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Hezbollah: Challenging International Politics in the Middle East

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Hezbollah: Challenging International Politics in the Middle East Double Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and Translation and Interpreting Dissertation in International Relations HEZBOLLAH: CHALLENGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Author: Berta Zabaleta Catón Supervisor: Dr. Javier Gil Pérez April 2015 To those who believe the Middle East still matters. We do not want to keep this weapon forever. We do not want to continue to shoulder this responsibility. We will forever be grateful when there is a strong state and a strong army that protect Lebanon, its South, villages and all its towns. (Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, August 2007) Table of Contents 1. Purpose and reasons............................................................................................1 2. The state of play...................................................................................................3 2.1. Hezbollah today: much more than a radical Islamic terrorist group.............3 2.2. Hezbollah and the Syrian crisis......................................................................6 2.3. Theoretical framework................................................................................10 2.3.1. Concept definition: terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency, weak state, failed state, Islam, Islamism, Sunnism and Shiism...................10 2.3.2. Hypotheses: Hezbollah has had an impact on the conduct of policy in the Middle East, particularly since 2006/Hezbollah: terrorism and insurgency..........................................................................................18 3. Objective.............................................................................................................20 4. Methodology......................................................................................................21 5. Analysis: What impact has Hezbollah had on the conduct of policy in the Middle East?...................................................................................................................23 5.1. The 1982-2006 years: the origins and evolution of Hezbollah....................23 5.1.1. The 80s: Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollah and suicide attacks....23 5.1.2. The 90s: the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the AMIA (1994) in Buenos Aires.....................................................................26 5.1.3. The 2006 Lebanon war: a weak state allows Hezbollah to become stronger............................................................................................29 5.2. Hezbollah’s communication strategy and popular support. Hezbollah as a hybrid between a terrorist organization and an insurgent group...............35 5.3. The consequences of Hezbollah’s activities on Israel’s and other states’ policies in the Middle East since 2006.........................................................38 6. Conclusion. What can we expect in the future?.................................................43 References................................................................................................................48 Annex. Map..............................................................................................................54 This paper is written in U.S. English and cited and referenced according to the American i Psychological Association (APA) Style. 1. Purpose and reasons Hezbollah has become significantly stronger since the 2006 Lebanon war against Israel. It has evolved from a Lebanese terrorist organization into much more than that: a powerful political and military group with a communication strategy and popular support. In the words of Augustus Richard Norton, author of Hezbollah: a Short Story, we have seen the transformation of “an Iranian- influenced conspirational terrorist group [initially] rejecting participation in Lebanese politics” into “a party with considerable autonomy and a talent for playing politics and winning elections.” Norton explains this as the result of the increasing consciousness among the Lebanese Shiites that their religious identity could bring the necessary force to change their marginal political and economic situation, and as a reaction to the destructive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The latter weakened the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) but gave birth to Hezbollah (Divine, Spring 2008, p. 92). Not only has Hezbollah gained importance at the national level, but it is also a key player in the wider Middle East, including Iran and Syria. These two countries were Hezbollah’s state sponsors during its early years and traditionally used the group in order to advance their objectives. As González- Úbeda Alférez points out (2012, p. 4), despite Hezbollah’s increasing autonomy and efforts to find alternative funding, Iran is still the group’s main financial provider. Syria does not just represent an important source of advanced weaponry; it is also the main transit point for the weapons that Iran sends to Hezbollah (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2013b, p. 5). Furthermore, Iran and Syria provide Hezbollah with a wide base of Shiite popular support, which gives the group a legitimacy that is vital for its survival. Given these interconnections, Hezbollah has become an important force determining the dynamics of the Syrian crisis. Finally, Hezbollah’s determination to fight Israel, as well as its Shiite solidarity, are two of the main drivers of Hezbollah’s behavior and elements of utmost interest to Iran. In other words, Iran sees Hezbollah as an important source of support for its Shiite interests and as an instrument that boosts its capacity to oppose Israel. 1 Apart from Hezbollah’s attacks throughout the Western world, all these factors make Hezbollah a player anyone interested in international politics should understand. Hezbollah’s influence in the Middle East conditions the policies and actions not only of Middle Eastern countries, but also of the United States and other stakeholders in the region. The fact that Hezbollah constitutes a movement poorly understood by many Westerners, who tend to “view the Middle East through the terrorist lens,” certainly calls for a deeper analysis (Divine, Spring 2008, 92). This dissertation seeks to offer such analysis: to explain Hezbollah’s role within the framework of the region’s policy dynamics— a role that affects the wider international community. 2 2. The state of play 2.1. Hezbollah today: much more than a radical Islamic terrorist group Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2006 meant a degradation of defenses along its fragile borders (Divine, Spring 2008, p. 93), increasing its vulnerability to regional terrorism. However, despite the violence that Hezbollah certainly directs towards Israel, the United States, other Western countries, and even the state of Lebanon, the group is nowadays much more than just a terrorist organization (Jain, 2010). In fact, despite U.S. pressure, powerful forces in the international system such as the European Union (EU) have refused for years to officially label Hezbollah a terrorist group (Mix, June 20, 2011, p. 5). Indeed, by including Hezbollah in their terrorist list, countries preclude the possibility to negotiate with the group. As detailed below, this has some members of the Obama administration reconsidering the wisdom of keeping a politically and militarily strengthened Hezbollah designated as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah has garnered support throughout the Arab world by presenting itself as an advocate for social justice, equity, and the right of the oppressed to resistance (González-Úbeda Alférez, 2012, p. 1). These are elements the Arab society, and especially the traditionally marginalized Shiites, desperately yearn for. In fact, many scholars emphasize Hezbollah’s “success and popularity as a resistance movement and as a powerful advocate for Shiite political interests” (Divine, Spring 2008, p. 92). Hezbollah’s army is made up of ordinary Lebanese people. This, together with the group’s political presence, favors Hezbollah’s integration in the Lebanese national life (Blinder, 2008, p. 6). At the same time, this popular support, earned through the above-mentioned promises and backed by Hezbollah’s demonstration of power, particularly in the 2006 Lebanon war, gives the group the necessary legitimacy to maintain its political and military status. 3 Hezbollah has also developed an international presence as far as Latin America. The cornerstone of Hezbollah Latin America (Hezbollah LA) is Hezbollah Venezuela, which presents itself as Autonomía Islámica Wayuu. It evolved from a leftist revolutionary group into a group that opposes Zionism and imperialism and that expresses its solidarity with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Autonomía Islámica Wayuu is active even on the Internet, where it has its own website (http://autonomiaislamicawayuu.blogspot.com.es). The same applies to the next most active faction in Latin America, located in Argentina (Karmon, 2006, p. 3). The leader of the Latin American network is the Venezuelan Teodoro Rafael Darnott. Like its Lebanese counterpart, Hezbollah LA advocates for the social improvement of the poor and takes an anti- Zionist and anti-American stance. Although Hezbollah LA supports Venezuela’s revolutionary process, it does not have a socialist ideology, for “Hezbollah’s ideology is theocratic and obeys divine rules” (Karmon, 2006, p. 3). As a consequence, when it comes to Venezuela, the revolution should pursue “the divine and the moral” in order to achieve Hezbollah’s “political-military
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