review from the editor's aerie Any dream of aerial conflict is merely the product of fertile imagination, a malady often encountered in younger men with insufficient service to recognize certain things as manifestly absurd. An anonymous Army spokesman (1911) as quoted in Air University Review. lanuary-February 1979, p. 47 One of the elder statesmen of the Air Foce recently agreed that the Air University Review is a book "written by old men for old men." That hurt! True, we have often been accused of prejudice against junior officers, women, and noncommissioned officers because of the scarcity of their articles in our pages. This is the 148th issue of the Review. Casual research in the tables of contents over this 30-year history reveals that the lead article spot is typically the stomping ground of the high and the mighty. Twice, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has occupied the lead position, though not in his present capacity. An ambassador of the United States headed the line-up in our luly-August 1977 edition. A congressman was number one in March-April 1975. Former Secretaries of the Air Force have been the point man. also. Even a foreign ambassador to the United States supplied the lead in the September- October 1971 issue. Twenty-five four-star generals, fourteen doctors of philosophy, eight chiefs of staff, and one Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force have also led the parade. Only once in these 147 issues, however, has a junior officer made the front rank, and that was a captain in September- October 1975. Never has a lieutenant made the grade. Now we march on new ground with First Lieutenant John W . lenson and his "Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American Thinking.” The thought of this young man is in no way absurd, and we offer his article with considerable enthusiasm. It has already drawn favorable remarks from readers on the Air Staff, and we hope it will please you. Lieutenant Jenson leads our little parade in another sense, also. His piece on the nature of Soviet strategic thought is one of four on the general subject of the relationship between the world's two superpowers. The cover art. depicting the fearsome array that could face us, is intended to tie the whole package together. With this issue we welcome a new and young (or younger, at least) Associate Editor to the staff of the Review: Major Theodore M. "Ted" Kluz. Ted, whose field is military history, comes to us from a tour as a teacher of strategy at the Air Command and Staff College. His students and colleagues there, and those from his days at the RAF College, Cranwell, England, and at AFIT, can help him along in his acquisitions work by burying him in manuscripts. He can be reached at Autovon 875-2773. Welcome aboard, Ted! As for our so-called prejudice against the young, the women, and the NCOs— perhaps it is only a prejudice against the meek, for we cannot publish that which we do not receive, be it out of meekness or whatever. Lieutenant lenson has proved that it can be done— and done well. What are you waiting for? March-April 1979 Vol. XXX No. 3 articles 2 Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American 1st Lt. John W. Jenson, USAF Thinking 15 Tactical Air Defense: A Soviet-U.S. Net Assessment Maj. Tyrus W. Cobb, USA 40 Soviet-United States Civil Defense: Maj. Thad A. Wolfe, USAF Tipping the Strategic Scale? 56 The Calculus of Surprise Attack Lt. Col. A. L. Elliott, USAF 65 The Shasta Disaster”: Forgotten Lesson in Dr. Murray Green Interservice Relations 75 The Challenge of Clausewitz Group Captain R. A. Mason, RAF departments BOOKS AND IDEAS 80 The Southern Duck Wants to Lie Down Col. James L. Morrison, Jr., USA (Ret) 85 Power. Control, and legitimacy Col. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USAR 90 Potpourri 95 THE CONTRIBITOHS NUCLEAR STRATEGY differences in Soviet and American thinking ORE than any other change in the Union, for military doctrines and strategies technology of war. the advent of appropriate for the respective nations during nuclear weaponry has forced military the nuclear age. andM political leaders around the world to Before discussing the military doctrines and reassess the role of warfare in international strategies that have evolved in the United politics and to re-examine the strategic con­ States and the Soviet Union during the postwar cepts that had served them in the past. War era, one must define the terms “doctrine’ and had reached such cataclysmic and terrible “strategy. Throughout the history of military proportions that even the possibility of war thought, both have taken on a variety of seemed unthinkable. More than ever before, meanings in different contexts. One studying the mandate of national strategists focused on the works of military theorists and strategists preventing war rather than on successfully is often confronted with a bewildering array of prosecuting it. The resulting debate among definitions depending on the period of history scholars over suitable doctrine and strategy' during which the author wrote as well as on was, unfortunately, often lacking in the objec­ the writer’s particular position and perspec­ tivity and firm logic that such a discussion tive. warranted. Some theorists went so far as to For purposes of this discussion, military suggest that the destructiveness and ferocity of doctrine can best be defined as a set of modern weaponry had made warfare obsolete prescriptive principles set forth as a guide for as a means of resolving international conflicts. action and designed to ensure "uniformity of A little reflection, however, revealed that the thought and action throughout the armed same notion had been popular prior to both of forces of a nation in prosecuting its policies the major wars of this century and in both during peace and war.1 It defines the manner instances had proved tragically false. In other in which the military is to contribute to the circles, scholars and national leaders tended to political activities of the state and establishes dwell on philosophical and moral issues, all the guidelines on which military action may but ignoring the urgent and equally important properly be employed in the pursuit of the military questions. goals of the state. Strategy is subordinate to The uncertainty and apprehension over the doctrine and is the broad set of military actions implications of nuclear weaponry were com­ consistent with the accepted doctrine, which pounded by the rapid polarization of the world are to be employed when the military is used system into two opposing, belligerent blocks to implement the policies of the state. after the collapse of the Axis powers. When A nation’s choice of military doctrine and the Soviet Union began to acquire its nuclear strategy has historically reflected the intellec­ arsenal, speculation among political and mili­ tual and cultural climate of the times and the tary leaders of both sides about the nature and peculiar economic, political, geographic, and likelihood of nuclear war became soberingly if social characteristics of the country. A state’s dismally relevant to the entire community of political system and ideology, its national goals nations. The need for some hard intellectual and aspirations, its historical experiences, and scrutiny of the impact ol modern weapons on its perception of itself and the world political the international political system became ap­ environment—all contribute to its choice of parent. It was also apparent that if nuclear war appropriate doctrine and strategy, while its were to be avoided, both sides would have to geography and resources determine the prac­ take active, deliberate measures to ensure ticality of the strategic options open to it. against it. Thus began the search, by theoreti­ Throughout the Cold War of the 1950s and cians in both the United States and the Soviet 1960s, the United States possessed continuous 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW superiority in number and technical quality of necessary to achieve national security. Advo­ nuclear weapons, even if she was not always cates of the mutual assured destruction concept certain of the existence or extent of her lead. have been generally divided into two schools During the same period, the Soviet Union, of thought. One side maintains that a force well aware of U.S. strategic superiority, was "balance" between both sides is necessary. generally preoccupied with catching up with The other argues that to deter a potential the U.S. As the American lead in nuclear aggressor effectively, one need not possess capability began to wane, U.S. doctrine and superior or even equivalent military forces but strategy' went through a continual process of simply a sufficient or adequate capability to revision and adaptation to the changing balance assure the aggressor that, regardless of which of nuclear capability. The first explicit U.S. side suffers the more from a nuclear exchange, doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons was the attacker will still suffer more than he is the doctrine of massive retaliation, conceived willing to bear. The “sufficiency concept has and articulated primarily by then Secretary of been increasingly cited by advocates in various State John Foster Dulles. Under massive retal­ circles as justification for cutting back on U.S. iation, the U.S. eschewed using limited mili­ nuclear force levels, regardless of Soviet or tary' responses in opposition to Soviet political Chinese force buildups. and military initiatives around the world and Lest the notion of sufficiency seem like too instead threatened the Soviet Union with nu­ easy a solution, however, one must realize that clear attack for any of an unspecified list of it has some important limitations.