Nationalism and Human Rights This Page Intentionally Left Blank Nationalism and Human Rights

Nationalism and Human Rights This page intentionally left blank Nationalism and Human Rights

In Theory and Practice in the Middle East, Central Europe, and the Asia-Pacific

First published in 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States – a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN 978-1-349-34157-3 ISBN 978-1-137-01202-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137012029 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nationalism and human rights : in theory and practice in the Middle East, Central Europe, and the Asia-Pacific / edited by Grace Cheng. p. cm.

1. Human rights—Political aspects. 2. Human rights—Political aspects—Middle East. 3. Nationalism—Middle East. 4. Human rights—Political aspects—Europe, Central. 5. Nationalism—Europe, Central. 6. Human rights—Political aspects—Pacific Area. 7. Nationalism—Pacific Area. I. Cheng, Grace, 1968– JC571.N33265 2012 320.54—dc23 2011040451

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company

First edition: March 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents

Foreword vi Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat

1 The Relationship between Nationalism and Human Rights: An Introduction to the Dimensions of the Debate 1 Grace Cheng 2 Human Rights as a Security Challenge: An Examination of Turkish Nationalist Discourse on Minority Rights Reforms 21 Beyza Ç. Tekin 3 All in the Name of Human Rights: A Historical Case Study on Australian Nationalism and Multiculturalism, 1980–1990 47 Troy Whitford 4 Migrants at Home: The Impact of Israeli Land Policy and Patrilocal Residence on Palestinian Women in Israel 69 Lilian Abou-Tabickh 5 National Rights, Minority Rights, and Ethnic Cleansing 97 Omar Dahbour 6 Cosmopolitan Citizenship as a Thin Concept: Who Is Willing to Die for Humanity? 123 Filiz Kartal 7 The Contradictions of Human Rights and Sovereignty: Contemporary Dilemmas of Postwar Historical Practice 141 Grace Cheng 8 Taming the Nation- State: Human Rights and Peoples 163 Mitch Avila 9 Conclusion: Nationalism versus Human Rights 179 Füsun Türkmen

Notes on Contributors 187 Index 189 Foreword

Both human rights and nationalism make emancipatory promises, and as such they serve as effective mobilizing devices. Oppressed, repressed, and marginalized people increasingly frame their issues in human rights terms. The early uses of nationalism meant liberation, as it was connected to first peoples’ struggles against the ancien régime in the modernization of Europe and then in seeking independence from colonial and other forms of imperialism. Moreover, the International Bill of Rights recognizes “peoples’ right to self-determination” as a human right. Peoples’ right to self- determination is often understood as a nation’s right to statehood, thus feeding the desire to form nation- states. Statehood is important because not only it equips a nation with claims of sovereignty against others, but also because the global and regional human rights regimes are essentially étatist. They recognize the state as the arbitrator as well as the provider and protector of human rights. In other words, although the post- Westphalian world structure brings forth international human rights treaties that curb states’ freedom to treat their citizens as they wish and oblige the states parties to follow international human rights norms, and “universalism of rights” means that they apply to all human beings regardless of their citizenship and other status, human rights, as constructed in these treaties, cannot be enjoyed without an active and strong state (Arat 2008). Noncitizens remain particularly vulnerable, as evident in refugee crises and treatment of immigrants. Yet, the emancipatory function of citizenship rights has been limited, and nation- states, including those that subscribe to the rule of law and democratic governance, maintain hierarchal structures and discriminatory policies (Kaplan 1997). They engender second- class citizens, who are, in Carlos Formet’s words, “racial, ethnic, national, religious, and gendered minorities who have been driven by the discriminatory practices of their compatriots to occupy marginal positions in the ‘central institutions’ of their own homeland” (Formet 1996, 316). Moreover, nationalist discourses and mobilization efforts have been masculine and militarist, yielding nation- states that follow and reinforce patriarchal norms, structures, and FOREWORD vii gender roles. In postcolonial or postrevolution states, the desire to form and forge a national identity further overburden women who are treated as the carrier and transmitter of the “authentic” culture (Yuval- Davis 1997) and embodiment of the national and family honor; but at the same time they are expected to transform themselves into an image of the revo- lutionary/modern “new woman,” which is typically imposed by the male leadership (Durakbas¸a 1998; Kandiyoti 1987). A blatant sign of the militarism of nationalism is the international and civil wars that have been increasing both in number and in terms of the damage and suffering that they inflict. Although when critics of nationalism, such as Arundhati Roy who notes that “nationalism of one kind or another was the cause of most of the genocide of the twentieth century” (Roy 2003, 47), emphasize the particularist, “othering” aspect of nationalism, the assimilationist, homogenizing, and civilizing missions of nationalism can be equally detrimental, if the persistent denial and exces- sive repression of cultural identity eradicates the culture through a “white genocide” (Tirman 1997). Assimilation policies are often problematized in assessing the impact of colonialism and Western states’ treatment of immigrants from the former colonies or in postcolonial states that are engaged in homogenizing efforts as a part of their nation- building projects. However, a quick comparison of the maps of the early- eighteenth- century and postrevolutionary France would reveal the scope of languages and ethnic/national identities lost in the process of unification and converting feudal provinces into a modern département system. It is important to note that nationalism was also a part of the modern/ Western imperialist expansion. Different from classical imperialism that typically served dynastic interests, in which territorial expansion involved acquiring the adjacent land and making the conquered land an integral part of the empire, with its overseas acquisitions or indirect rule, modern/ Western imperialism intended to serve the interest of the “motherland.” The three pillars of Western imperialism—the state, profit- seeking entrepreneurs/corporations, and Christian missionaries—reinforced each other’s interests, even though at times they appeared to be in conflict. Most important, they worked toward homogenizing the dominated people, politically, economically, and culturally, albeit without granting them full equality. Classical empires, on the other hand, although discriminatory and exploitative, usually allowed multiple cultures to coexist and even to flourish. Which ethnic/national groups’ right to self- determination is considered legitimate or which peoples’ demand for statehood are recognized by the community of states? I think the response to nationalist demands is largely determined by the colonial structures, as well as the power differentials viii FOREWORD among states. In countries where the colonial rule involved major population movements from Europe to the colonies (e.g., Americas, Oceania, South Africa), decolonization led to the establishment of states that are run by white settlers, and the colonized became “the indigenous people,” whose struggle for equality in dignity and self- determination still continues today. Indigenous peoples’ nationalist claims are often undermined, and their cultures are essentialized. In The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development, Karen Engle notes that “while powerful nonindigenous entities might be able to insist on being able to ‘pick and choose’ which parts of indigenous heritage shall be valorized and preserved, indigenous communities themselves are rarely afforded such liberty” (Engle 2010, 137). It is worth noting that beyond decolonization, only few peoples gained territorial independence and statehood during the Cold War years. Ethnic claims within both established and newly independent states were either disregarded, or they were provided accommodations that excluded statehood. However, the political map of the world changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and the number of states increased as each “nation” attempted to have its own nation- state. While the cause of the international community’s willingness to support more statehood claims in the aftermath of the Cold War deserves careful research, I would like to point to the irony in the proliferation of states during this recent phase of globalization, in which the global capital and neoliberal economics may be diminishing the power of state and making nation- state an element of the past. Even independence movements that were fought in earlier times, when the state enjoyed more power, usually resulted in disappointments for the majority of the population in postcolonial states. The indignations caused by imperialism were often replaced with frustrations instigated by economic dependency and repressive rule of the “nationalist” authoritar- ian state. Groups that gained dominance over others established “internal colonialism.” The collective right to self- determination has been exer- cised by the elite, usually without an effort to consult with the majority. Personalized governance defined elite interests as national interests. In fact, “national interests” and “national security” trump human rights in all nation- states. Powerful countries use them in devising foreign policies that undermine the rights of people living in other countries or other countries’ right to self- determination. For example, the US government’s goal to contain communism during the Cold War not only permitted granting military and economic assistance to repressive governments but also prevented many developing countries from carrying out redistributive social policies and nationalizing their natural resources and industries. Framed as “communist,” several governments that pursued progressive FOREWORD ix social policies that threatened the interests of US companies were toppled through CIA’s covert action (e.g., governments of Musaddiq in Iran, Árbenz in Guatemala, and Allende in Chile). Governments may also use other nations’ nationalist aspirations to advance their own interests. On the eve of World War I, for example, as they were provoking “Arab nationalism” against the Ottoman Empire and promising independence to Arabs, the British were secretly negotiat- ing with the French and Russians for the partitioning of the Ottoman- controlled territories among themselves. After the war, their plans were fulfilled by the League of Nations, which deemed Arabs not ready for self- rule and assigned the manufactured Arab states to the British and French as mandates and protectorates. Similarly, the current advocacy of human rights and the responsibility to protect create a milieu conducive to interventions that would serve the interests of the “intervening” parties more than the population in distress. Thus, the weaker/smaller states rebuke foreign criticisms of their human right practices and interventions by invoking “national sovereignty” arguments, and we see nationalism pit- ted against human rights. Nevertheless, all states, regardless of their power and international status, summon national interests or security arguments to justify policies that restrict freedoms and compromise economic rights of many within their own borders. But, do these policies articulated under the rubric of national interests serve the interest of the entire nation or that of a particu- lar group? Suspicious of nationalist claims, most Socialists, Feminists, and other critical analysts have considered subscribing to nationalism as false consciousness. Opposing nationalism for being divisive and militaristic, they have promoted internationalism and transnationalism. The advocacy of human rights, with its emphasis on universalism and equality in dignity, attempts to redress the discriminatory practices and the limitations of citizenship rights. Samuel Moyn, who considers human rights “the last utopia,” contends that “[w]hether the subaltern versions of internationalism that coexisted so uneasily with anticolonialist nationalism (most obviously, pan- Arabism and pan-Africanism), or communism and attempts to save it through ‘Marxist humanism,’ it was not only the loss of faith in the nation- state but also the desertion of the state by alternative promises to transcend the nation- state that accounts for the relevance of human rights in the last three decades” (Moyn 2010, 213). Yet, transnational claims are not always “universalist” or pro- human rights. As I was drafting this essay, Norway, normally a peaceful and calm country, was in shock and struggling to comprehend two attacks, a car bomb outside of the office of the Prime Minister and shootings at a youth camp run by the ruling Labor Party, which together claimed 76 lives. x FOREWORD

The person who was responsible for the attacks, Anders Behring Breivik, posted a 1,500-page manifesto entitled “2083-A European Declaration of Independence” on July 22, 2011, only hours before carrying out his planned attacks. His manifesto expresses a fear about “the extinction of the Nordic genotypes,” as well as “Islamic Imperialism,” which he thinks has been taking over Europe, as a result of Muslim migration, high birth rates among that migrant population, and the policies of multiculturalism that is promoted by the European political and intellectual elite. His strategy of expelling Muslims from Europe appears to be mass- murdering European politicians who are too lenient on Muslims. Thomas Hegghammer defines the sentiment expressed in Breivik’s writings, which is undoubtedly shared by many others across Europe, as a “macro-nationalism” that treats the European community as a “transnational entity.” Finding this akin to Al-Qaida’s transnationalism, he warns us about a new trend that justifies mass violence (Hegghammer 2011). However, while this Norwegian- on- Norwegian violence transcends nationalism, as it sees the main conflict between a population that follow a “ non- European religion” and the European community, it relies on the nation and its government to turn against the infiltrating population and restore the Europeanness of Norway. The mentality behind this violent act becomes more disturbing, if one recalls that the creation of a “supra- national” European identity has been a project of the European Union and related regional organizations for some time. The mutual rise of anti- immigrant sentiments and the frustration of the alienated immigrants and their Europe- born- and- raised children pose questions about the way minority rights and multiculturalism are promoted in European countries and point to the tension between human rights and communitarian transnationalism. As many emancipatory principles can be abused, misused, and sub- verted, nationalism, transnationalism, and human rights have had their shares. The sophisticated theoretical chapters and interesting case studies in Nationalism and Human Rights address the trajectory of human rights and nationalism in different settings, as well as the complicated relationship between the two concepts. The volume is based on a conference that was held in Istanbul on June 26–28, 2008. Cosponsored by the Human Rights Research Committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), which I have had the privilege and pleasure of chairing since 2006, and the Human Rights Center of Istanbul Bilgi University, the three- day conference brought together over 25 participants from 10 different countries at the Dolapdere campus of Istanbul Bilgi University. The three- day conference, which was also attended by about 50 scholars, students, activists, and journalists FOREWORD xi allowed rigorous and thorough discussions of the different aspects of the relationship between human rights and nationalism. Professor Grace Cheng, who had delivered an excellent and thought- provoking paper at the conference, later took the initiative of bringing together a set of strong and closely related papers from the conference to form a coherent volume. She also solicited additional papers to enhance and compliment the selected conference papers. Dealing with both nor- mative and empirical questions, chapters compose a volume that is timely, comprehensive, and challenging some conventional arguments. Professor Cheng’s introduction presents a brief yet pointed literature review that covers the major theoretical approaches and the main issues that appear at the intersection of human rights and nationalism. In the concluding essay, Professor Füsun Türkmen puts the tension between human rights and nationalism in a historical context and masterfully ana- lyzes the contribution of each chapter on two critical dimensions of the issue: identity and sovereignty. Given the important issues tackled and questions posed, Nationalism and Human Rights is bound to be a significant contribution to the literature in the fields of Human Rights, Political Science, Sociology, and International Relations. I would hope that it will make the students of human rights more attentive to the tension among various “right claims,” as well the “othering” that certain claims may engender, no matter how emancipatory they may appear from the claimer’s standpoint.

Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat Chair, Human Rights Research Committee International Political Science Association

References

Arat, Zehra F. Kabasakal. 2008. “Human Rights Ideology and Dimensions of Power: The State, Property, and Discrimination.” Human Rights Quarterly 30:4 (November): 906–932. Durakbas¸a, Ays¸e. 1998. “Kemalism as Identity Politics in Turkey.” In Deconstructing Images of “The Turkish Woman,” edited by Z. F. K. Arat, 139–157. New York: Palgrave. Engle, Karen. 2010. The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Formet, Carlos A. 1996. “Peripheral Peoples and Narrative Identities: Arendtian Reflections on Late Modernity.” In Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, edited by Seyla Benhabib, 314–330. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. xii FOREWORD

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2011. “The Rise of the Macro- Nationalists,” New York Times (Sunday Review), July 31, p. 5. Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1987. “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case.” Feminist Studies 13:2, 317–338. Kaplan, Gisela. 1997. “Comparative Europe: Feminism and Nationalism: The European Case.” In Feminist Nationalism, edited by Lois A. West, 3–40. New York: Routledge. Moyn, Samuel. 2010. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Roy, Arundhati. 2003. War Talk. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Tirman, John. 1997. Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America’s Arms Trade. New York: Free Press. Yuval- Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender and Nation. London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.