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IDSA Monograph Series No. 49 March 2016 Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine Prashant Kumar Singh Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine | 1 IDSA Monograph Series No. 49 March 2016 Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine Prashant Kumar Singh 2 | Prashant Kumar Singh Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). ISBN: 978-93-82169-60-4 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of India. First Published: March 2016 Price: Rs. 325/- Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010 Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in Layout & Cover by: Vaijayanti Patankar Printed at: M/S Manipal Technologies Ltd. Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine | 3 Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................. 5 Abbreviations .......................................................................................... 7 Preface ...................................................................................................... 9 1. Introduction .................................................................................... 11 2. The Study of Chinese Military Strategy: Exploring Concepts ..................................................................... 15 3. People’s War and Three Stage Warfare: Mao’s Strategy and Doctrine ..................................................... 43 4. Maoist Strategy and Doctrine after the Liberation ............. 55 5. The China-Vietnam War and the Falklands War: Reminders for Change ................................................................ 70 6. People’s War under Modern Conditions ................................ 76 7. Military Strategy and Doctrine since the Mid-1980s ........... 92 8. The PLA Training in a Doctrinal Light ................................... 121 9. The Changing Doctrine and Capabilities of the PLA .........128 10. Military Strategy and Doctrine under Xi Jinping .................. 133 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 147 Tables ........................................................................................................ 154 Appendix ................................................................................................ 162 References ................................................................................................ 163 4 | Prashant Kumar Singh Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine | 5 Acknowledgements I thank Dr. Arvind Gupta, former Director General,Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the present Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA), Government of India, for encouraging me to write on this topic. I am also thankful to Brigadier (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya for supporting me in my endeavour. I am grateful to Lieutenant General (Retd.) Satish Nambiar, Professor Madhu Bhalla, Air Commodore (Retd.) R.V. Phadke, Colonel Rajeev Agarwal, Group Captain Naval Jagota, Captain (IN) S. S. Parmar, and Dr. Jabin Jacob for reading the draft monograph. I acknowledge the help I received from Colonel Agarwal, Group Captain Jagota and Captain (IN) Parmar in interpreting the PLA's assets and capabilities, discussed in chapter 9. I thank Dr M.S. Prathibha for comments on the draft monograph. I am thankful to Professor M. Taylor Fravel for granting me permission to not only for sharing his unpublished paper ‘China’s Military Strategies: An Overview of the 1956, 1980 and 1993 Military Strategic Guidelines’ but also allowing me to extensively cite it. I thank Professor Arthur Ding, Director, Institute of International Relations (IIR), NCCU, and the then Secretary-General of Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), Taipei (Taiwan) for inviting me to attend the 2013 International Conference on PLA Affairs by CAPS-NDU-RAND, Taipei, November 14-15, 2013 as an official attendee. The opportunity made a significant contribution to my understanding of the subject. I acknowledge the valuable comments I received from the two anonymous referees to improve the quality of the monograph. I received valuable editorial help from Vivek Kaushik, Associate Editor, to put the monograph through its paces. Surender Jagariya from the 6 | Prashant Kumar Singh Systems Support Cell, IDSA helped with the preparation of graphs and tables. Prashant Kumar Singh Associate Fellow, IDSA New Delhi Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine | 7 Abbreviations A2/AD: Anti-Access/Area Denial AAM: Air-to-Air Missiles AD: Air Defence ADIZ: Air Defence Identification Zone AEWC: Airborne Early Warning & Control AIFV: Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle AJ: Anti-Jamming APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier ASCEL: Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations ATGM: Anti-Tank Guided Missile C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance CAGA: Combined Arms Group Armies CC: Central Committee CMC: Central Military Commission CPC: Communist Party of China DOD: Department of Defence ECM: Enterprise Content Management EFSA: Elite Forces and Sharp Arms EMP: Electromagnetic Pulse EW: Electronic Warfare EWS: Early Warning Systems FND: Flexible National Defence GPD: General Political Department GPS: Global Positioning System GSD: General Staff Department ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 8 | Prashant Kumar Singh IT: Information Technology IW: Informationised War KMT: Kuomintang LAN: Local-Area Networks LRBM: Long-range Ballistic Missiles MAC: Military Area Command MBT: Main Battle Tank MOD: Minister of Defence MOD: Ministry of Defence MOOTW: Military Operations Other Than War MSG: Military Strategic Guidelines NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NPC: National People's Congress PBSC: Politburo Standing Committee PCA: Permanent Court of Arbitration PLA: People's Liberation Army PLAA: People's Liberation Army Army PLAAF: People's Liberation Army Air Force PLAAN: People's Liberation Army Navy PMS: Preparation for Military Struggle RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs SACCS: Strategic Automated Command and Control System SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SP: Self-Propelled T&EO: Training and Evaluation Outline UAS: Unmanned Aerial Systems UK: United Kingdom US: United States USAF: US Air Force USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WZC: War Zone Campaign Changing Contexts of Chinese Military Strategy and Doctrine | 9 Preface The study of Chinese military strategy in its various dimensions and facets is a continuous process. In May 2015, China’s State Council Information Office released China’s Defence White Paper (2014), titled ‘China’s Military Strategy’. This is the first White Paper issued during President Xi Jinping’s tenure. As its reading in the relevant section of the monograph would reveal, it exhibits some points of departure in China’s military strategy. The White Paper provides cues for future developments in China’s military and strategic affairs. It was released in the beginning of the third year of President Xi’s tenure. In the normal course, President Xi should remain in the post for ten years that is, two terms of five years each. Thus, the release of the White Paper also gives an opportunity to look back at the evolution of China’s military strategy that Xi Jinping has inherited. The purpose of this revisit is to identify the context under which China’s military strategy has evolved and to understand the possible evolution of China’s military strategy in the future. This monograph argues that China’s military strategy has been evolving through the interplay between Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or Party-Military relations as well as the Chinese leadership’s assessment of the international balance of power. In addition, the role of geography, technology, and the combat experiences of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and other militaries are taken into account. The interplay between the Party and military decides the role of the military in Chinese politics and the ruling ideology. However, the Party- Military relations model in China should not be compared with the Civil-Military relations model in liberal democracies. In China, the military is not a department attached to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or only a part of the MoD. It is, rather, a part of the political structure or, more precisely, the Party leadership. Historically, the Party and the PLA have had a ‘symbiotic’ relationship, with overlapping leaderships. At 10 | Prashant Kumar Singh present, there is a high degree of separation between the two. However, the PLA continues to retain its political character and institutional links through representation in the Central Committee of the Party and through two Central Military Commissions (CMCs)—the State’s and the Party’s. China’s President, who also doubles as the Party General Secretary, is also