila- status, and settlement in new destination works for undocumented immi- tions, especially among Mexicans, new grants–depending on exactly when they destinations have higher proportions of arrive and precisely where they settle. undocumented immigrants among their foreign-born populations than do traditional destinations.48 This fundamentally changes immigrants’ starting points for achieving economic success, social inclusion, and political representation over time and generations in new, compared to traditional, destinations. In the words of neo-assimilation scholars Alba and Nee, it not only changes the proximal causal mechanisms underlying assimila-

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Assimilation endnotes in New 1 Desti - Elzbieta Gozdziak and Susan F. Martin, eds., Beyond the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing nations America (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005); Douglas S. Massey, ed., New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008); Audrey Singer, Susan W. Hardwick, and Caroline B. Brettell, eds., Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti- tution Press, 2008); Mary C. Waters and Tomás R. Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimi- lation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 105–125; and Victor Zúñiga and Rubén Hernández-León, eds., New Destinations: Mexican Immigration to the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005). 2 Helen B. Marrow, New Destination Dreaming: Immigration, Race, and Legal Status in the Rural American South (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011); and Audrey Singer, “The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, February 2004). 3 Lourdes Gouveia and Mary Ann Powell, “Second-Generation Latinos in Nebraska: A First Look,” Migration Information Source (January 2007); Sarah Morando, “Paths to Mobility: The Mexican Second Generation at Work in a New Destination,” paper presented at Labor Markets and Workplace Dynamics in New Destinations of Mexican and Latino Immigration, a workshop held at the University of California, Los Angeles, October 23, 2009; and Alexis Silver, “Aging into Exclusion: Transitions to Adulthood for Undocumented Immigrant Youth,” paper presented at Undocumented Hispanic Migration: On the Margins of a Dream, a conference held at Connecticut College, New London, Conn., October 16–18, 2009. 4 Victor Zúñiga and Rubén Hernández-León, “The Dalton Story: Mexican Immigration and Social Transformation in the Carpet Capital of the World,” in Latino Immigrants and the Transformation of the U.S. South, ed. Mary E. Odem and Elaine Lacy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 34–50. 5 Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 6 Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Con- temporary Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11. 7 Waters and Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation.” 8 For this “dissimilation” approach, see Tomás R. Jiménez and David Fitzgerald, “Mexican Assimilation: A Temporal and Spatial Reorientation,” Du Bois Review 4 (2) (2007): 337–354. 9 Ibid.; Frank D. Bean, Susan K. Brown, Mark A. Leach, James D. Bachmeier, and Rosaura Tafoya-Estrada, “The Implications of Unauthorized Migration for the Educational Incorpo- ration of Mexican-Americans,” in Regarding Educacion: Mexican-American Schooling, Immigration, and Bi-National Development, ed. Bryant Jensen and Adam Sawyer (New York: Teachers’ College Press, 2013), 43–65; Julie Park and Dowell Myers, “Intergenerational Mobility in the Post–1965 Immigration Era: Estimates by an Immigrant Generation Cohort Method,” Demography 47 (2) (2010): 369–392; James P. Smith, “Assimilation across the Generations,” American Economic Review 93 (2) (2003): 315–319; James P. Smith, “Immigrants and the Labor Market,” Journal of Labor Economics 24 (2) (2006): 203–233; and Edward E. Telles and Vilma Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 10 Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (Cambridge, Mass., and New York: Harvard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 11 Jiménez and Fitzgerald, “Mexican Assimilation.” 12 Telles and Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion.

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13 Richard D. Alba, Tomás R. Jiménez, and Helen B. Marrow, “Mexican Americans as a Paradigm Helen B. for Contemporary Intra-Group Heterogeneity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies (2013); and Jiménez Marrow and Fitzgerald, “Mexican Assimilation.” 14 Waters and Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation.” 15 Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Lisa Konczal, “‘Murdering the Alphabet’: Identity and Entre- preneurship among Second-Generation Cubans, West Indians, and Central Americans,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28 (6) (2005): 1153–1181. 16 Min Zhou, Jennifer Lee, Jody Agius Vallejo, Rosaura Tafoya-Estrada, and Yang Sao Xiong, “Success Attained, Deterred, and Denied: Divergent Pathways to Social Mobility in Los Angeles’ New Second Generation,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 620 (1) (2008): 37–61. 17 Fernández-Kelly and Konczal, “‘Murdering the Alphabet.’” 18 Jiménez and Fitzgerald, “Mexican Assimilation”; and Zhou et al., “Success Attained, Deterred, and Denied.” 19 Kasinitz et al., Inheriting the City; and Zhou et al., “Success Attained, Deterred, and Denied.” 20Kasinitz et al., Inheriting the City; Sara S. Lee, “Class Matters: Racial and Ethnic Identities of Working and Middle-Class Second Generation Korean-Americans in New York City,” in Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation, ed. Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 313–338; Vivian Louie, “‘Being Practical’ or ‘Doing What I Want’: The Role of Parents in the Academic Choices of Chinese Americans,” in Becoming New Yorkers, ed. Kasinitz et al., 79–109; and Zhou et al., “Success Attained, Deterred, and Denied.” 21 Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream; Herbert J. Gans, “Acculturation, Assimi- lation, and Mobility,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30 (1) (2007): 152–164; Park and Myers, “Intergenerational Mobility in the Post–1965 Immigration Era”; and Zhou et al., “Success Attained, Deterred, and Denied.” 22 Gans, “Acculturation, Assimilation, and Mobility.” 23 Ibid. 24 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 25 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “A Portrait of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2009). 26 Debra J. Schleef and H. B. Cavalcanti, Latinos in Dixie: Class and Assimilation in Richmond, Virginia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009). 27 William A. Kandel and John Cromartie, “New Patterns of Hispanic Settlement in Rural America,” Rural Development Research Report No. 99 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2004); and Rebecca María Torres, E. Jeffrey Popke, and Holly M. Hapke, “The South’s Silent Bargain: Rural Restructuring, Latino Labor and the Ambiguities of Migrant Experience,” in The New South: Latinos and the Transformation of Place, ed. Heather A. Smith and Owen J. Furuseth (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press, 2006), 37–68. 28 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming; Donald D. Stull and Michael J. Broadway, Slaughterhouse Blues: The Meat and Poultry Industry in North America (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2004); and Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway, and David Grif½th, eds., Any Way You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small Town America (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995). 29Katherine Fennelly and Christopher M. Federico, “Rural Residence as a Determinant of Atti- tudes toward U.S. Immigration Policy,” International Migration 46 (1) (2008): 151–190. 30 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 31 Ibid.; and Torres, Popke, and Hapke, “The South’s Silent Bargain.”

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Assimilation 32 Diane Schmidley, “The Foreign Born Population in the United States: March 2002,” U.S. in New Census Bureau Current Population Reports Series, P-20-539 (Washington, D.C.: Government Desti - Printing Of½ce, 2003). nations 33 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 34 Jamie Winders, Nashville in the New Millennium: Immigrant Settlement, Urban Transformation, and Social Belonging (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013). 35 “Annual Update of the hhs Poverty Guidelines,” Federal Register 71 (15) (January 24, 2006): 3848–3849, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 36 Stull and Broadway, Slaughterhouse Blues. 37 Bean et al., “The Implications of Unauthorized Migration for the Educational Incorporation of Mexican-Americans”; and Julie Park, Dowell Myers, and Tomás R. Jiménez, “Intergener- ational Mobility of the Children of Mexican Immigrants: Converging to a Mainstream Dif- ferentiated by Gender and Region,” paper presented at 2010 Annual Meeting of the Popula- tion Association of America, Dallas, Tex., April 15–17, 2010. 38 Author’s analysis of Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0 [Machine-readable database] (Minneapolis: Minnesota Popula- tion Center, 2004), http://www.ipums.org. 39 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 40Jiménez and Fitzgerald, “Mexican Assimilation.” 41 Peter Skillern and Tanya Wolfram, “Transforming Trailers into Assets,” Popular Government 70 (2) (2005): 4–11. 42 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming; and Torres, Popke, and Hapke, “The South’s Silent Bargain.” 43 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 44Monica McDermott, “Black Attitudes and Hispanic Immigrants in South Carolina,” in Just Neighbors? Research on African American and Latino Relations in the United States, ed. Edward Telles, Mark Q. Sawyer, and Gaspar Rivera-Salgado (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011), 242–263; and Mariel Rose, “Appalachian Mestizaje: Race and Latino Immigration in Western North Carolina,” in Constructing Borders/Crossing Boundaries: Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration, ed. Caroline B. Brettell (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), 185–210. 45 Gans, “Acculturation, Assimilation, and Mobility”; and Tomás R. Jiménez, Replenished Eth- nicity: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 46 Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream. 47 Bean et al., “The Implications of Unauthorized Migration for the Educational Incorporation of Mexican-Americans”; Park and Myers, “Intergenerational Mobility in the Post–1965 Immigration Era”; Park, Myers, and Jiménez, “Intergenerational Mobility of the Children of Mexican Immigrants”; and Telles and Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion. 48 Passel and Cohn, “A Portrait of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States.” 49 Alba and Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream. 50 Compare, for example, Shannon Gleeson and Roberto G. Gonzales, “When Do Papers Mat- ter? An Institutional Analysis of Undocumented Life in the United States,” International Migration 50 (4) (2012): 1–19; and Marrow, New Destination Dreaming. 51 Marrow, New Destination Dreaming.

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Immigration & the Color Line at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Frank D. Bean, Jennifer Lee & James D. Bachmeier

Abstract: The “color line” has long served as a metaphor for the starkness of black/white relations in the United States. Yet post-1965 increases in U.S. immigration have brought millions whose ethnoracial status seems neither black nor white, boosting ethnoracial diversity and potentially changing the color line. After reviewing past and current conceptualizations of America’s racial divide(s), we ask what recent trends in intermarriage and multiracial identi½cation–both indicators of ethnoracial boundary dissolution–reveal about ethnoracial color lines in today’s immigrant America. We note that rises in intermarriage and multiracial identi½cation have emerged more strongly among Asians and Latinos than blacks and in more diverse metropolitan areas. Moreover, these tendencies are larger than would be expected based solely on shifts in the relative sizes of ethnoracial groups, suggesting that immigration- generated diversity is associated with cultural change that is dissolving ethnoracial barriers–but more so for immigrant groups than blacks.

The “color line” has long served as a metaphor for the severe and enduring separation of whites and blacks in the United States. The election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency on November 4, 2008, however, broke a barrier many thought would never be breached. Yet while historic, this event’s signi½cance for the color line remains unclear. If FRANK D. BEAN is Chancellor’s one recalls W.E.B. Du Bois’s famous and pessi- Professor of Sociology at the Uni- mistic prophecy from a century ago–that “the versity of California, Irvine, where problem of the twentieth-century [would be] the he is also Director of the Center problem of the color line”1–one might imagine for Research on Immigration, Pop- that a single century would span too short a time to ulation, and Public Policy. eradicate such a deeply entrenched barrier. Racial JENNIFER LEE is Professor of Soci- realists today, perhaps like Du Bois, may well view ology at the University of California, Obama’s election as merely indicating that an ex- Irvine. ceptionally talented and appealing individual who JAMES D. BACHMEIER is Assistant just happened to be black was fortunate enough to Professor of Sociology at Temple follow one of the most unpopular White House occu- University. pants in recent history. Though Obama ran a terri½c (*See endnotes for complete contributor campaign and became president of the United biographies.) States, some analysts have thought the election alone

Immigration signi½es little about the demise of the native past and current conceptualizations & the Color black/white color line, arguing instead that of the color line and on evidence about Line at the Beginning of claims of a new postracial order in the the nature and extent of intermarriage and the 21st United States have been premature.2 Yet multiraciality among both blacks and the Century even if there are reasons to view Obama’s major new immigrant groups. If our in- ascendancy as an anomaly, a number of quiries lead us to conclude that the new- other developments suggest that the color comers belong on the black side of a per- line in fact has begun to shift in recent sisting and sharp divide, then it is likely decades, at least for some groups. that their sizable numbers over the past Given the crushing burden that the thirty years, together with their continuing black/white divide has imposed on Afri- high rates of entry, may be exacerbating can Americans throughout U.S. history, long-standing problems in U.S. race rela- questions about factors leading to possi- tions. But if Asians and Latinos are falling ble changes in the old black/white color largely on the white side of such a line, line are of considerable importance. In par- then this would imply that the successful ticular, a tectonic shift in U.S. immigra- integration of the new immigrants is not tion over the past forty years has brought only possible, but probably also likely. millions of newcomers whose ethnoracial This in turn would raise signi½cant ques- status seems neither black nor white.3 At tions about how the nonwhite diversity present (counting both the foreign born brought about by immigration is contrib- and their children), this group comprises uting to the weakening of boundaries more than sixty million persons.4The sheer between the new immigrants and native size of this new nonwhite population whites, and whether Latinos and Asians raises the question of what the color line are involved in these processes in similar means in today’s America. If such divi- ways and to the same degree. And even sions have not been reduced to irrelevance, more important, if growing diversity were has the color line nonetheless shifted and loosening the ethnoracial boundaries become replaced by new, multiple color that might constrain the life chances of lines? If convincing reasons exist to think new immigrants, is this diversity, along that the old black/white divide has faded, with rising familiarity and comfort among then the question of where the new im- native-born Americans with an ever-more migrant groups fall in relation to it are diverse nation, beginning also to erode largely moot. Moreover, if this is the case, the black/white divide? the same forces driving the color line’s dissolution would probably also be work- When Du Bois predicted the problem ing to enhance the sociocultural and eco- of the color line in 1903, the United States nomic incorporation of the new immigrant was in the midst of its rise to become the groups, implying that their successful inte- world’s leading industrial power. His gration represents little in the way of a poignant statement foresaw that slavery’s public policy challenge. On the other hand, contradictions would become more con- if strong remnants of the historic black/ spicuous and that its legacy–the stain of white color line persist, then questions which was painfully apparent in the form about where Latino and Asian immigrants of Jim Crow racial discrimination, as well fall in relation to the divide matter a great as continuing rationalizations and stereo- deal. types put forth to justify its inequities– As a lens through which to illuminate would continue to plague the country.5 today’s color line, we focus here on alter- As perceptive as Du Bois’s insights were,

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they overlooked another (and more often Du Bois’s era, provided sorely needed addi- Frank D. emphasized) de½ning theme in American tions to the workforce. If American immi- Bean, Jennifer Lee history: that of the “American dream,” gration represented the optimistic side of & James D. or the opportunity and prosperity prom- the country’s past and future, slavery and Bachmeier ised by immigration and symbolized in its aftermath tainted the fabric of national the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island in memory–a blot that many sought to nineteenth-century America.6 If slavery eradicate through denial and romantici- represented the scar of race on America zation.10 Indeed, a desire to transcend the and the country’s failure, immigration ex- lingering contradictions of slavery’s legacy empli½ed hope and the prospect of success. even helped focus the myth-making atten- Such dreams became reality for many of tion on the country’s immigrant origins. America’s nineteenth-century immigrant Immigration and race thus played settlers who fueled the expansion of the strangely symbiotic and compartmental- westward frontier with the aid of the ized roles in shaping the founding mythol- Land Act of 1820 and the Morrill Act of ogy of America. But in the early twentieth 1862, which provided land and technical century, the changing national origins of assistance for America’s new arrivals.7 immigrants began to undermine such con- But as the western frontier began to venient compartmentalizations. With the close at the end of the nineteenth century, arrival of America’s third wave of new- and as the United States increasingly comers from Eastern and Southern Europe, became an industrial society in the early agitated natives started to advocate the twentieth century, the nation found itself “Americanization” of groups they viewed in need of additional newcomers, but now as non-Nordic and thus hopelessly un- for a different reason: to ful½ll a demand assimilable.11 The new arrivals did not for workers in the burgeoning factories resemble the Western and Northern Euro- of America’s quickly growing cities.8 pean immigrants of the country’s past. Immigrants once again provided an answer. Moreover, they were Catholic or Jewish, These new arrivals, as had their predeces- not Protestant, and they largely settled in sors, (re)constructed themselves anew industrial cities outside the South. through geographic mobility, eagerly em- Thus, the tendency of the period to view bracing the American tradition of seeking foreigners in reductionist terms that con- opportunity and identity in “starting flated national origin and race meant over,” rather than remaining in Europe non-Southerners also had to confront where they and their governments faced and cope with persons of “races” different the challenge of trying to knit together from their own, a dilemma previously peoples torn apart by internecine conflict.9 faced in the case of the Irish but one that Nation-building in America, at least now could not so easily be dismissed as outside the South, involved new immi- only a Southern problem.12 The attendant grant settlements and work opportunities, tensions contributed to the rise of nativism not to mention dreams that encouraged and the passage of restrictive national- newcomers to recognize that they were origins immigration legislation.13 But part of a “nation of immigrants.” By denials both that racism existed and that World War I, American immigration had race relations involving blacks were less thus served multiple purposes: the early than exemplary continued through the waves provided the country with settlers Great Depression and World War II. It eager to begin new lives in a land of op- was not until the 1960s–when the emer- portunity; later waves, including those of gence of the geostrategic exigencies of

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Immigration the Cold War and the not-easily-denied cancer of racial status, borne of the legacy & the Color claims for equal opportunity emanating of slavery, so potent that it has metasta- Line at the Beginning of from post–World War II black veterans sized to include America’s nonwhite im- the 21st dramatized the contradictions of race–that migrant newcomers? Where did color lines Century substantial change ½nally began to occur.14 fall in the past and where are they drawn This dramatic shift involved Congress today? Four major viewpoints have aris- passing two landmark pieces of legisla- en to address these questions. tion: the Civil Rights Act in 1964, making discrimination against blacks illegal, and The disappearance of color lines altogether the Hart-Celler Act in 1965, abolishing is one common expectation. Perhaps no national-origin quotas as bases for immi- event in U.S. history has generated so much grant admissions.15 Scholars such as speculation that the color line might be Nathan Glazer thought the former would disappearing than Obama’s election as quickly lead to the full incorporation of president. During his campaign, Obama blacks into American society.16 Supporters presented a vision of a postracial America of the latter generally expected it not to in which racial status has declined in sig- generate much in the way of new immi- ni½cance and the country is strengthened gration, but rather thought it simply would by its multiracial and multicultural diver- remove the embarrassment of the coun- sity. Obama’s message resonated with try’s prior discriminatory admissions many Americans, in part because he him- policies.17 The two laws thus shared the self symbolized change, not only in his prospect of generating improved racial/ progressive political agenda, but also in ethnic relations in the United States. his multiracial and multicultural heritage. Neither prediction turned out as antic- After his election, journalists and pundits ipated, however. Blacks did not quickly proclaimed that the color line had fallen become economically incorporated, and and that America was now a “post-race” millions of new Asian and Latino immi- society in which anything was possible.19 grants, often seen as nonwhite, unex- Historian David Hollinger had sketched pectedly began to arrive in the country.18 such a society in his influential book, Now, nearly a half-century after the passage Postethnic America, in which he proposes of those watershed pieces of legislation, that color lines might be fading, with the we are addressing two broad and inter- United States moving into a new cosmo- related questions: to what extent has the politan or “postethnic” era.20 In this sce- country’s contemporary immigration re- nario, racial and ethnic identi½cation de½ned race in America; and in turn, to adopts a character similar to that of reli- what extent has the country’s prior expe- gious af½liation: that is, individuals could rience with race influenced its perception not only choose their af½liation, but also of today’s nonwhite immigrants? preserve the “right to exit” from that group. Certainly, the United States is more Critical to the concept of a postethnic racially and ethnically diverse now than society is the element of choice in ethno- at any time since World War II, and overt racial identi½cation. Hollinger stipulates racial discrimination is now illegal. But that postethnic is not anti-ethnic nor is it to what degree have racial/ethnic rela- color-blind; rather, postethnic means indi- tions, especially black/white relations, im- viduals can devote as much or as little of proved? If race is declining in signi½cance, their energy as they choose to their com- as many have claimed, is it declining munity of descent.21 In short, descent is equally for all nonwhite groups? Or is the not destiny.

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Hollinger claims that multiracial Amer- the United States for ten years beginning Frank D. icans are performing a historic role by in 1882, and Japanese Americans–regard- Bean, Jennifer Lee helping move the United States in a post- less of nativity and citizenship–were in- & James D. ethnic direction since they are able to carcerated en masse during World War II, Bachmeier freely choose “how tightly or loosely they resulting in more than 110,000 interns wish to af½liate with one or more com- between 1941 and 1947.26 In addition, Mex- munities of descent.”22 In a similar vein, icans were apprehended and forcibly sociologist Herbert Gans views rises in deported during Operation Wetback in multiracial identi½cation as harbingers of 1954 because of episodic fears of the Mexi- progress because they reflect the dimin- can immigrant population, often with little ishing signi½cance of racial rigidity.23 He regard for legal status. As these examples further predicts that today’s racial cate- illustrate, blacks, Asians, and Latinos often gories may become increasingly less rel- appear closer in status to one another than evant in each generation until they fade to whites during much of U.S. history. altogether. In other words, with the increas- A white/nonwhite divide was further ing hybridization of “American stock,” evident in the early twentieth century in the country may be recon½guring itself the state of Virginia, where the Racial along nonracialist lines.24 Given recent Integrity Act was passed in 1924, creating trends in intermarriage and a small but two distinct racial categories: “pure” burgeoning multiracial population, the white and all others. The statute de½ned a United States may indeed be moving in a white person as one with “no trace what- postethnic direction, where group bound- soever of blood other than Caucasian,” aries no longer circumscribe ethnoracial and it had the goal of legally banning inter- identi½cation and opportunity structures. marriage between whites and other races. However, numerous commentators, espe- While blacks were clearly nonwhite under cially after the onset of the recession in the legislation, Asians and Latinos also 2008, have noted that the disadvantages fell on the nonwhite side of the binary of ethnoracial status, especially among divide. The statute reflected the Supreme blacks and unauthorized nonwhite immi- Court rulings of Takao Ozawa v. United grants, remain too pronounced to conclude States (1922) and United States v. Bhagat that a postethnic society has yet arrived.25 Singh Thind (1923); in both of these decisions, persons of Asian origin were not Other observers believe that a white/ only classi½ed as nonwhite, but also con- nonwhite divide is now crystallizing in the sidered unassimilable. country. Indeed, such a color line has In the case In Re Ricardo Rodríguez (1897), been legally enforced throughout much of Rodríguez, a Mexican-born man who lived the nation’s history, with blacks, Asians, in San Antonio for ten years, petitioned and Latinos falling on the nonwhite side for U.S. citizenship in Bexar County, Texas, of the divide. These groups have faced both in order to exercise his right to vote. As in severe de jure and de facto discrimination the Ozawa and Thind decisions, the district in the past, in the form of enslavement, court did not rule that Rodríguez was white. exclusion, segregation, incarceration, con- What is notable in all three cases is that ½nement, and deportation. For example, none of the plaintiffs attempted to classify African Americans suffered two-and-a-half themselves as “of African descent,” even centuries of slavery, followed by another though Chinese, Asian Indians, and Mex- century of Jim Crow segregation. The Chi- icans at that time were often treated more nese were barred from immigrating to like blacks than whites; to have done so

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Immigration would have resulted in a drop in racial grants may follow a path of assimilation & the Color status. Moreover, neither did the Court into a racialized minority status. In light Line at the Beginning of consider classifying the plaintiffs as black, of these disadvantages, some immigration the 21st because doing so would have given them and race/ethnicity scholars point to the Century a route to citizenship. possible emergence of a white/nonwhite During the 1960s, however, in a report divide, in which Asians and Latinos fall on to the President’s Committee on Civil the nonwhite side of the color line, just as Rights, Asians and Latinos were of½cially they have done throughout much of U.S. designated as minority groups alongside history. However, as we note below, sharp blacks based on their color and distinctive differences between blacks and Asian and cultural characteristics. As groups who had Latino groups suggest that this perspec- “suffered enough” to be perceived as tive is more relevant to historical than “analogous to black,” civil rights admin- contemporary patterns of race relations. istrators extended af½rmative action bene- ½ts to Asians and Latinos in employment, Other social scientists offer a different including self-employment.27 Latinos, in possibility, a triracial strati½cation system sim- particular, have garnered a great deal of ilar to that of many Latin American and recognition as a disadvantaged minority.28 Caribbean countries. Sociologist Eduardo By grouping Asians and Latinos with Afri- Bonilla-Silva proposes that in the United can Americans, civil rights administrators States a triracial divide is emerging, made presumed that their experiences with dis- up of whites, honorary whites, and collec- crimination were similar and stemmed tive blacks.31 Included in the “white” cat- from their nonwhite racial status.29 An egory are whites, assimilated white Latinos, unintended consequence of these policies some multiracials, assimilated Native was that Latinos and Asians–who made Americans, and a few Asian-origin people. up, respectively, only 5 percent and 1 per- “Honorary whites” include light-skinned cent of the country’s population in 1970– Latinos, Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Asian were perceived and labeled as racialized Indians, Middle Eastern Americans, and minorities, or “people of color,” whose most multiracial Americans. Finally, the “color and cultural characteristics” would “collective black” category includes blacks, continue to set them apart from whites, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Hmong, Laotians, thereby making them more akin to blacks. dark-skinned Latinos, West Indian and By placing Latinos and Asians on the African immigrants, and reservation- nonwhite side of the divide, the country’s bound Native Americans. policy-makers reinforced the perception Because many of today’s new immi- that these groups may be racially unas- grants hail from Latin America and the similable, unlike the European immigrants Caribbean, Bonilla-Silva argues that a who came before them. In a similar vein, more complex triracial order naturally ethnic studies scholars Gary Okihiro and ½ts the “darkening” of the United States. Ronald Takaki contend that today’s immi- While a few new immigrants might fall grants from Asia, Latin America, and the into the honorary white stratum and may Caribbean will be unable to escape their even eventually become white, the major- racial status and the caste-like treatment ity will incorporate into a collective black that ensues because of their non-European stratum, including most Latino immi- origins.30 Hence, rather than following grants, a category Bonilla-Silva labels as in the footsteps of their European prede- “racial others” whose experiences with cessors, many of today’s nonwhite immi- race are seen as similar to those of blacks.

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In this regard, the triracial model is dis- divide, and the triracial hierarchy. This Frank D. tinctive because Bonilla-Silva posits that was a new binary color line–a black/non- Bean, Jennifer Lee most Latinos are racialized in a manner black divide–highlighting the persistent and & James D. similar to African Americans, and there- uniquely strong separation of blacks, not Bachmeier fore fall on the black side of the divide. only from whites but also from other non- While there has been some support for white ethnoracial groups.36 The concept the Latin Americanization thesis, it has of a black/nonblack divide surfaced in con- not gone without criticism. For instance, junction with a flurry of research docu- sociologists Edward Murguia and Rogelio menting the processes by which previously Sáenz argue that a three-tier system pre- “nonwhite” immigrant ethnic groups, such dated substantial Latin American immi- as the Irish, Italians, and Eastern European gration to the United States.32 Moreover, Jews, became “white.”37 Once considered other social scientists contest the uniform an inferior “race” by the country’s Anglo- characterization of Latinos as a monolithic Saxons, and regularly characterized in the group.33 Examining Latinos’ social atti- nineteenth century as “savage,” “low- tudes toward other racial/ethnic groups, browed,” and “bestial,” the Irish eventu- sociologist Tyrone Forman and his col- ally clawed their way into whiteness.38 leagues ½nd that Latinos fall into different Researchers have shown that European segments of the triracial hierarchy depend- immigrants are not the only groups to ing on national origin; Puerto Ricans differ have changed their status from nonwhite from Mexicans in their expressed feelings to white. Asian ethnic immigrant groups toward blacks, with the former group such as the Chinese and Japanese also man- demonstrating greater variation depend- aged to change their racial status from ing on skin color.34 Mexicans, however, almost black to almost white. Sociologist are more uniform in their feelings toward James Loewen, for example, documents blacks and express attitudes closer to how Chinese immigrants in the Mississippi those of non-Hispanic whites than those Delta made concerted efforts to modify of non-Hispanic blacks, perhaps as a result their lowly racial status through economic of the history of racial mixing in Mexico, mobility, the emulation of the cultural which involved very few Africans, unlike practices and institutions of whites, and the history of mixing in Puerto Rico.35 the intentional distancing of themselves Regardless of skin color, however, Latinos from blacks.39 Not only did they actively fall closer to non-Hispanic whites in their distance themselves both physically and attitudes toward blacks than to non-His- culturally from blacks, but the Mississippi panic blacks. Such results suggest consid- Chinese also rejected their fellow ethnics erable variation in the racialization expe- who married blacks as well as any multi- riences of Latinos in the United States. racial children they bore. By adopting the While Bonilla-Silva argues that a triracial anti-black sentiment embraced by Missis- hierarchy is forming, it remains to be seen sippi whites and by closely following the whether most Latinos, and especially Mex- region’s moral codes, the Chinese accepted icans, will fall into the collective black rather than challenged the existing racial category as he posits. hierarchy and essentially crossed over the black/white color line. As a consequence In the 1990s, social scientists began to of such deliberate efforts, the racial status suggest the possible birth of a new racial of the Chinese in the region changed from structure, one that differed from the almost black to almost white. Historians black/white divide, the white/nonwhite have noted a similar process of change

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Immigration among Japanese Americans who, at the and therefore do not want to be identi½ed & the Color beginning of the twentieth century, accom- as “black American” because this identity Line at the Beginning of panied blacks at the bottom of the racial connotes downward mobility into a stig- the 21st hierarchy. matized status.47 However, after only one Century Just as the boundaries of whiteness generation, U.S.-born West Indians ½nd it have changed in the past, they may be increasingly dif½cult to distinguish them- expanding yet again to incorporate new selves from black Americans; more often immigrant groups such as Asians and than not, they choose to identify as such, Latinos, reflecting the inconstant and both because they feel that their West changing nature of racial categories, for all Indian ethnicity is no longer salient and groups except perhaps blacks.40 Pointing because others treat and identify them as to patterns of residential segregation, for black American.48 example, scholars ½nd that blacks are more The fact that African Americans are not likely to be segregated than other racial/ able to change their racial status is evi- ethnic groups, regardless of household dence of a pattern of African American income.41 Moreover, research shows that “exceptionalism,” as described by Herbert Asians and Latinos are marrying whites Gans.49 Other scholars document patterns at higher rates than are blacks marrying of more severe residential segregation and whites, thereby enhancing the possibility intermarriage, arguing that the apartness that the children of these unions will adopt of blacks is real, and that the black racial a nonblack identity.42 Sociologist France identity and social status is ½xed.50 Given Twine’s research on multiracial identi½ca- the unique history of African Americans tion reinforces this point; she ½nds that and the rigidity of the boundary surround- the children of black intermarriages are ing blacks, some social scientists argue usually perceived by others as black, but that a black/nonblack divide has arisen, by contrast, the children of Asian and in which Asians and Latinos fall on the Latino intermarriages are not similarly per- nonblack side of the divide. Hence, unlike ceived as monoracially Asian or Latino.43 the white/nonwhite divide (which pre- Twine and fellow sociologist Jonathan dicts the formation of a “people of color” Warren posit that this is because Asians grouping against whites), a black/nonblack and Latinos appear to “blend” more easily divide suggests that blacks stand apart with whites compared to blacks, at least from other nonwhite groups, pointing to from the perspective of many Americans.44 a unique pattern of “black exceptionalism” Based on these trends, some scholars in race/ethnic relations. hypothesize that Asians and Latinos are the next in line to become white.45 Even though scholars and other observ- While a number of immigrant ethnic ers may differ over where they think today’s groups have changed their status from color lines are drawn, and may disagree nonwhite to white or almost white, black about how strong these might be, there is immigrants and African Americans have little question that as a result of immigra- yet to be able to do the same. West Indian tion, the United States has rapidly become and East African immigrants, for example, a more ethnoracially diverse society.51 distance themselves from black Americans More immigrants come to the United and do what they can to make sure that States than to any other country in the they are not associated with black Amer- world.52 According to the American Com- icans.46 In fact, most West Indian immi- munity Survey, by the year 2010, the for- grants feel superior to black Americans, eign-born population in the United States

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(including both whites and nonwhites) Second, the presence of a larger number Frank D. numbered almost forty million persons, of different groups may tend to diminish Bean, Jennifer Lee and their native-born children were nearly the signi½cance of any single group, if for & James D. as numerous, accounting for about another no other reason than that multiple minor- Bachmeier thirty-½ve million.53 ity groups may diffuse the intensity of neg- Unlike the waves of immigrants who ative affect and stigmatization.58 A third arrived in the early twentieth century, reason is that greater diversity may yield today’s immigrants are mainly non-Euro- other positive psychological and social pean. In 2010, only about 12 percent of dividends, such as increased creativity, legal immigrants originated in Europe or problem-solving capacities, social resilien- Canada, whereas about 80 percent came cies, and interpersonal skills that result from Latin America, Asia, Africa, or the from learning to cope with the differences, Caribbean.54 These new arrivals contribute challenges, and opportunities presented substantially to the size of the country’s by diversity. Such factors have been argued overall Latino minority (over 16 percent of to strengthen workplace and societal com- the national population in 2010, up from munication, cohesion, and effectiveness, less than 5 percent in 1970) and the coun- especially in technology- and knowledge- try’s Asian population (about 5 percent, based economies.59 They have also been up from less than 1 percent).55 And these observed to impart adaptive advantages to trends are likely to continue. According to second-generation persons growing up in conservative projections from the National such environments.60 Research Council, by the year 2050 Amer- Such ideas are also similar to the notion ica’s Latino and Asian populations will of heterogeneity as often more broadly make up, respectively, at least 24 percent invoked in sociology.61 Increased diversity and 8 percent of the U.S. population.56 (or heterogeneity, more generally) pro- Unquestionably, contemporary immigra- motes greater tolerance.62 Diversity thus tion has altered the racial and ethnic terrain may contribute to increases in the likeli- of the United States. hood of exogamy and multiraciality to the Is this rising diversity helping dissolve extent that diversity fosters the loosening the old black/white color line? Several rea- of ethnoracial boundaries and promotes sons suggest that this might be the case, and more flexibility in marriage and identity that growing ethnoracial diversity is indeed options for the members of ethnoracial helping increase tolerance among whites minorities and their offspring. of both new immigrant groups and African On the other hand, larger nonwhite Americans. One reason is simply that as minority groups may also give rise to per- minority immigrant groups grow relatively ceptions that these groups constitute a larger, the probabilities of contact between threat to majority whites. But whites may the members of such groups and majority perceive some ethnoracial groups as more natives increase, thus promoting familiar- threatening than others. In particular, ity, respect, and greater liking across the research evidence suggests that blacks groups. These are the processes that psy- are seen more negatively than Asians or chologist Gordon Allport noted in his Latinos. Whites in the United States have long-standing contact hypothesis, which pre- often seen blacks as threatening, in part dicts that greater interaction between the because of worries about economic com- members of different groups fosters famil- petition and in part because the harsh iarity and increases affect and liking, espe- discriminatory tactics employed against cially under certain conditions.57 blacks for decades after slavery engen-

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Immigration dered white fears of reprisal.63 But be- Walter Stephan ½nd that the higher rate & the Color cause the new largely nonwhite immigrant of multiracial reporting in Hawaii reflects Line at the Beginning of groups have not experienced similarly its greater multicultural environment; the 21st crushing discrimination on such a wide- while 73 percent of the Japanese in Hawaii Century spread scale for such a long period of time, identify multiracially, only 44 percent of whites are not likely to perceive the new Hispanics in New Mexico choose to do immigrant groups in the same way as they so.68 Demographer Karl Eschbach, too, do blacks.64 discovers regional differences in the Whites also view African Americans as choice of an American Indian identity for a less preferred source of unskilled labor American Indian/white multiracials, rang- than immigrants.65 Asian immigrants, by ing from 33 to 73 percent across the coun- contrast, are not as numerous as blacks or try.69 The results of all these studies sup- Latinos and are much more highly selected port the hypothesis that ethnoracial diver- for higher levels of education than most sity will be positively related to exogamy Latino immigrants. Thus they may be and multiracial identi½cation. viewed more favorably and be more likely That intermarriage and multiraciality to occupy higher positions in the Ameri- have been growing is also strongly evident can strati½cation system than Latinos and in recent data. By 2010, 11.8 percent of mar- blacks, and thus are unlikely to generate riages among young Americans (ages 20 negative group-threat effects. Such a to 34) were ethnoracially mixed, almost hierarchy of group-threat differences one in every eight unions.70 Moreover, this accords with the tenets of queuing theory ½gure was up from about one in eleven in and group position theory, both of which 2000, a rise of almost a third in just a single imply that an ordering among groups char- decade. This change is all the more notable acterizes the extent to which they face because it moves in the opposite direction discrimination in the labor market and from what one would expect based merely other contexts in the United States.66 on increases in the number of Latino and One way to gauge the consequences of Asian immigrants. Such increases have the country’s new ethnoracial diversity, boosted the sizes of minority groups, thus including its implications for color lines, providing more, not fewer, potential co- is to examine changes in those factors that ethnic spouses. are especially good indicators of the dis- Higher levels of intermarriage have also solution of ethnoracial boundaries. Two occurred in tandem with a growing multi- of the most important of these are ethnoracial population. For instance, 5.3 percent racial intermarriage and multiracial iden- of all children (ages 0 to 17) were identi½ed ti½cation. High and growing levels of these as multiracial in 2010 (compared to only suggest the possibility of boundary disso- 1.1 percent of persons age 55 or older). For lution. For example, living among a large whites, this ½gure was 6.4 percent, and coethnic community or residing in a puma among blacks and Asians it was 14.6 per- (Public Use Microdata Area) that is greater cent and 27.9 percent, respectively. (Com- than 20 percent Asian positively affects parable ½gures for Latinos are hard to the degree to which interracially married derive because Latinos report various Asians and whites identify their multiracial origins.)71 Recent research also racial children as Asian.67 Furthermore, shows intermarriage and multiraciality comparing patterns of multiracial iden- are highest in those parts of the country ti½cation in Hawaii and New Mexico, that are the most diverse; this results in social psychologists Cookie Stephan and part from more diversity per se, not just

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from larger minority populations.72 The data sets and in-depth interviews, we arrive Frank D. ½ndings of in-depth qualitative interviews at less sanguine conclusions about the Bean, Jennifer Lee also reveal that respondents see nonblack declining signi½cance of race for blacks. & James D. exogamy and multiraciality in much more Not only are rates of intermarriage with Bachmeier favorable terms, and even refer to it as a whites much lower for blacks than for “nonissue,” than they do black intermar- Asians and Latinos, but blacks are far less riage.73 likely to identify multiracially compared to Asians and Latinos. Such ½ndings pro- America continues to confront the vide evidence that legal and structural long-standing challenge of reconciling the changes alone–while of considerable myths of race and immigration. When importance–are insuf½cient to explain Congress passed the Hart-Celler Act in notable differences in rates of intermar- 1965, opening America’s doors to new riage and multiracial identi½cation when waves of non-European immigrants, new- we compare blacks to other nonwhite comers from Latin America, Asia, and the groups. It seems that residues of the cul- Caribbean began to change the face of the tural and behavioral frameworks that have nation. Neither exactly black nor white, sustained the black/white divide for cen- Latino and Asian immigrants have ush- turies continue to linger. ered in a new era of diversity, shifting the Thus, while the social distance between country from a largely black/white society blacks and other groups may be declining, to one consisting of multiple nonwhite it is not diminishing at the same pace as it ethnoracial groups. These changes–legal is for Asians and Latinos. Also, the distance eradication of discrimination, new immi- among nonblack groups is far smaller than gration from Latin America and Asia, that separating these groups from blacks. new ways of measuring “race” in the U.S. Continued immigration from Latin Amer- Census, increasing ethnoracial diversity, ica and Asia serves as a reminder that rising rates of intermarriage, and a growing Asians and Latinos are immigrant groups, multiracial population–seem to suggest and most blacks are not. Because bound- optimistic conclusions about the break- aries seem to be loosening for nonwhite down of America’s traditional black/white immigrant groups, it is tempting to con- color line. clude that “race” is declining in signi½cance The indicators appear to signal that the for blacks as well. But the bulk of recent boundaries between all ethnoracial groups evidence runs counter to this notion, thus are loosening, thereby paving the way for contradicting the conclusion that because a new era of cosmopolitan diversity in the ethnoracial status seems not much to twenty-½rst century. Racial status seems impede processes of incorporation for to be declining in signi½cance and loos- Asians and Latinos, then it must not matter ening its hold as an organizing principle much for blacks either. But it is also false of opportunity in the United States, and to conclude that because incorporation is the tenacious black/white color line that so dif½cult in the case of blacks, it must has long gripped the country appears to be equally hard for Asians and Latinos. be fading. Moreover, the country’s new It is fallacious to think that “race” is diversity appears to be contributing to the declining in signi½cance for everyone in breakdown of the color line for all groups. the United States. It would also be incor- However, when we examine differences rect for policy-makers and the American in patterns of intermarriage and multi- public in general to favor and endorse raciality, as revealed both in large national “color-blind” policies that fail to consider

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Immigration that ethnoracial status still constrains For Asians, however, no negative group- & the Color opportunity, most especially for blacks. threat effect emerges. While diversity also Line at the Beginning of Recent research on intermarriage and has a positive effect on boundary-weak- the 21st multiracial identi½cation points to a per- ening for Asians (as it does for blacks), Century sistent pattern of “black exceptionalism,” the places where Asians show larger group one that also emerges in studies of resi- sizes also have higher rates of multiracial dential segregation, educational attain- identi½cation. Latinos fall in between ment, racial attitudes, and friendship net- blacks and Asians. While diversity has a works. And while some blacks are closing positive, independent effect for Latinos, the gaps on some of these fronts, this body their increases in group size, while nega- of research forebodes the continued exis- tive, are not large enough to offset the tence of barriers to full and complete incor- positive effects of diversity. In sum, while poration of many blacks in the United diversity is bene½cial, its signi½cance for States. blacks, Asians, and Latinos is unequal. In short, while the disadvantage that Although paradoxical, it is critical to keep Asians and Latinos experience stems more in mind that even among blacks, the rela- from their immigrant backgrounds than tionship between diversity and multiracial ethnoracial ascriptions per se, the disad- reporting is a positive one, revealing that vantages that blacks experience stem from rising diversity alone is helping break down the enduring stigma attached to the his- racial barriers to some extent, even in the torical signi½cance of blackness. Although case of blacks. the United States is more ethnoracially diverse than ever before, a consistent tendency toward black exceptionalism is nonetheless implied by the workings of the marriage market and by patterns of multiracial identi½cation, both of which reveal a “diversity paradox” in America. Even while the country exhibits a new diversity, and although intermarriage and multiraciality are projected to increase in the foreseeable future, rates of intermarriage and multiracial reporting are occurring at an uneven pace. Boundaries are dissolving more rapidly for new immigrant groups such as Asians and Latinos than they are for blacks, for whom these boundaries remain very real. There is another dimension to the diversity paradox. Diversity in itself appears to independently foster the dissolution of boundaries, but this effect is differentially offset by the degree to which Asians, Latinos, and blacks appear to be perceived as threatening. For example, the positive effect of diversity for blacks is trumped by a negative group-threat effect.

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endnotes Frank D. FRANK D BEAN Bean, * Contributor Biographies: . is Chancellor’s Professor of Sociology at the Univer- Jennifer Lee sity of California, Irvine, where he is also Director of the Center for Research on Immigration, & James D. Population, and Public Policy. His publications include The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and Bachmeier the Color Line in Twenty-First Century America (with Jennifer Lee, 2010), America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity (with Gillian Stevens, 2003), and Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity, and Employment in the United States (edited with Stephanie Bell-Rose, 1999). JENNIFER LEE is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. Her publications include The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in Twenty-First Century America (with Frank D. Bean, 2010), Asian American Youth: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity (edited with Min Zhou, 2004), and Civility in the City: Blacks, Jews, and Koreans in Urban America (2002). JAMES D. BACHMEIER is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Temple University. His research focuses on Mexican migration to and within the United States, as well as the incorporation of second- and later-generation Mexican immigrants, especially in the areas of education, the labor market, and health. He has published articles in several journals, including Social Forces, Social Science Research, and International Migration Review. 1 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. David W. Blight and Robert Gooding-Williams (1903; Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 45. 2 Michael C. Dawson, Not in Our Lifetimes: The Future of Black Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Michael C. Dawson and Lawrence D. Bobo, “Themes and Variations: The Study of Immigration in the Era of the Obama Campaign,” Du Bois Review 4 (2007): 267–270; Jennifer Hochschild, Vesla Weaver, and Traci Burch, Creating a New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can Remake Race in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012); and David A. Hollinger, “Obama, the Instability of Color Lines, and the Promise of a Postethnic Future,” Callaloo 31 (4) (2008): 1033–1037. See also Dædalus 140 (2) (Spring 2011), in particular the essays by Lawrence D. Bobo, “Some- where Between Jim Crow & Post-Racialism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today”; Taeku Lee, “Post-Racial & Pan-Racial Politics”; Douglas S. Massey, “The Past & Future of American Civil Rights”; and Jennifer A. Richeson and Maureen A. Craig, “Intra- minority Intergroup Relations.” 3 Nancy Foner and George M. Fredrickson, Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contempo- rary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004). 4 Frank D. Bean, Susan K. Brown, and James Bachmeier, “Trends in U.S. Immigration: A Shift Toward Exclusion?” in Nations of Immigrants: Australia and the USA Compared, ed. John Nieuwenhuysen and John Higley (Camberley, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 42–55. 5 Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); and W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935). 6 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (1951; Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); and Oscar Handlin, The Americans: A New History of the People of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). 7 Allan Nevins, The Origins of the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (Washington, D.C.: Civil War Centennial Commission, 1962). 8 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Signi½cance of the Frontier in American History,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Associ- ation, 1893); Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1920); and Kerwin L. Klein, Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Nar- rating the European Conquest of Native America, 1890–1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

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Immigration 9 Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (New & the Color York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006). Line at the Beginning of 10 David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: the 21st Harvard University Press, 2001). Century 11 Gary Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans,” in The Handbook of Inter- national Migration, ed. Charles Hirschman, Josh DeWind, and Philip Kasinitz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 275–293; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995); Matthew Freye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); and David Roediger, “Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy and the Decline of Liberalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22 (1999): 1079–1080. 12 Zolberg, A Nation by Design; and Carl H. Nightingale, “Before Race Mattered: Geographies of the Color Line in Early Colonial Madras and New York,” American Historical Review 113 (1) (2008): 48–71. 13 John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1963); and Susan K. Brown, Frank D. Bean, and James Bachmeier, “Aging Soci- eties and the Changing Logic of Immigration,” Generations 32 (4) (2009): 11–17. 14 Frank D. Bean and Stephanie Bell-Rose, Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity and Em- ployment in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999); George M. Fredrick- son, Racism: A Short History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Aldon D. Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). 15 Frank D. Bean and Gillian Stevens, America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 16 Nathan Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). 17 David M. Reimers, Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 18 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contempo- rary Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America,” Population and Development Review 38 (1) (2012): 1–29. 19 Michael Eric Dyson, “Race, Post Race,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 2008; Thomas L. Friedman, “Finishing Our Work,” The New York Times, November 5, 2008; Adam Nagourney, “Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls,” The New York Times, November 5, 2008; and Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, “Is Race Out of the Race?” Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2008. 20David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 21 Hollinger, “Obama, the Instability of Color Lines, and the Promise of a Postethnic Future.” 22 Hollinger, Postethnic America. 23 Herbert J. Gans, “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-First Century United States,” in The Cultural Territories of Race: Black and White Boundaries, ed. Michèle Lamont (Chicago and New York: University of Chicago Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 371–390. 24Gary Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans,” in The Handbook of Inter- national Migration, ed. Hirschman et al., 275–293; and Gary B. Nash, “The Hidden History of Mestizo America,” The Journal of American History 83 (3) (1995): 941–964.

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25 Bobo, “Somewhere Between Jim Crow & Post-Racialism”; Hochschild et al., Creating a New Frank D. Racial Order; Massey, “The Past & Future of American Civil Rights”; Lee, “Post-Racial & Bean, Pan-Racial Politics”; and Roger Waldinger, “Immigration: The New American Dilemma,” Jennifer Lee & James D. Dædalus 140 (2) (Spring 2011): 215–225. Bachmeier 26 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 27 John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 28 Hollinger, Postethnic America. 29 Hollinger, “Obama, the Instability of Color Lines, and the Promise of a Postethnic Future.” 30 Gary Y. Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994); and Ronald T. Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989). 31 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “From Bi-racial to Tri-racial,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27 (6) (2004): 931–950; and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “We Are All Americans,” Race and Society 5 (1) (2004): 3–16. 32 Edward Murguia and Rogelio Sáenz, “An Analysis of the Latin Americanization of Race in the United States,” Race and Society 5 (1) (2004): 85–101. 33 Ibid.; and Tyrone Forman, Carla Goar, and Amanda E. Lewis, “Neither Black nor White?” Race and Society 5 (1) (2004): 65–84. 34 Forman et al., “Neither Black nor White?” 35 Ibid. 36 Richard Alba, Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Gans, “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty- First Century United States”; Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams (New York: Met- ropolitan, 1995); Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now; David A. Hollinger, “Amalgama- tion and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the History of the United States,” American Historical Review 108 (5) (2003): 1363–1390; Joel Perlmann, “Reflecting the Changing Face of America: Multiracials, Racial Classi½cation, and American Intermarriage,” in Interracialism: Black-White Intermarriage in American History, Literature, and Law, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 506–533; Roger Sanjek, “Intermarriage and the Future of the Races,” in Race, ed. Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 103–130; Mary C. Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities (New York and Cambridge, Mass.: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 1999); and George Yancey, Who Is White? (Boul- der, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 37 Richard Alba, Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1985); Richard Alba, Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks, and What That Says About Race in America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans,” in The Handbook of International Migration, ed. Hirschman et al.; Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White; Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color; and David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (New York and London: Verso, 1991). 38 Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness. 39 James Loewen, The Mississippi Chinese: Between Black and White (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 40Gans, “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-First Century United States”; Charles A. Gallagher, “Racial Redistricting: Expanding the Boundaries of Whiteness,” in

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Immigration The Politics of Multiracialism: Challenging Racial Thinking, ed. Heather M. Dalmage (Albany: & the Color State University of New York Press, 2004), 59–76; Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Mak- Line at the ing of Americans”; Ian Haney-Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: Beginning of the 21st New York University Press, 1996); and Jonathan W. Warren and France Winddance Twine, Century “White Americans, the New Minority?” Journal of Black Studies 28 (2) (1997): 200–218. 41 Camille Zubrinsky Charles, “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation,” Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003): 167–207; Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Domenico Parisi, Daniel T. Lichter, and Michael C. Taquino, “Multi-Scale Resi- dential Segregation: Black Exceptionalism and America’s Changing Color Line,” Social Forces 89 (3) (2011): 829–852. 42Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans”; Hollinger, “Amalgamation and Hypodescent”; Perlmann, “Reflecting the Changing Face of America”; and Joel Perlmann and Roger Waldinger, “Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Pres- ent–A Reconsideration,” International Migration Review 31 (4) (1997): 893–922. 43 France Winddance Twine, “Brown-Skinned White Girls,” Gender, Place, and Culture 3 (2) (1996): 205–224; and Hollinger, Postethnic America. 44 Warren and Twine, “White Americans, the New Minority?” 45 Gerstle, “Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans”; Hollinger, “Amalgamation and Hypodescent”; Perlmann, “Reflecting the Changing Face of America”; and Perlmann and Waldinger, “Second Generation Decline?” 46 Nancy Foner, In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration (New York: New York Univer- sity Press, 2005); Waters, Black Identities; and Katja M. Guenther, Sadie Pendaz, and Fortu- nata Songora Makene, “The Impact of Intersecting Dimensions of Inequality and Identity on the Racial Status of Eastern African Immigrants,” Sociological Forum 26 (1) (2011): 98–120. 47 Waters, Black Identities. 48 Ibid. 49 Herbert J. Gans, “Race as a Class,” Contexts 4 (4) (2005): 17–21. 50 Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now; and Yancey, Who Is White? 51 Jennifer Lee and Frank D. Bean, The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in 21st Century America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010); and Michael C. Dawson and Julie Lee Merseth, “Racial Pessimism in the Early Obama Era,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, September 1– 4, 2011. 52 Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean, “International Migration,” in Handbook of Population, ed. Dudley L. Poston, Jr., and Michael Micklin (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005), 347–382. 53 Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010). 54 U.S. Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 55 Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0. 56 Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou, Asian American Youth: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity (New York and London: Routledge, 2004); and James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997). 57 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954).

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58 Lee and Bean, The Diversity Paradox. Frank D. 59 Bean, Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Free- Jennifer Lee dom (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006); Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyper- & James D. powers Rise to Global Dominance–and Why They Fall (New York: Doubleday, 2007); David Bachmeier Singh Grewal, Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008); Cedric Herring, “Does Diversity Pay? Race, Gender, and the Busi- ness Case for Diversity,” American Sociological Review 74 (2) (2009): 208–224; and Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 60 Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (New York and Cambridge, Mass.: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 2008). 61 Peter M. Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Peter M. Blau and Joseph E. Schwartz, Crosscutting Social Circles: Testing a Macrostructural Theory of Inter- group Relations (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984); and Edward O. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism: The Form and Substance of Urban Social Networks (New York: John Wiley, 1973). 62 Hubert M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (New York: John Wiley, 1967); Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity; and Garth Massey, Randy Hodson, and Dusko Sekulic, “Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance: The Case of Yugoslavia,” Social Forces 78 (2) (1999): 669–693. 63 Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations; Mark A. Fossett, “Urban and Spatial Demography,” in Handbook of Population, ed. Poston and Micklin; and Mark A. Fossett and Therese Seibert, Long Time Coming: Trends in Racial Inequality in the Nonmetropolitan South since 1940 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). 64 Zolberg, A Nation by Design. 65 Philip Kasinitz and Jan Rosenberg, “Missing the Connection: Social Isolation and Employ- ment on the Brooklyn Waterfront,” Social Problems 43 (2) (1996): 180–196; Joleen Kirschen- man and Kathryn M. Neckerman, “‘We’d Love to Hire Them, But . . .’: The Meaning of Race for Employers,” in The Urban Underclass, ed. Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (Wash- ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 203–232; Jennifer Lee, Civility in the City: Blacks, Jews, and Koreans in Urban America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); and Mary C. Waters, “West Indians and African Americans at Work: Structural Differences and Cultural Stereotypes,” in Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity, and Employment in the United States, ed. Frank D. Bean and Stephanie Bell-Rose (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 194–227. 66 Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants since 1880 (Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press, 1980); Arthur Sakamoto, Jeng Liu, and Jessie M. Tzeng, “The Declining Signi½cance of Race Among Chinese and Japanese American Men,” Research in Social Strati- ½cation and Mobility 16 (1998): 225–246; Lawrence Bobo, “The Color Line, the Dilemma, and the Dream: Race Relations in America at the Close of the Twentieth Century,” in Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations since World War II, ed. John Higham (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 31–55; Lawrence Bobo, “Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations,” Jour- nal of Social Issues 55 (3) (1999): 445–472; Lawrence D. Bobo, “Inequalities That Endure? Racial Ideology, American Politics, and the Peculiar Role of the Social Sciences,” in The Chang- ing Terrain of Race and Ethnicity, ed. Maria Krysan and Amanda E. Lewis (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 13–42; Lawrence Bobo and Vincent L. Hutchings, “Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context,” American Sociological Review 61 (6) (1996): 951–972; Lawrence D. Bobo and Mia Tuan, Prejudice in Politics: Group Position, Public Opinion, and the Wisconsin Treaty Rights

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Immigration Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Jeffrey C. Dixon, “The Ties & the Color That Bind and Those That Don’t: Toward Reconciling Group Threat and Contact Theories Line at the of Prejudice,” Social Forces 84 (4) (2006): 2179–2202; and Michael W. Link and Robert W. Beginning of the 21st Oldendick, “Social Construction and White Attitudes toward Equal Opportunity and Multi- Century culturalism,” Journal of Politics 58 (1) (1996): 149–168. 67 Rogelio Sáenz, Sean-Shong Hwang, Benigno E. Aguirre, and Robert N. Anderson, “Persis- tence and Change in Asian Identity Among Children of Intermarried Couples,” Sociological Perspectives 38 (2) (1995): 175–194; and Yu Xie and Kimberly Goyette, “The Racial Iden- ti½cation of Biracial Children with One Asian Parent: Evidence from the 1990 Census,” Social Forces 76 (2) (1997): 547–570. 68 Cookie White Stephan and Walter G. Stephan, “After Intermarriage: Ethnic Identity Among Mixed-Heritage Japanese-Americans and Hispanics,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 51 (1989): 507–519. 69 Karl Eschbach, “The Enduring and Vanishing American Indian: American Indian Population Growth and Intermarriage in 1990,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18 (1) (1995): 89–108. 70 Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0. 71 Ibid. 72 Lee and Bean, The Diversity Paradox. 73 Ibid.

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Immigration & Language Diversity in the United States

Rubén G. Rumbaut & Douglas S. Massey

Abstract: While the United States historically has been a polyglot nation characterized by great linguistic diversity, it has also been a zone of language extinction in which immigrant tongues fade and are replaced by monolingual English within a few generations. In 1910, 10 million people reported a mother tongue other than English, notably German, Italian, Yiddish, and Polish. The subsequent end of mass immigration from Europe led to a waning of language diversity and the most linguistically homogenous era in American history. But the revival of immigration after 1970 propelled the United States back toward its historical norm. By 2010, 60 million people (a ½fth of the population) spoke a non-English language, especially Spanish. In this essay, we assess the effect of new waves of immigration on language diversity in the United States, map its evolution demographically and geographically, and consider what linguistic patterns are likely to persist and prevail in the twenty-½rst century.

Contrary to what some Americans seem to believe, the United States historically has been a polyglot nation containing a diverse array of languages. At the time of independence, non-English European immigrants made up one-quarter of the population; in Pennsylvania, two-½fths of the population spoke German.1 In addition, an unknown but presumably signi½cant share of the new nation’s inhabitants spoke an American-Indian or African language, suggesting that perhaps one-third or more of all Americans spoke a language other RUBÉNG. RUMBAUT is Professor than English. With the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 of Sociology at the University of (which doubled the size of the country), the Treaty California, Irvine. of 1818 with Britain (which added the Oregon DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, a Fellow Country), the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819 with Spain of the American Academy since (which gave Florida to the United States), and the 1995, is the Henry G. Bryant Pro- Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (which fessor of Sociology and Public acquired nearly half of Mexico), tens of thousands Affairs at Princeton University. of French and Spanish speakers, along with many (*See endnotes for complete contributor more slaves and the diverse indigenous peoples of biographies.) those vast territories, were added to the linguistic

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Immigra - mix.2 The addition of Alaska and Hawaii in which immigrant tongues die out and tion & would follow before the end of the nine- are replaced by monolingual English. Language Diversity teenth century. Although ethnic identities may survive in in the Although conquest clearly played a role some form into the third and fourth gen- United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, erations or even beyond, immigrant lan- language diversity in the United States guages generally suffer early deaths in has been driven primarily by immigration. America.5 This demise occurs not because Germans and Celts entered in large num- of an imposition or compulsion from bers in the 1840s and 1850s, followed by outside, but because of social, cultural, eco- Scandinavians after the Civil War in the nomic, and demographic changes within 1870s and 1880s, and then by Slavs, Jews, linguistic communities themselves.6 Based and Italians from the 1880s to the ½rst on an extensive study of America’s his- decades of the twentieth century. Ac - torical experience, sociologist Calvin cording to the 1910 census, which counted Veltman concluded that in the absence of a national population of 92 million, 10 immigration, all non-English languages million immigrants reported a mother would eventually die out, usually quite tongue other than English or Celtic (Irish, rapidly.7 Scotch, Welsh), including 2.8 million The revival of mass immigration after speakers of German, 1.4 million speakers 1970 spurred a resurgence of linguistic of Italian, 1.1 million speakers of Yiddish, diversity in the United States and pro- 944,000 speakers of Polish, 683,000 pelled the nation back toward its historical speakers of Swedish, 529,000 speakers of norm. The postwar period in which today’s French, 403,000 speakers of Norwegian, older white Americans came of age was and 258,000 speakers of Spanish. likely the most linguistically homoge- Linguistic diversity began to wane with nous era in U.S. history. Compared to the cessation of mass European immigra- what came before and after, however, it tion, which ended abruptly with the out- was an aberration. The collective memory break of World War I in 1914. European of those who grew up between the 1940s immigration revived somewhat afterward, and 1970 thus yields a false impression of but then lapsed into a “long hiatus” during linguistic practice in America. From a which flows were truncated by restrictive low of 4.7 percent in 1970, the percentage U.S. immigration quotas, a global depres- of foreign born rose steadily to reach 12.9 sion, a second world war, and ultimately percent in 2010, much closer to its his- the transformation of Europe into a zone toric highs. In this essay, we assess the of immigration rather than emigration.3 effect of these new waves of mass immi- As a result, the percentage of foreign born gration on language diversity in the United fell steadily in the United States, drop- States and consider whether the socio- ping from 14.7 percent in 1910 to a nadir historical reality of language extinction of 4.7 percent in 1970,4 at which point and English dominance will prevail in the language diversity had dwindled to the twenty-½rst century. point where the Census Bureau stopped asking its question on mother tongue. Language diversity refers to the num- The great American paradox is that ber of languages spoken in the United while the United States historically has States and the number of people who been characterized by great linguistic speak them. Since 1980, information on diversity propelled by immigration, it has languages spoken has been gathered also been a zone of language extinction, from three questions posed to census and

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survey respondents: Does this person among those who spoke Spanish, half (49.4 Rubén G. speak a language other than English at percent) were foreign born. Rumbaut & Douglas S. home? What is this language? And how Table 2 examines the geography of for- Massey well does this person speak English? eign language use by showing the share of Among other purposes, answers to these persons aged ½ve and older speaking a questions are used to determine bilingual non-English language at home in selected election requirements under the Voting states and metropolitan areas. To create Rights Act of 1965. These questions were the list, we examined all ½fty states and asked of all persons aged ½ve and older metropolitan areas with at least 500,000 on the censuses of 1980 through 2000, inhabitants and ranked the top twenty- and in 2010 on the American Community ½ve according to the percentage of non- Survey (acs), which replaced the census English speakers. The two lists clearly long form. Table 1 summarizes these data reveal that speaking a foreign language is by showing the share of U.S. residents a phenomenon of the nation’s periphery who said they spoke a non-English lan- rather than its heartland, concentrated in guage at home, as well as the share who cities and states along the coasts, the spoke only English, by decade between Great Lakes, and the U.S.-Mexico border. 1980 and 2010. Because Spanish is by far Only four of the states on the list are nei- the most widely spoken non-English ther on a coast, a lake, or the border, and tongue in the United States, we also report all of them were part of the Mexican Ces- the share that speaks Spanish at home. sion of 1848 (Nevada, Colorado, Utah in As one would expect during an age of full, and Kansas in part). Kansas stands mass immigration, the percentage speak- alone as the single heartland state on the ing only English at home has steadily fallen list, with 10.6 percent of its population in recent decades, declining from 89.1 speaking a non-English language at home. percent in 1980 to 79.7 percent in 2010, California tops the list with 43.3 percent while the share speaking a language other speaking a non-English language at home, than English correspondingly rose from followed by 36.1 percent in New Mexico, 11 percent to 20.3 percent. In absolute 34.5 percent in Texas, and over 29 percent numbers, the number of persons ½ve years in both New York and New Jersey. The and older speaking a language other than states listed in Table 2 clearly reflect the English at home rose from 23.1 million to influence of mass immigration, as the list 59.5 million, with over two-thirds of the includes the most important immigrant- increase attributable to the growing num- receiving states (California, New York, ber of people speaking Spanish at home, New Jersey, Texas, Florida, and Illinois) as who at 37 million made up 12.6 percent of well as a number of emerging immigrant the total population, but 62.2 percent of destinations (Arizona, North Carolina, all non-English speakers in 2010. Most of Virginia, Georgia, Utah, and Nevada). In the increase in Spanish language use was a country where by 2010 over one in ½ve driven by mass immigration from Latin persons (20.3 percent) spoke a foreign America. Indeed, most (56.7 percent) of language at home, West Virginia, Missis- the country’s nearly 60 million speakers sippi, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, of non-English languages are immigrants. and Alabama stood in sharp contrast, Among those who spoke only English at with 95 to 98 percent of their populations home in 2010, just 2.6 percent were born speaking English only. outside the United States (mostly immi- Language diversity, like immigration, grants from English-speaking countries); is also chiefly a metropolitan phenome-

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Immigra - Table 1 tion & Language Use Patterns in the United States, 1980–2010 Language Diversity in the 1980 1990 2000 2010 United States Languages Foreign spoken at home N (millions) % N (millions) % N (millions) % N (millions) % born % Total Population 210.2 100 230.4 100 262.4 100 289.2 100 13.6 5 years or older Spoke 187.2 89.1 198.6 86.2 215.5 82.1 229.7 79.7 2.6 English only Spoke non- 23.1 11.0 31.8 13.8 47.0 17.9 59.5 20.3 56.7 English language Spoke Spanish 11.1 5.3 17.3 7.5 28.1 10.7 37.0 12.6 49.4

Source: 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. censuses; 2010 American Community Survey.

Table 2 Percent of Population (those ½ve years or older) Speaking a Non-English Language at Home in Selected States and Metro Areas, 2008–2010, by Ranking

Top 25 States % Top 25 Metros % California 43.4 McAllen, TX 85.4 New Mexico 36.1 El Paso, TX 74.7 Texas 34.5 Miami, FL 73.0 New York 29.6 Jersey City, NJ 59.0 New Jersey 29.1 Los Angeles, CA 56.8 Nevada 28.8 San Jose, CA 50.8 Arizona 27.0 New York, NY 46.3 Florida 27.0 Orange County, CA 44.8 Hawaii 26.0 Fresno, CA 43.1 Illinois 21.9 San Francisco, CA 42.2 Massachusetts 21.5 Bakers½eld, CA 41.0 Rhode Island 21.0 Riverside, CA 40.5 Connecticut 20.8 Bergen-Passaic, NJ 40.5 Washington 17.8 San Antonio, TX 40.2 Colorado 16.9 Houston, TX 38.8 Maryland 16.4 Oakland, CA 38.8 Alaska 16.0 Ventura, CA 37.4 Oregon 14.5 Fort Lauderdale, FL 37.1 Virginia 14.4 San Diego, CA 36.9 Utah 14.1 Middlesex-Somerset, NJ 34.4 District of Columbia 13.9 Las Vegas, NV 32.8 Georgia 12.9 Dallas, TX 32.1 Delaware 12.1 Albuquerque, NM 31.3 Kansas 10.6 Vallejo-Fair½eld-Napa, CA 30.9 North Carolina 10.6 Chicago-Gary, IL 30.2

Source: American Community Survey, 2008–2010 merged ½les.

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non. Over 91 percent of the population of States today, which for purposes of pre - Rubén G. non-metropolitan areas in the United sentation were coded into 39 languages and Rumbaut & Douglas S. States speaks English only. The twenty- language groups, the largest of which are Massey ½ve metropolitan areas with the highest summarized in Table 3. Here we draw on percentages of residents who speak a merged acs ½les for 2008–2010 to achieve non-English language at home are con - greater reliability in estimating data for ½ned entirely to the six gateway states, as languages spoken by few people overall, shown in Table 2; the only exceptions are yielding samples and estimates that per- Las Vegas and Albuquerque. The largest tain roughly to 2009. shares of people living in homes where a The ½rst two columns of the table show language other than English is spoken are the estimated number and percentage of found, not surprisingly, in the large bor- people aged ½ve and above who reported der metropolises of McAllen and El Paso, speaking various languages at home Texas, where 85.4 percent and 74.7 per- (though for non-English speakers, no of- cent of the populations, respectively, speak ½cial data are collected on their fluency in a non-English language at home (over- or frequency of use of their non-English whelmingly Spanish). Miami (73 per- language). As already noted, Spanish dom - cent), Jersey City (59 percent), Los Angeles inates among non-English languages spo- (56.8 percent), and San Jose (50.8 per- ken in the United States. In all, 12.6 percent cent) are also home to large shares of of U.S. residents aged ½ve or above said non-English speakers. Even at the bottom they spoke Spanish at home. The next of the list, 30.2 percent of the Chicago met- closest language was Chinese, accounting ropolitan area population speaks a non- for just 0.9 percent of the population, fol- English language at home. Thus, tradi- lowed by Hindi, Urdu, and related lan- tional gateway metropolitan areas are guages at 0.7 percent, Tagalog and related bastions of non-English usage. Among Filipino languages at 0.6 percent, and metropolitan areas of newer immigrant Vietnamese at 0.5 percent. No other lan- settlement that do not appear in Table 2, guage category exceeded 0.5 percent. by 2010, only Tucson, Phoenix, Seattle, Moreover, the two largest non-English and Denver exceeded the national non- categories after Spanish hide considerable English-usage norm of 20 percent; but diversity, given the many mutually unin- Portland, Atlanta, Salt Lake City, and telligible varieties of Chinese and the diver- Raleigh-Durham were not far behind. sity of tongues spoken by people from the The dominance of Spanish among for- Indian subcontinent. eign languages in the United States today The right-hand columns show the per- sets the current age of mass immigration centages of language speakers born abroad apart from earlier eras in the nineteenth and in the United States. Among those and early twentieth centuries. In 1910, for speaking Asian languages, the vast majority example, the most common non-English were born abroad, with two exceptions: language, German, was listed as the moth- those who speak Khmer, Hmong, Lao, and er tongue by just 20.7 percent of the for- related languages, 34.3 percent of whom eign-born population, followed by Italian were native born; and those who speak at 10.2 percent, Yiddish at 7.9 percent, Japanese, 39.6 percent of whom were Polish at 7.1 percent, and Swedish at 5.1 native born. The former ½gure reflects percent. No other language exceeded 4 very high levels of fertility and declining percent. In contrast, the acs recorded immigration after 1990 for groups from some 382 languages spoken in the United Laos and Cambodia, whereas the latter

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Immigra - Table 3 tion & Main Languages Spoken (by those ½ve years or older) in the United States and Nativity of Speakers, Language 2008–2010 Diversity in the United States Estimated N % of % of speakers % of speakers Languages spoken of speakers population foreign born U.S. born

English-only 228,285,377 79.7 2.6 97.4 Non-English languages 58,266,345 20.3 56.7 43.3 Europe/Americas: Spanish 36,149,240 12.6 49.4 50.6 French* 1,267,188 0.4 38.6 61.4 German** 1,102,804 0.4 38.6 61.4 Russian 849,796 0.3 82.6 17.4 Italian 738,871 0.3 40.6 59.4 Haitian Creole 696,163 0.2 71.5 28.5 Portuguese 689,697 0.2 70.5 29.5 Polish 583,427 0.2 66.7 33.3 Greek 313,092 0.1 42.1 57.9 East/South Asia: Chinese 2,633,123 0.9 78.0 22.0 Hindi, Urdu, and related 2,088,057 0.7 81.4 18.6 Filipino Tagalog and related 1,709,651 0.6 87.1 12.9 Vietnamese 1,338,309 0.5 76.7 23.3 Korean 1,124,994 0.4 80.7 19.3 Khmer, Hmong, Lao, 748,896 0.3 65.7 34.3 and related Dravidian 595,019 0.2 88.5 11.5 Japanese 455,253 0.2 60.4 39.6 West Asia/North Africa Arabic 819,678 0.3 69.5 30.5 Persian (Farsi) 370,759 0.1 79.5 20.5 All other languages 3,992,328 1.4 61.3 38.7

Total (½ve years or older) 286,551,722 100 13.6 86.4

*French excludes Patois, Cajun, and Haitian Creole. **German excludes Pennsylvania Dutch. Source: American Community Survey, 2008–2010 merged ½les.

reflects the high levels of education Among languages spoken in Europe and attained by the Japanese, who are also the the Americas, the percentages of immi- only Asian-origin population that is pri- grant versus U.S.-born speakers are quite marily U.S. born. The share of speakers variable. Russian, Creole, Portuguese, and born in the United States does not exceed Polish are at one extreme, with 17.4 per- 25 percent for any other Asian language. cent, 28.5 percent, 29.5 percent, and 33.3 Speakers of Arabic and Farsi are likewise percent of respective speakers being born dominated by immigrants, with just 30.5 in the United States. French, German, Ital- percent of the former and 20.5 percent of ian, and Greek are at the other extreme, the latter being native born. with 61.4 percent, 61.4 percent, 49.4 per-

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cent, and 57.9 percent of respective speak- among Hispanics are Mexicans (just 36.2 Rubén G. ers being U.S. born. Spanish speakers lie percent foreign born) and Puerto Ricans Rumbaut & Douglas S. in-between these two extremes, with (almost all of whom are U.S. citizens by Massey roughly half being born in the United birth, though many are island born). States and half abroad. Among other Latin American groups, the percent of foreign born ranges from 57 Speaking a foreign tongue at home does percent to 67 percent. Even more than not necessarily imply a lack of fluency in Latin Americans, Asian groups tend to be English, of course; but given the nation’s dominated by immigrants, with the sole well-established reputation as a graveyard exception of the Japanese, among whom for immigrant languages, the prospects only 40.2 percent were born abroad. for stable bilingualism in the United Among those of other Asian origins, the States appear slim. As in past censuses, share born abroad ranges from 54 percent the acs does not ask Americans how well to 74 percent. they speak a non-English language; in - Groups with lower shares of foreigners stead, those who report that they speak a generally exhibit higher rates of mother non-English language at home are asked tongue extinction, with 55.6 percent of how well they speak English. (Those who Japanese speaking English only, com- did not answer the question are assumed pared with ½gures of 34.9 percent among to speak English only.) Table 4 examines Puerto Ricans and 24.3 percent among the English language pro½ciency of the Mexicans. Despite their concentration in nearly 60 million people who speak a for- areas where Spanish is widely spoken, eign language at home by showing the therefore, roughly one-third of Puerto percentage who reported speaking En - Ricans and one-fourth of Mexican Amer- glish only, speaking English very well, and icans have made the transition to mono- speaking English not well or not at all. lingual English. Apart from these national (The residual, not shown, is the percentage origins, few Latin American groups have who reported speaking English “well.”) made the shift to English only, with the We show percentages for non-Hispanic share ranging from around 9 percent whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and major among Dominicans, Salvadorans, and ethnic groups of Latin American and Guatemalans (groups with lower levels Asian origins, along with the percentage of education) to 16 percent among those foreign born in each group. Once again, in the residual “other Latin American” we pooled the 2008–2010 waves of the category and 17.6 percent among Cubans acs to derive more reliable estimates. (who have been in the United States As one might expect, the overwhelm- longer than other Latin American groups, ing majority of non-Hispanic whites and except Mexicans and Puerto Ricans). blacks (93 percent to 94 percent) speak A relatively high percentage of Fil- English only, with almost all of the small ipinos (32.9 percent) also speak English remainder speaking it very well (4 per- only, despite the fact that two-thirds of cent to 5 percent). In sharp contrast, as them are foreign born. The Philippines, shown in the column on the percentages of course, are a former American colony of foreign born, while well over 90 per- where English is widely taught and com- cent of non-Hispanic whites and blacks monly spoken by the educated. Com- are natives, most Latin American and pared with Latin Americans, the share of Asian groups are heavily populated by Asians speaking only English is some- immigrants. The principal exceptions what higher, but always well below one-

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Immigra - Table 4 tion & Size, Immigrant Share, and English Pro½ciency of U.S. Ethnic Groups, 2008–2010 Language Diversity in the Speaks English...* United States % of U.S. % foreign not well or Ethnic/pan-ethnic groups N population born only very well not at all

White, non-Hispanic 199,925,233 65.2 3.8 94.2 4.1 0.7 Black, non-Hispanic 39,405,797 12.8 7.7 93.1 4.6 0.9 Latin American Origins: Mexican 32,054,091 10.4 36.2 24.3 38.8 22.9 Puerto Rican (in mainland) 4,562,169 1.5 1.1 34.9 46.5 8.3 Cuban 1,760,256 0.6 58.9 17.6 41.4 27.2 Dominican 1,421,609 0.5 57.1 8.8 45.6 28.8 Salvadoran, Guatemalan 2,811,922 0.9 65.5 8.7 34.3 37.7 Colombian 943,989 0.3 65.8 13.4 45.3 20.2 Peruvian, Ecuadorian 1,201,984 0.4 66.7 11.3 41.9 25.6 Other Central/South American 2,169,199 0.7 64.5 15.9 42.8 23.4 Asian origins: Chinese 3,369,879 1.1 69.0 18.0 36.4 23.8 Asian Indian 2,831,277 0.9 72.6 20.3 57.7 7.3 Filipino 2,590,676 0.8 66.0 32.9 45.0 5.2 Vietnamese 1,601,842 0.5 68.0 12.1 34.8 28.9 Korean 1,492,080 0.5 74.1 21.8 32.8 22.5 Japanese 816,299 0.3 40.2 55.6 20.7 9.0 Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian 734,354 0.2 54.3 14.7 43.0 22.1 Other Asian 1,227,546 0.4 59.1 27.4 41.6 11.5 All other ethnic groups 5,818,232 1.9 12.2 65.3 25.4 3.7

Total population 306,738,434 100 12.8 79.7 11.6 4.7

*Asked of those (ages ½ve and older) speaking a language other than English at home. Source: American Com- munity Survey, 2008–2010 merged ½les.

third of the population, except for Filipinos relatively common among Puerto Ricans, and the Japanese. Among other Asian Cubans, Dominicans, Colombians, Peru- groups, the percentage speaking only vians, and other Central or South Ameri- English ranges from 12 percent among cans, for each of whom the percentage the Vietnamese to 27 percent in the resid- speaking English very well ranged from ual “other Asian” category. 41 percent to 47 percent. Filipinos, Lao- Those Latin Americans and Asians who tians, Cambodians, and other Asians also report speaking English very well must display “bilingual” rates in the same range. be at least somewhat bilingual, since they Despite a preponderance of immigrant speak another language at home (though origins in most of these groups, the per- we cannot determine how well from the centage who speak no or limited English is of½cial statistics). Bilingualism de½ned in fairly low–under 30 percent for all groups this rough way is most common among except Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Asian Indians (57.5 percent), but is also many of whom have indigenous mother

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tongues, have lower levels of education, 78 percent do so if they came between Rubén G. and have more recently arrived without 1990 and 2000 (at least twenty years of Rumbaut & Douglas S. documentation. In some groups–Puerto exposure), and 65 percent do so even if Massey Ricans, Asian Indians, Filipinos, and the they arrived between 2000 and 2010 (ten Japanese–the share speaking little or no or fewer years of exposure). Among English is under 10 percent. Taken to - those who arrived between the ages of 13 gether, those who speak English only and to 39, the respective levels of English those who speak it very well roughly indi- pro½ciency plummet to 34 percent, 38 cate the degree of English language fluency, percent, and 44 percent, and among and by this criterion a majority of all those who arrived at age 35 or later, the groups are fluent in English, again with share falls to between 22 percent and 25 the exception of Salvadorans and Guate- percent, with little variation by year of malans, as well as the Vietnamese. Among arrival. Thus, arrival before adolescence other groups, the share speaking English is critical to achieving English fluency. only or very well ranges from 53 percent The right-hand bars show the powerful among Peruvians and Ecuadorans to 81 effect of education on English pro½ciency, percent among Puerto Ricans. In general, as those with less than a high school edu- Latin Americans are just as likely to speak cation are quite unlikely to speak English English pro½ciently as are Asians, which is very well, especially if they arrived after consistent with recent survey data suggest- 2000 (just 8 percent spoke English only ing that huge majorities of Hispanics, in - or very well) or between 1990 and 2000 cluding recently arrived non-citizens, view (only 12 percent); but the prospects of learning English as “very important.”8 English pro½ciency do not rise much Three key determinants of English lan- even for those who arrived prior to 1990 guage fluency among the foreign born (just 21 percent spoke it well or only). In (from non-English-speaking countries) contrast, among high school graduates are age at arrival, years of education, and who arrived before 1990, 58 percent time spent in the United States. It is much spoke English only or very well, though easier for human beings to learn lan- among those who arrived between 1990 guages prior to adolescence, and educa- and 2000, the percentage is lower at 38 tion generally increases exposure to En- percent, and lower still at 26 percent for glish as well as cognitive skills. Period of those who arrived after 2000. arrival, of course, determines the length Very obviously, a college education of direct exposure to an English lan- greatly increases the likelihood of En- guage–based culture and society. Figure glish pro½ciency. Even among those who 1, based on 2010 acs data for immigrants arrived most recently (after 2000), 58 from non-English-speaking countries, percent spoke English only or very well. shows how the share speaking English only The share rises to 67 percent among those or very well varies according to these who arrived between 1990 and 2000, and three background factors. The bars to the to 79 percent among those who came left reveal that English pro½ciency is very before 1990. Thus, the prospects for En- high among those who arrived before the glish fluency are very bright for those who age of thirteen. Among those who arrived are well educated, arrived before adoles- before this age, 81 percent speak English cence, and have lived in the United States only or very well if they came to the United for at least a decade. The data presented States before 1990 (yielding at least thirty in Table 4 hint at the possibility that im - years of exposure to American English), migrants today may be following the path

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Immigra - Figure 1 tion & English Pro½ciency of Immigrants by Age at Arrival, Education, and Decade of Arrival Language Diversity in the United States

Data for immigrants from non-English-speaking countries of birth. Source: American Community Survey, 2008–2010 merged ½les.

of their predecessors toward native lan- nia, a region of sustained mass immigra- guage decline and English dominance, tion and high densities of non-English and eventually to the extinction of their speakers (especially Spanish speakers).9 mother tongues. As we noted, more than Indeed, the 2010 acs found that of the 21 one-third of Puerto Ricans and nearly million residents in the six counties of one-quarter of Mexicans spoke only En- Southern California, half spoke English glish in 2010. Without more precise knowl- only and half reported speaking a non- edge of the generational composition of English language at home. Generally, we the various populations, however, it is dif - de½ne the ½rst generation as immigrants ½cult to assess the likelihood of linguistic born outside the United States; the second survival over time. generation as those born in the United Figure 2 draws from a meta-analysis of States of immigrant parents; the third two merged databases–the Children of generation as those born in the United Immigrants Longitudinal Study in San States to native-born parents and one or Diego, and the Immigration and Inter- more immigrant grandparents; and the generational Mobility in Metropolitan fourth generation as natives with native- Los Angeles study–that estimated lin- born parents and grandparents. The guistic “survival curves” across detailed detailed data available from the above generational groups in Southern Califor- surveys enable us to break these broad

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Figure 2 Rubén G. Non-English Language Use, Pro½ciency, and Preference, by Generational Cohort Rumbaut & Douglas S. Massey

Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study in San Diego and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles merged ½les.

generational groups down into fractional ation; those arriving between the pri- cohorts corresponding to different levels mary-school ages of six and twelve are of exposure to the English language envi- the 1.5 generation; and those arriving ronment of the United States, as well as to from infancy to age ½ve are the 1.75 gener- different degrees of separation from the ation, closer in their developmental mother tongue and from the experience experience to second-generation peers. of being socialized in immigrant families We also divide the second generation at key developmental ages. into two groups: those in the 2.0 genera- Speci½cally, we divide the ½rst generational cohort have two foreign-born par- tion into four distinct cohorts by age at ents, whereas those in the 2.5 generation arrival. Those who arrived as adults aged have one foreign-born and one native- eighteen or older constitute the 1.0 gen- born parent. The third generation is sim- eration; those who arrived as adolescents ilarly divided into a 3.0 cohort with three between the secondary-school ages of or four foreign-born grandparents, and a thirteen and seventeen are the 1.25 gener- 3.5 cohort with just one or two immigrant

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Immigra - grandparents. Finally, those in the fourth to 93 percent. In the 3.0 generation, these tion & generation are the furthest removed from percentages become 12 percent and 97 Language Diversity the immigrant experience, with both percent. By the fourth generation, the share in the native parents and no foreign-born grand- speaking a foreign language well drops to United States parents. 2 percent and the share preferring En- Figure 2 summarizes the cross-genera- glish at home is 99 percent. When Span- tional story of non-English language use, ish speakers are considered separately pro½ciency, and preference. It clearly from speakers of other non-English lan- shows that as one proceeds upward guages, the percentage speaking their through these fractional generations, the mother tongue well is slower to fall, and percentage speaking a non-English lan- the share preferring English at home is guage while growing up drops, as does slower to rise in the second generation, the percentage able to speak a non-En - but by the third and fourth generations, glish language well; but the percentage the curves end up at the same point as who prefer to speak only English at home that of all other speakers of non-English rises rapidly. Speaking a non-English lan- languages.10 guage while growing up persists at high levels through the 2.0 generation and Our analysis provides no support for then plummets with the addition of one those arguing that mass immigration will native-born parent in the 2.5 generation. produce a fragmented and balkanized Exposure to a non-English language linguistic geography in the United States. while growing up may remain high into The revival of immigration has simply the second generation; however, this restored language diversity to something does not translate automatically into approaching the country’s historical sta- either foreign language fluency, literacy, tus quo, at least as measured by the vari- or use. Although 84 percent of the 2.0 ety of non-English languages and the generation spoke a non-English language number of non-English speakers. But in while growing up, only 36 percent said the absence of continued large-scale im - they spoke it well at the time of the survey migration, and even with its continuation and 73 percent said they preferred to speak at moderate levels, our data suggest that English at home. Moreover, although it is the mother tongues of today’s immi- not shown in Figure 2, the 2.0 genera- grants will persist somewhat into the section’s levels of non-English language lit- ond generation, but then fade to a vestige eracy (reading and writing ability) dropped in the third generation and expire by the even more rapidly than their ability to fourth, just as happened to the mother understand or speak that foreign lan- tongues of the Southern and Eastern guage. The loss of non-English literacy, in European immigrants who arrived be- turn, is typically a prelude to the loss of tween 1880 and 1930. Even the fact that a the mother tongue altogether. much larger fraction of immigrants today Thus, pro½ciency and use of non-En- speak a single language, Spanish, does not glish languages barely survive into the sec - seem to alter the ultimate trajectory of ond generation, even in places of immi- linguistic survival. Indeed, even in South- grant concentration such as Los Angeles ern California, the nation’s premier immi- and San Diego. By the 2.5 generation, the grant megalopolis–where non-Hispanic percentage speaking a foreign language whites are no longer the majority, and well drops to 17 percent, and the share where the density of a variety of Asian preferring to speak English at home rises languages and of Spanish speakers is

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high–it appears that pro½ciency in and worker migration from Mexico to levels Rubén G. use of Spanish effectively dies out in the not seen since the heyday of the Bracero Rumbaut & Douglas S. third generation, before disappearing into Program in the late 1950s, providing new Massey the nation’s language graveyard in the opportunities for legal circulation across fourth generation. The loss of Asian lan- the border, rather than permanent U.S. guage fluency and use takes place faster settlement. Within Mexico, the economy still. is growing, labor force growth is deceler- Whether Spanish and other immigrant ating, fertility is declining, education levels languages persist in being spoken within are rising, and wages are holding steady in the United States depends mainly on the face of stagnating earnings in the Unit- future trends in immigration, on whether ed States, making the United States a far enough ½rst-generation language speakers less attractive destination than it once was. offset the rising tide of linguistic deaths If mass immigration does not resume in in the 2.5 generation and above, and, if the near future, we may witness the same current trends were reversed, on whether process of mother tongue extinction fluent bilingualism might come to be val- among Mexicans as occurred among ear- ued rather than eschewed in the larger lier generations of European migrants. economy and society. With respect to Indeed, given the power of popular Amer - Spanish speakers, immigration from ican culture and the dividends to be gained Latin America continues, but the boom from English fluency, it turns out to be in Mexican immigration appears to be quite dif½cult to maintain stable bilin - over, at least for the moment. Mexicans gualism in the United States. Whether this presently constitute around 62 percent of is a good or a bad thing depends on one’s all undocumented residents of the United point of view. On the one hand, it assures States, 55 percent of all Latin American the continuation of a common civic lan- immigrants in the country, and 29 per- guage in the United States. On the other cent of all immigrants taken together.11 hand, there is little evidence that fluency in In a very real way, Mexico was the tail multiple languages damages the integra- wagging the dog of Spanish language tion and cohesiveness of U.S. society; on immigration to the United States in recent the contrary, in a very real way the pro- decades. No other country comes close to gressive death of immigrant tongues rep- matching Mexico’s dominance. resents a costly loss of valuable human, Recent work by demographer Jeffrey social, and cultural capital– for in a global Passel and his colleagues at the Pew economy, speaking multiple languages is Research Hispanic Center suggests that a valuable skill. Certainly the economy of net migration from Mexico has likely the Americas would function more fluidly fallen to zero and may even be negative.12 and transparently if more people spoke at Whether or not Mexican migration even- least two of the hemisphere’s three largest tually resumes remains to be seen, but languages: English, Spanish, and Portu - the era of mass undocumented migration guese. A recent report by the Council of that contributed so much to Latin Amer- Europe makes the case that plurilingual- ican population growth in the United ism is an advantage in the globalized States is probably over. Labor demand in marketplace of the future.13 Perhaps it is the United States remains weak, and what better to consider immigrant languages demand exists is now being met by legal as a multidimensional resource to be pre- temporary workers, as Congress has qui- served and cultivated, rather than as a etly opened the door to mass temporary threat to national cohesion and identity.

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Immigra - endnotes tion & RUB NG RUMBAUT Language * Contributor Biographies: É . is Professor of Sociology at the University Diversity of California, Irvine. His publications include Immigrant America: A Portrait (with Alejandro in the Portes; 3rd ed., 2006; 4th ed., forthcoming), Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Gen- United eration (with Alejandro Portes, 2001), and Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisci- States plinary Perspectives (edited with Nancy Foner and Steven J. Gold, 2000). DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1995, is the Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. His publications include Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times (with Magaly Sánchez R., 2010), Categorically Unequal: The American Strati½cation System (2007), and Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration (with Jorge Durand and Nolan J. Malone, 2002). 1 Marc Shell, “Babel in America; or, the Politics of Language Diversity in the United States,” Critical Inquiry 20 (1993): 103–127. 2 See David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer- sity Press, 1992); Thomas Fleming, The Louisiana Purchase (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003); and Laura E. Gómez, Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race (New York: New York University Press, 2007). 3 Douglas S. Massey, “The New Immigration and the Meaning of Ethnicity in the United States,” Population and Development Review 21 (1995): 631–652. 4 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Popula- tion of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). 5 Rubén G. Rumbaut, “A Language Graveyard? The Evolution of Language Competencies, Preferences and Use Among Young Adult Children of Immigrants,” in The Education of Lan- guage Minority Immigrants in the United States, ed. Terrence G. Wiley, Jin Sook Lee, and Rus- sell Rumberger (Bristol, U.K.: Multilingual Matters, 2009), 35–71. 6 James Crawford, “Seven Hypotheses on Language Loss: Causes and Cures,” in Stabilizing Indigenous Languages, ed. Gina Cantoni (Flagstaff: Northern Arizona University, 2003), 45–60. 7 Calvin Veltman, Language Shift in the United States (New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1983). The sole exception noted by Veltman was Navajo, but in the two decades since, there has been a rapid erosion of Navajo and other Native American languages. 8 Julie A. Dowling, Christopher G. Ellison, and David L. Leal, “Who Doesn’t Value English? Debunking Myths About Mexican Immigrants’ Attitudes Toward the English Language,” Social Science Quarterly 93 (2) (2012): 356–378. 9 Rubén G. Rumbaut, Douglas S. Massey, and Frank D. Bean, “Linguistic Life Expectancies: Immigrant Language Retention in Southern California,” Population and Development Review 32 (2006): 447–460. 10 Ibid. 11 Yesenia D. Acosta and G. Patricia de la Cruz, The Foreign Born From Latin America and the Caribbean: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). 12 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana González-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero–and Perhaps Less (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012). 13 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Why Should Linguistic Diversity Be Maintained and Supported in Europe? Some Arguments (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 2002).

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Schools & the Diversity Transition

Richard Alba

Abstract: In the next quarter century, North American and Western European societies will face a profound transformation of their working-age populations as a result of immigration, combined with the aging of native majorities. These changes will intensify the challenges of integrating the children of low- status immigrants. Abundant evidence reveals that most educational systems, including that in the United States, are failing to meet these challenges; and sociological theories underscore these systems’ role in reproducing inequality. However, the history of assimilation in the United States shows that native-/ immigrant-origin inequalities need not be enduring. An examination of variations across time and space suggests educational policy changes and innovations that can ameliorate inequalities.

A turning point in the history of the West is at hand. During the coming quarter-century, wealthy Western societies will undergo what could be called a “diversity transition” or a “third demographic transition.”1 Thanks to ongoing and irre- versible demographic changes, spurred in substantial part by immigration, these societies will have to rely increasingly on young people of non-native and minority backgrounds to sustain their economic, cultural, and social vitality. With an imperative to integrate these youth, schools will form the crucible where the future of North American and Western European societies is forged. The impending transition will be intensi½ed by a RICHARD ALBA is Distinguished demographic conjunction that links both ends of Professor of Sociology at the Gradu- the age spectrum. At the lower end, the majority- ate Center of the City University of origins population, however de½ned, will continue New York. His publications include to decline, while the numbers of those from immi- Blurring the Color Line: The New grant and minority backgrounds will increase. At Chance for a More Integrated America the upper end, an especially large population of (2009), Remaking the American majority workers will soon retire, a consequence of Mainstream: Assimilation and Con- the baby booms that followed World War II in most temporary Immigration (with Victor 2 Nee, 2003), and Ethnic Identity: The Western nations. The retiring baby boomers are, Transformation of White America on average, a well-educated group, including the (1990). ½rst cohorts to experience mass higher education.

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Schools They are also well positioned in the labor schools are charged with ensuring equal & the market, occupying a disproportionate opportunity and the potential for social Diversity Transition share of the most skilled and highest- mobility for children coming from disad- paying jobs. The critical question is: who vantaged backgrounds. Most often, the will replace them? ½rst charge dominates because schools This question underscores a major give primacy to the needs of children challenge for wealthy Western societies: coming from the middle and higher how to integrate the children (and, in classes of the native majority popula- some cases, grandchildren) of immigrants tion.4 But all is not lost. We can see from so that they can participate in the labor the history of assimilation in the United force and in mainstream institutions on a States that massive educational catch-up par with native majorities. In most West- by children from disadvantaged groups is ern countries, a large fraction of immi- possible. Through examination of educa- grant-origin children face substantial tional systems across time, between past disadvantages in reaching educational and present, and across space, in varia- parity with children from native fami- tions among countries, this essay begins lies.3 Although immigration has proven to identify the innovations and policies to be bimodal in most places, with a sub- that could ameliorate inequalities between stantial share of the foreign born bring- students from immigrant homes and ing with them high human and social their peers from mainstream backgrounds. capital, many children of immigrants grow up in homes where their parents Figure 1 shows how the demographic have low levels of education (by the stan- transition is likely to proceed in the dards of the receiving society), hold low- United States, according to the Census wage jobs (or are unemployed), and speak Bureau’s 2012 population projections. primarily in their mother tongue. More- The European-ancestry group (non-His- over, these immigrants and their children panic whites)–the majority population may be stigmatized for their national ori- from which most high-skilled workers gin (especially when it represents a former and civic leaders have historically been colony), phenotypic appearance, or reli- recruited–is in decline. This group is gion. The combination of a low socioeco- largest in the baby-boom cohorts (ages 45 nomic starting point and a stigmatized to 64 in 2010), and is substantially smaller ethnoracial origin leads me to describe in younger age groups. For instance, the these groups as low status (according to the number of European-ancestry whites from perceptions of the majority population). ages 0 to 19 is 23 percent less than in the The challenge of integration must be baby-boom group. The Census Bureau met head-on in schools, though given their projections for 2035 show that the shrink- current resources and structures, it is age of the white majority population will doubtful that they are equal to the task. continue well into the twenty-½rst century. The challenge exacerbates a tension at A little more than two decades from now, the heart of the educational mission: on the number of whites aged 16 to 64 is the one hand, schools are expected to expected to be about 110 million, down provide young people with an education from 130 million today; and the working- appropriate for their future adult lives, age population of minority origins will be which leads to sorting of students, pre- almost the same size. While the projec- sumably by ability but, as we know, also tion of the adult minority population by social origin; on the other hand, relies on assumptions, chiefly about im -

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Figure 1 Richard U.S. Population in 2010, and Projected U.S. Population in 2035, by Age and Gender Alba

Non-Hispanic whites are represented by the blank portions of the bars, and minorities are represented by the shaded portions. Source: The 2010 data come from the decennial census; the 2035 projections are derived from the Census Bureau’s 2012 population projections.

migration, that could turn out to be wrong, temporary child (under eighteen) popu- the projection of the adult white popula- lation. As of the end of the ½rst decade of tion does not. Whites could still poten- the twenty-½rst century, non-Hispanic tially gain in number from an assimilatory whites constituted a bare majority, at 56 shift across the minority/majority divide,5 percent of America’s children, with His- but any such shift is quite unlikely to attain panics, non-Hispanic blacks, and Asians a magnitude great enough to signi½cantly making up 22, 14, and 4 percent, respec- alter the projected decline. In short, the tively. The remainder belongs to other white “majority” will continue to shrink, ethnoracial categories, including individ- both in absolute numbers and relative to uals of mixed race. Children growing up the minority population, as the overall in immigrant homes make up a large part population grows. of the Hispanic and Asian groups, which Immigration plays a major role in driving are also the fastest growing segments of these changes, as evidenced by the con- the U.S. population. Over 60 percent of

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Schools all Latino children are children of immi- In virtually all wealthy Western coun- & the grants; among Asians, that number rises tries that have accepted large numbers of Diversity Transition to almost 90 percent. immigrants since the mid-twentieth cen- Some Latino groups correspond closely tury, a substantial body of evidence dem- to the concept of a low-status immigrant- onstrates that major portions of the sec- origin population. Immigrants from a ond and, in some cases, third generation number of Latin American countries, lag behind mainstream norms of educa- including Mexico and much of Central tional attainment. This ½nding suggests America, arrive with low levels of formal that, on average, the descendants of im - education (according to U.S. norms) and migrants will not be equipped to ½ll many take low-wage jobs.6 A sizable proportion of the vacancies left in the labor market lack legal status, and even legal immi- and in civic leadership by the retiring baby grants and their children are exposed to boomers.9 This is not to deny the bimodal increasingly virulent nativism and oppres- nature of the educational distribution of sive police measures in some states and the children of immigrants. Migration localities.7 For these and other reasons, streams have introduced some immigrant the educational barriers faced by Latinos professionals and other high-skilled work- appear to linger into the third generation ers, whose children generally do well in and beyond.8 Western educational systems, often out- In one demographic respect, the United performing the children of the native States has an advantage over many com- majority.10 parable European countries: namely, the We can observe the educational disad- United States will not have a shortage of vantages of children of immigrants in young people in the near future. By con- terms of either school-taught skills, such as trast, the Netherlands, like many Western literacy in the mainstream language and European countries, will experience a mathematical pro½ciency, or educational shrink age of its young-adult population. credentials. The two, though correlated, This future can be inferred from the pop- are not isomorphic, and their signi½cance ulation pyramid in Figure 2, which also for adult status is somewhat different. shows that the baby boom lasted well While educational credentials determine into the 1970s in the Netherlands, longer which tier of the labor market individuals than in the United States. As of 2010, can enter, school-taught skills are a plau- therefore, the youngest Dutch baby boom- sible predictor of workplace perfor - ers are only in their late thirties, and mance, especially in jobs that require more some will remain in the labor market for than a secondary-school credential, and another three decades. However, the thus they also indicate potential for ad - child population in Holland is substan- vancement. tially smaller than a comparable age band The Organisation for Economic Co-op- of adults, and is also more diverse, with the eration and Development (oecd) con- children of immigrants nearly one-quarter ducts the Programme for International of the total. The majority of these chil- Student Assessment (pisa) surveys to dren have parents who came from out- test the literacy and mathematics skills side Europe, including former Dutch col- (as well as scienti½c knowledge) of 15-year- onies (for example, Suriname), Morocco, olds from more than seventy countries. or Turkey. Generally, these are socioeco- By surveying students nearing the end of nomically disadvantaged groups within the period of mandatory schooling, the Dutch society. pisa study helps us understand the dis-

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Figure 2 Richard Population Pyramid for the Netherlands, 2010 Alba

Lightest portion is native Dutch; intermediate shade is ½rst- and second-generation immigrants of Western origins; darkest shade is ½rst- and second-generation immigrants of non-Western origins. Source: Statistics Netherlands.

advantages of students from immigrant parison, the gaps grow in magnitude. The families. Analysis of the overall native-/ pisa study does not collect consistent data immigrant-origin differences in main- on the national origin of immigrant fam- stream language literacy and mathemat- ilies, but we can approximate this compar- ics skills reveals that, on average, these ison by limiting the 1.5- and second-gen- gaps are about forty points on the pisa eration group to those whose parents have scales.11 The oecd estimates that sixty to not earned an upper-secondary creden- seventy points amount to a “pro½ciency tial, such as the U.S. high school diploma. level,” of which there are ½ve on the liter- Admittedly, this restricts the immigrant- acy scale and six on the mathematics scale. origin group to its most disadvantaged By this measure, the average forty-point portion (in the United States, about 30 per- gap is sizable. cent of children from immigrant homes These averages are a lower bound of the would be included), so the results should disadvantages of children of low-status be viewed as an upper bound on the skills immigrants because they do not account gap. for the bimodal nature of immigration– Using this method, Figure 3 shows that that is, the presence of children from pro- for most of the major receiving countries fessional and high-skilled immigrants. If of the North Atlantic, the gap is now on we remove these children from the com- the order of sixty points in literacy (and

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Schools Figure 3 & the Average Reading Scores for Native Students and 1.5- and Second-Generation Students Whose Parents Diversity Do Not Have a High School Diploma Transition

Differences between the two groups are indicated on the front bars. Source: Programme for International Student Assessment, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006 and 2009.

larger, in some cases, in mathematics). In is largely complete but also reflects recent Germany, it is one hundred points; in life chances in schools, demonstrate that Canada, about forty. In the case of Ger- U.S.-born Latinos are much more likely many, a highly strati½ed school system is than their non-Latino white counterparts implicated; in the case of Canada, a selec- to have left high school without a diplo- tive immigration system reduces the po- ma. This is especially true for the young tential for academic-skills inequality. men of the group, who are also much less Overall, we can see that in a number of likely to have earned postsecondary edu- major receiving countries, including the cation credentials (see Table 1). Young- United States, the literacy gap between adult whites have earned baccalaureate the children from native families and degrees at roughly twice the frequency children from disadvantaged immigrant of Latinos. Because comparable gaps in families varies between ½fty and seventy postsecondary education also separate points on the pisa scale. black from white Americans, these data The credentials gap is, if anything, larger. indicate problems for two groups that In the United States, lagging educational now make up more than one-third of U.S. attainment characterizes the second and children. later generations of Latinos, the largest mi- In most other Western countries, the cre- nority group among America’s children.12 dentials gap for children from disadvan- For instance, 2005–2009 American Com - taged immigrant families is also large, munity Survey data on individuals aged though not always as large as in the United 26 to 35, a group whose educational record States, as my colleagues and I have found

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Table 1 Richard Educational Attainment of 26- to 35-year-old, U.S.-born Whites and Latinos, by Gender Alba

Whites % Latinos %

MEN No high school diploma 8.0 19.1 High school diploma 28.2 33.7 Some college, no degree 23.0 24.6 Associate’s degree 8.4 7.5 Bachelor’s degree 24.2 11.6 Post-bachelor’s degree 8.3 3.5

WOMEN No high school diploma 5.8 14.7 High school diploma 21.1 27.7 Some college, no degree 23.0 27.5 Associate’s degree 10.3 9.2 Bachelor’s degree 27.7 15.3 Post-bachelor’s degree 12.1 5.6

Source: 2005–2009 American Community Survey.

in the Children of Immigrants in Schools differ fundamentally from one another. study.13 In the Netherlands, for example, Whether we consider such features as the gaps between native Dutch children and degree of internal strati½cation, the in - the children of Moroccan immigrants are equality among schools, or the division of large at both ends of the educational dis- educational labor among schools, families, tribution.14 In France, the failure of the and communities, we observe marked children of North African immigrants to variations among the school systems of complete secondary school is at least as the receiving societies.18 common as it is for Latinos in the United For instance, in some Northern Euro- States, but the gap at the upper end, in pean school systems, such as in the Neth- postsecondary credentials, is smaller.15 erlands and Germany, the students are In Great Britain, however, the youngest steered into separate tracks (often in dif- cohorts of the children of Bangladeshi ferent school buildings) at early ages; and Pakistani immigrants have caught up tracking begins after the fourth year of to their white British peers in terms of primary school in most German states. university credentials, though they are Such early tracking places students from concentrated in lower-status universi- immigrant backgrounds at an extreme ties.16 Nevertheless, this parity is remark- disadvantage. Because they begin school able and remains to be fully explained.17 behind students from native families, Despite these variations and the British they typically require more time for their exception, the disadvantage of young academic abilities to manifest themselves. people who have grown up in low-status In the French and American educational immigrant families is generally consistent systems, which also track students (though and sizable. Remarkably, this disadvan- in less rigid ways), students are educated tage appears in educational systems that for much longer periods in comprehensive

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Schools contexts, giving immigrant-origin young- advantaged origins, so long as this move- & the sters more opportunity to shift tracks. ment is not so widespread that it threatens Diversity Transition There is also considerable variation in the aggregate advantages of privileged the degree of inequality among schools. students. The U.S. system stands at one extreme, According to these theories, even when where school funding depends heavily on public policy alters educational systems locally and state-raised taxes, and spending to enhance opportunities for students per pupil can vary from one district to from humble origins, the imbalance of another by as much as a two-to-one mar- educational opportunity is quick to re- gin.19 Consequently, there are substan- assert itself. The processes that, like a social tial inequalities among schools in physical gyroscope, preserve inequality according facilities, teaching resources, and teacher to family origins are not entirely clear. quali½cations–inequalities that correlate However, we can observe that in dem - with the social origins of students.20 By ocratic societies, native middle-class par- contrast, in France, the national Ministry ents are better equipped than working- of Education controls the bulk of school class or immigrant parents to enlist the budgets, including, critically, the budgets collaboration of school administrators for teachers. There is even modest sup- and teachers to influence their children’s plementary funding for schools that educations. They are also in a better posi- serve large numbers of socially disadvan- tion to move their children between taged students, provided by the Priority school districts, or to opt out of or sup- Education Zones (zep) program. There plement public provision through full- or are still inequalities among French schools, part-time private education. Typically, but they are less pronounced than in the their privileged position is maintained by United States. Nevertheless, apart from the the “normal” workings of the educational large skills inequality evident in Germany, system. The influence of these parents, the variations in the native-/immigrant- therefore, remains largely invisible, man- origin educational gaps do not seem to ifesting itself only at moments when they align closely with the differences in edu- intervene to ensure that their children cational structures. What then is going on? retain advantages in spite of efforts to level the playing ½eld. The gaps separating young people of The thesis of maximally maintained low-status immigrant origins from the inequality argues that expansion of the majority population are unsurprising in higher tiers of an educational system, light of the role of educational systems in which is intended to create room for stu- transmitting inequalities from one genera- dents from disadvantaged backgrounds tion to the next. The gaps are, moreover, to move upward, also allows some students predicted by theories of inequality now from privileged families to improve their prevalent in the sociology of education, educational outcomes–hence, on net including the theories of “maximally” there tends to be little change in the dif- and “effectively” “maintained inequality.” ferentials separating students of different These theories assert that educational sys - origins.22 In complementary fashion, tems function in ways that preserve, on effectively maintained inequality claims average, the cumulative advantages of that as quantitative differences in stu- middle- and upper-middle-class majority- dents’ educational outcomes (for example, group students.21 Such theories do allow the number of years of education attained) for individual mobility by students of dis- level off, the qualitative differences be-

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come more consequential.23 Qualitative stream norms characterized one group, Richard disparities that maintain inequality in qualitative differences the other. Alba the aggregate, even as opportunity osten- The Italian case bears some resem- sibly expands, include secondary school blance to the situation of low-status tracks, along with the status tiers among immigrant groups today. Italian immi- universities in Great Britain and the United grants came from the economically back- States. ward regions of the Mezzogiorno, the These theories arose as an effort to ex - Italian South, and brought with them few plain the persistence of social class-based skills of value in an industrial economy, inequalities in education. But the theories apart from construction trades. The school may also be applied to native-/immigrant- system of the Mezzogiorno was very lim- origin inequalities, which are similarly ited in 1900, and many of the immigrants widespread and resilient. Ad mittedly, the were illiterate.25 These were among the theories might seem to foreclose any fur- ½rst transnational immigrants, some of ther consideration of ameliorating in - them migrating back and forth between equalities. If educational systems by their Italy and the United States on a seasonal very nature work to maintain the advan- basis. A large proportion hoped to return tages of privileged groups, then native-/ permanently to their hometowns, and immigrant-origin inequalities may be many eventually did.26 unyielding, and it may be impossible to Consistent with ideals held by the conceive of educational policies that immigrants at the time, children were kept make much of a dent in them. But a study close to the family; and in many families, of assimilation history in the United children were expected to make an eco- States suggests otherwise. nomic contribution as early as possible. These expectations created a series of The historical cases of educational catch- clashes with American schools.27 Conse- up by disadvantaged groups indicate that, quently, Italian children had high rates of under favorable circumstances, maximally truancy and frequently left school as and effectively maintained inequality early as the law allowed. Even as late as yield to other forces. For example, consider 1930, only 11 percent of Italian Americans the mass assimilation of the children and who entered New York City high schools grandchildren of Southern and Eastern earned diplomas, at a time when over 40 European immigrants from 1945 to 1970.24 percent of all the city’s high school stu- During the ½rst half of the century, these dents graduated.28 The obvious conse- groups were denigrated and excluded by quence was low educational attainment native, middle-class white Americans, for second-generation Italians and the who sought in various ways to maintain channeling of this group toward jobs in their advantages. Two of these groups, which educational credentials were un - Italians and Jews, stand out for the lessons important. This is the situation in which their experiences yield about educational sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel change. The children of immigrants from Patrick Moynihan found this population Southern Italy lagged far behind native at mid-century.29 white norms of education, while Jews, far Yet during the quarter-century follow- more educationally mobile, experienced ing the end of World War II, the Italians’ discrimination in admission to elite col- educational attainment accelerated, and leges and social exclusion when they did they caught up to native white Americans gain entry. Quantitative gaps from main- in the key areas of college attendance and

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Schools graduation. An analysis of educational olistic closure: the exclusion of outsiders & the attainment by generation and birth cohort from, or at least the restriction of their Diversity Transition suggests that the critical shifts occurred entry to, arenas where privileges are forged across cohorts, and thus reflect the his- and bestowed. torical evolution of the group’s life But this system of exclusion collapsed chances.30 For the second-generation in the postwar period. For example, at Italian children born during the period of Princeton, “long a bastion of anti-Semi- mass immigration, the gap separating tism” according to sociologist Jerome their educational attainment from that of Karabel, the enrollment of Jews reached mainstream white Americans, typi½ed by 6 to 7 percent in the late 1940s, double the British ancestry, was very large: two-to- proportion of a decade earlier, and con- one in terms of college attendance, and tinued to climb to about 14 percent by the even wider in terms of college gradua- late 1950s.33 Jews also joined the faculties tion. The gap narrowed substantially for of elite schools, including the Ivies.34 the cohort born during the late 1930s, a These educational changes were tied to group whose education took place mainly other societal changes that occurred in after World War II. For those born after the postwar period, such as greater resi- 1950, the gap vanished permanently. dential integration, especially in suburbs, The Jewish case was different, but also and eventually intermarriage across eth- instructive with regard to contemporary nic and religious lines. theories of educational inequality. In con- Together, these changes diminished trast with the Italians, Eastern European the once bright boundaries that separated Jews represented an immigrant popula- Jews and Catholics from what had been a tion unusually well supplied with skills white Protestant mainstream. How did valued by the industrial economies of such profound changes take place in so Northern U.S. cities.31 Jews by and large short a span of time? Why did these ethnic did not intend to return to Europe, and groups become acceptable to white Prot- they quickly established themselves in estants, who during the ½rst half of the the United States by learning English and century feared growing Catholic political acquiring citizenship. Their children found power, as well as the social and economic rapid success in the public school system challenges posed by rapid Jewish mobility? and soon applied for admission to colleges, An answer to these questions must also including top-tier universities. explain why white Protestants became Elite native white Protestants in the willing to share their once-exclusive United States responded by reinforcing advantages with these immigrant new- the boundaries separating them from comers and their descendants. Jewish newcomers. Quotas were imposed The postwar changes took place during a on the admission of Jews to elite colleges period of what could be called “non-zero- during the 1920s, and they lasted, in dis- sum mobility”–an extraordinary period guised forms, until the late 1950s.32 Jews of prosperity that opened the sluices of still attended college, but they were mobility for working-class, ethnic whites con½ned largely to less prestigious cam- without washing away the perches of puses, such as the public colleges of the advantaged white Protestants. The social New York City system. By imposing a ascent of previously disadvantaged ethno - qualitative restriction on the educational religious groups, then, required little careers of academically talented Jews, sacri½ce by their privileged predecessors. Protestants attempted to achieve monop- The magnitude of this non-zero-sum

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mobility is indicated by the changes in grounds to take advantage of any new Richard the postsecondary portion of the educa- openings, however, policy changes and Alba tional system. innovations in educational systems must State and municipal colleges and uni- occur. To reflect on the nature of these versities expanded rapidly in the quarter- modi½cations for the American system– century following the war. During this the focus for the rest of the essay–we can period, college education became a mass look either across time, searching for rel- phenomenon, as the number of students evant differences between the postwar in institutions of postsecondary educa- educational system and the current one, tion quintupled between 1940 and 1970. or across space, looking for features of Because of the educational non-zero-sum systems in other countries that might mobility generated by this expansion, ameliorate American inequalities. groups like the Southern Italians were Undoubtedly, there are many differ- able to catch up to mainstream educa- ences between the big-city schools of the tional norms in only a few decades. By postwar period, where the children of 1970, the groups of young adults emerg- Italian and Jewish immigrants were edu- ing from the educational system con- cated, and the urban and suburban schools tained ample representation of the white attended by the children of today’s immi- ethnic groups that had lagged behind grants. But two of these differences seem through the middle of the century.35 especially relevant at ½rst glance: the ½rst relates to “quality,” including the aca- The coming demographic changes, and demic skills and pro½ciencies of teachers; in particular the shrinkage of the privi- the second concerns public investment in leged youth population, such as children educational opportunity. from middle-class non-Hispanic white There is compelling evidence that the families in the United States, suggest emer- quality of teachers matters–that students gent conditions for a new period of non- learn more when their teachers have better zero-sum mobility, though not on the credentials, more teaching experience, scale of the postwar period. Nevertheless, and higher levels of verbal skills accord- there will be opportunities in the coming ing to standardized test scores.36 And a quarter-century for the children of disad- substantial body of research shows that, vantaged groups to move up without at least in terms of academic skills, the appearing to threaten the position of chil- average quality of teaching has declined dren of advantaged ones. Although middle- during the last half-century–despite the class native families play influential roles evident abilities of many in the profession in maintaining educational systems, the –as occupational opportunities for women demographic changes suggest that their have expanded and the prestige and work- grip could relax, and openings that favor ing conditions of teaching have declined.37 more opportunity for immigrant-origin However, the turnaround of educational students might become possible. achievement in Finland, which has ben- Thus, the coming changes may create a e½ted from upgrading the professional sta- situation in which the reproduction of tus of teachers and consequently recruit- educational inequality described by the ing more selectively into the occupation, theories of maximally and effectively demonstrates that gender equality and maintained inequality will not be as iron- high teacher quality are compatible.38 clad as it now seems. For children coming Another distinguishing feature of the from disadvantaged immigrant back- postwar period was the growing invest-

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Schools ment in education, especially in the post- and communities, outside agents that & the secondary sector. The investment began continue to play a crucial role throughout Diversity GI Transition with the Bill of 1944, which spurred a child’s school career. higher levels of attendance at colleges This division of responsibility is an and universities. The increased participa- important source of the disadvantages tion in higher education was sustained in that children of immigrants face in edu- the postwar decades by the enormous cational systems. Immigrant families lack expansion of the postsecondary educa- familiarity with the host society and its tional sector, most of which was publicly institutions, and if parents themselves funded. have limited education, the combination Compared to the other receiving soci- is potent. Immigrant parents may not eties of the contemporary Western world, understand the rami½cations of the deci- one prominent feature of American soci- sions that must be made by them and ety appears to undergird educational their children (for example, choices inequality: high levels of residential seg- regarding urban high school selection in regation by ethnicity/race and by income the United States40); they cannot help level.39 Because students usually attend their children with their homework; and schools in their vicinity, residential seg- they cannot provide their children with regation leads to high levels of school the linguistic and cultural foundations segregation. American schools, as noted for school success. To the degree that the earlier, are very unequal, with a strong burden of educational labor falls on them correlation between their social compo- and communities of people like them, their sition and their overall quality, as reflected children are likely to be handicapped. in physical facilities, resources, and teacher Indices of the division of educational preparation. Residential segregation en - labor include the age at which children ables this correlation. ½rst enter school or school-like settings The selectivity of teacher recruitment and the annual amount of time they spend and the residential segregation of ethno- there. In neither of these respects is the racial groups are the consequences of United States well positioned to counter- complex processes that are not easy to act the powerful inequalities among fam- change. If these were the only available ilies and communities. In France, for levers of change in the United States, instance, participation in the maternelle then any hope of meeting the challenges system is more or less universal among of integration in the coming quarter- children by the age of three. In the United century would seem remote. Fortunately, States, by contrast, the use of early child- there are other avenues to ameliorate hood educational programs is lower in educational inequality. Consider the divi- general and lowest of all for the children sion of educational labor among schools, from some major Latino groups, includ- families, and communities, a factor that ing Mexicans.41 Further, young Ameri- influences the correlation between social cans spend fewer hours in school in an origins and educational outcomes. Edu- average year than do most of their West- cation is never conducted solely in schools; ern European counterparts; and during from the very ½rst day of class, students the unusually long summer vacations in enter the classroom with predeveloped the United States, the children from dis- differences in school-relevant skills, advantaged backgrounds lose ground some as simple as the ability to sit still. compared to their more advantaged class - These differences are brought from homes mates.42

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Community institutions can sometimes grant homes–by increasing the role of Richard compensate for the lack of educational schools, on the one hand, and augmenting Alba resources in families, but here, too, the the educational resources of communi- low-status immigrant communities in ties, on the other. More generally, it is un- the United States experience disadvan- realistic to expect a wholesale reorgani- tages. As sociologist Min Zhou has shown, zation of educational systems to facilitate Asian immigrant communities have de - the successful integration of immigrant- veloped supplementary educational insti - origin children. But more modest policies tutions that share bene½ts across class also promise signi½cant improvement. In lines, but Mexican and Central American this respect, all of the different educa- communities lack equivalent facilities.43 tional systems can learn from each other In the United States, such institutions to better adapt to the coming period of depend chiefly on community resources. demographic change. Each system has In the Netherlands, by contrast, municipal features that disadvantage students of governments subsidize programs credited low-status immigrant families, but each with narrowing the skills gap between also has some features that can bene½t immigrant- and native-origin students, these groups. Students from low-status thereby distributing organized resources immigrant families will be as critical to more equitably.44 the labor forces of the advanced economies This brief survey of cross-national as those with mainstream backgrounds. variations in the division of educational The United States, like other Western labor suggests some points of leverage for countries, must pro½t from experiences ameliorating the disadvantages faced by elsewhere to meet the looming challenges students growing up in low-status immi- of integration.

endnotes Author’s Note: This paper has bene½ted from collaborative research conducted with support from the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Partnerships for International Research and Education (pire) program, in the form of the grant “The Children of Immigrants in Schools” (oise-0529921); in addition, a grant from the Nuf½eld Foundation in London allowed for the participation of European colleagues in this research. The collaborations are fully in evidence in the project volume The Children of Immigrants at School: A Comparative Look at Integration in the United States and Western Europe, edited by Richard Alba and Jennifer Holdaway (New York: New York University Press, 2013). The conclusions in this essay, however, are the responsibility of the author. 1 Richard Alba, Jennifer Sloan, and Jessica Sperling, “The Integration Imperative: The Children of Low-Status Immigrants in the Schools of Wealthy Societies,” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011): 395–416; and David Coleman, “Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition,” Population and Development Review 32 (2006): 401–446. 2 Richard Alba, Blurring the Color Line: The New Chance for a More Integrated America (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Dowell Myers, Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007). 3 Richard Alba and Jennifer Holdaway, eds., The Children of Immigrants at School: A Comparative Look at Integration in the United States and Western Europe (New York: New York University Press, 2013); and Anthony Heath, Catherine Rothon, and Elina Kilpi, “The Second Genera-

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Schools tion in Western Europe: Education, Unemployment and Occupational Attainment,” Annual & the Review of Sociology 34 (2008): 211–235. Diversity Transition 4 Adrian Raftery and Michael Hout, “Maximally Maintained Inequality: Expansion, Reform, and Opportunity in Irish Education, 1921–75,” Sociology of Education 66 (1993): 41–62; and Samuel Lucas, “Effectively Maintained Inequality: Education Transitions, Track Mobility, and Social Background Effects,” American Journal of Sociology 106 (2001): 1642–1690. 5 Jennifer Lee and Frank D. Bean, The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in 21st Century America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). 6 Roger Waldinger and Michael Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 7 Douglas S. Massey and Magaly Sánchez R., Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). 8 Edward Telles and Vilma Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 9 Alba and Holdaway, eds., The Children of Immigrants at School. 10 Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age (Cambridge, Mass., and New York: Harvard University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Where Immigrant Students Suc- ceed–A Comparative Review of Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006). 12 Telles and Ortiz, Generations of Exclusion. 13 Alba and Holdaway, eds., The Children of Immigrants at School. 14 Maurice Crul, Jennifer Holdaway, Helga de Valk, Norma Fuentes, and Mayida Zaal, “Edu- cating the Children of Immigrants in Old and New Amsterdam,” in ibid. 15 Richard Alba, Roxane Silberman, Dalia Abdelhady, Yaël Brinbaum, and Amy Lutz, “How Similar Educational Inequalities are Constructed in Two Different Systems, France and the U.S., and Why They Lead to Disparate Labor-Market Outcomes,” in ibid. 16 Mary Waters, Anthony Heath, Van Tran, and Vikki Boliver, “Second-Generation Attain- ment and Inequality: Primary and Secondary Effects on Educational Outcomes in Britain and the United States,” in ibid. 17 See Tariq Modood, “Capitals, Ethnic Identity, and Educational Quali½cations,” in The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard Alba and Mary Waters (New York: New York University Press, 2011). 18 Alba and Holdaway, eds., The Children of Immigrants at School. 19 Jennifer Hochschild and Nathan Scovronick, The American Dream and the Public Schools (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 20Meredith Phillips and Tiffani Chin, “School Inequality: What Do We Know?” in Social Inequality, ed. Kathryn Neckerman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004). 21 Sigal Alon, “The Evolution of Class Inequality in Higher Education: Competition, Exclusion, and Adaptation,” American Sociological Review 74 (2009): 731–755; Lucas, “Effectively Main- tained Inequality”; and Raftery and Hout, “Maximally Maintained Inequality.” 22 Raftery and Hout, “Maximally Maintained Inequality.” 23 Lucas, “Effectively Maintained Inequality.” 24 Alba, Blurring the Color Line. 25 Stephen Steinberg, The Academic Melting Pot (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

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26 Nancy Foner, From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration (New Haven, Richard Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). Alba 27 Leonard Covello, The Social Background of the Italo-American School Child (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Little½eld, 1972). 28 Ibid. 29 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 1963). 30 Richard Alba, “The Twilight of Ethnicity among Americans of European Ancestry: The Case of Italians,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 8 (1985): 134–158, Table 1. 31 Steinberg, The Academic Melting Pot. 32 Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006). 33 Ibid. 34 Steinberg, The Academic Melting Pot; Morton Keller and Phyllis Keller, Making Harvard Modern: The Rise of America’s University (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 35 Alba, Blurring the Color Line. 36 Jennifer Rice, Teacher Quality: Understanding the Effectiveness of Teacher Attributes (Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 2003). 37 For example, Sean Corcoran, William Evans, and Robert Schwab, “Women, the Labor Market, and the Declining Quality of Teachers,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23 (2004): 449–470. 38 Pasi Sahlberg, Finnish Lessons: What Can the World Learn from Educational Change in Finland? (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011). 39 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). See also Ceri Peach, “Does Britain Have Ghettos?” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 22 (1996): 216–235; and Sean Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, “Income Inequality and Income Segregation,” American Journal of Sociology 116 (2011): 1092–1153. 40Kasinitz et al., Inheriting the City. 41 Donald Hernandez, Nancy Denton, and Suzanne Macartney, “Early Childhood Education Programs: Accounting for Low Enrollment in Immigrant and Minority Families,” in The Next Generation, ed. Alba and Waters; and Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Immigrants Raising Citizens: Undocumented Parents and Their Young Children (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011). 42 Douglas Downey, Paul von Hippel, and Beckett Broh, “Are Schools the Great Equalizer? Cognitive Inequality during the Summer Months and the School Year,” American Sociological Review 69 (2004): 613–635. 43 Min Zhou, “How Neighborhoods Matter for Immigrant Children: The Formation of Edu- cational Resources in Chinatown, Koreatown, and Pico Union, Los Angeles,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35 (2009): 1153–1179. 44 Crul et al., “Educating the Children of Immigrants in Old and New Amsterdam.”

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Modernization for Emigration: Determinants & Consequences of the Brain Drain

Alejandro Portes & Adrienne Celaya

Abstract: This essay reviews existing theories of professional emigration as background to examine the present situation. Classical theories of the brain drain neglected the possibility that immigrant professionals would return to their home countries and make signi½cant investments and economic contributions there. They do, in fact, with bene½cial consequences for the development of these countries. The advent of the transnational perspective in the ½eld of immigration has helped clarify these dynamics, while identifying the conditions under which professional cyclical returns and knowledge transfers can take place. Implications for the future attraction of foreign professionals by the United States and other advanced countries are discussed.

The migration of professionals and technicians from poorer countries to the developed world has received considerable attention from governments, industry, and academia, less because of the number of immigrants involved than because of the economic and cultural consequences of such flows. Dubbed “brain drain,” the movement of high human capital immigrants has traditionally been de½ned as a net loss for sending nations that spend scarce resources providing advanced training for their cit- ALEJANDRO PORTES, a Fellow izens, only to lose them to opportunities abroad of the American Academy since after they have earned the necessary credentials. 1998, is the Howard Harrison and But due to new theories of migration and new Gabrielle Snyder Beck Professor of facts on the ground, this view has become consid- Sociology at Princeton University. erably more nuanced in recent years. The traditional ADRIENNE CELAYA is a Ph.D. characterization of the brain drain relies on a sim- candidate in the Department of pli½ed view of migration as a one-way process in Sociology at the University of which migrants leave to pursue a new life in the Miami. wealthier receiving countries, never to look back. (*See endnotes for complete contributor On the contrary, recent evidence reveals a two-way biographies.) and, sometimes, multidirectional traf½c between

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migrants’ origins and their new destina- nates in countries of the global South and Alejandro tions, giving rise to novel conceptualiza- is directed toward the advanced North; Portes & Adrienne tions of the process. Countries long but empirical support for push-pull theory Celaya regarded as labor exporters, and hence ends there. If “differentials of advantage” victims of the brain drain, have therefore calculated on an individualistic basis come to bene½t from such flows in previ- were the principal determinant of this ously unexpected ways. type of flow, professionals from the poorest Traditional destinations for this type of countries would be best represented, at migration have also recently started to least relative to their home country’s diversify, reflecting shifts in the global worker population. This is not the case. economic system. The relative decline of Highly skilled migrants often originate the United States and the rapid rise of in middle-income countries such as other large nations, such as China, have Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey, led to the partial rechanneling of high- and even in relatively high-income coun- end labor flows and the emergence of new tries, such as Israel and Canada.2 More- temporary and cyclical migratory move- over, only a minority of similarly trained ments. In this essay, we review the evolu- professionals in countries of out-migration tion of theories of the brain drain to create actually undertake the journey. Because a framework for examining empirical all persons with comparable training and evidence about the evolution of these skills are supposedly affected by the same flows, as well as their signi½cance for both push-pull forces and cost-bene½t calcula- the countries involved and the migrants tions, it stands to reason that many more themselves. would leave due to the decisive advantages of migration. Empirical evidence contra- The classical theory of international dicts this prediction. migration focuses on the joint “push” from The poor predictive record of push-pull places of origin and “pull” from immigrant theory and the associated economistic destinations; the cost-bene½t approach calculus has progressively relegated this of neoclassical economics is closely asso- approach to the status of metaphor, used ciated with this theory. Both theories are to describe ex post facto the reasons for individualistic and rational, predicting particular flows but incapable of antici- migration according to differentials of pating them. Neo-Marxist-inspired struc- advantage in receiving countries. Early tural theories are at the opposite end of analyses of transatlantic migrations, such the analytic continuum, explaining the as economist Brinley Thomas’s classic brain drain through the “core powers” of study, made ample use of the push-pull the global system, whose institutions framework. More recently, economist increasingly penetrate into the periphery. George Borjas has advanced an elaborate This penetration takes the form of not cost-bene½t approach to labor migration only diffusion of modern consumption based on the wage gap between sending standards, but also modern educational and receiving destinations, multiplied by and scienti½c practices and modes of the probability of securing a job upon institutional organization. Consequently, arrival, minus the costs of the journey.1 multinational corporations from the Yet these theories do not adequately advanced countries conquer the “heights” explain the migration patterns of highly of peripheral economies, while the edu- skilled immigrants. Broadly speaking, it cational and training systems in weaker is true that this type of migration origi- economies increasingly imitate those

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Determi - developed in economically advanced Professionals who secure relatively well- nants & countries.3 remunerated positions and who use the Conse - quences Because they are the most motivated to skills acquired during their training rarely of the “catch up” with the advanced world and migrate. On the contrary, those who can- Brain Drain possess the resources to copy its educa- not access incomes that provide a middle- tional practices, countries at mid-levels class lifestyle, according to the standards of development are particularly suscepti- of their own country, or who are threat- ble to this effect.4 The outcome is that ened with early obsolescence in their ca- young professionals in peripheral coun- reers, have every motivation to leave. Put tries commonly ½nd themselves with differently, the relevant point of refer- advanced scienti½c and technical training, ence is not the invidious comparison with but without opportunities to put their the incomes and work standards of ½rst educations into practice, given the limited world professionals, but with the internal demand in their respective labor markets. conditions of the sending countries. When shortages of trained workers in A second theory used to predict who their particular ½elds materialize in ad- migrates is grounded on the concepts of vanced countries, these professionals social capital, social networks, and path provide a ready supply. This syndrome, dependence.7 Once a few pioneers have dubbed “modernization for emigration,” successfully migrated, overcoming the is portrayed in Figure 1. economic constraints of their home Macro-structural theories explain why country, the risks and costs for other professional emigration originates in mid- would-be migrants are signi½cantly re- income countries, but they, too, fail to duced. This is because social networks differentiate migrants from non-migrants. convey the necessary information: how If all young professionals in a country are to apply for a job, what tests must be exposed to the same modernization syn- passed, how to negotiate work conditions, drome, it is unclear why only a minority where to live, and what to guard against. actually undertake the journey. It is cer- Pioneering migrants must confront these tainly true that the structural imbalance hurdles on their own, while their coun- of peripheral nations–a result of the terparts back home gain “social capital” interests of corporations and institutions through access to this migration-relevant from the advanced world–creates the information.8 conditions for such flows to begin. How- Over time, social networks can lead to ever, more grounded theory is required to a self-sustaining flow of migrants. As more explain who actually migrates. One such and more professionals move abroad, the theory, dubbed the “new economics of costs of migration for those left behind migration,” relies heavily on the concept are concomitantly reduced. Additionally, of “relative deprivation” to explain the relative deprivation–previously con½ned causes of out-migration from rural com- to internal conditions in the country of munities in countries like Mexico.5 In the origin–becomes externalized as stay-at- case of professional migrants, relative home professionals begin to assess their deprivation has also been found to be a incomes and work conditions in relation powerful motivating force. Generally, the to their fellow nationals abroad. Through relevant comparison is not between pro- these forces, out-migration may become fessional migrants and foreign profes- normative, considered the “thing to do” sionals, but between workers of the same by young professionals who do not want nationality in the same country.6 to fall behind their peers. At this point,

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Figure 1 Alejandro Determinants of the Brain Drain Portes & Adrienne Celaya

Source: Figure created by authors.

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Determi - migration turns path dependent as it is increases with length of time in the host nants & transformed into an expected behavior in society, security of legal residence, and eco- Conse - 9 12 quences the professional community. nomic status. This ½nding runs contrary of the Path-dependent migration represents to classic assimilation theories that would Brain Drain the ½nal stage of the process through regard such transnational contacts as a which the “modernization for emigration” short-lived “passing phase” of immigrant syndrome is actualized. But for various adaptation.13 In fact, the more secure and reasons, this stage is not always reached. occupationally successful migrants are, the One explanation is that as governments readier they are to take part in transna- and home country institutions ½ght to tional organizations and invest in enter- retain their high-skilled workforce, the prises in their country of origin. salaries and working conditions in sending Empirical literature has only recently countries improve. A second explanation begun to clarify the variables that de½ne is that the saturation of demand for foreign the character of immigrant engagement professionals in receiving countries sig - with their home countries. Still, the advent ni½cantly raises the barrier for successful of the transnational perspective has pro- migration. And ½nally, the return of mi- vided a novel lens to analyze what had grant professionals to their home coun- previously been viewed as a one-way flow. tries and the subsequent social and eco- By the same token, the transnational per- nomic changes they spur may also obstruct spective calls attention to entirely different sustained path-dependent migration.10 social dynamics, with consequences for Theories of professional migration have both places of origin and destination. concentrated so far on the departure of skilled workers, not on the likelihood of Most theories on the origins and con- their return. This explains why the sequences of the brain drain have fea- process, as outlined in Figure 1, culmi- tured U.S.-bound professional flows as nates in a net drain of talent for countries their main empirical referent. This is of origin. More recent theories have called largely because the United States has attention to the fact that international been the principal magnet of this type of migrants seldom leave for good. Advance- migration in the postwar era. A preference ments in communication and transporta- category of the U.S. visa allocation system tion technologies have made cross-border is reserved for “priority workers with relationships easier to maintain.11 This advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional new transnational perspective extends and ability.” This category provided, until corrects the structural unbalancing theory recently, the main entry channel for this presented in Figure 1 by adding a number type of high-skill immigrant. In 2002, for of signi½cant causal arrows. As applied to example, 34,452 “persons of extraordinary labor migrants, the emerging transna- ability” and “outstanding researchers” and tional perspective is represented in Fig- their kin, plus an additional 44,468 pro- ure 2. And in the case of professionals, fessionals holding advanced degrees and this perspective must be supplemented their families, were admitted for perma- by the signi½cant knowledge transfers nent residence. In 2010, despite the drop that, in addition to money remittances, in employment due to the recession, the these migrants generate. ½gures were similar: 41,050 “priority The literature supporting the transna- workers” plus 53,946 professionals with tional perspective has also uncovered that advanced degrees, or “aliens of exceptional migrant participation in these processes ability,” were admitted to the United States

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Figure 2 Alejandro The Process of Immigrant Transnationalism Portes & Adrienne Celaya

Source: Figure created by authors.

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Determi - or had their status adjusted to permanent constitute the other extreme with regard nants & residence.14 to temporality of migration. This new Conse - quences Although, in relative terms, employ- category, created by the 1990 Immigration of the ment-related immigration has represented Act and expanded thereafter, has become Brain Drain only about 13 percent of the total legal the principal conduit for the arrival of flow, it has been the main source of highly tens of thousands of foreign engineers, trained foreign workers in the American computer programmers, and medical labor force. Tens of thousands of immi- personnel on temporary labor contracts. grant physicians, nurses, engineers, and The H1-B visa is granted for a three-year scientists have arrived through this chan- period and may be renewed for an addi- nel, fueling the growth of diverse sectors tional three years. The annual ceiling for of the U.S. economy. Their presence petitions of the visa was originally set at helps explain why about one-quarter of 65,000; it was increased to 115,000 in 1999, the U.S. foreign-born population is made and then raised to 195,000 in 2001–2003 up of college graduates and postgradu- under the American Competitiveness for ates, and why roughly one-quarter of all the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21). foreign-born workers are in managerial or There were 197,357 bene½ciaries of the professional-specialty occupations.15 H1-B visa in 2002. In the same year, the Foreign professionals are not the only total number of “temporary workers and population to bene½t from the preference trainees” reached 582,250.19 categories of the American immigration While the cap on H1-B visas reverted to system; political refugees have also mi- 65,000 in 2004, the actual number of ben - grated to the United States in signi½cant e½ciaries exceeded several times that numbers. During the Cold War, the United ½gure because professionals coming to States uniformly admitted refugees escap- work for nonpro½t colleges and universi- ing from Communist regimes. This policy ties and government agencies were ex - translated into the arrival of thousands of empted from the cap, and renewals are not educated and formerly prosperous persons counted in the quota. Thus in 2009, more fleeing Marxist takeovers of their home than 214,000 H1-B petitions were granted. countries. Practically the entire Cuban up- Reflecting the economic recession, this per and middle classes left for the United ½gure represented a 22 percent decline States in the aftermath of Castro’s revolu- from the previous year, but it was still far tion.16 This pattern repeated itself in Viet- ahead of the original quota. Fiscal year nam twenty years later.17 Following the 2009 was the ½rst year of the decade in collapse of the Soviet Union, the annual which H1-Bvisas did not exceed 250,000.20 refugee flow has included signi½cant As shown in Table 1, professional im- numbers of university-educated Iranians, migrants originate overwhelmingly in Iraqis, and Bosnians. In 2010, more than Asia, speci½cally in India. Just as Mexico 73,000 refugees were admitted to the has become the main supplier of unskilled United States, including over 16,500 Bosni- and semi-skilled labor for the American ans, 18,000 Iraqis, and close to 5,000 Ira- economy, India has pride of place as the nians.18 Unlike other immigrants, refugees source of highly skilled professionals and are typically barred from returning home, technicians. As seen in Table 1, almost 99 and hence they tend to settle permanently percent of H1-B migrants possess a bach- in the receiving country. elor’s degree or higher. Their occupational Professional and technical specialty skills concentrate primarily in computer- workers arriving under the H1-B program related ½elds and, secondarily, in archi-

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Table 1 Alejandro The U.S. H1-B Program, 2008–2009 Portes & Adrienne Celaya

Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Characteristics of H1-B Specialty Occupation Workers– Fiscal Year 2009 Report” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 2010).

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Determi - tecture and engineering. Average annual As noted, traditional theories of the nants & incomes exceed $70,000, ranging from brain drain erroneously overlook the ten- Conse - quences $55,000 for college instructors and other dency of immigrants to remain in close of the educational personnel to close to $90,000 contact with their home countries. Like Brain Drain for medical and health professionals. the classical theory of assimilation, the Though reasonable, these salary ½gures theoretical cousin of these theories, the are not particularly high for university- orthodox portrayal of professional migra- trained professionals. Herein lies one of tion assumes that once these individuals the principal advantages of this type of leave their countries, they never look migrant for the ½rms and institutions back. Yet, as seen above, the longer that that hire them: namely, they allow em - adult immigrants live abroad and the bet- ployers to depress compensation for highly ter established they become, the more skilled personnel in high demand. Pre- likely they are to involve themselves in dictably, the principal industries bene½ting the development of their home nations. from this flow are computer systems As a result, countries like India and China, design companies, architecture and engi- once seen as the principal “victims” of the neering ½rms, and colleges and universi- brain drain, have become the principal ties. While H1-B visas are granted for a bene½ciaries of a return flow. This return maximum of six years, there is evidence has fueled remarkable and unanticipated that many of these professionals manage technological and economic develop- to gain permanent residence.21 ment in the migrants’ home countries. The situation portrayed so far by these These two-way flows have been charac- ½gures conforms, in all its essentials, to terized by two features. First, as AnnaLee that predicted by brain drain theory. Saxenian, one of the ½rst scholars to study Developed countries, in particular the the phenomenon, has noted, the transna- United States, bene½t year-by-year from tional activities of return professionals a steady flow of highly skilled personnel have consequences that go well beyond trained in educational institutions of the those of the remittances and philanthropic less developed world, often at public contributions of manual labor migrants: expense. In principle, the movement rep- By promoting the development of local resents a major net transfer of resources capabilities in Tel Aviv, Hsinchu, Shanghai, from the poor to the rich. The reality, how - Bangalore, and other technology clusters, ever, is more complex. while also collaborating with entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, the new “Argonauts” * * * have initiated a process of transformation Immigrant technologists–often the best that is shifting the global balance of eco- and brightest from their home countries– nomic and technological resources.23 integrated themselves into local economies. Put differently, return professional mi- . . . By extending their social networks to gration possesses both structural importance their home countries, they have transfor the home economies and signi½cant planted the relationships of technology change potential for the sending and receiv - entrepreneurship and are reshaping global ing nations. This potential is greater in technological competition. home countries because it can alter both –AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts22 their value systems and their skill reper- toires, though it also can affect the institutional framework that supports tech-

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nological entrepreneurship in the host The case of refugees represents a par- Alejandro countries.24 Second, the investments and tial exception to the transnational trend Portes & Adrienne knowledge transfers of transnational en - among expatriate professionals. Com- Celaya trepreneurs (whom Saxenian labels “new munication with and investment in home Argonauts”) can be achieved without countries are commonly blocked by rea- migrants leaving the host country or giv- son of refugees’ opposition to the domi- ing up legal residence in it. The typical nant regime. Their case may be labeled response to traditional analyses of the “blocked transnationalism” because, de- brain drain has been to recommend that spite their skills and resources, they are sending nations try to repatriate their prevented (or prevent themselves) from skilled professionals living abroad. But engaging in these kinds of activities for because sending countries can seldom political reasons.26 While exceptions to compete with the salaries or working this pattern have been identi½ed, nations conditions attained by expatriates, this that compel their educated citizens to solution has rarely worked. flee effectively lose the signi½cant devel- On the contrary, the transnational per- opmental effects associated with trans - spective highlights the key point that national activities elsewhere. immigrant professionals can, if they so choose, convert permanent migration into The pioneering work of Saxenian has a cyclical migration pattern through use of been followed by a bourgeoning litera- new communication and transportation ture that describes the current situation technologies. Indian engineers in Silicon in different exporting and receiving Valley, Chinese software programmers in nations. Countries of sub-Saharan Africa Boston, and Filipino doctors everywhere are in the worst situation because their can continue living and working in the emigrant professionals seldom return. United States while conducting a steady Medical professionals from this region stream of exchanges and investment leave for Canada, the United States, and activities in their own countries. This is a Western Europe. One study estimates that direct reflection, at the personal level, of over the span of a decade, poor African the compression of space achieved through countries lost $2.17 billion in training these new technologies, and of an increasingly emigrant professionals.27 Public health interconnected global system.25 scholars Sumit Oberoi and Vivian Lin Although the main intent of the U.S. have studied the motivations for migra- H1-B program has been to increase labor tion by medical personnel in Southern flexibility for American high technology Africa. They found that poor working con- ½rms and educational institutions, an un- ditions, lack of job satisfaction, and the anticipated consequence has been to prevalence of HIV/AIDS are the dominant reinforce the flow of transnational com- push factors that fuel the flow of doctors munication. The expectation of returning and other medical personnel to Australia.28 home after a few years, whether or not it Albania is in a similar situation, losing materializes, keeps migrant professionals an estimated 50 percent of its trained ½rmly connected to events and social net- labor force to Germany, Italy, and other works back home. It is not necessary for European countries, with no prospects of H1-B migrants to rebuild transnational return. Conversely, Slovenia has bene½ted connections after residing abroad because from signi½cant return migration and they never severed such links to begin transnational exchanges from its profes- with. sionals in the United Kingdom.29 Asian

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Determi - countries have been able not only to selves, expatriate communities are able, nants & stimulate visits and investments from at best, to sponsor philanthropic projects Conse - 32 quences their expatriates but, in some instances, in their places of origin. Targeted invest - of the to attract flows of professionals from ments and systematic transfers of scien- Brain Drain other countries. This is the case of Singa- ti½c and technological know-how require pore, which now successfully competes synergy between professionals abroad with the United States and Western and home country institutions. An ef½- Europe for foreign talent in science and cient and proactive state is a necessary engineering.30 condition for creating and sustaining the Sociologist Lynne Zucker and econo- institutions that will help place the country mist Michael Darby have provided quan- on the path of continued development.33 titative evidence that the “brain exchange” has bene½ted China’s economy. In their The United States continues to be the longitudinal study of 5,401 “star scien- principal bene½ciary of international tal- tists,” followed over a twenty-three-year ent flows, but in an increasingly multipolar period (1981 to 2004), Zucker and Darby world, other countries are challenging its found ample evidence of return migration, hegemony. Some authors have voiced both temporary and permanent, from the alarm at the rapid loss of American com- United States, as well as investments and petitiveness given the flexibility of entry managerial participation in high-tech requirements in other receiving nations industries in China.31 The diverse experi- and the dif½culty of gaining permanent ences of brain drain, brain gain, and brain residency in the United States. A Brook- exchange all converge on the same point: ings Institution report concludes that for expatriate professionals to contribute signi½cantly to their home countries’ To stay competitive, the United States development, there must be something must institute more of an open-door policy to return to. In other words, there must to attract unique talents from other nations. be a minimum of scienti½c and techno- Yet Americans resist such a policy despite their own immigrant histories and the sub- logical infrastructure capable of receiving 34 and putting to use the immigrants’ con- stantial bene½ts of welcoming newcomers. tributions in know-how and investment Given the flexibility of the H1-B pro- capital. Slovenia, like the much larger India gram, these comments refer primarily to and China, possesses such infrastructure; the dif½culties of shifting from temporary Albania and the countries of sub-Saharan to permanent visas and from student visas Africa do not. This common lesson also to temporary residence and work per- points to a path-dependent process lead- mits. The requirement that foreign stu- ing to both vicious and virtuous circles. dents must return to their countries of Poorer countries devoid of basic scien- origin after completing their degrees has ti½c facilities and equipment are victims the laudable purpose of stopping the brain of a brain drain that feeds on itself. At the drain from these nations, helping them opposite end, nations with a proactive state regain access to their pool of young pro- capable of providing the necessary infra- fessionals. At the same time, the require- structure and enticing the activities and ment leads to a signi½cant loss of talent investments of their expatriates can ben - for the United States, at a time when its e½t mightily from the transnational flow. competitors have no such qualms about In other words, unaided free markets retaining skilled migrants. Canada’s point work no magic in this ½eld. Left to them- system, the European Union’s blue card,

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and the United Kingdom’s new point tional exchanges in science and technology Alejandro scheme have all increased their competi- when immigrant professionals, secure in Portes & Adrienne tiveness in the quest for high-powered their legal status, communicate freely Celaya scientists and professionals. Technological with their counterparts at home and else- growth poles in China, such as Shanghai, where. These synergies not only underlie are attracting not only returned Chinese the “brain gain” for sending nations, but scientists and engineers but, increasingly, redound to the bene½t of the United States those from other countries as well.35 by creating an attractive environment for Embracing a transnational lens would other migrants. add flexibility to the present American To achieve this purpose, the cumber- immigration system by highlighting the some, even humiliating current processes mobility of highly skilled immigrants. It of adjusting to permanent legal status or would clearly demonstrate that those obtaining a residence visa under the oc - granted permanent resident visas do not cupational preferences categories of the necessarily stay permanently, and those law must be streamlined, and the two- who return home do not necessarily settle way flows of information and investments there for good. On the contrary, a great with source countries must be facilitated. deal of back-and-forth movement can be To retain its position at the lead of the expected, as talented individuals explore global economy, the United States must opportunities distributed unequally in adopt a policy toward highly skilled im - space. To stay competitive, U.S. policy migration that is as flexible as the reali- should reflect the synergies of transna- ties on the ground have become.

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: ALEJANDRO PORTES, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1998, is the Howard Harrison and Gabrielle Snyder Beck Professor of Sociology at Princeton Uni- versity. His publications include Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry (2010), Immigrant America: A Portrait (with Rubén Rumbaut; 3rd ed., 2006), and Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (with Rubén Rumbaut, 2001). ADRIENNE CELAYA is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Miami. Her research interests include race and the criminal justice system, intimate partner violence, family violence lethality, and Latino/immigrant violence. 1 Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); and George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Door: Immi- gration Policy and the American Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 2 Enrique Oteiza, “La Migracion de Profesionales, Technicos y Obreros Cali½cados Argentinos a los Estados Unidos,” Desarrollo Economico 10 (1971): 429–454; Alejandro Portes, “Deter- minants of the Brain Drain,” International Migration Review 10 (1976): 489–508; Rafael Alarcon, “Recruitment Processes Among Foreign-Born Engineers and Scientists in Silicon Valley,” American Behavioral Scientist 42 (1999): 1381–1397; and Steven J. Gold, “Transnationalism and Vocabularies of Motive in International Migration: The Case of Israelis in the United States,” Sociological Perspectives 40 (1997): 409–427. 3 John Meyer and Richard Rubinson, “The World Educational Revolution, 1950–1970,” Sociology of Education 50 (1977): 242–258; John Meyer and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980,” Sociology of Education 65 (1992): 128–149; Alejandro Portes and Adreain R. Ross, “Modernization for Emigration: The Medical Brain Drain from

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Determi - Argentina,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13 (1976): 395–422; and Saskia nants & Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow Conse - (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). quences of the 4 Nilda Sito and Luis Stuhlman, “La Emigración de Cienti½cos de la Argentina,” a working Brain paper, Fundación Bariloche, October 1968; Alarcon, “Recruitment Processes”; and Michel Drain Beine, Frederic Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport, “Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers,” The Economic Journal 118 (2008): 631–652. 5 Oded Stark, “Migration Decision Making,” Journal of Development Economics 14 (1984): 251–259; Oded Stark, The Migration of Labour (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Douglas S. Massey, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migra- tion,” Population Index 56 (1990): 3–26; and Douglas S. Massey and Nancy Denton, “What’s Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 102 (1997): 939–999. 6 Portes, “Determinants of the Brain Drain”; and Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Sidney Weintraub, Migration, Remittances, and Small Business Development, Mexico and Caribbean Basin Countries (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). 7 Grace M. Anderson, Networks of Contact: The Portuguese in Toronto (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1974); Charles Tilly, “Transplanted Networks,” in Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics, ed. Virginia Yans-McLauglin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 79–95; and Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 8 Douglas S. Massey and Felipe García España, “The Social Process of International Migration,” Science 237 (1987): 733–738; and Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, “Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1320–1350. 9 Oteiza, “La Migracion de Profesionales”; Thomas Straubhaar and Martin R. Wolburg, “Brain Drain and Brain Gain in Europe: An Evaluation of the East-European Migration to Ger- many,” Journal of Economics and Statistics 218 (1999): 574–604; and Sumit S. Oberoi and Vivian Lin, “Brain Drain of Doctors from Southern Africa: Brain Gain for Australia,” Australian Health Review 30 (2006): 25–33. 10 Alejandro Portes, “Migration, Development, and Segmented Assimilation: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610 (2007): 73–97; AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 1999); and Min Zhou, “Revisiting Ethnic Entrepre- neurship: Convergencies, Controversies, and Conceptual Advancements,” International Migration Review 38 (2004): 1040–1074. 11 Luis E. Guarnizo, “The Rise of Transnational Social Formations: Mexican and Dominican State Responses to Transnational Migration,” Political Power and Social Theory 12 (1998): 45–94; Luis E. Guarnizo, “The Economics of Transnational Living,” International Migration Review 37 (2003): 666–699; and Peggy Levitt, “Transnational Migration: Taking Stock and Future Directions,” Global Networks 1 (2001): 195–216. 12 Alejandro Portes, William Haller, and Luis E. Guarnizo, “Transnational Entrepreneurs: An Alternative Form of Immigrant Adaptation,” American Sociological Review 67 (2002): 278–298; Luis E. Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William J. Haller, “Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Immigrants,” American Journal of Sociology 108 (2003): 1211–1248; and Jose Itzigsohn and Silvia G. Saucido, “Immigrant Incorporation and Sociocultural Transnationalism,” Interna- tional Migration Review 36 (2002): 766–798. 13 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the

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American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Alejandro University Press, 2003). Portes & Adrienne 14 Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2003 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Celaya Homeland Security); and Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2011 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security), Table 6. 15 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 American Community Survey, “Pro½les of the Population of the United States–One-Year Estimates,” http://www.census.gov/acs/www/. 16 Lisandro Perez, “Cuban Miami,” in Miami Now, ed. Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992), 83–108; Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Alejandro Portes and Steven Shafer, “Revisiting the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty- Five Years Later,” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 25 (2007): 157–190. 17 Min Zhou, “Straddling Different Worlds: The Acculturation of Vietnamese Refugee Chil- dren,” in Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, ed. Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (Berkeley and New York: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 187–227. 18 Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security), Table 14. 19 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2009 Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid; and Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs. 22 AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 14. 23 Ibid. 24 For a discussion and analysis of the differences between structural importance and change potential of immigrant flows, see Alejandro Portes, “Migration and Social Change: Some Conceptual Reflections,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (2010): 1537–1563. 25 Guarnizo, “The Rise of Transnational Social Formations”; Peggy Levitt, “Transnationalizing Community Development: The Case of Migration between Boston and the Dominican Republic,” Voluntary Sector Quarterly 26 (1997): 509–526; and Steven Vertovec, “Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation,” International Migration Review 38 (2004): 970–1001. 26 Min Zhou and Carl Bankston, Growing up American: How Vietnamese Immigrants Adapt to Life in the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998); Portes, “Migration, Devel- opment, and Segmented Assimilation”; and Jennifer Huynh, “Vietnamese Transnational Organizations and Development,” ½nal report to the International Research Network on Immigrant Organizations and Development, Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University, April 2012. 27 Tikki Pang, Mary Ann Lansang, and Andy Haines, “Brain Drain and Health Professionals: A Global Problem Needs Global Solutions,” British Medical Journal 324 (2002): 599–600. 28 Oberoi and Lin, “Brain Drain of Doctors from Southern Africa.” 29 Centre for Social and Economic Studies, in collaboration with the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, University of Sussex, U.K., “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Mobilizing Albania’s Skilled Diaspora,” policy paper prepared for the Government of Albania, April 2006. 30 Linda Low, “Population Movement in the Asia Paci½c Region: Singapore Perspective,” The International Migration Review 29 (1995): 745–764; and Chris Gafner and Stephen Yale-

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Determi - Loehr, “Attracting the Best and Brightest: A Critique of the Current U.S. Immigration System,” nants & Fordham Urban Law Journal 38 (2010): 185–215. Conse - quences 31 Lynne G. Zucker and Michael R. Darby, “Star Scientists, Innovation, and Regional and of the National Immigration,” Social Science Research Network (2007), doi:10.2139/ssrn.1001112. Brain 32 Drain Patricia Landolt, “Salvadoran Economic Transnationalism: Embedded Strategies for House- hold Maintenance, Immigrant Incorporation, and Entrepreneurial Expansion,” Global Networks 1 (2000): 217–242; and Guarnizo, “The Economics of Transnational Living.” 33 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Dani Rodrik, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them,” Studies in Comparative International Development 35 (2000): 3–31; and Alejandro Portes and Lori D. Smith, “Institutions and Development in Latin Amer - ica: A Comparative Study,” Studies in Comparative and International Development 43 (2008): 101–128. 34 Darrell M. West, Brain Gain: Rethinking U.S. Immigration Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1. 35 Gafner and Yale-Loehr, “Attracting the Best and Brightest”; and Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The Eagle and the Dragon: Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development in China and Mexico,” Population and Development Review 38 (June 2012): 191–220.

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The Illegality Trap: The Politics of Immigration & the Lens of Illegality

Michael Jones-Correa & Els de Graauw

Abstract: The focus on undocumented immigrants in contemporary U.S. immigration debates, often at the expense of other immigration issues, has led to an illegality trap. This situation has serious negative consequences for both U.S. immigration policy and immigrants, including an overwhelming emphasis on enforcement; legislative gridlock and the failure of comprehensive immigration reform; constitutional conflict resulting from tensions between national, state, and local approaches to dealing with undocumented immigration; and the puzzling absence of federal policies addressing immigrant integration. This essay argues for a reframing of “illegality” as a contingent rather than categorical status, building on the insights of Plyler v. Doe and notions of implied contract and attachment to U.S. society. Doing so, we contend, will shift the terms of the immigration debate, enabling more fruitful policy discussions about both immigration and immigrant integration.

Americans have disagreed about immigration since the founding of the republic. What is curious about the contemporary immigration debate, however, is the degree to which it is focused on “illegal” immigrants. The heated rhetoric and deep partisan divisions over undocumented immigration dis- guise the fact that there is a durable and broad- based consensus about legal migration to the United States, dating back to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. The key provisions of the 1965 act– MICHAEL JONES-CORREA is Pro- equal quotas by country and region and a commit- fessor of Government at Cornell ment to family reuni½cation–still guide the federal University. government’s decisions about whom to admit to ELS DE GRAAUW is Assistant the country as legal migrants. However, the current Professor of Political Science at debate obscures this underlying consensus and Baruch College at the City Univer- instead focuses on the conundrum of undocumented sity of New York. migrants currently living in the United States. This (*See endnotes for complete contributor emphasis is ultimately dysfunctional for immigra- biographies.) tion policy and detrimental to the incorporation of

The Politics immigrants as residents and citizens of icy activism around the issue of undocu- of Immi- the United States. mented immigration; and 4) the puzzling gration & the Lens of There are an estimated 11.1 million un- absence of federal policies devoted to Illegality documented migrants living in the United immigrant integration. The essay con- States, up from an estimated 1.9 million cludes by looking again at how discus- in 1988.1 The majority, 59 percent, are sions of immigration in the United States from Mexico, with the majority of the have been trapped by the illegality frame, remainder coming from other Latin and how it might be possible to get out of American countries.2 These migrants it. We propose that reframing “illegality” either overstayed legal visas for tourism, as a contingent rather than categorical study, or temporary work or entered the status will enable more fruitful policy country clandestinely, often by crossing discussions about immigration and im - the U.S.-Mexico border. While their migrant integration. numbers are signi½cant, undocumented migrants make up only one in four for- Immigrants who enter the United States eign-born residents in the United States. without documentation or who overstay In 2010, the United States counted almost temporary visas are often referred to, in 40 million foreign-born residents, up contemporary popular discourse, as from 19.8 million in 1990, including 17.5 “illegals.” In this discourse, illegality is million naturalized immigrants.3 All taken as self-evident, as echoed in the together, legal immigrants now make up rhetorical question brandished by immi- 71 percent of all immigrants to the United gration opponents: “What part of ‘illegal’ States, with 44 percent of all foreign-born don’t you understand?”4 In reality, how- residents having acquired U.S. citizen- ever, illegality is far from self-evident ship. Given these statistics, it is curious because it is as much a political category that debates about immigration and its as a legal status. Since the late nineteenth effects on the United States have been century, a series of government policies driven by the minority of immigrants and practices have constructed and sub- deemed “illegal.” sequently modi½ed the category of “illegal The single-minded focus on undocu- immigrants,” in the process deepening mented immigration in the contempo- the division between “illegal” immigrants rary immigration debate, and the inability and their legal counterparts.5 to shift this focus, is what we term the Through much of the nation’s early illegality trap. This essay begins with a dis- history, “illegal” immigrants were counted cussion of how illegality is framed in alongside other migrants entering the public and political discourse, and how it country through formal ports of entry.6 became subsequently problematized in Only in 1891, following the creation of politics and policy-making. We then the Of½ce of the Superintendent of address how the focus on “illegal” immi- Immigration and the formalization of an gration has produced serious negative entry process under federal auspices to consequences for both U.S. immigration screen out undesirable immigrants, did policy and immigrants alike, resulting in: illegal immigrants emerge as a distinct 1) an overwhelming emphasis on en - category of persons residing in the United forcement; 2) legislative gridlock leading States without permission.7 However, to the failure of comprehensive immigra- undocumented immigrants had not yet tion reform; 3) constitutional conflict been problematized as a political issue. resulting from greater state and local pol- Federal immigration of½cials paid little

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attention to land borders until the 1920s, States, most of them from Mexico, had Michael and circular migration–including that of grown substantially, making illegal im- Jones- Correa & individuals crossing the U.S.-Mexico migration a top political issue. A pro- Els de border without formal documentation– longed debate in Congress about how to Graauw continued to be tolerated by the govern- curb illegal immigration and what to do ment and was encouraged by agricultural with undocumented immigrants already interests reliant on migrant labor. Being in the country led to the passage of the undocumented, a civil violation rather 1986 Immigration Reform and Control than a criminal one, was a contingent sta- Act (irca). This law was expected to pro- tus that could be remedied, and undocu- vide a comprehensive solution to the mented immigrants had different avenues growing problem of undocumented im - to regularize their status.8 migration by providing for increased Legislative changes during the second border control and employer sanctions to half of the twentieth century hardened curb illegal immigration, as well as a one- the boundaries of illegality and reduced time amnesty for undocumented immi- the pathways to legalization. The Bracero grants who could prove their U.S. resi- Program, which since 1942 had allowed dence for eight or more years. Although Mexico and Caribbean countries to send more than 2.7 million undocumented millions of temporary migrants to ½ll U.S. immigrants, including 2.3 million from labor shortages, was terminated in 1964, Mexico, legalized their status under thereby ending of½cial recognition of cir- irca, the legislation did not address the cular migration.9 The 1965 Immigration underlying causes of illegal immigration, and Nationality Act again rewrote the and its ineffective enforcement mecha- rules of the game. Overall, the act liberal- nisms failed to curb undocumented ized immigration to the United States by immigration.11 Consequently, the undoc- removing the restrictive national-origins umented population continued to grow quotas that for four decades had bene½ted over the next three decades, further hard- immigrants from Western Europe and ening the political discourse around ille- by shifting to a system of family-based gality.12 migration. However, the act also intro- Laws enacted since the 1990s–which duced, for the ½rst time, overall limits have restricted immigrant admissions, and caps on immigration from the Western facilitated immigrant deportations, and Hemisphere, which proved particularly restricted immigrants’ access to employ- problematic for migration from Mexico. ment, housing, education, and social In a few short years, visa availability for welfare programs–further distinguished migrants from Mexico plummeted from “illegal” from legal immigrants.13 In 450,000 annual guest worker visas and an recent years, there has also been an unlimited number of residence visas to increased blurring of criminal and immi- just 20,000 visas for permanent resi- gration law, a phenomenon that some dence, with no legal guest worker program. legal scholars have referred to as “crim- Because incentives to migrate to the United migration.”14 While immigration laws States remained, these policy changes did are civil and their violation has histori- little to reduce net migration from Mexico: cally been a civil offense, the federal gov- they simply meant that most migrants ernment has increasingly pursued crimi- were now considered “illegal.”10 nal prosecution for individuals who enter By the early 1980s, the number of and reenter the United States without undocumented residents in the United documentation.

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The Politics In doing so, the federal government has enforcement initiatives or offer any alter- of Immi- contributed to the public misperception natives. gration & the Lens of that residing in the country without legal Administratively, every recent president Illegality documentation constitutes a crime, there- has focused on immigration enforcement. by making “illegal” immigrants an accept- During President Bill Clinton’s tenure ed target of all discussions about immi- between 1993 and 2001, the Border Patrol’s gration. It also casts undocumented im - budget tripled from $363 million to $1.1 migration as a valence issue, disliked by billion, and the number of agents stationed politicians of both parties, the media, on the Southwest border increased from and the electorate. This has made it in - 3,444 to 8,580.17 Under President George creasingly dif½cult to address the under- W. Bush, enforcement broadened its lying structural reasons for why undocu- focus to the country’s interior, executing mented immigration occurs, or to address high-pro½le workplace raids and neigh- illegal immigration in conjunction with borhood sweeps to round up unautho- legal immigration. The immigration de - rized immigrants, tracking down illegal bate has become trapped by the language fugitives who had ignored of½cials’ orders of illegality. to leave the United States, and implementing the controversial 287(g) program that The gradual hardening of the political authorized designated state and local discourse around illegality and the grow- police of½cials to perform federal immi- ing public dislike of illegal immigrants gration enforcement functions. The em- have given rise to a set of federal initia- phasis on internal enforcement endured tives that disproportionately focus on under President Barack Obama, although enforcement as the path to curb illegal the focus has shifted to targeting employ- immigration.15 Legislatively, Congress ers with I-9 audits, as well as the iden- enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform ti½cation and removal of dangerous and Immigrant Responsibility Act (iirira) crim inal aliens. Under President Obama, and the Antiterrorism and Effective federal immigration of½cials have con- Death Penalty Act (aedpa) in 1996. tinued to rely on state and local law en- These laws have expanded the categories forcement of½cials to apprehend undoc- of immigrants subject to deportation, umented residents for deportation, with restricted the ability of immigrants to the 287(g) program superseded by the appeal deportation, and increased the nationwide implementation of the Secure crimes for which immigrants could be Communities initiative in 2013. deported.16 Five years later, following Those who claim that these enforcement the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress initiatives have been successful point to enacted the usa patriot Act, which fur- the recent increase in the number of illegal ther restricted immigrants’ civil liberties immigrant removals from the United by creating new grounds for deportation States and the simultaneous drop in illegal and making it easier for federal of½cials immigrant border apprehensions. How- to detain foreign-born individuals sus- ever, those arguing that these initiatives pected of terrorist activities. The crimi- have failed instead point to the growth in nalization of immigration and the por- the undocumented population in the two trayal of undocumented immigrants as decades following the enactment of irca, dangerous criminals and threats to national from an estimated 1.9 million in 1988 to security have made it dif½cult for politi- an estimated 12.4 million in 2007.18 Given cians to speak out against immigration the increased costs and risks of crossing

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the U.S.-Mexico border, the federal en - tive proposals that did provide a path to Michael forcement initiatives pursued since the legalization for unauthorized immigrants, Jones- Correa & 1990s have had the unintended conse- including the Comprehensive Immigra- Els de quence of ending circular migration and tion Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611) and the Graauw increasing the number of undocumented Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act immigrants who have settled permanently of 2007 (S. 1348), also failed to pass. in the United States.19 The 2001 expira- While there is a push to introduce com- tion of Section 245(i) of the Immigration prehensive immigration reform legisla- and Nationality Act, which since 1994 had tion in 2013, disagreements about what to helped certain undocumented immigrants do about the millions of undocumented to adjust their status without leaving the residents in the United States remain so United States, further in creased the size deep-seated that Congress appears grid- of the settled undocumented population. locked over even smaller legislative ini- Despite evidence that the twenty-year tiatives that focus on legalizing only rise in the undocumented population in speci½c groups of unauthorized immi- the United States is a direct response to grants, such as students (dream Act) increased border enforcement and a lack and agricultural workers (agjobs). The of legalization opportunities, calls for an continued failure of attempts at compre- enforcement-only approach have grown hensive immigration reform is surprising only louder in recent years. given that opinion polls routinely ½nd that most Americans favor such legisla- The post-irca focus on illegality not tion as a practical solution to the problem only produced an immigration regime of unauthorized immigration, as do the biased toward enforcement, but also con- various interest groups–including labor tributed to the failure of recent congres- unions, immigrant rights groups, and sional endeavors to enact a new legaliza- business groups–tied to the Democratic tion program as part of a comprehensive and Republican Parties.21 Additionally, immigration reform package. In 2005, both Presidents Bush and Obama have while the U.S. Senate considered com- supported comprehensive immigration prehensive immigration reform proposals reform proposals that combine enforce- of its own, the U.S. House of Representa- ment, legalization, and changes to the tives acted ½rst, passing the Border Pro- visa system. tection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immi- This disconnect between public prefer- gration Control Act (H.R. 4437), an en- ences and immigration reform policy is forcement-only bill that sought to increase illustrative of the extent to which the border and interior enforcement, crimi- issues of illegality and immigration en- nalize undocumented immigrants and forcement have skewed the policy-making those who help them, and further restrict process. Conservative politicians are at due process rights for illegal immigrants. one end of the spectrum, strategically Widely perceived as draconian, H.R. backing a focus on enforcement that pre- 4437 catalyzed the largest street protests cludes discussion of any type of legaliza- in U.S. history. In the spring of 2006, an tion. A coalition of groups supporting estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million people partic- comprehensive immigration reform– ipated in peaceful rallies in more than 160 business groups, labor unions, civil liber- cities nationwide to oppose the House ties groups, and immigrant rights groups– bill.20 The Senate subsequently refused are at the other end of the spectrum, to consider the legislation, yet its alterna- struggling with the political valence of

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The Politics immigration issues. This coalition of im - government of½cials, in addition to fed- of Immi- migration reform supporters has found it eral authorities, have come to view immigration & the Lens of dif½cult to reach consensus about the gration primarily through the lens of ille- Illegality type of legalization program they support gality. and which undocumented immigrants The explosion in state and local immi- they believe deserve legalization. gration laws is, on the one hand, a consequence of the immigration quandary in Congress’ failure through the 2000s to the federal legislative sphere. On the enact a legislative ½x to the illegal immi- other, it has added yet another layer of gration problem has compelled state and political conflict, though now in the judi- local governments to ½ll the federal policy cial sphere. State and local laws address- void with their own immigration laws ing illegal immigration have produced and ordinances. State legislative activity constitutional conundrums and conse- increased more than ½vefold between quently have triggered legal challenges 2005, when legislatures in 25 states con- invoking the preemption and supremacy sidered approximately 300 immigration- clauses of the Constitution under which related bills and enacted 39 of them, and immigration policy has traditionally been 2011, when state legislators introduced understood as a federal prerogative.26 1,607 immigration-related bills and reso- Anti-immigrant state and local laws, lutions and passed 306 of them in 42 however, have also come under legal states and Puerto Rico.22 Attention to scrutiny for purportedly subjecting in- immigration issues has also spiked in dividuals, especially Latinos, to racial municipalities, and by the end of 2007, pro½ling and other civil rights violations. 180 cities, towns, and counties across the Legal challenges have blocked the imple- country had considered immigration- mentation of local anti-immigrant ordi- related proposals, enacting close to 120 nances that penalize employers for hiring ordinances.23 undocumented immigrants and land- These state and local laws tackle immi- lords for renting to them.27 More recently, gration issues across a broad range of pol- in June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court icy areas, but most address immigrants’ invalidated most provisions of Arizona’s eligibility for state-issued identi½cation controversial anti-immigrant law, S.B. documents (such as a driver’s license), 1070, enacted in 2010. The courts thus their access to employment, housing, have sent a clear signal that setting immi- education, and other public bene½ts, and gration policy remains the purview of the the relationship between local law en - federal government. This does not mean, forcement agencies and federal immigra- however, that federal policy-makers have tion authorities. Some of these laws help reached any consensus about how to immigrants integrate by granting them solve the undocumented immigration in-state college tuition, local voting rights, problem. And as long as they continue municipal ID cards, and local sanctuary to prioritize an illegality frame, policy- from federal immigration laws.24 Many makers are unlikely to break the impasse other laws, however, seek to make life as over immigration reform. dif½cult as possible for undocumented immigrants by excluding them from em - The illegality frame, with its consequent ployment and housing opportunities as shifting of government resources to well as from a variety of government enforcement, has also meant that federal bene½ts.25 Increasingly, state and local of½cials have paid little attention to and

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invested few resources in the societal tion forces many undocumented immi- Michael integration of both legal immigrants and grants to lead hidden lives characterized Jones- Correa & undocumented migrants who have long by economic hardship and limited phys- Els de lived, worked, and paid taxes in the United ical mobility, where even the most mun- Graauw States.28 Even though the federal govern- dane activities such as working, driving, ment has granted legal permanent resi- and traveling become dangerous and dency to one million individuals (including illicit acts.32 an average of 80,000 refugees) annually The threat of deportation also discour- over the past twenty years, it takes very ages undocumented immigrants from limited responsibility for immigrants’ exercising their rights against unscrupu- integration.29 Within an overall laissez- lous employers and landlords who take faire approach to integration, immi- advantage of them in the labor and hous- grants are expected to use their own ing markets, and from reporting crimes to resources, family, friendship networks, law enforcement authorities.33 While un- and perhaps the assistance of local com- documented immigrants experience these munity organizations and local govern- integration barriers most acutely, they ment to survive and thrive in the United also affect their families and U.S.-born States, while the federal government pro- children.34 Just over half of all undocu- vides minimal support to help legal mented immigrants live in mixed-status immigrants naturalize, learn English, households, with 4.5 million American- ½nd employment, or participate in civic born children having at least one undoc- and political life.30 Illegal immigrants, umented parent, and 16.6 million people because they have violated the country’s living in families with at least one undoc- immigration laws, are not even consid- umented immigrant.35 ered legitimate bene½ciaries of public The focus on illegality also deempha- policies intended to advance immigrant sizes the integration of legally admitted sociocultural, economic, and political in - migrants, who make up nearly three- tegration in the United States. The political quarters of all foreign-born individuals sidelining of immigrant integration, and in the United States. Especially for legal the exclusion of undocumented migrants immigrants who are ethnoracial minori- from even minimal federal integration ties, limited-English pro½cient, unedu- efforts, harms immigrants and their fam- cated, or poor, the absence of federal ilies, in addition to the rest of U.S. society. integration policies curtails their life For undocumented immigrants, the chances and their successful integration barriers to integration are formidable. into U.S. society. Research suggests that Under current law, a person has to prove government integration policies in coun- his or her legal immigration status in order tries such as Canada (where the federal to get a driver’s license or get a job. With government funds and coordinates im - the exception of emergency medical care, migrant integration policies) help immi- K-12 schooling for undocumented chil- grants learn the host country’s language dren, and general municipal services such and secure better jobs more quickly, earn as libraries and policing, undocumented higher incomes, and thus contribute to immigrants are excluded from govern- the economy more fully and provide a ment-funded programs and services that brighter future for their children.36 In the can foster their integration.31 Their des- Canadian context, government policies ignation as “illegals” also undermines their targeting immigrants also facilitate their ability to integrate. The fear of deporta- naturalization and encourage their civic

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The Politics and political participation.37 Government adjusting their status over time.42 Recent of Immi- integration policies thus can bene½t the studies indicate that signi½cant numbers gration & the Lens of rest of society in addition to the immi- of immigrants obtain legal status despite Illegality grants they target. previous experience as an “illegal.” For instance, one study tracking legal immi- Framing the immigration debate around grants who arrived in 1996 found that illegality clearly has had a series of very approximately 19 percent had entered negative consequences: enforcement be - without inspection, another 12 percent comes the only conceivable and acceptable had overstayed visas, and 11 percent had response; it shuts off the possibility of worked without authorization. Among more comprehensive immigration reform; those with experiences of being “illegal,” this failure, in turn, leads to the devolution 61 percent were entries without inspec- of immigration policy-making to states tion while 38 percent had entered legally and localities; and it shifts attention away but overstayed their visas. A decade later, from the real needs and require ments of almost a third of the now “legal” immi- immigrant integration. Breaking this im - grants in this cohort had succeeded in passe around immigration policy requires regularizing their status and overcoming a reframing of the immigration debate. the stigma of illegality.43 Since illegality is a valence issue, with no A second step in rethinking illegality is upside, it is dif½cult to shift away from this to recognize that both political parties tend frame. We require a fundamental rethink - to ignore key aspects of undocumented ing of the meaning of the term illegal. migration. Republicans, for example, The ½rst step in rethinking illegality is often fail to recognize that many “ille- to stop using it so categorically; there is gals” are here to stay because they have no single kind of illegality. “Illegality” can deep ties to the United States through include legal and illegal entry, legal and marriage, children, and work.44 Although illegal residence, legal and illegal employ- the U.S. economy declined precipitously ment, and civil and criminal illegality. after 2008 and the pace of new immigra- Together, they combine to produce dif- tion to the United States certainly de - ferent forms and degrees of irregularity.38 creased, in 2011 there were still an esti- For example, despite the popular image mated 11.1 million unauthorized immi- of undocumented immigrants jumping grants in the country–a number not or swimming across the border clandes- much lower than during the economy’s tinely, as much as 45 percent of undocu- previous high point. Democrats, for their mented immigrants in the United States part, have focused on proposals provid- entered the country legally and then over - ing for “amnesty” or legalization, but stayed their visas.39 Only a small minority they still accept the frame of illegality of undocumented immigrants are engaged and the idea that there are categorically in criminal activity in the United States.40 “illegal” individuals. Both parties need to And ½nally, many undocumented immi- recognize that illegality is not an either/or grants–especially those brought to the categorization, and that the line delineat- United States as young children–do not ing illegal from legal is fuzzy. know they are undocumented until they One way to shift the debate from the apply for college or try to ½nd a job.41 illegality trap would be to build on Plyler v. In contemporary debates, immigrants Doe, the 1982 Supreme Court decision are either illegal or they are not. In reality, that found that all children, regardless of illegality is often contingent, with people legal status, are entitled to a free K-12

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public education. The Supreme Court adjustment of their status because they are Michael justices based their argument on the idea already good citizens.50 Similarly, a group Jones- Correa & that “the children who are plaintiffs in of scholars has argued that preceding their Els de these cases are special members of this acquisition of rights as full U.S. citizens, Graauw underclass [of unauthorized immigrants]. undocumented immigrants can acquire . . . The children of . . . illegal entrants can local citizenship or membership rights affect neither their parents’ conduct nor based on their residence and economic their own status. . . . Legislation directing contribution to a local community.51 the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fun- Reframing illegality would shift the damental conceptions of justice.”45 The terms of the debate and allow the dead- Plyler decision implies that we already rec- locked policy process to move forward. ognize that illegality is not categorical, and We list three plausible strategies that that the rights that people hold depend could be pursued once we accept a more on their circumstances. However, Plyler nuanced de½nition of illegality. A great also explicitly limits recognition of these deal of energy has been expended on the rights to children, not all migrants. legalization or amnesty option, as a num- Another way to move forward would ber of other countries have done and as be to recognize membership based on the United States did in 1986. This is a implied contract, resulting from working political dead end; and as we noted above, in the United States, or attachment, result- a one-time legalization largely preserves ing from length of residence in the United the categorical legal/illegal dichotomy.52 States.46 Recognition of a contractual A better alternative would be to pursue relationship between migrants and receiv- the idea of “earned legalization,” whereby ing societies hinges on the argument that migrants acquire points toward residency migrations are not accidental: they occur by meeting certain criteria, such as num- because the countries receiving immi- ber of years in the country, having a sta- grants acquiesce in their presence.47 As ble job, paying taxes, and not having a legal scholar Hiroshi Motomura notes, criminal record.53 Earned legalization the “policy of acquiescing and tolerating acknowledges the nuances of illegality immigration outside the law effectively and could be constructed as a continuous invites immigration outside the law.”48 process rather than as a one-shot deal, The attachment argument begins with avoiding the buildup of a large popula- the recognition that people living in the tion of undocumented migrants. United States, regardless of their age at Second, Congress could institute a arrival in the United States, are not sealed statute of limitations on deportations. off from U.S. society. They are, whether Through 1917, the United States very we like it or not, increasingly a part of it, rarely deported illegal immigrants, and especially with more time spent in the there was a statute of limitations on country.49 This is the line of reasoning deportation. After 1891, undocumented taken by those advocating a dream Act, migrants were deported only if they a federal law that would allow a path to became a public charge within one year citizenship for those who came to the of their entry, and in 1917 this statute of United States at a young age and com- limitations was extended to ½ve years.54 pleted their high school education in the It was only in 1924 that Congress elimi- United States. dream Act advocates nated the statute of limitations on undoc- contend that these residents deserve a re - umented entry. Reinstituting a statute of

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The Politics limitations would place undocumented must prove that deportation would result of Immi- residence more in line with other kinds in “exceptional and extremely unusual gration & the Lens of of illegal activity for which statutes of hardship” to a close family member who Illegality limitations already exist. Illegality would was a U.S. citizen or a legal permanent subsequently and more appropriately resident.57 The Obama administration’s de½ne the behavior of a person, not the recent decision, through its Deferred person in his or her entirety. Action for Childhood Arrivals (daca) Finally, the United States could expand program, to expand the role of adminis- administrative discretion. Discretionary trative discretion in the deportation of relief from removal takes into account certain unauthorized immigrants who the time immigrants have been in the entered the United States as children is country and the ties they have to U.S. cit- one example of this strategy in action.58 izens or lawful permanent residents.55 Any or all of these policy steps would U.S. law has historically allowed case-by- be possible if the U.S. immigration case administrative determinations of debate were to break free from the illegality attachments to the United States–through trap. Jettisoning the idea that illegality is family or time spent in the country–and categorical rather than contingent would allowances for “meritorious cases” or for break the logjam in immigration policy, those facing hardship if deported.56 but more important, it would allow for Administrative rules applying to depor- greater opportunities for the many immi- tation were tightened in 1996, when Con- grants now in the United States, regard- gress added the requirement that undoc- less of how they arrived. umented migrants challenging removal

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: MICHAEL JONES-CORREA is Professor of Government at Cornell University. His publications include Latinos in the New Millennium (with Luis R. Fraga, John A. Garcia, Rodney E. Hero, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary M. Segura, 2012), Latino Lives in America: Making It Home (with Luis R. Fraga et al., 2010), and Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City (1998). ELS DE GRAAUW is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Baruch College at the City University of New York. She has contributed chapters to Immigrants in American History: Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration (edited by Elliott Robert Barkan, 2013), Remaking Urban Citizenship: Organizations, Institutions, and the Right to the City (edited by Michael Peter Smith and Michael McQuarrie, 2012), and Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement (edited by S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Irene Bloemraad, 2008). Authors’ Note: Authors’ names are listed in reverse alphabetical order; they are equal co - authors. The authors are grateful to Roberto G. Gonzales, Helen B. Marrow, and Monica W. Varsanyi for their very helpful feedback on an earlier version of this essay. 1 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized Immigrants: 11.1 Million in 2011,” Pew Research Hispanic Center, December 6, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/ unauthorized-immigrants-11-1-million-in-2011/; and Karen A. Woodrow and Jeffrey S. Passel, “Post–irca Undocumented Immigration to the United States: An Analysis Based on the June 1988 cps,” in Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s, ed. Frank D. Bean, Barry Edmonston, and Jeffrey S. Passel (Santa Monica, Calif., and Washington, D.C.: rand Corporation and Urban Institute Press, 1990), 33–75.

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2 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Pop- Michael ulation Living in the United States: January 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigration Sta- Jones- tistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). Correa & Els de 3 Elizabeth M. Grieco, Yesenia D. Acosta, G. Patricia de la Cruz, Christine Gambino, Thomas Graauw Gryn, Luke J. Larsen, Edward N. Trevelyan, and Nathan P. Walters, The Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 2010 (Washington, D.C.: American Community Survey Reports, 2012). 4 Lawrence Downes, “What Part of ‘Illegal’ Don’t You Understand?” The New York Times, October 28, 2007. 5 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Susan B. Coutin, Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immi- grants’ Struggle for U.S. Residency (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Nicholas P. DeGenova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (2002): 419–447; Jacqueline M. Hagan, Deciding to Be Legal: A Maya Commu- nity in Houston (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); and Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). 6 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 7 The Of½ce of the Superintendent of Immigration was the precursor to the Bureau of Immi- gration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security. 8 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 9 Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (New York: Routledge, 1992). 10 Douglas S. Massey, “Only by Addressing the Realities of North American Economic Inte- gration Can We Solve the Problem,” Boston Review (May/June 2009), http://bostonreview .net/BR34.3/ngai.php; Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America,” Population and Development Review 38 (1) (2012): 1–29. 11 Bryan C. Baker, “Naturalization Rates among irca Immigrants: A 2009 Update” (Wash- ington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010); and Peter Brownell, “The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions” (Wash- ington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2005). 12 DeGenova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life.” 13 Angelo Ancheta, Race, Rights, and the Asian American Experience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 14 Juliet Stumpf, “The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,” Amer- ican University Law Review 56 (2006): 367–419. 15 Robert Suro, “America’s Views of Immigration: The Evidence from Public Opinion Sur- veys,” in Migration, Public Opinion, and Politics, ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (Washington, D.C.: Transatlantic Council on Migration, 2009), 52–76. 16 Jacqueline M. Hagan, Brianna Castro, and Nestor Rodriguez, “The Effects of U.S. Deporta- tion Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives,” North Carolina Law Review 88 (2010): 1800–1822. 17 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Staf½ng Statistics, 1992–2011,” December 12, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_ patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy11_stats/. 18 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2008); and Woodrow and Passel, “Post–irca Undocumented Immigration to the United States.”

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The Politics 19 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican of Immi- Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); gration & and Belinda Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen, Holding the Line? The the Lens of Illegality Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2002). 20Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, Elvia Zazueta, and Ingrid Garcia, “Immigrant Marches Spring 2006,” Mexico Institute: Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2006; Irene Bloemraad, Kim Voss, and Taeku Lee, “The Protests of 2006: What Were They, How Do We Understand Them, Where Do We Go?” in Rallying for Immigrant Rights: The Fight for Inclusion in 21st Century America, ed. Kim Voss and Irene Bloemraad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 3–43. 21 Lydia Saad, “Americans Value Both Aspects of Immigration Reform,” May 4, 2010, http:// www.gallup.com/poll/127649/americans-value-aspects-immigration-reform.aspx; and Ruy Teixeira, “Public Opinion Snapshot: Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the Arizona Law” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2010). 22 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Immigrant Policy Project,” yearly reports for 2005–2011, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19897. 23 S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Tom Wong, “Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Munic- ipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants,” in Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States, ed. Monica W. Varsanyi (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010), 73–93. 24 Els de Graauw, “Municipal Identi½cation Cards: Intergovernmental Challenges over Undoc- umented Immigrants,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Asso- ciation, Denver, Colorado, 2009; Ron Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006); Pablo A. Mitnik and Jessica Halpern-Finnerty, “Immigration and Local Governments: Inclusionary Local Policies in the Era of State Rescaling,” in Taking Local Control, ed. Varsanyi, 51–72; Alejandra Rincón, Undocumented Immigrants and Higher Education: Sí Se Puede! (New York: lfb Scholarly Pub- lishing, 2010); and Monica W. Varsanyi, “Interrogating ‘Urban Citizenship’ vis-à-vis Undoc- umented Migration,” Citizenship Studies 10 (2) (2006): 229–249. 25 Varsanyi, ed., Taking Local Control. 26 Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy (St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson West, 2008). 27 For example: Garrett v. City of Escondido (2006); Vasquez v. City of Farmers Branch (2006); Lozano v. City of Hazleton (2007); and Reynolds v. City of Valley Park (2007). 28 The naturalization process in the United States, for instance, is ½nanced by the fees immigrants pay to naturalize, which severely limits resources to support immigrant integration. Only a tiny fraction of the dhs budget–a few million dollars out of a budget of $47 billion–is allocated to immigrant integration; see FY 2012 Budget in Brief–U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010” (Wash- ington, D.C.: Government Publications Of½ce, 2011); and Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, “Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (wraps), Fiscal Years 1980 to 2010”(Washington, D.C.: Government Publications Of½ce, 2011). 30 Irene Bloemraad and Els de Graauw, “Immigrant Integration and Policy in the United States: A Loosely Stitched Patchwork,” in International Perspectives: Integration and Inclusion, ed. James Frideres and John Biles (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s Uni- versity Press, 2012), 205–232. 31 Raquel Aldana, “On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the ‘Alien,’” Washburn Law Journal 46 (2007): 263–308; and Huyen Pham, “When Immigration Borders Move,” Florida Law Review 61 (5) (2009): 1115–1163.

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32 Leo R. Chavez, Shadowed Lives: Undocumented Immigrants in American Society (Fort Worth, Michael Tex.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992); Coutin, Legalizing Moves; Jones- DeGenova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life”; Angela S. Garcia and Correa & Els de David G. Keyes, “Life as an Undocumented Immigrant: How Restrictive Local Immigration Graauw Policies Affect Daily Life” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2012); Roberto G. Gonzales and Leo R. Chavez, “Awakening to a Nightmare: Abjectivity and Illegality in the Lives of Undocumented 1.5-Generation Latino Immigrants in the United States,” Current Anthropology 53 (3) (2012): 255–281; and Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy J. Abrego, “Legal Vio- lence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants,” American Journal of Sociology 117 (5) (2012): 1380–1421. 33 Shannon Gleeson, Conflicting Commitments: The Politics of Enforcing Immigrant Worker Rights in San Jose and Houston (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012); and Rigel C. Oliveri, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination,” Vanderbilt Law Review 62 (1) (2009): 55–125. 34 Leisy J. Abrego, “Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to Claims-Making for First and 1.5-Generation Immigrants,” Law and Society Review 45 (2) (2011): 337–369; Hagan et al., “The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Fam- ilies and Communities”; and Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Immigrants Raising Citizens: Undocumented Parents and Their Young Children (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2012). 35 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2009). 36 John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres, eds., Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-½rst Century (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University Press, 2008); and Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998). 37 Irene Bloemraad, “The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organizational Capacity in Newcomer Communities,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (5) (2005): 865–887; and Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 38 Cecilia Menjívar, “Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology 111 (4) (2006): 999–1037; Georges Tapinos, “Irregular Migration: Economic and Political Issues,” in Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000), 13–44; and Joanne van der Leun, Looking for Loopholes: Processes of Incorporation of Illegal Immigrants in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003). 39 Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research His- panic Center, 2006). 40Xia Wang, “Undocumented Immigrants as Perceived Criminal Threat: A Test of the Minority Threat Perspective,” Criminology 50 (3) (2012): 743–776. 41 Abrego, “Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos”; and Roberto G. Gonzales, “Learn- ing to Be Illegal: Undocumented Youth and Shifting Legal Contexts in the Transition to Adulthood,” American Sociological Review 76 (4) (2011): 602–619. 42 Menjívar, “Liminal Legality.” 43 Guillermina Jasso, Douglas S. Massey, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James R. Smith, “From Illegal to Legal: Estimating Previous Illegal Experience among New Legal Immigrants to the United States,” International Migration Review 42 (4) (2008): 803–843. 44 Leo R. Chavez, “Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and Experi- ences of Incorporation,” American Ethnologist 18 (2) (1991): 257–278. 45 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

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The Politics 46 Joseph H. Carens, “On Belonging,” Boston Review (Summer 2005), http://www.bostonreview of Immi- .net/BR30.3/carens.html; Joseph H. Carens, “The Case for Amnesty,” Boston Review (May/June gration & 2009), http://bostonre view.net/BR34.3/ndf_immigration.php; and Hiroshi Motomura, “Who the Lens of Illegality Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in Waiting,” University of California-Irvine Law Review 2 (1) (2012): 359–379. 47 Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (New York: New Press, 1998). 48 Motomura, “Who Belongs?” 376. 49 DeGenova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life”; and David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 50 William Perez and Daniel Solorzano, We Are Americans: Undocumented Students Pursuing the American Dream (Sterling, Va.: Stylus Publishing, 2009). 51 Scholars who argue that attachments to U.S. society create grounds for full membership often discuss undocumented immigrants who, other than their violation of immigration laws, have been law-abiding residents of the United States. We leave open the question whether “hard cases” involving undocumented immigrants with serious criminal records can make claims to full membership in the United States based on their attachments to U.S. society. See Rainer Bauböck, “Reinventing Urban Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 7 (2) (2003): 139–160; Luis Guarnizo and Michael Peter Smith, “Global Mobility, Shifting Borders, and Urban Citizenship,” Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geogra½e (Journal of Economic and Social Geography) 100 (5) (2009): 610–622; and Michael Peter Smith and Michael McQuarrie, eds., Remaking Urban Citizenship: Organizations, Institutions, and the Right to the City (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2012). 52 See Joaquín Arango and Maia Jachimowicz, “Regularizing Immigrants in Spain: A New Approach” (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2005). 53 Alexander Aleinikoff, “Legalization Has Its Costs, but They Are Outweighed by the Bene½ts; Pragmatic Arguments May, in the End, Be the Most Persuasive,” Boston Review (May/June 2009), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/aleinikoff.php; Migration Policy Institute, “New Concepts in Regularization: Earned Legalization,” 2005, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ newconcepts.php; Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Migration Policy Institute, “The ‘Regular- ization’ Option in Managing Illegal Migration More Effectively: A Comparative Perspec- tive,” MPI Policy Brief (4) (September 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Policy Brief_No4_Sept05.pdf; and Aspasia Papadopoulou, “Regularization Programmes: An Effective Instrument of Migration Policy?” Global Migration Perspectives 33 (May 2005), http://www .unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,GCIM,,,42ce542a4,0.html. 54 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 59–60. 55 Motomura, “Who Belongs?” 56 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 86–90. 57 Aleinikoff, “Legalization Has Its Costs.” 58 John Morton, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, June 17, 2011), http:// www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.

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The Criminalization of Immigrants & the Immigration-Industrial Complex

Karen Manges Douglas & Rogelio Sáenz

Abstract: Over the last few decades, and particularly after 9/11, we have witnessed the increasing criminalization of immigrants in the United States. Changing policies have subjected immigrants to intensi½ed apprehension and detention programs. This essay provides an overview of the context and policies that have produced the rising criminalization of immigrants. We draw on the institutional theory of migration to understand the business of detention centers and the construction of the immigration-industrial complex. We link government contracts and private corporations in the formation of the immigration-industrial complex, highlighting the increasing pro½ts that private corporations are making through the detention of immigrants. We conclude with a discussion of how the privatization of detention centers is part of a larger trend in which basic functions of societal institutions are being farmed out to private corporations with little consideration for basic human rights.

Though the path of the immigrant in the United States has never been easy, the costs of being an undocumented immigrant are higher today than ever before. Not only is the always-risky journey into the United States much more treacherous now than it was in the past, but blending in once here is becoming increasingly dif½cult. The attitude of U.S. natives toward undocumented immigrants (particularly if they are from Latin American countries) is increasingly hostile and inhospitable. Even gainful employment offers little insulation from KAREN MANGES DOUGLAS is the rabid xenophobia that has engulfed some seg- Associate Professor of Sociology ments of the U.S. population in the post-9/11 era. at Sam Houston State University. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ice) ROGELIO SÁENZ is Dean of the of½cials have raided and rounded up people who, College of Public Policy and Peter but for their lack of documentation, would be Flawn Professor of Demography viewed no differently from the millions of hard- at the University of Texas at San working Americans trying to make a living for Antonio. themselves and their families. They are seized from (*See endnotes for complete contributor their workplaces, shackled, and hauled off to biographies.) detention centers–jails and prisons–where they

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The Crimi- are thrown into a shadow world with few How has a nation once perceived as a nalization protected human and legal rights. Despite beacon of democracy and justice evolved of Immi - grants numerous media accounts describing the to grossly abuse these very principles? & the Immi- deplorable conditions of the detention This essay seeks to answer that question gration- Industrial centers and the inhumane treatment of by ½rst describing the rising detention Complex the detainees, the bureaucrats in charge rate of immigrants and illustrating the seem indifferent, as does the larger public context in which this growth has oc - to whom they must answer. Few seem curred. Toward this end, we provide an even to be asking questions. overview of the policies and the environ- The criminalization of undocumented ment that have helped criminalize immi- immigrants has been heightened by the grants. Next, we draw on the institutional establishment and endorsement of puni- theory of migration to understand the tive actions–both individual-based and ascension of the business of detention government-sponsored–against undoc- centers. We draw links between govern- umented groups and those who assist ment contracts and private corporations them. Furthermore, prisons are being rap- in the formation of the immigration- idly erected to detain more inclusive seg- industrial complex, while highlighting ments of the undocumented immigrant the increasing pro½ts that private corpo- population. Several detention centers have rations are making through the detention recently been constructed and designated of immigrants. And we conclude with a to house immigrant families; and perhaps discussion about how the privatization of still operating under the framing of youths detention centers is part of a larger trend as “super predators,” an image that dom- in which basic functions of societal insti- inated criminal justice thinking during tutions are being farmed out to private the 1980s and 1990s, undocumented juve- corporations with little consideration for nile immigrants are not exempt from this basic human rights. immigration-industrial complex.1 The contracts that link government, As many scholars have detailed, the which supplies immigrant detainees to recent demonization of immigrants is prison facilities, with the private industry nothing new.3 Anxiety over the immigrant responsible for building, maintaining, and “other”–the alien–is an enduring char- administering such prisons signal the acteristic of the American experience. So, emergence of a new type of prison-indus- too, are efforts to exclude those deemed trial complex. This essay identi½es this “undesirable” (historically, poor people trend as part of a larger privatization and people of color) from immigrating to movement in the United States and around the United States. For example, beginning the world. Broadly, this movement is char - in 1790, immigration laws restricted nat- acterized by the dominance of market lib- uralization to those designated as white, eralization and the transition from a mar- while those deemed “likely to become a ket economy to a market society; the public charge” (lpcs) were barred from fracturing of U.S. society; the death of entry. Dual mechanisms accomplished the liberal class; “winner take all” politics these mandates. Restrictions based on that have redistributed resources upward; race and other characterizing features and the reestablishment of Jim Crow-like targeted speci½c groups (for example, policies in the criminal justice system that anarchists, prostitutes, contract laborers, ensnare poor and vulnerable populations, illiterates, and lpcs) and banned them including immigrants, in their web.2 from entry into the United States. At the

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same time, deportation policies sought to the “obnoxious Chinese,” “if the power Karen eliminate undesirables already in resi- exists, who shall say it will not be exer- Manges Douglas & dence. While the racial restrictions were cised tomorrow against other classes and Rogelio ostensibly eliminated in 1952, the 150 pre- other people?”7 Sáenz ceding years of de jure racial exclusion Justice Brewer’s concerns were war- were not inconsequential in shaping the ranted. The Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 (also racial and socioeconomic landscape of known as the Immigration Act of 1924) the United States. Tellingly, the lpc clause, signi½cantly curtailed immigration from indicative of the United States’ discom- Southern and Eastern Europe and banned fort with poor people, has remained a outright immigration from countries policy ½xture. Indeed, the perceived threat with nonwhite populations, arguing that of lpcs was the rationale for the roundup these classes of people were racially inel- and deportation (known as repatriation) igible for citizenship. While the Immi- of thousands of Mexicans–citizens and gration Act of 1924 did not subject immi- non-citizens alike–during the 1930s. grants from the Western Hemisphere The plenary power doctrine, estab- (including Mexicans and Canadians) to lished by the U.S. Supreme Court during quotas, administrative provisions were the era of Chinese exclusion in the nine- developed to address their migration. teenth century, undergirds all immigra- The act created foreign consular of½ces tion law. In establishing this doctrine, the to issue visas for entry into the United Supreme Court assumed that immigrants States and reconstituted the Border Patrol, posed a threat of foreign invasion, and which was charged with securing what thus linked immigration control with the had historically been an open border.8 state’s authority to wage war.4 The Su- Ironically, immigrants need not have preme Court conferred on Congress the actually broken a law to have found plenary power to regulate all matters of themselves on the wrong side of it. It is immigration, stating that “aliens enter estimated that upwards of 1.4 million and remain in the United States only with people who had entered the United States ‘license, permission, and sufferance of legally before 1921 were abruptly clas- Congress.’”5 si½ed as lawbreakers through this policy Congress sought to deal with the un - change.9 documented Chinese through deporta- With the Border Patrol reinvigorated, tion. In 1892, Congress passed the Geary securing the southern border between Act, which authorized the expulsion of the United States and Mexico took pri- Chinese immigrants in the country unlaw- macy over policing the northern border fully. Although it was challenged, the with Canada. This was partly due to the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the legisla- fact that the most popular route into the tion (and the plenary power of the leg- United States for illegal European and islative branch), ½nding that “the right to Asian immigrants who could not pass the exclude or expel aliens, or any class of literacy requirements, had passport dif - aliens, absolutely or upon certain condi- ½culties, or were excluded due to quota tions, in war or in peace, is an inherent restrictions was through Mexico. With and inalienable right of every sovereign means established for Europeans to cir- nation.”6 Presciently, in his dissent in Fong cumvent quota restrictions, and the resul - Yue Ting v. United States (1893), Supreme tant decline in illegal European entry Court Justice David Josiah Brewer noted through Mexico, attention increasingly that while this particular case targeted turned to the flow of Mexicans. In 1921,

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The Crimi- new immigration policy reversed the The outbreak of World War II created nalization Mexican exemption from literacy tests domestic labor shortages. The Bracero of Immi - 10 grants and head taxes. In addition to pre- Program–a bilateral guest worker pro- & the Immi- screening to acquire a visa (and the atten- gram between the United States and gration- Industrial dant fee), Mexicans, like all potential im - Mexico that temporarily allowed contract Complex migrants, had to pass a literacy test and Mexican labor to work in U.S. agricul- prove they were not likely to become a ture–was instituted to address these public charge upon reaching the United shortages. It was expected that a guest States. Once at the border, legal immi- worker program would stem undocu- grants faced a head tax, degrading med- mented Mexican immigration. Lasting ical inspections, delousing fogs, forced from 1942 until 1964, the Bracero Program bathing, and interrogations. provided more than 4.5 million individual These onerous and offensive policies contracts for temporary employment.14 compelled many immigrants to bypass However, with the same onerous condi- these border checkpoints and cross into tions for legal entry into the United the United States without proper inspec- States, the Bracero Program, rather than tion.11 By 1929, unauthorized entry into stem undocumented immigration, encour- the United States was itself declared ille- aged it instead. Many braceros, once in gal. With the incidence of border-crossing the United States, simply did not return without inspection on the rise, the pro - to Mexico when their contract expired.15 cess of ridding the nation of these “crim- Responding to the concerns generated inals” ensued. The number of immigrants by the unanticipated rise in undocumented expelled from the United States rose immigration from Mexico, the Eisenhower from 2,762 in 1920 to 38,796 by the end of administration approved “Operation Wet- the decade. “Alien without proper visa” back,” which increased apprehen sions of became the single largest explanation for undocumented Mexican immigrants. Con - deportation.12 comitantly, yielding to pressure from The relationship between U.S. agricul- farmers and ranchers critical of the pro- ture and Mexican labor is a source of long- cedural requirements for securing bra - standing tension in the United States. ceros, Border Patrol of½cials sometimes Immigration policies and procedures engaged in a perverse bait and switch: have schizophrenically vacillated between apprehending undocumented border cros- accommodating labor needs and quelling sers and releasing them in Mexico, only nativist fears of being overtaken by Mex- to then escort them back into the United ico. Immigration policies and procedures States as legal braceros. In some instances, directed at Mexicans grew especially of½cials paroled former undocumented punitive during the Depression era of the immigrants directly to U.S. employers.16 1930s, culminating in the wholesale re - But encouraging, even abetting, Mexi- moval of Mexicans from the United States, can labor migration amidst growing anti- irrespective of citizenship status. Indeed, Mexican sentiment proved untenable for as historian Mae N. Ngai has written, border authorities. The pressures of an “the repatriation of Mexicans was a racial increasing Mexican presence in the United expulsion program exceeded in scale only States, the embarrassment from the ex - by the Native American Indian removal posure of the deplorable working condi- of the nineteenth century.”13 Then, as now, tions of braceros in the national televi- few protested the legality of these re - sion broadcast documentary Harvest of movals. Shame, and labor union opposition coa-

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lesced to formally end the Bracero Pro- laws, rising budgets and agency growth, Karen gram in 1964 after twenty-two years of the deployment of more sophisticated Manges 17 Douglas & operation. The institutionalization of the equipment and surveillance technologies, Rogelio Bracero Program was not without reper- and a growing fusion between law enforce- Sáenz cussions, however. Not only had the pro- ment and national security institutions gram failed to stem undocumented im- and missions.19 migration from Mexico, but with visas And as a result, border policing has risen scarce, the Bracero Program had actually to unprecedented heights. encouraged it by offering relatively easy This intensi½ed policing is the product entry for Mexican laborers. (U.S. employ- of the policies and procedures of the past, ers bore the onus of documentation.) as well as a new set of protocols that have In the end, the Bracero Program ce - increasingly criminalized people of color, mented the relationship between U.S. both citizen and immigrant, albeit to dif- employers and the relatively cheap labor fering degrees. The development of spe- supply provided by Mexican workers. cial commerce zones between the United Thus, while the program of½cially ended States and Mexico during the 1960s, Pres- in 1964, the decades that followed dem - ident Nixon’s declaration of a war on drugs onstrated a growing U.S. presence of for- in the 1970s, the perverse consequences mer braceros and other undocumented of the 1986 Immigration Reform and migrants, creating a migratory social net- Control Act (irca), the passage of the work to support and encourage future North American Free Trade Agreement migrants from Mexico. The legal status (nafta), the terrorist bombings of the of Mexican workers was the only sig - World Trade Center and Oklahoma City ni½cant shift that resulted from the for- in the 1990s, and especially the terrorist mal end of the program. Impunity for events of September 11, 2001, have com- their hiring, coupled with a pliable, vul- bined to expose the U.S.-Mexico border nerable cheap supply of labor, engendered region to unprecedented scrutiny. As a continued support from U.S. employers result, a mass of federal and state initia- for Mexican workers. The formal Bracero tives have taken criminalization of immi- Program was simply replaced by an infor- grants to stratospheric levels. mal and unsanctioned labor program.18 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (ina) eliminated the much ma- The criminalization of immigrants, ush - ligned national-origins quota system; ered in by the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, while the new policies prioritized family continued–indeed, escalated–throughout reuni½cation, the overall intention was to the twentieth century. At the dawn of the maintain immigration at roughly the same twenty-½rst century, the United States was levels as during the forty years the quota once again characterized by anti-immi- system was in place.20 Additionally, the grant, or more speci½cally, anti-Latino, ina imposed for the ½rst time a limit of sentiment. And once again, the conse- 120,000 immigrants from Western Hemi- quence has been an increase in punitive sphere countries. These dual immigra- policies intended to “stop the invasion” tion policies–a ceiling of 170,000 per occurring at the southern border. As politi- year from Eastern Hemisphere countries, cal scientist Peter Andreas has described it: and 120,000 per year from Western Hemi - On both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border- sphere countries–lasted until 1976, when line, escalation has translated into tougher they were replaced by a 20,000 visas per

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The Crimi- country cap for both Eastern and West- his new immigration policy on July 27, nalization ern Hemisphere countries.21 While im - 1993, explaining, “I asked the Vice Presi- of Immi - grants mediate family members were not sub- dent to work with our departments and & the Immi- ject to these numerical restrictions, im - agencies to examine what more might be gration- Industrial migration from Mexico already exceeded done about the problems along our bor- Complex 20,000 when the ceiling was established. ders. I was especially concerned about the Thus, the ina spurred undocumented growing problems of alien smuggling immigration rather than deterred it. and international terrorists hiding behind Andreas has succinctly summarized the immigrant status, as well as the continuing situation: “as the front door of legal entry flow of illegal immigrants across Ameri- became more regulated, the backdoor of can borders.”25 illegal entry became more attractive.”22 While President Clinton did not single Passage of irca in 1986 did little to halt out the southern U.S. border, most of the undocumented immigration from Mex- allocated federal resources were devoted ico and other Latin American countries. to hardening the U.S.-Mexico border. In theory, irca sanctioned employers for Between 1993 and 1999, the ins budget knowingly hiring undocumented mi - tripled, from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion. grants, forced them to verify the identity The stated goal of the militarization of and status of employees via the I-9 form, the southern U.S. border with Mexico was and expanded the Border Patrol. But prevention through deterrence: to make the weak economies and civil unrest in Latin border-crossing so dif½cult that would-be America, combined with lax enforcement immigrants were deterred from their ini- of employer sanctions, propelled undoc- tial efforts. In addition to funding more umented migration through the latter Border Patrol agents, the Clinton admin- part of the twentieth century. At best, the istration authorized the infusion of high- employer veri½cation provision prompted tech military equipment, including mag- a thriving black market for fake docu- netic footfall detectors and infrared body ments needed to satisfy the I-9 require- sensors, along the U.S.-Mexico border.26 ments for employment.23 irca also of- Politics and economics combined with fered a legal avenue for naturalization for maximum effect in California Governor undocumented migrants who could prove Pete Wilson’s 1994 reelection campaign. continuous residency for a speci½ed period Under a backdrop of what border of½cials of time, and millions of migrants took dubbed “Banzai runs”–groups of ½fty un- the opportunity to legalize. documented migrants running en masse Terrorist attacks, politics, and the econ - across the border, weaving into and out omy joined forces in the 1990s to escalate of traf½c–Wilson declared undocumented anti-immigrant sentiment and lay the immigrants enemy combatant no. 1 and groundwork for more stringent immigra- waged a war that bred copycat anti-im- tion policies.24 The bombing of the World migrant legislation across the country. He Trade Center in February 1993 provided ½red his ½rst salvo with a political cam- both the impetus and purpose for Presi- paign advertisement in which he declared dent Clinton to address immigration dur- that he was “suing the federal govern- ing his ½rst term in of½ce. While no Mex- ment to control the border” and “working icans were involved in the 1993 bombing, to deny state services to illegal immi- U.S.-Mexico border policies were incor- grants.”27 The tough anti-immigrant rhet- porated into broader terrorism-focused oric galvanized his reelection campaign initiatives. President Clinton introduced and he won handily.

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Wilson ½red his second round with that may be classi½ed as misdemeanors Karen Proposition 187, making good on his in state courts. What is more, the law Manges Douglas & campaign promise to deny state services considered offenses retroactively, mean- Rogelio to illegal immigrants. In a referendum ing that past convictions could be used as Sáenz before California voters, the measure a basis for deportation.31 passed by a three-to-two margin.28 Al- The complementary iirira, meanwhile, though Proposition 187 was ultimately authorized the construction of a fourteen- struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico border; the idea of undocumented immigrants as doubled the force of border patrol agents; a drain on the economy sparked a new allowed for summary exclusion of immi- wave of anti-immigrant sentiment that grants (for example, immigration of½cials had already been simmering near the sur- were granted the authority to summarily face. In 1996 alone, more than 500 anti- deport individuals apprehended within immigrant state-level bills were introduced one hundred miles of the border); ex - across the United States (37 in Arizona panded the grounds for depor tation; alone). By 1997, the number had tripled to reduced the allowable documents to sat- 1,562.29 isfy I-9 requirements; and prohibited legal Building on the immigration reforms immigrants from federal welfare provi- of 1993, and working in tandem with wel- sions for the ½rst ½ve years of their U.S. fare reform, President Clinton in 1996 residency.32 In what would become a signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective boon to private prison companies, leg- Death Penalty Act (aedpa) and the Ille- islative changes also “required the deten- gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant tion of all immigrants, including perma- Responsibility Act (iirira). These new nent residents, facing deportation for most pieces of legislation revised the denial criminal violations until the ½nal resolu- and/or deportation provisions for every tion of the case.”33 class of immigrant. In most instances, The “likely to become a public charge” the limited rights held by aliens were fur- clause, a mainstay in immigration policy, ther constrained, while the power of the was also strengthened in the 1996 legisla- immigration enforcement branch of the tion. The legislation required that a family- Immigration and Naturalization Service sponsored visa applicant be denied un- (ins; now Immigration and Customs less the sponsoring family member in the Enforcement) was strengthened. United States submits an af½davit that Cumulatively, these policies imbued stipulates that the sponsor agrees to: 1) the ins with the power to arrest, detain, support (and maintain support of ) the and deport unauthorized immigrants applicant at an annual income of not less while signi½cantly curtailing, and in cer- than 125 percent of the federal poverty tain circumstances eliminating, immigrant guideline for ten years and/or until the rights to appeal the decisions. aedpa applicant has become a U.S. citizen (using declared that “any ½nal order of deporta- the 2011 poverty line data and assuming a tion against an alien who is deportable by two-person household, this ½gure is reason of having committed” any of a $18,387 or greater); 2) be held liable to the long list of criminal offenses “shall not be sponsored immigrant, the federal gov- subject to review by any court.”30 The ernment, any state, or any other entity that new law also signi½cantly expanded the provides means-tested public support; de½nition of criminal grounds for removal and 3) be under the control of any federal from the United States to include crimes or state court.34

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The Crimi- Signi½cantly, iirira built a partnership States to register with the Department of nalization between federal immigration authorities Homeland Security and answer ques- of Immi - grants and local and state law enforcement tions. Failure to comply could have & the Immi- of½cials. Section 287(g) of iirira autho - resulted in deportation. Further, the gov- gration- Industrial rized immigration of½cials to sign a ernment required noti½cation of foreign Complex memorandum of agreement (moa) with travel by the registrant, and even restricted local and state law enforcement of½cials future travels to select ports of departure. that designated of½cers to perform immi- This program led to the detention of 1,834 gration law enforcement functions.35 Al- registrants and 13,000 deportation pro- though little used at the time of its craft- ceedings. Ultimately, no criminal charges ing, the 287(g) program allowed state and for terrorism were ½led against any of the local police to make immigration arrests more than 18,000 registrants.38 Amid a on behalf of federal authorities. Exercise flurry of accusations of racial pro½ling, of this provision began in earnest in the program ended in May 2003. 2004. Indeed, it has become a major tool Immigrant detention has grown drain the law enforcement arsenal, enabling matically since 2006, when the U.S. Of - of½cers to racially pro½le, arrest, detain, ½ce of Homeland Security shifted its pol- and deport record numbers of undocu- icy from “catch and release” to “catch and mented immigrants. detain” in the case of apprehended non- The blurring of immigration and crim- Mexican immigrants. This change in pol- inal laws reached a new apex after the icy thereby placed all immigrants in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. category (catch and detain) that had pre- Within a month after the attacks, Presi- viously included only Mexican immi- dent George W. Bush established the De - grants. As in the case of the post-9/11 partment of Homeland Security through policies that infringed many basic rights executive order. And on October 26, and liberties of the American people, 2001, he signed into law the usa patriot new policies regarding the detention of (Uniting and Strengthening America by immigrants and the development of ma - Providing Appropriate Tools Required to chinery to house detainees occurred in Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act of the shroud of secrecy, with little knowl- 2001, which dramatically revamped the edge from the general public. security and immigration road map of the Equally alarming is the increasing use United States.36 of criminal prosecution for immigration The patriot Act signi½cantly increased offenses that have historically been han- the budget for immigration enforcement dled administratively. In 2008, for exam- and tripled the number of Border Patrol ple, ice raided a food processing plant in agents on the northern border.37 More so Postville, Iowa, criminally charging 305 than even the 1996 immigration legisla- detainees with some combination of ag- tion, the patriot Act expanded the gov- gravated identity theft, social security ernment’s ability to detain and deport fraud, and/or illegal reentry into the terrorists, however de½ned. In a demon- United States. Almost all those detained stration of these newly expanded powers, accepted the plea deal offered to them by the government instituted a “Special federal prosecutors, in which prosecutors Registration” program in November agreed to drop the most serious charge of 2002. This racially targeted effort required aggravated identity theft and waive court men aged 16 to 45 from Arab and Muslim fees in exchange for a ½ve-month sen- countries in residence in the United tence and an order of judicial removal. As

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a consequence of these sentences, the class.43 And as is the case with black men Karen detainees were precluded from ever in the new Jim Crow, imprisoned/detained Manges Douglas & becoming legal permanent residents or Latinos are increasingly locked away in Rogelio citizens of the United States.39 for-pro½t, private prisons/detention cen- Sáenz Beginning in earnest during the 1920s, ters, the growth and proliferation of which the continual hardening of the U.S.-Mex- has marched lockstep with the hardening ico border has had many negative conse- of the U.S.-Mexico border. quences for migrants trying to reach the United States. For migrants whose family The growth in immigrant detention did members live in the United States but are not occur in a vacuum, but rather along- undocumented, the legal avenues for side and in response to social, economic, entry have become long and tortuous, and political changes that facilitated its with an average wait of sixteen years be- development. Economic downturns have fore an application is even considered. historically bred anti-immigrant senti- And most visas for entry to the United ment, and in the past thirty years, the States are issued to skilled workers, often United States has been characterized by at the expense of laborers from Latin growing inequality. Coupled with gov- America, further obstructing the path to ernmental devolution of programs de- legal entry for those without a U.S. citi- signed to assist individuals in times of zen sponsor.40 crisis, this growing inequality is a recipe The militarization of the U.S.-Mexico for social anxiety and anti-immigrant border has made the border-crossing sentiment. Victims of this devolution much more dangerous, and undocumented include the usual working-class suspects. migrants often hire agents to assist them As political scientist Jacob Hacker has in the journey. And as the border has described, the transference of economic hardened, so, too, have the fees these risks from government and corporations agents charge, often resulting in a form of to workers and their families has exposed indentured servitude for labor migrants.41 the middle class to the harshest aspects of The U.S. labor market itself has been an economic downturn.44 Recently, teach- characterized as a Juan Crow caste system ers, policemen, and ½remen (particularly that locks undocumented and largely if represented by a union) have found Latino labor into low-wage, exploitative themselves in the crosshairs of federal, working conditions with limited avenues state, and local budget cuts. American for recourse. Even so, most migrants will- workers have felt besieged. ingly submit to degrading work condi- The historical record shows that during tions even with the constant threat of periods of economic downturn and un- workplace raids, racial pro½ling, discrim- certainty, immigrants make convenient ination, and deportation. Civil rights law- scapegoats, blamed for a host of societal yer Michelle Alexander has persuasively ills. As psychologists Priscila Diaz, Delia argued that the criminal justice system is Saenz, and Virginia Kwan have ex- the reconstituted Jim Crow for young plained: “there is a pattern in U.S. history African American men.42 Legal scholars in which presence of economic competi- Kevin Johnson and Bernard Trujillo have tion is associated with greater negativity extended this argument to Latinos, rea- toward certain groups, even when immi- soning that the immigration system, in gration is not relevant. . . . Similarly, anti- tandem with the Juan Crow caste labor immigrant sentiment and extreme immi- market, has created a new Latino under- gration policy may arise from the desire

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The Crimi- to blame outsiders for poor economic The series of terrorist attacks that nalization conditions.”45 Just as low-income women began in 1993 and culminated on the of Immi - grants were blamed in the 1980s for not taking morning of September 11, 2001, no doubt, & the Immi- personal responsibility for their own eco- shocked the nation. The nation experi- gration- Industrial nomic welfare, so, too, have immigrants enced a collective numbness in the face Complex been blamed for irresponsibly draining of such an unprecedented terrorist attack scarce economic resources intended only on its own soil. Media commentators for citizens. argued that September 11 would mark a Some of the strongest anti-immigrant watershed in the history of the nation. legislation dates to the relatively robust While the nation mourned in a dazed economy of the 1990s. Despite the opti- state, Congress and the Bush administra- mism surrounding this prosperity, ter- tion quickly implemented drastic legisla- rorist attacks on the World Trade Center tive changes in the name of protecting and Oklahoma City left Americans feel- Americans from terrorism. In short ing vulnerable, prompting political action order, Americans lost many of the rights that resulted in militarized zones along and freedoms–such as privacy and civil the U.S.-Mexico border and draconian liberties–that they had long enjoyed in immigration policies. Social activist Naomi peacetime. The patriot Act passed Klein’s book Shock Doctrine: The Rise of through Congress swiftly and with over- Disaster Capitalism offers an analogy for whelming support, with many Americans understanding the drastic shifts the coun- truly unaware of the rights and civil liber- try took after the terrorist bombings in ties that they were surrendering. Notably, 1993, and even more so post-9/11. Klein the inde½nite detention of immigrants, uses psychological shock as an analogy to even those not considered to be terror- illustrate the initial shock that many ists, is among the litany of provisions of countries around the world have experi- the patriot Act. enced over the course of the last four Consequently, amidst federal, state, decades in the face of calamitous “wars, and local budget contractions, the crimi- terror attacks, coups d’état and natural nal justice industry was an exception to disasters.”46 These initial shocks numb the rule of devolution. With an expanded the populace, inducing anomie.47 As the scope and seemingly unlimited budget– shock spreads through the population, the the result of a stunned populace and an traditional ways, regulations, and customs opportunistic administration–the secu- of the society no longer prevail. Citizens rity industry was overhauled. Existing enter survival mode, with the principal facilities to house immigrant detainees goal of perseverance. It is in this context were quickly stretched beyond their lim- of societal numbness that corporations its. Signi½cantly, the private sector seized and politicians attempt to subject the the opportunity to build new detention populace to severe and punitive economic centers, operate them, and provide provi- and political shocks. Klein argues that cor - sions for them. A steady flow of undocu- porations and politicians “exploit the fear mented immigrants into the United and disorientation of [the] ½rst shock to States coupled with a sizable undocu- push through economic shock therapy.”48 mented population already resident in Thus, policies that under normal condi- the country offered private prison entre- tions would not be tolerated are easily preneurs an ideal growth market: vili½ed imposed on the population without any– “illegal aliens” who possessed limited or at best, with minimum–opposition. rights thanks to the plenary power doc-

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trine and a hostile public wanting assur- Entrepreneurs gain handsomely through Karen ance that something was being done their provision of services to migrants Manges Douglas & about the threat of terror and the “immi- who attempt to gain entry into the United Rogelio gration problem.” States and obtain the documents required Sáenz to work and access resources here. Sociologist Douglas Massey and his col- While the institutional theory of mi- leagues have provided an inventory of the gration has helped us understand how theoretical perspectives that account for institutions and organizations emerge to international migration.49 The most com - support international migration, it was mon of these perspectives are based on narrowly conceived. The perspective how economic forces and labor markets focuses on underground market economic influence the flow of people across inter- endeavors and on the institutions and national boundaries as well as how social organizations that facilitate the move- networks facilitate and sustain interna- ment of people into capital-rich coun- tional migration. The institutional theory tries. The perspective must be broadened of migration is a relatively new perspec- to understand how “aboveboard” state- tive for understanding international supported business ventures have emerged migration.50 This theory focuses on the to apprehend, detain, and deport migrants institutions and organizations that emerge as a means of discouraging people from once international migration is set in migrating to the United States. In this motion to “satisfy the demand created by case, it is not underground entrepreneurs an imbalance between the large number but corporations that, through contracts of people who seek entry into capital-rich with ice, establish or extend their busi- countries and the limited number of im - ness ventures to house immigrant detain- migrant visas these countries typically ees. The pro½ts reaped by these businesses offer.”51 The institutional theory of migra- in the ½ght against international migration emphasizes the underground mar- tion dwarf those garnered in the under- kets that emerge to assist migrants in ground economy. Further, corporations overcoming obstacles erected to keep in the business of immigrant detention them out of capital-rich countries, in ad - centers do not have the legal risks that dition to voluntary humanitarian organi- their counterparts in the underground zations that press for the protection of economy face. undocumented immigrants and their The prison-industrial complex is a human rights. derivative of the military-industrial com- A variety of underground economic plex, as conceived by President Eisenhower markets have blossomed to facilitate in his 1961 Farewell Address.52 Social sci- migration in the face of the barriers erected entist Tanya Golash-Boza has noted that to deter it. These include, for example, the military-industrial complex reflects business ventures related to human smug- the “close relationships between the cor- glers (coyotes help bring Mexicans and porate elite, bureaucrats, and politicians, other Latin Americans into the United and these actors work together to ensure States; snakeheads help smuggle in Chi- that state military investments serve the nese migrants); fraudulent documents interests of capital.”53 The military- such as social security cards, birth cer - industrial complex emerged and is sus- ti½cates, visas, and passports; labor contained by the element of fear and the tracts; and arranged marriages between pro½ts gained by corporate, governmental, undocumented migrants and citizens. and military actors. In particular, the arms

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The Crimi- buildup was justi½ed by the fear of Com- and you’re out”), changes in drug policies nalization munism, as well as the powerful entities– in the mid-1980s resulted in a tremen- of Immi - grants in the form of the corporate elite, govern- dous growth of the prison population & the Immi- ment bureaucrats, and the military hier- and in the construction of new prisons to gration- 57 Industrial archy–who bene½ted economically and house inmates. In this context, the Complex politically from the ceaseless buildup of demography of the prison population the military machinery.54 shifted from predominantly white pris- Analyses linking the prison system to oners to African American and Latino the military-industrial complex began to prisoners. emerge in the 1980s. Scholar Mike Davis Golash-Boza has isolated three de½ning described the context in which California features of the prison-industrial com- established a prison-industrial complex: plex: a rhetoric of fear; the confluence of powerful interests; and a discourse of California has the third-largest penal sys- other-ization.58 The rhetoric of fear in tem in the world, following China and the the prison-industrial complex is focused United States as a whole: 125,842 prisoners on the at-large criminal in society. The at last of½cial count. Over the past decade, confluence of powerful interests includes the state has built Calipatria, located 220 people in the government, corporate, and miles southeast of L.A., and ½fteen other criminal justice sectors who gain eco- new prisons–at a cost of $10 billion (inter- nomically and politically through mass est included). An emergent ‘prison-indus- incarceration. Private prison corpora- trial complex’ increasingly rivals agribusi- tions, such as Corrections Corporation of ness as the dominant force in the life of America and the geo Group Inc. (for- rural California and competes with land merly a division of the Wackenhut Cor- developers as the chief seducer of legisla- poration), especially bene½t from well- tors in Sacramento. It has become a mon- placed connections in the government ster that threatens to overpower and devour and criminal justice sectors. Finally, the its creators, and its uncontrollable growth discourse of other-ization focuses the ought to rattle a national consciousness fear of the criminal on black men and, now complacent at the thought of a perma- increasingly, on Latino men. nent prison class.55 Beginning in the early 1980s, the Rea- These ideas were expanded beyond gan administration pressed for the out- California by activist and writer Angela sourcing of many government functions Davis as well as by journalist Eric Schlosser, to the private sector. President Reagan who has de½ned the prison-industrial argued that the free market would enhance complex as “a set of bureaucratic, politi- competition and consequently promote cal, and economic interests that encour- better quality service and greater ef½ - age increased spending on imprisonment, ciency. Changes in U.S. drug and immi- regardless of the actual need.” Schlosser gration policy, as well as a variety of has added that the prison-industrial “push” factors in Latin American states, complex represents a “confluence of spe- necessitated increased space for the im - cial interests that has given prison con- prisonment of detainees, leading the way struction in the United States a seemingly for the growth of the private incarcera- unstoppable momentum.”56 Alongside tion sector. For example, during the early new get-tough policies (for example, 1980s, the U.S. government denied the longer sentences, mandatory minimums, majority of political asylum petitions of felonizing drug offenses, and “three strikes Central Americans fleeing the violence

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associated with U.S.-backed wars in tor corporations answered the call. Cor- Karen Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. rections Corporation of America (cca) Manges geo Douglas & And as the cases of asylum-seekers were was established in 1983, and the Rogelio decided, the refugees were placed in deten- Group was incorporated in 1984. These Sáenz tion centers for varying amounts of time. are the two dominant private-sector Moreover, new legislation that inten- providers of prisons and detention centers si½ed the criminalization of both drug in the country, with cca being the largest. use and undocumented immigration ac - cca and the geo Group have pro½ted celerated and expanded the privatization handsomely from the nation’s growth in of prisons. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act prisoners and detainees (see below). mandated minimum sentences for drug- Nonetheless, many local and county jails related offenses, including ½ve- and ten- have also bene½ted by renting out space year minimum sentences for drug distri- to house detainees. For example, in 1993 bution or importation. The policy also the ship Golden Venture ran aground close enforced disparate treatment of powder to New York City. The ship had attempted cocaine (used primarily by the middle to smuggle approximately three hundred and upper classes) and crack cocaine undocumented Chinese immigrants to (used disproportionately by poor persons the United States, many of whom were of color) offenses, with crack cocaine detained in York, Pennsylvania, for nearly charges attracting the most punitive four years to await a hearing of their actions. Meanwhile, the 1986 Alien Crim- cases. Journalist Mark Dow has described inal Apprehension Program, based on how communities vied for the privilege joint efforts between the Bureau of Pris- to detain some of the Chinese immi- ons (bop) and ins, sought to uncover grants: immigrants with criminal records, even Local politicians and business entrepre- those whose sentences had already been neurs have taken full advantage of the rev- completed. The objective of this policy enue possibilities in immigration deten- was to apprehend, detain, and eventually tion. Many asylum seekers aboard the deport these immigrants. Golden Venture, for example, were detained Between 1980 and 1994, the number of in a York County Pennsylvania jail. In a inmates in federal prisons nearly quadru- neighboring county, a Harrisburg Patriot pled, from 24,363 to 95,034.59 The com- headline read, “Prison Board Shopping for position of the inmate population also Immigrants to Prevent Layoffs.” A Perry shifted dramatically during this period. County commissioner told the Patriot, “We For instance, while drug offenders ac - tried like the dickens to get some of the counted for one-fourth of all inmates in Chinese . . . but it didn’t pan out. . . . If no 1980, they made up more than three- immigrants are secured, some layoffs may ½fths in 1994. And the changes in drug be inevitable.” The federal government policy disproportionately affected African paid York County $45.00 per detainee per Americans and Latinos, as the number of day, although it only cost the prison $24.37 black drug offenders increased ½vefold to maintain each prisoner. As the Chinese and the number of Latino drug offenders asylum seekers approached the two-year quadrupled between 1986 and 1991 (com- mark of their detention, the county’s gen- pared to a twofold increase in white drug eral fund boasted a pro½t of about $1.5 mil- offenders in federal prisons).60 lion. A Mississippi sheriff said, “We don’t To meet the rising demands for jail and always agree with the ins holding them. . . . detention space, two major private-sec- But we like the money,’” and a Miami ins

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The Crimi- of½cial con½rmed that a jail in northern other complexes, including the security- nalization Florida was “calling us all the time to bring industrial complex65 and the border- of Immi - 66 grants back some business for them.” A Nigerian industrial complex. & the Immi- detainee being transferred from Krome to As is the case with the prison-industrial gration- Industrial the Monroe County Jail in Key West over- complex, the immigration-industrial com- Complex heard a jail of½cer and an ins of½cer dis- plex has three major features: a rhetoric cussing vacancies and wondered, “Is this of fear; the confluence of powerful inter- slave trade or what?”61 ests; and a discourse of other-ization.67 In particular, efforts to counter terrorism To some, undocumented immigrants have featured a dual concern with national represented a threat to their way of life; security alongside immigration law en - however, to enterprising entrepreneurs, forcement. The fear of a terrorist attack immigrants represented potential pro½t, at the hands of immigrants has been used and to many local of½cials, immigrants to justify the massive increase in funds in represented the key to healthy budgets the war against terrorism and the protec- and job protection. A threshold had been tion of international borders. And simi- crossed. lar to the prison-industrial complex, a Over the last decade, private prison confluence of interests surrounding im- corporations, such as cca and geo Group, migrants binds together powerful enti- have turned their attention to the busi- ties in the government, corporate, and ness of housing undocumented immi- criminal justice sectors. grants. Indeed, the massive pro½ts that The links between private prison cor- these corporations garnered in the prison- porations, such as cca, and the govern- industrial complex abruptly declined ment and criminal justice sectors have from 1998 to 2001 as they built speculative been crucial to the expansion of for- prisons: “excess prison space for inmates pro½t detention centers and the increase who did not yet exist.”62 Because 9/11 in detentions of undocumented immi- dramatically increased government re - grants on which they rely. Finally, the sources available to combat terrorism immigration-industrial complex is further and undocumented immigration, includ- supported and sustained by the discourse ing the increased effort to apprehend and of other-ization and the racialization of deport undocumented immigrants, pri- immigrants, especially the portrayal of vate prison corporations shifted their Mexican immigrants as “invaders” and attention to the business of housing “foreigners” who do not belong in the undocumented detainees. United States.68 The booming expansion of the construction of detention centers to house A variety of corporations have contracts these immigrants has resulted in the ice emergence of the immigration-industrial with to house immigrant detainees. The corporations that provide such ser - complex: “the public and private sector ice cca interests in the criminalization of undoc- vices to include , Emerald Compa - nies, the geo Group, Immigration Com- umented migration, immigration law en - lcs forcement and the promotion of ‘anti- pany of America-Farmville, Correc- illegal rhetoric.’”63 Analyses of the immi- tions Services, Inc., and Management and Training Corporation. We will pro- gration-industrial complex have emerged cca only recently.64 More broadly, policies to vide an overview of , the largest such curb terrorism and undocumented immi- corporation, to examine its role in the gration have included the development of prison-/immigration-industrial complex.

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Founded in 1983, cca made its ½rst substance abuse treatment. These services Karen major contract with the ins in 1984 to are intended to reduce recidivism and to Manges Douglas & construct and manage the Houston Pro- prepare inmates for their successful re- Rogelio cessing Center. cca’s website calls atten- entry into society upon their release. The Sáenz tion to its cofounders’ skills and connec- Company also provides inmates health tions to the political, criminal justice, and care (including medical, dental and psychi- corporate sectors, the triumvirate of con- atric services), food services and work and fluences that embody the prison-/immi- recreational programs.72 gration-industrial complex: “Co-founders Spanning twenty-one states, cca con- Tom Beasley, Don Hutto and Doctor sists of sixty-½ve facilities, which cca has Crants brought diverse skills to their new described as an adjustment center, cor- venture: public policy, knowledge of the rectional centers/facilities/institutions, legislative process, and experience in detention centers/facilities, jails, pre- public corrections and ½nancial exper - parole transfer facilities, processing cen- tise.”69 cca highlights its industry lead- ters, a residential center, a treatment ership in pioneering public-private part- facility, a women’s correctional facility, nerships in the ½eld of corrections and in as well as cca’s corporate headquar- establishing cost-effective solutions to ters.73 Of these sixty-½ve facilities, about correctional problems.70 The vision of one-½fth have contracts with ice: thir- cca is “to be the best full service adult teen facilities containing a total of 15,016 corrections system in the United States. beds.74 . . . In partnership with government, we In calendar year 2011, cca reported will provide meaningful public service by total revenues of approximately $1.72 bil- operating the highest quality adult cor- lion, compared to total revenues of $1.66 rections company in the United States.”71 billion in 2010.75 In addition, cca de - cca’s corporate pro½le states: clared a net income of $162 million in Corrections Corporation of America is the 2011 compared to $157 million in 2010, nation’s largest owner and operator of pri- representing a gain of 3.4 percent.76 vatized correctional and detention facilities Unfortunately, we are not able to identify and one of the largest prison operators in what portions of the total generated rev- the United States, behind only the federal enues and net incomes were generated gov ernment and three states. cca currently from ice contracts. owns and operates more than 65 facilities The three cofounders of cca possessed including 47 company-owned facilities, connections to the corporate, political, with a design capacity of more than 90,000 and criminal justice sectors. One of these beds in 19 states and the District of Columbia. founders, Tom Beasley, was serving as the chairman of the Tennessee Republican The Company specializes in owning, oper- Party in the late 1970s when he observed ating and managing prisons and other cor- that the state’s correctional system was rectional facilities and providing inmate hampered by high levels of turnover, residential and prisoner transportation tight budgets, and overcrowding.77 He services for governmental agencies. In thought that the private sector may be a addition to providing the fundamental res- solution to these problems. Beasley sub- idential services relating to inmates, cca sequently shared his thoughts and plans offers a variety of rehabilitation and educa- with the two persons who would become tional programs, including basic education, his fellow cofounders of cca: Doctor life skills and employment training and (“Doc”) Crants, Beasley’s West Point

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The Crimi- roommate who held an M.B.A. and law • Dennis DeConcini is a former U.S. sen- nalization degree from Harvard University but who ator from Arizona, having held the of Immi - grants had no corrections experience; and Don of½ce for three terms (1977 to 1995). He & the Immi- T. Hutto, former commissioner of correc- currently serves as director of Ceramic gration- Industrial tions in Arkansas (1971–1976) and Vir- Protection Corporation and is a partner Complex ginia (1976–1981), and later president of in the law ½rm of DeConcini McDonald the American Corrections Association Yetwin and Lacy. DeConcini is a princi- (1984–1986).78 pal in the lobbyist consulting ½rm Parry, The current board of directors of cca Romani, DeConcini & Lacy P.C. in likewise has deep ties to the political, Washington, D.C. criminal justice, and corporate sectors. • Thurgood Marshall, Jr. is the son of John D. Ferguson became the chairman Thurgood Marshall, the ½rst African of the board and ceo of cca in July 2008, American Supreme Court Justice. He is after serving as president of cca from a partner in the law ½rm Bingham 2000 to June 2008.79 Before joining cca, McCuthen llp in Washington, D.C., Ferguson had thirty-three years of expe- and a principal in Bingham Consulting rience in “½nance, entrepreneurial ven- Group, which assists business clients tures, corporate turnarounds and govern- with communications, political, and ment experience.”80 Immediately before legal strategies. Marshall has held ap - coming to cca, he served as Tennessee’s pointments in each branch of the fed- Commissioner of Finance and Adminis- eral government, serving as cabinet tration, a post he held for four years. secretary to President Clinton and The cca board also includes Donna M. director of legislative affairs and deputy Alvarado, William F. Andrews, John D. 82 Correnti, Dennis DeConcini, Damon counsel to Vice President Al Gore. Hiniger, John Horne, C. Michael Jocobi, Many cca employees have held impor- Anne L. Mariucci, Thurgood Marshall, Jr., tant government posts prior to joining Charles L. Overby, John R. Prann, Jr., the corrections business. For instance, Joseph V. Russell, and Henri L. Wedell.81 John Ferguson, cca’s current ceo, served We highlight three board members below on Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist’s to illustrate the interconnectivity between Transition Advisory Council, which was the political, criminal justice, and corpo- charged with providing policy recom- rate sectors. mendations at the time that the state was considering privatizing 70 percent of its • Donna M. Alvarado is the founder and 83 managing director of Aguila Interna- correctional system. Other individuals tional, an international business-con- moving from the Tennessee state government to cca include Brian Ferrell (aide sulting ½rm. She has held senior man- cca agement positions in government as to Governor Sundquist, later ’s vice deputy assistant secretary of defense in president for government relations), John Tighe (Governor Sundquist’s top the U.S. Department of Defense, coun- cca sel for the U.S. Senate Committee on health care advisor, later ’s vice pres- the Judiciary subcommittee on Immi- ident of health services), Natasha Metcalf (Tennessee’s commission of health ser- gration and Refugee Policy, and staff cca member of the U.S. House of Represen- vices, later ’s vice president for local tatives Select Committee on Narcotics government customer relations), and Tony Abuse and Control. Grande (Tennessee commission of economic and community development,

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later cca’s vice president of state customer ½cials and legislators, especially in its Karen relations).84 home state of Tennessee, to improve its Manges cca Douglas & also has a long history of using its chances of winning contracts. The company Rogelio ties and personal relationships with peo- has nurtured these relationships through Sáenz ple in government to gain economic its generous campaign contributions and advantages and contracts.85 cca’s rela- its practice of hiring former government tionship with former Governor of Ten- of½cials. nessee and Senator Lamar Alexander is cca’s efforts to make friends and influence one of the earliest and strongest such ties. important people are also evident at the Tom Beasley worked for Alexander when federal level. The company has depended he was governor of Tennessee, though heavily on federal contracts since its found - they share a history extending back to ing, and it was the feds who were largely Beasley’s time as an undergraduate at responsible for helping cca survive its Vanderbilt University, when he rented an brush with bankruptcy several years back. apartment above Alexander’s garage. The emphasis on homeland security in the Honey Alexander, Lamar’s wife, also was wake of 9/11 has created new opportunities an investor in cca, and such ties were for cca and the rest of the prison industry. helpful in cca’s ultimately unsuccessful bid to win a contract to operate Ten- For 20 years cca has invested large amounts nessee’s correctional system in 1985.86 of time and money in the public sector, and Furthermore, Philip Perry, who is a son- it expects to receive a continuing payoff.88 in-law of former Vice President Dick As noted, business in the private prison Cheney, lobbied for cca prior to holding industry was not always booming. Be- the post of general counsel for the De - tween 1998 and 2001, corporations in the partment of Homeland Security.87 prison business experienced signi½cant cca has aggressively lobbied and made declines in their pro½ts. This was the case campaign contributions to affect public with cca, which saw its stock market policy issues related to corrections, crim- value plummet from 144.239 on January inal justice, and immigration, and to gain 2, 1998, to 68.368 on January 1, 1999; 18.343 government contracts. As privatization on January 7, 2000; and ½nally 2.501 on researchers Philip Mattera, Mafruza Khan, January 5, 2001.89 The downward slide and Stephen Nathan observe in their was not as dramatic for geo: 8.025 on report Corrections Corporation of America: January 9, 1998; 9.546 on January 1, 1999; A Critical Look at Its First Twenty Years: 3.481 on January 7, 2000; and 3.293 on For an industry whose only customer is the January 12, 2001.90 public sector, it is no surprise that private The events of 9/11 reversed this prison operators need to cultivate relation- descent, for the immediate federal re - ships with government of½cials. Yet cca sponse to the terrorist attacks was to allo- has taken this to great lengths. Most con- cate massive amounts of resources to troversial has been the involvement of cca wage war against terrorism, with the con- in American Legislative Exchange Council, trol of borders and the detention of a conservative group that promotes changes unwanted immigrants part and parcel of in state laws by drafting model bills and this plan. It is clear that the corporations networking with legislators. in the business of detention centers anticipated the oncoming windfall pro½ts. For cca has also attempted to use its direct instance, the chairman of the Houston- relationships with executive branch of - based Cornell Companies, speaking in a

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The Crimi- conference call to investors shortly after while geo’s greatest surge (131 percent nalization 9/11, gushed: gain) took place between 2006 and 2007, of Immi - the time period associated with the change grants It can only be good . . . with the focus on & the Immi- in policy from catch-and-release to catch- people that are illegal and also from Middle gration- and-detain. In general, there has been a Industrial Eastern descent. . . . In the United States Complex slight decline in the value of the stock of there are over 900,000 undocumented both corporations between 2010 and 2012. immigrants from Middle Eastern descent. Lobbying is a key strategy for cca to . . . That’s half of our entire prison popula- exert its influence on the political process, tion. . . . The federal business is the best and Figure 2 shows cca’s lobbying ex- business for us . . . and the events of Septem- penditures between 1998 and 2011. These ber 11 [are] increasing that level of busi- expenditures nearly doubled from year to ness.91 year during the 2001 to 2004 period. By Similarly, the head of the Wackenhut 2005, cca spent $7 in lobbying for each $1 Corporation (the parent company of the that it spent in 2001. From 2008 to 2011, geo Group) noted: cca’s lobbying expenditures dropped signi½cantly from the 2007 levels; yet the As a result of the terrorist attacks in the corporation still paid approximately $1 United States in September we can expect million in each of the last four years. As federal agencies to have urgent needs to noted earlier, cca has combined its lob- increase current offender capacity if cer- bying efforts with generous campaign tain anti-terrorism and homeland security contributions to influence public policy legislation is passed. . . . It’s almost an oddity and help acquire government contracts. that. . . given the size of our country and the cca’s role in the formation of Arizona’s number of illegal immigrants entering our controversial S.B. 1070 legislation is the country that we have such a small number most recent example of its influence on of beds for detention purposes, and I think public policy. National Public Radio ex- this has become an issue under the ‘home- posed the important role that cca, land security’ theme, and I think it’s likely through its association with the Ameri- we’re going to see an increase in that can Legislative Exchange Council (alec), area.”92 played in political discussions that led to As anticipated, the aftermath of 9/11 the formation of S.B. 1070, with cca stand- proved to be a bonanza for corporations ing to gain handsomely from the enact- like cca and the geo Group. Stock prices ment of the bill.93 rebounded robustly. Figure 1 provides the In sum, cca has been the pioneer and stock market values of cca and geo leader in the establishment of the prison- stock on the January opening for each industrial complex and the immigration- year between 2001 and 2012. The stock industrial complex through its strong ties value of each corporation experienced across the political, criminal justice, and signi½cant gains between 2001 and 2008. corporate sectors. But what trends can Indeed, the value of cca stocks soared we observe in the growth of the immigra- elevenfold, from 2.501 in 2001 to 28.55 in tion-industrial complex? And in what 2008, while that of geo stocks climbed direction can we expect it to go? eightfold, from 3.293 in 2001 to 27.30 in 2008. cca experienced the greatest an- The growth in immigrant detentions nual percentage increase (147 percent has been exceptionally strong over the gain) in its stock between 2001 and 2002, last few decades. The average number of

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Figure 1 Karen Market Values of cca and geo Stocks During First Week of January, 2001–2012 Manges Douglas & Rogelio Sáenz

Source: New York Stock Exchange, “Corrections Corp of America (nyse:cxw),” https://www.google.com/ ½nance?client=ob&q=NYSE:CXW (accessed July 27, 2012); and New York Stock Exchange, “The geo Group, Inc. (nyse:geo),” https://www.google.com/½nance?client=ob&q=NYSE:GEO (accessed July 27, 2012).

Figure 2 Lobbying Expenditures of cca, 1998–2011

Source: “Annual Lobbying by Corrections Corporation of America,” OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets .org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2012 (accessed July 30, 2012).

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The Crimi- immigrant detainees increased nearly dented punitive actions. The privatiza- nalization ½vefold, from 6,785 in 1994 to 33,330 in tion of the prison system and the demon - of Immi - grants 2011 (see Figure 3). We can clearly see the ization of immigrants combined with the & the Immi- impact of iirira in 1996, as well as the threat of terror to propel for-pro½t incar- gration- cca Industrial change of policy from catch-and-release ceration companies like to record Complex to catch-and-detain in 2006. For example, pro½ts. These trends have been advanced the average number of detainees more by politicians in response to vague public than doubled from 1996 to 2001, while demands for the government to “do the average has increased by approxi- something” about crime, drugs, terror- mately 72 percent between 2006 and ism, and immigration. They have not, 2011. The average number of detainees however, been without sig ni½cant has surpassed 30,000 each year since human rights implications for citizens 2009. and non-citizens alike. The growth trends surrounding the As Edmund Burke warned, those who 2006 policy change are also attributable cannot remember the past are destined to to a signi½cant increase in arrests from repeat it. In many ways, history tells us ice worksite raids (see Figure 4). The that immigrant-bashing is more the norm number of persons arrested for criminal than not. It was the tremendous nativist violations (employers, contractors, and backlash against Southern and Eastern managers who hire undocumented work - Europeans that inspired the National ers; immigrants who use fraudulent doc- Origins Act of 1924, which signi½cantly uments to ½nd employment; and immi- curtailed immigration from these areas grants charged with identity theft) in - and concomitantly gave rise to the phe- creased more than ½vefold, from 176 in nomenon of illegal immigration. The 2005 to 1,103 in 2008, while the number current climate of immigrant-bashing of administrative arrests (undocumented distinguishes itself from this history of immigrants arrested but not charged nativism by focusing almost exclusively with criminal violations) rose more than on Latinos as scapegoats. fourfold, from 1,116 in 2005 to 5,184 in The adoption of terminology such as 2008. Nonetheless, the volume of crimi- “alien” and “illegal alien” to characterize nal arrests has dropped by 35 percent this administratively created class is from 2008 to 2011, while the number of fraught with racial connotations. As administrative arrests has declined by 72 Johnson and Trujillo have pointed out: percent during this period. The construction of alien has justi½ed our legal system’s restrictive approach, offering eoliberal policies that came to the N noncitizens extremely limited rights. Ref- fore during the Reagan administration erences to the “alien,” “aliens,” and “illegal provided an ideological rationalization aliens” as societal others thus helps make for the privatization of many functions of the harsh treatment of people from other the criminal justice system. Mass incar- countries seem reasonable and necessary.94 ceration has been used as the primary weapon in the war on drugs (declared by They have also observed that the usage Nixon and waged by every administra- of alien terminology is not benign because tion since), solidifying and expanding it treats “racial minorities poorly on the the prison-industrial complex. And after grounds that they are ‘aliens’ or ‘illegal 9/11, the federal government targeted aliens’ [which] allows people to reconcile undocumented immigrants with unprece- the view that they ‘are not racist’ while

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Figure 3 Karen Average Daily Immigrant Detainee Population, FY 1994 to FY 2011 Manges Douglas & Rogelio Sáenz

Source: Data for FY 1994 to FY 2006 are from Alison Siskin, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2007,04 06-crs.pdf; and data for FY 2007 to FY 2011 are from Alison Siskin, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf.

Figure 4 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Worksite Enforcement Arrests, FY 2002 to FY 2011

Source: Andorra Bruno, Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf.

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The Crimi- pursuing policies that punish certain right that all people have to dignity, nalization groups of persons viewed as racially or respect, and equality regardless of citizen- of Immi - 95 grants otherwise different.” ship. The citizenship/national sovereignty & the Immi- Moreover, it is hard to distinguish perspective, meanwhile, holds that rights gration- Industrial between documented and undocumented are conditional upon nation-state recog- Complex immigrants, and consequently, “alien” nition. Citizenship comes with rights (for becomes synonymous with “Mexican example, to vote and receive a trial by jury) appearance,” irrespective of citizenship.96 and responsibilities (to pay taxes and Unfortunately, racial pro½ling by law follow the law). The citizenship/national enforcement has been sanctioned by the sovereignty perspective has held sway in highest courts for over thirty years. The the United States. Consequently, the mere U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. presence of undocumented aliens is evi- Brignoni-Ponce (1975), held that “Mexican dence of their lawbreaking nature and jus - appearance is a relevant factor” that can ti½cation for the dismissal of their human be taken into consideration in law en - rights.103 When framed within the post– forcement decisions regarding whom to 9/11 anti-terrorism and national security stop and interrogate.97 discourse, it is even easier for the public The plenary power doctrine is the cor- to stomach these human rights abuses. nerstone that allows, if not encourages, Pro½ting from prisoners is also not a the disparate and highly questionable new practice. As historian Robert Perkin- treatment of immigrants. According to son has detailed, the United States, par- Ngai, the plenary power doctrine “has ticularly the South, embraced a convict allowed Congress to create rules that leasing system within decades of the would be unacceptable if applied to citi- formal abolishment of slavery.104 By ex- zens. Second, it has marginalized or erased ploiting a loophole in the 13th Amend- other issues from consideration in policy ment that abolished slavery “except as formation, such as human rights and the punishment for crime,” Texas and other global distribution of wealth.”98 The Southern states were able to reestablish a merging of immigration and criminal slavery-like system using convicts (pri- law, a trend that escalated in the 1990s marily blacks) as leased labor to high bid- and expanded considerably after 9/11, has ders. Today, private contractors are en - allowed that “mundane, everyday polic- gaged in social control functions that ing with no direct relevance to national have fundamentally altered the traditional security by nonfederal authorities can social control apparatus. The general now lead to detention and eventually assumption is that privatizing government deportation.”99 These policies further functions will generate greater ef½ciency. disenfranchise immigrant communities Although this idea is in and of itself ques- and act as a form of legal, political, and tionable, an even more fundamental ques- economic apartheid.100 Additionally, tion is whether or not ef½ciency as judged deportations devalue assimilation and by corporate pro½ts should be the mea- fracture families.101 sure by which we evaluate prisons and/or Two competing views have framed the detention centers. It is, after all, in the human rights issues regarding immigra- best interest of corporations to increase tion and immigrant rights: the citizen- occupancy rates and punish people for ship and national sovereignty perspective, longer periods of time. and the human rights perspective.102 The immigration-industrial complex is The latter recognizes the fundamental enormous, as are its entrenched interests.

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Investors are pro½ting handsomely from secure state funding for managing the Karen the imprisonment of other people, creat- lives of detainees, all the while making Manges Douglas & ing a new class of what journalist Joseph money for their shareholders. Rogelio Hallinan has called “prison millionaires” As sociologist Gideon Sjoberg has artic - Sáenz that marks “a turning point in American ulated, corporations “are in the curious penology. Never before had it been possi- position of having a monetary stake in ble in this country to become rich by destabilizing social orders through their incarcerating other people. Now, it is support of certain economic and political commonplace.”105 Unfortunately, the policies.”109 Indeed, cca illustrates such pro½t generated by detaining immigrants a “curious position” in its participation extends beyond individuals, as the sys- in the creation of the destabilizing, anti- tem has itself become institutionalized. immigrant S.B. 1070 in Arizona through Although detainees are at most tempo- which they stand to pro½t. Moreover, the rary and unwanted “residents,” their in - standards of transparency and account - clusion in the U.S. Census as residents of ability between the public and private the counties in which they are detained sectors are very different. What further contributes thousands, if not millions, of complicates the situation is that the dollars to state and local budget coffers. moral accountability of corporations is As journalist Henry Sieff has observed: seldom addressed by social scientists or “four hundred billion dollars in federal even legal scholars, let alone the broader funding over the next 10 years will be dis- citizenry.110 In a larger sense, Sjoberg tributed based on the count, making suggests that we may need to reexamine detainees worth thousands of dollars to the legal foundation of corporations if cities, counties, and states where they are these social entities are to be held morally briefly detained. The government will accountable, especially in light of the rise allocate more than $100 million in addi- of the prison-industrial complex and tional funds to places where immigrants now the immigrant detention industry are detained.”106 and, beyond the focus of this essay, the What can be done about detention cen- international scope of these organiza- ters now and in the future? And how can tions. At minimum, Sjoberg urges that their negative impact on U.S. society be corporations be prohibited from pro½ting minimized? Professor of Government from coercion and violence.111 As Profes- Michael Sandel has called for a discussion sor Sandel has contended, one of the con- regarding the “reach of markets, and sequences of the shift to a market society market-oriented thinking into aspects of is the corrosive and corruptive effects that life traditionally governed by non-market markets have on our integrity, for treat- norms.”107 As has been illustrated in this ing human beings as commodities “fails essay, private corporations are managing to value human beings in the appropriate detention centers and making huge way–as persons worthy of dignity and pro½ts from doing so. We must recognize respect, rather than as instruments of gain that the market system, in this case as and objects of use.”112 reflected in the construction and operation The issues addressed in this essay are of private detention centers, are, as legal part of a major transformation under way scholar Bernard Harcourt has stressed, a in the United States (and globally) in creation of the state.108 The corporations which neoliberal ideology dominates that manage these detention centers have nearly all aspects of society. What has a vested interest in expanding them; they resulted in the United States is an increas-

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The Crimi- ing wealth and income strati½cation, rate power is being addressed by the United nalization high levels of risk for individuals, and Nations. In his opening address to the of Immi - grants harsh and punitive policies for immi- United Nations Forum on Business and & the Immi- grants and the poor.113 An urgent discus- Human Rights, human rights scholar gration- Industrial sion is needed about the encroachment of John Ruggie pointedly urged that “states Complex market-based policies and principles into must protect; companies must respect; our nation’s prisons and immigrant and those who are harmed must have detention centers. Unfortunately, the redress.”115 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Citizens Demonizing and criminalizing immi- United v. Federal Election Commission, in grants–by and large, nonthreatening addition to its 2012 ruling against Mon- labor migrants–serves no one’s inter- tana’s efforts to limit corporate reach ests. It disenfranchises the immigrants into state and local politics, indicates that and maintains their marginality and the reexamination of the legal structure exploitation. The billions of dollars spent of corporations is an idea whose time has to militarize the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet come, at least not under the pres- not made us safer; arresting and deport- ent political and legal constructions. ing the most vulnerable among us does However, as Perkinson has documented, nothing to address the growing economic penal reform, even in the most unlikely inequality that Jacob Hacker and political of places (like conservative Texas), has scientist Paul Pierson have vividly de - happened in the past.114 Furthermore, scribed.116 It does, however, tarnish the the issue of the need for a broader human reputation of a nation that purports to rights platform in light of growing corpo- stand for “liberty and justice for all.”

endnotes * Contributor Biographies: KAREN MANGES DOUGLAS is Associate Professor of Sociology at Sam Houston State University. She has contributed book chapters and articles to Globaliza- tion and America: Race, Human Rights and Inequality (edited by Angela J. Hattery, David G. Embrick, and Earl Smith, 2008), Debates on U.S. Immigration (edited by Judith Gans, Elaine M. Replogle, and Daniel J. Tichenor, 2012), and the research annual Studies in Symbolic Inter- action. ROGELIO SÁENZ is Dean of the College of Public Policy and Peter Flawn Professor of Demography at the University of Texas at San Antonio. His publications include Latino Issues: A Reference Handbook (with Aurelia Lorena Murga, 2011), Latinas/os in the United States: Changing the Face of América (edited with Havidán Rodríguez and Cecilia Menjívar, 2008), and the census report Latinos and the Changing Face of America (2004). 1 Tara Herivel, “Behind Closed Doors: Privatized Prisons for Youth,” in Prison Pro½teers: Who Makes Money from Mass Incarceration (New York: The New Press, 2007), 157–178. 2 Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012); Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); Chris Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class (New York: Nation Books, 2010); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Wash- ington Made the Rich Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color- blindness (New York: The New Press, 2010); and Kevin R. Johnson and Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2011).

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3 Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Karen Press, 2000); Mae N. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America Manges (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Johnson and Trujillo, Immigration Douglas & Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border. Rogelio Sáenz 4 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 5 Ibid., 18. 6 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/ us/149/698/case.html. 7 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 76. 8 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 9 Ibid. 10 Don M. Coerver, “Immigration/Emigration,” in Mexico: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Culture and History, ed. Don M. Coerver, Suzanne B. Pasztor, and Robert M. Buf½ngton (Santa Barbara, Calif.: abc-Clio, 2004), 223–230. 11 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 75. 14 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 15 Johnson and Trujillo, Immigration Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border. 16 Andreas, Border Games. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 4. 20Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 21 Ibid. 22 Andreas, Border Games, 35 23 Andreas, Border Games. 24 Ernesto Verdeja, “Law, Terrorism, and the Plenary Power Doctrine: Limiting Alien Rights,” Constellations 9 (1) (2002): 89–97. 25 William J. Clinton, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on Immigration Policy,” in Administration of William J. Clinton (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of½ce, 1993), 1194, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg1194.pdf. 26 Andreas, Border Games. 27 Ibid., 87. 28 Andreas, Border Games. 29 Anna Ochoa O’Leary and Azucena Sanchez, “Anti-Immigrant Arizona: Ripple Effects and Mixed Immigration Status Households under ‘Policies of Attrition’ Considered,” Journal of Borderland Studies 26 (1) (2011): 115–133. 30 Verdeja, “Law, Terrorism, and the Plenary Power Doctrine,” 93. 31 Mathew Coleman and Austin Kocher, “Detention, Deportation, Devolution and Immigrant Incapacitation in the U.S., Post 9/11,” The Geographical Journal 177 (3) (September 2011): 228–237.

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The Crimi- 32 Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., “The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act nalization of 1996: An Overview,” International Migration Review 31 (2) (Summer 1997): 438–460. of Immi - grants 33 Barbara Hines, “An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy Since 9/11,” Texas Hispanic & the Immi- Journal of Law and Policy 12 (9) (2006): 17. gration- 34 Industrial Ibid. Complex 35 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,” http://www.ice.gov/news/ library/factsheets/287g.htm (accessed July 30, 2012). 36 Verdeja, “Law, Terrorism, and the Plenary Power Doctrine”; and Juan Carlos Linares, “Hired Hands Needed: The Impact of Globalization and Human Rights Law on Migrant Workers in the United States,” Denver Journal of International Law Policy 34 (3) (Fall 2006). 37 Hines, “An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy Since 9/11.” 38 Ibid. 39 Cassie L. Peterson, “An Iowa Immigration Raid Leads to Unprecedented Criminal Conse- quences: Why ice Should Rethink the Postville Model,” Iowa Law Review 95 (1) (2009): 323–346. 40 Johnson and Trujillo, Immigration Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border. 41 Linares, “Hired Hands Needed.” 42 Alexander, The New Jim Crow. 43 Johnson and Trujillo, Immigration Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border. 44 Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the Ameri- can Dream (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 45 Priscila Diaz, Delia S. Saenz, and Virginia S.Y. Kwan, “Economic Dynamics and Changes in Attitudes Toward Undocumented Mexican Immigrants in Arizona,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 11 (1) (2011): 302. 46 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 25. 47 Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893; New York: Free Press, 1984). 48 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 25. 49Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review 19 (3) (September 1993): 431–466. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 450. 52 Dwight Eisenhower, “Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation,” January 17, 1961, http:// www.ourdocuments.gov/print_friendly.php?flash=true&page=&doc=90&title=President +Dwight+D.+Eisenhower%27s+Farewell+Address+%281961%29. 53 Tanya Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex: Why We Enforce Immigration Policies Destined to Fail,” Sociology Compass 3 (2) (2009): 301. 54 Charles C. Moskos, “The Concept of the Military-Industrial Complex: Radical Critique of Liberal Bogey?” Social Problems 21 (4) (1974): 498–512; and Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex,” 301. 55 Mike Davis, “Hell Factories in the Field,” The Nation 260 (7) (February 20, 1995): 229, http://road-trip.syntone.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/davis-mike-hell-factories -1995.pdf.

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56 Angela Davis, “Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex,” Colorlines, Karen September 10, 1998, http://colorlines.com/archives/1998/09/masked_racism_reflections_on Manges _the_prison_industrial_complex.html; and Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Com- Douglas & plex,” The Atlantic Monthly 282 (6) (1998): 54. Rogelio Sáenz 57 Earl Smith and Angela Hattery, “The Prison Industrial Complex,” Sociation Today 4 (2) (2006), http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v42/prison.htm. 58 Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex.” 59 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1995), http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Prisoners_in_1994.pdf; and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Prison Inmates, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1993), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/sospi91.pdf. 60 Ibid. 61 Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 9–10. 62 Phillip J. Wood, “Globalization and Prison Privatization: Why Are Most of the World’s For- Pro½t Adult Prisons to Be Found in the American South?” International Political Sociology 1 (3) (2007): 232; and Tanya Golash-Boza, “A Confluence of Interests in Immigration Enforce- ment: How Politicians, the Media, and Corporations Pro½t from Immigration Policies Des- tined to Fail,” Sociology Compass 3 (2) (2009): 290. 63 Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex,” 296. 64See Dow, American Gulag; Deepa Fernandes, Targeted: National Security and the Business of Immigration (St. Paul, Minn.: Seven Stories Press, 2007); Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex”; and Golash-Boza, “A Confluence of Interests in Immigration Enforce- ment.” 65 Brendan I. Koerner, “The Security Traders,” Mother Jones (September/October 2002), http:// www.motherjones.com/politics/2002/09/security-traders; and Mark Mills, “On My Mind: The Security-Industrial Complex,” Forbes, November 29, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/ 2004/1129/044.html. 66 Justin Akers Chacón and Mike Davis, No One is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006). 67 Golash-Boza, “The Immigration Industrial Complex.” 68 Leo R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008). 69 Corrections Corporation of America, “Our History,” http://www.cca.com/about/cca-history (accessed July 28, 2012). 70 Ibid. 71 Corrections Corporation of America, “The cca Way,” http://www.cca.com/about/cca-way/ (accessed July 28, 2012). 72 Corrections Corporation of America, “Corporate Pro½le,” http://ir.correctionscorp.com/ phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-homePro½le&t=&id=& (accessed July 28, 2012). 73 Corrections Corporation of America, “cca Facility Locations,” http://www.cca.com/facil ities/ (accessed July 28, 2012). 74 Ibid. 75 Corrections Corporation of America, “cca Announces 2011 Fourth Quarter and Full-Year Final Results,” http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-newsArticle &ID=1658614&highlight= (accessed July 28, 2012). 76 Ibid.

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The Crimi- 77 Funding Universe, “Corrections Corporation of America History,” http://www.fundinguniverse nalization .com/company-histories/corrections-corporation-of-america-history/ (accessed July 28, 2012). of Immi - grants 78 Ibid.; and Philip Mattera, Mafruza Khan, and Stephan Nathan, Corrections Corporation of & the Immi- America: A Critical Look at Its First Twenty Years (Charlotte, N.C.: Grassroots Leadership, gration- 2003), http://www.soros.org/sites/default/½les/CCA_Report.pdf. Industrial Complex 79 Corrections Corporation of America, “Board of Directors,” http://www.cca.com/about/ management-team/board-directors/ (accessed July 29, 2012). 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. The website includes a full list of current cca board members, along with their bios. 83 Mattera et al., Corrections Corporation of America. 84 Ibid., 22. 85 Mattera et al., Corrections Corporation of America. 86 Ibid. 87 Adam Zagorin, “Scrutiny for a Bush Judicial Nominee,” Time, March 13, 2008, http://www .time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1722065,00.html. For further details on the many po - litical ½gures who have ties to cca, see Mattera et al., Corrections Corporation of America. 88 Mattera et al., Corrections Corporation of America. 89 New York Stock Exchange, “Corrections Corp of America (nyse:cxw),” https://www .google.com/½nance?client=ob&q=NYSE:CXW (accessed July 27, 2012). 90 New York Stock Exchange, “The geo Group, Inc. (nyse:geo),” https://www.google .com/½nance?client=ob&q=NYSE:GEO (accessed July 27, 2012). 91 Dow, American Gulag, 10. 92 Ibid. 93 Laura Sullivan, “Prison Economics Help Drive Arizona Immigration Law,” National Public Radio, October 28, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=130833 741&sc=emaf. 94 Johnson and Trujillo, Immigration Law and the U.S.-Mexico Border, 5. 95 Ibid., 11. 96 Diaz et al., “Economic Dynamics and Changes in Attitudes Toward Undocumented Mexican Immigrants in Arizona.” 97 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/ us/422/873/. 98 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 12. 99 Coleman and Kocher, “Detention, Deportation, Devolution and Immigrant Incapacitation in the U.S.,” 230. 100 Coleman and Kocher, “Detention, Deportation, Devolution and Immigrant Incapacitation in the U.S.” 101 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. 102 Bryan S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni- versity Press, 2006). 103 Caroline B. Brettell and Faith G. Nibbs, “Immigrant Suburban Settlement and the ‘Threat’ to Middle Class Status and Identity: The Case of Farmers Branch, Texas,” International Migration 49 (1) (2010): 1–30.

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104 Robert Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire (New York: Picador, 2010). Karen 105 Manges Joseph T. Hallinan, Going up the River: Travels in a Prison Nation (New York: Random House, Douglas & 2001), 174. Rogelio 106 Henry Sieff, “Down for the Count: The Pro½table Game of Counting Immigrants in the Sáenz Census, Then Deporting Them,” Texas Observer, March 25, 2010, http://www.texasobserver .org/cover-story/down-for-the-count. 107 Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, 7. 108 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011). 109 Gideon Sjoberg, “The Corporate Control Industry and Human Rights: The Case of Iraq,” Journal of Human Rights 4 (2005): 98. 110 Sjoberg, “The Corporate Control Industry and Human Rights.” 111 Gideon Sjoberg, “Corporations and Human Rights,” in Interpreting Human Rights: Social Sci- ence Perspectives, ed. Rhiannon Morgan and Bryan Turner (New York: Routledge, 2009). 112 Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, 9–10. 113 Rogelio Sáenz, Karen Manges Douglas, David Geronimo Embrick, and Gideon Sjoberg, “Pathways to Downward Mobility: The Impact of Schools, Welfare and Prisons on People of Color,” in Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, ed. Hernán Vera and Joe Feagin (New York: Springer, 2007). 114 Perkinson, Texas Tough. 115 John G. Ruggie, “Opening Address: United Nations Forum on Business & Human Rights, Geneva, Switerzerland,” December 4, 2012, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/ Ruggie_UN_Forum_4_December_2012.pdf. 116 Hacker and Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics.

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Immigration, Civil Rights & the Evolution of the People

Cristina M. Rodríguez

Abstract: In considering what it means to treat immigration as a “civil rights” matter, I identify two frameworks for analysis. The ½rst, universalistic in nature, emanates from personhood and promises non-citizens the protection of generally applicable laws and an important set of constitutional rights. The second seeks full incorporation for non-citizens into “the people,” a composite that evolves over time through social contestation–a process that can entail enforcement of legal norms but that revolves primarily around political argument. This pursuit of full membership for non-citizens implicates a reciprocal relationship between them and the body politic, and the interests of the polity help determine the contours of non-citizens’ membership. Each of these frameworks has been shaped by the legal and political legacies of the civil rights movement itself, but the second formulation reveals how the pursuit of immigrant incorporation cannot be fully explained as a modern-day version of the civil rights struggle.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which eliminated national-origin quotas from the code, coincided with the enactment of framework civil rights legislation. Throughout the mid- to late twentieth century, lawmakers and advocates who pressed for immigration reform formulated their ideas as extensions of the civil rights struggle.1 And generally speaking, the civil rights movement has given us the vocabulary with which we frame CRISTINA M RODR GUEZ . Í is Pro- debates concerning justice, equality, and citizenship. fessor of Law at Yale Law School. Characterizing the immigration debate as a civil Her publications include Immigra- tion and Refugee Law and Policy (with rights struggle therefore has strong intuitive appeal Stephen H. Legomsky; 5th ed., for defenders of immigrants’ rights. 2009); chapters in several edited But what precisely it means to connect immigra- volumes, including The Encyclopedia tion with the civil rights project is not self-evident. of Human Global Migration (2013) The immigrant population encompasses persons and Taking Local Control: Immigra- whose ties to the body politic vary considerably in tion Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and kind. “Civil rights” is itself a term with multiple States (2010); and numerous articles in journals such as the Duke Law meanings. It can refer to particular legal protections Journal, the International Journal of against discrimination and exploitation, as well as to Constitutional Law, the Michigan Law abstract principles of equality and anti-subordina- Review, and the Yale Law Journal. tion, and it can be employed to evoke the civil rights

movement itself and the forms of popu- by courts. Whereas the personhood for- Cristina M. lar mobilization that de½ned that social mulation entitles non-citizens to the pro- Rodríguez struggle. tection of certain rights by virtue of their When advocates or scholars invoke the identity alone, the process of incorporation civil rights of immigrants, or charge that requires taking into account the prefer- the treatment of non-citizens undermines ences and prerogatives of the existing civil rights, they might mean any number members of the body politic, thus impli- of things. The claims could mean that the cating a reciprocal relationship between constitutionally protected civil liberties the non-citizen and the polity. This differ- of immigrants have been violated, or that ence between what it means to be respect- immigrants have been denied the protec- ed as a person and what it means to be tions of generally applicable social welfare incorporated into the people reflects the legislation. The reference might also be difference between civil rights as a basic to the civil rights externalities generated legal regime and civil rights as an ongoing by efforts to enforce the immigration laws social struggle. –rights violations that fall disproportion- I have given sustained treatment else- ately on lawful permanent residents and where to the personhood formulation of U.S. citizens of the same race or national civil rights as it has applied in the immi- origin as the primary targets of enforce- gration context. After considering the sig- ment. And sometimes the appeal to civil ni½cance of personhood briefly, I there- rights might be intended to invoke some- fore focus largely on what the de½nition thing grander–to tap into a historical of “the people” entails. I explore the place struggle for justice and inclusion by mar- of non-citizens within that construct and ginalized groups in order to build the moral consider the bene½ts and limitations of case for events such as the legalization of drawing from civil rights history as part the unauthorized population. of the inquiry. When invoking civil rights in immigra- On the one hand, immigration law de- tion debates, we ought to distinguish veloped in dialogue with the civil rights between two interconnected but distinct and civil liberties movements of the 1960s frameworks of analysis. The ½rst formu- and 1970s, and meaningful similarities lation, universalistic in orientation, empha- exist between the circumstances of many sizes the right of all persons to basic respect immigrants today and the subordinated for their dignity and to protection from groups whose struggle constituted the arbitrary state action. This civil rights civil rights movement. Many poor, non- formulation focuses on personhood and white immigrants perform essential but promises immigrants the protection of dif½cult labor, often at the mercy of the generally applicable laws, as well as a lim- removal laws and without full capacity to ited but important set of constitutional defend their interests in the political pro- rights grounded in the fact of personhood. cess. But as important as these conver- The second formulation accepts the rights gences might be, immigrant incorporation that emanate from personhood as a base- and the civil rights movement also impli- line but ultimately seeks recognition of cate equities quite different in kind. full membership in “the people.” “The Whereas the protagonists of the civil people,” in turn, should be understood as rights movement sought recognition of taking shape over time, primarily through the full citizenship guaranteed to them at social contestation, rather than by opera- birth by the Fourteenth Amendment, im- tion of universalistic norms enforceable migrants seek entrance into a new polity

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Immigra- that has made no preexisting commitments cerns when enforcing the law.5 Critics of tion, Civil to their inclusion.2 Accepting these dis- the slew of state and local laws designed Rights & the Evolution of tinctions does not mean that debates over to crack down on unauthorized immigrants the People immigrant incorporation cannot bene½t –Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement from application of the principles that tri- and Safe Neighborhoods Act of 2010 umphed in the civil rights movement, (S.B. 1070) most notorious among them– namely, equality and nondiscrimination on have condemned the laws for violating the the basis of race. Instead, the distinctions basic civil liberties of the unauthorized highlight how justi½cations for immigrant and giving rise to civil rights externalities incorporation have always (properly) in the form of racial pro½ling and use of taken their own shape, given the nature aggressive police tactics, even against law- of the demands made on the polity. fully present immigrants and citizens.6 But when fully realized in practice–when Scholars have written at length about legislatures exercise restraint in their how personhood has been mobilized to treatment of non-citizens, when the exec- challenge legal and social distinctions utive engages in proportional enforcement, made between citizens and aliens.3 The and when courts act as backstops to po- literature reveals how courts, in cases litical actors’ excesses–the personhood involving non-citizens, have interpreted formulation meaningfully protects basic the constitutional provisions that protect rights of immigrants. the rights of persons to recognize certain Despite its relative stability in American universally applicable personal rights. The law, however, the personhood formulation due process guarantees in the Fifth and falls short of the sort of incorporation Fourteenth Amendments of our Consti- reflected in the highest ambitions of the tution, which promote rule of law values civil rights project. As constitutional law by restraining the government from arbi- scholar Ruth Rubio-Marín and I have trary action, also have been invoked to written, “Despite the universalistic prom- advance human dignity by ensuring that ise of a human rights discourse focused persons are not deprived of basic liberty on personhood as the source of entitle- interests without adequate legal safe- ment, the persistence of national sover- guards. The courts similarly have under- eignty as an organising concept means that stood the equal protection clause as pre- rights-respecting governments need not venting states (though not the federal gov- treat citizens and non-citizens equally.”7 ernment) from denying generally available Personhood today does not entitle non- social welfare protections to at least law- citizens to core elements of membership fully present non-citizens (and, in limited in the polity: namely, the right to remain circumstances, unlawfully present non- in the United States and the right to vote.8 citizens). In so doing, the courts have Personhood also does not require that ex- highlighted how social policy goals that isting members of the people take equal also promote equality and justice can be or even meaningful regard of non-citizens’ served by evenhanded treatment of non- political interests, or of their demands on citizens.4 public resources and institutions. These This regime does not operate perfectly. exclusions are justi½ed not only by the Critics of the federal government’s depor- persistence (and importance) of national tation policies would point to the govern- sovereignty, but also by powerful socio- ment’s failure to respect due process norms cultural norms that de½ne polities as dis- and take into account humanitarian concrete entities comprised of persons tied

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to one another for historical, emotional, legal residency follows, during which the Cristina M. and practical reasons. Indeed, personhood non-citizen may claim nearly all the rights Rodríguez cannot confer the sociocultural dimensions of citizens,9 and during which a process of full membership–goods that can take of political and social acculturation pre- time even for new citizens to acquire. And sumably occurs. The process then culmi- thus, an understanding of the civil rights nates in naturalization and the former of immigrants grounded in universal per- alien’s incorporation into the range of sonhood norms is valuable, but it has a legal rights and nonlegal bene½ts of full particular and limited meaning. membership. This linear narrative sustains Determining who exactly may claim America’s self-conception as a nation of membership in the people ultimately in- immigrants and offers an account of volves ongoing political debate; perhaps nation-building based on an ordered tran- the critical feature of “the people” as a sition from alien outsider to fully assimi- concept is that it must be constituted over lated citizen. Though debates persist over time. To be sure, the birthright citizenship whether permanent residents ought to be rule of the Fourteenth Amendment recon- guaranteed all the same rights as citizens, stitutes the bulk of the people automati- and the federal government remains free to cally with each generation. But de½ning remove non-citizens, block their natural- the polity also involves identifying other ization, or otherwise discriminate against potential members and establishing the them in the distribution of bene½ts,10 the terms of their full inclusion, which then instability that attends noncitizen status occurs at different rates along legal, polit- remains limited in time, because those on ical, and social dimensions. this trajectory have been selected as eligi- To understand how these dimensions ble for ultimate incorporation. of the nation-building enterprise unfold, Historically, the parameters of this nar- we should begin with consideration of the rative have been de½ned as much by the very formal legal processes that de½ne exclusion of certain groups as by a nation- full membership. But it then will be cru- al commitment to turning immigrants into cial to appreciate how membership can members of the people.11 But over the transcend these formalities by emerging course of the twentieth century, the United through quotidian social interactions. It States eliminated categorical racial and ultimately should become clear that both ethnic exclusions from the law through the formal and informal mechanisms of processes that culminated in the Immigra- incorporation have been shaped to some tion and Nationality Act of 1965,12 through degree by civil rights norms, but that such which Congress ½nally abandoned the norms have been elements of wider- numerical quotas that limited the admis- ranging political processes that have high- sion of immigrants from Southern and lighted the particular challenges immigra- Eastern Europe, as well as from the “Asia- tion can pose to the concept of the nation. Paci½c triangle.”13 The motivating factors for these devel- The conventional, albeit oversimpli½ed, opments were likely myriad. Typical inter- narrative of immigrant incorporation est-group politics and intra-governmental into the people begins with legal migra- institutional concerns certainly shaped tion, usually authorized for the bene½t of congressional action; Italian, Eastern Euro- an existing citizen or lawful resident, but pean, and Chinese ethnic lobbies sought to also to protect persons fleeing persecution open legal migration to their family mem- or other forms of disaster. A period of bers and coethnics,14 and the State Depart-

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Immigra- ment forcefully pressed its concern over level, as well as tangible bene½ts for cer- tion, Civil the negative implications of a discrimina- tain existing citizens and residents, the ide- Rights & the Evolution of tory immigration regime for foreign rela- alism the reforms embodied grew largely the People tions.15 But more idealistic references to out of a desire to promote American virtue the civil rights movement and the ethical by aligning the legal system with the and legal principles of nondiscrimination nation’s developing self-conception as that emanated from it also inflected debates incompatible with racially de½ned citizen- over whether and how to restructure the ship, not from a particular vision of the incorporation trajectory. As scholars have membership claims of non-citizens. The remarked, “The temporal coincidence (as reforms, accordingly, were process-orient- well as discursive linkage) of immigration ed and did not occasion an especially broad reform with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or deep popular debate about how Amer- and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is too ican society ought to use its exclusion obvious to be missed.”16 powers to constitute the people. More Indeed, numerous lawmakers pursued important, despite its civil rights “perfec- immigration reform by vigorously defend- tionism,” the conventional narrative can- ing application of formal egalitarian norms not fully account for how “the people” to the immigration code, arguing that a actually have taken shape. Today, at least person’s national origin could not de½ne two trends in immigration law compli- his or her eligibility for entrance into the cate the account of nation-building: the body politic. President Johnson, for exam- increased turn to legal but temporary labor ple, exhorted Congress in his 1964 State migration and the rise of a population of of the Union to “return the United States unauthorized immigrants numbering in to an immigration policy which both serves the millions. Though non-citizens in each the national interest and continues our category typically enter without any ex- traditional ideals.” He observed that “[n]o pectation of ultimate incorporation, their move could more effectively reaf½rm our interests can mature into valid claims to fundamental belief that a man is to be membership, the legal foundations for judged–and judged exclusively, on his which can be elusive. If we focus on un- worth as a human being.”17 And in an authorized immigrants, in particular, it April 1965 speech on immigration legisla- becomes clear that we must move beyond tion, Vice President Hubert Humphrey was legal formalities to understand what con- even more concrete, noting that “[w]e stituting the people entails. It becomes want to bring our immigration law into necessary to traf½c in sociological judg- line with the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of ments and appreciate a far less ordered 1964.”18 The politics as well as the achieve- and more fluid understanding of nation- ments of the civil rights movement thus building than the step-by-step conven- helped make the legal framework for im- tional narrative allows. migrant incorporation both more open and stable. By removing the taint of racial An appreciation of the fluidity of the preference from the law, the reforms of people actually appears in constitutional 1965 transformed the people as a concept doctrine, albeit in an underdeveloped way. into a body composed without regard to Two insights characterize the courts’ ancestry or race–a signi½cant civil rights reflections. First, not all persons within advancement.19 the United States or subject to the reach At the same time, while these shifts re- of U.S. law are part of the people, but the sulted in a more egalitarian code at a formal people encompasses more than the citi-

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zenry. And second, membership can turn ing ½rearms violates the Second Amend- Cristina M. on the extent of one’s earned connection ment “right of the people to keep and bear Rodríguez to American society and may not be merely arms.” On the one hand, no court appears a function of legal status (though the birth- to have struggled to uphold the statutory right citizenship rule does make member- provision as consistent with the govern- ship a matter of happenstance for the vast ment’s interest in regulating ½rearms. majority of the polity).20 In United States v. But the cases have provided occasion to Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court fa- explore how the people differ from per- mously expressed these ideas, suggesting sons as subjects of the Constitution. that certain non-citizens possessed “[t]he The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for right of the people to be secure in their example, expressed reluctance to limit the persons” and thus the right to be free from people protected by the Second Amend- “unreasonable searches and seizures,” as ment to citizens24–a reluctance that ap- guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. pears to have been driven by the desire to The Court referred to the people as “a maintain consistency in meaning across class of persons who are part of a national constitutional provisions, as well as by community or who have otherwise devel- intuitions concerning the validity of cer- oped suf½cient connection with this coun- tain non-citizens’ claims to membership try to be considered part of that commu- in some sort of American collective. In re- nity.”21 In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court solving the case before it, the Tenth Circuit conceptualized non-citizens’ rights simi- observed that the unauthorized alien chal- larly, as existing along a trajectory de½ned lenging the gun control law may well have by the degree of connection to the United belonged to the national community, by States: virtue of having “been here for decades and nowhere else.”25 As a consequence, the [T]he alien . . . has been accorded a generous court subjected the elimination of his right and ascending scale of rights as he increases by federal law to intermediate scrutiny, identity with our society. Mere lawful pres- the form of judicial review invoked when ence in the country creates an implied assur- signi½cant interests or protected classes ance of safe conduct and gives him certain of persons are at issue. Similarly, a dissent- rights; they become more extensive and ing judge in a case decided by the Fifth secure when he makes preliminary decla- Circuit Court of Appeals premised his con- ration of intention to become a citizen, and clusions even more squarely on an af½lia- they expand to those of full citizenship upon tion model, suggesting that a person, by naturalization.22 virtue of simply having taken certain In other words, the Court has on some actions–living in the country for eighteen occasions articulated a concept of “the months, paying rent, supporting a family, people” that entails earned membership and generally accepting social obligations but that does not necessarily map onto to employers, his landlord, and his family formal legal status–a concept legal scholar –could claim to be part of the people. For Hiroshi Motomura has called “immigra- this judge, one could accept societal obli- tion as af½liation.”23 gations without complying with the immi- The lower courts similarly have explored gration laws.26 The sociological reality of this sociological approach to de½ning the individual’s life was what determined membership, most recently in cases con- his membership.27 cerning whether the federal law that pro- Of course, despite its ruminations, the hibits unauthorized aliens from possess- Tenth Circuit had little trouble in conclud-

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Immigra- ing that Congress had good reason to Denial of education to some isolated group tion, Civil keep ½rearms out of the possession of per- of children poses an affront to one of the Rights & the Evolution of sons present unlawfully, in part because goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the the People of their inherent untrustworthiness.28 abolition of governmental barriers present- But these Second Amendment cases still ing unreasonable obstacles on the basis of suggest that de½ning the people entails a individual merit. . . .The inestimable toll of competitive dynamic that demands con- that deprivation on the social, economic, in- sideration of the contributions made and tellectual, and psychological well-being of risks posed by those seeking incorpora- the individual . . . makes it most dif½cult to tion, and not just their legal status. The reconcile the cost or the principle of a status- judges’ reasoning highlights the fluidity based denial of basic education with the of the concept of the people and the bal- framework embodied in the Equal Protec- ancing of individual and social equities tion Clause. . . . We cannot ignore the signi½- that goes into its de½nition. Embedded in cant social costs borne by our Nation when the discussion of formal categories is thus select groups are denied the means to absorb a dialogue about who the Constitution, the values and skills upon which our social and the people themselves, might regard order rests.33 as complete members of the polity. His approach thus underscores that the The unauthorized immigrant presents dif½cult question of whether to legally a particularly stark challenge to the formal incorporate unauthorized immigrants mechanisms for de½ning membership. cannot be answered exclusively as a mat- He embodies a collision between the sov- ter of individual right. Instead, it must be ereigntist belief in the state’s ability to the subject of political contestation that control the nation’s composition by lay- involves the weighing of social equities. ing out ex ante procedures for incorpora- This contestation has been an ongoing tion and the notion of earned member- feature of the political process, at least since ship.29 As legal scholar Linda Bosniak the late 1970s, when members of Congress has explored, the unauthorized immigrant (and then the Reagan administration) has long had a dual identity in American began grappling with whether and how to consciousness as both an outsider to and legalize the existing population of unau- a member of the national community.30 thorized immigrants. Among the goals of This duality reflects ambivalence about reformers a generation ago was to bring the membership of the unauthorized– the formal membership regime in line with ambivalence that appears even in cases a more sociological conception similar regarded as victories for immigrants’ to the one described above. The debates rights. In Plyler v. Doe, for example,31 culminated in the Immigration Reform rather than squarely address the claims to Control Act of 1986, which acknowledged social status of unauthorized immigrants, millions of unauthorized immigrants as Justice Brennan emphasized the unau- functional members of American society thorized child’s lack of blame32 and the by creating legal paths to their eventual social policy implications of unequal treat- citizenship (albeit in exchange for a re- ment. In his explanation for his holding, doubled commitment to enforcement). Justice Brennan combined a commit- And yet, whatever consensus might have ment to an anti-subordination vision of existed at the time concerning the criteria equality with recognition of the social ills for membership, it was short-lived.34 that would result from such inequality, Whereas in other societies, periodic legal- emphasizing that:

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izations occur as a matter of course, in the moral case for incorporation. The fact that Cristina M. United States the debate over the moral most of the would-be bene½ciaries of the Rodríguez and social status of unauthorized immi- dream Act are also functional Americans grants recurs. Today we are living through who have been socialized by our institu- yet another period of heightened debate tions would seem to establish the sort of over who constitutes the people and what commonality and connectedness that it might mean for unauthorized immi- should make the granting of legal status grants to claim membership in the polity, an afterthought.37 And yet the dream Act with persistent ambivalence still framing has languished in Congress, stymied in part the debate. by concern that rewarding illegal behavior would create perverse incentives for future The national-level legislation that would illegal immigration. be required to resolve the status of the But even as these examples of law reform current unauthorized population has at- reflect deep public disagreement, most tracted meaningful support in recent years participants in the debate over the mem- within Congress and among the public at bership status of the unauthorized share large, but its passage has proven elusive. one basic assumption: that it is not ten- Perhaps the most vivid manifestations able to maintain a large unauthorized pop- today of the ambivalence that stands in the ulation embedded in the nation’s social way of a resolution are the voluminous and structures, because illegality has corrosive conflicting state and local efforts to address effects, whether on society or the immi- illegal immigration. As I have discussed grants themselves. For those who believe at length elsewhere, this activity, which unauthorized status disquali½es non-citi- simultaneously treats illegal immigration zens from membership, legal recognition as a social scourge and seeks to make it remains anathema, and some combination “functional,” reflects the polity’s pro- of enforcement measures and imposition tracted consideration of whether to regard of legal disabilities becomes attractive as unauthorized immigrants as de facto a means of reducing if not eliminating the members, or as false claimants to society’s population. But for those like me, who respect.35 This debate, percolating in a accept the premise that many of the un- decentralized fashion, has been funda- authorized constitute members sociolog- mentally about whether an alien’s lack of ically speaking, the imperative becomes to legal status amounts to a technicality that turn the ambivalence that has character- can be ½xed by formally recognizing socio- ized the debate into broad support for legal logical membership, or whether the fact recognition through legislation, to stabi- of illegality defeats the legitimacy of a lize and anchor the social fact of mem- person’s claim to membership.36 bership.38 The fortunes of the Development, Relief, In 2013, the country may be on the verge and Education for Alien Minors (dream) of expanding its membership rules in Act, the legislation ½rst proposed in 2001 dramatic fashion. Any immigration legis- to provide unauthorized youth who meet lation that does emerge likely will be the certain conditions a path to lawful status product of partisan and interest group and citizenship, also highlight the dif½culty trade-offs, and support for legalization in of achieving popular consensus. The claims particular will continue to be built by ap- of the affected youth, whose unlawful peals to the self-interest of politicians and status initially resulted from the choices the polity alike. But one of the lessons of of others, might seem to present an easy the debates of the 1960s and 1980s is that

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Immigra- ideas can also matter–especially ideas that as the potential disruption to his or her tion, Civil embody basic American values. In his ac- life or the lives of others that might attend Rights & the Evolution of count of what ½nally prompted Congress an uprooting. And emphasis on criminal the People to enact the legalization program in 1986, conduct reflects either an intuition that legal scholar Peter Schuck contends that we ought to choose only members of good the standard pluralist model of the leg- moral character, or a belief that past con- islative process cannot explain the dra- duct can serve as evidence of the individ- matic and expansionist policy adopted. ual’s respect for the society into which he He cites instead the power of ideas and seeks incorporation. values that “can precede interests as well Also relevant to the gestalt is the basis as advance them,” contending that popu- for the individual’s “illegality”: whether it lar assumptions about the bene½ts of eth- arose because of a largely unconstrained nic diversity and family uni½cation, and the choice, as a response to persecution or belief that human rights, civil liberties, deprivation, or because of the choice of and due process norms should govern another, such as a parent.43 This question our treatment of even illegal immigrants, requires interrogating our assumptions “helped to galvanize a consensus around about illegality to determine whether it is an expansive immigration policy.”39 best understood as an administrative vio- The enactment of a legalization program lation, or whether it in fact reflects bad today thus may depend on advocates and character or a moral transgression that lawmakers turning the sociological factors obscures the equities in the non-citizen’s suggestive of the unauthorized immi- favor.44 These questions, in turn, might grant’s actual membership into political prompt consideration of unauthorized im- arguments grounded in appeals to fair- migrants’ motives, such as whether their ness, justice, and social welfare.40 These actions reflect a desire for self-improve- arguments might call back to the para- ment and a willingness to work, or some digmatic civil rights movement, but they less creditable motives. The legitimacy of must also engage the unique membership these motives will be connected to the ex- questions posed by legalization. In its tent of the existing polity’s own “blame” recent decision striking down most of for illegal immigration45–a complicity no Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the Supreme Court less real because of the dif½culty of quan- identi½ed certain positive equities that tifying it, or ascribing it to individual might be entertained, including “whether choices rather than systemic factors, such the alien has children born in the United as allocation of enforcement resources or States, long ties to the community, or a failure to properly channel economic and record of distinguished military service.”41 demographic pressures. These considerations parallel the factors And ½nally, the transformation of the scholars and activists have long high- sociological case into a political claim for lighted, most common among them length legal recognition requires consideration of presence, extent of ties to the country, of incorporation’s likely effects on exist- and existence of a criminal record42– ing citizens and future iterations of the factors that combine notions of fairness polity, including the possibility that in- and dessert with an assessment of the ex- corporation would weaken the status of isting polity’s interests. Presence and ties the least well-off and create incentives for appear to stand in as proxies for de facto future illegal immigration, which in turn membership, de½ned in part by the extent would compound these negative effects.46 of the non-citizen’s contribution, as well This element requires an honest reckon-

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ing with the question of whether the the particular circumstances that de½ne it. Cristina M. interests of the existing polity ought to The conventional narrative casts a very Rodríguez take primacy over the interests of those long shadow over this debate, because the seeking incorporation.47 It should not be existing legal mechanisms of incorpora- enough to assume in a nationalistic vein tion are perceived to be neutral and fair. that the impact on existing citizens should But placing this narrative in proper histor- always take precedence, at least not if ical perspective requires acknowledging that impact is more perceived than real, its formal limitations and unintended con- or if means of ameliorating the impact sequences. The underlying premises of while also accounting for the interests of legalization are necessarily that the formal non-citizens can be identi½ed. But failure legal regime has failed and must be brought to take into account the costs of incorpo- into line with the complex social structures ration for existing members would cir- that de½ne actual membership, and that cumvent the reciprocal dimension of this realignment will promote equality and membership important to the long-term fairness while offsetting future social dys- stability of the nation-building project. function. In the end, this vision of a better integrated society ties the immigration An argument for the sociological mem- debate to the civil rights movement and bership of unauthorized immigrants that the core commitments of the American in turn justi½es their legal recognition as polity, even as the vision depends on under- part of the people ultimately demands an standing the moral ambiguities associated unwieldy balancing of interests. The incor- with nation-building. poration debate thus must revolve around

endnotes 1 For examples of this framing, see Cristina M. Rodríguez, “Immigration and the Civil Rights Agenda,” Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 6 (2010): 125–127. 2 My aim here is largely descriptive–to provide a socio-legal account of how non-citizens become members of “the people.” I leave for another day whether the process of incorporation should be governed by certain moral imperatives, such that it might be illegitimate for existing members of the polity to exclude non-citizens who seek incorporation. For an influential defense of the polity’s right to exclude, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 34–42. 3 For representative literature, see Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 80– 95; and Peter Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81–108. 4 For discussion of this framework, see Cristina M. Rodríguez and Ruth Rubio-Marín, “The Constitutional Status of Irregular Migrants: Testing the Boundaries of Human Rights Protec- tion in Spain and the United States,” in Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, ed. Marie Dembour and Tobias Kelley (New York: Routledge, 2011), 74, 81–84, 92–98. 5 See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3–5. 6 For an account of how immigration enforcement, particularly at the state and local levels, raises civil rights concerns, albeit different in kind from Jim Crow segregation, see Kevin R. Johnson, “Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration,”

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Immigra- Georgia Law Review 46 (2012): 629–638. Johnson asks, “[H]ow can racial pro½ling in border tion, Civil enforcement, massive detentions of non-citizens, and record levels of deportations not im- Rights & the plicate civil rights concerns” (611). See also Kevin R. Johnson, “A Case Study of Color-Blind- Evolution of ness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive the People Immigration Reform,” UC Irvine Law Review 2 (1) (2012): 352–356. 7 Rodríguez and Rubio-Marín, “The Constitutional Status of Irregular Migrants,” in Are Human Rights for Migrants? ed. Dembour and Kelley, 74. 8 For an account of these rights as “sovereignty” rights, see ibid., 83. 9 For a discussion of this point, see Spiro, Beyond Citizenship, 81–108. 10 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 11 For an account of this discriminatory history, see Gabriel J. Chin, “The Civil Rights Revolu- tion Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,” North Carolina Law Review 75 (1996): 279–297. 12 In the years leading up to the 1965 reforms, “cumulative ad hoc measures,” often driven by foreign policy, led to the gradual erasure of racial exclusion from the code. See Christian Joppke, Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 51–53. Congress, for example, eliminated the Chinese exclusion laws in 1943, and presidents used their executive authority to admit refugees from the otherwise disfavored region of Eastern Europe. 13 Pursuant to this scheme, which Congress added to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 to replace the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” two thousand visas were allocated annually for “all nonwhite immigrants born within an Asian-Paci½c Triangle stretching from India to Japan to the Paci½c Islands.” See Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 191. 14 Joppke, Selecting by Origin, 55. 15 See Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 176–181. Scholars have identi½ed this dynamic in the passage of civil rights legislation generally. For influential accounts, see John Skrentny, “The Effect of the Cold War on African-American Civil Rights,” Theory and Society 27 (1998): 237–285; and Mary Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (1988): 61–120. 16 Joppke, Selecting by Origin, 56. 17 Quoted in ibid., 261 n.66. 18 Quoted in Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 215; see also Chin, “The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law,” 300–302. 19 In his work on the subject, Jack Chin challenges the view that the 1965 Act was designed to expand white Southern and Eastern European immigration; see Chin, “The Civil Rights Rev- olution Comes to Immigration Law,” 275. He argues that “Congress meant exactly what it said–that race was no longer to be a factor in America’s immigration law” (278). He points to evidence throughout the legislative record suggesting that lawmakers were aware that they might transform the country’s demography by enabling the admission of large numbers of Asian immigrants, in addition to Europeans, underscoring the dramatic egalitarian nature of the reforms (303–321). 20 The adoption of this rule in 1868 undid the most discredited of the Supreme Court’s efforts to de½ne “the people,” in Dred Scott v. Sandford. The Court concluded that blacks were “not included, and were not intended to be included,” and that, at the time of the Constitution’s formation, they were thought to be a “subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to give them”; see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

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21 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejects this construct Cristina M. and writes: “Given the history of our Nation’s concern over warrantless and unreasonable Rodríguez searches, explicit recognition of ‘the right of the people’ to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert it” (at 276). 22 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950). 23 Motomura, Americans in Waiting, 11–12. 24 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F. 3d 1164, 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012). 25 Huitron-Guizar, at 1169. 26 See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442–443, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In elaborating this view, the dissenter tacks back and forth between an effort to de½ne the people as a term of art and the more fundamental concept of the person reflected in the due process precedents, thus demonstrating how robust defenses of the rights of personhood inevitably inform articulation of the collective people (at 445–446). To this dissenter, the rights to bear arms, to be free from unwarranted searches, and to peaceably assemble, which all belong to “the people,” represent mechanisms of self- defense against the state that all persons who make their home in the United States ought to be considered to possess (at 444). 27 Linda Bosniak, for example, expresses her sympathy for an “ethical territoriality” according to which membership is treated as “a matter of social fact rather than as a legal formality”; see Linda Bosniak, “Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants,” Theo- retical Inquiries in Law 8 (2) (2007): 392. 28 Huitron-Guizar, at 1170. Both the Tenth and Fifth Circuits found it permissible for the government to prevent unauthorized aliens from possessing ½rearms, and in the course of so ½nding described unauthorized immigrants as having unknowable identities–as persons “who . . . are likely to maintain no permanent address in this country, elude detection through an assumed identity, and already living outside the law, resort to illegal activities to maintain a livelihood”; see Portillo-Munoz, at 441. 29Catherine Dauvergne writes: “Globalization brings a range of pressures to national borders, and they are increasingly permeable to flows of money and ideas. . . . Although it is evident that prosperous states would like to assert complete control over those who cross their borders, it is equally evident that this is not possible. Or, at least, that states (especially democratic capitalist ones) are not willing to undertake the trade-offs (mostly economic) that would be necessary to come anywhere close to achieving this goal”; see Catherine Dauvergne, Mak- ing People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17. 30 Linda Bosniak, “Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law,” Wisconsin Law Review (1988): 956. 31 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 32 Justice Brennan invoked justice as a basis for his conclusion, noting that “legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice. . . . [I]mposing disabilities on the child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing”; see Plyler, at 220 (quotations omitted). 33 Ibid., at 222. 34 As Daniel Tichenor has documented, in implementing the Immigration Reform Control Act, the Reagan administration “set out to restrict the number of amnesty grants that were issued” under the statute; see Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 263–265.

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Immigra- 35 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, “The Signi½cance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,” Mich- tion, Civil igan Law Review 106 (4) (2008). Rights & the Evolution of 36 The Supreme Court’s recent intervention into this debate through its decision to strike down the People most, but not all, of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 will limit the tools with which states and localities may respond to anti-incorporationist sentiments in particular, but it remains to be seen how the Court’s decision will affect the broader debate over whether and how to incorporate unauthorized immigrants. By limiting the states’ capacity for action, the decision might accelerate the debate at the federal level, though the same opposition to incorporation reflected in Arizona’s enforcement laws may simply entrench the stalemate in Congress. See United States v. Arizona, 567 U.S. __ (2012). 37 As Joseph Carens has put it, “Human beings who have been raised in a society become members of that society: not recognizing their social membership is cruel and unjust”; see Joseph Carens, “The Case for Amnesty,” Boston Review (May/June 2009), http://bostonreview.net/ BR34.3/carens.php. 38 This imperative feels urgent, but its realization demands patience. As the history of the 1986 reforms highlights, a legislative breakthrough can take years of agitation; though the 1980s began with an American public “convinced that the country had lost control of its borders” and willing to “embrace . . . harsh crackdowns on illegal immigration,” by the middle of the decade, previously unthinkable legislative victories had been won. Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 242. 39 Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 93–96. For a detailed account of the forces responsible for the 1986 reforms, see Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 261–262. 40 The willingness of unauthorized youth to publicly state their claims to membership provides something of a model, as their actions helped create the political and moral pressure that prompted the Obama administration to announce its plan for deferred action for childhood arrivals–a plan that has allowed those who meet certain eligibility criteria to be considered for a form of temporary relief from removal and authorization to work. See the memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to dhs Of½cials, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Chil- dren,” June 15, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20120612-napolitano-announces -deferred-action-process-for-young-people.shtm. 41 Ibid., 4–5. 42 Joseph Carens has argued that “[i]rregular migrants should be . . . allowed to remain with legal status as residents–if they have been settled for a long time. Some circumstances– arriving as children or marrying citizens or permanent residents–may accelerate or strengthen their moral claims to stay”; see Carens, “The Case for Amnesty.” Rogers Smith has called for legalization of those who have been present at least ten years and who do not possess a criminal record, on the ground that such a conservative proposal would stand a chance of “breaking the destructive gridlock on immigration”; see Rogers M. Smith, “A More Con- servative Proposal has a Better Chance of Succeeding,” Boston Review (May/June 2009), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/smith.php. Linda Bosniak has developed an argument she calls “ethical territoriality,” or the “conviction that rights and recognition should extend to all persons who are territorially present within the geographical space of a national state by virtue of that presence”; see Bosniak, “Being Here,” 390–391. 43 As Catherine Dauvergne has emphasized, “The minimal content of the term ‘illegal’ obscures the identities of those to whom it is af½xed”; see Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, 16. 44Dauvergne notes the increasing shift in perception toward illegality as criminal in a “mala in se sense”; see ibid. 45 For an account of how U.S. immigration policy since 1986 has contributed directly to the rise of illegal immigration, see Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell

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Sage Foundation, 2002), 73–104. These scholars also have identi½ed the reforms of 1965 as a Cristina M. culprit in the creation of large-scale unauthorized immigration. These and other legal reforms Rodríguez meant that between 1968 and 1980, the number of visas available to Mexicans “dropped from an unlimited supply” to twenty thousand per year; coupled with demographic and economic factors, the changes in the law meant that “only one outcome was possible: an explosion of undocumented migration” (43–44). 46 In United States v. Arizona, the Supreme Court described additional concerns, relying on reports presenting descriptive statistics, as well as anecdotal evidence: “Accounts in the record suggest there is an ‘epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems’ associated with the influx of illegal migration across private land near the Mexi- can border”; see Arizona, at 6. 47 Carol Swain has emphasized consideration of the “impact of illegal immigration on the most vulnerable members of American society: native-born Americans and legal immigrants with low skills and low levels of education”; and has contended that moral claims of these individuals “trump” those of the “unknown millions who are in the country illegally.” See Carol M. Swain, “Apply Compassion Offered Illegal Immigrants to the Most Vulnerable Citizens,” Boston Review (May/June 2009), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/swain.php.

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