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Argentina Accuses Iran of Responsibility for the Hezbollah Terrorist Attack Which Destroyed Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, 1994

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Argentina Accuses Iran of Responsibility for the Hezbollah Terrorist Attack Which Destroyed Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, 1994 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) November 14, 2006 Argentina accuses Iran of responsibility for the Hezbollah terrorist attack which destroyed Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, 1994. The Argentinean Attorney General’s office announced it had found Iran responsible for the terrorist attack and an Argentinean judge issued arrest warrants for seven senior Iranians and one senior Hezbollah member Scenes from the terrorist attack Wanted: 7 senior Iranians and a senior Hezbollah member Photo: Attorney General’s Website, Argentina The rubble of the AMIA building. Removing the bodies of the victims took weeks. 2 Overview 1. On October 25, 2006, Dr. Alberto Nisman, Argentina’s Attorney General, and Marcelo Martínez Burgos presented the findings of the special team which investigated the terrorist attack which destroyed the Jewish Community Center building (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. The explosion, carried out by a Hezbollah suicide bomber on July 18, 1994, killed 85 persons and wounded 151. 2. The detailed report, which was presented by the Attorney General and his aide at a press conference, unequivocally showed that the decision to blow up the building was taken by the “highest instances of the Iranian government,” and that the Iranians had asked Hezbollah, which serves as a tool for its strategies, to carry out the attack. Therefore, the Argentinean Attorney General petitioned the judge in the case, Dr. Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, to issue international arrest warrants for seven senior Iranian officials, including former president Rafsanjani, and senior Hezbollah operative Imad Moughnieh. It should be noted that no warrant was issued for Iranian leader Ali Khamenei although the report determined that he was involved in the decision to carry out the attack. 3. On November 9, 2006, Judge Corral adopted the Attorney General’s recommendations and issued international arrest warrants for seven Iranians and one senior Hezbollah operative. The warrants were for the upper echelons of the former Iranian government, including the former president, Iranian diplomats posted to Buenos Aires and for Hassan Nasrallah’s military deputy. The following are the names and positions the aforementioned individuals held in 1994, according to the Argentinean Attorney General’s report: i. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, Iranian president.1 ii. Ali Fallahijan, Minister of Intelligence and Security. iii. Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister. iv. Mohsen Rezai, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. v. Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the Qods Force.2 vi. Mohsen Rabbani, in 1994 Iranian cultural attaché in Buenos Aires. 1 It is clear that such a decision could never have been taken without the approval of Ali Khamenei. A report of the investigation carried out by the CIDE (Argentina’s intelligence service) issued in March 2003 also stated that Ali Khamenei was responsible. In the current report the Argentinean judicial system did not ask for an international arrest warrant despite that fact that his name was mentioned as one of the senior Iranians who decided to blow up the AMIA building. 2 The Qods Force, today commanded by Qassem Suleimani, is responsible for directing and supporting Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in Lebanon and other locations around the world. 3 vii. Ahmad Reza Asghari, (also known as Mohsen Randjbaran), third secretary of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires. vii. Imad Moughnieh, head of Hezbollah’s External Security Service in 1994, a position he holds to this day, as well as serving as Hassan Nasrallah’s military deputy.3 4. As usual, Iran and Hezbollah rejected the investigation’s findings, although they avoided directly responding to the accusations against them: i. Sayid Muhammad Ali Husseini, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, claimed that there was no truth to the Argentinean accusations and that they were the outcome of “Zionist political pressure” exerted to divert public opinion from the “Zionist attacks” against the Palestinian and Lebanon peoples. He added that “Iran itself was a victim of various terrorist actions and had paid a heavy price in terms of both human life and property damage” (IRNA News Agency, October 26). After the warrants had been issued he repeated his claims of a “Zionist-American conspiracy” (Reuters, November 11). ii. Hezbollah’s radio station claimed that the United States was waging an international campaign against Hezbollah to sabotage all its efforts to establish a national unity government in Lebanon. The organization further stated that the Argentinean Attorney General’s accusations should be viewed as part of the campaign, since they are, it claimed, without foundation (Radio Nur, October 25). The destruction caused by the attack 3 Imad Moughnieh, a notorious international terrorist, commanded many attacks against Western, Israeli and Jewish targets both inside and outside Lebanon. For that reason he is on the United States’ most wanted terrorist list. 4 The crater in front of the AMIA building formed by the blast. It was estimated that 400 kg (880 lbs) of explosives were used. Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral (Photo: AMIA Website) 5 AAAppppppeeennndddiiixxx 111 Main points of the report 1. The Argentinean Attorney General’s full report is more than 800 pages long. It details and analyzes the enormous amount of information collected by the Attorney and draws conclusions. The summary of the investigation (which is ongoing) was issued by the Attorney General’s Office and translated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry from Spanish into English (See Appendix 2). 2. Following are the summary’s main points: i. The report states with certainty that “the decision to carry out the attack was made not by a small splinter group of extremely radical Islamic functionaries, but was instead a decision that was extensively discussed and was ultimately adopted by a consensus of the highest representatives of the Iranian government at the time.” ii. During the investigation the issue of how to characterize Hezbollah was raised. Should it be defined as a “terrorist organization” or as a movement fighting against the Israeli “occupation” of Lebanon? The report states that “it is obvious to us that the ‘terrorist movement’ characterization is…correct,” because of the vast amount of evidence in the investigation’s file supports that definition. iii. The conclusion drawn by the investigation was that the highest ranks of the Iranian regime had told Hezbollah to carry out the attack against AMIA. The Iranian regime exploited the terrorist infrastructure of Hezbollah, which had “evolved into a fundamental instrument for the realization of the Iranian foreign policy objectives.” iv. The reasons behind the attack: The report did not ignore the fact that the attack was carried out for reasons connected to the conflict in the Middle East (including the abduction of Mustafa Dirani and the Israeli bombing of the Hezbollah training camp in the Beqa’a Valley). However, based on the evidence collected, it concluded that the fundamental reason was the Argentinean “government’s unilateral decision to terminate the nuclear materials and technology supply agreements that had been concluded some years previously between Argentina and Iran.” v. The report describes in detail how the Iranian upper echelons arrived at the decision to carry out the attack. It was the work of a group called the Special Affairs 6 Committee (Omure Vijeh), whose members at that time were Ali Khamenei,4 Ali Rafsanjani, Ali Fallahijan and Ali Velayat. The committee convened on August 14 1993, in the Iranian city of Mashad and approved the attack. vi. The report also gives details of the vast intelligence network set up by the Iranian regime in Buenos Aires, without which they could not have been able to attack AMIA. According to the report, in the mid 1980s the Iranians “began establishing a vast spy network that then became a complete ‘intelligence service’ that basically comprised the Iranian embassy and its cultural attaché in Buenos Aires.” It also included “extremist elements” in Argentina’s Muslim community in Buenos Aires and other cities. vii. The “driving force” behind Hezbollah’s intelligence activity was sheikh Mohsen Rabbani, who began as soon as he arrived in the country in 1983, and who later became the cultural attaché of the Iranian embassy in Argentina; he also attended the Mashad meeting. After his return, funds (detailed in the report) were transferred to finance the attack. The Argentineans have many documents and the times and places of phone conversations providing incriminating evidence indicating Rabbani’s involvement in preparing the logistics for the attack. The report also states that evidence analyzed “indicates that the then Iranian minister of information, Ali Fallahijan, was in charge of overall coordination of the operation from Iran.” viii. The perpetrators of the attack: The attack was carried out by Hezbollah terrorist-operatives who arrived in Argentina on July 1, 1994. Imad Moughnieh, head of Hezbollah’s External Security Service, was responsible for running the operational squad and to that end entered Argentina in 1994. The Argentineans have records of many phone conversations involving Moughnieh, Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon and Brazil’s Hezbollah infrastructure in the region known as the “triple border.”5 On July 18, the day of the attack, “the final call received by the operation coordinator’s cell phone was verified…There can be little doubt that the assigned task of this segment of the operational group (i.e. the suicide bombing) was carried out successfully.” ix. The suicide bomber carried out the attack: On July 18, at 9:53 in the morning, Ibrahim Hussein Berro, blew himself up inside a Renault van carrying 300-400 kg (660-880 lbs) of explosives. The attack killed 85 persons and wounded 151. The explosives were detonated in front of the AMIA building, causing the front of the 4 His participation notwithstanding, a warrant for his arrest was not issued.
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