Report by Tim Veitch

North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee Report by Tim Veitch

July 2019

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Report by Tim Veitch

Project No. 16-081

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Qualifications and experience ...... 1 3. Technical Report ...... 1 4. Further work since preparation of the Technical Report...... 1 5. Summary of issues, opinions and recommendations ...... 4 6. Submissions ...... 5 6.1 Submissions received ...... 5 6.2 Summary of issues raised ...... 6 6.3 Response to issues raised ...... 7 6.3.1 Issues related to the robustness and realism of the traffic modelling ...... 7 6.3.1.1 Accuracy of the forecasts ...... 7 6.3.1.2 EES study area ...... 8 6.3.1.3 Forecast years ...... 9 6.3.1.4 Peak period definitions ...... 9 6.3.1.5 Modelling of travel times ...... 10 6.3.1.6 Modelling of travel demand induced by North East Link ...... 14 6.3.1.7 Modelling of mode choices ...... 19 6.3.1.8 Modelling of drivers’ willingness to pay the North East Link tolls ...... 22 6.3.1.9 Realism of the forecast traffic impacts on the Eastern Freeway and M80 ...... 23 6.3.1.10 Approach to trip distribution ...... 25 6.3.2 Issues related to future year modelling assumptions ...... 28 6.3.2.1 Included and excluded projects in forecast years ...... 28 6.3.2.2 Public transport network assumptions ...... 29 6.3.2.3 Demographic and land use assumptions ...... 30 6.3.2.4 Emerging technologies ...... 32 6.3.3 Issues related to the traffic and transport impacts of the Project ...... 32 6.3.3.1 Impact on driver behaviour from Eltham ...... 33 6.3.3.2 Impact on driver behaviour from the Hume Freeway ...... 33 6.3.3.3 Construction traffic ...... 36 6.3.3.4 Traffic impacts on the EastLink Tunnels ...... 36 6.3.3.5 Traffic impacts around Hoddle Street, Alexandra Parade and the western end of the Eastern Freeway 36 6.3.3.6 Traffic impacts outside of the EES study area ...... 36 6.3.3.7 The effect of the North East Link project on public transport patronage ...... 41 7. Response to IAC Questions and Further Information Request ...... 42 8. Environmental Performance Requirements ...... 43 9. Declaration ...... 43 Annexure A - Matters Raised by PPV Guide to Expert Evidence ...... 45 Annexure B - Tim Veitch’s Curriculum Vitae ...... 49 Annexure C – Letter of Instruction ...... 53

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

1. Introduction

Veitch Lister Consulting (VLC) prepared the report titled “Transport Modelling Summary Report” (Technical Report) which is attached as Appendix B of Technical Report A to the Environment Effects Statement (EES) for North East Link (Project).

I have been instructed by Clayton Utz on behalf of NELP to review and respond to the public submissions and give evidence on the environmental effects of the Project relevant to my area of expertise. 2. Qualifications and experience

Annexure A contains a statement setting out my qualifications and experience, and the other matters raised by Planning Panels Victoria's Guide to Expert Evidence. A copy of my curriculum vitae is provided as Annexure B. 3. Technical Report

The role that I had in preparing the Technical Report was as an Expert Technical Advisor. In that role I was responsible for providing specialist technical advice, including advice related to model design, development and application. I also reviewed and approved the Technical Report. Other significant contributors to the Technical Report (VLC team) and their expertise is set out as follows:

• Aaron Alaimo – Project Manager – Qualifications: Bachelor of Engineering (Civil), Monash University 1997; • Lawrence Leung – Senior Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Master of Engineering (Mechatronics), University of Melbourne, 2014. Bachelor of Science Mechanical Systems, University of Melbourne, 2012. Diploma Informatics, University of Melbourne, 2012; and • Clements Chan – Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Bachelor of Science and Engineering (Civil), Monash University 2018.

I adopt the Technical Report, in combination with this statement, as my written expert evidence for the purposes of the North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee's inquiry into the environmental effects of the Project. 4. Further work since preparation of the Technical Report

Since the Technical Report was finalised, the VLC team has undertaken further work in relation to the potential impact of future vehicle technologies and business models. A summary of the findings in relation to this further work is as follows:

• Connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV) technology (without any increase in car pooling) has the potential to increase traffic volumes, primarily due to an increase in empty running, and people switching trips from public transport to car. While this increase would be somewhat offset by an increase in freeway capacity, the net effect may be a slow down in average travel speeds across the road network; • A shift from private car usage to on-demand ride sharing using mini-busses (with an assumed average occupancy of 6.7 passengers per vehicle) has the potential to reduce traffic volumes, and improve average travel speeds across the road network; • In the CAV scenario, the impact of North East Link on travel demands and travel times was found to be similar to the scenario presented in the EES; and • In the on-demand ride sharing using mini-busses scenario, the impact of North East Link on travel demands was similar to the scenario presented in the EES, but the travel time savings delivered by North East Link were somewhat reduced (because the road network was less congested in this scenario).

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

The above findings reflect the combined effect of numerous assumptions, many of which may never occur, or may occur in a different way to what was envisaged. There is significant uncertainty over the impact of these and other technologies.

In addition, the VLC team has continued working to improve the strategic model, following its use as part of the EES. The version of the model used in the EES was version C2, while the new version is C3. The new C3 version is being used to support the development of the Outline Scope and Requirements (OSR) to support a potential tendering process. In summary, the key improvements made in version C3 are:

• Improved calibration of truck volumes by time of day, with a particular focus on the Eastern Freeway where the model previously over-estimated truck volumes; • Updates to the toll diversion curves (which are responsible for modelling toll avoidance) using newer survey data; • Updates to the population and employment forecasts to better reflect forecast growth in the Alphington Paper Mill site redevelopment and the Queens Parade Activity Centre Precinct 2; • Updates to the enrolment forecasts at Latrobe University; and • Slight updates to the future road network assumptions in Melbourne’s south east.

The VLC team has looked at whether the C3 model would materially change the results contained in the EES. The impacts of North East Link in the C2 model are shown in Figure 4-1 below, while the impacts in the C3 model are shown in Figure 4-2. In my opinion, the results are not materially different.

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Figure 4-1: Impact of North East Link using the C2 model used in the EES (2036)

Figure 4-2: Impact of North East Link using the C3 model (2036)

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None of the above further work has caused me to materially change my opinions as expressed in the Technical Report. 5. Summary of issues, opinions and recommendations

Issue Opinion Recommendation

Is the strategic transport No form of modelling will ever be completely The strategic modelling that underpins accurate 20 years into the future. Nevertheless, modelling should the EES reliable? in my opinion the strategic transport modelling be viewed in light has been prepared to a reasonable standard, of its limitations and provides a sound basis for assessing the and assumptions, direction and broad scale of impacts on traffic and an awareness volumes, public transport patronage, and travel that forecasts of times as a result of North East Link. The human behaviour strategic modelling contains limitations, and is 20 years into the built on a number of assumptions about the future are future. I discuss these issues more in Section inherently 6.3.1.1 below. uncertain.

Are the forecast impacts I consider the forecast impacts of North East None of North East Link Link to be realistic and reasonable. realistic?

Do the forecasts account Yes (see Section 6.3.1.2). None for cases where the origin or destination of a trip is outside of the EES study area?

Do the forecasts account Yes (see Section 6.3.1.2). None for the impacts of North East Link on travel behaviour outside the study area?

Is 2036 a reasonable year In my view it is (see Section 6.3.1.3). None to adopt as the basis for the EES?

Do the forecasts account The forecasts account for some types of induced None for the potential impact of demand, and the scale of forecast induced induced demand (e.g. demand is significant (see Section 6.3.1.9). The people switching from types that are not accounted for are not likely to public transport to car as a have a material impact in the context of the result of the project)? EES. These are discussed more in Section 6.3.1.6 below.

Do the forecasts account Yes. The model’s treatment of toll avoidance None for drivers who might has been calibrated to replicate toll avoidance of avoid the North East Link CityLink and EastLink. toll?

Do the forecasts account The EES forecasts assume a ‘business as None for the potential impact of usual’ situation. However, some additional future technologies and future scenarios were subsequently run to business models, such as explore these issues. In my view these do not

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

autonomous vehicles and fundamentally alter the findings of the EES (see “mobility as a service”? Section 4).

Why were certain projects The future base case assumptions were based None excluded from the future on standard assumptions set by Transport for base and / or future Victoria, as is standard practice for the project case? evaluation of major transport projects in Victoria. This ensures consistency across projects. However, in some cases sensitivity tests were performed to test the impact of key excluded projects. These are discussed in Section 6.3.2.1 below.

6. Submissions

6.1 Submissions received

My team and I have read the public submissions to the EES, draft planning scheme amendment and works approval application, where those submissions were identified by the Technical Advisors as being relevant to the Technical Report and my area of expertise. These include the following submissions:

PPV ID PPV ID PPV ID PPV ID

22 37 47 59

60 61 136 177

181 201 223 229

236 254 259 302

304 339 351 378

498 514 515 521

523 531 614 646

669 681 691 704

716 736 759 775

798 808 824 849

My team also reviewed and identified a small number of other submissions that had some relevance to my expertise within the Traffic and Transport broad category. My team and I have read those submissions. These included the following submissions:

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PPV ID PPV ID PPV ID PPV ID

90 92 98 109

140 171 215 221

222 230 258 293

298 317 321 386

402 408 410 418

468 526 533 557

559 572 582 598

632 633 636 692

707 715 733 738

744 762 765 787

792 797 816 820

6.2 Summary of issues raised

The submissions have raised the following issues relevant to my area of expertise:

• Issues related to the robustness and realism of the modelling: o Accuracy of the forecasts o The study area o The forecast year of 2036 o The definitions of the peak periods o Modelling of travel times o Modelling of induced demand o Modelling of mode choices o Modelling of drivers’ willingness to pay tolls o Realism of the forecasts traffic impacts o Approach to trip distribution • Issues related to future year modelling assumptions: o Included and excluded future projects o Public transport network assumptions o Demographic and land use assumptions o Emerging technologies • Issues related to the traffic and transport impacts of North East Link: o Impact on driver behaviour from Eltham o Impact on driver behaviour from the Hume Freeway o Impact of construction traffic o Impacts on the EastLink tunnels o Impacts around Hoddle Street, Alexandra Parade and the western end of the Eastern Freeway o Impacts outside of the EES study area o Impacts on public transport usage 6

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

6.3 Response to issues raised

Set out below are my comments and response to the issues raised by the written submissions relevant to the area of my expertise.

6.3.1 Issues related to the robustness and realism of the traffic modelling

In this section I address specific questions and concerns related to the robustness and realism of the traffic modelling.

6.3.1.1 Accuracy of the forecasts

Some submissions (e.g. 304, 351 and 136) raised high level questions about the accuracy and precision of the modelling that underpins the EES.

For example, submission 304 asks:

“What transport model has been used and how reliable is it? What guarantees are there that the model is correct?”

Submission 351 asks (in relation to the predicted travel time outcomes):

“How accurate are these projections 5, 10 and decades into the future?”

These are important questions.

It is often said that “it is difficult to make forecasts, especially about the future”, and this is certainly so of transport modelling. Any field which involves modelling human behaviour (which transport models aim to do) is inherently challenging. This is especially so of long term forecasting (in this instance 2036). With these things in mind, I would suggest that there are absolutely no guarantees that the model is correct. Quite the opposite, it is guaranteed that the modelling is not 100% correct.

The more important questions are: how reliable is the modelling?; and how accurate are the forecasts likely to be?

I will answer in the context of the strategic modelling, which has been used to:

• Forecast demand for North East Link; • Forecast percentage impacts on demand for other roads within the study area and across Melbourne (and public transport); and • Forecast travel times.

When transport modellers set out to develop a transport model, the techniques that they use to check that the model is working soundly include:

• Running the model for a recent year (e.g. 2016) and checking that the model’s outputs align (to a reasonable degree) with known outcomes from that year. This process, which is often called “model validation”, can involve comparing the modelled traffic volumes against real world traffic volumes (as measured by traffic counters), and comparing the modelled travel times against real world travel times (as measured by travel time surveys). For a project like North East Link, particular focus would be given to traffic counts and travel times in the study area; • Running “sensitivity tests”, which involve checking how sensitive the model’s outputs are to changes in particular inputs (e.g. changes in fuel prices, tolls, public transport fares, etc.); • Running scenarios for future years, and checking that the forecast growth rates are sensible in light of past growth rates; and • Checking how accurate past forecasts proved to be.

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Having reviewed the Technical Report, I am satisfied that the above tasks have been undertaken to a reasonable standard, and that the strategic model provides a sound and reliable basis from which to assess the impacts of North East Link.

In relation to the likely accuracy of the model, I would start by saying that it is impossible to quantify the accuracy of a forecast made nearly 20 years into the future (until we get there). There are too many unknown unknowns. However, that does not make modelling useless. As the saying goes, “all models are wrong, but some are useful”. In light of the purpose of this work (i.e. to assess the impacts of North East Link) I would make the following general observations:

• The model should do a reasonable job of predicting where traffic will go up and where it will go down as a result of North East Link, and should give a broad indication of how much. The same goes for travel times; • Modelled traffic volumes and impacts will tend to be more accurate (in percentage terms) on large roads (e.g. major arterials and motorways) and less accurate (in percentage terms) on small roads (e.g. local roads); • The forecasts are a function of numerous assumptions about future population and employment growth, future vehicle technology, future prices of fuel, parking, tolls and public transport fares, and future transport network improvements. These are documented in the Technical Report; and • Like all models, the strategic model used for this project has a number of limitations. Understanding these will help the reader to understand where the model is likely be more or less accurate. These are also documented in Appendix A of the Technical Report.

6.3.1.2 EES study area

A number of submissions raised questions and concerns in relation to the EES study area. The two main issues were:

• Concerns about traffic impacts outside the EES study area; and • Questions over whether the modelling process used to forecast impacts inside the study area took account of travel behaviour outside the study area. For example, submission 61 asked whether the modelling accounted for the fact that vehicles using the Hume Freeway might head east onto the M80 Ring Road to access North East Link rather than heading west to access the Tullamarine Freeway.

In relation to the first question, I present maps showing traffic impacts outside the EES study area in Section 6.3.3.6.

In relation to the second question, it is worth noting that the EES was based on three types of modelling with different levels of detail:

• Strategic modelling, which covered all of Melbourne and the surrounding cities of Geelong, Bendigo and Ballarat (as shown in Figure 6-1 below); • Spreadsheet modelling, which covered the EES study area only; and • Micro-simulation modelling, which covered the project corridor only.

The strategic modelling covered the entirety of Melbourne, Geelong, Bendigo and Ballarat, and therefore accounted for travel behaviour changes well outside the EES study area (including route choice to and from the Hume Freeway).

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Figure 6-1: Area covered by the Zenith model

6.3.1.3 Forecast years

Submission 669 pointed out that studies of induced traffic demand often assess the impact after 15 years whereas the EES only considers impacts in 2036, which is 9 years after the expected opening date.

The choice of forecast years for the EES was made by other members of the Project Team. In my experience, it is normal for an EES to examine the impacts of a project around 10 years after opening. In my experience, it is also reasonable to assume that any extra demand that is “induced” by a new piece of infrastructure will occur within 10 years1. In my opinion the year 2036 is a reasonable year to assess the environmental impacts of North East Link.

6.3.1.4 Peak period definitions

Submission 304 raises a question about the duration of the peak periods used in the modelling:

“On page 11 of the NEL Transport Model Peer Review it is stated that the Zenith model for the NEL project considers four time periods. AM peak from 7.00 to 9.00. Inter-peak from 9.00 to 16.00. PM peak from 16.00 to 18.00 and Off-peak from 18.00 to 7.00 although this last timeframe has not been reported in detail. The RACV data lists peak hours as 6.30am to 9am in the morning and 3pm to 6.30 pm in the evening. Why have NEL used different times to what

1 Note, demand may still continue growing after 10 years (for example, because of on-going population growth), but this is a different effect to induced demand. 9

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

the RACV data shows as peak times? How accurate are NEL’s results if they shorten the peak periods by 2 hours per day and don’t report in detail after 6pm?”

In response to this question, there is no formally agreed definition of the peak periods, and different transport models and transport professionals use a range of different definitions depending on the purpose of their analysis.

On the one hand, if you adopt a short, focussed definition of the peak (e.g. 1 hour), then you might better reflect the most intense congestion that occurs at the “peak of the peak”, but at the expense of ignoring the remainder of the peak period. On the other hand, if you adopt a long peak period (e.g. 3 hours) then you might capture that remainder, but you do so by “diluting” the most intense periods of the peak with periods of less intense congestion.

The strategic modelling undertaken for the North East Link EES uses 2 hour peak periods (i.e.. 7-9am and 4-6pm), which in my view strikes a reasonable balance between these two competing objectives.

6.3.1.5 Modelling of travel times

A number of submissions raise questions or concerns about the modelling of travel times.

Issue 1: Treatment of trip origins and destinations

The North East Link EES and Business Case often report changes in modelled journey times for particular routes (e.g. along the Eastern Freeway), which typically occur inside the EES study area. Some submissions (e.g. submission 849) ask whether the modelling accounts for travel times from the true origins to the true destinations of trips, including the time taken to get to or from freeways. Other submissions (e.g. submission 61) ask whether the modelling correctly accounts for cases where the true origin or destination might be outside of the EES study area.

Response:

Yes, the strategic modelling accounts for the true origins and destinations of trips within an area well beyond the EES study area (the modelled area is shown in Figure 6-1 above). As stated above, it accounts for the fact that North East Link might result in changes in travel behaviour outside of the EES study area.

There is one caveat, however. The strategic model does not consider travel to and from individual buildings / landmarks, as doing so would be computationally very challenging. Instead, the model divides Melbourne and the surrounding cities into around 3500 distinct “travel zones”, and considers the travel made between each pair of travel zones (meaning there are around 12 million (3500 x 3500) distinct origin / destination pairs in the model).

The travel zones within North East Melbourne are shown in red in Figure 6-2 below.

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Figure 6-2: Modelled travel zones within North East Melbourne (shown in red)

Issue 2: Treatment of ramp metering

Submission 849 asks:

“Does the project modelling include (a) ramp distances and (b) travel diversion kilometres in its modelling of trip distances and journey times, or are they based solely on the on-freeway distances?

As the freeways are to be ‘fully managed motorways’, have queuing times for entry on to the motorways been included in the motorway journey times?

These questions apply to Tables 8, 9, and 10 at pages K-59 & 60 (pdf 52 & 53 of 77 Business Case Appendix K – Transport”

Response:

• The model does (approximately) include ramp distances. • As stated above, the travel times are not solely based on freeway distances, and do include the full length of each trip. • The model does not explicitly account for the time spent queuing when a freeway ramp is metered. In fact, as I will discuss below, the model’s inability to explicitly model queues in general is an important limitation.

Issue #3: Modelling of traffic congestion and queues

A number of submissions raised concerns about the model’s ability to account for the effects of traffic congestion and queues. 11

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Submission 716 stated:

“Assuming that the forecast demand along the Eastern Freeway is accurate, this would necessitate duplication of the EastLink Tunnels (Melba and Mullum Mullum). The failure to consider this consequential effect of the Project is a major flaw, or inconvenient truth. The full extent of the required duplication and connecting roads should form part of this EES.

The transport model does not adequately account for queues and congestion during the peaks. It assumes free flow conditions. It is submitted that this will reduce the modelled travel time savings to the point that it significantly undermines the alleged benefits during the peaks, when travel speeds drop significantly as cars back up on the freeway.”

The above paragraphs raise particular concerns in relation to queuing in and around the EastLink tunnels if North East Link is built. Other submissions raise concerns in relation to the ability of the model to account for congestion and queues at the western end of the Eastern Freeway (at its intersection with Hoddle Street).

Response:

In this section I will address the methodological question of what the model does and does not account for in relation to traffic congestion and queuing. I address the specific issues of the EastLink tunnels and the Eastern Freeway in Sections 6.3.3.4 and 6.3.3.5.

One of the core objectives of the strategic model is to predict travel speeds (and hence travel times) across the road network. The strategic model needs to cover a large area, so that it can reasonably capture the true origins and destinations of trips across Melbourne. However, the need to cover such a large area means that the methods used to estimate travel speeds need to be relatively simple, otherwise modelling would become too complex and impractical.

Traffic speeds are modelled as a function of traffic volumes, meaning that the more traffic uses a road, the slower the predicted speed will be. This is reflected in the strategic model by way of “speed flow curves”, which predict the speed of each road depending on how much of the road’s capacity is consumed. Traffic modellers often refer to the fraction of capacity consumed as the “volume / capacity ratio”.

An example speed flow curve is shown in Figure 6-3 below. It shows speed decreasing as the volume / capacity ratio increases. The maximum speed (where the volume / capacity ratio is 0) is often referred to as the “free flow speed”.

The speed for each road section is calculated separately using the estimated traffic volume for that section, independent of any other road section. The process is repeated separately for four separate time periods (AM peak, PM peak, day time interpeak and night time off peak), resulting in separate speed estimates for each time of day.

An important limitation of this overall approach is that it does not explicitly account for queues, where congestion on one road section leads to a queue that blocks back to upstream road sections. This limitation is not unique to the model used for North East Link. All strategic models around Australia use speed flow curves which do not explicitly account for queueing.

Consequently, in responding to the view expressed by submission 716 above that “The transport model does not adequately account for queues and congestion during the peaks. It assumes free flow conditions” I partially agree. The inability of the strategic model to explicitly model queues does adversely affect its ability to estimate travel times in some circumstances, including those found at the western end of the Eastern Freeway and around the EastLink Tunnels. However, it would be wrong to say that the model “assumes free flow conditions”, as the model does reflect that speeds will decline as traffic volumes increase.

Given this limitation, I understand that the EES project team looked closely at the issues surrounding the Eastern Freeway and EastLink tunnels. I address this further in Sections 6.3.3.4 and 6.3.3.5. 12

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Figure 6-3 - Example Zenith speed-flow curve

Issue #4: Modelling of intersections

Some submissions raise concerns over another limitation of the model, namely the fact that it doesn’t take account of the detailed configuration of traffic intersections. Those details (which are not accounted for) include the type of the intersection (i.e. signalised, priority junction, give way, etc.), the length of dedicated turning lanes, and in the case of signalised intersections, the phasing and timing of the signals.

Response:

This is a genuine limitation of the model, which is highlighted in the Technical Report. By way of explanation, there are significant practical challenges in modelling intersection details:

• They can make the traffic assignment model unstable. From a mathematical perspective, the modelling of intersection delays can mean that the model no longer converges to a unique solution. This can make interpretation of the model outputs challenging; and • The modelling of intersections adds significantly to the complexity of the modelling.

The question is how this limitation affects the reliability of the traffic impacts forecast by the model. As described in Section 6.3.1.1 above, there is significant uncertainty when forecasting into the future, particularly in relation to smaller roads. Generally, the model will produce a “sensible” outcome, in terms of the direction and broad scale of change. However, in cases where details of intersections play an important role in local route choices, the model may send traffic one way when it should go another.

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One way in which this limitation has been addressed in the TTIA is that the strategic model has only been used to forecast percentage changes, rather than absolute numbers. These percentage changes have then been applied to traffic volumes taken from real world traffic counts, which will be reflective of these local details. This process is implemented within the spreadsheet model that covers the EES study area.

Issue #5: Concern that the modelled travel time savings are overstated

Given the limitations outlined above, particularly the model’s inability to account for queuing and intersection details, some submissions express concern that the modelled estimates of travel time savings due to North East Link might be overstated. These submissions often focus on the western end of the Eastern Freeway (together with Hoddle Street, Alexandra Parade, etc.), as well as the EastLink tunnels.

Response:

I agree that the model’s limitations may lead to some inaccuracies in travel time estimates. Those inaccuracies may not always result in over-estimation of time savings; in some cases it can lead to under-estimation. The speed flow curves used in the model are designed to reflect average travel times accounting for the average effects of queuing and intersections, meaning that these effects are implicitly reflected in the modelling (on average), even if they are not explicitly accounted for.

That said, in particular cases where these effects are of high importance (e.g. the end of the Eastern Freeway), the model’s limitations can be a greater concern. In the case of the Eastern Freeway, the forecast increase at the western end is only relatively small, at around 2% over the day, and as stated in Technical Report A, this increase tends to occur outside the peaks. As such, I do not consider this a major issue.

In the case of the EastLink tunnels, the model is only forecasting a smallish decrease in travel speeds, of around 2-3km/hr as a result of North East Link. Some submissions argue that the reduction might be larger given that congestion is already an issue in the EastLink tunnels during the peaks. One thing to consider, however, is that some of the congestion problems in the EastLink tunnels are caused by effects outside the tunnels themselves, such as the large westbound flow of traffic onto the Eastern Freeway via the Springvale Road ramps. As part of the project, the Eastern Freeway is proposed to be a managed motorway (using integrated ramp metering), which may go some way to addressing these issues. If the strategic modelling is considered in isolation (without the benefit of other traffic engineering analysis), there is significant uncertainty over the combined impact of these various factors. I understand that other technical advisors have looked closely at this issue.

6.3.1.6 Modelling of travel demand induced by North East Link

A number of submissions raised concerns about the potential for extra traffic to be generated by the introduction of North East Link into the Melbourne road network. In transport modelling practice we typically refer to this extra traffic as “induced demand”. In summary, the main issues raised in the submissions were: • Concerns that induced demand had not been accounted for in the modelling (e.g. submission 792); • Concerns that the scale of induced demand was over-stated or under-stated in the modelling; • Concerns that roads will simply fill up again within 3-5 years as a result of induced demand, meaning that the travel time benefits of the project won’t persist in the medium-to-long term; and • Concerns about the impact of induced demand on already congested parts of the road network (e.g. the intersection of the Eastern Freeway and Hoddle Street and the EastLink tunnels). The last issue above is outside of my area of expertise, and I understand it is being addressed by the traffic engineering experts.

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I will address the first three of the above concerns shortly. First, however, I will define induced demand, and distinguish it from other causes of traffic growth. A project such as North East Link can have a number of different effects on travel behaviour. In summary it can: 1. Cause people to change the route of their journey 2. Cause people to change their mode of travel; 3. Cause people to change the origins / destinations of their trips; 4. Cause people to change the departure time of their trips; 5. Cause people to make additional trips; and 6. Cause changes in land use (e.g. where people live and where businesses and other organisations locate). Collectively, when these effects result in an increase in travel on a road or in a corridor we often refer to it as “induced demand”. Some of these effects can occur quite quickly (e.g. changing routes or departure times), while other changes occur gradually over a long time period (e.g. changing origins / destinations, or affecting where people / businesses choose to locate). Induced demand is separate to growth caused by other factors, such as population growth, and changes in petrol prices. Issue #1: Is induced demand accounted for in the modelling? Response: The strategic modelling that was input to the North East Link Traffic Impact Assessment (as part of the EES) accounted for items 1, 2 and 3. I am satisfied that these effects are accounted for reasonably. In relation to the other three items: • Changes in departure times - modelling changes in departure times is very challenging. Current models in Australia do not predict this phenomenon, meaning that travellers are not predicted to change their departure time in response to congestion. Consequently, under heavily congested conditions, the model will tend to overpredict traffic volumes during the predefined peak periods (7-9am and 4-6pm) and underpredict traffic volumes outside the peaks. In the EES Transport Impact Assessment, this was accounted as a post-processing step by other technical advisors. With this taken into consideration, I expect this limitation will have a fairly minimal impact on the North East Link Project; • Making additional trips – there is no consensus on whether this actually occurs to a scale that has any material impact on the capacity consumption of roads and/or economic benefit assessments. Research by the State concludes that the “...induced demand from making additional journeys can be assumed to be negligible and need not be dealt with in the transport model” (VicRoads Transport Modelling Guidelines Volume 2, dated 26/04/2012). I consider it unlikely that this form of induced demand will have a significant impact on the North East Link project; • Changes in land use – to explore this effect, another technical advisor (EY) produced a separate set of population / land use forecasts taking into account the effect of North East Link. These were input to the strategic model as a sensitivity test, and the resulting impact on North East Link demands was found to be small (approximately 1%). For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the key elements of induced demand are either taken into account within the transport model, or taken account of outside of the transport model by another technical advisor.

The State Government has also published two documents that discuss the capabilities of travel demand forecasting models in dealing with the way people and businesses respond to a road improvement:

• “Induced Travel Demand - Draft Position Paper", Department of Transport Victoria, November 2009

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• “Transport Modelling Guidelines - Volume 2: Strategic Modelling”, VicRoads, December 2011

The views expressed by the DoT and VicRoads in their reports on induced demand are broadly consistent with my views on the subject. I will also respond specifically to submission 792 which stated that transport models fail to properly reflect induced demand because they use distance as the only measure of separation between different locations, rather than reflecting the quality, capacity or convenience of travel by the various available modes between different places. This is incorrect. The transport model used on this project accounts for numerous factors including travel times, congestion, fuel costs, tolls, public transport fares, as well as the perceived convenience of different modes.

Issue #2: Is the scale of induced demand over or under stated in the modelling? Response: As part of its work for the Business Case, VLC analysed the effect of induced demand (as a result of changing routes, destinations, modes and land use) on: • The total predicted usage of North East Link; and • The total predicted usage of other existing Yarra River crossings (i.e. Chandler Highway, Burke Road, Manningham Road, Fitzsimons Lane and Warrandyte Bridge).

I have taken the spreadsheets underpinning these analyses and changed some of the labelling and scaling to make them clearer. The results are shown below. Impact of induced demand on usage of North East Link Figure 6-4 below shows:

• Initial demand for North East Link, assuming changes to route choice only – i.e. no changes to trip origins, destinations, modes, etc.; • Induced demand caused by changes in mode – this increases the predicted usage of North East Link by approximately 2%; • Induced demand caused by changes in trip origins / destinations – this increases the predicted usage of North East Link by approximately 10%; and • Induced demand caused by changes in land use – this type of induced demand is predicted to increase usage of North East Link by around 1%.

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Figure 6-4: Contribution of induced demand to total weekday demand for North East Link in 2036

In relation to the above analysis, submission 136 states:

“Clearly, the various assumptions in the modelling – all debateable – about the extent of induced demand that NELP will attract sit behind these barely believable figures. The expectation that people changing trip destinations as a result of the link will contribute a massive 10 per cent to the traffic growth is particularly hard to believe, but the 2 per cent contribution made by people ceasing to use public transport is also hard to swallow, given that the Mernda and Hurstbridge rail lines could well have train timetabling increase to ‘turn-up and go’ frequency well before 2036.”

Submission 136 suggests that the scale of induced demand in the modelling is unrealistically high. In my view the forecast impacts are reasonable. The corridor through which North East Link runs is currently highly constrained, due to the relatively small number of arterial roads, and small number of crossings of the Yarra River. It is believable to me that the constrained nature of the network might suppress certain trips from occurring (i.e. trip between certain origins / destinations through the corridor) and that the introduction of North East Link might encourage more of these trips to occur.

In relation to 2 percent of demand coming from public transport, and the point about the Mernda and Hurstbridge rail lines, I would point out that many of the trips predicted to use North East Link will be orbital trips for which rail is not an attractive option (noting that neither rail line crosses the Yarra River). In light of the analysis shown in Section 6.3.1.7 below, I consider the 2 percent figure to be reasonable.

Impact of induced demand on existing Yarra River bridges Induced demand can also affect demand for roads other than North East Link itself, such as the existing bridges crossing the Yarra River (shown in Figure 6-5 below).

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Figure 6-5: Existing bridges across the Yarra River (in North East Melbourne)

An argument made in a number of submissions (e.g. submission 775) is that any reduction in demand on these existing routes (as a result of North East Link) will quickly fill up again.

The modelling attempts to account for the additional traffic that will be induced as a result of congestion relief on these existing routes. Figure 6-6 below shows that:

• The initial impact of North East Link (when drivers change their route choices) is a 23% reduction in demand for the existing bridges (in aggregate across all bridges); • Changes in mode choice (presumably resulting from faster car travel times) result in a 1% increase in demand for the existing bridges; • Changes in trip origins / destinations result in a further 5% increase in demand for the existing bridges; • The combined impact of the above effects is that in the EES, aggregate demand for the existing bridges is predicted to reduce 17% as a result of North East Link; and • A separate land use sensitivity test indicated a further 1% increase in aggregate demand on these bridges.

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Figure 6-6: The impact of NEL and induced demand on the predicted volume of traffic using the existing Yarra River bridges in 2036

In aggregate, the modelling (excluding the land use sensitivity test) predicts a 17% decrease in aggregate usage of the existing Yarra River bridges in 2036. This does not mean that the bridges will never fill up again. Population and economic growth is likely to continue post 2036 leading to further gradual increases in demand.

In my view, the above modelling results are reasonable.

6.3.1.7 Modelling of mode choices

Submission 798 states: “The modelling Transurban has done for the North East Link is based on the assumption that commuters will not alter their mode of travel (Summary Report, p37)”. Similarly, submission 236 states: “NE link modelling erroneously assumes people will not change their mode of transport. People chose what they perceive to be most convenient form of transport. If local roads are free flowing, more locals will drive.” These statements are incorrect. As described in Section 6.3.1.6 above, the modelling does account for the fact that people may change modes as a result of the North East Link project. In doing so, the model takes into account: • Changes to the future road and public transport networks; • Changes to transport costs (e.g. fuel, tolls, public transport fares, etc.); • Forecast changes in traffic congestion; • Where population and employment growth are assumed to occur; and • Changes in demographic profiles. Submission 798 above cites page 37 of the Summary Report, which states:

Would North East Link encourage greater use of cars?

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Strategic transport modelling conducted for the EES indicated that North East Link would not result in a material increase in road vehicle trips relative to trips made using public transport and active transport (walking and cycling), as the project includes upgrades across all transport modes. This means that travellers are largely anticipated to continue using their existing mode of travel once North East Link opens.

Modelling for the year 2036 estimates that, regardless of whether North East Link is operating, road vehicles would still comprise 73 per cent of trips across metropolitan Melbourne and 76 per cent of trips within the project’s surrounding area.

The point made by the Summary Report is that North East Link will not materially impact the share of car trips relative to public transport trips, and that aggregate mode shares across the entirety of Melbourne will remain approximately the same. In my view this is a realistic outcome.

To shed further light on this, I have analysed the change in predicted mode share between two sectors, one north of North East Link, and one south. The sectors are shown in Figure 6-7 below. The model predicts a 3 percentage point shift from public transport to car for trips between these sectors as a result of the Project. This demonstrates that mode shares are predicted to change as a result of North East Link. However, as pointed out by the Summary Report, those changes would have a relatively minor impact on overall mode shares for Metropolitan Melbourne as a whole.

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Figure 6-7: Sectors north and south of North East Link

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I should also clarify that the strategic modelling for North East Link was undertaken by Veitch Lister Consulting, not Transurban as suggested in submission 798.

6.3.1.8 Modelling of drivers’ willingness to pay the North East Link tolls A number of submissions raise questions over whether drivers will be willing to pay the North East Link tolls. For example, submission 498 states:

“the Project is not a viable solution for alleviating traffic from Rosanna Road which was a main objective for NELA. It will only provide a second route for trucks alongside Rosanna Road. The North East Link will include a toll road operated by Transurban. This will encourage cars and trucks to find another route to avoid the toll road. … Why would trucks or other vehicles choose to use a tolled road when there is still a free road so close by to it?”

It is a valid question.

The modelling does attempt to take account of drivers’ willingness to pay tolls. For each trip origin / destination, the model calculates the proportion of drivers who would be willing to pay a toll, taking into account:

• The amount of time that can be saved using a toll road; • The price of the toll; • Whether the trip is to or from the airport (people travelling to or from airports tend to be more willing to pay tolls); and • Whether the vehicle is a company car or not (people who drive company cars tend to be more willing to pay tolls, because the tolls are often paid by their employer).

As an example, Figure 6-8 below shows how likely different types of car trips are to pay a toll in exchange for a 10 minute time saving. The x-axis shows different toll levels, ranging from 0 up to $10. For example, approximately 70% of drivers driving a private (non-company) car are predicted to be willing to pay a $6 toll in exchange for a 10 minute time saving.

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Figure 6-8: Percentage of drivers willing to pay a toll to save 10 minutes

These curves have been calibrated using surveys of travel behaviour in Melbourne, as well as traffic counts for Melbourne’s existing toll roads (i.e. CityLink and East Link).

VLC experience is that price elasticities are lower for trucks. The curves for trucks have been calibrated to match the observed price elasticity, as well as match current truck volumes on Melbourne’s existing toll roads.

Given the above, my view is that the model’s treatment of the effect of tolls on travel behaviour is reasonable. However, as with all modelling (particularly modelling of human behaviour) there is inevitable uncertainty over exactly how willing drivers will be to pay the North East Link toll.

6.3.1.9 Realism of the forecast traffic impacts on the Eastern Freeway and M80 Some submissions raise concerns about the realism of the forecast traffic impacts on the Eastern Freeway and M80. While the traffic impacts are not taken directly from the strategic model (i.e. the strategic model’s growth forecasts are fed through a spreadsheeting process) the strategic model is a key input to the traffic impacts, and as such I respond to those concerns below.

Submission 716 notes that:

• “The modelled volumes of an increase of 100,000 vehicles per day along the Eastern Freeway appears to be unrealistic and inconsistent with the No Project traffic impact assessment. There is no plausible explanation for the modelled increase of 100,000 vpd in the 2036 Project Case compared to the No Project Case 2036”; and • “The modelled volumes of an increase of 70,000 vehicles per day along the M80 appears to be unrealistic and inconsistent with the No Project traffic impact assessment. There is no plausible explanation for the modelled increase of 70,000 vpd in the 2036 Project Case compared to the No Project Case. Further, the 2036 Project Case volumes for the M80 are at odds with the volumes for the connecting arterial roads of Greensborough Bypass and Plenty Road.” The modelled increase in traffic appears to have been calculated from the ‘Daily traffic volumes (AWDT)’ table in Appendix D of Technical Report A using the forecast upper limits in both directions. When quoting an increase of 100,000 and 70,000 vehicles per day, I believe submission 716 is referring to two specific locations:

• Eastern Freeway mid-block – between Doncaster Road and Bulleen Road; and • M80 Ring Road – east of Plenty Road. I have reviewed both those locations and can confirm that the quoted uplift in daily traffic is broadly in line with values from our strategic models.

In testing the realism of these forecasts, there are two perspectives to consider:

• A supply (or capacity) perspective – i.e. do the roads in question have sufficient capacity (in the project case) to accommodate this level of increase; and • A demand perspective – i.e. is it realistic for this level of demand to exist.

The supply question is an issue for the traffic engineering experts.

In terms of demand, when a road is upgraded, demand for that road can increase for one of two reasons:

• People change routes (e.g. from the Maroondah Highway to the Eastern Freeway); or

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• The infrastructure upgrade “induces” extra car travel (as described in Section 6.3.1.6). This can occur because the new road provides faster travel times, or it can occur because other roads may be relieved somewhat by the new road upgrade, which can itself induce travel.

To analyse this, I have looked at the forecast daily traffic demands across two “screenlines” shown in Figure 6-9 below.

Figure 6-9: Screenlines affected by North East Link

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2036 without NEL 2036 with NEL Difference Eastbound Westbound Both directions Eastbound Westbound Both directions Both directions Screenline total 422,000 418,000 841,000 444,000 439,000 883,000 42,000 Eastern Freeway (Doncaster Rd - Bulleen Rd) 86,000 84,000 170,000 133,000 129,000 261,000 92,000 Screenline (excluding Eastern Freeway) 336,000 335,000 671,000 311,000 311,000 622,000 - 49,000

Table 6-1: Volumes across the blue screenline

2036 without NEL 2036 with NEL Difference Eastbound Westbound Both directions Eastbound Westbound Both directions Both directions Screenline total 524,000 519,000 1,043,000 551,000 544,000 1,095,000 53,000 M80 (M80 interchange - Plenty Road) 65,000 63,000 127,000 101,000 102,000 202,000 75,000 Screenline (excl. M80) 460,000 456,000 916,000 450,000 443,000 893,000 - 23,000

Table 6-2: Volumes across the red screenline

Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 present the volume of traffic crossing the blue and red screenlines, with and without North East Link. In each case I present the total amount of traffic forecast to cross the screenline, as well as a breakdown between the Eastern Freeway and other roads (for the blue screenline), and between the M80 and other roads (for the red screenline).

In the case of the blue screenline, demand using the Eastern Freeway is forecast to increase by around 92,000 vehicles per day, while other roads on the screenline are forecast to reduce by 49,000 vehicles per day. This suggests that at least half of the increase in Eastern Freeway usage is coming from changes in route choice. This appears reasonable to me. The screenline as a whole also increases by around 42,000 vehicles per day, which is an increase of around 5%. This is induced demand. The scale of this induced demand is, in my view, significant, counter to the views expressed by many that the modelling ignores or under estimates induced demand. This scale of change would also not occur overnight. The ‘project case’ forecasts represent the new “end state” once induced demand effects have fully taken place. These effects can take many years, as they occur gradually as people change homes or work locations.

In the case of the red screenline, demand for the M80 (east of Plenty Road) is forecast to increase by 75,000 vehicles per day as a result of North East Link, while other roads on the screenline are forecast to decline by 23,000. This suggests that around one third of the increase in M80 usage is coming from changes in route choice, and two thirds is coming from induced demand. The scale of induced demand (53,000 vehicles per day) is similar to the increase in the blue screenline, and represents a 5% increase in demand across the red screenline.

In my view, the forecast scale of induced demand is significant but plausible, as the corridors in question (particularly the existing crossings of the Yarra River) are capacity constrained, meaning that by 2036 there is likely to be significant “supressed” demand.

6.3.1.10 Approach to trip distribution “Trip distribution” is a key component of the strategic model, which is responsible for predicting the number of trips made between each origin and each destination within Melbourne. The trip distribution model is also responsible for predicting how those origins and destinations might change in the 2036 ‘no project’ case (as population and employment grow or shift, and as new infrastructure is built) and in the 2036 ‘project case’ (as a result of North East Link).

As stated in the Technical Report, VLC used what it calls a “dampened single distribution” approach to trip distribution. Submission 136 criticises VLC’s rationale for taking this approach, and states:

"In the case of NELP, the owner of the Zenith model, VLC, consciously adopted a different modelling approach to that endorsed by the Victorian Government on the grounds that the

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dampened single distribution approach previously produced more accurate results in the past...This reasoning is flawed, akin, perhaps, to sticking with a Ptolemaic system of planetary motion because it worked well . . almost

The VLC report does discuss past trends and future projections of distance travelled per capita (Appendix B, pp. 19-21) but the discussion is a cop-out, skirting proper consideration of the likelihood that both approaches may lack particular variables, or routines that operate to adjust model parameters, which may impact on any shortening of per capita travel distances. The fact that certain behavioural trends have been stable for a particular period does not mean that will stay so”

I disagree that the reasoning is flawed. As the submission states, one of VLC’s justifications for its approach is that it has worked well in the past, and produces results that are consistent with past trends. However, Mr Legge analogy of “sticking with a Ptolemaic system of planetary motion” is wrong because it assumes that a better, more accurate approach is available (i.e. in the case of planetary motion, Newton’s laws of motion). In this case, the alternative approach (i.e. the approach endorsed by the Victorian Government) does not, in my view, produce results that are consistent with past trends, and as such, I do not consider it a better approach. I agree with some of the second paragraph above, where it states that “both approaches may lack particular variables, or routines that operate to adjust model parameters, which may impact on any shortening of per capita travel distances”. This is a reasonable view, and trip distribution is an area where I believe significant further research is required, and where transportation models can improve significantly. However, doing so will take time.

Submission 792 raises some further issues in relation to trip distribution. In summary, I understand those concerns to be:

• That “gravity models” (the mathematical approach used by the strategic model to perform trip distribution) cannot be “completely” calibrated from traffic flows alone, and instead need to be calibrated using rich origin-destination data, which is in his view seldom available; • That gravity models systematically over-estimate long distance travel and orbital travel. The submission cites the example of EastLink, where it states that the actual traffic volumes were lower than forecast; and • That the overestimation of orbital travel will lead to over-forecasting of demand for North East Link.

These are complex issues. In my view, trip distribution is the weakest and least accurate component of strategic travel models. Predicting where people travel is fundamentally very difficult, and the models we use (i.e. gravity models) are relatively simple. Unfortunately, as the submission points out, rich, accurate and large sample (real world) origin-destination data is seldom available for trip purposes other than commuting. Consequently, I agree with the submission that it is currently not possible to “completely” calibrate a trip distribution model to very accurately match the real world in all its idiosyncratic detail.

In relation to the concern about over-estimation of orbital travel, the submission diagnoses the cause of the problem as follows:

“Since strong radial flows to and from inner Melbourne produce a lot of widely separated origin-destination pairs, the model builds in the assumption that a similar number of widely- separated pairs must be present in orbital directions as well – raising the likelihood that the model will overestimate long-distance orbital travel and consequently underestimate local travel.”

This is a very insightful point, and I believe there is some truth to the argument, in principle at least. The question is whether this is a material problem in the modelling of this project. I am not aware of any material over-estimation or under-estimation of orbital trips in the model which is being used for this project. In considering this, I note that:

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• The Zenith model did not over-predict demand for the EastLink toll road (and was in fact, quite accurate); • The Zenith model has been calibrated to ensure that the amount of traffic passing through the North East Link corridor (i.e. the amount of traffic crossing the Yarra River) closely matches current day volumes; and • I have looked at the validation of the model for major orbital routes in Melbourne, to see if there is any obvious bias. I have looked specifically at the M80, with count locations shown in Figure 6-10 below. In Figure 6-11 I provide a comparison of the model’s daily traffic prediction against actual traffic counts. It can be seen that the model closely replicates the observed volumes, and does not systematically over-or-under forecast.

Figure 6-10: Traffic count locations on the M80

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Figure 6-11: Comparison of daily modelled volumes and actual volumes at individual locations on the M80

For the above reasons, while I agree with the submission that the way in which gravity models are structured could, in principle, lead to an overestimation of the length of orbital trips, I consider it unlikely that this is a material issue in this case.

6.3.2 Issues related to future year modelling assumptions

6.3.2.1 Included and excluded projects in forecast years

Many submissions have raised concerns that the modelling excludes a number of different projects which may have impacts on traffic volumes across the network. In particular, many submissions suggested that the modelling should include one or more of:

• Suburban Rail Loop; • East West Link; • Melbourne Metro stage 2 (from Clifton Hill to Newport); and • EastLink widening (including tunnel upgrade).

The modelling assumptions regarding future transport projects were based on version 1.09 of TfV’s Transport Modelling Reference Case, as is standard practice for the evaluation of major transport projects in Victoria. Details can be found in Appendix C1 of the Technical Report. TfV’s Reference Case provides a standard set of future network assumptions for each future year. One of the purposes of the Reference Case is to ensure that all major projects are evaluated on a consistent basis using a consistent set of assumptions.

In relation to the specific projects listed above, none were included in TfV’s Reference Case for 2036, and none were considered to be in scope of the North East Link project. Consequently, none were included in the ‘project’ or ‘no project’ scenarios in the EES.

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However, during the course of the project (including the Business Case phase), sensitivity tests were run of a number of different projects. Some key sensitivity tests are:

• Suburban Rail Loop – this project was not announced until after the modelling for the EES had largely been completed. To understand its potential impact, the full Suburban Rail Loop was modelled using the following assumptions: o AM and PM peaks: 15 services per hour; and o Off peak periods: 6 services per hour. The outcome of this test was that demand for North East Link reduced by around 1%; • Melbourne Metro Stage 2 – A sensitivity test of Melbourne Metro Stage 2 + Doncaster Rail was run during the Business Case, and the impact on demand for North East Link was less than 1% (see Table 12 in Appendix R of the business case). This is consistent with only a small proportion of North East Link users being destined for the inner city; • EastLink widening – During the project, a sensitivity test was also undertaken where EastLink was widened between the Maroondah Highway and the Dandenong Bypass (i.e. not including the EastLink tunnels). The effect was to increase demand for North East Link by only 0.18% at its crossing of the Yarra River; • East West Link – During the project, a sensitivity test was also undertaken of the eastern section of East West Link (between CityLink and the Eastern Freeway). The effect was to increase demand for North East Link by around 4% at its crossing of the Yarra River; and • Hume Freeway Widening (including Craigieburn Bypass) – During the business case, a sensitivity test was run which included widening of the Craigieburn Bypass to 6 lanes, and widening the section of the Hume Freeway between the Hume Highway and Donnybrook Road to 8 lanes. The impact of this test on demand for North East Link was less than 1%.

Further to the above, Submission 824 stated: “I am concerned about the congestion on Diamond Creek road Greensborough between Civic drive and Yan Yean Road. I am concerned that the traffic modelling may be very wrong with the duplication of Yan Yean Road, combined with the significant growth of the Doreen area by the time NEL opens.”.

I assume the submission is concerned that the modelling might not account for the duplication of Yan Yean Road. I can confirm that duplication of Yan Yean Road was included in the modelling, as it is part of TfV’s Reference Case for 2036.

6.3.2.2 Public transport network assumptions

Submission 531 criticised that the NEL documentation lacks details on specific bus network and service improvements that will be applied prior to commencement or following completion of the project. Submission 704 raised concerns that the EES only refers to the four DART bus routes that make use of the Eastern Freeway while ignoring other bus services in the year 2036.

I have looked into the assumptions and describe them below.

In relation to the DART busses, it was assumed that service frequencies would increase in the future ‘no project’ case (relative to today), and then increase further in the ‘project case’. The detailed assumptions are presented in Table 9-20 (p409) of Technical Report A. A dedicated busway along the Eastern Freeway corridor was also assumed as part of the ‘project case’, which leads to an improvement in bus travel times. These upgrades are shown in Figures 9-106 and 9-107 of Technical Report A.

In relation to other busses, the future bus network assumptions (for the entire network) are standard future assumptions taken from TfV’s Transport Modelling Reference Case, which were developed and used as part of planning for Melbourne Metro Stage 1. I have reviewed the routes listed in Table 9-23 of Technical Report A, plus route 305, and summarise the results in Figure 6-12 below.

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Figure 6-12: Changes to bus routes relevant to North East Link

Routes 250/350, 302, 207 and 513 are assumed to continue operating in 2036, at generally higher frequencies. Routes 508, 548, 550 and 551 also continue operating in the future, but are each extended. Route 305 continues to operate but is truncated at Doncaster Shopping Centre, rather than travelling on to the city. Routes 200 and 561 do not exist in the 2036 scenario.

None of the above routes are changed in the North East Link project case. The only changes to public transport in the project case are the DART busses described above.

6.3.2.3 Demographic and land use assumptions

Some submissions questioned the modelling assumptions for population growth. I address the specific queries below. First, however, it is worth clarifying that the demographic and land use forecasts (including population growth) were based on v1.09 of TfV’s Transport Modelling Reference Case, which is based on Victoria In Future 2015 forecasts.

Submission 704 specifically questioned whether the Manningham housing in-fill development had been included in the modelling, as it could have a large impact on projected bus patronage and car traffic volumes. The growth in population shown in Figure 6-13 appears to be consistent with the in-fill residential development prescribed by Manningham City Council’s Managing Residential Development Advisory Committee. For reference, I have included Manningham Council’s population growth plan. I do not currently know what scale of growth Manningham City Council is expecting to occur in this area, and so I can’t comment on whether the assumed scale of growth is consistent with the council’s expectations.

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Figure 6-13 - Forecast population growth 2016 to 2036 (Victoria in Future, 2015)

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Figure 6-14: Population growth plan from Manningham Council

Submission 824 raised concerns about whether population growth in Doreen had been accounted for. Figure 6-13 shows that the modelling does include population growth in Doreen. Specifically, the forecasts assume that population will grow by around 48% between 2016 and 2036 in the indicated area.

6.3.2.4 Emerging technologies

Some submissions (e.g. 792 and 357) suggested that the potential impact of autonomous vehicles should be considered. As described in Section 4, the potential impact of autonomous vehicles was considered as a separate exercise after the EES modelling had been completed. I summarise the findings in Section 4.

Submission 357 also suggested that new modes such as Uber Air should be considered. Uber Air was not considered as part of the EES. There is a high degree of uncertainty over whether or how Uber Air will operate, and what impact it will have. If Uber Air were to take off, I would expect it to serve high value trips between major trip generators, such as between the CBD and Melbourne Airport. I would be surprised if Uber Air had a material impact on the types of trips that use the North East Link corridor in the short-to-medium term.

6.3.3 Issues related to the traffic and transport impacts of the Project

A number of submissions raised concerns about the traffic and transport impacts of the North East Link project. Many of these queries relate to local traffic impacts and traffic engineering, which are 32

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee outside of my area of expertise. I understand these questions will be addressed by the relevant experts.

However, some of the queries are relevant to my area of expertise, and I address them below.

6.3.3.1 Impact on driver behaviour from Eltham Submission 304 asked “Does NEL believe that traffic from Eltham will travel to Greensborough to access NEL instead of using Fitzsimons Lane? What roads do NEL think people will use to do this?”. In response to this question we have analysed the predicted routes taken by drivers from Eltham in the 2036 ‘project case’. The results are shown in Figure 6-15 below. It can be seen that approximately half of all drivers from Eltham are predicted to head south along Fitzsimons Lane. Very few drivers (around 4%) are predicted to use North East Link.

Figure 6-15 - 2036 with NEL, distribution of daily traffic volumes from Eltham

6.3.3.2 Impact on driver behaviour from the Hume Freeway Submission 61 asks whether the model takes into account changes in travel behaviour that will occur on the Hume Freeway, and notes that the North East Link might cause some drivers from the Hume Freeway to head east along the M80 rather than west.

The model does account for this, and the results are shown below. Figure 6-16 shows the routes taken by Hume Freeway traffic in the 2036 ‘no project’ case, while Figure 6-17 shows the routes taken in the 2036 ‘project case’. It can be seen that in the ‘no project’ case, around 66% of Hume Freeway traffic heads west along the M80, with around 19% heading east. In the ‘project case’, 48% head west, while around 42% head east.

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Figure 6-16 - 2036 without NEL, distribution of daily traffic volumes from the Hume Freeway north of M80 Ring Road (southbound) 34

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Figure 6-17 – 2036 with NEL, distribution of daily traffic volumes from the Hume Freeway north of M80 Ring Road (southbound) 35

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6.3.3.3 Construction traffic Many submissions raised concerns over the impact of additional trucks around the project area during construction. Construction traffic associated with the North East Link Project (or any other project) is not reflected in VLC’s modelling. 6.3.3.4 Traffic impacts on the EastLink Tunnels A number of submissions raise concerns about the impact of the North East Link project on usage and performance of the EastLink tunnels and question whether the tunnels need to be duplicated. Submission 177 questions whether the tunnels can cope with a 30% increase in traffic as a result of North East Link. The 30% figure appears to come from Figure 9-31 of the EES. I have reviewed the figure, and it does not show a 30% increase in usage of the EastLink tunnels. Instead, it shows that 30% of the traffic predicted to use North East Link is predicted to travel onwards to (or come from) the EastLink tunnels. However, that does not imply a 30% increase in demand for the tunnels, as many of these trips would already use the EastLink tunnels (for example, they might currently use the Greensborough Road, Rosanna Road, Bulleen Road route to connect to the Eastern Freeway and then onto EastLink). Regarding the ability of the EastLink tunnels to cope with the forecast change in demand, this is an issue that falls inside the expertise of traffic engineers.

6.3.3.5 Traffic impacts around Hoddle Street, Alexandra Parade and the western end of the Eastern Freeway A number of submissions raise concerns about the impact of the North East Link project on usage and performance of the road network around Hoddle Street, Alexandra Parade, and the western end of the Eastern Freeway. I am comfortable that the scale of impact predicted for these roads is reasonable. Regarding the ability of the network to cope with these impacts, this is an issue that falls inside the expertise of traffic engineers. 6.3.3.6 Traffic impacts outside of the EES study area The study area for the EES was determined by other members of the Project Team but was informed by the strategic modelling outputs. The study area was intended to represent the area where traffic volumes would materially change as a result of North East Link.

Submission 61 states that the EES study area does not cover the full area that will be impacted by the Project. In response to this, the two figures below show traffic impacts (as estimated by the strategic model) in areas outside of the EES study area. Figure 6-18 to Figure 6-21 show impacts to the west, south, east and north of the EES study area.

The modelled impacts outside of the study area should be treated with some caution. The model has not been checked in detail outside of the study area (e.g. using current day traffic counts), but it should provide a guide to the likely direction and broad scale of impacts.

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Figure 6-18: Traffic impacts to the west of the EES study area as a result of North East Link (2036 project case vs 2036 no project case)

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Figure 6-19: Traffic impacts to the south of the EES study area as a result of North East Link (2036 project case vs 2036 no project case)

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Figure 6-20: Traffic impacts to the east of the EES study area as a result of North East Link (2036 project case vs 2036 no project case)

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Figure 6-21: Traffic impacts to the north of the EES study area as a result of North East Link (2036 project case vs 2036 no project case)

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

6.3.3.7 The effect of the North East Link project on public transport patronage Submission 704 asks for more information about how many passengers are forecast to use the Eastern Freeway busway, and what impact this will have on the amount of traffic using the freeway west of Bulleen Road.

Figure 6-22 below shows the forecast patronage for the DART busses in 2036 with and without the North East Link project. Overall, patronage is forecast to increase from around 49,000 to 56,000 passengers per day, an increase of 15%. I consider this reasonable.

DART route 2036 without NEL 2036 with NEL % increase 905 inbound 5,400 6,300 17% 905 outbound 5,800 6,900 19% 906 inbound 6,400 6,800 6% 906 outbound 6,800 7,300 7% 907 inbound 7,600 8,700 14% 907 outbound 8,100 9,000 11% 908 inbound 4,100 5,300 29% 908 outbound 4,300 5,400 26% Total 48,600 55,700 15%

Figure 6-22 - Forecast daily passenger loads on DART bus routes

Figure 6-23 below shows the impact on passenger loads for the DART busses as well as the nearby train lines. The modelling suggests than much of the increase in DART bus patronage is taken from trains, rather than from roads.

While this might appear surprising at first, I do not consider it unrealistic. For travel to the Melbourne CBD, public transport is already the dominant mode of transport, primarily because of the very high costs (and short supply) of parking. Consequently, there are relatively few car trips travelling to the CBD which can be brought back to public transport. For travel from the Doncaster corridor to other destinations across Melbourne, car is generally the dominant mode, and the upgrade of the DART busses will not (on their own) change that.

For the above reasons, the modelling indicates that the improvements to DART busses are unlikely to significantly reduce traffic on the Eastern Freeway.

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

Figure 6-23 - Difference in daily metropolitan rail and Doncaster Busway passenger loads

7. Response to IAC Questions and Further Information Request

I have been asked to respond to question 12 from the IAC: Technical Report A – Appendix B – VLC transport modelling report Section 3.4 identifies that several major road projects have been excluded from the transport modelling for the future base cases, however there is no explanation as to why these projects were excluded.

12. Information to assist the IAC understand why these particular projects have been excluded.

The IAC question refers to Section 3.4 of the VLC’s report, but it is Section 3.3 that details road projects that are excluded from the transport modelling for the future base case. I assume the IAC question relates to Section 3.3.

The projects that are listed as being excluded are:

• North East Link (‘the project’); 42

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

• Craigieburn Bypass widening; • EastLink widening; • Williamsons Road / Fitzsimons Lane widening; • East West Link – Western Section (WestLink) and Eastern Section; and • Outer Metropolitan Ring (OMR) Road, including E6.

As described in Section 3.1 of the Technical Report, the future road network assumptions are based on TfV’s Transport Modelling Reference Case. Of the above projects, the EastLink widening, East West Link and the OMR (including the E6) were excluded because they are not part of the Reference Case assumptions for 2036, and were not considered to be in scope of the Project.

Of the other three projects:

• North East Link is included in the Reference Case (assumed to open by 2026), but it was excluded from the future base case for the EES because the base case represents a ‘no project’ case; and • Craigieburn Bypass widening and Williamsons Road / Fitzsimons Lane widening (between Main Road and Porter Street) are included in the Reference Case assumptions for 2036. My understanding is that the project team excluded these projects from the future base case because these projects have some potential inter- dependencies with North East Link. Consequently, I understand the project team sought to identify which of these projects would be necessary if the North East Link project were to be implemented. As described in Section 6.3.2.1, a sensitivity test was run of the Craigburn Bypass widening during the business case, and it was found to have a less than 1% impact on demand for North East Link.

8. Environmental Performance Requirements

It is my view that the environmental performance requirements relevant to my area of expertise, being T1 and T5 are appropriate and will ensure that the environmental effects of the Project relevant to my area of expertise will be suitably managed to achieve acceptable outcomes.

As such, I do not recommend any changes to the environmental performance requirements for the Project. 9. Declaration

I have made all the inquiries that I believe are desirable and appropriate and no matters of significance which I regard as relevant have to my knowledge been withheld from the North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee.

Report by Tim Veitch North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee

...... Signed

Date: 15/07/2019

North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee Report by Tim Veitch

Annexure A - Matters Raised by PPV Guide to Expert Evidence

a) the name and address of the expert:

Timothy Robert Veitch

35/19 Dixon Street

New Farm, QLD, 4005

b) the expert's qualifications, experience and area of expertise:

i. The author of this report, Tim Veitch has 16 years of experience in the transport planning and travel forecasting/modelling industry (including toll road forecasting);

ii. In his 16 years of experience working in this industry:

A. He has spent 8 years of his career working as VLC’s Technical Director. In this role, Tim was heavily involved either as a traffic forecaster, or as a technical advisor, in many of VLC’s transport planning and traffic forecasting projects;

B. He has spent 4.5 years of his career working as VLC’s Chief Executive Officer;

C. He has led the development and application of sophisticated toll road forecasting models in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne;

D. He has been heavily involved in the preparation of traffic and revenue forecasts for both Government and the private sector in both greenfield and brownfield projects for the following toll roads in Australia:

− East Link, CityLink, and East West Link toll roads in Melbourne; and

− The Clem7 tunnel, Legacy Way, Gateway Motorway and Logan Motorway in Brisbane;

E. He submitted an expert report to the West Gate Tunnel EES and appeared in the associated panel hearing; and

F. He has been heavily involved in the on-going development of multi-modal travel demand forecasting models for all of Australia’s mainland capital cities, including models with a proven toll road forecasting capability.

iii. A more detailed summary of Tim’s experience is set out in 0 Annexure B - Tim Veitch’s Curriculum Vitae.

iv. VLC’s work for this project involved the development and application of a multi-modal strategic travel demand forecasting model, so as to assess the potential strategic impacts of the Project;

v. Tim is an industry leading expert in the development and application of such models. He is the lead architect and developer of the strategic model used on this project;

vi. Tim has significant experience in the transport modelling of major projects in Victoria, having been heavily involved in:

A. EastLink;

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B. CityLink Material Adverse Effects related to Wurundjeri Way;

C. East West Link;

D. Melbourne Metro;

E. Geelong Bypass;

F. The Eddington East-West Link Needs Assessment; and

G. West Gate Tunnel.

c) Details of any other significant contributors to this statement (if any) and their expertise; i. Aaron Alaimo – Project Manager – Qualifications: Bachelor of Engineering (Civil), Monash University 1997. Aaron is a highly experienced Transport Modeller and Project Manager, who has worked on numerous major projects in Victoria including Melbourne Metro, East West Link, and West Gate Tunnel;

ii. Lawrence Leung – Senior Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Master of Engineering (Mechatronics), University of Melbourne, 2014. Bachelor of Science Mechanical Systems, University of Melbourne, 2012. Diploma Informatics, University of Melbourne, 2012; and

iii. Clements Chan – Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Bachelor of Science and Engineering (Civil), Monash University 2018.

d) All instructions that define the scope of this statement (original and supplementary and whether in writing or verbal): i. I received a written letter of instruction from Clayton Utz on the 28th of May, 2019. That letter is attached as Annexure C;

e) Details and qualifications of any person who carried out any tests or experiments upon which the expert relied in preparing this statement: i. In preparing this report, I relied upon traffic modelling and analysis prepared by the VLC Project Team during the preparation of the EES. The traffic modelling and analysis for the EES were prepared by the following VLC staff:

A. Aaron Alaimo – Project Manager – Qualifications: Bachelor of Engineering (Civil), Monash University 1997;

B. Lawrence Leung – Senior Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Master of Engineering (Mechatronics), University of Melbourne, 2014. Bachelor of Science Mechanical Systems, University of Melbourne, 2012. Diploma Informatics, University of Melbourne, 2012; and

C. Clements Chan – Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Bachelor of Science and Engineering (Civil), Monash University 2018.

ii. In preparing this statement I also relied upon additional analyses produced by:

A. Lawrence Leung – Senior Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Master of Engineering (Mechatronics), University of Melbourne, 2014. Bachelor of Science Mechanical Systems, University of Melbourne, 2012. Diploma Informatics, University of Melbourne, 2012; and

B. Clements Chan – Transport Modeller – Qualifications: Bachelor of Science and Engineering (Civil), Monash University 2018.

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f) Any questions falling outside the expert’s expertise:

i. The scope of my expertise in relation to the EES is limited to the preparation of traffic modelling outputs, reflecting the strategic level transportation impacts of the Project in 2036. The following fall outside my expertise;

A. Detailed traffic impacts of the Project (e.g. the impact of the Project on the performance of individual road sections or intersections or particular public transport routes); and

B. The ability of individual roads or road sections to accommodate the forecast changes in demand; and

C. The rationale behind particular input assumptions taken from the State of Victoria’s Reference Case transport modelling assumptions, or received from other members of the Project Team (e.g. the definition of the Project).

g) Key assumptions made in preparing the Technical Report;

i. In order to prepare the traffic modelling outputs in the Technical Report, the VLC team relied upon inputs from other members of the Project Team, including:

A. The State of Victoria’s Reference Case transport modelling assumptions (which define future population / employment assumptions, future transportation network assumptions, etc.);

B. The definition of the Project as specified by the Project Team in conjunction with VicRoads and other Technical Advisors (e.g. road geometry, configuration, speed limits, etc.);

C. Various data sets that have been used in the calibration, validation and analysis of the model, such as traffic surveys, travel time surveys and origin-destination surveys.

ii. In order to prepare the traffic modelling outputs in the Technical Report, my team and I have assumed that the inputs provided by other members of the Project Team (and outlined above) are sound and can be relied upon.

iii. My personal involvement in the project was as an Expert Technical Advisor and reviewer / approver of the Transport Modelling Summary Report. While I have subjected the modelling work to high level scrutiny drawing upon my experience, I have not undertaken a detailed review or check of all of the model inputs and model outputs for all model scenarios, as doing so would be impossible in the time frame available to prepare this report. As such, I have largely relied upon the information contained in the Transport Modelling Summary Report, and where such information passes my high level sensibility checks, I have assumed that such information provides an accurate representation of the work done.

iv. In preparing this report, I have relied on others to identify which submissions are relevant to my area of expertise. I assume that all of the submissions relevant to my area of expertise have been identified. I am referring here to the submissions listed in Section 6.1 of this report.

h) Any departures from the findings or opinions expressed in the Technical Report and, if so, why;

i. nil

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i) Whether the Technical Report is incomplete or inaccurate in any respect

i. To the best of my knowledge, nothing in the Technical Report is incomplete or inaccurate.

j) Details of any changed circumstances or assumptions since the Technical Report was prepared and whether these affect the opinions expressed in the Technical Report

i. nil

North East Link Inquiry and Advisory Committee Report by Tim Veitch

Annexure B - Tim Veitch’s Curriculum Vitae

Position: Chief Executive Officer | Veitch Lister Consulting Qualifications: B.Science (Mathematics) & B.Commerce (Finance) – The University of Queensland, 2004 Summary of experience Tim is the Chief Executive Officer of Veitch Lister Consulting and leads the model development team. He has 16 years’ experience in the development of sophisticated four-step transport models and the software within which they operate and is a recognised industry leader in this field in Australia.

Tim’s primary area of expertise is the development and application of strategic transportation models, being responsible for the on-going development of Zenith, a multi-modal transportation modelling system which has been implemented in eight Australian cities / regions. These models are used extensively in the planning of many of Australia’s largest transport infrastructure projects.

During his career, Tim has also been heavily involved in transport modelling applications. He has played key leadership roles in the transport modelling for numerous toll roads, metro rail systems, and strategic planning studies, including the EastLink toll road, East West Link and West Gate Tunnel (Melbourne); as well as Sydney Metro and Melbourne Metro.

Tim’s expertise in both the development and application of transportation models makes him unique within the industry, and allows him to develop bespoke modelling systems to analyse real-world transport problems. Examples include the development of innovative toll choice models, public transport crowding models and capacity constrained station parking models.

Tim is also the author of public transport assignment software which is sold as part of the Dutch transport modelling software package OmniTRANS, and is used extensively in the Netherlands.

Relevant Project Experience Expert Witness • BrisConnections Proceedings, PPB Advisory (2014-2017)

Expert Witness - Tim was involved as an Expert Witness in proceedings related to the failed Airport Link toll road in Brisbane. Tim prepared a joint Expert Report with Mike Veitch. • Rivercity Motorways Litigation, Korda Mentha (2013-14)

Lead Assistant to the Expert Witness - Tim was the lead assistant to Mike Veitch in his role as Expert Witness in proceedings related to the failed Clem7 toll road in Brisbane. Tim was heavily involved in analysing the traffic models which were used to produce traffic forecasts for Clem7, and for preparing data which was input to the Expert Report. • West Gate Tunnel EES (2017) – Tim submitted an expert report to the West Gate Tunnel Inquiry and Advisory Committee, and appeared before the public hearing. Toll Road Forecasting • West Gate Tunnel (2016-2017)

Expert Technical Advisor – Tim was an expert technical advisor supporting VLC’s preparation of traffic forecasts for West Gate Tunnel, both as part of the Business Case and EES.

• Legacy Way, Queensland Motorways Limited (2013-2014) 49

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Expert Technical Advisor - Tim was heavily involved as an expert technical advisor in VLC’s preparation of investment grade traffic and revenue forecasts for Queensland Motorways Limited (QML). Those forecasts were relied upon by QML to support its successful purchase of the Legacy Way Tunnel from the Brisbane City Council. • East West Link, Linking Melbourne Authority, VIC (2013-14)

Lead Traffic Forecaster - Tim was VLC’s lead traffic forecaster during the Victorian Government’s East West Link Needs Assessment study which proposed a major new toll road in inner Melbourne (the East West Link). In 2013/14, Tim was heavily involved as an expert technical advisor in VLC’s preparation of updated traffic forecasts for East West Link to support the Victorian Government’s East West Link Business Case. • Long Term Traffic and Toll Revenue Forecasting, Queensland Motorways Limited (2013)

Expert Technical Advisor - Tim was heavily involved in the preparation of investment grade traffic forecasts for two existing toll roads in Brisbane, being the Gateway Motorway and Logan Motorway. Those forecasts were relied upon by QML as part of its debt refinancing. • Clem7 tollway demand and business advisory, Queensland Motorways Limited (2010)

Lead Model Developer - Tim refined VLC’s traffic model of Brisbane to more accurately forecast demand for the soon to open Clem7 tunnel. The resulting traffic model was used to produce traffic forecasts for QML. • Melbourne CityLink MAE, Melbourne CityLink Authority (2009)

Lead Transport Modeller - Tim undertook modelling to estimate the impact of Wurundjeri Way on the future toll revenue of the CityLink toll road. This modelling was used to assess the material adverse effects claim by Transurban against the State of Victoria. Tim also reviewed and reported on the transport modelling conducted by Transurban as part of the case. • EastLink, Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, VIC (2003-2004)

Lead Traffic Forecaster & Model Developer - Tim was the lead traffic forecaster in VLC’s preparation of traffic and revenue forecasts for the EastLink toll road in Melbourne. EastLink was successfully opened in 2008. As part of the project, Tim developed an entirely new toll road forecasting model, which has since been successfully applied to produce forecasts for toll roads around Australia (including all of those listed above). Tim was also heavily involved in auditing the traffic forecasts prepared by bidders. • Lane Cove Tunnel Traffic Forecast Audit (2004)

Transport Modeller - Tim played a supporting role in Mike Veitch’s audit of the traffic forecasts (and traffic modelling) of one of the bidders for the Lane Cove Tunnel in Sydney. Public Transport Demand Forecasting • Melbourne Metro Business Case, PT Division of DOT (Victoria) (2010-12)

Lead Modeller - Tim led VLC’s transport modelling for the Melbourne Metro Business Case. The outputs produced were used to plan and design the proposed Melbourne Metro rail tunnel and stations. As part of this project, Tim made significant upgrades to

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the Zenith transportation model, including, for the first time, behavioural responses to over-crowding on public transport services.

• Cross River Rail pre-feasibility, Queensland Transport (2009-10)

Expert Technical Advisor - Tim was heavily involved as an expert technical advisor in VLC’s transport modelling for the Cross River Rail pre-feasibility study. • Sydney Metro Business Case, Sydney Metro Authority (2008-09)

Lead Modeller - Tim led VLC’s transport modelling for the Sydney Metro Business Case. The outputs produced were used to plan and design the proposed Sydney Metro rail tunnel. Transportation planning • East-West Link needs assessment, DOT Victoria (Eddington Report) (2008)

Lead Modeller - Tim led VLC’s transport modelling for the landmark planning study “East-West Link Needs Assessment” in Melbourne, which was led by Sir Rod Eddington, and led to the further planning of the East West Link tunnel and Melbourne Metro projects. Transport Model Development • Development of Public Transport Crowding Model, PTD Division of DOT (Victoria) (2010)

Lead Model Developer - Tim developed and implemented a new methodology for modelling public transport crowding. This method is unique in that it explicitly separates seated and standing passengers and considers their behavioural responses separately. The resulting model was used to plan, design and evaluate the proposed Melbourne Metro rail tunnel. • Development of Toll Choice Model, SEITA (Victoria) (2003-04)

Lead Model Developer - Tim developed and implemented a new methodology for modelling the demand for toll roads. This method is unique in that automatically enumerates a logical set of tolled alternatives, which allows competition between toll roads to be explicitly modelled in a straight forward manner. The model Tim developed has been successfully applied to produce accurate traffic forecasts for numerous toll roads around Australia, including EastLink, Cross City Tunnel, Lane Cove Tunnel, Clem7 tunnel, Airport Link tunnel, Go Between Bridge and Legacy Way. Publications and Conference Papers • Veitch, T, Paech, M & Potesil, T 2012, ‘The Case for Government Buying Back of Toll Roads’, AITPM Annual National Conference 2012, AITPM, Sydney. • Veitch, T, Alaimo, A & Walker, L 2013, ‘Demand forecasting for toll roads: an approach to more accurately forecasting traffic volumes’, 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum, ATRF, Brisbane. • Veitch, T, Partridge, J & Walker, L 2013, ‘Estimating the costs of overcrowding on Melbourne’s rail system’, 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum, ATRF, Brisbane. • Potesil, T, Oelrichs, C & Veitch, T 2013, ‘Rivers as barriers to mobility in Australian cities’, 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum, ATRF, Brisbane. • Shobeirinejad, M, Veitch, T, Smart, J, Sipe, N & Burke, M 2013, ‘Destination choice decisions 51

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of retail travellers: results from discrete choice modelling in Brisbane’, 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum, ATRF, Brisbane. • Veitch, T, Paech, M & Eaton, J 2013, ‘What’s missing from Australian Household Travel Surveys? - Off Peak Travel!’, 36th Australasian Transport Research Forum, ATRF, Brisbane. • Veitch, T 2013, ‘A capacity constrained model of park and ride demands’, AITPM Annual National Conference 2013, AITPM, Perth. • Brands, T, de Romph,E, Veitch,T & Cook,J 2013, ‘Modelling Public Transport Route Choice, with Multiple Access and Egress modes’, 41st European Transport Conference, ETC, Frankfurt, Germany.

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Annexure C – Letter of Instruction