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Op #280: the Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Earl Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern U

Op #280: the Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Earl Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern U

OP #280: THE QUESTION OF RUSSO-UKRAINIAN UNITY AND UKRAINIAN DISTINCTIVENESS IN EARLY MODERN UKRAINIAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE by: Zenon E. Kohut

Introduction areas did they seek links with and in which ones did they hold on to Many present-day still what they considered essential differ- consider to be part of Russia, ences? In order to get to the root of historically, culturally, and even spiri- these questions, it is necessary to at tually. So pervasive has been the myth least touch upon the Ukrainian out- of Russo-Ukrainian unity that any look prior to the encounter with attempt at asserting a Ukrainian Russia. identity has been viewed by many Russians as betrayal or as foreign The Polish-Lithuanian Experience intrigue. Despite the persecution of When in 1654 Bohdan in both Imperial Khmel’nyts’kyi placed Ukraine under Russia and the , Ukraini- the protection of the Muscovite , ans have developed the idea of a the country had experienced more distinct Ukrainian nationhood. Many than half a century of political, reli- of the current misunderstandings gious, cultural, and social turmoil. Up between Russia and Ukraine have as to the 1654 agreement, and their base a fundamental clash over the even after it, Ukrainian (Ruthenian) historical role of Ukraine. Are Ukraini- elites were trying to find a place within ans and Russians the same people? Are the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. somewhat distinct only Only after the failure to reach an because their “Russianness” has been accommodation within - corrupted by Polish practices? Are did Ukrainian elites begin Ukrainians really a distinct nation both looking toward Muscovy and involv- 1 in the past and in the present? ing it in Ukrainian affairs. In their In this clash, both sides are look- encounter with Russia in the seven- ing at the same historical experience teenth century, Ukrainian elites were but reaching diametrically opposed primarily focusing on and reacting to conclusions. To a large extent, each political, social, religious, and cultural side selects examples that corroborate issues within the Polish-Lithuanian its own interpretation and ignores or Commonwealth. explains away evidence to the contrary. By the sixteenth century, the But the problem is deeper than this, for Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth there is an ambiguity to the Russo- was, in theory, a “Republic of the Ukrainian encounter from its very Nobles” of two territories, the King- inception in the seventeenth century. dom of Poland and the Grand Duchy Much of the ambiguity comes from of Lithuania. The nobles, encompass- posturing; from what Kliuchevsky has ing the political nation, could be of said about the 1654 Pereiaslav agree- diverse ethnic origins—Polish, ment, in which both sides “did not say Lithuanian, Ruthenian, or German— what they thought and did what they and diverse faiths—Roman Catholic, 2 did not wish to do.” In these encoun- Protestant, or Eastern Orthodox—but ters both sides found it convenient to had individual liberties and equal overlook differences and concentrate rights. Reality differed greatly from on areas of real or imagined unity. But theory, particularly in the territories of how did Ukrainian elites view the the Commonwealth inhabited by relationship with Russia? In which (Ukrainians and 1 ). There was no equality the Protestant reforms. In the program- among the nobles: political leadership matic vision of the Jesuit ideologue, was exercised by the princely houses Peter Skarga, confessional unity was of the Rurikids and the Gedyminids, essential for political unity, and East- while the nobles, descended from the ern Orthodoxy was considered not boyars, acted as subordinates and only erroneous, but also subversive of retainers. Although the Union of the state.5 Owing to increasing political Lublin, which transferred pressure, accompanied by a flowering and the land from the Grand of Polish culture, Ruthenian nobles Duchy to Poland, did not create a third began converting to Roman Catholi- ’ entity, it did guarantee the rights cism and adopting the of the and recog- and culture. As the Ruthenian political nized the laws of Rus’ as the official nation declined because of these code in the annexed territories. The defections, the remaining Ruthenian Rus’ faith—Eastern Orthodoxy— elites—both nobles and clergy—began provided another link to the ancient looking for ways of defining a Kiev. Thus, despite Lithuanian and, Ruthenian identity that would find after 1569, Polish rule, Ukrainian acceptance in the political, social, and society preserved the social structure, cultural structure of the Common- religious faith, language, and law code wealth. One attempt was the Church of Kievan Rus’.3 Union at Brest (1596), whereby the Ukrainians conceived of unity Ruthenian recog- within the Commonwealth primarily as nized the pope but retained its eastern a political matter. They were part of the Christian traditions. Another response Polish political nation because they was a vigorous Orthodox Slavic reform belonged to the . There were that attempted to counter the Catholic ethnic, religious, and cultural differences attacks on theological, intellectual, and between the Ruthenian szlachta and the even cultural grounds. In the end, Polish, Lithuanian, and German nobili- these efforts failed. By the seventeenth ties, but these were not significant for the century, the Commonwealth was unity of the state. Thus a Ukrainian increasingly becoming an association nobleman could be designated as gente of Roman Catholic, culturally Polish ruthenus, natione polonus. Since religious noblemen. Others were considered and cultural differences were encom- politically unreliable, heretical, or passed within the political nation, these simply uncivilized and unsuited to be differences were tolerated in other orders part of the political nation. Thus the of society.4 Because some members of the areas that Ukrainians had defined as szlachta were Orthodox, townsfolk or distinct— and culture—were even peasants could also be Orthodox. no longer legitimate. Unity in the While this is a highly idealized and Commonwealth had to pertain to all theoretical picture, it does reflect to some spheres. The political szlachta nation degree the tolerance and cultural hetero- had to be Roman Catholic in religion geneity of the Polish-Lithuanian Com- and Polish in language and culture.6 monwealth up to the mid-sixteenth In attempting to find a place for a century. reformed Eastern Orthodoxy and In the latter half of the sixteenth Ruthenian culture in the Polish- century, Ruthenian Orthodox society Lithuanian Commonwealth, the was challenged intellectually by both Ruthenian clerical and cultural elites the Catholic Counter- and entered a larger struggle between 2 Eastern and Western Churches, be- and Turks. The saw them- tween Greek-Slavonic and Latin-Polish selves as frontier knights, a military culture—in essence, a struggle be- order that possessed certain “rights tween West and East. It was hardly an and liberties.” Although, at times, the even struggle, for the Western side Commonwealth recognized these simply viewed the East as heretical, rights for some of the Cossacks, the ignorant, and backward, while the idea of a non-noble brotherhood of Eastern side, using Western learning, Cossack warriors with liberties clashed attempted to prove its doctrinal cor- fundamentally with the concept of a rectness and create a revitalized hu- Commonwealth of free nobles. The manistic Ruthenian Orthodox Slavic lack of recognition of Cossack estate learning. While the Ruthenian side rights led to a series of Cossack revolts, could never bridge the gap of per- including the fateful one of 1648.9 ceived inferiority within the Polish- Up to the end of the sixteenth Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was century, the leadership of Rus’ was still certain that it had created the most exercised by the princely households enlightened Orthodox Church—one and executed through a system of that could and should play a leading subordinate noble retainers.10 For role in the renovation of Eastern example, the princes of Ostrih led the Orthodox .7 Orthodox revival by printing the The new learning and polemics Orthodox Bible and founding the over the church union sparked a keen Ostrih academy, which generated the interest in history, particularly that of cadres for the revival in the late six- Kievan Rus’. In the early seventeenth teenth and early seventeenth centuries. century, not only were the old Kievan However, owing to the extinction of chronicles recopied, but new historical some princely households and the writing brought them up to more conversion to Roman Catholicism and contemporary times. The polemical Polish culture of others, princely literature debating the leadership began to wane and the made use of the Rus’ past. Moreover, subordinate Ukrainian nobility became spurred by Polish historical writings, disoriented. By the time of the the Ukrainian authors introduced new Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising, the lesser terminology and concepts into history Ukrainian nobles had either become writing, such as a Rus’ “fatherland” Polish or joined the Cossacks, but had and a Ruthenian or Rus’ people. These ceased to act on behalf of a Ruthenian writings went beyond the Polish- noble estate. A new leadership role was Lithuanian concept of a szlachta nation assumed, rather hesitantly, by the and implied the existence of a Rus’ Cossacks. In 1620, the entire hierarchy nation that included the Orthodox of the then outlawed Orthodox church Ruthenian population from various was consecrated in Kiev under Cossack estates.8 protection. From that time on, the The religious and social picture in Cossacks fought not only for their Ukraine was further complicated by estate rights, but also for the Rus’ faith.11 the emergence of a new social group— Despite the increasing intoler- the Cossacks. Recruited primarily from ance, the Ruthenian elites, including non-noble elements of the population, the remaining szlachta, the Orthodox the Cossacks organized themselves clergy, and the Cossack officers, ex- into a military host that defended the pressed loyalty to and identity with southern frontier against the the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 3 The revival of the Rus’ faith, the wealth is the true mother of Rus’, who renewed interest in Rus’ history and grieves over the injustice done to Rus’ culture, and the recognition of a dis- by his brothers.13 tinct Ruthenian or Rus’ people called The fundamental outlook of the for some political recognition and Ukrainian elites had been shaped by acceptance for Rus’ within the Com- the Polish-Lithuanian experience. The monwealth. But finding a place for Orthodox clerical elite strongly identi- Ukraine or Rus’ within Poland- fied itself with an enlightened Ortho- Lithuania would require a fundamen- doxy in competition with Catholicism tal restructuring of the Common- and the West. Both secular and clerical wealth. Such an attempt was made in elites had a concept of a Common- 1658, after Ukraine’s break with the wealth or state composed of several Commonwealth and the 1654 political entities—Poland, Lithuania, Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy. and possibly Rus’. Historical writings The Treaty of (1658) trans- had spread the idea of a Rus’ people formed the dual Commonwealth into a and of ancient Rus’ as a direct historical confederation of three states: the Polish predecessor. And parts of Ukrainian Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, society believed in the political “rights and the Grand Duchy of Rus’. Rus’ and liberties” of estates and lands, had its own administration, treasury, particularly of the Cossack estate. These army, and judiciary, while the rights of beliefs and perceptions would color the the Orthodox Church were to be behavior of Ukrainians as they encoun- guaranteed throughout the Common- tered Muscovy and the Russians. 12 wealth. But the arrangement could The Search for Links with Muscovy/ not succeed, because it required that Russia Ukraine, in the form of the Grand Duchy of Rus’, return to szlachta rule, The Ukrainian elites, striving to while Ukraine was governed de facto be included in the szlachta nation of the by the Cossacks. The attempted en- Commonwealth, generally avoided noblement of Cossack officers was maintaining any overt links with accepted neither by the Polish or Muscovy. If in Polish eyes Rus’ was Lithuanian szlachta nor by the Cossack backward and schismatic, then Mus- rank and file. Thus, the most funda- covy was nothing less than barbaric. mental definition of the Common- Moreover, Muscovy was frequently an wealth, as a composite of the szlachta enemy of the Commonwealth, and nation, could not be maintained. links with it could be viewed as trea- Muscovy, moreover, now deeply sonous. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian involved in Ukrainian affairs, would elites were aware that Muscovy was not permit the existence of a Rus’ state the only independent and powerful as part of the Commonwealth. Never- Orthodox polity. Some elements of the theless, the idea of Rus’ as part of the Ukrainian clergy began looking to Commonwealth continued to linger. In Muscovy for religious, political, and 14 the early eighteenth century, a popular financial support. poem viewed Poland as the mother of As the Ukrainians began coming three children: Liakh, Rus’, and Lytva. to Muscovy, seeking alms for monas- Liakh and Lytva killed their brother teries or subsidies for publications, Rus’ against the will of Poland, the they were treated with considerable mother. The poem tries to make the hostility. The Muscovites suspected the point that Poland or the Common- Ukrainians’ Orthodoxy and viewed 4 the “Lithuanians” or “,” as The main thesis of the work is they called them, as foreign and dan- encapsulated in its title, The Sinopsis, or gerous. The Ukrainians persisted and short compilation from various chronicles, developed the terminology and con- about the beginning of the Slavic-Rus’ cepts that would bring Rus’ and nation and the first princes of the God- Muscovy closer together. saved city of Kiev and the life of the holy, Given their renewed interest in devout prince of Kiev and all “Rossiia,” the Rus’ past, the Ukrainian clerics of the first autocrat Volodimer and about the the 1620s and 1640s turned not only to pious sovereign, tsar, and grand prince their own historical tradition, but also Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great, to Polish and Muscovite sources. From Little and White Rossiia. The author the Polish historians, particularly intertwines concepts of a people, Stryjkowski, they learned about Slavic dynasty, and state. He begins in pre- unity and that ancient Rus’ was com- Kievan times with the “slaveno- mon to both Muscovites and rossiiskii narod,” which is subse- Ruthenians. More importantly, in quently ruled by the “Varangian trying to define and differentiate Rus’ princes,” beginning with Ihor from Lithuania and Poland within the Rurykovych. For subsequent periods Commonwealth, these writers began of history, the author uses the terms looking more closely at Muscovite “rossy,” “rusy,” and “rossiiane” in chronicle writing. From such sources, order to describe a people inhabiting a the Ukrainian writers created an image historical territory north of the Black of the Rus’ past that transcended Sea, between the - and current political boundaries. In fact, Danube-- river sys- the seventeenth-century Ukrainian tems. Although no northern boundary writers incorporated, somewhat is given, Novgorod Velikii is included.17 mechanically, a number of contradic- The author of the Sinopsis states that tory views of Rus’—Polish, Ukrainian, the Rurikide princely family estab- and Russian—into their writings. By lished the Russian state. This assembling these varied traditions, gosudarstvo Rossiiskoie emerges fully some of these writers were able to link with Volodimer’s conversion to Chris- Ukraine and Muscovy through faith, tianity and encompasses Muscovy as dynasty, land, and even people.15 well as the lands of the Polish- The work that went farthest in Lithuanian Commonwealth.18 The establishing such links was the Sinopsis, story of the Russian state is, in fact, the frequently described as the first history story of the Rurikide family, which of the Eastern . Attributed to allows the author to include in the Innokentij Gizel’, the of chronicle various fragments of Russian the Kiev Caves Monastery, the Sinopsis and Ukrainian history (including an first appeared in Kiev between 1670 extensive episode on Dmitrii Donskoi) and 1674.16 While attempting to enlist and link various territories, time the help of the tsar, the author fiercely frames, and centers of power. For maintained the autonomy of the Caves example, when the princely seat of Monastery vis-à-vis the Kiev Rus’ is moved from Kiev to Vladimir metropolitanate and the on the Kliaz’ma, and from there to patriarch. For Gizel’, it was vital that Moscow, this occurs because it suits the monastery retain its stauropigial princely desires.19 The creation of two status, subordinated directly to the metropolitanates (Kiev and Moscow) is Patriarch of Constantinople. due to the fact that one part of Rus’ 5 (Kiev) comes under the rule of a traces the history of Rus’ during the foreign prince, the Lithuanian Kievan period, then describes how Vytautas.20 And, most importantly, Lithuania absorbed Rus’, and finally when Kiev comes under Muscovite focuses on Poland’s entry into Rus’ rule, this is lauded because “the first- history. He shows little concern for the born of all the cities of Rossiia, the Russian territories of Rus’. Like Gizel’ tsarstvennyi city of Kiev,” has come in the Sinopsis, Sofonovych concen- under the rule of the pravoslavnyi trates on rulers, but the Russian samoderzhets.21 Orthodoxy is also Rurikides are of no interest to him. identified with the tsar, land, and Instead, he lavishes his attention on people. Thus the wars that the Prince Danylo of -Volhynia. He fight against the sees the Muscovites and Ruthenians as Turks are waged in the interests of the separate peoples. In describing hetman pravoslavnyi rossiiskii narod. Rus’ is Khmel’nyts’ky’s placement of Ukraine called pravoslavnyi krai and the tsar is under the suzerainty of Muscovite tsar, referred to as the pravoslavnyi Sofonovych simply reports the event samoderzhets.22 without expressing any opinion about Despite considerable confusion in it.23 its account of history and ethnography, It must be remembered that the the Sinopsis brought together a number search for Rus’, whether within the of ideas that had been reverberating in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Ukraine during the second half of the under the Muscovite tsar, occurred seventeenth century: (1) Rus’, or, as it against the background of continuous was beginning to be referred to in the crises and turmoil in Ukraine: the 1670s–80s, “,” on account renewal of the Orthodox hierarchy of its historical ties to the house of (1620), the Khmel’nyts’kyi revolt (1648), and its Orthodox faith, belonged the Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy within a larger, all-Russian context; (2) (1654), and a period of continuous although there was ethnic multiplicity, warfare over Ukraine known as the there was also a larger pravoslavnyi Ruin (1660s–80s). After three decades of rosiiskii narod that inhabited the terri- conflict, the Ukrainian elite was slaugh- tory of the house of Rurik; (3) Rossiia, tered, and Right-Bank Ukraine (west of which included Muscovy and Little the Dnieper river) devastated and Russia, and the entire rossiiskii narod depopulated. For some members of the were to be ruled by the Orthodox elite, gaining the protection of the autocrat, whose ancestry derived from Muscovite tsar and the powerful the house of Rurik; (4) the Muscovite Muscovite state seemed the only means tsar represented the continuation of of attaining a measure of stability. the house of Rurik (the fact that the In turning to the Muscovite tsar, were no longer Rurikides was the author of the Sinopsis and numer- never mentioned). ous other Ukrainian petitioners were The Sinopsis’ somewhat extreme seeking the help of Muscovy in pro- Russocentrism was one view among moting and protecting Slavia several held by members of the Ukrai- Orthodoxa. This Slavic Orthodox world, nian clerical elite. In the 1670s, based on the Orthodox faith, the Feodosii Sofonovych, the archimandrite Slavonic language, Byzantine and of the Monastery of St. Michael of the post-Byzantine culture, the literary and Golden Domes, wrote another major artistic styles of Rus’, and the South historical work, Kronika. Sofonovych Slavic influence included Ukraine, 6 , Muscovy, Bulgaria, and non- religion, dynasty, high culture, and Slavic . It was this culture of even ethnos, they insisted on their Slavia Orthodoxa that was threatened by own distinctiveness within the existing the Catholic Counterreformation in the political, ecclesiastical, and social Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.24 structures. For the most part, the In countering the Polish, Catholic, proponents of Ukrainian political and and Western challenge, the Ukrainian social distinctiveness were the secular prelates, to some extent, transformed the political elite. However, the clergy culture of Slavia Orthodoxa. They com- were also adamant defenders of Ukrai- bined post-Byzantine and Western nian privileges, particularly their own. cultural models, introducing the “Greek- The secular political elite was Latin-Slavonic” school (the Ostrih represented by the Cossack officers academy and the Kiev Mohyla col- and the Cossack administration that de legium). They attempted to provide facto ruled Ukraine. This elite per- Orthodox answers to theological ques- formed two political roles, acting as tions never before posed in the Ortho- representatives of their own estates dox world. Perhaps the most lasting and, in some fashion, as representa- Ukrainian contribution to the revitalized tives of Ukraine. This dual role of the Slavia Orthodoxa was the recodification of Cossack elite was in effect a continua- so that it would equal tion of the role it had assumed after the Latin as a sacred language. The 1648 Khmel’nyts’kyi revolt. Two “Meletian” (named after Meletii important documents defined the Smotryts’kyi, compiler of the grammar) political status that the Cossacks were norm of Church Slavonic became the accorded in seventeenth-century standard not only in Ukraine, but Ukraine, the Zboriv Treaty and the throughout Slavia Orthodoxa.25 Pereiaslav Agreement.27 The Zboriv In fact, a spiritual and cultural Treaty, concluded with Poland in 1649, revitalization of Slavia Orthodoxa affirmed that the relationship of the through Ukrainian learning was the King of Poland with the Cossack elite vision of such Ukrainian clerics as was that of a contractual bond between Smotryts’kyi. As he contemplated the the sovereign and the Zaporozhian Orthodox world, he saw it in chains, army. That army, in turn, had virtual except in Muscovy, where it was free control over a good part of Ukraine. but ignorant, and in Ukraine, where The Pereiaslav Agreement concluded Orthodoxy was both free and learned.26 with Muscovy in 1654 was modeled on It was this learning that the Ukrainian the Zboriv Treaty.28 From the Cossack clerics wanted to bring to Muscovy. In point of view, the Pereiaslav Agree- going to Muscovy they were not only ment maintained the same contractual obtaining protection, alms, or a good relationship between the Zaporozhian office, but also attempting to create a army and the monarch: in this case, the united revitalized Orthodoxy capable of Muscovite tsar was substituted for the meeting the Roman Catholic and Polish king. The idea of a contractual Protestant challenges. relationship between tsar and subject The Insistence on Distinctiveness was, however, incompatible with the from Muscovy/Russia Muscovites’ sense of authority. The Muscovite interpretation of the At the same time that some Pereiaslav Agreement was that of Ukrainians were attempting to find unilateral submission of the Cossacks affinity with Muscovy/Russia in and Ukraine to the tsar.29 7 Whatever the legal interpretation, the further refinement of the idea of the tsar did confirm certain “Little “Little Russian rights and liberties.” Russian rights and liberties” at The term “Little Russia” won Pereiaslav and reconfirmed them— acceptance because of its historical sometimes in radically altered form— precedence in ecclesiastical usage, each time a new leader of Ukraine, or official status in Russia, and termino- hetman, assumed office (1657, 1659, logical linkage with Russia. This term 1663, 1665, 1669, 1672, 1674, 1687). first appears in fourteenth-century Thus there was a formal recognition by ecclesiastical usage: the Constantino- the tsar and Muscovy that Ukraine was politan Patriarchate used the term a distinct political entity and that mikra Rosia to identify Ukraine, while Ukrainians were privileged subjects. the term makra Rosia identified the Moreover, there was hardly any ques- territory of Muscovy. Prior to the tion about Ukraine’s political distinc- Pereiaslav Agreement, the Muscovite tiveness, since it acted as a semi-inde- tsar titled himself tsar vseia Rusi (tsar of pendent Cossack polity. Despite the all Rus’); after the Agreement, Aleksei Pereiaslav Agreement with the Musco- Mikhailovich adopted the title tsar vite tsar, the Ukrainian Cossack elite vseia Velikiia i Malyia Rossii (tsar of all pursued alliances with various states of Great and Little Russia). Bohdan that were in fact Moscow’s enemies: Khmel’nyts’kyi identified Ukraine as Poland-Lithuania (i.e., the politics of the “Little Russia” in his dealings with the Hadiach Union and the Right-Bank Muscovites. Nevertheless, a number of Ukrainian ), the Ottoman terms—”Ukraine,” “Little Russia,” Empire (i.e., Hetman Doroshenko), and “Rus’”—continued to be utilized in Sweden (i.e., Hetman ). designating Ukraine.31 It was only after the Battle of The gradual acceptance of the (1709) that Russian control term “Little Russia,” the emergence of over the Ukrainian Cossack polity, a historical consciousness, and the idea referred to as the Hetmanate, was of loyalty to a Ukrainian political sealed. In the post-Poltava period the entity and its relationship to Russia secular political elite, the Cossack was elaborated in a new historical/ officers, gradually transformed them- literary genre, the Cossack chronicle. selves into a szlachta or gentry. They In fact, this genre was partially developed a more consistent political sparked by the indignation felt by the outlook that attempted to blend the Ukrainian Cossack elite over the presumed unity of the emerging clergy’s inattention to the Cossack Orthodox Slaveno- polity. In 1718, Stefan Savyts’kyi, a with the political and social distinc- clerk in the Lubny regiment, lamented tiveness of Ukraine. that none of his countrymen had The Little Russian concept written a history, “particularly from emerged gradually throughout the the spiritual rank, who since the time eighteenth century.30 Its basic elements of emancipation from Poland lacked were the acceptance of the term “Little neither people capable of the task nor Russia” for Ukraine or part of Ukraine, the necessary typographical means.”32 the emergence of a specific Ukrainian In response, the Cossack elite pro- historical consciousness, the duced its own history. Two of the most conceptualization of a distinct “Little influential Cossack chronicles were Russia” that was nevertheless part of a those of Hryhorii Hrabianka (1710) larger Russian imperial scheme, and and Samuil Velychko (1720).33 8 The two works are not really version, the tsarist envoys at Pereiaslav chronicles but histories that attempt to swore in the name of the tsar that all document and explain how the new Ukrainian rights would be respected in Ukrainian Cossack polity came into perpetuity.37 existence. For both works, the central Unlike the Sinopsis, the Cossack event was the great uprising under the chronicles developed no general leadership of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, scheme of East European history, nor who is presented as the hero and did they present justifications for founder of the Cossack state. At the tsarist protection based on dynastic same time, both chronicles connect the claims, or even link Ukraine with Cossack polity with an ancient lineage. Russia on the basis of religion or In Hrabianka’s case, the Ukrainian ethnicity. They strove to present the Cossacks are linked to the and story of Ukraine from the Ukrainian to Rus’. Velychko asserts that the Cossack point of view. For them, the Sarmatian Cossack Rus’ provinces had Kievan Rus’ period is the murky past: been “the Ukrainian Little Russian their primary interest is in Cossack fatherland” since the time of Ukraine under Poland, the great Volodimer, who baptized Rus’.34 Both liberator hetman Bohdan chronicles attempt to show by this Khmel’nyts’kyi, and Cossack and lineage the historical continuity and szlachta rights and liberties. At the same legitimacy of the current political and time, these post-Poltava authors social order. wanted to show their loyalty to the tsar. Both chronicles exhibit a great The Cossack chronicles demon- deal of terminological fluidity in strate and infer a number of crucial referring to Ukraine.35 In Hrabianka, components of the emerging Little “Rus’,” Ros,’ “Rossiia,” “Mala Russian concept: (1) that Little Russia Rossiia,” “Malaia Rossiia,” and were separate lands “Malorussiia,” “,” and peoples; (2) that the two lands “Malorossiiskaia Ukraina,” and were linked by a common tsar; (3) that “Ukraina” are all used to indicate the Zaporozhian army, the Little Ukraine or Ukrainian territory. Russian people, and Little Russia itself Velychko uses the terms “Rus’,” “Little entered into voluntary agreements first Rus’,” “Cossack-Rus,” “Ukraina,” and with the Polish king and later with the “Little Russia” when referring to Muscovite tsar; and (4) that Little Cossack Ukraine. Both chronicles Russia and its people always retained distinguish Ukraine from Muscovy their “rights and liberties.” and Ukrainians from Russians. In the second half of the eigh- Hrabianka presents the Pereiaslav teenth century, the Little Russian Agreement as a pact necessitated by concept appears as a fully developed political and military circumstances.36 viewpoint in two important sources, Because of the common Orthodox the Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei faith, Khmel’nyts’kyi was able to and the works of Hryhorii Poletyka. obtain the tsar’s protection over However, there are two significant Ukraine and a guarantee of Cossack changes from the views of the Cossack rights. Velychko develops further than chronicles. Although the chronicles Hrabianka the idea of a contractual had shown little precision as to the relationship between Little Russia and territorial extent of Little Russia, they its people on the one hand and the tsar presumed that at the very least Little on the other hand. In Velychko’s Russia encompassed Ukraine on both 9 sides of the Dnieper. Later authors still Russia has its own rights guaranteed by use the term in this larger sense when all the tsars. speaking of historical Little Russia, but In his writings, Hryhorii Poletyka to late eighteenth-century contempo- insisted that Little Russia had always raries, “Little Russia” meant only the possessed certain rights guaranteed by Hetmanate, the truncated Left-Bank the Muscovite tsar. He wrote a treatise polity ruled by the tsar on the basis of entitled “Historical Information on the Pereiaslav Agreement. For them What Basis Little Russia Was under the this Little Russia, and not the much Polish Republic and by What Treaties larger seventeenth-century entity, was It Came under Russian Rulers and a their “Fatherland.” Patriotic Opinion as to How It Could The second major transformation Be Ordered so that It Would be Useful was the emergence of a Ukrainian to the Russian State without Violations gentry or szlachta as Little Russia’s of Its Rights and Freedoms.”39 Poletyka leading social class. The differentiation identified the rights of Little Russian between the Cossack rank and file and gentry with the Polish nobility’s the officers was clearly evident in the “golden liberties” and wanted to chronicles. However, the early eigh- resurrect the administrative, judicial teenth-century chronicles still empha- and social systems of Ukraine under sized the Zaporozhian Army and the the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Cossacks as the major contracting prior to the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising.40 partners with the tsar. Without exclud- At that time, according to Poletyka, ing the Zaporozhian Army or the regular diets of the szlachta acted as Cossacks, the late eighteenth-century legislative bodies, consulting with authors presented the gentry or other estates on important matters, szlachta as the corporate representative while courts of the nobility and town of Little Russia and the main contract- magistrates adjudicated civilian cases. ing partner with the tsar. According to Poletyka, Ukraine’s The Razgovor Velikorossii s misfortunes were the consequence of Malorossiei reflects the thinking of this the Cossacks’ usurpation of these newly developed Ukrainian gentry. powers from the nobility following the Dedicated to the “honor, glory and Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising. defense of all Little Russia,” it included While Poletyka’s gentry democ- a panegyric to Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi.38 racy may have been somewhat ex- The poem ascribes the paramount role treme, the views expressed on Ukrai- in liberating Little Russia from the nian autonomy and Ukraine’s relation- Polish yoke to the Ukrainian gentry ship with Russia did reflect the think- and laments the fact that the Ukrainian ing of the Ukrainian gentry. Similar noble and military ranks have not been views were presented at a 1763 Offic- recognized by the imperial authorities. ers’ Council attended by 100 delegates Most important, the poem flatly rejects from all parts of Little Russia. More- the concept of Little Russia as part of a over, the petitions to the 1767 Legisla- uniform Russian Empire. The personi- tive Commission, with more than 950 fied Little Russia bluntly tells Great gentry signing the various petitions, Russia that it swore allegiance to the do indicate a widespread acceptance of tsar, not to Russia. It goes on to state the Little Russian concept on the part that, in fact, Little Russia and Great of the Ukrainian gentry.41 Russia are separate lands bound only by By the end of the eighteenth a common monarch, and that Little century, the Little Russian concept 10 encompassed historical consciousness Church. This attitude intensified after and political loyalty to Little Russia Kievan Metropolitan Petro Mohyla’s and its peculiar constitutional and liturgical reforms in the 1630s dis- administrative prerogatives. At the tanced the Ukrainian Church further same time, the Ukrainian gentry from Muscovite practices. viewed Little Russia as linked to Official Muscovite attitudes Russia through the tsar and, therefore, changed at the time of the Pereiaslav to an even larger Russian state or Agreement. Since the main justification empire. Such a formulation of the for bringing Ukraine under the suzer- differences between Ukraine and ainty of the tsar was the protection of Russia permitted the Ukrainian gentry Orthodoxy (as expressed by the 1653 to maintain their political and social Zemskii sobor), one could hardly main- system in Little Russia, affirm loyalty tain that Ukrainians were not truly to the tsar and even the Empire, and Orthodox. Muscovite expansion into partake in the political and social life Ukraine had also whetted the appetite of that Empire, if they so desired. of Patriarch Nikon for establishing a Ukraine and the Evolution of Imperial Russia subordinated to him. Moreover, the Muscovite Church could not avoid the When Ukrainians first encoun- Western challenge. The Polish Roman tered Muscovy, in the seventeenth Catholic king had been a serious century, it was an increasingly power- contender for the Muscovite throne, ful yet remote country on the fringe of and coalition politics made Muscovy Europe. By the late eighteenth century, an ally of Protestant states. If the Russia was a huge multi-national Muscovite Church were to provide a empire and a major European power. leadership role for Eastern Orthodoxy, The change from Muscovy to Imperial then it also needed to assume, at least Russia involved not only territorial partially, the mission of the Ukrainian expansion, but also a fundamental Orthodox clergy, i.e., to create an administrative, military, and cultural Orthodoxy that could withstand the transformation. Ukrainians played an Catholic and Protestant challenge. For important role in this transformation Patriarch Nikon, a reformation of the and, at the same time, were profoundly Muscovite Church was necessary not affected by it. in order to bring it closer to the West, Ukrainian clerics began coming to but rather to consolidate Orthodox Muscovy seeking alms and support for forces against the West. This could be publication well before the 1654 done only by unifying the Greek, Pereiaslav Agreement. These contacts Kievan, and Muscovite traditions, and proved very difficult because of the the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were insularity of Muscovite Orthodoxy. In particularly well placed to accomplish essence, the Muscovite Church did not such a task.42 accept the Orthodox population of the Patriarch Nikon’s political ambi- Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as tions notwithstanding, the Muscovite Orthodox. It placed the Ukrainian Church was hardly ready for a blend- Orthodox in the same category as ing of various Orthodox traditions. Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Muscovite Orthodoxy was grounded Uniates, requiring that Ukrainian in the belief that it possessed the one Orthodox be rebaptized before being true faith, in its fullness, in the only accepted into the Muscovite Orthodox Orthodox—i.e., truly Christian—realm. 11 It emphasized simplicity as the main and Ukrainian clergy, it is hardly avenue of pleasing God and was surprising that they clashed over the fundamentally opposed to the Ukraini- doctrines of the transubstantiation and ans, Latin, and the “study of philoso- the immaculate conception of the phy.” Thus, Muscovy had a function- Virgin Mary.44 Kievan theology, in ing well-developed autarkic cultural theory, yielded to the authority of tradition which could only view the Muscovite tradition on these ques- Ukrainian presence as alien. tions, but in practice, Western and The Ukrainian clerics were able to Kievan iconography, literature, music, penetrate and have an impact on and intellectual currents poured into Russian religious and cultural life Muscovy via the Ukrainians. because they received the support of This attempted of tsar and court. As Muscovy began its Muscovite Orthodoxy helped trigger western expansion, the Ukrainian the Old Believer schism in Russia. clerics provided an important vehicle Patriarch Nikon’s attempt to reform for Muscovy’s acquisition of Western Muscovite Orthodoxy according to ideas and intellectual techniques. Ukrainian and Greek models, which, Although the Kiev Mohyla Academy during the sixteenth and seventeenth and its Russian copy, the Greco- centuries, had also been Westernized Slavonic-Latin Academy, were hardly by Greek scholars educated at Italian at the cutting edge of Western learning, universities, resulted in the raskol that they were, nevertheless, firmly planted divides the Russian church to this day. within the Western intellectual tradition. Despite the raskol (against which The rhetoric, logic, neoscholasticism, the Muscovite Church engaged the and the Latin and Greek languages efforts of Ukrainian scholars and taught by the Kievan clerics estab- preachers), the Ukrainian presence in lished the intellectual foundations for Muscovy brought Ukrainian and some natural philosophy and political Russian clerics (the younger genera- theories drawn from other sources. tion of whom were being educated by Most importantly, the Ukrainian elites émigré Ukrainians) closer together provided a large number of educated intellectually. The Ukrainian clerics cadres without whom the early drive were attempting to bring the two toward empire could hardly have been traditions together, to create a fairly sustained. unified Slavia Orthodoxa. Their vision Thus, from the mid-seventeenth linked “enlightened” Orthodoxy with century, several waves of Ukrainian the tsar, ancient Rus’, and the Slavonic clerics moved or were summoned to language and culture. In essence, they Muscovy and, in effect, assumed were the proponents of a unified prominent roles in Muscovite religious, “Slaveno-Rossian” (Slaveno-rossiiska) educational, cultural, and intellectual high culture based partly on the post- life. Among the Ukrainians who Mohyla, Jesuit school version of dominated Muscovite high culture Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian during this period were Arsenii version of Church Slavonic. Satanovs’kyi, Epifanii Slavynets’kyi, The impact of the Ukrainian Dymytrii Tuptalo, Stefan Iavors’kyi, clerics on Russian intellectual and , Teofan cultural life has been the subject of Prokopovych and the Belarusian considerable debate. Traditional Symeon Polacki.43 Considering the historiography has represented the different world views of the Muscovite Ukrainian influence as a major trans- 12 formation of Muscovite culture. Some Ukrainian clerics did help to “jump- scholars, George Florovsky, saw this start” Muscovy’s transformation into transformation as a tragedy, a corrup- Imperial Russia. Soon other ideas and tion of orthodoxy and developments made that process more by Latin, Catholic, and Protestant European and, paradoxically, also elements.45 Others, Prince Nikolai more Russian. Cameralism and the Trubetskoi and Dmitrii Likhachev, concept of the well-ordered police welcomed the Ukrainian influx as state, imported from the Germanies, beneficial “Ukrainization” of Musco- formed the intellectual underpinnings vite culture which greatly enriched of the new state activism. The Russia.46 Most scholars credit Ukrai- cameralists had the political goal of nian humanism in preparing the maximizing society’s productive Petrine “revolution” and in aiding in potential through the agency of the the transformation of Muscovy into state, which assumed the role of modern Russia.47 policing and developing society. From Recently, Max Okenfuss advanced the time of Peter I, the Russian Empire a revisionist view that the large influx pursued the goals of increasing the of Ukrainians had a minimal impact on power and wealth of the state not only Russian culture. By carefully studying through annexation and conquest, but both book and manuscript libraries in also by attempting to rationalize Russia, Okenfuss concluded that , extract greater state Orthodoxy combined with humanism revenues, and increase productivity.50 was limited to Ukrainians and other In its activism, , foreigners. Okenfuss argues for a and pursuit of reforms, Imperial fundamental cultural autarky of both Russia began developing a more the Muscovite nobility and most of the secular, cosmopolitan, and, at the same clergy. He claims that the “Ukrainian- time, more Russian imperial culture Lithuanian-Belorussian community that initially supplemented and then was small, isolated, and alien” and began to displace Slaveno-Rossian that “the growth of humane secular culture. Primary in this process was learning was not an organic develop- the development of a modern literary ment within Muscovite society, but the and secular Russian struggle of Kievans—the struggle of literature. The Russian Imperial state Ukrainian humanists to make them- introduced the civil alphabet, which selves head above the din raised by an sharpened distinctions between eccle- avalanche of psalters and liturgical siastical and civil linguistic forms; books.”48 At most, Ukrainian human- published grammars and dictionaries; ism created “Russian Levites,” a caste and produced works dealing with all with education alien to those of the aspects of the secular world, from nobles, most of the middle estates, and practical manuals to translations of the peasantry.49 foreign literature.51 The linguistic Inrespective of the resistance to medium that began to emerge was a humanistic Slaveno-Rossian culture in middle that incorporated ele- Muscovy, this culture produced by the ments of the “high” style of Slaveno- Ukrainian clerics was subsequently Rossian and the “low” style of collo- viewed as a point of unity between quial Russian. By the nineteenth Russia and Ukraine and as an impor- century, the new literary Russian had tant step in the evolution of modern become the linguistic medium of the Russian culture. Moreover, these empire. At the same time, the imperial 13 elites had an increasing knowledge of number of basic flaws. First, it could German and, by the end of the eigh- not accommodate the prevailing teenth century, French. Although concept of tsarist authority and power. elements of Slaveno-Rossian culture From the time at Pereiaslav when survived well into the nineteenth tsarist envoys refused to take an oath century, it was gradually being rel- on behalf of the tsar because such an egated to Orthodox Church services act was an unthinkable encroachment and spiritual literature. on autocratic rule, Ukrainian “rights For the Ukrainian elites, the and liberties” were at the mercy of evolving Russian Empire presented tsarist wishes and even whims. It is both opportunities and dangers. A true that in the seventeenth century strong Orthodox state, based largely the tsar had issued charters upon each on Slaveno-Rossian culture, and election of a Ukrainian hetman, challenging both Poland-Lithuania thereby de facto confirming traditional and the Tatar-Ottoman world, certainly “rights and liberties.” Moreover, every fulfilled the aspirations of at least a break with Muscovy/Russia by part of the Ukrainian clerical elite. The Hetmans Vyhovs’kyi, Doroshenko, and evolution of the Little Russian concept Mazepa was justified by the Ukraini- allowed the clerical and non-clerical ans with the argument that the tsar elites to express political loyalty to the had violated his solemn obligations tsar and a greater Russia while, at the toward Ukraine.52 But obligations to same time, insisting on specific “Little subjects were antithetical both to Russian rights and liberties.” The traditional autocracy and to the more cameralist police-state concepts were modern absolutism of the eighteenth not hostile to such regional autonomy century. In the final analysis, the and corporate traditions. In fact, the Ukrainian elite had no legal or moral cameralist practice was to subordinate recourse when its “rights” were vio- the corporate bodies to the new state lated; it could only appeal to tradition purpose rather than to curtail or and the tsar’s sense of justice. abolish them. Nor was the evolving The Little Russian concept also Russian imperial culture considered a clashed with Enlightenment ideas that threat by the Ukrainian elite, since it became dominant in mid-eighteenth- continued to share high culture, century Russia. While cameralism whether Slaveno-Rossian or a mixture recognized regional, historic, and of imperial Russian and Slaveno- cultural differences, the Enlightenment Rossian. The Ukrainian elite of the late insisted that there was a basic unifor- eighteenth century readily accepted the mity in nature and society. What was fact that it shared a monarch, some important to “enlightened thought” aspects of history, and high culture with was the discovery of these basic rules or Russia. At the same time, this elite laws, and not concentration on superfi- continued to insist on the special juridi- cial differences. For good government, cal and social arrangements and distinct it was crucial to discover the laws of historical development of Ukraine (i.e., governance and apply them. It was the Hetmanate of the Left Bank). very difficult for the Ukrainian elite to While the Little Russian concept defend the historical and legal tradi- provided sufficient intellectual space tions of their “homeland” against the for the Ukrainian elite to participate in argument that the introduction of the Imperial Russia and, at the same time, “best of all possible laws” would bring to remain distinct within it, it had a greater development and progress. 14 Catherine II’s introduction of the Little Russian gentry to be recog- what she conceived to be the “best of nized as part of the Imperial all orders”53 resulted in administrative dvorianstvo.54 Previously, the Little uniformity for the Empire, including Russian gentry had attempted to claim Ukraine. The Hetmanate was divided the same rights as those enjoyed by the into three provinces; the Ukrainian szlachta under Polish-Lithuanian rule.55 administrative, military, and fiscal This, of course, was unacceptable to institutions were dismantled; and a Catherine, as the Polish szlachta en- new Russian imperial provincial and joyed much greater privileges than did district administration was installed. the Russian dvoriane. The abolition of Similarly, the Orthodox Church in all Ukrainian institutions and the Ukraine was reorganized along impe- introduction of the 1775 provincial rial lines. By the beginning of the regulations, however, finally forced the nineteenth century, little remained of Imperial Russian authorities to recog- the legal institutions, historical legacy, nize the Little Russian gentry.56 Since and corporate “rights and liberties” nobles were to play an essential role in which, in Ukrainian eyes, distin- the new provincial administration, the guished them from Russians. former claim that there were “no The Remnants of Distinctiveness: The nobles in Little Russia” had to be Little Russian Concept in the Early dropped, and a Little Russian Nineteenth Century dvorianstvo had to be created out of the old Ukrainian gentry. The Ukrainian The abolition of the Hetmanate’s elite’s integration into the Russian institutions and the introduction of an nobility, along with the complete imperial administration effected the enserfment of the Ukrainian peasantry gradual fusion of the Ukrainian and in 1783, provided the Ukrainian gentry Russian social structures. Yet alongside with unprecedented opportunities to this absorption of the Ukrainian elite pursue imperial careers and to acquire into the Russian Imperial system, the immense wealth.57 As a result, as a Little Russian identity continued to noble class they absolutely dominated exist. It existed as a subset either of an the local administration of Little all-Russian identity or of one centered Russia. on the notion of Empire. The Little The second factor that ensured Russian identity continued to exist the continuation of the Little Russian because of a number of factors: (1) the concept was the survival of Ukrainian Ukrainian gentry’s dominant role in common law. In 1801, Ukrainian courts the Imperial administration of Little on the territory of Little Russia were Russia; (2) the survival of Ukrainian abolished and replaced with Imperial customary law; (3) the occasional Russian courts.58 Ukrainian common restitution of certain legal and military law, however, was appended to the formations traditional to Little Russia; Russian law code in these courts, thus and (4) an interest in the history and ensuring that the legal system in Little folklore of Ukraine that helped nurture Russia would continue to operate the idea of a Little Russian fatherland. somewhat differently from that of the The first factor, the gentry’s role in rest of the Russian Empire.59 These the administration of this territory, was legal peculiarities survived until the due to the Little Russian gentry’s 1917 Revolution as the only remaining acceptance into the Imperial ruling vestige of the Hetmanate’s former class. In 1785, Catherine II permitted autonomous status. 15 The third factor that sustained a tory. The Istoriia Rusov was enormously sense of Little Russian identity was the popular among the nobility of the occasional restitution of certain legal former Hetmanate and circulated and military institutions that had widely in manuscript form. While previously been abolished. For ex- recognizing Ukrainian history as a ample, Ukrainian traditionalists were special branch of a greater “all-Rus- able to convince the imperial authori- sian” entity, the work at the same time ties to partially restore one of the most stresses Ukrainian separateness and is important elements of Cossack an eloquent apology for the Hetmanate Ukraine—the Cossack army. During the and Cossack rights and privileges. Its Napoleonic invasion, fifteen Cossack tone, at times, is quite anti-Russian, regiments were reestablished and then and it insists that Ukraine has certain disbanded after the Russian victory.60 inalienable and guaranteed rights that During the 1830 Polish uprising, Tsar must be upheld. However, the Istoriia Nicholas authorized the reactivation of Rusov never questions the tsar’s claim eight Cossack regiments consisting of to sovereignty over Little Russia— 1,200 men each.61 Again, once the indeed, it looks to the tsar in the hope uprising was crushed, the Cossack units that he will maintain the last remnants were no longer needed and were of Ukrainian autonomy, and even subsequently disbanded. Any attempt restore the traditional rights of the to revitalize the Cossacks as free war- Ukrainian elite. riors of old Ukraine, however, was But no restoration was possible. forestalled by Imperial opposition and On the contrary, the imperial authori- by the Cossacks’ own economic decline. ties continued to pursue a policy of By 1837 the Cossacks were placed administrative uniformity. The loss of under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of any semblance of political distinctive- State Properties (Ministerstvo ness convinced some of the more gosudarstvennykh imushchestv), an reflective members of the Ukrainian agency intended primarily for state gentry that they were epigones of a peasants.62 However, the Cossacks country and a nation that had ceased retained certain privileges that had to exist. Oleksa Martos captured this been granted to them concerning land mood in a diary entry written at the ownership, taxes, and military service. grave of Hetman Mazepa in 1812: The fourth development that ”Mazepa died far away from his encouraged the survival of the Little country, whose independence he Russian concept was literary—the defended. He was a friend of unprecedented writing concerning the liberty and therefore deserves to be history of and nostalgia for the Little honored by posterity. After his Russian fatherland. The most influen- expulsion from Little Russia, its tial work of this type was the anony- inhabitants lost their sacred rights, mous Istoriia Rusov.63 This early nine- which Mazepa had defended for teenth-century work presents a long, so long with great enthusiasm and elaborate, and to a great extent ficti- patriotic ardor. He is no more, and tious history extending from Kievan the name of Little Russia and its times to the 1760 Turkish war. Perhaps brave Cossacks have disappeared its most interesting claim is that the from the list of nations who, Kievan Rus’ period properly belonged although small in numbers, are yet to the Ukrainians and had been inap- famous for their way of life and propriately included in Russian his- their constitution. Now rich Little 16 Russia is reduced to two or three claimed affinity with Muscovy in provinces. That this is the common religion, dynasty, high culture, and destiny of states and republics, we even ethnos. However, they insisted on can see from the history of other maintaining their distinctiveness in nations.”64 political, social, and, on occasion, After a century and half, the ecclesiastical structures. The claim to balancing by the Ukrainian elite distinctiveness proved so strong that it between assertions of Russo-Ukrainian even survived the abolition of separate unity and insistence on Ukrainian Ukrainian political and juridical political distinctiveness seemed over. institutions. Russians and Ukrainians shared the That Ukrainians could claim unity idea of an all-Russian tsar, an all- with Russia and at the same time insist Russian Orthodox faith and church, an on their own distinctiveness was not empire, and an imperial Russian high surprising. Before the advent of nation- culture. Russians and Ukrainians were alism, multiple identities and loyalties administered in a similar manner and were the norm, particularly in large were part of a similar imperial social multinational states. Therefore, it was structure. The only differentiation on the possible to be a political Pole, a devout part of the Ukrainian elite lay in Orthodox Christian, and an advocate Ukraine’s distinct past. The Ukrainian of Rus’ culture. It was normal to be elite was certainly aware that Ukrainians loyal to the tsar, Orthodoxy, Imperial spoke a different “vulgar” language than Russia, and, at the same time, to be a Russians and had different songs and fervent defender of Little Russia. In folk customs, but in the pre-Romantic fact, the whole Little Russian concept era such differences among the common was nothing more than an intellectual people were of little significance. To justification for such multiple loyalties them, Little Russia was long dead. What and identities. lingered for some was a nostalgia for the From the first quarter of the distinctiveness of the past. nineteenth century, Ukrainians began Concepts of Russo-Ukrainian Unity discovering other areas of distinctive- and Ukrainian Distinctiveness: ness from Russians. Under the influ- Epilogue and Conclusions ence of Herder and Romanticism, a new generation discovered the Ukrai- For most of the early modern nian folk and their vernacular lan- period, Ukrainians were part of two guage. Until its banning in the 1860s large states: Poland-Lithuania and and 1870s, literature written in ver- Muscovy/Russia. In both instances, nacular Ukrainian evolved slowly Ukrainians accepted some form of under the cover of a mere local variant unity while at the same time insisting of a larger all-. In this on maintaining essential differences. In respect, Ukrainians were still employ- the case of Poland-Lithuania, Ukraini- ing the old Little Russian concept, but ans subscribed to political unity as part applying it to the areas of vernacular of the szlachta nation, yet insisted on language and literature. In the late religious and cultural differences. As nineteenth century, Ukrainian intellec- these and other attempted arrange- tuals emancipated themselves from the ments within Poland-Lithuania proved Russian connection, positing that unworkable, some Ukrainians began Ukraine was different from Russia in looking for succor to Muscovy. In their all respects: language, literature, pro-Muscovite orientation, Ukrainians culture, history, and politics. This 17 marked the birth of modern Ukrainian Lithuanian Commonwealth until his nationalism, which no longer permit- death, a defender of “Russian” reli- ted multiple identities. By identifying gion, culture, and values. Such a view themselves as Ukrainian, the national- also sanctioned the banning of the ists excluded the possibility of being on the grounds Russian. that there “never was, is, or could be a Concomitantly, Russians began Ukrainian language.” identifying the Imperial Russian state By the late nineteenth century, primarily with the Great Russian Ukrainians and Russians were inter- people and culture. This was a rejec- preting their history on the basis of tion of a meta-Russian nationality two completely opposed paradigms. In which would contain separate and discussing the , legitimate Little Russian and Great Ukrainians emphasized those areas Russian components. The imperial and that were distinct from Russia and saw even the Slaveno-Rossian culture in them evidence of Ukraine’s autoch- began to be treated as narrowly Rus- thonous development. Russians sian. Thus what had been shared in the emphasized those aspects that Ukrai- past by Ukrainians, Belorusians, nians held in common with Russia and , and Russians was appro- saw in them proof that Ukraine had priated to a Russian or Great Russian been and always would be Russian. nationality. The identification by some These two fundamentally opposed of the entire Slavia Orthodoxa with views still cast their shadow on current Russia and Russians made the debates concerning the question of Moldovan-Ukrainian prelate Petro Russo-Ukrainian unity and Ukrainian Mohyla, who had never been to Russia distinctiveness in the early modern and remained a patriot of the Polish- period.

18 Notes 1. For a discussion of the current Russo-Ukrainian disputes on history and relevant literature, see my article, “History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, 1994), 123–46. 2. V.O. Kliuchevskii, Kurs russkoi istorii, 3: 118, in his Sochineniia, 8 vols. (Moscow, 1956–59). 3. The literature on the history of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state and the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth is voluminous. The works most relevant for our analysis include M.K. Liubavskii, Ocherk istorii Litovsko-russkogo gosudarstva do Liublinskoi unii vkliuchitel’no (Moscow, 1910) and F.M. Shabul’do, Zemli Iugo- Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo (Kiev, 1987). For a discussion of the nobility in the Ukrainian lands after 1569, with extensive bibliographic notes, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648,” in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., Rethinking Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987), 29–102. The most recent, and extremely valuable, addition to the literature of the subject is N.M. Iakovenko, Ukrains’ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: (Volyn’ i Tsentral’na Ukraina) (Kiev, 1993). 4. Natalia Iakovenko has noted the significant presence of a nobility of Tatar background in the Ukrainian lands of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and an influx of nobles from Muscovy in the sixteenth. See N.M. Iakovenko, Ukrains’ka shliakhta, 170–74, 242. 5. See Janusz Tazbir, A State without Stakes: Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York, 1973) and Wiktor Weintraub, “Tolerance and Intolerance in Old Poland,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 13, no. 1 (1971): 21–44. 6. See David A. Frick, Meletij Smotryc’kyj (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 232–34. 7. For definitive works on the Ukrainian church elite of the time, see G. Golubev, Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1883–98); V. Eingorn, O snosheniiakh malorosiiskogo dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel’stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha (Moscow, 1894); The Kiev Mohyla Academy, special issue of Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 8, no. 1–2 (June 1984); Frank Sysyn, “The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Geoffrey A. Hoskins, ed., Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine (Edmonton, 1990), 1–22. 8. See Frank E. Sysyn, “The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History Writing 1620–1690,” Europa Orientalis 5 (1986), 285–310, and “Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,” Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe (Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10, no. 3/4 [December 1986]), 393–423. 9. The from the fifteenth to seventeenth century is well summarized in V.A. Golobutskii, Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo (Kiev, 1957) and Gunter Stökl, Die Entstehung des Kosakentums (, 1953). The topic is treated in much greater detail in volumes 6–10 of Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi’s Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols. ( and Kiev, 1898–1937).

19 10. This notion is developed in Iakovenko, Ukrains’ka shliakhta, 268–69. 11. The Cossack intervention in the religious strife is best treated in volume 6 of Hrushevs’kyi’s Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy. See also Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, “The National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century,” Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe, 377–92. 12. Andrzej Kami½ski, “The Cossack Experiment in Szlachta Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (Hadziacz) Union,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol.1, no.2, June 1977: 178–97. 13. See Serhii Plokhii, “The Symbol of Little Russia: The Pokrova Icon and Early Modern Ukrainian Political Ideology,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer-Winter 1992): 173. The poem, “Hlaholet Pol’shcha...,” is reprinted in Ukrains’ka literatura XVII stolittia. Synkretychna pysemnist’. Poeziia. Dramaturhiia. Beletrystyka (Kiev, 1987), 284–85, 564–65. 14. The state of Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth century is described in V. Žingorn, O snosheniiakh malorossiiskogo dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel’stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha (Moscow, 1894); Metropolitan Makarii (Bulgakov), Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, 12 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1889–1903), vol. 12; Ivan Vlasovs’kyi, Narys istorii Ukrains’koi pravoslavnoi tserkvy, 4 vols. (Bound Brook, N.J., 1956–66), vol. 2. The subordination of the Kiev metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch has been exhaustively treated in S.A. Ternovskii, Issledovanie o podchinenii Kievskoi metropolii Moskovskomu patriarkhatu (Kiev, 1912). The church in the eighteenth century is treated in I. Chistovich, Ocherki istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1882–84), vol. 2; K. Kharlampovich, Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn’ (Kazan’, 1914); Vlasovs’kyi, Narys, vol. 3, 5–30. 15. See O.P. Tolochko, “Mizh Russiu i Pol’shcheiu: Ukrains’ka istoriohrafiia XVII st. v katehoriiakh pohranychnosti.” Paper presented at the conference “Peoples, Nations, Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Encounter,” Köln University, 23–25 June 1994. 16. The scholarly literature on the Sinopsis is examined in the introduction to Hans Rothe, ed., Sinopsis, Kiev 1681: Facsimile mit einer Einleitung (Cologne, 1983). Of particular note are S.I. Maslov, “K istorii izdanii kievskogo Sinopsisa,” in Stat’i po slavianskoi filologii i russkoi slovesnosti: Sobranie statei v chest’ akademika A.I. Sobolevskogo (Leningrad, 1928), 341–48; I.P. Eremin, “K istorii obshchestvennoi mysli na Ukraine vtoroi poloviny XVII v.,” Trudy otdela drevnerusskoi literatury (hereafter TODRL), vol. X (1954), 212–22; and S.L. Peshtich, “Sinopsis kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie,” TODRL, vol. XV (1958), 284–98. An interesting recent addition to the literature is Gianfranco Giraudo, “‘Russkoe’ nastoiashchee i proshedshee v tvorchestve Innokentiia Gizelia,” Medievalia Ucrainica: Mental’nist’ ta istoriia idei (Kiev, 1992), 1: 92–103. 17. Hans Rothe, ed., Synopsis, Kiev 1681, 149–51. The author continues to use terms “russkie” and “Rossiia” to describe both Vladimir-Moscow and Ukrainian lands from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century (pp. 328, 335, 349, 351, 354), and his “pravoslavnorossiiskii narod” designates both Ukrainians and Muscovites under Aleksei Mikhailovich (pp. 278, 364–5).

20 18. For the first use of the term “gosudarstvo Ruskoe,” see ibid., 167. Vladimir is called “Velikii Samoderzhets Rossiiskii” (p. 216). 19. Ibid., 208. 20. Ibid., 353. 21. Ibid., 360. 22. Ibid., 364. 23. See Feodosii Sofonovych, Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh, ed. by Iu.A. Mytsyk and V.M. Kravchenko (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1992), 231, 255 and Frank E. Sysyn, “The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History Writing, 1620– 1690,” 306. 24. See Harvey Goldblatt, “Orthodox Slavic Heritage and National Consciousness: Aspects of the East Slavic and South Slavic National Revivals,” Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe (Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 10, no. 3/ 4 [December 1986]): 337–38. 25. Harvey Goldblatt, “Orthodox Slavic Heritage and National Consciousness,” 342; Bohdan Strumins’kyj, “The Language Question in the Ukrainian Lands before the Nineteenth Century,” in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question, vol. II, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven, 1984), 13–14. 26. David A. Frick, Meletij Smotryc’kyj, 238. 27. The ever-expanding contractual relationship between the Cossacks and the king of Poland is very well traced in volumes 7 and 8 of Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi’s Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy; the is discussed in vol. 8, pt. 3, 193–288. 28. For information on the Pereiaslav Agreement, see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1954); Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, 15 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1861–1892), vol. 10; and John Basarab’s Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton, 1982). The articles of the agreement are analyzed in A. Iakovliv, Ukrains’ko-moskovs’ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh, Pratsi Ukrains’koho naukovoho instytutu, vol. 19 (, 1934). 29. The conflicting Ukrainian and Muscovite interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement are dealt with in B.E. Nol’de, Ocherki russkogo gosudarstvennogo prava (St. Petersburg, 1911). The section dealing with Ukraine has been translated into English: “Essays in Russian State Law,” Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, 1988, no. 3 (Winter–Spring): 873–903. 30. For a more detailed discussion of the Little Russian concept, see Zenon E. Kohut, “The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding,” Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe (Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10, no. 3/4 [December 1986]): 559–76. 31. The transformation of the term “Rus’” into “Rossiia” and then “Malorossiia” is best summarized in M.A. Maksimovich, “Ob upotreblenii nazvanii Rossiia i Malorossiia v Zapadnoi Rusi,” in Sobranie sochinenii, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1877), vol. 2: 307– 11. See also the discussion of the terms “Rus’” and “Little Russia” by Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, “Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus’,” Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1991, no. 2: 77–85 (originally published in Ukraina, 1917, no. 1-2: 7–19); and A. Solov’ev, 21 “Velikaiia, Malaia i Belaia Rus’,” Voprosy istorii, 1947, no. 7: 24–38. 32. M. Hrushevs’kyi, “Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century,” in The Eyewitness Chronicle, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 7, pt. 1 (Munich, 1972), 12. 33. Hrabianka was published under the title Deistviia prezel’noi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebuvaloi brani Bogdana Khmelnitskogo...Roku 1710 (Kiev, 1854); and Velychko under the title Letopis’ sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII veke. Sostavil Samoil Velichko byvshii kantseliarist Voiska Zaporozhskogo, 1720 (Kiev), vol. 1 (1848), vol. 2 (1851), vol. 3 (1885), vol. 4 (1864). My references are to the facsimile edition of Hryhorii Hrabianka, The Great War of Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj (The Harvard Library of Early , Texts, vol. 9) (Cambridge, MA, 1990) and Valerii Shevchuk’s translation of Velychko in Samiilo Velychko, Litopys, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1991). 34. See, for example, “A tsia zemlia—predkovichna vitchyzna nasha, iaka siiaie pravdeshnim i neskhytnym blahochestiam vid sviatoho i ravnoapostol’noho kniazia Volodymyra Kyivs’koho, shcho prosvityv Rus’ khreshchenniam.” (Velychko, vol. 1, p. 79. The quotation is from the text of Bohdan Khmelnyts’kyi’s universal as reproduced in Velychko. According to M. Kostomarov and V. Ikonnikov, Velychko edited the text of the actual document. According to I. Franko, M. Hrushevs’kyi, O. Levyts’kyi, and M. Petrovs’kyi, the entire text is a creation of Velychko. See Valerii Shevchuk’s footnote on the same page.) For references to the fatherland as “kozats’ko-rus’ka malorosiis’ka Ukraina” see vol. 2, 200–202 and elsewhere. 35. For a discussion of names used in the Cossack histories, see Serhii Shelukhin, Ukraina—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavniishykh chasiv (, 1936), 145–50. 36. Hryhorii Hrabianka, The Great War of Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj, 359–60. 37. Velychko, Litopys, 1: 137. Velychko’s treatment of the Pereiaslav Agreement stands in contradiction to the actual events, for the Russian envoys refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar. 38. The poem was published by N. Petrov, “Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei (literaturnyi pamiatnik vtoroi poloviny XVIII veka),” Kievskaia starina, 1882, no. 2, 313–365, and “Dopolneniia Razgovora Velikorossii s Malorossiei,” Kievskaia starina, 1882, no. 7, p. 137. A slightly abridged version was published by O.I. Bilets’kyi, ed., Khrestomatiia davn’oi ukrains’koi literatury (Kiev, 1967), 165–83. 39. “Istoricheskoe izvestie na kakom osnovanii Malaia Rossiia byla pod respublikoiu Pol’skoiu, i na kakikh dogovorakh otdalas’ Rossiiskim Gdriam, i patrioticheskoe rassuzhdenie, kakim obrazom mozhno by onuiu nyne uchredit’ chtob ona polezna mogla byt’ Rossiiskomu Gosudarstvu bez narusheniia prav ee i vol’nostei,” Ukrains’kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk 1 (1926): 147–161. 40. See “Vozrazhenie Deputata Grigoriia Poletiki na nastavleniia Malorossiiskoi kollegii gospodinu zhe deputatu Dimitriiu Natal’inu,” Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete 3 (1858), 72; “Proshenie malorossiiskikh deputatov vo vremia sostavleniia Ulozheniia,” Nakazy malorossiiskim deputatam 1767 g. i akty o vyborakh deputatov v Komissiiu sochineniia ulozheniia (Kiev, 1890), 178: “Istoricheskoe izvestie,” pp. 154–61. Poletyka’s political

22 views have been discussed by Zenon Kohut in “A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25–1784),” Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to by His Students and Colleagues on His Sixtieth Birthday [Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vols. 3–4] (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 507–519. 41. On the 1763 Officers’ Council and the Ukrainian elite’s participation in the Legislative Commission, see Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 86–95, 125–190. 42. See Tetiana Oparina, “Spryiniattia unii v Rosii XVII stolittia,” in Borys Hudziak, ed., Derzhava, suspil’stvo i Tserkva v Ukraini u XVII stolitti. Materiialy Druhykh “Beresteis’kykh chytan’” (L’viv, 1996), 131–63. 43. The influence of these Ukrainian clerics on Muscovite church life is the subject of K. Kharlampovich’s Malorossiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn’ (Kazan’, 1914). 44. On the conflict between the Kievan and Muscovite clerics concerning transubstantiation, see Grigorii Mirkovich, O vremeni presushchestvleniia sv. darov, spor, byvshei v Moskve, vo vtoroi polovini XVII-go veka (, 1886), 31–82, appendix I–XXVI. 45. Georges Florovsky, Ways of Russian Theology, 2 vols. (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1979–87), esp. vol. 1: 59–60, 65, 85, 121, 131–2. For a scholarly critique of Florovsky, see Frank E. Sysyn, “Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Culture,” The Kiev Mohyla Academy (Harvard Ukrainian Studies 8, no. 1/2 (June 1984): 160–70; Francis J. Thomson, “’s Ecclesiastical Reforms and the Ukrainian Contribution to Russian Culture. A Critique of Georges Florovsky’s Theory of the Pseudomorphosis of Orthodoxy,” Belgian Contributions to the 11th International Congress of Slavists, Bratislava, 30 August–8 September 1993 (Slavica Gandensia 20 (1993)), 67–119. 46. Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetzkoy, The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, ed. and with a postscript by Anatoly Liberman. Preface by Viacheslav V. Ivanov (Ann Arbor, MI: Slavic Publications, 1991), 245–68; Dmitrii S. Likhachev, Reflections on Russia, trans. by Christina Sever, ed. by Nikolai N. Petro (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 74–5 (Likhachev asserts that Russia and Ukraine for centuries “have formed not only a political, but also a culturally dualistic unity”). 47. See Marc Raeff, “The Enlightenment in Russia and Russian Thought in the Enlightenment,” in John G. Garrard, ed., The Eighteenth Century in Russia (Oxford, 1973), 25–47, here 25 and Donald W. Treadgold, The West in Russia and China. Vol.1: Russia 1472–1917 (Cambridge, 1973), 115. 48. Max J. Okenfuss, The Rise and Fall of Latin Humanism in Early-Modern Russia: Pagan Authors, Ukrainians, and the Resilency of Muscovy (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1995), 70, 57. 49. Ibid., 109. 50. See V.I. Syromiatnikov, “Reguliarnoe gosudarstvo” Petra Pervogo i ego ideologiia (Moscow, 1943); Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800 (New Haven, 1983). 23 51. V.V. Vinogradov, Ocherki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka XVII–XIX vv. (Leiden, 1949), 72–84. 52. A. Iakovliv, Ukrains’ko-moskovs’ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh (Warsaw, 1934). 53. This expression was used by Catherine in 1765 in her instructions to the newly appointed Governor-General and President of the Little Russian College, Count Petr Rumiantsev. The instructions were published in Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vol. 7 (1871), 376–91. 54. The provisions of the charter are discussed at length in Robert E. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762–1785 (Princeton, NJ, 1973), 272–99. 55. The Ukrainian gentry’s claims are outlined in a 1784 preliminary draft of the charter. For a good summary of these, see D. Miller, “Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo,” Kievskaia starina, no. 2 (1897), 194–96. A detailed listing is to be found in the 1786 law code: N. Vasilenko, ed., Ekstrakt iz ukazov instruktsii i uchrezhdenii s razdeleniem po materialam na deviatnadtsat’ chastei [Materialy dlia istorii ekonomicheskogo, iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo byta Staroi Malorossii, vol. 2] (, 1902), 216–31. 56. For the 1775 Basic Statute for the Administration of the Provinces of the Russian Empire, see PSZ, no. 14,392 (7 November 1775), 20: 229–304. 57. For Catherine’s decree forbidding the movement of Ukrainian peasants and extending the poll tax to Ukraine, see PSZ, no. 15,724 (3 May 1783), 21: 908. 58. Described in “Dnevnik Akima Semenovicha Sulimy,” Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, vol. 20 (Suvorova-Tkachev), 141–42. 59. Vasylenko enumerates the local legal practices retained with the introduction of the imperial code, “Iak skasovano Lytovs’koho statuta,” Zapysky Sotsiial’no- ekonomichnoho viddilu VUAN, vol. 2–3 (1923–25), 288–316. 60. The organization, activities and disbandment of the 1812–16 Cossack formations have been studied in numerous works. The most important are: I. Pavlovskii, “Malorossiiskoe kozach’e opolchenie v 1812 godu,” Kievskaia starina, 1906, no. 9: 1– 20 and no. 10: 137–54; N. Storozhenko, “K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka,” Kievskaia starina, 1897, no. 6: 460–83; P. Klepats’kyi, “Dvorians’ke zems’ke opolchennia (kozaky),” Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva 31 (1930): 6–21; V. I. Strel’skii, Uchastie ukrainskogo naroda v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev, 1953); B. S. Abolikhin, “Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.,” Istoricheskie zapiski, 72 (Moscow, 1962). 61. For a detailed discussion of the 1830–31 Cossack project, see N. Storozhenko, “K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka,” Kievskaia starina, 1897, no. 10: 115–31. 62. Istoricheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatiletnei deiatel’nosti Ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv 1837–1887, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1888), 18. 63. See Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii. Sochinenie Georgiia Koniskago Arkhiepiskopa Beloruskogo (Moscow, 1846). 64. , A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., vol. 5–6 (New York, 1957), 112. 24

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