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UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Crime in the Mandate: British and Zionist criminological discourse and Arab nationalist agitation in Palestine, 1936-39 Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8x61q5jz Author Kelly, Matthew Kraig Publication Date 2013 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Crime in the Mandate: British and Zionist criminological discourse and Arab nationalist agitation in Palestine, 1936–39 A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in History by Matthew Kraig Kelly 2013 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Crime in the Mandate: British and Zionist criminological discourse and Arab nationalist agitation in Palestine, 1936–39 by Matthew Kraig Kelly Doctor of Philosophy in History University of California, Los Angeles, 2013 Professor James L. Gelvin, Chair This study examines British strategies for social control during the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936–39. It focuses specifically on the British discourse of criminality vis-à-vis the Arabs, and the ways in which this discourse related to British and Zionist representations of Arab Palestinian nationalism. Its primary finding is that British imperial discourse in the 1930s necessitated that nationalist movements such as that for Arab Palestinian independence be criminalized in a particular manner. London tended in the nineteenth century to regard the nationalist movements within its colonial domains as essentially criminal enterprises. Given the terms of the post-WWI mandates system, however, the British were poorly positioned to suggest that Palestinian nationalists in general were criminally inclined. After all, the entire justification for the British ii presence in the Middle East was the shepherding of its peoples across the threshold of national autonomy. Thus, while the British undoubtedly practiced a form of colonialism in Iraq and Palestine/Transjordan, they did so on an anti-colonial pretext. When the movement for Palestinian national independence threatened their traditional colonial prerogatives in 1936–39, the British could neither plausibly deny the existence of Palestinian nationalism nor suggest that it amounted to mere criminality. In consequence, while privately acknowledging that they faced a nationalist uprising in the mandate, British officials publicly presented the rebellion as the work of a criminal minority masquerading as a national army. In this, they had the full support of mainstream Zionist opinion, both official and popular. By presenting the rebellion as a crime wave, both parties attempted to marginalize what the revolt sought to foreground: the Arab majority’s case for national autonomy in Palestine. In neglecting to narrate the events of 1936–39 within this political context, previous histories of the Palestinian Great Revolt have often reproduced uncritically aspects of the British and Zionist criminological framing of the rebellion. iii The dissertation of Matthew Kraig Kelly is approved. Gabriel Piterberg Michael Mann David N. Myers James L. Gelvin, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2013 iv For Tammie v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 1. Crime is Chaos, Punishment Order: The Repression of Arab Nationalism 35 in the Early Months of the Palestine Revolt of 1936 2. “The Policy is the Criminal”: War on the Discursive Frontier, 91 July-December 1936 3. Towards a Rebel Parastate: The Arab Rejection of Partition and the Effort 157 to Institutionalize the Revolt, 1937–38 4. New Policy, New Crime: London’s Reversal on the Balfour Declaration 228 and the End of the Revolt, 1939 Conclusion 280 Bibliography 297 vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people were indispensible to the completion of this dissertation. Above all, my wife, Tammie Johnston, and my parents, Kraig and Dolores Kelly, proved constant sources of love and support over the years required to research and write it, to say nothing of the prior years of graduate study. My advisor and committee chair, Professor James Gelvin, was likewise a source of perpetual encouragement, as well as constructive criticism, with respect to both the dissertation and my graduate endeavors more generally. He always made himself available to me, which must have been inconvenient at times. I am in his debt. I would also like to thank my committee members––Professors Michael Mann, David N. Myers, and Gabriel Piterberg––who offered me wise insights and were kind enough to read through the dissertation carefully and critically. I am honored to have such esteemed scholars lend me their time and thoughts. I could not have completed the research for this study without the generous funding of the UCLA Department of History, nor could I have conducted it without the staffs and collections of the National Archives and Imperial War Museum in London, the Middle East Centre at Oxford University, the Central Zionist Archives and Israel State Archives in Jerusalem, and the Haganah Archives in Tel Aviv. I would like also to thank Hadley Porter for always helping me to make my way through the university bureaucracy. Lastly, I wish to express my gratitude to a number of people who read drafts of chapters or otherwise offered me their considered thoughts on aspects of my dissertation, and to several people who aided me in my research. Closest to home, these include my lifelong friend, Professor Tommy Givens, and my uncle and dear friend, the great Dr. Gary Lynch. They also include Abu Nihad, Prof. Ami Ayalon, Muhammad al-!Azzeh, Yoni Furas, Gaby Goldstein, Prof. Mustafa Kabha, Ibrahim Maher Bkirat, Maher Ibrahim Bkirat, Maurice Levi, Prof. Zachary Lockman (who gave me the original idea, although I doubt he remembers it), Fredrick Meiton, Prof. Benny Morris, Lexi Newman, Dr. Jacob Norris, Prof. Laila Parsons, Tony Peterson, Prof. Avi Shlaim, Dr. Adam Talib, Natasha Wheatley (an enormous help), and Alex Winder. Needless to say, my thanking these people in no way implies their agreement with the views expressed in this dissertation. vii VITA Education 1997 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles 2007 Master of Arts in History, University of California, Los Angeles Professional Societies Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Association of Israel Studies (AIS) American Historical Association (AHA) Publications 2008 “The Fall of Decline: The Decline Paradigm and its Lessons,” Revue de l'Institut des belles–lettres arabes (IBLA) No. 201 2012 “An Ambivalent Nation: Australian Nationalism and Historical Memory,” UCLA Historical Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 1 Presentations 2009 “A Light Unto the Nations: Developments in Israeli Sociology and Their Lessons for the Lobby Controversy,” Conference: “Cross Disciplinary Perspectives in Middle Eastern Studies,” University of Arizona, Tucson 2011 “U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: An Abbreviated Survey,” Conference: “History+ (Plus),” UCLA 2013 “The Arab Revolt of 1936: The British, Zionist, and Arab Struggle for Discursive Ascendancy,” Conference: Association of Israel Studies (AIS), UCLA 2013 “Participant observers: the role of the mandatory in the Palestinian Great Revolt,” Conference: Middle East Studies Association (MESA), New Orleans viii INTRODUCTION Given the number of excellent histories of the Palestinian Great Revolt, it is natural to wonder as to the occasion for another scholarly treatment of the topic. Addressing this concern requires that I delve briefly into autobiography. I first came across the subject of the revolt in a survey course on the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which I attended in my first year of a graduate program at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The instructor was my advisor, Professor James Gelvin, who structured the curriculum around his forthcoming book, a primer titled simply, The Israel-Palestine Conflict. He provided me and the other students with a copy in galleys. I found Professor Gelvin’s lectures and manuscript fascinating, but was intrigued above all with his contention––contra Rashid Khalidi and other scholars of modern Palestine––that the birth of Palestinian nationalism was the Arab revolt against the British in 1936–39.1 It was during this three-year period, Gelvin reasoned, that the Arabs of Palestine first orchestrated a sustained project of national protest, in contrast to the spontaneous and short-lived demonstrations (what Eric Hobsbawm termed “primitive rebellions”) they had occasionally mounted against the British in earlier years. Gelvin was adamant that nationalism was not only an ideology, but also, and crucially, a mode of action. Its starkest impressions in the historical record were the traces of the street-level activities of its adherents, and not the ideological pronouncements––as recorded in newspapers or learned political treatises––of its champions among the literati. Although talk of a Palestinian nation had been in the air as early as the 1910s, 1 For Khalidi and Gelvin’s respective views, see: Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 119–149; Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 94, 113. On the basis of his Herculean survey of newspapers published in Syria and Palestine between 1908 and 1914 (and the “Palestinians” bouncing off their pages), Khalidi places the birth of Palestinian nationalism in the period before World War I. 1 only in the 1930s did events signifying the emergence of a Palestinian national consciousness transpire on the ground. Benedict Anderson