THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
Loyal to the Crown: Shifting Australian Public Opinion on the Monarchy Prepared for delivery at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association, Sheffield, March 30 – April 1
Luke J. Mansillo 10 February 2015
Over the past half century the Australian public has remained divided on the issue of whether Australia should retain the monarchy or become a republic. Clive Bean (1993) found there had been remarkable stability on the issue and evidence of a long-term trend away from support for the monarchy with a sudden decline in 1992. This article adopts Bean’s (1993) longitudinal cross- sectional methods to examine the social and political basis of public attitudes. This articles analyses the Australian Election Study (1993-2013) to compare Bean’s results and reanalyse earlier data from the National Social Science Surveys and Australian National Political Attitudes surveys (1967-1990). Public opinion has been fluid and is now at a crossroads between the 1980s high and the 1990s lows. Cohort analysis suggests socialisation impacts long term opinions. Gender and ethnic nationalism also influences opinion. It has been put ‘The survival of the monarchy in late twentieth century Britain is a socio- psychological phenomenon of strange proportions’ (Billig [1992]2002:1). If so the monarchy’s survival in twenty-first century Australia is far more outlandish. What is more peculiar is monarchy’s growing antipodean popularity. In the lead up to the 1999 referendum public opinion wilted for the monarchy (Bean 1993: 191) in spite of this the referendum failed (McAllister 2002) as voters took a least risk strategy opting to keep the Queen to one day vote for a congressional system instead of alter a parliamentary one (Davidson et al. 2006: 866; Wellings 2003). In the referendum’s aftermath, there has been a resurgence of public support for the monarchy. The monarchy’s fortunes were expected to continually decline over time given previous cohort analysis evidence (Bean 1993: 204) ‘bolstered by the effects of [...] education and religion and related social change.’ This article investigates the social basis for support for the monarchy and argues events in both the United Kingdom and Australia influenced monarchy’s appeal in conjunction with the processes of banal nationalism.
This article is a longitudinal analysis of Australian public opinion on the monarchy-republic issue. It is an update of an article by Clive Bean (1993) which demonstrated opinion on the monarchy-republic issue had then been stable until 1990. Bean noted that commercial polling on the issue showed a shift away from monarchy in the early 1990s. This article demonstrates that public opinion on the issue since 1990 has been anything but stable. Before 1990 was an era of general stability with modest gradual declining support for the monarchy, which is well documented (McAllister 2011: 29). An era of instability has proceeded. First a rapid decline of support in the 1990s, followed by significant gains of support in the twenty-first century.
It is opportune to revisit the study of the monarchy-republic issue in Australia. In the intervening years since Bean’s analysis there has been a series of events with the potential to affect public opinion. The 1990s featured significant royal scandals. These include the 1992 annus horribilis, Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s divorce in 1996, and the death of Princess Diana in 1997. This was followed by the failed 1999 republic referendum. More recently, the wedding of Prince William and Princess Catherine, the Duchess of Cambridge and the birth of Prince George, has been a boon to the monarchy. The monarchy has been modernised with an end to succession and royal marriage anachronisms (Parpworth 2013). A quarter century since Bean’s analysis it is worth returning to the issue to investigate the social compositional factors behind opinion change over this period.
This article uses Bean’s (1993) analysis of Don Aitkin’s Australian National Political Attitudes study (ANPA) (1967-79) and Jonathan Kelley’s National Social Science Surveys (NSSS) (1984-90). It compares Bean’s analysis with data from Ian McAllister’s Australian Election Study (AES) (1993-2013) using Bean’s methods. This is an attempt to update Bean’s article with the most recent AES data; comparing the era of stability with the era of instability.
This study compiles 46 years of academic public opinion data building upon previous research (Bean 1993). I find support sharply declined from 58 per cent in 1990 to 40 per cent in 1993 dropping to a low of 34 per cent in 1998. Ian McAllister (2011: 29) described public opinion (as of 2010) as, ‘monarchy has attracted renewed if modest public support.’ There was a 5 per cent increase in support from 42 per cent in 2010 to 47 per cent in 2013. The increase in support from 34 per cent to 47 per cent challenges the assertion of a mere modest support increase for the monarchy as an institution of Australian government. Rather public opinion on the monarchy is at a crossroads. It is
2 | P a g e between the 1998 low of 34 per cent and the 1987-88 high of 60 per cent. It is worth questioning why the movement of public opinion in both directions over the decades.
Trends in public opinion
Here I shall provide a brief overview of public opinion trends on the monarchy-republic issue as recorded by fourteen academic surveys. It is important to note that responses vary to a small degree on the exact question asked. Bean (1993: 192) noted that ANPA, NSSS and AES all have comparable questions which have only ‘minor differences.’1
The first question asks respondents ‘how important do [they] feel the Queen and the Royal Family are to Australia’ and the second question asks if ‘[they] think that Australia should become a republic with an Australian head of state, or should the Queen be retained as head of state.’ For the first question there are differences with the number of response categories.2 Second there are minor wording changes across the NSSS to the AES and ANPA questions and in the opinion of Bean (1993:192) – and for that matter the author too – ‘[t]here is no reason to assume that [...] these small variations would have any bearing on the comparisons.’ Overall since the referendum support has improved in both absolute numbers who hold monarchist views and in strength.
There was reasonably stable support for the monarchy for both measures up to 1990 (see Table 1; Figure 1) which is reinforced by commercial polling (Figures 2 and 3). Curiously before 1993, there were significantly more people who wished to retain the monarchy but did not think the Queen was terribly important; however this had changed by 1993. This probably is due to the 1992 scandals. Commercial polling shows a leap from 36 per cent approval for the republic in 1991 to 57 per cent in 1992 (Bean 1993: 196). Murray Goot (1994: 65) also nominates 1992 as the year when ‘a high level of support for the republic’ emerged – surprisingly royal misbehaviour and public opinion has been neglected in academic discussions despite the 1992 height of public Royal misbehaviour.3
The strength of support for the republic has declined. In 1998 and 2001 respectively, 34 per cent and 38 per cent, believed Australia should ‘definitely become a republic.’ This has declined to 27 per cent and 26 per cent in 2010 and 2013 respectively. There is a similar level of strong republicans in 2010- 13 to 1993; however the weak republicans have fallen away declining from 33 per cent to 27 per cent in 2013. The high level point of weak monarchist support is 2013 with 33 per cent exhibiting weak support for the monarchy. Furthermore strong support for the monarchy is at its highest point since 1990 – the damage from the annus horribilis may have been recovered. In 2013 importance for the monarchy was at a similar level to the 1980s after Prince Charles’s marriage to Diana. The AES results mirror a similar analysis using International Social Science Surveys data (Kelley et al. 1999). Ben Wellings (2003: 47-48) observes ‘the failure of the republican campaign cannot be seen as a
1 The question used in the AES is adopted from the ANPA. Bean referred to the ANPA and NSSS similarities. 2 The ANPA and AES have three response categories: ‘very important’, ‘fairly important’ and ‘not very important.’ The NSSS has the additional category: ‘not important at all’. It is assumed that the ANPA and AES ‘not very important’ category corresponds to the NSSS ‘not very important’ and ‘not important at all.’ In the 1979 ANPA the question ‘should Australia retain the Queen’ did not have the four categories but instead they were collapsed into two categories. In 1967 only the importance of royalty question was asked. 3 Billig (2002: 2-15) wrote of the volumes of popular press and nothingness of academic press on the issue as a function of academic sociologists and social psychologists failing to identity monarchy itself as a ‘problem.’
3 | P a g e victory for monarchism or Australian attachment to Britain.’ This recovery in both total support and strength of support surely must be seen as a victory for the Palace.
Figure 1: Public opinion on the monarchy: Importance and whether to retain
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Table 1: Attitudes towards the Monarchy-Republic issue, 1967-2013 (%)a 1967 1979 1984-85 1986-87 1987-88 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Importance of the Queen & Royal Family Very important 28 25 16 20 18 17 13 12 10 10 10 11 13 16 Fairly important 26 29 29 29 25 28 22 27 21 21 23 25 25 28 Not very important 47 46 31 32 32 31 65 61 70 69 68 64 63 56 Not important at all - - 24 21 25 24 ------(n) (2007) (1996) (2979) (1517) (1646) (2488) (2335) (1797) (1856) (1980) (1731) (1850) (2055) (3865) Australia become a Republic Definitely Retain the Queen - - 35 32 33 31 14 12 9 11 11 10 12 15 Probably Retain the Queen - - 24 27 26 27 26 29 25 25 27 30 30 33 (Total Retain Queen) - (64) (59) (59) (60) (58) (40) (41) (34) (36) (38) (40) (42) (47) Probably become a Republic - - 20 20 22 22 33 30 32 26 29 29 31 27 Definitely become a Republic - - 21 20 19 19 27 29 34 38 33 31 27 26 (Total become a Republic) - (36) (41) (41) (40) (42) (60) (59) (66) (64) (62) (60) (58) (53) (n) - (1864) (2907) (1512) (1640) (2481) (2334) (1730) (1833) (1960) (1722) (1830) (2047) (3841) Sources: Bean (1993); Australian Election Study, 1993-2013 a Percentages do not always sum exactly to subtotals because of rounding.
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Figure 2: Support for the Monarchy, 1969-2014, Newspoll & Roy Morgan with a quadratic trend; R2=.515, n=57
Figure 3: Support for the Republic, 1969-2014, Newspoll & Roy Morgan with a quadratic trend; R2=.564, n=57
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Methodology
In this article there are four analyses. First I repeat Bean’s analysis with AES data from 1993 to the most recent. Second I modify Bean’s cohort analysis. Third I estimate the effect of ethnic and civic nationalisms on attitudes towards the monarchy with 1996 and 2001 AES data. Fourth I disaggregate the model by gender at high and low saliency periods.
The data used is from the ANPA (1967-1979), NSSS (1984-90) and the AES (1993-2013). The results in Bean (1993) are reproduced. The three analyses use the same variables with a few exceptions. Factor analysis and reliability analysis indicate that both questions on the importance of and whether to retain the monarchy are closely related measures of the same underlying concept. As Bean did (1993: 197) they are thus combined into a simple additive scale for the analyses coded 0 (most pro-republican) to 1 (most pro-monarchy).5 All independent variables are coded as dummy variables with the exceptions of years of age, years of education and frequency of church attendance. The variables are coded as Bean (1993: 197-98) described his variables. The second analysis investigates cohort effects. It differs from the first analysis with age removed and a series of birth year cohorts coded as dummy variables. The third analysis investigates the relationship ethnic and civic nationalisms have to public opinion on the monarchy republic issue. The independent variables are identical to the first analysis with the addition of civic and ethnic nationalism scales. The fourth analysis investigates the effect of gender through disaggregation at periods of high and low salience on the issue.
The four analyses use a wide range of social background factors which are known to influence political attitudes and behaviour in Australia (see McAllister 1992; 2011). Each employs an ordinary least squares regression to estimate the effects of each independent variable on attitudes towards the monarchy-republic issue modelled on Bean’s (1993: 197-99) study. The unstandardised regression coefficient (b) increases are thus interpretable as proportional increases in pro-monarchy (and anti-republican) sentiments for each unit of change in the dependent variable.
Each analysis predicts public opinion with the following social background attributes: parental party preference (Liberal-National Coalition), gender, age, occupation, subjective social class, religion, church attendance, urban-rural residence, state, birthplace, and political party identity. The first analysis identifies the long term relationship between each observed social compositional factor and attitudes. The second analysis of cohorts is in two parties. First it modifies Bean’s (1993: 202) cohort analysis and second constructs a version to test political socialisation’s effect. Bean controlled for the effects in the first analysis with the exception of age and he coded cohorts into 20 year cohorts. I reanalyse Bean’s original design with the addition of my design testing political socialisation with eight year cohorts to measure socialisation between the ages of 12 and 18 (Torney-Purta 2005). Due to generational replacement the reference category has been altered. The third analysis determines if there is a relationship between monarchism and the two nationalism measures which are produced using principal components factor analysis from a seven question battery. The model investigating nationalisms the model presented in the first analysis identical to Bean’s (1993) original model is compared to a second model with ethnic and civic nationalism scales produced from
5 Across the 13 surveys with combined measures, the correlations of the two variables are between .7 and .8 and the Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient rages between .75 and .9. The variables combined make a highly reliable scale.
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principal component factor analysis of the nationalism battery included in the 1996 and 2001 AES (Appendix 1). This will determine the relationship of opinion on the Australian monarchy to ethnic and civic nationalisms. The fourth analysis compares the effects of gender disaggregating gender in the model in the first analysis; i.e. gender is removed and men and women analysed separately.
Social and Political Underpinnings of Monarchy-Republic Attitudes
The results from the first analysis are presented in Table 2. Bean’s (1993: 200) results are reproduced for comparison with the author’s analysis from 1993 onwards. The first analysis reveals from 1996 to 2010 parental socialisation did not have a significant relationship to attitudes on the monarchy unlike the period before the republic was discussed. In 2013 parental socialisation re- emerged as a factor of support for the monarchy following the royal marriage and Prince George’s birth. Conservative partisan political identity has been a stable social compositional factor for support for the monarchy.6 Bean (1993: 205) concluded that the partisan divide would be ‘biggest hurdle’ – this was passed with a dissolving of parental socialisation’s influence but the conservative partisanship hurdle the republicans failed to shift. Parental socialisation’s influence has since 2010 regained influence on public opinion. Generally the older an individual the more monarchist they were; age had a larger effect from 1967 to 1993 but since 1996 the effect has significantly lessened – in 2007 and 2010 there was no significant relationship for age and a small effect in 2013. This confirms previous research (Kelley et al. 1999: 106). Urban dwellers remain more republican. Education continues to have a mostly stable effect producing anti-monarchical public opinion and there is a gender divide with male support for the republic higher. The resilient gender divide is bemusing with women’s education levels reaching parity with men (Evans 1980) along with their political attitudes – and in some recent years becoming more progressive than men (McAllister 2011: 112-20).
Class continues to make a stable impression on monarchy-republic public opinion. Those who identified with the middle class or non-manual workers were relatively antithetical towards the monarchy and stable in their opinion over the period covered. Trade union membership has been a poor indicator of support over the half century; 1993 was an exception.
Protestant identity remains a stable and a good predictor of support for the monarchy. Those who claim no religion more often tend to support republicanism. Religiosity, measured as church attendance, has become a weaker indicator of support for the monarchy. This I interpret as a long term secularisation on the monarchy-republic issue.
A person’s birthplace has an enduring effect on public opinion. Those born in Asia have lower levels of attachment to the monarchy; however this has been declining in recent years. Those born in continental Europe had lower support for the monarchy than those born in Australia. This trend declined from the 1980s to 2001 and no longer has a significant effect. Those born in the United Kingdom or Ireland retain a large degree of support for the monarchy compared to those born in Australia. The support for the monarchy from migrants from the British Isles has been stable over the period unlike those from Asia and continental Europe. This could be an effect associated with John Howard’s manipulation of Australian identity to reflect the values of the majority Anglo-Celtic population as Carol Johnson (2007) has argued; something this article will expand upon.
6 However in 1993 following the 1992 annus horribilis the effect for partisan identity is remarkably smaller.
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Some states retain greater residual support for the monarchy. Queensland and South Australia have had higher support. In 2010 there were high levels of support for the monarchy in Tasmania when the pregnant Crown Princess Mary of Denmark, a Tasmanian by birth, visited Hobart in the week prior to the election. Royals apart from the Windsors have an impact upon attitudes to keep the Crown in Australia.
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Table 2: Social background and attitudes towards the monarchy-republic issuea by year, 1967-2013: unstandardised regression coefficientsbc
1967 1979 1984-85 1986-87 1987-88 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Parents’ party preference .06* .02 .04* .07* .04+ .03+ .05** .02 .05* -.03 .01 .03+ .00 .03* (Conservative) Gender (male) -.10* -.03+ -.07* -.07* -.04* -.06* -.03* -.01 -.04* .02 -.03+ -.03* -.06*** -.05*** Age (years) .004* .003* .004* .004* .003* .004* .003*** .001** .001** .001** .002*** .000 .000 .001* Education (years) -.009* -.006* -.018* -.011* -.006+ -.005* -.004 -.009* -.005 -.013*** -.013*** -.014*** -.008* -.007** Occupation (non-manual) -.03 .01 .01 .01 .01 -.03 -.02 -.04* -.03+ -.04** -.05*** -.02 -.04** -.05*** Subjective social class (middle) -.04* .03+ .02 -.05* .01 -.00 -.06*** -.06** .05** -.06+ .00 .03* -.03* -.02+ Trade union membership .02 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.03+ -.04** -.01 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.01 Religion (Reference: Catholic & ------Other) Protestant .10* .10* .10* .09* .13* .10* .08*** .06** .09*** .08*** .07*** .09*** .11*** .12*** No religion -.11* -.00 -.02 -.08* -.07* -.08* .00 .00 -.00 -.02 -.04+ -.03 -.04* -.03* Church Attendance .10* .08* .15* .17* .15* .10* .03*** .02** .02** .03*** .01 .02** .02* .01* Urban-rural residence (urban) -.03+ -.02 -.03* -.03 -.03 .00 .01 -.04* -.05** -.06*** -.01 -.03* -.04** -.04** State (Reference: NSW) ------Victoria .02 .01 -.01 .05* -.02 .03+ .02 -.03 .02 -.01 -.03 -.01 -.02 .02 Queensland .00 .02 .07* .05+ .02 .05* .04+ .00 .05* -.01 .02 .00 -.02 .03* South Australia -.04 .01 .04+ .07* -.01 .01 .03 -.01 .05+ -.05 -.03 -.01 -.00 .05*** Western Australia -.02 .04+ .01 .02 -.00 .02 .02 -.02 .03 -.02 -.02 -.02 .00 .01 Tasmania -.03 .08* .08* .05 .01 .05+ -.01 .04 .00 .04 -.02 -.01 .10** -.02 Birthplace (Reference: Australia ------& Other) British Isles .04 .09* .13* .16* .09* .10* .10*** .10*** .08*** .10*** .05+ .07** .12*** .07*** Continental Europe -.03 -.13* -.18* -.17* -.16* -.14* -.08** -.10** -.05 -.12** .07 -.07+ -.06+ -.03 Asia - -.04 -.01 -.12+ .02 -.09+ -.03 -.10* -.01 -.06* -.09+ -.03 -.03 -.02 Political identity (Conservative) .03 .16* .18* .21* .16* .15* .22*** .19*** .09*** .12*** .14*** .14*** .15*** .13*** Constant .36 .31 .35 .28 .28 .29 .08*** .24*** .19*** .21*** .21*** .26*** .37*** .34*** R2 .12 .25 .32 .32 .26 .24 .28 .20 .14 .17 .17 .18 .18 .16 (n) (2054) (2016) (3012) (1528) (1663) (2504) (1737) (1364) (1424) (1532) (1311) (1446) (1747) (3225) Mean on monarchy-republic .53d .56 .51 .53 .52 .51 .33 .33 .28 .28 .30 .31 .34 .38 scale (standard deviation) (.36) (.30) (.34) (.34) (.34) (.34) (.32) (.31) (.29) (.30) (.30) (.30) (.31) (.32) Sources: Bean (1993); Australian Election Study, 1993-2013 a Dependent variable scaled from 0 (most pro-republic) to 1 (most pro-monarchy). b + significant at p≤.10; *p≤.05; ** p≤.01; ***- p≤.001 c All figures have been rounded to two decimal places, with the exception of age and years of education which are to three decimal places. d The means and standard deviations of the dependent variables at each time point are show consistency. There are minor measurements differences between the ANPA, NSSS and AES meaning the means are not a good guide of the level of public support for the monarchy.
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Cohort Analysis: Generational Political Socialisation and Attitudes
The second analysis (Table 3), investigates cohort effects as Bean (1993) demonstrated lifecycle effect and several studies have pointed to the most impressionable years being from 12 to 18 where significant national events have a disproportionate and enduring impact on public opinion (Jennings and Zhang 2005; Schuman et al. 1998; Schuman and Rogers 2004; Torney-Purta 2005). Critical events leave their mark upon children and adolescence that quickly can change their political views. Dennis and Webster (1975) found the opinions on the US president of those as young as seven years old shifted after the Watergate Scandal. Sears and Valentino (1997) hold pre-adult socialisation produces stable predispositions which are catalysed by exogenous political events. These events socialise ‘attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient’; thus longstanding predispositions are socialised ‘episodically rather than incrementally’. The 1975 Whitlam dismissal, the 1992 annus horribilis, and lead up to the 1999 referendum provide three critical episodes; first misuse of royal prerogative, second royal misbehaviour and increasing saliency of monarchy as an issue and third lead up to the 1999 referendum. This analysis sets out to empirically test the generational difference of public opinion based upon their political socialisation. Generational responses to the annus horribilis, referendum, the marriage of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and the birth of Prince George are covered. Here I shall discuss some notable cohorts.
Bean’s model finds little divergence between the 1940-1959 and 1960-1979 cohorts. While from 2001 to 2010 the generation born 1980 onwards is indistinguishable from the cohort born 1920- 1939. Unsurprisingly the generation born before 1920 held the most monarchist views. Furthermore as each of the five cohorts in Beans model age the general trend is for increasing support for the monarchy. For example the 1960-79 cohort has unstandardised coefficients ranging from -.15 to -.10 in the 1980s reducing the -.12 to -.04 in the 2000s.
The author’s modified cohort analysis finds childhood and adolescent political socialisation influences opinion on the monarchy. Those born from 1916-1923 experienced the year of three kings, those born 1932-1939 experience the 1952 Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, those born 1955- 1963 were socialised when Whitlam was ousted in 1975, those born 1964-1970 experienced Prince Charles’ marriage in 1981, those born 1979-1985 royal misbehaviour, Princess Diana’s death and the referendum, and those born after 1986 experienced the new generation of royals, namely princes William and Harry, come of age.
The generation born 1916-1923 exhibit significantly higher support for the monarchy than the 1924- 1931 cohort. This group was of prime socialisation age in when the 1936 year of three kings rocked the Court of St. James. From 1979 to 1993 there is evidence to suggest this cohort’s higher level of support compared to the 1924-1931 cohort could be attributed to that political experience.
Those born in 1932-1939 where impressionable when Queen Elizabeth II was coronated in 1953. Compared to the generation born 1940-47 they have higher levels of support for the monarchy. The different levels of support disappeared in 1996 reappearing in 2010.
The 1955-1963 cohort has the most resilient passion against the monarchy. From 1979 to 1993 and reappearing in 2001 and 2007 to 2013 they had the most longstanding republican sentiments. They were the only cohort to a strengthen their anti-monarchism resolve in 2001 in the referendum’s afthermath. While from 2007 to 2013 the cohort exhibits the highest level of republicanism. This is
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congruent with the effect early experiences have on childhood and adult political development (Sears and Brown 2013: 59-60). This disposition has lasted through the lifespan.
Similar to the 1955-1963 cohort, those born from 1964-70 were particularly republican from 1984 to 1993 and again in 2007 and 2010. From 1984 to 1986 this cohort exhibited stronger antimonarchical feelings than the 1955-1963 cohort. At the time of the Whitlam Dismissal many were five through eleven year olds in this cohort. The cohort responded in a similar way to the seven and eight year old children did to Watergate (Dennis and Webster 1975). In 2013 following the royal wedding and Prince William’s marriage there is no significant difference between the 1932-39 and 1964-70 cohorts. This cohort has not remained set by their early childhood experiences; they have developed their views during their life course (Sapiro 1994: 204). In 2007 the 1955-1963 and 1964-1970 cohorts had similar levels of republicanism. By 2010 a gap between the 1955-1963 and 1964-1970 cohorts had emerged, and by 2013 1964-1970 had no significant difference compared to 1932-39 the cohort, unlike those born in 1955-1963. One cohort warmed to monarchy, while another did not. On the monarchy issue, socialisation at after the age of 12 is more long-lasting than before the age of 12.
The cohorts born 1979-1985 and 1986-1995 exhibit no significant difference from the 1932-39 cohort. The first was socialised with royal misbehaviour characterising the period and the death of Diana and the second the coming of age of the new royals.
Public opinion is structured around age cohorts created through socialisation impacted by exogenous political events. Since 2007 the generation politically socialised during the Whitlam dismissal is the only generation which shows overt negative attitudes towards the monarchy. This confirms Sears and Valentino (1997), exogenous shocks to the political system crystallise thought on the monarchy. Only the Whitlam dismissal and not the annus horribilis, could be deemed to crystalise thought on the monarchy while also confirming some cohort opinions did evolve more than others during adulthood as expected (Sapiro 1994) but within the period of royal renewable. Royal misbehaviour appears not to have affected those born after 1979 but instead temporarily damaged opinion (Figure 2). Those who had developed the cognitive capacity for abstract thought when Whitlam was dismissed (Sears and Brown 2013: 60) had greater resilience thus the recognition of the ‘problem’ of monarchy is more enduring for that cohort (Billig 2002: 7-12).
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Table 3: Cohort Analysis 1967 1979 1984-85 1986-87 1987-88 1990a 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Born before 1920 .13*** .10*** .08*** .06* .10*** .02 .05+ .02 .11* .16** -.02 .06 -.04 -.06 (proportion in cohort) (.41) (.21) (.14) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.06) (.04) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) Born 1920-1939 (Ref.) ------(proportion in cohort) (.44) (.31) (.26) (.31) (.27) (.30) (.32) (.25) (.26) (.25) (.20) (.18) (.10) (.05) Born 1940-1959 -.03 -.08*** -12*** -.11*** -.09*** -.11*** -.09*** -.05* -.03 -.04+ -.05* -.07*** -.12*** -.05* (proportion in cohort) (.15) (.42) (.46) (.43) (.46) (.40) (.40) (.39) (.39) (.36) (.38) (.40) (.33) (.30) Born 1960-79 - -.05 -.14*** -.15*** -.10*** -.13*** -.09*** -.04+ -.04+ -.04+ -.07*** -.06** -.12** -.07* (proportion in cohort) - (.04) (.14) (.14) (.18) (.21) (.22) (.32) (.32) (.33) (.29) (.28) (.36) (.39) Born 1980 onwards ------.02 -.03 .01 -.05+ -.05* (proportion in cohort) ------(.05) (.08) (.10) (.21) (.26) Born before 1892 .09 .22+ (proportion in cohort) (.01) (.00) Born 1892-1899 .14** .13+ .03 .03 .03 (proportion in cohort) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) Born 1900-1907 .09** .11** .15*** .04 .15* .11 .04 .08 .01 .02 (proportion in cohort) (.10) (.05) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) Born 1908-1915 .06+ .09** .12*** .12** .08+ .08+ .08* -.11 .11 .28 .09 .05 .05 .02 (proportion in cohort) (.13) (.09) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) Born 1916-1923 .04 .08* .14*** .11*** .07* .06* .07* .04 .08+ .04 .18*** .10+ -.08 .14+ (proportion in cohort) (.16) (.11) (.10) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.06) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.00) Born 1924-1931 -.05+ .00 .06** .03 -.02 .02 .00 .06 .01 .07* .15*** .08* .03 .12** (proportion in cohort) (.19) (.15) (.10) (.12) (.11) (.12) (.12) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.03) (.02) Born 1932-1939 ------(proportion in cohort) (.21) (.12) (.10) (.17) (.12) (.14) (.14) (.14) (.17) (.15) (.16) (.15) (.07) (.05) Born 1940-1947 -.07* -.05 -.04+ -.05* -.06* -.06* -.06* -.01 -.02 -.00 -.02 -.02 -.10** .01 (proportion in cohort) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.17) (.17) (.13) (.15) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.14) (.11) (.10) Born 1948-1954 -.36 -.08** -.07*** -.07** -.10*** -.12*** -.08*** -.03 -.04 -.01 .02 -.04+ -.12*** -.05+ (proportion in cohort) (.00) (.16) (.18) (.15) (.17) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.13) (.15) (.16) (.11) (.12) Born 1955-1963 -.06* -.09*** -.13*** -.12*** -.09*** -.10*** -.03 -.02 -.05* -.01 -.07** -.15*** -.08** (proportion in cohort) (.17) (.22) (.20) (.21) (.19) (.17) (.20) (.20) (.19) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.16) Born 1964-1970 -.12*** -.17*** -.09** -.10*** -.10*** -.05 -.04 -.01 .01 -.06* -.10** -.03 (proportion in cohort) (.05) (.05) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.10) (.10) (.15) (.13) Born 1971-1978 -.13** -.02 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.10** -.02 (proportion in cohort) (.03) (.05) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.11) (.13) Born 1979-1985 -.01 .01 .04 .05 -.04 -.03 (proportion in cohort) (.03) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.12) (.12) Born 1986-1995 -.07 .01 -.04 -.03 (proportion in cohort) (.01) (.04) (.11) (.15) (n) (2054) (2016) (2898) (1511) (1638) (2371) (1771) (1433) (1530) (1633) (1417) (1554) (1747) (3225) Sources: Australian National Political Attitudes survey, 1967-79; National Social Sciences Survey, Integrated 1984-88 file (1993 release) & Election Panel, 1990; Australian Election Study, 1993-2013 a The 1990 Election panel file held by the Australian Data Archive no longer has all independent variables; the country of birth is missing from this analysis unlike Bean (1993.
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‘The equation of monarchy and nation’
Nationalism studies in recent years have been a fertile ground of academic discussion. Discourses on the division of the world into ‘us and them’, how a nation hegemonises, how nations reproduce themselves and how the nation operates through institutions have been active in the last two decades (Özkirimli 2005). There is ample reason to test the relationship of the national institution of monarchy to types of nationalisms. The dominate conceptualisation of nationalism is a split between civic nationalism (variously labelled political, individualistic and voluntary) and ethnic nationalism (variously termed cultural, collective and organic) (Özkirimli 2005: 22). The strength of each nationalism will be tested here using data from the 1996 and 2001 AES. This inquiry is justified with scholars such as Billig (2002: 34) asserting in Britain that ‘the equation of monarchy with the nation implies an attack upon monarchy is an attack upon the fundamental uniqueness of the nation’. Some argue (McGregor 2006: 503) Australia has a ‘composite nationalism’ fusing Britishness into an Australian identity which is highly contested (Warhurst 1993).
Both 1996 and 2001 data indicates there is a clear relationship to Australian ethnic nationalism and the monarchy while the relationship towards Australian civic nationalism is less clear (Table 4). In 1996 before the 1999 campaign on the referendum there was a reasonably strong relationship between civic nationalism and support with the monarchy. By 2001 there was no significant relationship between support for the monarchy. However in the model the partial coefficient flipped and the p value is 0.069 – approaching significance. There are 6.9 civic nationalists in every hundred whom have positive opinion on the monarchy. This evidence suggests that after the referendum civic nationalism may not have discontinued its positive relationship to monarchy but also become opposed to monarchy.
Unsurprisingly urban and conservative political identity becomes less powerful forces when the nationalism scales are added to the model. This indicates that conservatives and rural dwellers tend to be more ethnic nationalist. However republican sentiments in urban Australia were considerably stronger after the referendum. Similarly in 2001 class with the nationalism measures emerged as an important factor as the middle class were more republican. Age in the model with nationalism measures is a less powerful predictor of support for the monarchy. This is possibly a function of different cohort socialisation with different national ethnic compositions.
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Table 4: Monarchism and nationalism
1996 2001 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 b β b β b β b β Parents’ party preference (Conservative) .02 .03 .01 .02 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.03 Gender (male) -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .02 .03 .01 .02 Age (years) .001 .07** .001 .06* .001 .07** .001 .05* Education (years) -.009 -.07* -.007 -.05+ -.013 -.10*** -.010 -.08** Occupation (non-manual) -.04 -.07* -.04 -.06* -.04 -.07** -.04 -.06* Subjective social class (middle) -.06 -.09*** -.05 -.08** .06 .04+ .06 .05* Trade union membership -.01 -.01 -.00 -.00 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.03 Religion (Reference: Catholic & Other) ------Protestant .06 .09** .06 .09** .08 .13*** .08 .12*** No religion .00 .00 .01 .02 -.02 .03 -.01 -.01 Church Attendance .02 .08** .02 .08** .03 .10*** .03 .09*** Urban-rural residence (urban) -.04 -.06* -.02 -.02 -.06 -.10*** -.04 -.07** State (Reference: NSW) ------Victoria -.03 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 Queensland .00 .00 .01 .01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 South Australia -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.03 Western Australia -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 Tasmania .04 .02 .03 .01 .04 .02 .03 .02 Birthplace (Reference: Australia & Other) ------British Isles .10 .10*** .15 .14*** -.10 .09*** .13 .12*** Continental Europe -.10 -.07** -.07 -.05+ -.12 -.08** -.10 -.06* Asia -.10 -.06* -.08+ -.04+ -.06 -.06* -.05 -.05* Political identity (Conservative) .19 .30*** .19 .30*** .12 .19*** .12 .19*** Ethnic Nationalism Scale - - .26 .15*** - - .20 .13*** Civic Nationalism Scale - - .12 .05* - - -.09 -.05+ Constant .24 - -.01 - .21 - .16 - R2 .20 .23 .17 .18 (n) (1364) (1297) (1532) (1466) Mean on monarchy-republic scale .33 .33 .28 .28 (standard deviation) (.31) (.31) (.30) (.30) Source: Australian Election Study, 1996 & 2001
It is clear from the 1996 and 2001 data that ethnic nationalism has a strong and stable relationship to public opinion on the monarchy and the relationship of civic nationalism and public opinion altered in the period. The level of ethnic nationalism increased in Australia from 1996 to 2001 (Table 5) with the mean position the scale increasing over time. This fits well with analyses of Howard’s manipulations of values and identity (Johnson 2007)
While the 2013 AES did not have a battery of questions measuring the different nationalisms the 2013 Australian Social Attitudes Survey (AuSSA) did. On identical questions the median Australian has become more civic nationalist and less ethnic nationalist since 2001 (Appendix 1; Table 5). Simultaneously since 2001 attitudes towards the monarchy have improved. A triangulation of data suggests with reasonable confidence that the link between civic nationalism and the monarchy has probably returned. This is indicated by the stable link between ethnic nationalism and opinion on the monarchy, the 11 per cent improvement in public opinion towards the monarchy from 2001 to 2013 (to a point above 41 per cent where civic nationalism held some sway on opinion towards the monarchy in 1996; see Table 1) and the electorate becoming more civic nationalist and less ethnic nationalist.
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Table 5: Nationalism Scale Means, 1996, 2001 & 2013
Mean (μ) 1996 2001 2013 Change Change (1996-2001) (2001-2013) Ethnic Nationalism Scale .556 .588 .473 +.032 -.115 Civic Nationalism Scale .813 .769 .804 -.044 +.035 Difference +.263 +.181 +.331 -.082 +.150 (n) (1693) (1896) (1465) - - Source: Australian Election Study, 1996 & 2001; Australia Survey of Social Attitudes, 2013
A Woman’s Realm: a gender perspective
In Talking of the Royal Family, Billig (2002: 173) found ‘the differences between males and females, found on the question about ‘interest’, virtually disappeared on [... the] abolition of the monarchy.’ The pervious analysis (Table 2) indicates that unlike Britain, in Australia, there is a gender divide on this question. Here opinion on the monarchy is disaggregated by gender in two periods; at a height point of saliency, before the 1999 referendum using 1998 data, and at a low point of salience, following the birth of Prince George using 2013 data.
When the data is disaggregated by gender, only male migrants from the British Isles exhibit a greater support for the monarchy. Female British migrants are not significantly different from women born in Australia. This is true in both periods where the monarchy’s salience as an issue is both high and low. The class dynamics differ by gender as expected. Women load more on class identity while men load more on occupation; a product presumably of disrupted labour force status through pregnancy and child rearing expectation that are social norms.
When comparing high saliency to low saliency periods, education, age, Asian migrants and trade unionism appear to have unique features. In periods of high saliency there is no gender difference on education while there is an effect for women in periods of low saliency, unlike men. There is no effect for age in periods of high saliency while in periods of low saliency age effects only men. This fits well with Billig’s (2002: 172-201) work on gender and the monarchy. In periods of low saliency female Asian migrants are more opposed to the monarchy than male Asian migrants. In periods of high saliency female trade union members are more opposed to the monarchy than male trade union members; this probably related to Australian women’s difficulty to relate to the Royal Family given the wealth difference (Black and Smith 1999).
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Table 6: Gender and monarchism
1998 2013 Male Female Male Female b β b β b β b β Parents’ party preference (Conservative) .05 .07+ .05 .07+ .03 .04 .03 .04 Age (years) .001 .07+ .001 .07+ .002 .08*** .000 -.01 Education (years) -.003 -.03 -.005 -.03 -.004 .03 -.013 -.09*** Occupation (non-manual) -.05 -.09* -.01 -.02 -.06 -.09*** -.04 -.06* Subjective social class (middle) -.02 -.04 -.07 -.11** -.01 -.02 -.03 -.05* Trade union membership .01 .01 -.06 -.08* -.03 -.04+ .01 .01 Religion (Reference: Catholic & Other) ------Protestant .08 .14** .10 .17*** .13 .18*** .12 .17*** No religion .02 .03 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.06+ -.03 -.04 Church Attendance .02 .08* .02 .08* .01 .04 .01 .04 Urban-rural residence (urban) -.03 -.06 .06 -.10** -.04 .06* -.04 -.06* State (Reference: NSW) ------Victoria -.02 -.03 .06 .08* .01 .02 .03 .04 Queensland .05 .07+ .05 .06 .02 .02 .05 .06* South Australia .05 .05 .06 .05 .10 .09*** .04 .03 Western Australia .00 .00 .06 .05 .03 .03 -.01 -.01 Tasmania -.01 -.01 .01 .01 .00 .00 -.04 -.02 Birthplace (Reference: Australia & Other) ------British Isles .10 .10** .05 .05 .08 .07** .05 .03 Continental Europe -.01 -.00 -.11 -.06 -.07 -.04+ .02 .01 Asia -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .04 .03 -.08 -.06* Political identity (Conservative) .11 .19*** .08 .12** .12 .19*** .13 .19*** Constant .13 - .19 - .25 - .39 - R2 .14 .15 .17 .15 (n) (717) (707) (1600) (1624) Mean on monarchy-republic scale .26 .31 .36 .40 (standard deviation) (.29) (.30) (.32) (.32) Source: Australian Election Study, 1998 & 2013
Discussion
Over the last half century public opinion on the monarchy-republic issue has not been stable. The observed data indicates instability from 1990 to 2013. First support dropped to the low of 34 per cent total support in 1998, prior to the 1999 referendum to alter the constitution to replace the Queen with a president elected by the parliament.a Support increased to 47 per cent by 2013. Monarchism is at its highest level of support since 1990 though some (McAllister 2011: 29) have previously described the trend as ‘modest’. The recovery in monarchism’s support appears not to be modest and instead is a significant departure from the lows of the late 1990s to a more resilient level closer to its historical trend from 1967 to 1990. This represents a crossroads of support for the monarchy in Australia. Inferring causation is difficult with cross-sectional data therefore here I will describe context and potential sources of public opinion change.
There are two competing explanations for the shifts in public opinion. To borrow Walter Bagehot’s ([1867] 2009) terminology, first there is an efficient thesis and a dignified thesis. These are two separate narratives that intertwine and are inseparable; however focus could be given to either. It is probably that both play a significant part in producing public opinions shifts. The efficient thesis includes monarchy’s domestic politicisation, prolonged debate leading up to the referendum, and John Howard’s manipulation of values and identity (Gulmanelli 2014; Johnson 2007). The dignified a In 1999 a recorded low of 25% of Australians were monarchists if data from the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study is used, however the respondents were primed by the context of the referendum (McAllister 2002: 256).
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thesis emphasise aspects of 1990s royal misbehaviour followed by princes William and Harry coming of age. I will then discuss Billig’s (1995) banal nationalism thesis as a social psychological explanation for support for the monarchy and discuss Australia’s composite civic and ethnic nationalism and its potential relationship to opinion on the monarchy.
Efficient
In the 1990s the monarchy became politicised with the help of the new Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, who was a leading proponent of republicanism. The partisan divide on the issue broke down. Keating took particular preoccupation on the monarchy-republic issue. His efforts to pollicise saw him speaking on the monarchy on 17 occasions from 1992 to 1995 in the House of Representatives – a topic of discussion which has not been brought up in the chamber since. A cluster of discussions occurred in parliament shortly following the British tabloids publishing Sarah Ferguson in a lewd act and her public separation with the Duke of York. Keating sensationalised the monarchy.b The overt domestic politicisation of the issue split voters aligned to both major parties (McAllister 2002). Comparison of opinion in New Zealand to Australia finds prolonged debate to have contributed to Australia’s more republican opinions (Kullmann 2008).
Voters, according to McAllister (2002), preferred a republic on the condition citizens were to elect the president. Voters sought an elected president to have their own sovereignty to act in conflict with parliament (Wellings 2003); the political class was not willing to give up parliamentary supremacy. The added combative element desired by voters requires the imposition of a complex system of ‘check and balances’ through a popularly elected president holding parliament to account. Such a constitutional change would present major legal and electoral challenges; the latter due to the low success rate of referenda in Australia (see Legislative Studies 1992). Voters demanded more than a nip-tuck to the monarchy but instead reform of how Australia governs itself.c Sinclair Davidson, Tim Fry and Kelly Jarvis (2006) attribute the referendum’s loss to voters taking on a loss- minimisation strategy aiming to reduce their political risk instead of employing value-maximisation logic. ‘Given that voters could not diversify, or hedge their political risks, they are more likely to vote ‘No’ in the face of uncertainty (2006: 863).’ Keating may have successfully contributed to making the monarchy unpopular but voters decided Australian Westminster democracy was better with a Queen than without one.
Keating was not the only prime minister to attempt to manipulate the electorate’s opinion towards the monarchy. Less overt than Keating, Howard subtly encouraged cultural change (Gulmanelli 2014; Johnson 2007) with the use of populism (Snow and Moffitt 2012; Wear 2008). The Howard government placed greater emphasis on Anglo-Celtic values as part of its Australian nationalism narrative as Johnson (2007) highlights. The monarchy must be included in any reasonable interpretation of Johnson’s assessment of Howard’s promotion of traditional values. Monarchy has become a more central part of the state’s construction of identity for its citizens following the referendum. There are increased visits of Royal Family members – at the invitation of the various
b One occasion typifies this sort of activity, in November 1994 Keating detailed the expenses of royal visits with the aid of a Dorothy Dixor (Hansard 1994). c Perhaps it is worth considering if the measure for ‘retain the monarchy or become a republic’ was for some respondents interpreted as a proxy for Westminster democracy and congressional government.
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governments of the day. The efficient part of state had clear involvements in agitating the demurring and improvement of public opinion towards the monarchy.
Dignified
The dignified explanation for the change in support for the monarchy in Australia centres on the Australian public’s response to the 1990s royal scandals and the coming of age of the new Royals. In the 1992 annus horribilis, Prince Charles and Princess Diana separate, the Princess Royal divorced, and the Duke of York’s estranged wife featured on the tabloids topless ‘having her toes sucked by a ‘financial adviser’’ among other scandals (Davies 2012). At this point Australia’s high support for the monarchy ebbed (see Figure 2). Commercial polling spiked from 36 per cent republican support in 1991 to 57 per cent in 1992 (Bean 1993: 196). Some have challenged, at least in Britain, whether this had any impact. Billig (2002: x) asserts that ‘it would be wrong [...] to chart the decline in monarchy’s fortunes purely in terms of the behaviour, or misbehaviour, of the Windsors.’ Royal fortunes fade at the moment the dignified part of state appears undignified.
These events were taken advantage of by proponents of the republic, such as Keating. Diana’s death saw national mourning in Britain and Australia for ‘the people’s princess’ (Abrams 1997). However some (Duruz and Johnson 1999) argued Australian media treated Diana in death more as a media icon rather than an icon of royalty. A study of Australian Anglo-Celtic women (Black and Smith 1999) found it difficult to identify with Diana in some respects such as the wealth difference, something reflected in female trade unionists’ opinion (Table 6). There is evidence to suggest that among Anglo-Celtic women their ‘identification included her physical and character attributes, the mothering role and the universal tragedy of death’ (Black and Smith 1999). Women related to Diana as a mother within the royal family. While the Durz and Johnson (1999) media ethnography suggests the media represented Diana as a media icon, the reading of the media was that of royalty (Black and Smith 1999: 271-72). Black and Smith found age was not a barrier to relating to Diana, something which is reflected in the results (Table 6). Australians were critical of the Royal Family’s treatment of Diana and juxtaposed Diana’s ‘human, emotional and loving’ mothering to an ‘impassive, cold and unemotional’ Royal Family (Black and Smith 1999: 271). The focus shifted from Prince Charles once Prince William grew up. As a father, William, publically shows affection as his mother did – unlike his grandmother which Anglo-Celtic women observed (Black and Smith 1999). With Prince William there is no public point of comparison between cold and warm royal characters.
The coming of age of Princes William and Harry has kept royalty in the public’s attention. The princes ventured into Iraqi and Afghanistan theatres and pictures appeared on Australian television screens, William courting, the pomp of his marriage to the Duchess of Cambridge and the hype surrounding the birth of Prince George. Improvement to public opinion occurred as the natural life cycle of each generation were shown the splendour of the dignified part of state in 2011. This undoubtedly had an effect with the highest support for the monarchy in commercial polling data since 1988 being registered six weeks after Prince William’s marriage (see Figures 2 and 3).d There were 58 per cent
dThere are hazards using such data as Jackman (2005) shows commercial ‘in house effects’ are substantial and there is little reliability with the low sample sizes used by commercial pollsters producing large confidence intervals. Goot (2000: 46) points out these polls are commissioned for news content rather than any social- scientific value stressing ‘the press plays up differences which are otherwise insignificant because it has to.’ A ritual which pollsters do is poll on the issue infrequently either annually or for sporadic events such as
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who supported the monarchy while only 35 per cent supported a republic. This is a similar level to when Prince Charles and Princess wedded in 1981. It was publically confirmed that Catherine Middleton was dating the Prince in 2006 since then, in commercial polling at least, there has been improving support for the monarchy as an institution. Since 2008 the presence of these new royals appears to have maintained high support for the monarchy.e
Intriguingly there is an effect of women’s education levels but not men while the monarchy is popular and a low salient issue. Billig (2002: 177) finds a distinction in the household gender division of regarding interest towards monarchy. It is probable that the effects of education at different levels of saliency (Table 6) are a product of educated women actively considering the issue of monarchy more than men giving education more of an opportunity to effect public opinion.
Banal Royals
The coming of age of the new royals saw a return of good fortune for the support of the monarchy. Those who embraced or re-embraced the monarchy probably did as a form of banal nationalism. Billig’s (1995) account of nationalism as a social psychological phenomenon is dependent upon symbolism and the nation-state (Day and Thompson 2004: 98). Symbols such as flags and armed service uniforms propagate the polity. Monarchy has a subtle presence in Australia but there remain symbols and cultural practices legitimising the monarchy. A week does not go by without the media mentioning the Royal Family and symbolism in the form of currency carry Queen Elizabeth II and uniforms carry St. Edward’s Crown. These provide a banal reminder to the legitimacy of the monarchy – Banal Royalty. These symbols in their ubiquity they form ‘everyday a constitution of their awareness’ (Day and Thompson 2004: 99). As the ‘flag repeatedly reminds people of where they are, and to what they belong’ currency has the same effect on the collective imagining of the nation.f Continual reminders of monarchy’s presence self legitimises the Crown as an institution. The legitimisation of this social order is a product of ‘applying to the objective structures of the social world structures of perception and appreciation that have emerged from these objective structures and tend to see the world as self-evident’ (Bourdieu 1990: 135). One generation’s social constructed social relationship to monarchy becomes socially inherited and the given for successive generations. Australians continue cultural practices such as observing the public spectacles of weddings in Westminster Cathedral and the bonds between each generation and the monarchy are set. I suggest the gradual ‘modest’ improved McAllister (2011: 29) observed following the 1999 referendum was the symbols of banal nationalism working to repair the Crown’s legitimacy as the republic declined in salience. From 1998 to 2007 the AES records an improvement of 6 per cent in support for the monarchy. Then a spike from 40 per cent support in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2013 occurs while the Australian public witness the once in a generation courting of an heir and the pomp of monarchy; a sort of stimulant ‘brilliant to the eye; that which is seen vividly for a moment’ (Bagehot 2009: 9). This is potentially a period effect. referendum, death, weddings or royal visitations. The data can be described as patchy as best cannot be pooled with methods similar to Jackman (2005). e The last data point in Figures 2 and 3 is a Newspoll from June 2014 eleven weeks after Tony Abbott reintroduced Knights and Dames in the Order of Australia. This suggests that while the dignified part of state has made inroads in public opinion, the efficient part of state could have marred public opinion towards the monarchy. f For that matter, the Union Flag affixed in the corner of the Australian national flag would have an effect on the collective imagining of Australia in relation to the United Kingdom.
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For Billig (1995: 69) national identity is ‘more than an inner psychological state or an individual self definition: it is a form of life that is daily lived.’ The usage of national symbols and sporadic Royal Family media provides the basis for legitimising the ancient institution. This is the probable source of the gradual improvement in public sentiments towards the monarchy in the recent past. Monarchy is a deep-seated part of the Australian national identity. In national cultural events, such as royal marriages in Britain, Australians wish to keep their monarchy more. For many Australians monarchism ‘is a form of life that is daily lived’ and unconsciously associated to the nation-state.
Ethnic Nationalism
Here I shall briefly discuss the nature of Australian nationalism and the monarchy and an avenue of inquiry worth exploring. Little scholarship has been conducted into how Royalty features in Australian nationalism; thought this article demonstrates the relationship between ethnic nationalism and public opinion on the monarchy to be stable and conversely civic nationalism and public opinion to be unstable (Tables 4 and 5). There is significant scholarship ‘[a]gainst persistent trends in Australian historiography, [which] argue that Britishness was neither inimical nor incidental to Australian nationalism’ (McGregor 2006: 494). Russell McGregor (2006: 494) argues that Australian nationalism is ‘distinctively Australian while simultaneously and fervently British: a composite nationalism.’ McGregor (2006: 503) expands:
The Australian head of state was the British monarch, and many of the symbols of civic nationhood – anthem, flag, honours, titles – remained wholly or substantially British long after federation. Australians of the day were not only aware of the Britishness of their civic institutions, they rejoiced in the fact and regarded their freedom and democracy as part of their ethnic inheritance as Britons.
While no longer do Britain and Australia share an anthem there is an ethnic and civic nationalism in Australia that has ‘combined in mutually supportive ways’ (McGregor 2006: 503-4) something supported by recent scholarship (Fozdar and Spittles 2010; 2014). The White Australian policy which lasted until 1966 and demographic population momentum has ensured this composite nationalism has continued. Howard managed to define multiculturalism, not as the literal plurality of ethnic identities co-existing within a civic nationalism, but ‘not a return to assimilation so much, but somewhere in between’ (Megalogenis 2006: 2). Howard reframed multiculturalism ‘in a way that it was acceptable within an Anglospherist cultural fame work, which foresees assimilation’ (Gulmanelli 2014: 592-93) to accommodate the ethnic nationalism element described by McGregor. Furthermore there was a tone which tapped into Australian ethnic nationalism in Howard’s construction of an other, ‘non-Australians’ against ‘ordinary Australians’, within his use of populism and wedge politics (Snow and Mottiff 2012: 285). The results show stable public opinion for ethnic nationalists on the monarchy who fit Howard’s ‘ordinary Australian’ construction. There is evidence of a convergence of civic nationalism with ethnic nationalism on the issue. Australian civic nationalism’s semi-cultural assimilation is accommodated on ethnic nationalist terms. This could in some part explain the recent weakening of migrant hostilities towards the monarchy (Table 2). Howard’s role in manipulating national identity and values (Johnson 2007) with the composite nationalism (McGregor 2006) provides one potential explanation for improving fortunes for the monarchy.
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The monarchy’s resilience as an institution beyond the 1999 referendum posits a predicament of explaining the phenomenon of improved public opinion if sociologists, historians, social psychologists and political scientists reject the banal nationalism, or more accurately banal royalty thesis. ‘Constant news about royalty provides the inhabitants of the United Kingdom’, and Australia, ‘banal reminders of nationhood, for it informs them regularly about the family which symbolically represents that nationhood’ (Billig: 1995; 2002: xii). The resurgence in popularity in Australia is all the more puzzling question of public opinion if we are to reject that the Queen embodies some form of Australianness as some scholars have (Warhurst 1993) and ignore evidence for Anglo-Celtic identification with royalty (Black and Smith 1999), and that there is an ethnic nationalist component to Australian nationalism which reinforces public opinion on the monarchy.
Conclusions
Australian public opinion on the monarchy has been fluid in recent years. There are cohort effects associated with socialisation, the types of nationalism affect opinion and that relationship is not always stable. Gender differences on the issue are stark however consistent with the Billig’s (2002: 175-76) ‘women and weddings’ summation of the differences. Public opinion towards the monarchy has been improving over the last fifteen years. Australians were reluctant to do away with the monarchy in 1999 due to the alternative presented however Australians are themselves more loyal to the Crown. This is in contrast to expectations of continual erosion of support for the ancient institution because of the effects of education and religion. Australia has become better educated and more secular over time but in spite of the expectations of some (Bean 1993: 204) that ‘generational replacement [...] is the obvious solution’ to ‘the monarchy problem’ (Billig 2002: 7-12; Warhurst 1993) fortunes have improved with a new generation with relatively high support. Public opinion is at a crossroads at a time distant enough from the referendum that the Opposition Leader, Bill Shorten attempted to revive the issue on Australia Day when Tony Abbott gave Prince Phillip a knighthood to the chagrin of the public and his backbench. It remains to be seen if the important in public opinion is merely the effect of Duchess of Cambridge and Prince George arriving on the scene but the topic remains fertile for academic discussion on public opinion and its consequences.
References
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Appendix 1: Factor Loadings for Nationalism scalesa 1996 2001 2013 Ethnic Civic Ethnic Civic Ethnic Civic To be Truly Australian: born in Australia .845 -.024 .849 -.014 .865 .074 To be Truly Australian: live in Australia most of life .787 .160 .816 .155 .871 .080 To be Truly Australian: be Christian .601 .156 .608 .128 .561 .253 To be Truly Australian: speak English .423 .492 .498 .517 .466 .540 To be Truly Australian: Australia citizenship .336 .550 .411 .557 .417 .597 To be Truly Australian: feel Australian .089 .686 .063 .759 .325 .578 To be Truly Australian: respect Australian laws -.066 .762 -.006 .800 -.222 .826 Cronbach’s alpha .678 .728 .750 (n) (1693) (1896) (1465) Source: Australian Election Study, 1996 & 2001; Australia Survey of Social Attitudes, 2013
a Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation used. First three eigenvalues for 1996, 2001 and 2013 respectively are 2.45, 1.19 & .85; 2.74, 1.26 & .77 and 2.89, 1.21, & .79.
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