review from the editor's aerie

Any dream of aerial conflict is merely the product of fertile imagination, a malady often encountered in younger men with insufficient service to recognize certain things as manifestly absurd.

An anonymous Army spokesman (1911) as quoted in Air University Review. lanuary-February 1979, p. 47

One of the elder statesmen of the Air Foce recently agreed that the Air University Review is a book "written by old men for old men." That hurt! True, we have often been accused of prejudice against junior officers, women, and noncommissioned officers because of the scarcity of their articles in our pages. This is the 148th issue of the Review. Casual research in the tables of contents over this 30-year history reveals that the lead article spot is typically the stomping ground of the high and the mighty. Twice, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has occupied the lead position, though not in his present capacity. An ambassador of the United States headed the line-up in our luly-August 1977 edition. A congressman was number one in March-April 1975. Former Secretaries of the Air Force have been the point man. also. Even a foreign ambassador to the United States supplied the lead in the September- October 1971 issue. Twenty-five four-star generals, fourteen doctors of philosophy, eight chiefs of staff, and one Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force have also led the parade. Only once in these 147 issues, however, has a junior officer made the front rank, and that was a captain in September- October 1975. Never has a lieutenant made the grade. Now we march on new ground with First Lieutenant John W . lenson and his "Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American Thinking.” The thought of this young man is in no way absurd, and we offer his article with considerable enthusiasm. It has already drawn favorable remarks from readers on the Air Staff, and we hope it will please you. Lieutenant Jenson leads our little parade in another sense, also. His piece on the nature of Soviet strategic thought is one of four on the general subject of the relationship between the world's two superpowers. The cover art. depicting the fearsome array that could face us, is intended to tie the whole package together. With this issue we welcome a new and young (or younger, at least) Associate Editor to the staff of the Review: Major Theodore M. "Ted" Kluz. Ted, whose field is military history, comes to us from a tour as a teacher of strategy at the Air Command and Staff College. His students and colleagues there, and those from his days at the RAF College, Cranwell, England, and at AFIT, can help him along in his acquisitions work by burying him in manuscripts. He can be reached at Autovon 875-2773. Welcome aboard, Ted! As for our so-called prejudice against the young, the women, and the NCOs— perhaps it is only a prejudice against the meek, for we cannot publish that which we do not receive, be it out of meekness or whatever. Lieutenant lenson has proved that it can be done— and done well. What are you waiting for? March-April 1979 Vol. XXX No. 3 articles 2 Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American 1st Lt. John W. Jenson, USAF Thinking 15 Tactical Air Defense: A Soviet-U.S. Net Assessment Maj. Tyrus W. Cobb, USA

40 Soviet-United States Civil Defense: Maj. Thad A. Wolfe, USAF Tipping the Strategic Scale? 56 The Calculus of Surprise Attack Lt. Col. A. L. Elliott, USAF 65 The Shasta Disaster”: Forgotten Lesson in Dr. Murray Green Interservice Relations 75 The Challenge of Clausewitz Group Captain R. A. Mason, RAF departments BOOKS AND IDEAS 80 The Southern Duck Wants to Lie Down Col. James L. Morrison, Jr., USA (Ret) 85 Power. Control, and legitimacy Col. Raymond E. Bell, Jr., USAR 90 Potpourri 95 THE CONTRIBITOHS NUCLEAR STRATEGY differences in Soviet and American thinking ORE than any other change in the Union, for military doctrines and strategies technology of war. the advent of appropriate for the respective nations during nuclear weaponry has forced military the nuclear age. andM political leaders around the world to Before discussing the military doctrines and reassess the role of warfare in international strategies that have evolved in the United politics and to re-examine the strategic con­ States and the Soviet Union during the postwar cepts that had served them in the past. War era, one must define the terms “doctrine’ and had reached such cataclysmic and terrible “strategy. Throughout the history of military proportions that even the possibility of war thought, both have taken on a variety of seemed unthinkable. More than ever before, meanings in different contexts. One studying the mandate of national strategists focused on the works of military theorists and strategists preventing war rather than on successfully is often confronted with a bewildering array of prosecuting it. The resulting debate among definitions depending on the period of history scholars over suitable doctrine and strategy' during which the author wrote as well as on was, unfortunately, often lacking in the objec­ the writer’s particular position and perspec­ tivity and firm logic that such a discussion tive. warranted. Some theorists went so far as to For purposes of this discussion, military suggest that the destructiveness and ferocity of doctrine can best be defined as a set of modern weaponry had made warfare obsolete prescriptive principles set forth as a guide for as a means of resolving international conflicts. action and designed to ensure "uniformity of A little reflection, however, revealed that the thought and action throughout the armed same notion had been popular prior to both of forces of a nation in prosecuting its policies the major wars of this century and in both during peace and war.1 It defines the manner instances had proved tragically false. In other in which the military is to contribute to the circles, scholars and national leaders tended to political activities of the state and establishes dwell on philosophical and moral issues, all the guidelines on which military action may but ignoring the urgent and equally important properly be employed in the pursuit of the military questions. goals of the state. Strategy is subordinate to The uncertainty and apprehension over the doctrine and is the broad set of military actions implications of nuclear weaponry were com­ consistent with the accepted doctrine, which pounded by the rapid polarization of the world are to be employed when the military is used system into two opposing, belligerent blocks to implement the policies of the state. after the collapse of the Axis powers. When A nation’s choice of military doctrine and the Soviet Union began to acquire its nuclear strategy has historically reflected the intellec­ arsenal, speculation among political and mili­ tual and cultural climate of the times and the tary leaders of both sides about the nature and peculiar economic, political, geographic, and likelihood of nuclear war became soberingly if social characteristics of the country. A state’s dismally relevant to the entire community of political system and ideology, its national goals nations. The need for some hard intellectual and aspirations, its historical experiences, and scrutiny of the impact ol modern weapons on its perception of itself and the world political the international political system became ap­ environment—all contribute to its choice of parent. It was also apparent that if nuclear war appropriate doctrine and strategy, while its were to be avoided, both sides would have to geography and resources determine the prac­ take active, deliberate measures to ensure ticality of the strategic options open to it. against it. Thus began the search, by theoreti­ Throughout the Cold War of the 1950s and cians in both the United States and the Soviet 1960s, the United States possessed continuous 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW superiority in number and technical quality of necessary to achieve national security. Advo­ nuclear weapons, even if she was not always cates of the mutual assured destruction concept certain of the existence or extent of her lead. have been generally divided into two schools During the same period, the Soviet Union, of thought. One side maintains that a force well aware of U.S. strategic superiority, was "balance" between both sides is necessary. generally preoccupied with catching up with The other argues that to deter a potential the U.S. As the American lead in nuclear aggressor effectively, one need not possess capability began to wane, U.S. doctrine and superior or even equivalent military forces but strategy' went through a continual process of simply a sufficient or adequate capability to revision and adaptation to the changing balance assure the aggressor that, regardless of which of nuclear capability. The first explicit U.S. side suffers the more from a nuclear exchange, doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons was the attacker will still suffer more than he is the doctrine of massive retaliation, conceived willing to bear. The “sufficiency concept has and articulated primarily by then Secretary of been increasingly cited by advocates in various State John Foster Dulles. Under massive retal­ circles as justification for cutting back on U.S. iation, the U.S. eschewed using limited mili­ nuclear force levels, regardless of Soviet or tary' responses in opposition to Soviet political Chinese force buildups. and military initiatives around the world and Lest the notion of sufficiency seem like too instead threatened the Soviet Union with nu­ easy a solution, however, one must realize that clear attack for any of an unspecified list of it has some important limitations. First of all, military and political actions.2 Such a doctrine, its viability depends in turn on the viability of of course, could be tenable only while the the mutual assured destruction doctrine, which Soviet Union had no significant strike capabil­ presumes that the sole objective of both sides ity against the U.S. As Soviet capabilities is the prevention of nuclear warfare. This grew, however, and as the imprudence of tends to be true of U.S. doctrine but is far less massive retaliation became manifest, nuclear characteristic of Soviet doctrine, which assigns arms policy was divested of such sweeping a much broader range of tasks to the nation’s political roles and began to focus exclusively strategic nuclear forces in both peace and war. on the prevention of a large-scale nuclear For sufficiency to be attainable, both sides holocaust. U.S. policy-makers eventually real­ must subscribe to the assured destruction ized that options short of nuclear warfare ought doctrine. If either side is determined to deny to be devised for dealing with lesser political the other an assured destruction capability, the and military conflicts. Ultimately, the U.S. other will find itself continually reaching for, approach to the prevention of large-scale nu­ but never being able to attain, the requisite clear war came to rest on a strategy of deter­ level of forces. It will, instead, find itself racing rence under the doctrine of mutual assured for sufficiency with no less effort than if it were destruction, which postulated that so long as racing to obtain decisive superiority. either side was capable of inflicting unaccepta­ Second, aside from the practical limitations ble damage on the other, after having itself on attaining “sufficient” deterrent forces, the suffered a massive attack, neither side would required level and composition of those forces have any incentive to initiate a nuclear ex­ is extremely difficult to determine. One must change. first outguess the enemy on what level of The adoption of mutual assured destruction destruction he is willing to allow and then try as the guiding principle of U.S. deterrence to determine what sorts of force structure and initiated the ensuing perpetual debate over weaponry are necessary to achieve the requi­ what size and type of military forces were site destructive power. It behooves us to keep NUCLEAR STRATEGY 5 in mind, incidentally, that the willingness of to the U.S. or her allies, might not be suffi­ other nations to endure destruction may he cient cause for launching a global nuclear war. quite different from our own. Russia, to cite How, for instance, was the U.S. to respond to the most relevant example, has historically a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe if demonstrated an awesome capacity to endure the Soviets were to launch an unlimited attack incredible destruction and huge losses, yet go on our NATO allies but refrain from attacking on to fight, survive, and win. The Soviets, who the U.S.? Would the U.S. really come to the suffered 20 million casualties in World War II defense of her NATO allies if doing so meant and who witnessed the loss of 12 million triggering a global nuclear war and especially additional countrymen at the hand of their own a war at the expense of her own population? government during Stalin’s regime, have a To cope with threats short of an all-out much different perception of violent conflict attack on the U.S., current doctrine calls for a than Americans, who have never fought a range of options from very limited attacks with modem war on their own soil and who regard a small number of weapons to a full-scale war. the preservation and protection of human life By assuring the enemy that we can, and might, as the highest duty of the state. also respond to lesser military initiatives than The American debate of strategic issues, a full-scale attack on the U.S., we can deter even as late as the early seventies, centered such initiatives without having to threaten almost exclusively around the assured destruc­ initiating a holocaust. Besides deterring lower- tion concept and its corollaries, primarily the order enemy initiatives, possession of a range notions of sufficiency and overkill. Deterrence of responses short of full-scale war may enable through mutual assured destruction had be­ us to control the escalation of nuclear warfare come the orthodox faith, and its disciples in the event that it does break out. Although usually argued only over how much of the present doctrine concedes that nuclear war federal budget ought to be spent on it and may be extremely difficult to control and may what kinds of weapons and force mix were even escalate rapidly once started, such esca­ necessary to achieve it. Not until the recent lation is, at least, nc longer automatic. rethinking of U.S. strategy, fostered to a large Finally, present doctrine establishes a com­ degree by then Secretary of Defense James R. mitment to maximizing the military, political, Schlesinger, did the U.S. move away from its and economic capacity of the U.S. relative to reliance on the assured destruction concept the enemy, in the event that escalation cannot and broaden its doctrine and strategy to in­ be controlled. 3 To w'hat extent this constitutes clude such objectives as escalation control and victory or even national survival is open to U.S. survival in the event of war. debate, but it indicates that U.S. theorists are Under current doctrine, the principal goal of beginning to think in terms of attempting to strategy remains deterrence of a nuclear war, provide some means of assuring U.S. survival but rather than rely on mutual assured destruc­ or at least of limiting damage should war break tion, current doctrine is based on the concept out. Under the doomsday mentality of pre­ I shall call, at the risk of oversimplification, vious decades, such issues were seldom seri­ assured response." Under assured destruc­ ously discussed. tion, nuclear war was virtually an all-or-noth- One must be careful, however, not to as­ ing proposition. As long as the enemy did not sume that the emergence of the current U.S. exceed the requisite level of provocation, he assured response doctrine represents the could engage in any number of lesser political wholesale abandonment of the assured destruc­ or military initiatives which, though they may tion doctrine. The latter concept is by no have been very threatening or even damaging means dead, and there remain many who scoff 6 AIR UNIVERSITY' REVIEW at the concepts of escalation control and na­ deed the very processes by which they are tional survival. Indeed, many people view the created in the Soviet Union, are fundamentally mere discussion of such concepts as morally different from their counterparts in the U.S. reprehensible. Unfortunately, too few Americans appreciate Speculation on the nature of nuclear warfare how the vast gulf between the national histo­ and its potential impact on international poli­ ries, ideologies, and political characters of the tics has never been popular in the United two nations has led to profoundly different States. Herman Kahn’s famous works in the perceptions of warfare and the role of military early sixties, On Thermonuclear War and forces in the affairs of the state. The remainder Thinking about the Unthinkable, were an­ of this article shall be devoted to a description swered not by equally well-thought-out theo­ of the fundamental differences between U.S. retical challenges but by a barrage of moral and Soviet nuclear thought and the implica­ outrage that demonstrated just how unthinka­ tions that the latter holds for U.S. security ble the subject really was to much of the Effective military strategy cannot be formed in American academic and political community, a vacuum. It must be designed with the as well as to the general public. More recently, opponent’s intentions, perceptions, and capa­ James Schlesinger’s advocacy of a nuclear arms bilities in mind. It is, after all, the Soviets, not strategy allowing for limited and flexible coun­ ourselves, that we are hoping to deter. A terforce as well as countervalue options in strategy aimed merely at the pacification of our general nuclear warfare proved most unpopu­ own fears from our own perspective, or for the lar in this country. The very notions that satisfaction of popular sentiment, can at best nuclear warfare is winnable, or that it may take provide only an illusory feeling of security; at any form other than instant, reciprocal annihi­ worst it invites disaster. lation are still held by most people to be Soviet military doctrine and strategy, like preposterous. Scenarios for fighting, surviving, their Western counterparts, have been de­ and achieving victory in various types of nu­ signed to help lessen the likelihood of a clear warfare have been discussed from time to general nuclear conflict. But Soviet doctrine time by a few military theorists and by stu­ and strategy reflect the essential differences dents at the professional military schools but between the Soviet and American political have rarely been employed as a basis for U.S. systems, ideologies, historical experiences, policy.4 The direction of U.S. doctrine and geographic positions, economic and technical strategy during the next decade cannot be capabilities, and differing perceptions of them­ predicted with certainty. Because our policy, selves and the world at large. Indeed, the doctrine, and strategy are created and adopted entire Soviet approach to the formation of through a dynamic and essentially democratic military doctrine and strategy is fundamentally process, our position at any given time will different from the approach in the West. For reflect the particular disposition of our political example, while American strategy has been leadership, the impact of national and interna­ aimed at maintaining the present world order, tional events on the general mood of the the Soviets have stated time and again their country and, of course, the creativity of our ideological commitment to altering rather than strategic theorists, both military and civilian. preserving the status quo. The Soviets see world affairs as a dynamic system that neither can nor should be held perpetually in its present state. Military strategy, as they see it, T he essential premises behind should be tailored to an inherently changing Soviet nuclear doctrine and strategy, and in­ rather than a static world. NUCLEAR STRATECY 7 To assume that Soviet doctrine has emerged historical process ol the creation and development through a process similar to that in the U.S. or of official ideas. . . . There can be no single military' doctrine for all states, since the general that it is constructed along parallel lines but political line of the state s ruling class and the has merely reached different conclusions be­ economic and moral resources at its disposal cause the objectives of the two systems are determine military doctrine.5 different is to make the error of trying to analyze the characteristics of another culture In contrast to what is often assumed in the using the perspectives and yardsticks appropri­ U.S., the Soviets do not believe that there are ate for, but peculiar to, one’s own. Soviet any universally applicable schemes for achiev­ military thought, revealed in doctrine and ing strategic stability'. There are, therefore, no strategy, is a creature different from its Amer­ attempts made in Soviet literature to divine ican counterpart not only in color, size, and such a scheme. shape, but in its basic anatomy and physiology. Although the Soviets reject the notion that It must be explored within the context of its doctrine can be produced by a cognitive proc­ own origin and environment. ess, or that any doctrine can be generally In examining Soviet military literature, the applicable to all states, strategy and tactics are Western reader is immediately struck by a the subjects of intense intellectual scrutiny by number of features not present in American military scholars in the Soviet Union. Military military writing. The first of these is the strategy is defined, as in the West, as occupy­ persistent claim of Soviet writers that Soviet ing a subordinate role to doctrine. Military military concepts proceed from a scientific doctrine is said to determine general positions basis, founded on irrevocable principles about and principles, whereas military strategy deals which there can be no debate or argument. with concrete problems of the actual deploy­ This scientific basis is Marxism-Leninism, ment of military forces in the preparation for which in the Soviet view provides the frame­ war and the conduct of war b work of analysis for all social phenomena. Another unique feature of Soviet military- Military doctrine, according to Marxism-Len­ thought is the very limited role of debate in inism, is a class phenomenon, springing ulti­ the open literature. Consistent with their view mately, as all other social phenomena do, from that doctrine cannot be developed through a the economic conditions of the society. Al­ deliberate academic approach, there is no though the Soviets also recognize the impact discussion of alternative doctrines or the rela­ of political, geographic, and demographic fac­ tive merits of each. Moreover, only a very few tors, they reject the notion that military doc­ dissertations on strategic and tactical concepts trine can be deliberately formulated through are deemed suitable for open publication. To an intellectual, cognitive approach. In the the outside observer, there is little evidence of volume Military Strategy, which was compiled debate. This does not reflect any monolithic- in 1960 by a group of military scholars headed unity of thought, as the Soviets are given to by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky and which still claiming; rather, Soviet strategic concepts are serves as one of the chief explications of the ultimately formulated only by high-ranking basic premises of Soviet strategy- and doctrine, members of the Soviet politico-military estab­ the following explanation is given of the nature lishment. Soviet publications on strategy and of military doctrine: tactics do not represent contributions to a Military doctrine is not thought out or compiled freewheeling interchange of scholarly opinions by a single person or group of persons; it comes and differences but could more appropriately out of the vital activities of the state as a whole, be characterized as statements of the accepted, and is the result of a quite complex and lengthy official position arrived at by consensus within 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the higher political and military circles. If enemy. As long as the capitalist camp endures, questions of strategy are ever treated by it will continue in its aspirations to destroy the groups of scholars, such groups are generally socialist camp. A formidable peacetime deter­ under the central control of some leading rent is therefore a necessity. In order for the personality, as was the committee which, un­ socialist world to achieve lasting victory in the der Sokolovsky’s guidance, compiled Military event of a large-scale conflict with the capitalist Strategy. Statements of Soviet doctrine and world, the latter system must ultimately be policy are the outcome of official efforts to dismantled and a new social order established identify the military concepts and measures in its stead. From this ideological imperative best suited to achieving the political objectives springs the doctrinal requirement, in the event of the state. of war, for “complete defeat of the enemies’ The role of Marxism-Leninism in the for­ armed forces,’ the invasion and holding of his mulation of military doctrine and strategy is territory, and “eternal vigilance” in the protec­ difficult to assess—just as it is difficult to assess tion of Soviet territory against invasion.7 For its role in domestic or foreign policy or any of any nation to have such a capability, it must the other activities of the Soviet government. not have merely “sufficient or even “bal­ That it does impact on Soviet policy and anced forces but decidedly superior forces. decisions cannot be denied. Marxism-Leninism This is the essence of Soviet doctrine. does give Soviet leaders a framework within The determination of Soviet leaders to have which to evaluate world events. It also pro­ a free hand in implementing peacetime foreign vides broad prescriptions for dealing with var­ policy goals provides further impetus for advo­ ious political and military problems. cating superior strategic capability. Firm be­ Because it is a sociopolitical rather than a lievers that a nation’s ultimate peacetime military theory, Marxism-Leninism provides prerogatives depend on its relative military no direct guidance for Soviet military strategy capability, Soviet leaders are committed to and tactics; but it does serve as the foundation acquiring a military force that will allow them for a de facto Soviet military doctrine. It maximum freedom from coercion or interfer­ establishes the need for armed forces, the ence by other nations in prosecuting their politically acceptable modes of warfare, and foreign policy. The Soviet experience during other general rules governing the role that the the Cuban missile crisis of the early sixties was military may play in the affairs of the state. a profound lesson, and the almost immediate From the dissertations of Marx and Lenin, subsequent acceleration of Soviet arms buildup Soviet leaders obtain theories and arguments was evidence of their resolve that never again necessary t'o explain, justify, rationalize, and would they allow themselves to be put in a legitimize their policies and to interpret and position in which they would have to back act on world events. down in the face of an ultimatum from a War itself is seen as a manifestation of the superior military power. class struggle. Soviet leaders assert that al­ Marshal A. A. Grechko, in his important though the Soviet Union, being a socialist monograph On Guard over the Peace and the state, is inherently peaceful and would never Building of Communism, published in 1971, initiate a war, it must be prepared for conflict justified Soviet military efforts in characteristic with the hostile and inherently warlike impe­ Soviet terms: rialist nations of the capitalist camp. Further­ In the USSR and the other Socialist nations there more, because of the nature of class warfare, are no social groups interested in a war, and there can be no coming to terms with the indeed, they could not be. L. I. Brezhnev said at enemy. One does not compromise with a class the Twenty-fourth Congress: "we have territorial NUCLEAR STRATEGY 9 claims on no one whatsoever. We are in favor of that the historical preoccupation solely with the free and independent development of all the deterrent mission of U.S. nuclear forces peoples. But let no one try to talk to us in the continues to stifle discussion of policy meas­ language of ultimatums and force. s ures that could help to preserve the United Soviet strategy for the employment of nu­ States or U.S. interests in the event of a clear forces, then, consists of two dicta. The nuclear conflict. Recent warnings about ex­ first calls for a military force capable of deter­ panding Soviet civil defense capabilities have ring potential enemies from the use of nuclear sparked little interest in the U.S., which weapons during peacetime and. in the event presently has no meaningful civil defense pro­ such deterrence fails, surviving the war and gram largely because no one believes it can do going on to defeat the enemy. The second calls any good. Much of the debate over the MX for a military force of sufficient strength to and B-l has been disappointingly unsophisti­ prevent other nations, including other nuclear cated, proceeding too often from the assump­ powers, from limiting Soviet peacetime pre­ tion that such weapons will be employed only rogatives through the use of force or the threat as a means of futile retaliation by an already of force. Current U.S. policy, 1 believe, has dead or dying nation. Because of the unpopu­ more limited objectives. Rather than defeat of larity of discussing any aspect of nuclear war the enemy, U.S. policy has emphasized control other than its deterrence, U.S. theorists have of the conflict. Second, although the U.S. also barely begun to explore scenarios for prosecut­ seeks to deter the use or threat of use of ing nuclear war, surviving it, or winning it. nuclear and conventional forces against itself Nor have we even made many serious attempts and its allies, the U.S. is not seeking the same even to define what might constitute survival broad freedom of action that the Soviet Union or victory. hopes to achieve under its expanding nuclear The acceptance or rejection of such scenarios umbrella. as a basis for policy, of course, is the preroga­ One should also keep in mind that even tive of the political leadership of the nation, though U.S. defense spokesmen may from who must reconcile the strategic options with time to time speak in terms of "escalation the nation’s political constraints and objectives. control,” "U.S. survival," and other terms But it is, indeed, unfortunate that U.S. theo­ associated with current doctrine, the nation’s rists have not been more active, more objec­ commitment to that doctrine is not absolute. tive, and more academically courageous in There are many in Congress, the executive, providing political decision-makers with a and the public at large who do not believe that greater data base and a more candid analysis of nuclear war is winnable, controllable, or even contemporary issues for their use in policy­ survivable. Previous commitments to conflict making. In what follows, 1 shall offer a compar­ escalation control and counterforce options are ative analysis of American and Soviet strategic being constantly re-examined. As the debate theory and shall conclude by examining some over appropriate national strategic options con­ strategic options open to the U.S.—not as tinues, appeals to the persistent notions of policy proposals, for that is outside my pur­ assured destruction, massive retaliation, bal­ view—but to help illuminate some of the ance of terror, sufficiency, and overkill, are compelling, though disquieting, strategic is­ continually made by members of Congress as sues of the coming decade. well as the academic community and the popular media. The dearth of serious refer­ ences to the possibilities of realizing a U.S. rO Western readers, accustomed war-winning or survival capability is evidence to thinking of nuclear warfare as a synonym for 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the inevitable and immediate destruction of ern and Central Asia has meant land warfare. humanity, any discussion of victory and the Over the last two millennia, the Russian people various means of achieving it seems moot. But have been continually invaded by armies in this field of discussion, largely unexplored sweeping in from both the East and West. by Western theoreticians, Soviet military Because of the extreme exposure of the Rus­ theorists have produced some impressive sian and Soviet states to invasion by the armies works addressing contingencies for war as well of Europe and East Asia, large, well-equipped, as peace. While Western strategic theory is and highly mobile standing armies have always often preoccupied with the preservation of been of crucial importance in guaranteeing the peace, Soviet writing contains extensive dis­ security of the nation. cussions on every problematical level of nu­ The geographical position of the U.S.S.R. clear warfare from national strategy to the most has given it a far different perspective from the minute aspects of civil defense and battlefield U.S., which, in contrast, has always been tactics. buttressed against invasion by two oceans. In 1970, Marshal A. A. Sidorenko published Until the advent of intercontinental bombers his book The Offensive, which deals at consid­ and missiles, the U.S. relied almost exclusively erable length with the tactical problems of on the navy as her means of protection against nuclear warfare in land theaters. In this and invasion. The Soviet Union, unlike the U.S., other works, Soviet theorists have explored an has constantly had to prepare for the possibility impressive array of theoretical topics from the of land invasion and has fought both of the problems of targeting nuclear weapons to mov­ major wars of this century on her own soil. To ing infantry through areas undergoing nuclear the Soviets, the possibility of any enemy attack. attempting a full-scale invasion subsequent to The mere fact that Soviet discussion of a massive nuclear attack on her military bases battlefield tactics in land nuclear warfare is and centers of government, industry, and pop­ occurring is evidence of their conviction that ulation has been more than mere academic there exists an important role for ground speculation. troops and army units in nuclear war; indeed, Furthermore, the Soviet Union has tradi­ tactical and theater employment of nuclear tionally faced a much larger number of poten­ weapons receives as much or more attention in tial enemies both across the seas and directly Soviet writings as strategic nuclear employ­ on her borders. Today, not only the U.S. but ment. The popular conception in the West, on Western Europe, China, Japan, and possibly the other hand, is that ground units will be of India are all perceived as potential enemies; little use once the planet is blown to bits. But and it should be noted that most of them have Soviet theorists have been more sympathetic at one time or another invaded or attempted toward the views of Herman Kahn than of an invasion of the Russian or Soviet states. Nevil Shute. The fastidious attention that the Soviet strategy in the nuclear era, as well as in Soviets have paid to the theory of ground the past, has had to be designed to cope with operations in nuclear warfare can be attributed a considerably wider variety of threats and first to the Soviet doctrinal requirement for possible scenarios of war than has U.S. strat­ victory by seizure and occupation of enemy egy. territory and second to the historical impor­ To deter potential attackers, Soviet strate­ tance of ground warfare in Soviet military gists have advocated a combined conventional experience. and nuclear force superior in strength to any Throughout their entire history, war to the potential enemy or likely combination of en­ peoples living on the exposed plains of West­ emy forces. Marshal Grechko, in his previously NUCLEAR STRATEGY 11 mentioned pamphlet on Soviet military strat­ U.S. strategy, the Soviets have been com­ egy and doctrine, declared: pelled to contend with other possibilities. The In order to be completely prepared for ... Soviet Union has a number of potential ene­ [future war], it is essential to constantly follow mies within short and medium ballistic missile Lenin's thesis that in war the victorious side will range, and the possibility of having to deter or be the one which possesses superiority in the fight a number of enemies at the same time is economic, scientific, technical, socio-political, morale, and military areas. This superiority finds keenly felt by Soviet planners. Furthermore, itself concentrated primarily in the army, in its the Soviet Union, unlike the U.S., faces poten­ definite socio-political type and combat capabili­ tial enemies on her perimeter capable of ties. 9 invading her either as a follow-up to a nuclear attack or coincident with a nuclear barrage Superiority in nuclear as well as other types launched by another nation. of military capability and the possession of a Soviet strategy further differs from Western strong standing army are seen as essential strategy in that it proceeds from a fundamen­ aspects of Soviet strategy. Possession of such a tally different concept of the nature of nuclear force not only provides an effective deterrent warfare. As previously mentioned, the Soviets against aggression but as Soviet officials have see an extensive role for ground troops even in often stated provides “those conditions under general nuclear war. The popular Western which politics is in a position to achieve the concept of nuclear warfare has generally been aims it sets for itself. ”10 one involving a convulsive or spasmodic ex­ Should peacetime deterrence fail, however, change of weapons, after which both nations and the Soviet Union be drawn into nuclear will lie prostrate and incapable of deploying war, or should she opt for nuclear war in order traditional invasion forces and land armies. to protect what she deems a vital interest, Although an exchange between the Soviet Soviet strategy has also been designed to meet Union and the U.S. could possibly follow such the doctrinal mandate that the Soviet Union a scenario, one must keep in mind that the survive and retain the capability to crush the goal of Soviet planners and strategists is to enemy forces and consummate its victory by ensure that the U.S.S.R., at least, will never invading and occupying the enemy’s territory. find itself in such a position. Furthermore, Standing superiority in nuclear forces, which aside from the threat posed by the U.S., is in the opinion of the author the cornerstone Soviet planners must also consider the possi­ of Soviet strategy, would enhance the potential bility of nuclear warfare between themselves for survival of the Soviet Union by allowing it and peripheral nations on the Eurasian land- to destroy an increased amount of the enemy’s mass. Since the final victory, in the Soviet offensive capability during an initial exchange view, will go to the nation that eventually of nuclear weapons. Force superiority would seizes and occupies the other’s territory, Soviet also allow the U.S.S.R. to respond to a com­ strategy also calls for the maintenance of large bined attack by a number of enemy nations standing armies, highly mobile, possessing acting in concert, and to deter nonbelligerent great firepower, and capable of seizing the nuclear powers that may consider intervening initiative and achieving large territorial gains in the exchange or threatened exchange of in the ground war before, during, and subse­ strategic weapons with another nation. The quent to the exchange of long-range weapons.11 architects of U.S. strategy have traditionally The Soviets apparently see nuclear weapons presumed that nuclear war would be waged not so much as having introduced a fundamen­ against a single powerful enemy: the Soviet tal change in the nature of war but rather as Union. Though this premise may be valid for having merely extended warfare to more vio­ 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW lent proportions—a process that has been ob­ tempt to annihilate the other belligerent served and discussed by military theorists ever merely for the sake of annihilating him, or of since Clausevvitz wrote about it in On War making good one’s previous threats. nearly a century and a half ago. The first two Furthermore, if the realization of certain chapters of Sidorenko’s The Offensive are de­ political goals or military objectives requires voted to a Clausewitzian analysis of the evolu­ the preservation of given economic or military tion of twentieth-century warfare toward resources and government or population cen­ increasing levels of violence and destruction ters, the deployment of nuclear forces should and the role that nuclear weapons play as the be limited accordingly. Nuclear war, as Sidor­ most recent addition to the technology of mass enko sees it, will basically resemble previous destruction. Sidorenko’s thesis is that nuclear modern wars but will simply be fought using weapons in both a tactical and strategic sense more concentrated firepower and faster deliv­ have reduced the distinction between the front ery systems. and rear lines of the enemy forces; and that by To many Westerners this concept of nuclear giving the attacker the capability of quickly warfare seems at least surprising, if not absurd. and decisively penetrating huge areas of the American doctrine and strategy, by tradition­ enemy’s positional defenses, nuclear weapons ally relying on deterrence through terror, has have extended the tactical and strategic advan­ conditioned most Americans to think of nuclear tage of the offensive. Modern large-scale weapons only as instruments of total annihila­ ground warfare has, therefore, become more tion. The perception of nuclear strategy' held than ever before a contest of maneuver and by most of the public and adhered to by many initiative rather than of attrition.12 An impor­ national leaders remains rooted in the belief tant corollary to this thesis is that although a that the only object of nuclear war is indiscrim­ general war employing nuclear weapons will inate, unrestrained, and absolute destruction. be much more destructive than any previous So long as this belief persists, U.S. policy will war, it will proceed along analogous lines. often be influenced to varying degrees by the Instead of launching long-range attacks on old mutual assured destruction concept and enemy cities by using waves of conventional could during such times forswear many mili­ bombers, as in the last war, it will now be tary options and force structures that could done by ballistic missiles; and instead of long- help to assure U.S. survival and victory in the range artillery and conventional air support in event of hostilities. More important, a persist­ the battlefield, armies will now employ nuclear ent faith in mutual assured destruction by its artillery and jet aircraft delivering tactical nu­ advocates would continue to justify the suffi­ clear weapons in support of highly mobile ciency argument. Should this argument prevail ground operations. World War III, in the in the coming debates on force structure and Soviet view, will be much like World War II— weapons procurement, the U.S. could find only bigger, faster, and more destructive. itself possessed of a force of only tenuous There is nothing in this conception of war­ deterrent capability, abdicating all but the fare which dictates that the levels of destruc­ faintest hope for U.S. survival in a general tion in warfare be absolute or even the nuclear war, and incapable of precluding future maximum attainable. Indeed, a nation facing Soviet political initiatives that may jeopardize an assortment of potential enemies would be U.S. interests. Ironically enough, should the well advised to deploy its forces as economi­ sufficiency notion ever become the basis for cally as possible, using only those required to U.S. strategy while the Soviets press for supe­ secure victory rather than throwing them all riority, it would become increasingly likely away at the initiation of hostilities in an at­ that in the advent of nuclear war between the NUCLEAR STRATEGY 13 two powers, the U.S. could suffer the kind of need for nuclear forces on the grounds of the Armageddon-like destruction currently envi­ threat posed by imperialist and capitalist ad­ sioned by those who advocate this concept. versaries, Soviet strategists have never over­ A more subtle but equally sobering aspect of looked the possibility of war against China or a the popular American conception of nuclear coalition of a number of other states. In recent warfare as mutual suicide is the widely held years it has become apparent that the conflict confidence that the validity of that concept is between Moscow and Peking is genuine. The self-evident to the rest of the world—including Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Com­ the Soviets. The typical American is unaware munist Party went so far as to state explicitly that the Soviet concept of nuclear warfare is that although the Communist Party of the profoundly different from ours. Which of the Soviet Union “sought to aid . . . in the normal­ two concepts is the more valid can ultimately ization of relations, and to restore friendship be determined only in the unfortunate event with Chinese People’s Republic,” the “CPSU that nuclear warfare between the two nations would never make concessions to the national someday occurs. In the meantime, however, interest of the Soviet State, of the principles of for purposes of political decision-making and Marxism-Leninism. ”13 diplomatic intercourse, what matters is not The rapid buildup of the Soviet stockpile of whether the Soviet concept of warfare is more strategic weapons in the 1960s can be attrib­ accurate than the popular Western concept but uted to the need which the Soviet Union felt that the Soviets believe it is. The strategy they not only to reduce America’s superiority but to adopt and the subsequent agreements and establish unmistakable superiority over China’s commitments they will be willing to enter into nascent nuclear power. Adam B. Ulam argues with the West will all be significantly influ­ that it was to offset the future Chinese threat enced by their view of warfare. American that the Soviets erected their ABM system to policy-makers and planners must not lose sight protect their capital and other sites. By purely of the fact that some Soviet strategists continue technical criteria, it makes little sense to install to view nuclear warfare in more traditional an ABM system; for all its huge expense, it strategic and tactical terms and are committed offers no protection against a first-rate atomic- to the position that national security and other power, such as the United States. But, as lesser objectives in both peace and war are Ulam suggests, the Kremlin was not thinking best attained through the possession of decid­ of a large nuclear power when it erected its edly superior force—both nuclear and conven­ ABM system. With the great degree of cen­ tional. tralization that characterizes their political sys­ American negotiators, policy-makers, and tem, the Soviets have to take account of the strategists must also keep in mind that the threat and potential effect of one bomb or international political and geographical position missile striking Moscow.14 of the Soviet Union dictates some strategic- Flanked by potential enemies on both sides, requirements not shared by the U.S., which the Soviets have had to anticipate the possibil­ the Soviet Union cannot and will not ignore. ity that war with one might precipitate an While U.S. and NATO strategy has primarily attack by the other, either from political com­ been formulated to counter only the Soviet mitment or a desire to exploit an opportunity threat, Soviet nuclear strategy is designed to for easy victory. With the easing of relations cope with a multitude of threats from nuclear between the U.S. and mainland China in the and nonnuclear powers alike. Although Soviet last few years, Soviet strategists have had to doctrine on nuclear forces may be espoused in take increasing account of the possible actions Marxist-Leninist phraseology establishing the that the U.S. may take should the Soviet 14 AIR UNIVERSITY' REVIEW Union ever become embroiled in open hostili­ viet strategy. The important question is ties, including nuclear warfare, with China. To whether the Soviets do, in fact, perceive the provide assurance that the U.S. would stay out world with such apprehension and how this of a Si no-Soviet conflict, particularly if such a apprehension impacts on their military posture conflict were to escalate to nuclear war, the and political behavior. Soviet Union would have to engage a portion Although Western analysts of the Soviet of her forces against one nation but still have Union may have overplayed the themes of sufficient reserve left to deter the other. The traditional Russian xenophobia and Bolshevik U.S. does not have to cope with this type of suspicion of the outside world, the Soviets strategic problem to anywhere near the same have always exhibited a cautious approach to degree. world politics and military strategy. They have The possibility of having to conduct a multi­ historically prepared for a broad set of contin­ front or multilateral war is further complicated gencies in peace and war, and have generally by the antagonistic relationship that exists made concessions in international politics only between the Soviet Union and her manifestly when coerced or limited by an opponent of resentful and reluctant satellites in Eastern superior military or political strength. What Europe. The specter of having to hold the implications, then, does Soviet strategy have forces of revolution within her allies at bay for Western security at the present time and after suffering a nuclear attack herself, or while during the forthcoming SALT discussions with engaged in war on another front, provides the U.S.? tremendous impetus for maintaining both her It is the author’s contention that since Soviet huge forward-based standing army and a nu­ strategy is designed to provide both a deter­ clear umbrella against outside nuclear powers rent and a war-winning capability and ensure a who may be sympathetic with the Eastern peacetime environment in which the political European countries. objectives of the Soviet Union can be freely Finally, Soviet strategy reflects concern over pursued, it seems doubtful that the Soviet the eventual rise of China and conceivably Union will opt for any military posture short of other nations to nuclear power status. Cer­ superiority over any of its potential enemies. I tainly China will possess a viable nuclear believe that the historical, ideological, and delivery capability against the Soviet Union strategic imperatives behind Soviet military several years before she will pose a commen­ planning make it difficult for the Soviet Union surate threat to the United States. Of Soviet to feel secure with anything less than a strate­ concern also is the possibility that India, Japan, gically superior nuclear force. These impera­ or Germany may someday acquire substantial tives include her perceived need to prepare nuclear arsenals of their own. The Soviets have for multilateral conflict with other nations or been, and remain, much more apprehensive coalitions of nations on and off the Eurasian than the U.S. has traditionally been over the landmass. It seems doubtful to me, therefore, possibility of two or more nuclear powers that the U.S. can expect the Soviet Union to teaming up against them. The forces of both make substantial concessions in arms limita­ historical experience and Marxist ideology tions under the SALT agreements or any have not served to ameliorate Soviet apprehen­ subsequent discussions. The Soviets will con­ sion about the intentions and aspirations of tinue to build a diversified mixture of forces many of the nations in the outside world, both including land-based and sea-based missiles, in the East and the West. Again, whether such and their interest in refining the accuracy of a perception of the world is realistic is not the their delivery vehicles and developing a M1R\ relevant question for Western analysts of So­ capability is not likely to wane.15 Soviet strat- N VC LEAR STRATEGY 15 egy, especially in the face of growing rap­ the subsequent phases of the conflict. prochement between the l . S. and China, is The first option of unilaterally returning to almost certain to remain one of emphasis on assured destruction as a deterrent would long-range nuclear weapons, backed up with amount to little more than clinging to false vast standing ground forces capable of rapid hopes. Since the Soviets lend little credence deployment on both the European and Asian to the notions of assured destruction and fronts. sufficiency, it is unlikely that U.S. policy based on these concepts could give us the sort of security we have had in the past or would have hoped for in the future. These two notions IN coping with the Soviet nuclear gained force and acceptance in the U.S. during threat, the U.S. can, of course, pursue any the first two decades after World War 11 when number of options. There are, however, given the U.S., in fact, enjoyed the kind of superi­ the force of recent history' and the impact of ority over the U.S.S.R. that the Soviets are current events, three options particularly now attempting to establish over the U.S. It worth examining. A comparative examination has been only in the last few years that Soviet of them could be the most valuable academic nuclear strength has begun to approach our exercise possible in an article of this length. own. Ironically, the peace and stability of the The first of these options is for the U.S. to postwar period can be more readily accounted return to reliance on the assured destruction for by U.S. superiority during those decades concept. Since it is unlikely that the Soviets than by the presumed validity of the U.S. will ever agree to such a doctrine, there would doctrine of mutual assured destruction. With be little about it that would be mutual, and the Soviet Union, I believe, now pressing for the U.S. would have to identify and strive for superiority, U.S. reliance on assured destruc­ some sort of sufficient force structure in the tion as a means of achieving international face of Soviet superiority. Second, the U.S. stability has little future. Indeed, the U.S. could attempt a traditional balance-of-power military capacity for an assured destruction approach by establishing an entente among the capability against the Soviet Union is one of various blocks of world powers, balancing them the very things which I believe the Soviets in a series of alliances in hopes of achieving a intend to eliminate in their pursuit of superi­ stable world order. Under such a system, the ority. Soviet-sponsored exploits in Africa and deterrent for war would rest not so much on the growing uneasiness in Western Europe are the nuclear capabilities of any one nation, but but the faint rumblings of things to come in on a system of interconnected alliances de­ the future of emerging Soviet pre-eminence as signed to ensure, by collective agreements, the Soviet Union begins to test U.S. resolve the security of all nations against any one under the changing strategic balance. belligerent power. Third, the U.S. could opt As for the second option, balance-of-power for a powerful nuclear and conventional stra­ politics is a time-honored method of establish­ tegic strike force, protected from and designed ing a peaceful world order. Efforts begun by primarily to neutralize Soviet offensive and Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administra­ conventional forces at the onset of a military tion to establish a detente through a balanced conflict. By being able to deny the Soviet system of world power raised some hopes that Union her sought-after force superiority, the a permanent solution had been found to the U.S. could achieve both an effective deterrent problem of international stability. Detente, and a force capable of ensuring both national however, has always traveled a very rocky survival and the protection of U.S. interests in road, and the success of such a system in the 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW future would he dependent on the continuing allow the Soviet Union to cease doing so at a improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations, the position of discernible superiority to Western continued confidence of Japan and our NATO nuclear capability. Whether the U.S. could, allies in our commitment to their interests, under those circumstances, ensure its own anti Soviet agreement in the upcoming SALT safety and the stability of the world political discussions to substantially limit her buildup of order would then depend primarily on the military forces. But even if vve could he sure success of U.S. diplomacy. of maintaining all of these requisite ifs, there The third option calls for retaining our are some less obvious but even more serious present diplomatic ties and the concomitant shortcomings to any international order based commitments of conventional forces to NATO on a balance of power. and East Asia but emphasizing in U.S. stra­ As long as the balance is maintained by tegic posture a flexible counterforce capability careful and skillful statesmanship, the system against Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. can be an effective instrument in preventing Such a strategic force would have considerable international conflict. But if allowed to break deterrent value and would have the added down, it can rapidly polarize into a perverse benefit of helping to ensure U.S. survival and assemblage of separate and arbitrarily antago­ continued military strength in the event that nistic blocks, as did the European system on war actually does occur. Furthermore, such a the eve of the First World War. The congeal - posture has the welcome attribute of being ment of the European system at the turn of best achieved by improving the control and the century into the opposing Triple Entente increasing the accuracy, selectivity, speed, and and Triple Alliance can be traced to the fall invulnerability of our strategic forces more from office of Germany’s Bismarck and Eng­ than by simply adding megatonnage or increas­ land’s Lansdowne, who throughout the late ing the number of weapons. Moreover, a nineteenth century had adroitly balanced the strong counterforce commitment is far more military and political power of England, morally and politically defensible than the France, Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hun­ traditional countervalue concept. While mak­ gary against one another.16 Whether the U.S. ing the prospect of war no more inviting to the is capable of similar statesmanship and how potential aggressor, it provides neither side long it could sustain it would be important with any incentive to target the others’ civilian questions for the future should the U.S. ever populations. In fact, such a strategy forces both Opt for this course. sides to commit what weapons they have to But the final and most serious indictment of the others’ offensive forces rather than squan­ the two courses just discussed is that, in my dering them on civilian targets. One need only opinion, neither provides any incentive for the recall that the decisive factor in Nazi Ger­ Soviets to forswear their military doctrine of many’s failure to overwhelm British air power assured survival and preparedness for war, nor in the Battle of Britain was Goring s decision to scrap their strategy of eventually achieving to deploy German bombers against London nuclear superiority. U.S. negotiators must instead of British airfields and radar installa­ recognize that the Soviets are committed to tions in order to appreciate the imprudence of achieving superiority and that it is not likely misdirecting one’s ultimately limited offensive that they will accept a position of inferiority or resources. *' even parity with the West. If the U.S. hopes Finally, the most compelling argument of all to persuade the Soviet Union to stop increas­ is that a decisive counterforce capability, which ing its stockpile and improving its nuclear allows one to deny the enemy his sought-for delivery capability, it will probably have to superiority, is the most effective strategy NUCLEAR STRATEGY 17 against an enemy who bases his strategy- on viving, and winning against the enemy in the force superiority. The only real way to deter event of nuclear war. Policy-makers and lead­ such an enemy is to deny or be able to deny ers, both civilian and military', will have to him at the outbreak of war precisely the boldly confront the task of honest, courageous, advantage that he deems necessary to ensure and dispassionate discussion of these same his success and survival. topics. However catastrophic nuclear war may be, The preceding discussion is not intended to the world may someday witness it; and if we be construed as a comprehensive list of the fail in the meantime to rationally and objec­ strategic options open to the U.S., nor is the tively discuss not only the deterrence of nu­ third option professed to be the only possible clear w'ar but the problems of its prosecution means of achieving our national goals of peace­ as well, its unfortunate eventuality will be all time deterrence and of conflict limitation and the more terrifying and tragic. To study the survival in the event of war. The implications, prosecution of warfare no more implies a however, should be clear. In the face of Soviet desire to perpetrate it than the study of disease goals of acquiring a force that can fight, sur­ implies a desire to promote an epidemic. vive, and win a nuclear war, and given the Indeed, it is our prior study of both warfare present momentum of the Soviet military- and disease that will enable us best to cope buildup, U.S. theorists and strategists will with the cataclysm or the epidemic, when and have to face up to the task, however unfashion­ if they come. And if nuclear warfare is poten­ able it may have been in the past, of designing tially the greatest tragedy that may yet befall and proposing scenarios for not only deterring the human race, ought it not receive the but for countering, controlling, fighting, sur­ tireless attention of our best minds? Malmstrom AFB, Montana

Notes 1 Russell F Wriglcy. The American Way of W ar A History of United 9 Ibid., p. 28. Italics added. States Military Strategy and Policy (New York Macmillan. 1973b p 512 10 Bruct* D Hamlett. "SALT The* Illusion and the Reality.” Strategic 2. Ibid pp 403-4 Review. Summer 1975. p. 68. 3 t S Can Still Hold Its Own for Now.” U S Xews and World 11 Andrei A Sidorenko, The Offensive translated under auspices of Report. February 14. 1977. p. 61 United States Air Force iWashington. U.S Government Printing Office. 4 Richard L Curl. Strategic Doctrine in the Nuclear Age.” Strategic 1970b pp 40-70 Review, Winter 1975. p 49. 12. Ibid., pp. i-70 5 Vasilii D Sokolovskii, editor Military Strategy Soviet Doctrine and 13 Grechko, p 7. Italics added C e m c e p t s , translation by Translation Services Branch. Foreign Technology 14 Adam B Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence Soviet Foreign Policy (New Division W'nght-Patterson AFB. Ohio (New York Praeger 1963), p 42 York Praeger, 1974). p. 771 6 Ibid 15. Thomas W Wolfe, "The Global Strategic Perspective from Moscow," P- 7 Ibid . p 192 4978, March 1973 (Rand Corporation. 1973). p 9. S A A Grechko ‘On Guard over the Peace and the Building of 16 Richard Rosecrance, "Detente or Entente?" Foreign Affairs. April 1975. Communism JPRS Translation 54602 December 3. 1971. from "Na Strazhc pp 466-67 Mira. Stroitestvo Komrnunizna Moscow. Military Publishing House. 1971 17 B H. Liddell Hart. Histon/ of thr Second World War (New York G P p 26 Putnam's Sons. 1970). pp. 104-8. TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE a Soviet-U.S. netassessment

M ajor Tvri s W. Cobb, USA N THE next decade, United States and quiring and tracking targets and differentiating Soviet ground forces will encounter formi­ between friendly and enemy aircraft will be dable air threats, consisting of light/medium increased dramatically. bombers,I fighter aircraft, and assault helicop­ It is useful to try to determine how well the ters. all capable of employing sophisticated U.S. and Soviet tactical AD systems are capa­ electronic warfare (EW) measures and deliver­ ble of denying this airspace to their adversar­ ing ordnance with excellent accuracy, speed, ies. Comparing defensive weapon systems is and effectiveness. To counter the air threat, somewhat of an illusory exercise, however, the U.S.S.R. has deployed a diverse and since they will not be pitted in battle against extremely dense tactical air defense (AD) net­ one another and can only be understood in work, ranging from advanced interceptor air­ terms of the threat they are designed to craft to fully tracked, self-propelled surface-to- counter. Thus this assessment begins with an air missile (SAM) systems augmented by highly analysis of the air threat to both Soviet and mobile, rapid-firing antiaircraft artillery (AAA). U.S. forces, then examines the AD aircraft, Although the United States has deployed an SAM systems, and AAA weapons deployed by impressive counterair capability, ground-based each superpower to counter the enemy’s offen­ air defense has received relatively low priority sive capability. Finally, deployment patterns in terms of research and development (R6cD) and tactical employment concepts will be com­ funding, weapon systems acquisition, and doc­ pared to complete the net assessment. trine development. This trend has shifted since At the outset it might be helpful to distin­ 1973, when the critical importance of SAMs guish between strategic and tactical air de­ and AAA on the battlefield was clearly dem­ fense. In both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic onstrated by the Arab-Israeli War. Still, Soviet AD is the responsibility of a major command air defense systems are currently more numer­ that has the mission of defending the territorial ous, mobile, and responsive than their U.S. integrity of the homeland. The disparity be­ counterparts. Further, the fact that the Russian tween U.S. and Soviet strategic defenses is systems are generally as sophisticated and quite broad, reflecting different perceptions of technologically advanced as the U.S. weapons the threat and contrasting strategic doctrine. erases one of our traditional “combat multi­ The U.S.S.R. now has some 12,000 SAM pliers.” launchers and 2600 interceptor aircraft under The relative importance of tactical AD on its National Air Defense Command (PVO the battlefield will continue to increase in the Strany), whose responsibilities include coordi­ near future. Army commanders will be facing nation of the AD effort in all the Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pact attack aircraft capable of striking countries. The U.S.-Canadian counterpart, at low altitudes while using terrain-following North American Air Defense Command (NO­ techniques and employing increasingly sophis­ RAD), suffers in comparison, having recently ticated air-to-surface missiles, cannons, and eliminated the United States Army Air De­ conventional ordnance. Not only is the grow- fense Command (ARADCOM) and most of its ing lethality of the threat a factor but modern Nike-Hercules units and reduced the number AD systems will also have to operate in a of interceptor squadrons to fifteen—six active potentially chaotic environment. The airspace USAF F—106, six manned by the Air National will be congested by many users, including Guard, and three by the Canadians.* friendly and enemy high-performance aircraft, rockets, missiles, helicopters, air defense, and *PVO Si rant/ is one of the five services that constitute the Soviet Armed field artillery w'eapon fires, etc., all employing Forces. For a more complete comparison of U.S and Soviet strategic defense, advanced EW measures. The difficulty in ac­ see Major Tyros W Cobh. "Who’s Out in Front?” ARMY. January 1975 19 20 AIR UNIVERSITY' REVIEW emphasized in Soviet tactical considerations in The Air Threat favor of armor and artillery firepower—was not to Tactical Forces viewed as a sufficient threat to require an Prior to undertaking an assessment of’ U.S. extensive U.S. battlefield AD network. and Soviet AD systems, a review of the air Soviet tactical aviation (Frontovaya Aviat- threat these weapons are designed to counter siya), when employed in the ground-attack is in order. Soviet defense planners must role, has been used primarily as an extension design their AD systems to defend against an of the artillery, striking targets beyond the impressive array of USAF fighters and bomb­ range of the ground systems, and seldom ers, Navy and Marine carrier and land-based employed to support troops in contact. Recent aviation, and U.S. Army helicopters. Techni­ doctrinal changes, however, have broadened cally superior and at least numerically equiva­ Soviet tactical air responsibilities. The U.S.S.R. lent over the years, U.S. aviation, unlike its is now deploying fighter aircraft with improved Soviet counterpart, has traditionally performed avionics, advanced munitions capabilities, and close air support (CAS) missions as well as greater range, enhancing their capability to interdiction and counterair roles.1 While the perform ground attack and interdiction mis­ U.S. advantage in tactical aviation has been sions and possibly even close air support. narrowed dramatically in the last few years, The new-generation aircraft entering the Soviet air defenses must still consider that the inventory are indeed impressive. The venera­ U.S. has some 6000 fighters and helicopters in ble MiG—21/Fishbed has been modified to give its inventory.2 Most of these platforms are it greater range and payload capabilities. In equipped with sophisticated air-to-surface, an­ 1973 the Su-17/Fitter-C fighter-bomber was titank. and antiradiation (to suppress air defen­ deployed, followed by the multipurpose MiG- ses) missiles, some of them precision-guided 23/Flogger. Both are variable-geometry aircraft and laser-assisted. The front-line interdiction carrying rockets, bombs, cluster bomb units, aircraft now is the F -lll all-weather, variable- and cannons. The Fencer A, the first Soviet geometry fighter-bomber, backed up by the fighter designed specifically for the ground- multipurpose F-4s. The Warsaw Pact forces attack role, carries bombs, 57mm unguided will soon have to deal with the A-10 CAS rockets, and four air-to-surface missiles (ASM) fighter, the dual-mission F-16, and the Army's fired by an on-board weapons officer. The family of advanced attack and transport heli­ variable-geometry fighter has a laser range­ copters. 3 The A-10 will mount Maverick mis­ finder and a terrain-avoidance radar. About siles, Rockeye cluster-bomb units, and a 30mm 200-300 of the Fencers have been deployed cannon. The A-10, in conjunction with the with Soviet forces in East Europe.4 Tactical Army’s soon-to-be-deployed Advanced Attack bombers have been upgraded, too, especially Helicopter (AAH), will give the U.S. two with the deployment ol the controversial Back­ potent tank-killers on the battlefield. fire to naval and long-range aviation units. Following ten years of fighting in Vietnam. These new aircraft will earn modern air-to-air U.S. Army ground forces became accustomed missiles (AAM), tactical ASMs, and cluster and to operating in a total air-superiority environ­ retarded bombs. Most are dav/night and all- ment. This factor had the effect of deferring weather capable and are designed to tight in a R&D efforts in the AD area in favor of more heavy ECM environment. ’ pressing concerns raised by the Vietnam con­ The Soviets are also encroaching on a former flict. Although the Soviet air threat was not U.S. preserve with the rapid deployment of forgotten, the numerically large but compara­ transport and attack helicopters. Most impres­ tively unsophisticated Soviet Air Force—de­ sive is the new Mi—24/Hind, the worlds most TACTICAL Alii DEFENSE 21 heavily armed helicopter. Carrying antitank the various weapon systems of all forces. He in guided missiles (ATGMs), rockets, and a 23mm turn assigns weapon systems in the required cannon, the Hind can also transport an infantry amount, type, and sequence to meet the squad. threat. Usually this Area Air Defense Com­ Because of this rapidly expanding inventory, mander will establish AD regions and subas­ General George Brown, former Chairman of sign areas of responsibility, delineated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has estimated that the distance from the forward edge of the battle Warsaw Pact would have a 2 to 1 edge in area (FEBA), horizontally and verticidfc, dele­ fighter assets over NATO air forces in the gating authority to U.S. Army AD commanders opening stage of a European conflict.6 In for air defense within certain parameters. Co­ addition, the increased range will mean that ordination is achieved through common doc­ the Floggers and Fitter-C will be capable of trine, standing operating procedures (SOPs), striking NATO airfields and command and established procedures, and joint target distri­ control centers from bases in the Western bution centers. Nevertheless, AD operations U.S.S.R. The number of tactical aircraft in have become quite autonomous, with the Warsaw Pact operational units now exceeds USAF primarily handling the air-to-air battle 5000, including 4000 fighters, up 1300 since and the U.S. Army concentrating on the sur­ 1968.7 These forces could be further aug­ face-to-air conflict. mented by medium bombers dispatched from While there is a great deal of commonality the long-range aviation command and several between AD operations in the Soviet and U.S. hundred armed assault helicopters now in armed forces, one important difference is the theater. Countering this massive threat carry­ Soviet practice of assigning responsibility for ing advanced munitions and employing sophis­ AD operations to the ground forces com­ ticated penetration measures, U.S. air defense mander. In fact, virtually all Soviet air opera­ gunners will have only seconds in which to tions are controlled from the ground.8 “Frontal acquire, identify, track, and engage targets. Aviation units, usually organized as tactical air armies (TAA), are organic to military dis­ tricts (MD) in the U.S.S.R. or Groups of Soviet Forces in East Europe and operate Air Defense under the control of the ground commander. Command and Control These MDs and Groups will probably become Effective air defense requires centralized Fronts in wartime, a level somewhat analogous planning of AD weapon employment in an area to a U.S. Army Group but perhaps better of operations, although execution may be de­ considered as a Joint Task Force in terms of centralized and autonomous. Identification cri­ functions and organization. At the front the Air teria, weapons assignment procedures, rules of Defense Directorate (PVO Voisk) will coordi­ engagement—all must be standardized and nate early warning, tactical AD employment, coordinated. Both U.S. and Soviet doctrines and direct air-intercept operations from the adhere to these requirements, but there are ground (GCI).* On the whole, AD operations significant differences in the conduct of tactical in the Soviet forces appear to be much more AD operations. centralized, rigid in terms of execution, and U.S. doctrine for the employment of air lacking in flexibility.9 defense weapons by a unified command desig­ nates the senior Air Force commander as the •Where the line of responsibility between PVO St rant/ and the PVO Voisk Joint Air Defense Commander,” who has is drawn is not clear, Iml the former will probably control AD operations tip authority to exercise operational control over to a few miles from the Pact's western Iwirder

Soviet Inventory Infrared tlB >. heat-seeking missile systems are nou part of the Soviet arsenal The newest surface-to-air missile, a low-altitude IR system, is the SA-9 Gaskin (facing page). . . The shoulder-fired S.\-7 Grail i above1 is effective only for short ranges. . The MiG-25 Foxbat (below) is deployed in the forward area in a reconnaissance role. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY' REVIEW away from generalized to specialized training, Air Defense Weapon Systems having its F-4 wings designated as either primary air-to-air or air-to-ground, and requir­ fighter-interceptor aircraft ing 65 percent of training to be in the primarv Given the traditional Soviet emphasis on the area. Aircraft specifically designed for a single air defense role for its fighters, the numerically mission, like the A-10 CAS plane, the F-15 impressive interceptor inventory is not surpris­ counterair fighter, and the F-lll interdiction ing. There are about 4600 fighters in Frontal fighter-bomber, are now the rule. Aviation units, about 40 percent of which are The primary U.S. fighter today is the F-4, designated primarily counterair. Counting the performing both ground attack and counterair 1000 or so organic to Soviet forces in East missions as required. The F—4E is the princi­ Europe, augmented by an equivalent number pal interceptor version, a mach 2.3 fighter in the other Pact nations inventory and about armed with infrared (IR) seeking Sidewinder 500 immediately available in the Western and semiactive homing Sparrow missiles, and U.S.S.R., the Pact could send over 2500 further augmented by a 20mm cannon. The fighter-interceptors into battle in the first USAF fighter inventory will soon be enhanced hours of a European conflict.10 by the addition of the world’s two most capable The most widely deployed tactical intercep­ fighters, the F-15 and the F-16. Each has a tor is the MiG—21/Fishbed, principally the J, primary mission of air superiority, but the F- K, and L versions. These Fishbeds are short- 16 can also be employed in the air-to-surface range, delta-winged mach 1.1 all-weather role. fighters carrying four A-A missiles. The most The F-15/Eagle is a single-seat, fixed-wing, recent addition is the multipurpose MiG—23/ all-weather fighter carrying Sparrow and Side­ Flogger, a variable-geometry aircraft deployed winder missiles and a 20mm cannon.11 The F- in interceptor and ground attack variants. 15, a mach 2.5 aircraft, can climb to over Likely soon to become the Pact’s primary air- 65,000 feet and has radar that can track high­ to-air tactical weapon system, the Flogger is speed objects down to tree-top level (with a capable of flying at mach 2.3 while carrying “head-up’ display) for dogfights. The USAF four A-A missiles. The MiG—25/Foxbat is also first deployed the Eagle with TAC in 1974 and reported to be deployed in the forward area, ultimately plans on procuring 729 of them. but in a reconnaissance not an interceptor role. The F—15 was specifically designed for sus­ The USAF, in contrast to Soviet Frontal tained air combat operations against potential Aviation, developed its fighters primarily for future Soviet Frontal Aviation fighters. interdiction 'and ground-attack missions and The F-16 is the Air Force’s newest fighter, only secondarily for the counterair role. Rela­ a relatively low-cost, multipurpose aircraft tively few aircraft were developed especially being developed primarily to defeat the large for one or the other task. The prevailing number of Warsaw Pact aircraft that will likely philosophy has been simply to assign a certain provide cover for a Soviet armored break­ percentage of the available dual-mission air­ through. The F-16 is highly maneuverable, craft to the counterair role and the rest to flies at mach 2, and carries a 20mm cannon ground attack, with the emphasis going to the and IR missiles. It can also load munitions for former in the initial stages of the conflict. a ground attack mission. It does not, however, However, the rapidly expanding and diverse have an all-weather capability. The compara­ threat represented by Soviet tactical aviation tively low-cost F-16 will complement the has caused a rethinking of this approach. The longer-range F—15 for the close-in air-superi­ Tactical Air Command (TAC) is now moving ority battle and will become the standard TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE 25 fighter for four other NATO nations. U.S. SAM system there are generally two A major advance in effective battlefield man­ Soviet counterparts in the field, and the U.S. agement should be forthcoming as the first of trails in terms of tactical SAM launchers by at the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control Sys­ least a three-to-one margin. The proliferation tem (AWACS) aircraft are deployed. While the of SAM systems has been so rapid that DOD E-3A will perform several functions, from now estimates that Soviet AD systems will tactical and theater-level command and control have multiplied threefold in the five-year pe­ to long-range reconnaissance, the air defense riod from 1973 to 1978.14 capabilities of the system will also be substan­ Providing medium-to-high-altitude air de­ tial. The goal is the establishment of a single, fense for Soviet forces are the SA-2/Guideline integrated capability to control and allocate air and the SA-4/Ganef. The SA-2 is.a two-stage, defense resources for a theater of operations in command-guided missile system with a slant peacetime and wartime.12 From a normal op­ range of 45 km and a ceiling of 80,000 feet. erating level of 30.000 feet, the AWACS can The Guideline is fired, often in “salvo” fashion, detect low-flying aircraft some 250 miles away from a single-rail launcher deployed in star and is virtually immune to enemy electronic fashion in a group of six about a central fire- countermeasures. AWACS is the forerunner of control radar. While the SA-2 lacks the mobil­ a family of compatible units that will tie in ity of newer SAMs, it is transportable. For­ with the JTIDS, the projected Joint Tactical merly organic at front and army echelons, the Information Distribution System. Once inte­ SA-2 is primarily used today to defend static grated with the ground systems, DOD be­ positions in the rear.15 lieves the AWACS will result in a significant The primary SAM system for high-altitude improvement in offensive as well as defensive air defense is the SA^i/Ganef, twin-mounted air operations and will increase our capability on a tracked carrier and capable of striking to detect a Warsaw Pact preparedness to targets 70 km away.16 The SA-4 is command- attack.13 guided, and the fire-control radar is also fully tracked. Like the SA-2 it is replacing, the Ganef is organic to front and army. Because of surface-to-air missiles its excellent mobility, the SA-4 will be de­ The rapid Soviet advances in surface-to-air ployed far enough forward to provide AD missile technology and deployment exemplify coverage to divisions in contact, leaving rear- the comprehensive military-technological rev­ area defense to the SA-2 and SA-3. olution the Kremlin has embarked upon to Two excellent SAM systems are providing overtake the U.S. A decade ago the United low-to-medium-altitude defense for the Soviet States had widely deployed its Nike-Hercules ground forces, the SA-6 and SA-8. The SA-6/ missile systems, augmented by the Hawk tac­ Gainful, with an effective slant range of about tical SAM system, and the Redeye infrared 22 km, is triple-mounted on a tracked carrier missile was coming into the inventory. The and can deliver extremely responsive fires. Soviets, in contrast, were performing tactical Employing sophisticated electronic counter- AD with machine-guns, .AAA, and two SAM countermeasures (ECCM) and command-guid­ systems, the SA-2 and SA-3. Since that time ance systems, coupled with semiactive hom­ they have deployed five new tactical SAM ing, the SA-6 proved to be an effective weapon systems as well as several advanced variants of against Israeli aircraft in the 1973 October the SA-2. The U.S. has fielded only the War. The Gainful is found at army level but Chaparral system and is not overly pleased may be deployed at division level with the SA- with its performance. Currently, for every 8 as the 57mm guns are phased out. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW One of the newest SAM systems is the SA- A third low-altitude system, the older SA-3/ 8/Gecko, a fully contained, short-range (10-15 Goa, is a dual-mounted SAM system now km), command-guided missile system. The employed primarily in defense of installations, highly mobile SA-8 system mounts four rails airfields, and critical assets in the rear. on top of a 6-wheeled amphibious carrier and Two infrared, passive heat-seeking missile has an auxiliary electro-optical (TV) tracking systems round out the Soviet inventory. The system for use in a heavy ECM environment. man-portable and shoulder-fired SA—7/Grail TACTICAL Alh DEFENSE 27 (Strela in Russian), like the U.S. Redeye, is Gaskin, along with the ZSU-23-4 Shilka AAA effective only for short ranges (about 2-3 km) system, will provide air defense at the regi­ and is organic to maneuver battalions. The mental level. newest SAM, the SA-9/Gaskin, is a low-alti­ The proliferation of SAM systems gives the tude IR system effective to about 7 km. Four Soviets capabilities at various frequencies, de­ missile canisters are mounted on a modified fense in depth, and complementary systems. BRDM-2 amphibious armored vehicle. The Qualitative improvements as well as these 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW numerical deployments have lessened their Under the “belt” concept, all AD assets above dependence on fighters for air defense, and division level would be employed in a line will, consequently, free some Frontal Aviation designed to stop massive waves of aircraft in assets to concentrate more on ground attack the initial assault.* operations.17 While this proliferation may not The Basic Hawk system was first deployed in itself raise the kill probability against attack­ in 1959 and is in the process of being phased ing aircraft to beyond, say, .05 percent, a 1 -in- out in favor of the Improved Hawk (IH). In 20 shot against a vehicle costing perhaps 500 addition to the fact that the original system times as much is certainly cost-effective! Of reflects 17-year-old technology. Hawk lacks course, the very proliferation of SAMs has mobility, is hampered by an inability to engage generated countermeasures such as air defense more than two targets simultaneously, and is suppression, but this requirement will take susceptible to ECM.19 The Improved Hawk away assets that might otherwise be engaged has an increased range capability (40 km), a in offensive operations and thus is in itself an repackaged warhead with greater lethality, effective measure. more sophisticated ECM equipment, and en­ Long-range, high-altitude air defense is pro­ hanced ability to discriminate against multiple vided for U.S. tactical forces by the command- target formations. The missile is delivered as a guided Nike-Hercules system in conjunction “certified round, ready to fire without field with USAF interceptors and Hawk missiles. maintenance or testing. The IH system will Here” units are normally assigned to theater appear only in towed form efforts to employ a AD organizations protecting critical rear area self-propelled Hawk having been somewhat assets. The Hercules, which also can be em­ unsuccessful.20 In comparison to the Soviet ployed in a surface-to-surface role, carries SA-6, the IH has greater range and a better either high explosive or nuclear rounds and is capability at lower altitudes, but the SA-6 has effective out to 140 km. The “Here," first greater mobility and is deployed in greater deployed in 1958 with the last one produced density on the battlefield. over 13 years ago, is technologically out of Like the Soviets the U.S. has fielded two date. The system suffers from a lack of mobility infrared-missile systems, one man-packed and and a limited rate of fire, and it is becoming one vehicle mounted. The Chaparral system quite expensive to operate.,s However, until carries four IR missiles mounted on a self- the Patriot system is deployed in the 1980s, propelled, fully tracked launcher. However, the Nike-Hercules will continue to serve as targets must be acquired visually and tracked NATO’s only high-altitude SAM system. only with the assistance of an audible tone to The key to U.S. ground-based tactical air the gunner. The missile is effective out to 5 defense is the Hawk system, designed to km but, like most IR-seeking missiles, can be provide protection against the low-to-medium- easily evaded. More important, the Chaparral altitude air threat. Often described as the best is more of a “revenge weapon” in that it can SAM system in the world, the Hawk employs engage aircraft only by “chasing the attacker semiactive homing guidance and ranges out to after he has passed over the defended area. 30 km. Current doctrine for a LbS. corps Doctrine calls for the Chaparral to be generally organization prescribes one Hawk battalion employed in conjunction with the ^ ulean gun with a direct support mission to each commit­ system. A composite Chaparral-Vulcan battal­ ted division, while at least one battalion pro­ ion is now organic to infantry, armor, and vides general support to the corps rear. In •Tins Hawk forward-missile intercept inne ("belt"! is essentially an exten­ practice, a “Hawk belt may be established sion of the EEBA as the Hawk units will still he deployed so as to cover parallel to and about 30 km from the FEBA. deploying divisions TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE 29 mechanized divisions, and platoons of each forces. 22 In view of these serious shortcomings, system are generally cross-attached for maxi­ the U.S. is now committed to moving forward mum effectiveness. The towed Vulcan alone is in the development of a new family of mobile, the airborne and air-assault division weapon. capable, and responsive SAM systems. The Low-altitude, short-range AD for the divi­ aging Hercules and Hawk systems will be sion is provided by the man-portable, shoul­ replaced by the Patriot, formerly the SAM-D. der-fired Redeye IR missile, with one team In the forward battle area, the U.S. Roland generally assigned to each company-sized unit. system is programmed to replace or supple­ Like the Chaparral, the Redeye uses a passive­ ment the Chaparral, and Stinger is slated to homing, infrared-seeking guidance system, has come in for the Redeye. a short effective range (about 3 km), and can The Patriot is an advanced AD guided-inis- engage only receding aircraft. The Redeye is sile system designed to counter threats across employed in concert w'ith small arms, AA the entire spectrum. Programmed to replace guns, and with the self-propelled Chaparral both Hercules and Hawk in the mid-1980s, system. Patriot will have the capability of engaging a DOD officials are clearly unhappy with the high-G maneuvering target, multiple aircraft, present lineup of American SAM systems.21 and maintaining effectiveness in a dense ECM Both the Nike-Hercules and the Hawk reflect environment. Patriot will have a single multi­ aging technology and are clearly limited in function phased-array radar tied to the terms of mobility, reaction time, and ability to launcher area by radio, not cables. Although engage multiple targets. The Chaparral and the development program is very ambitious, Redeye are clear-weather, day-only systems, system performance has thus far met or ex­ since targets are visually acquired. Neither is ceeded all criteria. No further improvements effective against high-performance aircraft or will be made to the Hercules system in the any incoming target. Even if the SAM systems interim, but the Improved Hawk program will were more effective, adequate defense would be upgraded through the next decade until be hampered simply by the sparsity of deploy­ Patriot is in the field. 23 ment of these systems. The adequacy of our Complementing the Patriot in the forward SAM program can be gauged by noting that area, the U.S. Roland SAM program will Egypt alone had more SAMs deployed along provide an all-weather, day/night. low-altitude the Suez Canal in 1973 than we then possessed capability in place of or supplementing Chap­ in our entire inventory! arral. The entire firing module, developed The inadequacy of U.S. tactical air defense jointly by France and West Germany, is now was recently highlighted by former Undersec­ being adapted to U.S. production. The system retary of the Army Norman Augustine and will be tested this year and operational by the Lieutenant General Howard Cooksey, then the mid-1980s. However, all is not roses in this Army’s DCSRD&A, who noted that our SAM effort at NATO standardization. The U.S. con­ AD systems simply were not capable of inflict­ tractor has experienced considerable difficulty ing unacceptable attrition rates on a mass in interpreting the engineering design and formation of the sophisticated high-speed at­ many parts were not interchangeable.24 How­ tack aircraft possessed by the U.S.S.R. They ever, an international interchangeability pro­ added that this might cause the loss of essential gram is now progressing well. Congressional installations and units and could cause the critics have criticized the excessive R&D costs diversion of our high-performance tactical air­ for what was supposed to be an operational craft to the air superiority mission instead of missile system. DOD is also moving ahead on being used in support of engaged ground an improvement program for Chaparral. The Continued on Paine 32 The impressive Soviet ZSL’-23-i Shilka (left ) has been in the field for several years and is superior to anything the U.S. has deployed. . . . A Soviet counterpart to LT.S. surface-to-air missiles is the SA-2 Guideline (below). In production in 1956-57. it is primarily used today to defend static positions in the rear. The SA-6 Another of the excellent surface-to-air missiles providing low-to-medium altitude defense for the Soviet ground forces is the SA-6 Gainful. This weapon system has great mobility and can he deployed in much density on the battlefield. 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW improved system will have a forward engage­ range of 7 km. The Shilka covers the “dead ment capability, an improved fuze and war­ zone” of the SA-6. The ZSU-23-4 and the SA- head, a new guidance system, identification, 9 apparently will be organic to tank and friend or foe (IFF) capability, reduced signa­ motorized rifle regiments. ture, and increased resistance to countermea­ The Soviets have phased out the ZSU-57-2 sures. system, a twin 57mm self-propelled gun effec­ Stinger, a follow-on system to the Redeye, tive to 4 km that was found in tank divisions. will be in the field later in this decade. It has A towed 57mm gun, the S-60, has served as an extended range and velocity over Redeye, the standard AA gun with the Soviet motorized an improved IR seeker. IFF capability, and rifle divisions. The S-60 is a powerful, radar- will engage incoming as well as outgoing controlled gun that can also be employed aircraft. effectively as a direct-fire weapon in addition to its AA functions. The S-60 is being replaced by the SA-6 and SA-8 missile systems, but it antiaircraft artillery probably will be utilized in a rear-area static Soviet planners have carefully monitored the defense role. U.S. experience in Vietnam and lessons Following the phase-out of the venerable learned from the 1973 Mideast conflict. From twin-40mm Duster gun system, the U.S. Army these disparate wars one conclusion came fielded the Vulcan gun system as a stop-gap through loud and clear: AA guns working in measure to provide automatic weapons AD concert with SAMs are a very effective AD support for the division. The Vulcan is fielded team in the forward area.25 The U.S.S.R. has in towed and self-propelled versions, and its produced a number of weapons ranging from 20mm gun system is capable of firing at a rate 12.7mm machine-guns (MGs) to 130mm AAA of 3000 rounds per minute. However, the guns. Several of the 12.5, 14.5, and 23mm Vulcan gun is severely limited in range, effec­ caliber machine-guns are proliferated through­ tive only to 1200 meters in the AD role, and! out the forces, either single, double, or quad- hampered by the lack of a fire-control radar. barrel versions, towed or mounted on armored The gunner is assisted by a range-only radar vehicles and tanks, and some 100mm and but must visually acquire the target, making 130mm guns are found in reserve and East the system effective only in good weather. The European divisions. But the frontline AAA Vulcan is severely limited in range, accuracy, systems are the S-60 and the impressive ZSU— and kill probability. The system is very vulner­ 23-4. able to ECM and cannot handle rapidly ma­ The Soviet ZSU-23—4/Shilka gun system was neuvering targets. Vulcan is normally deployed credited with nearly half the total kills against with Chaparral, in four-gun teams, but the Israeli aircraft in the 1973 Mideast War.26 The Vulcan may move with the maneuver unit completely self-propelled system mounts four while Chaparral is held back to defend critical, 23mm cannons on a modified PT-76 chassis fixed assets. In airborne and air assault divi­ and is capable of firing up to 4000 rounds per sions the towed-\ ulean is the only organic AD minute to an effective range of 2.5 km. Target system. acquisition and fire control are radar-con­ The U.S. Army is unhappy with the per­ trolled, with an optical assist for use in an formance of the Vulcan gun system and greatb ECM environment. The Shilka can fire on the impressed by the success exhibited by the move at speeds up to 25 KPH. The ZSU-23-4 ZSU—23—4. A 1974 study concluded that a new with its high rate of fire can also be effectively low altitude forward area air defense system employed in a direct-fire role to a maximum (LOFAADS) gun was needed, and Army is TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE 33 now proceeding with a development program ing smart bombs and antiradiation missiles, for a division AD (Divad) gun system. This Wild Weasel locate and attack aircraft, and system is expected to be a self-propelled standoff jamming airborne platforms.28 Passive (tracked), radar-aimed, medium-caliber, all- defensive measures such as camouflage, terrain weather system capable of firing over 4000 preparation, hardened sites, and use of non­ rounds per minute; in other words, it is a electronic acquisition and tracking means are system not unlike the Soviet Shilka! However, emphasized. Centralized fire control and tight it is doubtful that such a gun could be fielded fire discipline are required. before the mid-1980s. U.S. air defense tactics do not materially differ from those of the Soviets. However, our efforts have been handicapped by insufficient numbers of systems in the field and by a Deployment Patterns growing gap in the application of technology. and Tactical Employment A comparison of AD assets available at equiva­ In the employment of tactical AD systems, lent tactical levels is shown in Figure 1 and Soviet doctrine stresses mobility, mass, mix, illustrates the impressive lead maintained by system redundancy, centralized fire control, the U.S.S.R. and passive defensive measures. 2‘ A viable air A Soviet “front” is the highest tactical level defense network must represent a mix of and has no set organization, although it is complementary systems that can engage en­ roughly analogous to a U.S. theater army or emy aircraft at virtually any altitude, at great NATO Army Group. Air defense assets are a distances, and in any condition of visibility. composite of organic fighter-interceptors and Multiple frequency capabilities even within long-range SAMs,29 augmented by AAA in a the same system (e.g.. the various models of point defense role. Although all of the aircraft the SA-2) are considered necessary in order to are multipurpose and Soviet air regiments are force enemy ECM operators to jam a wide designated with a primary mission, it would be spectrum and suffer a consequent loss of difficult to say with any certainty how many power. MiG—21s and 23s would be available for the Realizing that insufficient assets in an area air superiority role. A reasonable guess is that represents a significant risk, Soviet planners about 40 percent of the TAA’s aircraft will be insist on deploying AD systems in mass. Cov­ fragged for air defense in the initial stages of erage in depth and over a wide lateral area is the conflict. Ground-based AD in the near ensured by utilizing “obsolete” weapons in future will be provided by one or two SA—1/ gap-filler and auxiliary defense roles. Through Ganef brigades (27 launchers in each), replac­ such redundancy a progressive saturation of ing the less-mobile SA-2/Guidelines. How­ the airspace horizontally and vertically ever, as the SA-4 deployment progresses, the throughout the area of operations is ensured. SA-2 will probably shift to a rear-area static Since virtually every Russian AAA and SAM defense role, protecting bridges, rail junctions, system deployed in the last decade is self- airfields, and the like. In addition, some SA-3s propelled, the requirement that AD systems will provide low-altitude point defense in the have mobility equal to that of the unit sup­ rear, and S-60s and other AA guns will serve ported is being achieved. as gap-fillers and back-up AD systems. Training is repetitive, rigorous, and some­ Since there is no table of organization and what mechanical. The primary systems that equipment (TO&E) for a U.S. theater army, it their air defenders train against are attack is necessary to speculate regarding probable helicopters, close air support aircraft employ­ AD assets.30 If CENTAG, in the NATO chain, Figure I Tactical air defense assets available at comparable US. and Soviet echelons

Soviet Echelon U.S. Echelon

Major Subordinate Air Defense Air Defense Major Subordinate Tactical Units Assets Assets Tactical Units

Front Army Group/Major Air Command

4/5 CAAs 1/2 SA-4 brigade Nike-Hercules 4/5 corps 1/2 T A s 0/1 SA-2 regiment group 1 TAA MiG-21, MiG-23 F-15, F-16, F-4 2 t a c t ic a l air SA-3s, S-60s forces*

Army Corps

CAA—3/4 MRDs 1/2 SA-2 regiment 1 Hawk battalion 2/4 divisions 1 T D 1/2 SA-4 brigade (GS) TA—3/4 TDs 1/SA-6 regiment 1 C/V battalion 1 MRD

Division Division

TD—3 TRs 1 SA-6 regiment or 1 Hawk battalion 3 brigade 1 MRRs 1 SA-8 regiment or (DS) MRD—3 MRRs 1 57mm AAA regiment 1 C/V battalion 1 TR

Regiment Brigade

TR—3 tank 1 SA-9 platoon none 3/4 battalions battalions MRR—3 MR battalions 1 ZSU-23-4 platoon

Maneuver Battalion Maneuver Battalion

3 Commanding SA-7s Redeye 3 Commanding Officers Officers

CAA—combined arms army TD—tank division TA—tank army MRR—motorized rifle regiment TAA—tactical air army TR—tank regiment MRD—motorized rifle division

'A ir assets are subordinate to the ground forces commander at the front level in the Soviet armed forces On the U S. side, the air and ground components do not share a common commander until the next echelon. Thus in Europe. U S. ground forces (V and VII Corps) are under the NATO Central Army Group (CENTAG). while the air elements are in two allied tactical air forces under the Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (AAFCE) However, both CENTAG and AAFCE are subordinate to CINCENT, the commander of Allied Forces, Central Europe 34 TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE 35 is used as an example, this echelon might have available. A Soviet regiment, on the other four Nike-Hercules battalions supported by a hand, is extremely strong in terms of air number of U.S. and allied F—15, F—16, or F—4 defense. Until recently a motorized rifle regi­ wings. The area air defense commander would ment (MRR) had a mixed AAA battery consist­ initially devote the majority of his air assets to ing of towed 14.5 and 23mm AA guns and counterair, but these aircraft would not be from four to eight SP ZSU-23-4s, while a tank controlled by the ground commander (CEN- regiment (TR) had a mixed ZSU-23-4 and TAG) as is the case with a Soviet front. Some ZSU-57-2 battery. The future regimental AD Hawk and even Chaparral-Yulcan (C/V) assets picture for both the MRRs and the TRs will may be pulled from corps support missions to consist of a platoon of four ZSU-23-4 SP guns form a rear area AD belt, depending on how complemented by a platoon of SA-9 infrared the threat is perceived. seeking missile fire units. The subordination at a U.S. corps/Soviet Finally, at maneuver level the U.S. now has army level is somewhat clearer. An American roughly 73 Redeye teams organic to battalions corps will have one Hawk battalion in a general in a type division (six weapons per team). The support role (24 or 27 launchers) and one C/V Soviets have a similar number (about 400) of battalion (24 of each), although other assets the SA-7/Grails deployed with the division’s may be pulled from their role in support of maneuver elements. In addition, some combi­ subordinate divisions. A Soviet army currently nation of older 14.5 and 23mm AA guns will has the SA-2, but the Guideline is gradually be scattered throughout the Soviet division. being relegated to rear area defenses at this level, too. Air defense for an army in the future probably will consist of one or two SA- T he contrast in relative emphasis placed on 4 brigades and an SA-6/Gainful regiment (20 tactical air defense by Soviet and U.S. planners launchers). is quite significant. The gap between battle­ .Air defense for the division is in the process field AD systems is now approximately three- of rapid change in the Soviet armed forces as to-one in favor of the U.S.S.R. and, in light of the 57mm guns are phased out. The future mix the continued deployment of Soviet systems, of division AD assets is subject to debate, but is likely to widen further in the near future. it now appears that both the tank division (TD) More disconcerting, however, is the techno­ and the motorized rifle division (MRD) will logical edge enjoyed by the Soviet armed have either an SA-H regiment (24 fire units) or forces in this field, an area of traditional U.S. an SA-6 regiment organic—or possibly a mixed supremacy that formerly could offset Russian SA-S/SA-6 regiment. Although the SP 57mm numerical advantages. guns are being withdrawn, the venerable Complicating the comparison is an increas­ towed S-60 will likely be kept around to ingly more sophisticated Soviet Air Force that perform close-in defense of critical positions. is shifting its focus away from an emphasis on In contrast, a U.S. division is now limited to the air-superiority role toward increasing its one organic C/V battalion (24 Vulcans, 24 capabilities for ground attack and interdiction Chaparrals) or a straight towed Vulcan battal­ missions. Fighter aircraft are now being de­ ion in airborne and air assault units, aug­ ployed with improved avionics, range, muni­ mented by a Hawk battalion in direct support tions, and penetration capabilities. Added to when the division is committed. this are the versatile new attack and transport A U.S. brigade is not a fixed organization helicopters, the Hind A/D and Hip E, which and has no organic AD assets and will be significantly broadens the spectrum repre­ limited to whatever support division makes sented by the Soviet air threat. The newest US. aircraft in the air defense role, such as the F-15 (left) and the F-16 (facing page), represent the most advanced technology available and are clearly superior to their Soviet counterparts. . . . The same cannot be said of our I lawk system (belou). which reflects aging technology and is limited in mobility, reaction time, and ability to engage multiple targets.

W - TACTICAL AIH DEFENSE 37 Defense planners in the U.S. have coped systems reflect aging technology and are lim­ with the challenge in the counterair arena ited in terms of mobility, reaction time, and rather well. The new U.S. aircraft in the air ability to engage multiple targets. The Chapar­ defense role such as the F-15 and the F-16 ral and Redeye systems are clear-weather only represent the most advanced technology avail­ and somewhat ineffective against high-per­ able and are clearly superior to their Soviet formance targets, deficiencies that will be counterparts. In fact, tactical fighters are the partially corrected by the Roland II. The only item in the current defense budget in Vulcan’s shortcomings have caused DOD to which we will outspend the Russians.31 search for a more effective forward-area AD The same cannot be said with respect to gun. In comparison with the newer Soviet SAMs and AAA guns. Our Hercules and Hawk SAMs such as the SA-4/Ganef, SA-6/Gainful, 38 AIR UNIVERSITY' REVIEW or the SA—8/Gecko, the U.S. systems have in numbers of tanks, by more than two-to-one serious drawbacks. The impressive ZSU-23-4 in armored fighting vehicles, and they have a has been in the field for several years and is critical advantage in offensive and defensive clearly ahead of anything we will have until chemical equipment. In view of these discrep­ the Divad gun is deployed. ancies, it may be difficult to secure funding for However, tactical air defense is only one of additional tactical air defense weaponry. On the critical areas in conventional force weap­ the other hand the rapidly expanding Soviet onry in which the Soviets are rapidly outpac­ fighter and helicopter inventory makes it im­ ing the U.S. Right now the U.S.S.R. maintains perative that the U.S. respond with a capable an impressive three-to-one lead over the U.S. battlefield air defense network. in artillery and is outproducing us by an eight- U.S. Military Academy to-one rate! The Soviets lead us by four-to-one West Point, New York

Notes 13. Harold Brown. Department of Defense Annual Report. FY 1979. p 209. 1. Whether the Soviet Frontal Aviation performs close air support missions In the JTIDS role, the A WAGS will assure jam-resistant surface-to-air com­ is a matter of dispute within the U.S. intelligence community. If close air munications and data links essential for command and control. AW’ACS is de­ support is considered as the delivery of aerial fires in support of ground forces signed to provide real-time intelligence to commanders on the battlefield Sec in contact, then it is the author s opinion that although the Soviets conduct FY 79 Authorization Hearings, pp 4692-4705 ground attack missions they have not traditionally performed close air 14 “The Importance of Electronic Warfare to the National Defense support (except in emergency circumstances). Posture," Commanders Digest. 9 December 1976. p 4. 2 The United States has about 4100 tactical aircraft in its inventors, 15. The SA-2/Guidcline is the most widely deployed system in the including assets from the Air Force Navy, and Marine Corps (excluding U.S.S.R with some 9000 SA-2 launchers under the control of the PVO trainers and CONAD aircraft), supplemented by about 9000 helicopters The Strany. In addition, the SA-2 is found in all of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 6000 figure represents an assessment of the number of tactical aircraft and countries. In the "strategic" role, the SA-2 is operated from fixed sites, much assault helicopters that Soviet AD gunners could face. For a more detailed like the U.S.’s Nikc-Hcrcules. comparison see General George Brown. Chairman. Joint Chiefs of StafT. 16. Data on Soviet air defense missile systems is extracted from numerous United States Military Posture for FT 1.97.9 (20 January 1978i pp. 82-86. sources. Among the most useful are "Military* Operations of the Soviet Army.” (Henceforth referred to as United States Military.) pp. 36-43. USAREUR Pamphlet 30-60-1. Identification Guide. Volume II. I A thorough comparison would include non-U.S. aircraft in this discus­ Part One. Artillery (15 January 1973). Handbook on Soviet Airpower and sion. but U S -only assets are discussed here since the focus of this article is Artillery (Fort Bliss Texas. U.S. Army Air Defense School. April 1976). on the U.S-Soviet comparison Organization and Equipment of the Soviet Army ( Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 4 Technical characteristics of the Fencer can be found in Commanders USA Combined Arms Development Activity. 1 December 1976); and Selected Digest, 17 February 1977 "How DOD Assesses the Balance of US. USSR. & US and Soviet Weapons and Equipment (Fort Leavenworth. Kansas: USA PRC General Purpose Forces, p 16 Command and General StafT College. July 1976) 5. Ibid., pp 14-18. 17 Commanders Digest. 17 February 1977 p. 15 6. Brown. United States Military. FY 1977, p. 12 18 Ibid . p 8. 7 Harold Brown. Annual Defense Department Report. FY 1979 (February 19. See Rumsfeld. FY 77 and FY 78 Reports Ofcxiur.se, virtually any AD 2. 1978). p. 76. and Brown. United States Military. FY 1979. p. 82 system is susceptible to ECM. but the Hawk vulnerability at present is 8. Military Operations of the Soviet Army (Arlington, Virginia. U.S. Army beyond what DOD would like. The IH organization of the Triad configuration Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment 25 May 1976). pp. 229-234. will allow the Hawk system to engage three targets simultaneously (battalion 9. See Major A E Scheglov, The Commander of an Anti-aircraft Battery level). Controls the FirtV” Voennyi Vestnik # 3(Military Herald), 1971 (Moscow, 20 The self-propelled Hawk system foundered on maintenance and alignment translated by OACSI. # K-0089! Scheglov stresses that the unit commanding problems, the fact that it was more expensive and primarily because time to officer must have constant control over his fire units, resorting to decentral­ fire was not significantly improved merely by bettering the system mobility. ized operations only when centralized mode is nut feasible. Even when the Alignment and missile transfer problems determined the battery operations shift to decentralized operations is made, the subordinate leaders are required time more than maneuverability. to "act according to the instructions given them (p. 133) 21. See, for example, the issues of the Commanders Digest of 1* February 10. Reaching an accurate count of the "available interceptors" is almost an 1977 and 27 May 1976 both stressing the need for the U.S to move ahead impossible exercise given the difficulty in deciding which aircraft are to be with a more mobile family of battlefield air delense systems with greater used in that role, whether the assets of the other Pact nations should be capabilities and response time For a complete overview of the Army s air counted, if the PVO Strany aircraft should be included, and if one should defense program, set; FT’ 79 Authorization Hearings. pp, 4804-14 consider the fighters immediately available from bases in the Western 22. Statement by Norman Augustine, Assistant Secretary of the Army for U.S.S.R The difficulty is compounded further by the miiltirnission capabilities R&D. and Lieutenant General Howard Cooksey. Acting Deputy Chief of Staff of the newer Fishbeds and especially of the Floggers for RD&A. before the House Armed Services Committee. 7 March 1975. p. II Donald H Rumsfeld. Annual Defense Department Report. FY 1978 38. (January 17 1977, p. 214 (Henceforth referred to as FY 1978.) See also 23. Ibid . pp. 40-41. and Rumsfeld. FY 78. p. 169 Harold Brown, DOD Report. FY 79. p. 207 The F-15 Program Review can 24. Gene Famighetti. "Europe Roland to Fire US Missiles. Army Times, be found in DOD FY 79 Authorization Hearings (Part VI) before the U S. 20 December 1976. p. 28 Senate’s Armed Services Committee (March 1978), pp. 4596-4615. i Hence­ 25. See. for example. A N Latukhin. Sovremennaya Artillenya (Modem forth referred to as FI' 79 Authorization Hearings • Artillery). Voenizdat. 1970. p. 215 and p 33. The author notes that the 12 John Ralph. "Tactical Air Systems and New Technologies." in The appearance of armed helicopters on the battlefield Created a renewed need Other Arms Rare (Kemp. Pfaltzgraff. and Ra’anan), Lexington. Massachusetts: for AA guns To complement the AAA systems, the Soviets are introducing Lexington Books. D C, Heath. Co. 1974. pp. 29-30 the SA-8 and SA-9 SAM systems into the forward area, also TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE 39

26 RB 100-2. Vol 1. Selected Reeding* in Tactic% Tin 1973 Muldle Fust 30. It is extremely difficult to compare a Soviet front, which has organic War iFort Leavenwwrth. Kansas USAC&CSC. August 1976'. Chapter 5, Air aviation and ground units, to a comparable U S or NATO entity The NATO Defciiw ’ Army Group, such as CENTAC, has no aviation assets, but it is supported by 27 Sec Schestfov T he Commander." for a review of Soviet tactics. For an a Tactical Air Force under the control of the Commander of the Allied Air excellent summary of Soviet air defense training, see Captain Michael H. Forces in Central Europe who is on a level equal to the CENTAC Crutcher. "Soviet Tactical .Air Defense—An Introduction of Anti-Aircraft Unit commander All land and air forces from the Alps to the Elbe River are under Weapons for the Defense of Maneuver Forces/' unpublished paper written at the next higher commander. C1NC AFCENT who has two Army Croups the U S. Arms Institute for Advanced Russian & East European Studies. (Allied! and the Allied Air Force (CE) subordinate to bun The 4th ATAF Carmisch. Germany March 1975 supports the Central Army Group and is composed of Canadian. German, and 2S. Ibid U S components See Jim Taylor. "USAFE and AAFCE. Central Europe's 29 USAITAD. "Military Operations." pp 229-36. Cohn Cra\ m "Soviet Airpower. ‘ in Air Force Magazine. February 1977, pp 41-47 Tactical Airpower." Air Force Magazine. March 1977. argues that a typical 31 In recent years the U S lias surrendered its lead over the Soviets in tactical air armv organic to the front would have two Fighter-Bomber numbers of tactical aircraft, but the trend was reversed last year However Divisions and three Fighter-Interceptor Divisions but the total number of the U S. total will continue to be about 1000 below the numbers of tactical assets available could range from 100 to 1100 (pp 62-651 aircraft fielded by the Soviets (Commanders Digear. 17 February 1977 p 14»

Basis of Issue A F R P 50-2, Air University Review, is the p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l o f t h e A i r F o r c e . . . . Requirements [for distribution] will be based on the following:

1 copy for each Active Duty Air Force, Air 1 copy for each full time student attending Force Reserve, and Air National Guard schools of professional military education general officer and colonel; such as Air War College, Air Force Institute of 1 copy for each civilian employee in grades Technology, and NCO Academies; GS-16 thru GS-18 and each Public Law 313 1 copy for each 10 faculty members of such appointee: schools; 1 c o p y for every 10 officers in the grades of Lt 1 copy for each Office of Information; Colonel thru 2d Lt assigned to HQ USAF, and 1 copy for each Air Attache office; to each Headquarters of major commands, separate operating agencies, numbered Air 1 copy for each office listed in Chapter 1, HQ Forces, divisions, wings, depots, districts, USAF Headquarters Pamphlet 11-1, hospitals, military assistance advisory Directory of Air Force Representation on groups, missions, detached special activities Committees and Non-Air Force Activities; and offices: 1 copy for each library in the following 1 copy for each Air Force Reserve and Air categories: master publications, academic, National Guard major headquarters in states base or general, branch, contractor- or numbered Air Forces, wings, groups, operated, field, special and technical; squadrons, and separate activities: 1 copy for each 89MAW and T-39 aircraft.

If your organization Is not presently receiving Its authorized copies of the Review, consult your Publications Distribution Officer. The Editor SOVIET- UNITED STATES CIVIL DEFENSE tipping the strategic scale?

M ajorT hadA. W olfe

It should he reiterated . . . that detente is unlikely to be stable if the Soviet leadership concludes that the USSR is demonstrably superior to the United States either in political will or in military power. Zbigniew Brzezinsei Stirtfi/. Summer/Autumn 1976

ONCERN about United States civil defense preparedness ebbs and flows. But civil defense (CD) measures have taken on new dimensions since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the advent of thermonuclearC weapons. Still the United States has no consistent civil defense policy or morally justifiable in whatever fashion Rut descriptively prograni that promises to reduce the scale of and analytically, its not the end of humanity. Zbio n iew Bkzezinski suffering if efforts to deter nuclear war should Interview. Washington Post. fail. Nuclear conflict has been potentially the 9 October 1977 most devastating yet the least likely form of modern warfare. Unfortunately, several factors make the chances of nuclear conflict more Civil Defense Measures: likely in spite of U.S. efforts. Nuclear prolifer­ Effectiveness ation may yield as many as thirty more nations A fundamental aim of civil defense is to save to the nuclear club by the 1990s.1 raising the lives. Other aims are the preservation of peace probability of nuclear weapons’ employment by rendering war less likely, enhancement of and increasing the abundance of nuclear by­ transwar production and services, postattack products. These developments, coupled with recovery, and restoration of social institutions. the possibility' of clandestine nuclear weapon One’s emphasis depends largely on his concept construction and an increase in both the terror­ of CD. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director of the ist threat and aggression by proxy, could easily Stanford Linear Accelerator, differentiates be­ increase the chances for nuclear destruction. tween CD as “insurance” and CD as a “stra­ Therefore, it is appropriate and necessary to tegic measure. Viewed as insurance, CD review those elements critical to survival and represents efforts to reduce the effects of to address civil defense as one of those ele­ nuclear war without affecting the likelihood of ments. Weapons testing since World War II dem­ war’s occurrence. Viewed as a strategic meas­ onstrates that nuclear conflict would result in ure, CD is an integral part of the total military unprecedented devastation. Nonetheless, the effort. The former concept envisions a small broadening potential for the use of nuclear CD effort while the latter implies a large-scale weapons suggests that the devastation could program.3 Reducing the disaster impact of just as easily be localized as global. Even if nuclear attack requires consideration of imme­ each superpower employed the majority of its diate and delayed effects.4 nuclear weapons against the other, life very likely would continue.2 Benefits, then, accrue blast and heat (immediate) effects to maximizing the residual life, industry, and Casualties caused by blast were difficult to facilities for rebuilding society. determine in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but Hash burns alone caused an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the deaths in those cities. The best The belief on either side that you can survive a strategic protection against immediate effects is to be thermonuclear war as a going society—when you can t— remote from the blast site. However, separa­ is the worst possible situation for the world to be in. tion may not be possible for people in key Dh HAHOLD B rown, Secretary of Defense Interview, Los Angeles Times. December 26 1976 cities, near vital industrial complexes, or on military facilities, particularly if warning time the fact of the matter i.s that if ue used all our is limited. There may, in fact, be no protection nuclear weapons and the Russians used all of their nuclear weapons, about 10 percent of humanity would near ground zero, but beyond this point blast be hilled. Sow this is a disaster beyond the range of shelters can provide significant lifesaving po­ human comprehension It's a disaster which is not tential. The Congressional Research Service 41 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW (CRS), in United States and Soviet City De­ fense, estimates that a combination of blast views opposing CD measures protection in key cities, coupled with evacua­ There are several arguments against wide­ tion into less populated areas, could ensure spread implementation of civil defense meas­ 190 million survivors following a large-scale ures, such as the primacy of offensive nuclear attack. The cost of such a program may technology, warning sensitivity, problems of approach $40 billion or an estimated annual evacuation, and the social/political impact. The cost of $5.5 billion through program comple­ offense school contends that CD cannot be tion. In the same report, the CRS indicated effective long enough to make it worth the cost that a combination of limited blast shelters, because offensive technology could overcome fallout shelters, and city evacuation could save widespread passive measures at a fraction of approximately 180 million people at an esti­ the cost. Further, defensive measures may mated annual cost of $200 million. invite an aggressor to launch a more intemper­ ate attack than originally planned.7 Others have cautioned that casualty studies tend to radiation (delayed) effects ignore some immediate effects wherein soci­ Fallout shelters can provide significant protec­ ety’s interdependence is greatest and support tion at a fraction of the cost of blast shelter would be minimized. construction. However, the primary advantage In the area of warning, some sources believe of fallout shelters would be at distances beyond that the short flight times associated with the blast-damage region. ’ missile attack could allow surprise and negate The crucial points in most arguments that the value of most passive measures.8 Time CD measures can reduce the disaster impact compression would stress the system and could of nuclear war are that preparation is essential lead to chaos. and that some population protection is better The Center for Defense Information (CDI) than none.6 cites inherent problems in evacuation, espe­ cially under minimum warning conditions. It states that the evacuating population would he extremely vulnerable because of concentrated population centers, increasing numbers of So­ viet weapons, and a resulting scarcity of fall- out-free corridors. In CD Is view, evacuation would turn highways into death traps. Evacua­ tion plans would recpiire cadre training, host area preparation, and maintenance of supplies and stockpiles. CDI also cites mass transporta­ tion deficits, fuel shortages, repair difficulties, and the probability of irrational evacuee behav­ ior as extreme problems. The crux of this argument is that timing for evacuation may be too critical: waiting too long is too late and moving too early is tantamount to crying Figure 1 Lifesaving potential of a fallout shelter “wolf. 9 system in attacks against inilitary-urhan-industrial targets. In the event of attacks against military tar­ Social/political arguments contend that basic gets alone, total fatalities would he reduced and the democratic values might be discarded in the lifesaving potential of shelters would he increased. interest of security and that a shelter-oriented SOV1ET-U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE 43 society would cause serious social problems diverse perceptions by examining U.S. and and warlike attitudes toward other nations. Soviet national security objectives, policies, Some sources warn that, in a crisis. CD will and strategies. create a bias against negotiation and divert attention from alternatives to thermonuclear weapons. Others highlight the possible impact national security objectives, of CD on democratic values; that is, the issue policy, and strategy of CD will cause polarization and conflict over United States. The critical U.S. national the priorities of protection afforded different security objective is to survive as a free nation groups or regions. Further, necessary compli­ with its fundamental institutions and values ance with CD programs would decrease indi­ intact. This implies both physical security and vidual liberty and undermine U.S. faith in an international environment in which U.S. democracy, the government, and the scientific interests are protected. U.S. national security community. Several analysts feel that a large policy requires both peaceful resolution of CD effort would increase U.S. vulnerability to situations that could bring violence threatening psychological warfare based on feigned war U.S. security and deterrence of the use or preparations.10 threat of use of military forces against the An examination of some of the potential U.S., its allies, and other nations deemed damage-limiting capabilities of civil defense important.11 The U.S. has developed a mixed suggests that many lives could be saved. Most military strategy that includes damage limita­ arguments against CD programs do not specif­ tion and flexible offensive response options ically deny their potential for reducing the across the spectrum of conflict. Assured de­ extent of a disaster. Rather, they warn against struction resides at the strategic nuclear level too much confidence in such programs and and forms the cornerstone supporting U.S. urge caution about the many assumptions deterrent policy.12 U.S. planners believe that made in casualty studies. Still, as a practical both assured destruction and damage limita­ matter, Soviet efforts in CD indicate that the tion are guaranteed by invulnerable retaliatory' Soviet government perceives significant value nuclear forces capable of inflicting unaccepta­ in civil preparedness. Differing perceptions of ble destruction on the attacker. This mixed CD and its security implications have led to strategy is supported by a force sized to vast differences in the role CD plays in U.S. provide "essential equivalence” between the and Soviet strategy. U.S. and U.S.S.R. in both conventional and nuclear forces. The U.S Civil Defense program should be sized and structured as an "insurance policy" hedging against the • Soviet Union. The Communist Parts-• of the failure of our deterrence policy and attempts at escala­ Soviet Union voices an interest in strengthen­ tion control. ing Soviet defensive capabilities, consolidating DOD Planning and Programming Guidance military alliances with other socialist countries, I I March 1977 and protecting the achievements of socialism.13 Underlying these objectives, Soviet strategy appears to stress a war-winning capability sup­ Civil Defense Roles Compared: ported by a superior military force. The Sovi­ U.S.-U.S.S.R. ets do not recognize the U.S. concept of The United States has for some time consid­ deterrence or assured destruction in their ered CD an "insurance policy." To the Soviet national security policy or strategy. The Soviet Union, it is a "factor of great strategic signifi­ shift toward a war-winning strategy, which cance.” One can gain some insight into these occurred in the early to mid-1960s, remains LIGHT DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL-TYPE BUILDINGS. ______MODERATE DAMAGE TO SMALL RESIDENCES. [PERCENT OF PEOPLE : OEADiTO I HURTiE3= i I SAFE------1

MODERATE DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL- TYPE BUILDINGS, SEVERE DAMAGE TO 100 SMALL RESIDENCES

Direct effects of n five megaton blast (surface burst). If the burst is elevated to an altitude maximizing the reach of blast damage, moderate damage from blast and initial fires on a clear day are extended from fi to 13 miles.

significant: a nuclear war between the super­ civil defense roles powers became, in their view, a possibility. in national security strategy Furthermore, it could be won on the condi­ tions that . . effective margins of strength United States. CD plays a diminutive role in were brought into play and, above all. that U.S. strategy. This minor role stems from a undue reliance on deterrence’ in the Khrush­ dominant view in America that nuclear war is chev style was no substitute for the assurance unthinkable. U.S. planners have viewed the that the Soviet Union can realistically stand up mutual vulnerability of populations as a sure to the risk of nuclear war."14 means of keeping war unthinkable. According A factor that must be considered in U.S. to this logic, there is no reasonable alternative damage-limiting efforts (of which CD is a part) to a deterrent role for military force, particu­ is the possible Soviet targeting philosophy. larly nuclear force.lfi Certainly there were Some experts feel that the Soviet Union is other considerations in the level of emphasis both skeptical of the limitability of nuclear given to U.S. civil defense. Some of the weapons and makes no fine distinction be­ arguments against the effectiveness of CD tween counterforce (military) and countervalue presented earlier in this article as well as (population, leadership, and industry) targets threat perception, cost, and lack of public in their integrated targeting. 15 acceptance have collectively fostered the minor 44 LIGHT DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL-TYPE BUILDINGS, MODERATE DAMAGE TO SMALL RESIDENCES PERCENT Of PEOPLE DEiXX7Q AO HURT I SAFEI

MODERATE DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL- TYPE BUILDINGS SEVERE DAMAGE TO 100 SMALL RESIDENCES 0—1 pfi

SEVERE DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL-TYPE BUILDINGS

DESIGNEO FACILITIES

MAXIMUM md FIREBALL RADIUS 2 50

CRATER DIA S MILES 8 M I L E S 14 Mrt.ES 22 MILES 0 70 MILES Direct effects of a 2-5 megaton blast i surface burst1 IJ the burst is del ated to an altitude maximizing the reach of blast damage, moderate damage from blast and initial fires on a clear day are extended from 14 to 22 miles.

role for CD. Nonetheless, a major determinant Department of Housing and Urban Develop­ in the current status of CD is reliance on an ment. offensive capability for assured destruction Each state has its own internal structure for which deters war and, hence, protects the CD with varying subordination. The sprawling population.1 The C.S. has budgeted approxi­ organization has been labeled "a body without mately $2.6 billion for civil defense since 1962. a head’ by the U.S. Congress Joint Committee The U.S. annual CD budget request from the on Defense Production.19 U.S. training and Department of Defense was $87 million for education in CD are largely up to each state FY76 and $71 million for FY77.Ih The organi­ and local authorities. If DCPA funds are avail­ zation of the U.S. civil defense effort, ostensi­ able, state CD organizations can apply for bly under the Defense Civil Preparedness matching funds from the DCPA for projects Agency (DCPA), is somewhat diffused. Three related to nuclear attack planning.20 The CD federal agencies are involved in disaster pre­ program emphasis is on peacetime planning paredness planning and funding. These agen­ that provides for a rapid surge in crisis condi­ cies include the DCPA under the DOD, the tions. Estimates of the effectiveness of the Federal Preparedness Agency under the Gen­ current U.S. program vary significantly, de­ eral Services Administration, and the Federal pending on the postulated attack scenario. The Disaster Assistance Administration under the JCS-sponsored “Post Nuclear Attack II (PON- 45 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AST II) study assumed a 10 percent evacuation government charged with responsibility for of major U.S. cities and estimated 94 million administering the country under the extreme American fatalities and an additional 35 million stresses of nuclear war and its immediate injuries.21 It attributed the high casualty fig­ aftermath.”24 ures to the number of Soviet weapons targeted The potential lifesaving effectiveness of the on urban industrial areas, the concentrated Soviet CD program is not a matter of unani­ U.S. population, and the absence of an effec­ mous agreement. However, several studies tive U.S. program for civil evacuation and estimate casualty rates as low as two to three protection. percent of the Soviet population in the event Soviet Union. The role civil defense plays in of nuclear war. 25 Soviet strategy is significant. Based on the Table I provides a summary comparison of view that nuclear war is a clear possibility and CD-related factors between the U.S. and that civilization is protectable, the Soviets have U.S.S.R., including some apparent perceptions implemented a massive and thoroughly inte­ of U.S. and Soviet leaders concerning their grated civil defense effort.22 Soviet leaders CD programs.26 This divergence in emphasis have shown interest in civil defense for many and perception may have an impact on U.S. years, but they enhanced their efforts following national security strategy. the 23rd Party Congress in 1966. Despite SALT I agreements in 1972, the U.S.S.R. further intensified its civil defense program. City Defense plays no part in US nuclear deterrent CD currently ranks as a separate force organi­ plans. Ballistic missile defenses are nonexistent, except zationally equal to other Ministry of Defense for early warning. Air defenses are sufficient solely to Forces. The CD chief. General of the Army ensure the sovereignty of peacetime airspace. Civil Altunin (four-star rank), is also Deputy Minis­ defense is a charade. ter of Defense with three CD deputies of Congressional Research Service ( 1976' colonel-general (three star) rank serving under him. A Stanford Research Institute (SRI) study21 in 1974 stated that there were at least The Civil Defense Imbalance 35 to 40 active list Soviet army general officers and U.S. Military Strategy holding posts in the Soviet CD system, which The critical issue is whether the present is intricately organized in the 15 constituent actual or perceived CD imbalance will prevent republics of the U.S.S.R. The SRI report U.S. military strategy from properly support­ mentioned a three-year CD military officer ing national security objectives. That is, at the candidate school that might indicate the Soviet nuclear war level, can the U.S. still assure interest in a continuing civil defense program. destruction of the Soviet Union and thereby The Soviets spend the equivalent of more deter the use or threatened use of military than $1 billion annually (the CIA in Soviet force inimical to the interests of the U.S., its Civil Defense estimates approximately $2 bil­ allies, and other important countries? If a lion) on their CD program and have conducted significant obstacle has been raised, then some tests of their city evacuation plans. changes in strategy or policy may be necessary. Although the extent of these tests is not fully Soviet leaders believe that their CD pro­ known, they concentrate efforts on protecting gram has eroded the U.S. assured destruction political and military leaders, industrial man­ capability by limiting damage to their popula­ agers, and skilled workers. Professor Richard tion and industry. Hence, they profess that Pipes of Harvard sees the CD organization nuclear war is a viable political element en­ under Altunin as “. . . a kind of shadow hancing the overall correlation of forces in Table I Summary role of US. and U.S.S./i civil defense compared

u.s. U.S.S.R.

National Physical Physical Security Security Security Objectives International environment Protect advances wherein interests are of socialism protected

National Peaceful resolution of Peaceful conditions Security threatening situations for building communism Policy in U S S R

Deterrence of use or Peaceful conditions threat of use of military for development of force against U S., a world socialist allies, others deemed system important

Military Mixed War winning Strategy —Flexible response anchored Damage limiting by assured destruction War survival vs. —Damage limiting assured destruction

Size forces for Size forces for equivalence superiority

CD Role in Limited Significant Strategy —hostage population — protection critica l to for mutual assured war survival strategy destruction (MAD) —MAD as Measure of strategic deterrence significance

CD only as "insurance" Decisive factor in cor­ against failure of de­ relation of forces terrence —evolving perception-as element in strategic balance

Organization Diffused Centralized Characteristics —Federal agencies within On an organizational departments level equal to other —State agencies Ministry of Defense —Local programs forces Plan to consolidate —Federal Emergency Management Agency

Uses some existing Headed by a Deputy organizations (police Minister of Defense and fire department)

Essentially civilian Essentially a military program

CD Education Cadre training National education and Training and some training Voluntary for others mandatory

DCPA provides CD Forces Officer training assistance Candidate School

CD staff school Cadre training and education

States planning for Evacuation plans crisis relocation in existence CD Protective Warning sensitive Warning sensitive, Value but less than U.S.

Shelter spaces Combination in-place designated and sheltering and marked for about 180 evacuation could save million— not stocked about 97% of Soviet population Crisis relocation possible with long warning

CD Role as Keeps nuclear war Permits nuclear war Perceived by unthinkable as element of politics Leaders —CD may enhance deterrence and stability

Peacetime planning Denies U.S. assured for wartime surge destruction capability

U.S.-U.S.S.R. imbalance can Leverage in other be offset and deterrence countries maintained Permits risk taking

CD $ (billion) Estimated $1-2B Estimated S 1 B Comparison (annual) Some state matching funds

favor of the socialist camp. They also feel that vation that underlies the move toward a CD their CD effort reduces risks inherent in imbalance may not be entirely clear even to projecting force and socialist influence. This the Soviet leaders. But it can provide a frame­ provides them leverage in diplomatic crisis and work for evaluating Soviet actions. a stronger position with nonaligned nations.27 In the final analysis the value of the imbal­ The Congressional Joint Committee on De­ ance to the Soviet Union may not be deter­ fense Production examined several possible mined by Soviet statements hut by the Soviet strategic motivations for seeking a CD leverage the U.S. is willing to allow them. imbalance: to speed worldwide communization through aggressive attack; to promote crisis or gain leverage in crisis resolution; to serve as a the imbalance and deterrence hedge against U.S. attack, use of tactical nu­ There are varying opinions in the U.S. regard­ clear weapons by NATO, or a desperate attack ing the significance of the imbalance.2S At one by a lesser force; or to protect a residual extreme is the tendency to attribute to the CD capability to deny territorial occupation. The imbalance all that the Soviets wish to make of committee offered several nonstrategic moti­ it. At the other extreme are those who rule vations: low tolerance to external threats, insti­ out the effectiveness of any CD effort and, tutional momentum, internal discipline and therefore, see nothing adverse in the Soviet control, psychological reassurance following a protection program. The middle ground is long period of perceived inferiority, and a covered by arguments mentioned earlier in possible concession to military leadership for assessing the effectiveness of CD measures. their support of arms control. The real moti­ Deterrence reduced. A central concern is 48 SOVIET-U.S. CIVIL DEFESSE 49 that the imbalance may. in fact, have convinced military aggression. Professor Thomas Et/.old Soviet leaders that their loss projections and of the Naval War College highlights the prob­ expected postattack position have reached an able ineffectiveness of Soviet civil defense acceptable level. Such a belief would under­ measures under current U.S. general war-tar­ mine the “assured destruction’ foundation ol geting doctrine. This doctrine would assure U.S. military strategy and could encourage risk destruction by spreading retaliation over a taking. Furthermore, their CD measures re­ significant period, perhaps weeks or longer. duce the effectiveness of a given U.S. weapon Etzold wrote that the U.S. also maintains the and compound the U.S. targeting problem viability of its deterrence at the limited nuclear through target proliferation. Conversely, by war level because of Soviet sensitivities even not planning for dispersal, evacuation, and to minor disruption. 31 sheltering, the U.S. simplifies Soviet targeting Likewise, Dr. Sidney Drell, Professor and problems, especially as the U.S.S.R. develops Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accel­ more warheads with greater accuracy. In addi­ erator Center, writes in the Bulletin of Atomic tion, the prospect of a Soviet "free ride” to Scientists that he sees no serious threat to strike U.S. forces as defenses are downgraded deterrence in the Soviet CD effort. He be­ may become an overwhelming temptation to lieves that technical data and intelligence infor­ the Soviet Union—encouraging, not deterring mation can as easily be interpreted to show an attack. Some sources argue that the United that the U.S. retains its retaliatory effective­ States may become more inclined to a pre­ ness. He cautions that the Soviet Union de­ emptive first strike or earlier first use of votes primary emphasis to protecting leadership nuclear weapons, owing to the advantages a cadres and essential industry and that Soviet surprise attacker has against a country with mass evacuation plans based on an inferior high damage-limiting capability. In most of transportation system could fail. Drell notes these arguments one must remember the fun­ the sensitivity of casualty studies to numerous damental role of perception in deterrence. The assumptions and a mistaken tendency to judge deterrent threat must be credible, and unilat­ the effectiveness of the Soviet CD program on eral vulnerability may impair a convincing the basis of their technical manuals.32 threat. Some allies, as well as enemies, may A few strategists might argue that, in limit­ perceive that the U.S. would, through this ing its options, the U.S. has, in effect, made vulnerability, deter itself from employing its an initial strategic move that leaves no option power either on its own behalf or that of an but to fulfill the threat when the country is ally. Similarly, perceptions of asymmetrical faced with imminent attack. In short, limiting security between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. might the options secures the threat and makes the lead third parties to concede an ascendant deterrent credible.33 If the Soviets doubt the position to the Soviets in international rela­ U.S. declared strategy of assured destruction, tions. This could be a Soviet goal.29 they would be taking a potentially catastrophic Deterrence uneffected. Herman Kahn, an risk. The adverse effect on deterrence embod­ early CD proponent, wrote that civil defense ied in the imbalance of CD measures may not had very little to do with deterrence of direct be conclusive. Its impact on stability is more attack. M' His rationale: in an all-out surprise pronounced. attack on cities, it is virtually impossible to hold down casualties to a level that would totally blunt the attack: CD measures do not the imbalance and stability directly contribute to military operations Stability in the context of this discussion refers against an enemy: hence, they do not deter his to the U.S. desire for stability of the deterrent 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW force, the world military situation, force levels, enhancing the admittedly small chances of and nuclear nonproliferation. A workable defi­ accidental war. A real security asymmetry nition offered in Strategy and Arms Control could drive the U.S. to abrogate the ABM states generally that stability would exist in treaty in favor of active defenses while it builds these areas if they were secure against shocks, up its CD program. Accelerated nuclear prolif­ alarms, perturbations, political events, misun­ eration may also be an outgrowth of the derstandings, frightening intelligence, etc.34 imbalance depending on the perceptions of There are significant arguments about the third parties. destabilizing nature of a serious defensive Allied or those nonaligned countries impor­ imbalance. First, to maintain a stable deterrent tant to the U.S. may perceive the need to with assured destruction, one would very- acquire their own arsenal of nuclear weapons. likely develop new weapons or capabilities to Their aim could be to defend where they think offset the CD measures. Efforts to increase the U.S. would fail; to secure spoils after a accuracy and payload or to expand the types of major power war; or to step into the power weapons could give rise to the growth in vacuum left by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. chemical, biological, or exotic devices to main­ In the diplomatic or political arena where tain deterrence. Pre-emption or first use of many see the primary detriment of the imbal­ nuclear weapons could become a necessity. In ance, generally stable conditions could be times of crisis short of war, the imbalance may replaced by a new testing of limits, brinkman­ operate toward earlier increases in alert rates ship, and possible reckless confidence by the

Fallout conditions from a random assumed attack against a wide range of targets (military, industrial, and population) on a spring day

A Spring Day

Survival Actions No shelter required under this wind n condition □ Up to 2 days shelter occupancy n 2 days to ^ week shelter occupancy 1 week to 2 weeks shelter occupancy followed by decontamination in excep- tional areas SOVIET-U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE 51 Soviet Union or their proxies. Some non- tack may very well increase during the coming aligned countries may move into the socialist decades whether through nuclear proliferation, camp due to the perceived security asymme­ terrorist access, “proxy” aggression, or major try. It is probable that the imbalance is irrele­ power action. Should such a disaster occur, vant to deterring low-level military, political, the weight of evidence shows that significant or diplomatic maneuvering or proxy involve­ numbers of lives can be saved through CD ment until U.S. interests are clearly threat­ preparation and action. The Soviet Union ap­ ened. pears to understand these two points as appar­ There is another factor equally important in ent in their emphasis on a war-survival the long-term quest for peace. The Soviet CD program which has, in part, led to the CD program acts as a constant promotion of the imbalance. It is not totally clear whether this hostile adversary illusion without which their imbalance will have an adverse effect on U.S. CD effort would be unnecessary. Some experts deterrence of higher levels of violence—it on the Soviet Union feel that the continued could. But the Soviet Union does not show a justification for Soviet economic priorities and tendency to risk disaster when so many uncer­ the elaborate internal control system is based tainties currently cloud the war-survival issue. on the threat of a hostile external power.35 The effect the CD imbalance may have on Several points in the foregoing discussion perceptions could affect U.S. allies and non- need further emphasis in terms of U.S. deter­ aligned nations if they perceive real security rent objectives. The possibility of nuclear at­ asymmetries. Although the effect on deter-

Fallout conditions from a random assumed attack against a wide range of targets (military. industrial, and population1 on a fall day

1 week to 2 ml>! ineltar occupancy tionalloiiowaij areas by aacontammanon in excep­ 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW rente is unclear, the effect on stability is not. attempt in some measured way to redress the A perceived or actual security imbalance can imbalance as much for the perceptual value as only bring change to right the scale. for real gain, it should in no way detract from U.S. resolve. The Soviet Union for all its Hence to fight and conquer in all our battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in military power has horrendous problems. It is breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. strapped with an ideology that virtually blinds it to certain development options, not the least Sun Tiu. Art of War being its human potential. Agricultural short­ ages could undermine the party control system Maintaining the Balance and erode party credibility. Basic climate, Uncertainties can cripple. The U.S. simply northerly latitude, and geography represent does not know with certainty how effective the constraints with which Soviet assertive policies Soviet passive measures are or whether they must always contend lest they overextend their would be a decisive factor in a postwar bal­ means. The Soviets face the potential threat ance. Nonetheless, the Soviets seem to believe from China, possible tenuous control in East­ in them. Hence, U.S. efforts should aim at ern Europe, and internally diverse races and blunting any advantage the Soviets may try to cultures. Hence, their control system is not gain from the perceptual or real asymmetry. without its stresses. U.S. policies and support­ ing strategy should consider these factors in political-military initiatives seeking moderation of Soviet—U.S. conflict. U.S. response in the political arena may be the most critical. A necessary first step should be population protection to reiterate periodically to enemies, allies, and In developing a civil defense program, one nonaligned nations the effectiveness of the must keep its primary aim in mind. Herman U.S. deterrent. Beyond that, extracting Kahn notes that CD does not directly deter concessions in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks war or an attack. It is designed to reduce death (SALT) for Soviet defensive measures would and casualties should deterrence fail. The more be both desirable and difficult. The louder the compelling arguments regarding basic effec­ U.S. deterrent is praised, the more America tiveness of CD measures, as well as the effects argues against Soviet concessions. Conversely, of the U.S.-Soviet CD imbalance, call for a the more the U.S. seeks concession for CD guarded movement toward some form of pop­ measures, the more credible the imbalance ulation protection. While mirror-imaging the appears. Whether CD measures are addressed Soviet program may not be in the U.S. inter­ openly in SALT or not, they should certainly est, those considerations short of a Soviet be placed on the agendas of the U.S. negotiat­ attack such as nuclear armed terrorists or ing team and strategy planners. A significant third-party nuclear strikes are relevant and concern to both Soviet and U.S. strategists will must receive more consideration. CD mea­ increasingly become the possibility of Nth sures may have little value against terrorist power nuclear attack. The U.S. military strat­ surprise use of such weapons, but there would egy of flexible nuclear and nonnuclear re­ be potential applications (blackmail, extortion, sponse very likely addresses the deterrence of political concession, etc.) wherein warning such an event, but not necessarily the greater might be available. Although national survival chance of deterrent failure through terrorist may not be at stake, protection of those living access or accident. Thus, defensive means may in affected areas would be worthwhile and a become more critical. While the U.S. may governmental responsibility. SO VIET-US CIVIL DEFENSE 53 The overlap between CD measures and the targeting doctrine many facets of disaster preparedness (DP) Operating under the general planning con­ suggest a means for gaining public acceptance straint eschewing a first nuclear strike, U.S. of a CD effort as well as organizational and planners nonetheless have the flexibility that funding possibilities. The Joint Committee on does permit, under extreme provocation, pres­ Defense Production recommended in early idential authorization for first use of nuclear 1977 that all emergency functions of the cur­ weapons. The caveat was again asserted in rent Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Fed­ President Carter s 4 October 1977 speech to eral Disaster Assistance Administration, and the United Nations. This is an unlikely occur­ the Federal Preparedness Agency should be rence but one that the Soviet Union and other combined under a single independent agency, adversaries must bear in mind. To bolster the the Federal Preparedness Administration assured destruction strategy underlying U.S. (FPA). The proposed new FPA should have deterrent objectives at the strategic nuclear central control and coordination responsibili­ war level, U.S. planners must constantly reas­ ties for the entire emergency preparedness sess the targeting doctrine to be certain that effort of the federal government. The FPA the targets are significant in the Soviet psyche. director would have authority and budgetary Presently, those targets that would most dis­ control for specific preparedness programs of rupt parts control both in the Soviet Union other departments and agencies; he would also and elsewhere (e.g., Warsaw Pact-dedicated have membership on the National Security Soviet troops) represent probably the most Council as well as the ability to report through frightening prospect to the party and govern­ the Domestic Council on other than national ment apparatus in the U.S.S.R. *' Those targets security matters. A final means of breathing most essential to control and the power base life into the proposed FPA would be the are not so numerous that U.S. retaliatory establishment of a single category in the fed­ forces could not deliver unacceptable damage eral budget for all emergency preparedness even after riding out a Soviet first strike. Such programs.36 This could possibly justify removal a targeting doctrine has been referred to as a of CD responsibility from the DOD. In a 13 countercombatant or counterpower.38 These November 1978 White House news confer­ target sets would be flexible and sensitive to ence, the Carter administration announced political winds between the U.S.S.R. and that Congress had approved an administration countries on its periphery as well as internal plan establishing the Federal Emergency Man­ conditions that reflect cyclic degrees of vulner­ agement Agency. The new agency’s role is ability; party control, energy, food, transporta­ expected to be much like that of the proposed tion, border problems, etc. The counterpower FPA. or countercombatant doctrines are designed to Substantive movement by the U.S. in civil retain assured destruction but are not tied to defense might reassure U.S. allies that the older concepts of specific levels of destruction U.S. deterrent equation, including factors of utilized as planning factors in the early 1960s. capability, will, and credibility, was still vital. The target sets may be influenced by SALT or This is critical to the diplomatic support pro­ other forms of restraint; the view should be vided by U.S. deterrent forces. Such actions toward assuring destruction at ever decreasing provide possible mid- to long-range ballast for levels of violence. This implies not only re­ U.S. deterrent objectives. The evaluation and duced destructiveness of weapons but reduced timely alteration of U.S. strategic targeting doc­ numbers as well. These constraints do not alter trine provide short-term and continuing support the fact that if there is to be a balance of terror of deterrence. both sides must be equally terrified. 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW weapon development and civil defense would clearly undermine U.S. Soviet dispersal and hardening dictate some national security objectives of deterrence by combination of increased warheads, accuracy, denying an assured destruction capability. or yield. It could require development and deployment of a different family of weapons. When seeking a stable deterrent, the planner T hese suggested measures are by no means must consider that these weapons will be exhaustive. They simply point out that the employed as second strike retaliatory weapons. potential security advantage the U.S.S.R. According to Dr. Harold Brown, 1979 repre­ hopes to gain through passive defense activities sents the point at which surviving U.S. stra­ can be offset without major alteration to U.S. tegic forces still operational following a Soviet programs or strategy. Whatever actions na­ first strike against U.S. forces in a day-to-day tional leaders take to maintain the security alert would equal the number of retained balance, they must be consistent with the Soviet weapons.39 The implications for U.S. maintenance of stability and deterrence of war, deterrence are significant. Clearly, short-term coercion, and use or threatened use of force measures are in order. A consensus seems to by U.S. adversaries. The costs of U.S. initia­ exist in the value of improving offensive tives must be consistent with the country’s weapon accuracy while keeping the number of priorities, bearing in mind that public accept­ warheads as high as possible under current ance is the fundamental link between Ameri­ agreements. 40 The air-launched cruise missile can capabilities and the strategies that support (ALCM) may provide this renewed deterrent our national objectives. Illegal weapons, a stability. Dr. Brown forecast a satisfactory multibillion dollar blast shelter program, seri­ postattack balance into the mid-1980s through ous militarization of U.S. society, and forced development and deployment of the air- population and industrial dispersal are exam­ launched cruise missile coupled with the B-52 ples that may fall outside reasonable bounds. and existing or programmed forces (excluding The DOD Annual Report-Fiscal Year 1979 the B-l and the M—X). 41 Continued develop­ signals renewed interest in CD but reports ment of the enhanced radiation warhead (neu­ little change from previous programs. Notably, tron bomb), though conceived for use in the use of the “insurance policy’ analogy' response to a Warsaw Pact attack into Western against failure of deterrence was dropped. This Europe, could have some strategic deterrent may reflect an awareness that, like a life utility in negating selected CD measures. It insurance policy, the cost rises sharply the appears that increased accuracy and yields on longer one puts it off; and once deterrence existing systems in conjunction with ALCM fails it is too late to buy the policy. development could be a reasonable counterbal­ . . . the President . . . has decided upon a civil defense ance to the Soviet defensive effort. policy and program which basically states that civil The protection of satellite surveillance and defense is an element of the strategic balance in conjunc­ warning systems as well as research and devel­ tion with our offensive and defensive forces and can opment in ballistic missile defenses seem criti­ serve to enhance deterrence and stability. cal as hedges against Soviet actions. Nearly all JODY POWELL. White House economically feasible forms of passive popula­ news conference, 13 November 1978 tion protection are warning sensitive. Enemy Air Command and Staff College ability to “blind U.S. warning systems would be significant. Soviet ability to neutralize a U.S. Notes 1 Lewis A Dunn. ‘Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics TV Annals retaliatory strike through a combination of warn­ of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Richard D Lambert, ing cancellation, antiballistic missile capability. editor (March 1977), p 99 Thomas C Schrlling predicted that Twenty or 30 SOVIET-U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE 55

countries, using their own materials and people, could assemble nuclear 16 Herman Kahn. On Thermonuclear War (Princeton. New Jersey explosives within the next few years T C. Schelling, "The Limits of Non- Princeton University Press, 1961), especially Chapters 111 and IV Sec also Proliferation.'* The New Republic (January 22, 1977). pp 38—10. Bernard Brodie. Wat and Politics (New York Macmillan, 1973), especially 2. Several studies are significant in their view that nuclear war will not mean Chapter 9 on the utility of the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Richard Pipes the total destruction of mankind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff “Post Nuclear Attack provides an overview of the rise of deterrent objectives in "Why the Soviet Study” (PONASTII) was cited as yielding among its conclusions, “ although Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War.” Commentary. July 1977 damage was awesome, both sides are calculated to have survived and to be pp 21-34 capable of recovery."* in US. Congress Joint Committee on Defense Production. 17. James R. Schlesinger. Annual Defense Department Report FY75. p. 67 Civil Preparedness Return' Part ll Industrial Defense and Suclear Attack. 95th 18. U.S., Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977 Cong.. 1st sess.. 1977. p. 105 See also Robert A Conrad et al A Twenty Year Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 94tb Review of Medical Findings in a Marshallese Population Accidentally Exposed Cong . 2d sess.. 4 February 1976. p 313 Also see United States and Soviet to Radioactive Fallout, excerpts in U S . Congress. House. Committee on In­ City Defense, p 11 ternational Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Se­ 19. U S.. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee on Defense Production. Civil curity and Scientific .Affairs, First Use of Suclear Weapons Preserving Preparedness Review Part I Emergency Preparedness and Industrial Mobili­ Responsible Control. 94th Cong.. 2d sess . 1976. pp 195-98 See also Long- zation. 95th Cong 1st sess . 1977. p. 10 Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Suclear Weapons Detonations. Washing­ 20. Interview by author with CD official in Alabama State Civil Defense ton. D C . National Academy of Sciences. 1975 This report investigated for Office, 20 January 1978. Construction and equipping of emergency operations the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the long-term worldwide effects centers are types of projects that currently qualify for matching funds that might propagate through environmental and ecological processes With 21 NCP (Nuclear Civil Protection) Briefing, Prepared by Defense Civil critical caveats the Academy concluded that the biosphere and the species Homo Preparedness Agency Region Three, 22 July 1976 Added casualty results sapiens would survive a nuclear exchange of significant magnitude 110,000 were given in U.S.. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Arms Control megatons) International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on 3 Wolfgang K H Panofsky, “Civ il Defense as Insurance and as Military Foreign Relations Analysis of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare 94th Strategy ,” in Civil Defense, edited by Henrs tyring Lancaster. Pennsylvania Cong , 1st sess . 1975 Donnelley Printing Co.. 1966?. 22 Goure. especially pp 47-57 and United States and Soviet City Defense. 4. United States and Soviet City Defense Congressional Research Service. p 15 See also Central Intelligence Agency. Soviet Civil Defense (Washington. Library'of Congress 1 Washington; Government Printing Office. 1976). pp. 33- Government Printing Office. July 1978). pp 1-13 36 See also Eugene P Wigner, The Possible Effectiveness of Civil 23. James T Reitz. Selected Aspects of the Soviet Civil Defense Program. Defense.** in Civil Defense, edited by Henry Evring i Lancaster Pennsylvania SRI Project 3275 (Washington, D C. Stanford Research Institute. 18 October Donnelley Printing Co.. 1966*. pp 35-36. for discussion of immediate 1974), pp 3-6 survival considerations and a proposed shelter system See the United States 24. Pipes, p. 34. Strategic Bombing Survey. The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and 25. Joanne Gailor and Dr Eugene Wigner. "Civil Defense in the Soviet Nagasaki i Washington Government Printing Office. 30 June 1946), pp. 24-32 Union,” Foresight (May-June 1974). p 10 See also United States/Soviet Stra­ for discussion of weapons effects tegic Options. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 5. James C Bresee and David L Narver, Jr . ' Improved Shelters and Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, 95th Accessories, in Survival and the Boml? edited by Eugene P Wigner Cong., 1st sess . 1977. pp 112-13 Bloomington Indiana University Press. 1969), p 199 See United States and 26 See Gour£, especially the Foreword by Foy Kohler, and Chapter Two. Soviet City Defense for cost comparisons which explores Soviet perceptions of the CD program as a part of their war 6 In John M Collins. Grand Strategy Principles and Practices (Annapolis survival requirement, pp 47-57 Maryland Naval Institute Press. 1973'. p 108 See also Arthur A Broyles. 27. Ibid See also Sokolovskiy, pp. 329-33 Eugene P Wigner. Sidney D Drell. "Civil Defense in Limited War—a 28 Thomas H. Etzold, "Soviet Civil Defense and U.S Strategy." Air Force debate.” Physics Today. April 1976. p. 46 Magazine (October 1977,1. pp 38—41 See also "The Real Paul Warnke,” The 7 United States and Soviet City Defense, p 7 See also Herman Kahn. New Republic (March 26, 1977), pp 22-25, and Bernard T Feld, "The Thinking about the Unthinkable New York Horizon Press. 1962). pp. 86-91 Consequences of Nuclear War, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (June 1976). pp. 8 Sidney D Drell Beyond SALT II—A Missile Test Quota.” Bulletin of 10-13 Finally, see First Use of Suclear Weapons Preserving Responsible the Atomic Scientists. May 1977. p 41 Control, pp 118-19. for the effect the security imbalance may be having on 9. The New Nuclear Strategy Battle of the Dead?"* The Defense Monitor. allied perceptions of U.S. resolve. July 1976, pp 1-8 29 Civil Preparedness Review Part ll. p 112. 10 Kahn Thinking about the Unthinkable, p 91 See also Arthur I 30. Kahn. Thinking about the Unthinkable, p 81 Waskow. The Shelter-Centered Society (Washington Peace Research Insti­ 31 Etzold pp 39. 40 tute. January 1962'. pp 4-14 32 Drell. pp. 39-40 11 Department of Defense Planning and Programming Guidance. II 33 Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York. Oxford March 1977. p 1-1 University Press. 1963). pp. 127-28. 12 Russell E Dougherty. “Strategic Deterrence and the Strategic Air 34 Morton II Halperin and Thomas C. Schelling. Strategy and Arms Command, in Air War College Associate Programs Vnl. II. Ch 1. 10th ed . Control (New York. The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 50. Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama. Air University. 30 July 1975. pp 4-12 35 Marshall I) Shulman. "World Role of the USSR " The National He stresses that thr ability to assure destruction remains the corner­ Security Affairs Forum (from an oral presentation). Spring 1974. pp. 19-30, stone of our strategic deterrent, we build options from that assured base—we hi Air War College Associate Programs Vol. I. Cli 7. 10th ed., pp 19-20 never relinquish it." p. 5. 30- Civil Preparedness Review Part I. VIII 13. V D Sokolovskiy. Setter Military Strategy (New York. Crane. Ruvsak 37 Robert H Reed. "On Deterrence A Broadened Perspective." Air & Company Inc, 1975). p xl\ See also Improving Climate of Soviet- University Review (May-June 1975). pp. 4-5 See also Bernard S. Albert. American Relations Congressional Record. 123 SI9079-SI9080 November "Constructive Counterpower." Orbis (Summer 1976). 15. 1977 38 Ibid See also Bruce M Russett. "Assured Destruction of What? A 14 John Erickson. Soviet Military Power USSl Report 73-1 (Washington. Ooontercombatant Alternative to Nuclear Madness." Public Policy (Spring D C United Stales Strategic Institute. 1973). p 41. See also Paul H Nitze. 1974), pp 125-26 The Assured Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente, Foreign Affairs, No 39 Dr Harold Brown. "What's Rebind the B-l Cruise Missile Decision?" 2. January 1976. p 216 Nitze moves the Soviet shift in strategy back to the Commanders Digest (September 15. 1977). p 5 Cuban missile crisis While the U.5 attempted to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons, the Soviet response was ambiguous but probably divergent. See Ar­ 40. Paul H Nitze. "The Assured Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente. nold L Horelick The Strategic Mind Set of the Soviet Military An Essay - Foreign Affairs (January 1976), pp 227-28 Albert Wohlstetter. "Threats and Review The Rand Paper Series, P-5813. Santa Monica. California. February Promises of Peace.” Orbis (Winter 1974), pp. 1126-27. See also Schelling. The 1977. pp 10-11 Strategy of Conflict, p 237. for the possible stability benefits that may accrue 15 Herbert F York. The Nuclear Balance of Terror in Europe. Bulletin to having more than the bare minimum number of weapons. Schilling's point of Atomic Scientists May 1976. p 10 See also Horelick. pp 9-10. and Leon is that the larger system of arms is less subject to minor perturbations, break­ Gour*. War Survival in Soviet Strategy USSR Civil Defense (Miami. Florida: throughs, etc. Center for Advanced International Studies. 1976). especially pp 6. 47. 50 41 Dr. Brown, p. 11. Ah, what a dusty answer gets the soul When hot for certainties in this our life!' Geo r g e Mer ed it h

HE SEARCH for certainties in military affairs is a flourishing enterprise backed by thousands of quantitative studies that aspire to calculate, with precision, the latest Tissues in national security. Yet it is an enter­ prise characterized by debate between those who find different truths emerging from their differing approaches. This is particularly evi-

THE CALCULUS OF SURPRISE ATTACK

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel A. L. E lliott

56 dent in the context of debates concerning the selected theoretical and current operational nature of the Soviet threat and the require­ facets of Soviet surprise attack capabilities and ments for U.S. security. In recent debates, the constraints in terms of their reasonableness as problem of surprise attack has become an issue realistic challenges to the current NATO pos­ of significance for which precise solutions are ture. The aim is also to categorize those Soviet now being sought. However, only dusty, frag­ challenges that present the most acute prob­ mented answers appear to those who want lems for NATO forces. only the truth. The dusty answers on the problems of sur­ prise attack range between two views: (1) that Nature of the Problem Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces can, will, and wish The history of Pearl Harbor lias an interest to launch a surprise attack on Western Europe exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastro­ phe that might have been the results of negli­ with such perfect political and military orches­ gence or stupidity or treachery, however lurid. tration that, unless NATO makes drastic For we have found the roots of this surprise in changes. Western Europe will be lost; or (2) circumstances that affected honest, dedicated, that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces face so many and intelligent men. The possibility of such sur­ political and military operational constraints prise at any time lies in the condition of human that surprise attack is not a credible option. perception and stems from uncertainties so basic Each extreme proposition, as well as those in that they are not likely to be eliminated, though between, employs laborious calculations, they might be reduced.2 movement tables, indicator lists, political-mili­ Roberta VVohlstetteb tary reliability factors, and citations from So­ viet doctrinal literature to indicate the The uncertainties associated with surprise certainty of each thesis. But surprise attack, by attack problems are receiving increased atten­ its very nature, defies the certainties that tion among Western military planners. The military planners insist on. It is a condition origin of this concern is most often associated that is not normally anticipated and is rarely with a new round of estimates and studies that deterred. In the context of modern military occurred between 1975 and 1977. Studies from history, surprise attack is, for the defender, a Department of Defense organizations, private political-military problem that has not been research corporations, and individual defense solved. intellectuals have played a role in sharpening Solutions to surprise attack problems may the debate on the Soviet buildup and the lie in the ability to describe clearly the reason­ possibilities of Soviet surprise attack. As a ableness of those activities that functionally result of the review on Soviet surprise attack constitute surprise attack capabilities. This ap­ capabilities, the issues, implications, and prob­ proach is not limited to a recognition of the lems of surprise attack have been identified at adversary's preference, nor does it impose on a rather high level of abstraction. him our views of his ingrained hostility. For example, the central issue has come to Rather, in a systematic calculation, it describes be the cost of deterring Soviet surprise attack the critical factors of surprise attack that the capabilities. The dilemma that NATO planners military planner must account for, be he opti­ face of either placing prime emphasis on the mist or pessimist. There are, in fact, theoreti­ immediate readiness of the force structure or cal and current operational facets of surprise of emphasizing long-term strength is in both attack capabilities that challenge most Western cases a resource problem.3 It appears that orthodox accounts of the surprise attack prob­ NATO cannot afford both long-term strength lem. The purpose of this article is to illustrate and constant readiness. Yet failure to do so 57 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW may facilitate surprise attack during crisis pe­ and timing as essential to strategic surprise. riods. Misdirecting the opponent’s calculations of the The debate over the cost to improve NATO time, strength, direction, speed, and manner readiness has, to some degree, obscured the of attacks is a factor in operational surprise. requirement to examine the operational feasi­ Tactical surprise derives from the unexpected bility of countering surprise attack. While it weapons, techniques, and skills that are ac­ may be convenient to focus on a single meas­ tually employed in combat.4 From the Soviet ure of effectiveness (cost), the various political- Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, surprise military responsibilities of NATO cannot be (vnezapnost’) is: reduced to a costing formula. The cost argu­ One of the principles of military art, ensuring ments do not consider the methodological success in battle and in operations. Surprise makes it possible to inflict heavy losses upon the difficulties of calculating the adversary’s mili­ enemy in short periods of time, to paralyze his tary options and the unquantifiable political will, and to deprive him of the possibility of consequences of dealing only with cost-effec­ offering organized resistance.5 tive choices. Calculating the political and military cost of To the Soviet definition, we might add that a deterring (or failing to deter) surprise attack surprise attack is an attack with minimum or requires analysis, initially unconstrained by no warning, which comes with such sudden­ cost considerations, of the following: ness and intensity as to promote a decisive, major, and quick victory. It is a form of attack • the factors which facilitate surprise attack; that is only truly understood in retrospect. • the readiness factors, which increase an Other military establishments have views on attacker’s risks in conditions of surprise attack; surprise beyond the Soviet definitions. In and Asian military doctrine, which includes the • Soviet concepts and capabilities for sur­ experiences of the People’s Republic of China, prise attack. the Democratic People’s Republic of Vietnam, These factors need to be examined in terms of and the Democratic People’s Republic of Ko­ both theoretical and practical measures. In this rea, the chief element of surprise is deception. article, a preliminary analysis is offered that Success in war is based on deception, full deals with (1) the theoretical facets of surprise preparation, and the use of surprise, lightning attack (primarily from the Soviet view), (2) the attacks. Asian variants on the notion of surprise universal human factors which, in theory, emphasize techniques and modes of battle as important factors. For example, the use of complicate counters to surprise attack, and (3) special tactics in guerrilla warfare, night com­ the current capabilities (beyond theory) of bat, psychological operations, mountain war­ Soviet forces for surprise attack. fare, ambush, counter-envelopments, and rapid movements are all essential elements of surprise in combat. The framework in which Theoretical Challenge these elements become effective is the mask of In Soviet military doctrine, surprise in mili­ deception. As Sun Tzu notes: tary operations is not an either-or situation but I make my enemy see my strengths as weaknesses a question of degree. Surprise is seen as a and my weaknesses as strengths, while I cause product of a victim's ignorance, preconcep­ his strengths to become weaknesses and discover tions, and gullibility as well as the attacker’s where he is strong.B ability to deceive. Soviet doctrine describes To assess a potential adversary s ability and the attacker’s success in concealing his intent preferences for surprise attack and his con­ CALCULUS OF SURPRISE ATTACK 59 straints in executing such an attack requires an theoretical results of surprise attack based on accounting of the conceptual or theoretical historical analyses: aspects of surprise in the adversary’s military As a result of the stunning effects of surprise doctrine. Therefore, among the methodologies attacks by nuclear and conventional weapons and employed in the study of surprise attack, the decisive offensive operations by troops, the en­ emy’s combat capabilities are sharply lowered and historical approach may he useful at the outset the correlation of forces changes immediately. He in order to determine continuities and discon­ may panic and his morale will be crushed. In a tinuities in military thought. The historical vague situation his overall and particular systems data allow description of: of control are disorganized to a greater extent, and the will of his commanders and the regular • the adversary's theory of surprise attack, activity of staff's are paralyzed to a considerable and degree. As a result of this, the enemy’s command­ • sources of military views on surprise ers and staffs are incapable of organizing timely attack. and effective counteraction. They have to hastily make on-the-spot changes in their previous plans The importance of analyzing historical case without clarifying the conditions and status of the studies has been illustrated by the excellent sides properly. The changes at times will not correspond to the situation at all. They will have Rand Report, Timely Lessons of History: The to assign new missions to troops and under Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy. This conditions of unceasing influence by the side study illustrates the importance of military which delivered the strike unexpectedly.7 history and historiography in Soviet military planning and the current operational emphasis Savkin’s work on surprise attack describes two the Soviets place on historical models. The critical points on the nature of surprise in modem significance of the Manchurian case modern military operations. First, since the has been explicitly affirmed or commended by modern battlefield (in the Soviet view) favors Soviet analyses of the campaign’s strategic the rapid employment of forces in fast-moving design. A considerable body of knowledge has operations, one can expect that the defender developed in recent Soviet military literature generally will not have taken steps to eliminate that refers to the Manchurian model and other the consequences of surprise attack. Insofar as lessons of history on the importance of sur­ the defender has not taken “counter-surprise prise. The common conclusions in the Soviet action, surprise attack can be the deciding literature are that: factor in achieving total success. Savkin s second point seems even more • strategic and tactical surprise can be significant. After illustrating Soviet success in achieved, i World War II surprise attacks, Savkin notes • strategic surprise yields a low-cost that, "it is possible to count on the success of method for victory', surprise actions only on the condition of their • surprise of time can be induced by de­ prior planning, preparation, and timely imple­ ception, and mentation. ”8 Given the Soviet emphasis on • surprise in the Manchurian experience is the importance of surprise attack, one might a model for procedures in modern combined assume that the Soviets have already com­ arms operations and prewar mobilization. pleted their planning and, it appears, most military preparations to execute surprise attack Soviet emphasis on surprise has continued in Western Europe if necessary. At minimum, and is authoritatively set down in V. E. Sav- there is a Soviet doctrinal requirement to kin s book, The Basic Principles of Operational attain (1) a state of deployed readiness for Art and Tactics (1972). Savkin describes the defense and surprise attack, (2) forms of secu- 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ritv and concealment, and (3) counter-surprise orthodox perceptions appear to have existed capabilities. To the extent that NATO security, for several years: concealment, and counter-surprise abilities do not exist, Soviet surprise is facilitated. • A Soviet attack against NATO can occur In terms of military operational theory, sur­ only during a period of tension. prise attack presents a significant challenge to • Capabilities to obtain information on So­ the defending force. However, most military viet preparations for an attack will produce operational difficulties can he solved, or at unambiguous signals that will alert NATO. least modified, to some level of tolerance. The • NATO can make the appropriate re­ human perception problems are not so easily sponse under conditions of surprise attack and solved. In theory, as well as in historical successfully defend against the Soviets. experience, the human perception (or misper­ These assumptions may be entirely appro­ ception) problems have most often defied res­ priate for the present; however, in the past, olution. These problems, perceptions, attitudes, assumptions such as these have usually led to and assumptions may be grouped under the disaster. The analytical scheme that follows general heading of the "behavioral dimensions’ illustrates the danger. of surprise attack. The best illustration of the The first step in this analytical scheme behavioral problems can be found in the work involves a careful review of the indications and by Robert Jervis on hypotheses on mispercep­ warning environments and the abilities and tion. The following hypotheses on mispercep­ disabilities of both attacker and defender in tion are relevant to surprise attack problems: major crisis events of the past. The following • Decision-makers tend to fit incoming in­ crisis situations were reviewed: the opening of formation into theories and images. Theories World War I, the opening phase of the Ger­ determine what they notice. man attack in World War II, Pearl Harbor, the • A theory will have greater impact on an Soviet Manchurian attack in 1945, the Korean actor’s interpretation of data (1) the greater the War (to include Chinese intervention), Soviet ambiguity of data, and (2) the higher the intervention: Hungary and Czechoslovakia, degree of confidence with which the actor and war in the Middle East: 1967 and 1973. holds the theory. The primary requirement of the analysis is to extract those factors which proved most criti­ • Actors tend to overlook the fact that cal, on the parts of both attacker and defender, evidence consistent with their theories may in the success or failure of past surprise attack also be consistent with other views.9 cases. The hypotheses of misperceptions beg ques­ Abraham Ben-Zvi recently analyzed a num­ tions concerning current NATO views of the ber of case studies of surprise attack aimed at Soviet threat. Given the fact that there is great revealing a conceptual framework through ambiguity in the data on Soviet capabilities which the general problem of surprise could and intentions, is it possible to describe the be understood. He concluded that in all the U.S./NATO theory of the Soviet threat, and is case studies: there a set of perceptions about the Soviets In their determination to give priority to the strategic assumptions of possibilities over the that is generally held with high confidence by tactical assumptions of actualities, the decision the NATO members? In other words, is there makers of the state about to he attacked attrib­ perceptual orthodoxy in NATO which facili­ uted their own line of reasoning to the adversary. tates Soviet surprise attack abilities? In terms Overlooking the possibility that the enemy might of general planning assumptions, at least three not follow a similar train of thought, they failed to CALCULUS OF SURPRISE ATTACK 61 cross the conceptual boundaries that separated ioral model of the critical properties of past them from their opponent.10 surprise attacks. The term “critical,” in this Ben-Zvi also noted the need to evaluate context, suggests the properties which caused tactical information on its own without inter­ the attacker to succeed and ensured the de­ preting tactical data only in the light of a priori fender’s failure. In terms of the theoretical strategic assumption. In fact of experience, the challenges of surprise attack, it is held that tactical indicators are probably more impor­ these critical properties are operative today as tant. The Ben-Zvi conclusions are borne out much as they were in the past. Further, the bv a central theme that is common to the case model illustrates why, as Henry Owen has studies: that the behavioral dimensions of sur­ noted, surprise attack usually works.11 prise attack are the most complicated and the The left-hand column of the model indicates least understood. the categories under which the critical proper­ Further, an examination of case studies on ties of surprise attack have been grouped. surprise attack supports the view that surprise During the analysis of the various elements of attack is primarily a behavioral problem. It is the attacker/defender relationship (in seven only after the behavioral dimensions have been case studies), a pattern emerged that suggested recognized that military operational analyses the five critical categories. The critical cate­ have any meaning. Some of these dimensions gories may contain an internal hierarchical are illustrated in Figure 1. The challenges of relationship in both degree of importance and surprise attack have been developed in a difficulty to explain. Initial research indicates format that illustrates the relationships be­ that the attacker pays more attention to the tween the attacker and the defender in a first three categories than the last two. This surprise attack. It illustrates the relationship in subdivision also implies the difference between terms of these critical categories: behavioral, long-term goals (strategic interest) and those of environmental, procedural, technical, and doc­ more immediate, practical value. Another in­ trinal. Tracking the asymmetries of the at- ternal relationship exists between the cate­ tacker/defender relationship through the critical gories in that they are not rigid. There is categories leads to conclusions about the criti­ spillover between the various categories and cal properties of surprise attack. the groupings of attacker/defender rationale. The figure presents an interactive model of Across from the five different categories of the critical properties of surprise attack. The critical properties are sets of attacker and data in the model are based on this author’s defender rationales, behaviors, procedures, analysis of seven cases of surprise attack. The tasks, reactions, interpretations, etc. The rela­ analysis consisted of documenting the behav­ tionship between the attacker and defender in ioral aspects of the attacker/defender relation­ each category is not parallel. However, the ship in these seven cases. For example, in relationships imply a form of parallelism. For each case, attackers and defenders (in the example, under the behavioral properties of opening phase of war) in World War I, World attacker rationale, the first item states that War II, Pearl Harbor, etc., indicated in writ­ “the risks are extremely great, but we must ten memos and messages, etc., their assump­ proceed.” There is a parallel response in terms tions and perceptions regarding themselves of the defender rationale: “The risks are so and the defender. These indications were ex­ great that the (rational) enemy will not attack.” tracted, paraphrased under the heading at­ A specific example of the data in Figure 1 tacker rationale, and categorized to illustrate can be illustrated through the critical category how the attacker/defender behavioral relation­ of doctrinal activity. Today, according to many ship operates. Figure 1, therefore, is a behav­ defense analysts, Soviet military doctrine is CATEGORIES Attacker Rationale Oefender Rationale Behavioral properties Behavioral assumptions Behavioral assumptions Include perceptions, The risks are extremely great, but we must proceed The risks are so great that the (rational) attitudes, cultural values We have no other alternatives enemy will not attack and norms, roles, and the National survival is at stake, and we must succeed Military activity does not make political dynamics of group inter- Political necessity dictates an attack at this time sense at this time actions Military necessity dictates an attack at this time in order If the enemy attempts attack, he will fail to gam an advantage at the outset of an inevitable war We have a credible defense (by our standards). Success depends on open, honest assessments of our situation, and the enemy should understand that we are strong creativity and innovation in our planning and accurate Our plans account for enemy capabilities; assessments of the enemy those of us who developed the plans are Be positive in the approach we will win committed to them the plan is set our defensive strategy is sound Our power is so great, our ideals so high that no one would dare an attack

Environmental properties Manipulative tasks Standard preparation include elements of the Create political environment that least suggests the use of Give minimum attention to tactical indicators political-military military force. that do not fit with our frame of reference environment that are Negotiating forums will serve as the mam mode of develop- (perception of the international-political- subject to exploitation ing the surprise environment and assessing the mood ot the military environment) through deception and mis- enemy The situation is normal interpretation Political deception must be based on clear but false signals; Our intelligence is good We have statistical capitalize on enemy's preconceptions and biases with the evidence to support our views disinformation he expects The tensions that do exist in this area are Desensitize the enemy in those areas critical to your mili- normal tary plan by establishing new long-term patterns of The serious nature of an adversary's political/ normalcy diplomatic behavior proves he has no intent Secure and control the plan, even from top leaders to use military force Perform overt military operations or activities which tend Our "indications list" is current and to indicate that no military conflict is imminent comprehensive Security demands the continued compartmentali- zation of sensitive intelligence.

Procedural properties Procedures Reactions include operational Coordinate political deception with tactical deception in com- Some activity is developing, pay closer atten- behavior derived from munication procedures, communications security (COMSEC), tion to strategic indicators action plans, organiza- troop movements, and schedules prior to the first phase of Assure that our forces are responsive in tional and managerial mobilization accordance with current plans habits, and concepts of Pattern the assault sequences of troops on the line against Avoid mterservice disputes regarding our "time" in batlle the enemy in terms of his time requirements (exploit his differences over the enemy activity; these mobilization through political and propaganda activities, etc ). differences can be worked out Activate special plans network for the “surprise" mobiliza- Our observations to date confirm the fact tion schedule. that our current plans are adequate (We still Perform final check on enemy's on-the-line readiness know what the enemy will most reasonably do.) Activate COMSEC and CJ deception procedures to project normal Standard defense readiness condition signals profile for the season procedures will be implemented as Perform final intelligence check for timing and direction of required the attack Criteria are the requirement to do the greatest damage Imply that we may begin to mobilize, our produce greatest overall shock, disrupt enemy alert mobilization capabilities will certainly process and defense readiness condition response deter the enemy from any thought of military activity Inform the headquarters that we are in the best position to determine what is going on

Technical properties Objectives Observations include employment of Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) Systems intelligence data are static There »s undetected weapon tech- programs are test coordinated with deception programs to mask no need to track technical improvements to nologies. extraordinary new weapons, improvements in old systems existing weapon systems of the enemy intelligence collection Weapon improvements and new efficiencies in training and fire- The enemy cannot deceive us in RDT&E activity. means, and unexpected power will be masked in exercises he is too far behind us. efficiencies in battle Technical deception data will be aimed at the enemy's technical Pay close attention to strategic RDT&E collection systems Incremental improvements in firepower rates. Test programs and technical literature will focus on the mobility, etc . are not significant impossible and insignificant (however, minor improvements in Our technical intelligence base is excellent combat efficiencies will, in the long run. prove decisive) Sophisticated deployment schemes for transportation and emplacement of troops, equipment, ammunition, communication networks, and other combat and support units that exploit the technical, environmental, and weather/daylight limita- tions of the enemy's indications and warning systems

Doctrinal properties Role of doctrine Interpretations include the processes by Authoritative sources and institutional literature articulate The adversary s doctrine is consistent We which military doctrines doctrinal preferences in continuity with past views (or at know the sources of his doctrine, and the are developed, articu- least not in contradiction with) and in a manner which pre- processes that impact his doctrine are lated. and integrated sents a normal (acceptable) rationale for pre-emptive capa- similar to those which impact ours into combat operational bilities The enemy will not depart from his doctrine capabilities, interpre- Technical training includes significant departures from No dramatic shifts have occurred in hardware tations of foreign mili- doctrinal norms for the sake of surprise attack and technology, therefore, no need for tary doctrines and the Special doctrines (closely held) deal with special subjects changes in doctrine accounting for devia- such as "surprise attacks" and war conclusion roles and The minor changes that have occurred in tions between declared missions" (surprise attack preparation and profiles represent technology and In training habits will doctrine and doctrine on significant departures from doctrinal norms, yet doctrinal probably be incorporated into the main body the battlefield norms will be re-established after the initial stage of the of doctrine battle) Technological breakthroughs in weapons and support equipment that do not necessarily produce doctrinal changes but do make possible substantial improvements in the execution of the doctrine may not be revealed until the surprise attacks take place

Figure l . An interactive model of surprise attack 62 CALCULUS OF SURPRISE ATTACK 63 both a body of technical military knowledge five-year plan, 1928, or to 1968-69, when a and an indicator of Soviet preferences for new group of Soviet forces was added to the forms of attack. According to the research Pact—is a concept that has escaped definition model, prior to the time of a surprise attack in recent defense literature. This has been the the sources of adversary doctrine would con­ case in part because an inappropriate question tinue to articulate current doctrinal norms in a has driven the search for revelations about way to suggest that: Soviet intentions. The question has been, Is • No shifts in doctrinal views have oc­ the current Soviet deployment in Eastern curred. Europe offensive or defensive? Some answer • Doctrinal preferences of today indicate “defensive,” because history shows that Russia continuity both in thought and in behavior. must always be concerned with her defensive • Doctrinal prescriptions suggest the ideal posture or suffer another large-scale invasion. toward which progress is being made. Others say “offensive,” because history also Yet, the attacker has in the past, through shows that Russia has continually expanded special planning mechanisms and organiza­ during the last ten centuries. What is missing tional relationships, departed from his ideal from both positions is the recognition that the doctrinal norms in order to execute the sur­ Soviet buildup, while currently a capable de­ prise attack. This form of doctrinal interaction fensive force, is also developing characteristics and perception reinforces the defender’s fault) which go beyond either offensive or defensive assumptions and creates new options for the requirements. It may also be characterized as attacker. After the initial phase of war, the a pre-emptive deployment in terms of gross attacker’s operational style is usually based on numbers, organizational arrangements, and op­ his normal doctrinal standards and operational erational style. habits. However, doctrinal revolutions can oc­ For the purpose of this hypothesis, one can cur during conflict also. confine the assessment to Soviet forces only There are those who will not allow the and consider the following propositions: Soviets enough flexibility to execute surprise • Current Soviet forces in Eastern Europe attack. The Soviet style is characterized as too have achieved an in-place reinforced status rigid and, therefore, too vulnerable for inno­ (the classical indicators of attack will soon be vation on the battlefield. However, it may be permanently present with or without crisis worth noting that the current Soviet commit­ conditions). ment to the utility of surprise attack is also a • A lengthy mobilization is no longer re­ commitment to flexibility not unlike the flexi­ quired, nor is it politically feasible. bility that Soviet armies did. in fact, demon­ • The doctrinal emphasis for the “pre-emp­ strate during WAV' II. The challenge to the tive deployed Soviet force is on high-speed defender (NATO) is to anticipate the reasona­ operations in an unrelenting offensive, in the ble means and conditions under which the context of a surprise attack. Soviets can achieve flexibility and depart from • The performance characteristics of the (maybe exceed) normal operational and doc­ deployed force include capabilities to execute trinal standards. surprise attack either in the conventional or nuclear mode, but they increasingly emphasize the requirement to maintain the conventional Beyond Theory: for an advantageous period as well as to change The Deployed Challenge from the conventional to the nuclear mode. The Soviet military buildup in Eastern Eu­ These propositions are not meant to suggest rope—whether one dates its origin to the first that the Soviets prefer the surprise attack or. 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW for that matter, the military solution in Eu­ the task of presenting to NATO a critical rope. However, the nature of the political security problem. setting in Eastern Europe and the Soviet The maintenance of a pre-emptive force is perception of military threats in the area also a critical problem for Soviet commanders. simply require the development of pre-emp­ They no doubt must deal with a great number tive capabilities to (1) provide for the defense of operational problems and political con­ of the East European and Soviet heartlands straints. However, Soviet perceptions of their and (2) ensure the credible representation of operational problems and constraints have be­ Soviet interest in the mid-European butter come the basis lor substantial improvements in zone. In other words, these pre-emptive capa­ the forces. For example, there have been bilities bear on the political as well as the increases in artillery strength, greater re­ military balance in Europe. sources for mobile air defense, and improve­ The deployed threat, however, does consist ments in command and control.12 of a certain numerical strength in the form of Significant changes have also occurred in 58 Soviet and East European divisions. The aircraft deployments: increased performance of operational deployed threat would most likely older aircraft, increased performance in all- consist of 27 to 30 Soviet divisions (in the weather capability, introduction of third-gen­ initial phase) and, in John Erickson’s terms, eration aircraft for ground strike missions, and certain “earmarked forces of the East German modernization of air defense aircraft for sec­ and Polish forces. The total pre-emptive force ondary roles. The impact of these changes of 30-32 Warsaw Pact divisions is, by almost indicates that in terms of Western military any firepower/manpower equation, adequate to planning, in the event of a surprise attack by Soviet forces, there will no longer be an adequate warning period. With the newly introduced aircraft, the Soviets may be able to launch an immediate offensive from their Figure 2. The deployed threat initial positions without a gradual buildup and without dependence on the “wave” principle of air attack.13 The combined improvements in air deployments and ground forces constitute a Forward area: 58 divisions - 760,000 combat troops set of refinements that ensure the defensive, 15,500 battle tanks offensive, and pre-emptive utility of Soviet 2.500 tactical aircraft forces in Eastern Europe. Further, there is a

GDR: Soviet troops - 20 divisions continual emphasis on organizational and op­ National erational readiness factors to ensure the utility People’s Army - 6 divisions of the Soviet forces, whatever their assign­ 1,000 tactical aircraft ment. CSR: Soviet troops - 5 divisions Among the current factors on the Soviet Czechoslovakia readiness utility listing, one finds the following Socialist requirements: Republic - 10 divisions • Preparations for short, intensive opera­

Poland: Soviet troops - 2(3) divisions tions Polish People's • Examination of theater command and Army -15 divisions control coordination demands • Organizational arrangements for the man­ Source: International Detense Review. February 1975. pp 175-86 agement of multiple breakthrough zones CALCULUS Ob SURPRISE ATTACK 65 • Establishment of superiority ratios in ar­ employment of U.S. Air Forces in a short­ mor (5:1) and artillery (8:1) and provision for warning scenario? delivering superiority in manpower, mobility Air Force planners are now considering these assets, and air defense to breakthrough zones operational issues and their implications in • Planning for reconstitution of divisional terms of budgetary considerations, short-term elements (replenishment and resupply in com­ and long-term consequences, U.S./NATO po­ bat) litical constraints, and trends in the Warsaw • Establishing time-critical criteria for the Pact. However, the actions of the future, performance of each operational task whether under the rubric of readiness or • Provisions for massive deception opera­ modernization, require some overarching ob­ tions. 14 jective to guide Air Force priorities. If our In view of the readiness activities associated planning experiences of the past reveal any­ with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, NATO thing, they show that we have not placed military planners should consider how the sufficient planning priorities on clearly devel­ Soviets view NATO’s postures. Is it not possi­ oping trends in the Warsaw Pact forces. The ble that the Soviets recognize, as we do, that developing pre-emptive characteristics of War­ NATO’s shallow rear, maldeployments, and saw Pact forces may be only dimly understood dependence on mobilization and reinforcement today. However, today’s trends have a way of facilitate the Soviet surprise option? Is it not maturing rapidly. The Air Force can keep pace also worth considering the minimum require­ with the maturing threat by allowing some ments for NATO forces to achieve an efficient planning excursions that deal with trends. In state of readiness that specifically increases the terms of readiness planning, the Air Force can adversary’s risks in attempting surprise attack accommodate this need by organizing the read­ without intensifying tensions in specific crisis iness business into categories of effort, such as situations? the following: At minimum, both the consequences of Category I—Readiness initiatives for improving Soviet surprise attack and an analysis of Soviet the initial effectiveness ofTACAIR in Europe constraints must be displayed in a way that • Mohilization/deployment innovations illuminates options other than the “either’ of • C3 enhancements • Logistics changes investing in long-term stability or the “or of • Indications-warning alc-rt procedures fixing the force for present security. Category II—Readiness initiatives for quick-fix The potential consequences of the Soviet • Munitions programs pre-emptive posture demand greater attention • Training from the analytical community and from Air • New equipment integration Category III—Readiness initiatives for the Force planners. The Air Force needs to state long-term (extended readiness planning) its own concept for the “initial phase” of • Long-range readiness requirements defense, which clarifies the following opera­ • TAC/TRADOC joint planning tional issues: There may be other organizational forms for • What is the USAF’s role in deterring the future management of Air Force readiness surprise attack? plans and programs. One should expect change • How will the Air Force consume its in the management approaches to readiness as warning time in Europe? changes occur in U.S. perceptions. For the • How will the Air Force operate under present, however, the Air Force will increas­ the conditions of surprise attack? ingly be relied on to solve many of the initial • What planning factors should govern the defensive problems in NATO. The Air Force 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW has an opportunity to define a major role for been made to provoke unfounded fears. In itself in deterring the Pact’s pre-emptive terms of Soviet designs on Western Europe, power or providing the main, initial defense or any other region, there may be no need to should deterrence fail. worry about Soviet military aggression. As Whatever resource solutions we finally apply Hannes Adomeit has noted: to NATOs posture, we must constantly note What is remarkable in Soviet foreign policy over the conceptual difficulties in developing strat­ the past decade is its failure to fulfill Western egies for defense. Our strategies and opera­ predictions that the newly-won status as a super­ tional plans are governed by sets of assumptions, power somehow required expansionist behavior regionally oriented perceptions (or mispercep­ and risky ventures “commensurate with it.15 tions) which, in a sense, institutionalize both It would be easy to make the case that the the behavioral and operational factors that Soviets will avoid the risks associated with facilitate surprise. For example, the process by either political or military confrontations with which regional strategies are decided and at­ the West. This risks-avoidance behavior is not tendant operational plans are determined is only characteristic of Soviet risk-taking history based on sets of expectations both about the but also recognizes the political constraints potential attacker and the defender. These imposed by the current state of affairs in expectations may be, and usually are, biased Eastern Europe. by several external forces, such as political and However, to dismiss the need for compre­ fiscal priorities. Yet the expectations in strate­ hensive military planning on the basis of the gies and plans eventually prescribe the accept­ Russian past and the uncertainty of recent able behavior of those who must participate in trends is to miss the major fact recognized by their development and implementation. the Soviet deployment in Eastern Europe. Therefore, conceptually, surprise can result That is, the Soviets recognize both the need to when an adversary’s actions fall outside a set of avoid military confrontation and the require­ orthodox expectations. And, to the extent that ment to deal with unexpected, unplanned for military planning functions omit the continuing crises promptly and successfully. They also need to test expectations and trends and un­ apparently recognize that the conflict potential derstand the differences between operational between the U.S.S.R. and the individual East reality and political constraints, military estab­ European states will be greater in the future, lishments can become reactive bureaucracies not less. And, in the context of evolving unable to support either political initiatives or internal crises, the Soviets may be forced to unorthodox operational requirements. Yet employ military forces. there exists- no calculus that accounts for insti­ The Soviet Union has invested much treas­ tutional factors, self-deception, and the impact ure in the East European buffer zone since of planning techniques. 1946. It is a zone of strategic importance to the Soviets, yet it is increasingly a difficult area to manage. It is a management problem that may require extreme solutions. It is a IN DISCUSSING the theoretical management problem that could involve West­ and operational elements in the calculus of ern Europe; indeed, it has been affected by surprise attack, it is easy to drift into the West European political and military postures hysteria of uncertainty and fear so often asso­ for decades. Finally, it is the type of manage­ ciated with descriptions of the Soviet threat. ment problem which, on the military level, This tendency may be unavoidable. However, can be dealt with best by the existence of and it should be understood that no attempt has ability to use pre-emptive capabilities. CALCULUS OF SURPRISE ATTACK 67 As the Soviet Union has recognized that the of surprise attack suggests, the greatest clral- more likely military confrontation in Europe lenge in planning to deal With the unorthodox may be borne out of' a sudden crisis which is not the discovery of fixed military opera­ must be quickly resolved, so must NATO tional solutions. The challenge is to learn how planners admit to the need to deal with to deal more precisely with uncertainty. unorthodox, surprising events. As the calculus Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

Notes H. Ibid 1 Cited in VV T Jones. A History of Western Philosophy Kant to 9. Robert Jervis. "Hypotheses on Misperception World PolitUs. April Wittgenstein and Sartre (New York Harcourt. Brace, and World. Inc 1969), 1968. pp 454-79 xxiil. 10 Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight; A Conceptual Framework p. 2. Roberta Wohlstctter, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision (Stanford, for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks." World Politics. April 1976, cited in California. Stanford University Press. 1962'. p 397 DOD Current News #112. 10 June 1976. p 8 3. In this context, ' long-term strength" refers to Inith the process of 11 Henry Owen. "Surprise Attack It Usually Works." editorial. Washing­ improving NATO’s general posture over time and the specific ability to build ton Post. November 10, 1976 Mr Owen's work begs tin* question When has up forces in a crisis period and sustain combat power for a longer term than surprise attack not worked? Very little has been done in military historics/case the adversary. studies to show how surprise attack has failed However, it seems most 4. John Desprev Lilita Dzirkal.v Barton Whaley. Timely Lessons of History. appropriate to understand how surprise attack works before investigating how The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica; Rand Working it fails. Note 9151-NA. July 1975). p 80 12 John Erickson. "The In-Place. Unreinforced Soviet Attack. Soviet 5. General-Colonel A. I Radziyevslciy. editor. Dictionary of Basic Military Military Digest (University of Edinburgh) October 1976. p. 5 Terms (Moscow: Voyenizdal, 1965). p. 35 13 Peter Borgart. "The Air Attack Potential of the Warsaw Pact. 6. Sam C. Sarkesian, editor. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago International Defense Review, April 1976. p. 43. Precedent Publishing. Inc . 1975). p. 169 14 From Erickson, op. cit. 7 V. E. Savkin. The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics 15. Hannes Adomeit. "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior From (Moscow: Voyenizdal, 1972). pp 232-33. (Translated and Published by USAF Confrontation to Coexistence?" Adelplii Paper So. 101. International Institute in Soviet Military’ Thought. No. 4.) of Strategic Studies. 1973, p 37.

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen, USAF, of the Europe/NATO Division, Director­ ate of Plans, Hq USAF, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1978. His article, “The Central Europe Battlefield: Doctrinal Implications for Counterair-Interdiction, was previously designated outstanding article in the July-August 1978 issue. "THE SHASTA DISASTER" forgotten lesson in interservice relations

Dk. M urray Green

General Douglas MacArtliur. Army Cliiel of Stafl. and Admiral William Veazie Pratt. Chief of Naval Operations, signed an agree­ ment in January 1931, the validity of which was to he strained in the S.S. Mount Shasta exercise the following summer.

FEW' months after Billy Mitchell resigned from the U.S. Army in 1926, the Army Air Corps Act came into being. As it offered a less than half-a-loaf solution to the air leadership s visionA of a proper national defense, the law did not still the clamor for a unified organization in which air, land, and sea forces would serve as equal partners. A fresh opportunity was inadvertently provided by the so-called MacArthur-Pratt Agreement, signed in January 1931 between two sovereign military powers. The Army and Navy had carved up the territory to lessen interservice friction between them and to cut oil the air zealots before they regained the momentum lost when Mitch­ ell retired to Boxwood, his wife’s estate in Middleburg, Virginia. 68 The agreement, signed by General Douglas “Bert Dargue stationed at Langley Field, MacArthur. who had just taken office as Army Virginia, were to fly to sea, search out the Chief of Staff, and Admiral William Veazie Shasta, and bomb it to the bottom, thus Pratt, who had just come aboard as Chief of demonstrating the Air Corps capability to meet Naval Operations, proclaimed their respective its obligation for coastal defense. domains—the one over land operations, the There seemed to be little reason to doubt other over the seven seas. Between the cracks that the exercise, scheduled for mid-August, of their empires, however, an aggressive Air would be a success. When staff planning pa­ Corps leadership saw a new opportunity to pers trickled across Constitution Avenue from assert its right to participate in the coastal the Munitions Building, Navy supporters has­ defense of our shores against invasion. And tened to discount any larger significance that that right included the training of long-range might be attached to the exercise. bomber crews to search the seas and attack an Nor were there doubts among Air Corps enemy armada before it could land. sponsors. Dozens of reporters, including crews That mission interpretation was not exactly from Fox Movietone News and Paramount shared by General MacArthur. In fact, the News, were invited to record in words and Chief of Staff expressed a willingness for all pictures the spectacular destruction of the S.S. military aviation to be eliminated by treaty, if Mount Shasta. that could be arranged at the World Disarma­ The mission started confidently, perhaps ment Conference soon to convene in Geneva. reminiscent of the first Battle of Bull Run, Admiral Pratt vetoed that idea, however. It where spectators came from Washington in seems that Navy planners had just begun to carriages bringing their picnic lunches. Ship­ appreciate the potential offensive power that loads of observers, regaled with food and the carrier taskforce could add to the fleet. drink, had been invited to witness the sinking In this setting, in the summer of 1931, just of the Shasta. a decade after Mitchells triumph over the But first it had to be found. On August 11, German warships off the Virginia Capes, the starting day, the weather was less than ideal, air advocates saw their chance to grab the but everything was in place. Second Bomb limelight and strike a public relations blow for Group planes went out and searched and freedom and equality and to regenerate among crisscrossed their tracks, but they could not congressional supporters a fresh surge of legis­ locate the Shasta. At first observers were lative action. In July of that year. Major surprised, then aghast, and finally smirking General James Fechet was the lame duck with delight that the bombers were unable to Chief of Air Corps preparing to turn over the locate a slow-moving target on a known course. controls to Major General Benny Foulois in By afternoon, the weather socked in, frustrat­ just a few months. An idea was born and given ing further search efforts. impetus in the executive staff Office of the Three days later, the skies cleared enough Chief of Air Corps (OCAC), headed by Lieu­ for a second mission. But according to the tenant Colonel Frank Andrews, to test bomb a post-mortems filed with headquarters, the steel cargo ship of World War vintage. The bombers came in at 5000 feet instead of 12,000 S.S. Mount Shasta, declared surplus, was to feet, as they had been trained to do. Officials be sited off the Virginia Capes, then set on a in charge had been pursuaded to change the slow, straight course. Bombers from the 2nd mission so the news photographers could get Bomb Group, commanded by Major Herbert better pictures. In addition, the bombers were

Continued on Page 72 The Shasta Misadventure Aminiums officers oj the fledgling Army Air Corps sought to establish a role in coastal defense with the bombing of the surplus S.S. Mount Shasta in August 1931 off the Virginia coast. In the thwarted exercise, it was a ('oast Guard volley that fondly sank the Shasta, to the chagrin of the Army and its eager new Air Corps.

In May of 193S the Air Corps proved itself in a more difficult mission—by flying three B-17s some TOO miles over the Atlantic anil breaking from the clouds to engage the Italian liner Rex. this time with camera— but even success did not please the Army Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig.

armed with smaller bombs than they had chant Ship,’ Captain Dudley Knox, USN, originally trained with. gloated in the New York Herald Tribune, for So it was stated, but neither reason seemed three days, the lightly constructed, entirely valid. unarmored, and otherwise defenseless mer­ The fact is that the bombers found the chant ship, the Mount Shasta. survived efforts Shasta only belatedly, but then they could not to sink her by bombing.” Afterwards, Captain sink it. The Navy’s public relations apparatus Knox wrote, the vessel was then finally sunk leaped to the offensive. Writing under the by a few shots from one-pounders, scarcely headline "Naval Supremacy in Defense Found more than pop-guns, fired from an attending Upheld by Air Bombers Failure to Sink Mer­ Coast Guard vessel to prevent her from be­

72 SHASTA DISASTER 73 coming a derelict menace to navigation. Air Corps, could erode the Navy’s traditional The New York Evening Post remembered control of operations on or over the high seas. Mitchell’s test-bombings off the Virginia Capes When Admiral Pratt retired in July 1933, the a decade earlier and said the Navy evened up Navy pressed General MacArthur to rescind an old score.” Edward Folliard, a young re­ the offending agreement on grounds that it porter covering the story for the Washington was a “purely personal arrangement that Post from a nearby Coast Guard cutter, wrote: should not be honored by Admiral William “The Air Corps took a terrible beating out Standlev, successor to Pratt. here today.” MacArthur at first took exception to the General Foulois. Air Corps Chief-designate, view. He told a congressional committee that was called to account by the fuming General he regarded the issue of coastal air defense as MacArthur. Foulois disclaimed personal “completely and absolutely settled." But it knowledge of the affair, saying he learned of it became somewhat less than settled for him as in the press. Years later, Foulois was more yvell as for the Navy in August 1934 when forthright in his autobiography, writing that he Arnold daringly led ten B-10 bombers in was “against the idea because I saw it as formation 950 miles diagonally across the nothing more than a reopening of . . . contro­ North Pacific Ocean from Juneau, Alaska, to versy. He said the project had been approved Seattle, Washington. Newspaper headlines by the General Staff—not likely if the details that followed the triumphant fliers as they had been disclosed in advance—and that “Jim made their yvav back to Washington, D.C., Fechet overruled me and took charge of the proclaimed the beginning of a new style of preparations.” warfare. While others busied themselves protecting The Navy called an urgent meeting of the their flanks, Frank Andrews accepted respon­ Joint Board (predecessor to the Joint Chiefs of sibility for the mission. Hap Arnold was wor­ Staff). MacArthur, representing the War De­ ried "because the newspapers all over the partment as senior member of the board, country’ have lambasted us, but Andrews found consistency of position a lesser virtue replied, “What worries us most is the possibil­ than joining the Navy in shoving the upstart ity' that something is wrong with our training Air Corps back into its place. First, MacArthur and our ability to attack targets at sea. Arnold, directed in his own hand that no ayvards or at Wright Field, Ohio, was slated to command other recognition be accorded the offending the First Bomb Wing at March Field, Califor­ fliers. And, further, the Chief of Staff agreed nia, with a coastal defense mission identical to on 26 September 1934, to redefine service the one so badly bungled by Bert Dargue and roles and missions as follows: the Navy would his group. Arnold feared the War Department have “paramount interest” in air operations at might relinquish the mission and abort his new sea when the fleet was present and free to act. job. w'hile the Army should have “paramount inter­ Captain Dudley Knox had called it “the est" in operations over land. Neither service Shasta Disaster,” but its dimensions were was to build or operate planes intended to larger than the canvas on yvhich he painted it. duplicate the functions of the other. The immediate consequence was that General That last sentence of the restated agreement Foulois displaced Lieutenant Colonel Andrews hurt the Air Corps by undermining the ration­ and six other officers from Air Corps headquar­ ale for buying in quantity the B-17 Flying ters when he took command. At higher levels, Fortress, which was just coming off the draw­ the Navy was concerned lest the MacArthur- ing board. The B-17 was to be the centerpiece Pratt Agreement, as interpreted by the Army of Air Corps designs for a strategic air capabil­ 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ity, and that included extended flying over to sea. The Italian liner Rex was more than a water. day’s journey from New York Harbor, about 700 Two months later, in November 1934, the miles away. Despite heavy weather en route, Federal Aviation (the Howell) Commission, First Lieutenant Curtis LeMay, flight navigator, established by President Roosevelt to survey headed those planes right to their target. As the soundness of America’s civil and military they broke out of the clouds, Major George aviation, heard closed-door testimony by Rear Goddard, father of American aerial reconnais­ Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the Bureau of sance, turned on his equipment, producing sen­ Aeronautics (BuAer), that the Army should be sational pictures from just above masthead restricted to building only planes it needed for height of dozens of passengers waving from the overland flying. According to Captain George deck. Goddard’s pictures made the front page C. Kenney, who sat in at the hearing, Admiral of the New York Herald Tribune and many other King said: “In case we need some Army newspapers around the country. bombers out there, we ll have a Navy airplane The following day, General Andrews at Lang­ fly out there with them and show them how to ley Field received an irate call from General get back to North America. Admiral King, Malin Craig, successor to MacArthur as Chief years later as Chief of Naval Operations, de­ of Staff. Henceforth, all GHQ Air Force planes nied having made such a statement. were to be restricted to flying not more than The upstart Air Corps refused to stay in place. 100 miles out to sea—for safety reasons. By 1938. Douglas MacArthur was safely away Those restrictions were not lifted in some from Washington, sent to reorganize the de­ instances until nearly the eve of America’s fense of the Philippines. Major General Frank entry into World War II. The suppressed Andrews, back in power as General Headquar­ hostility that showed itself between the serv­ ters (GHQ) Air Force commander, was still will­ ices during “the Shasta Disaster" now elicits a ing to take chances to stretch the military air few smiles among survivors. But it was nothing mission, even if it meant stepping on sensitive to laugh at on 7 December 1941, when real toes. In May 1938, three B-17s, commanded by- disaster struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philip­ Major Caleb V. Haynes, flew from Langley pines. Field to search for another ship, this one far out Silver Spring, Maryland

. . . safety will be tin* sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. Sir Winst on Churchill House of Commons, March 1. 1955 THE CHALLENGE OF CLAUSEWITZ

G roup C aptain R. A. M ason, RAF

N HIS introductory essay to the recent relations in our own generation will confirm Princeton edition of Clausewitz's On War, that war, or the threat of war, remains a ready, MichaelI Howard concluded. if uncertain, instrument of policy at all levels It remains the measure of his genius that, al­ below that of direct superpower confrontation. though the age for which he wrote is long since Indeed, it may be plausibly argued that the past, he can still provide so many insights rele­ very presence of nuclear power stalemate vant to a generation, the nature of whose prob­ places a high, if riskier, premium on more lems he could not possibly have foreseen.* traditional, conventional habits ol wielding the To an airman in the last quarter of this military instrument. It may also be that the century-, Clausewitz presents a particular and Soviet government has learned that particular very- important challenge. It is not simply to lesson rather more easily than the more liberal read and understand him, which in all consci­ minded, diffident Western democracies. ence may well seem challenge enough. Nor is But we would also agree that war is “to be it even to identify and use those insights that fully consonant with political objectives, and transcend the 150 years of mechanized war­ policy suited to the means available for war." fare, evolution of air power, thermonuclear (p. 608) How would Clausewitz assess the deterrence, and the increasingly complex political objectives of the Western alliance? As weapon systems of a rapidly advancing micro- an allied airman, I only offer the questions technological revolution. I suggest, however, rather than give the answers, which are the that a survey of some of the insights, in light prerogative of my political masters. of contemporary military problems and circum­ Yet, are we seeking to check the spread of stances, can lead ultimately to a very clear Communist ideology? Are we seeking to pro­ recognition of what the challenge actually com­ tect the territorial integrity of alliance mem­ prises. bers? Are we seeking to reduce the existing control and influence of Communist regimes? Are we seeking to preserve essential economic- the political objective resources or interests? Is any one objective No thinking Western airman would disagree paramount, or is there a blend of more than that war must belong to policy and that “Policy one? If there is a blend of more than one, is the guiding intelligence and war only the there may also be a conflict of priorities, and instrument, not vice versa, (p. 607) Sadly, before an appropriate instrument of policy is even the most cursory survey of international selected, either a clear-cut decision must be made or the consequence of conflicting inter­ "Xjt I von Clausewitz, On War csliti il and translated b> Michael Howard ests accepted and understood. A few moments’ and Peter Parct i Princeton. New jersey Princeton University Press. 19761, p •M All quotations in the article are from this book, and the page numbers follow reflection over events in Europe in 1945 and the quotations For an extensive review of this new edition of Clausewitz. see Lieutenant Colonel David Matlsaac. Master at Arms Clausewitz in Full more recently in Southeast Asia will illustrate View. Air I'nitrrtUi/ flrrteu January-Fehrtiary 1979 what can happen when the military instrument 75 76 AIR UNIVERSI'n REVIEW is not wedded to clearly defined political government, and, in any event, such a policy objectives. would have horrendous implications for all the Nor is it sufficient for political leaders to nuclear powers and many others as well. argue that real life is not like that; that shifting Would alliance cohesion be a likely centre of international relationships and changing per­ gravity? Perhaps, but it may well be argued ceptions of interests cannot be expected to that the first attack, nuclear or otherwise, on produce such simplicity. Is it too critical to Polish, Czechoslovak, or Hungarian territory suggest that the evaluation and selection of would immediately validate thirty years of long-term priorities is the primary responsibil­ Soviet propaganda and convert potentially pa­ ity of the statesman? triotic Eastern-European armed forces into bitter opponents of the West. How far, one wonders, would this speculation be borne in the centre of gravity mind when nuclear strikes against targets in Assuming that the political objective has been Eastern Europe were being considered? clearly defined and assuming that the instru­ Or should we accept Clausewitz’s most fa­ ment of policy is to be military, we see that vored assessment and assume that the centre Clausewitz explained quite clearly what the next of gravity of Soviet strength does, in fact, lie step should be. in her armed forces and, in the most likely One must keep the dominant characteristics of scenario, in those forces intended for use as a both belligerents in mind. Out of these character­ military instrument in Central Europe? If we istics a certain center of gravity develops, the huh of all power and movement, on which everything consider the fundamental, original, and endur­ depends. That is the point against which all our ing roles of the Red Army to be the midwife of energies should be directed, (pp. 595-96) the Bolshevik Revolution and mainstay of both external policy and internal structure, then In the event of an East-West confrontation, perhaps the idea has much to commend it. It where would the centres of gravity be located? is intriguing, if a little mischievous, to reflect I have an uneasy feeling that ours may not be that a catalyst of revolution in 1917 was the in our military strength, conventional or nu­ military collapse of the previous regime. clear, but in the fundamental nature of demo­ cratic W'estern society or in the sources of economic power that sustain it. If so, then the what kind of war energies of a shrewd potential opponent might There is, happily, no evidence that Western be best directed against our public opinion on policies of defence, deterrence, and detente are the one hand and against the heart of our in­ about to fail. There are certainly no envisageable ternal and external economic resources on the circumstances in which the Western allies would other. wish to initiate a war of any sort with the Warsaw The potential opponent’s centre of gravity Pact forces. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence may well be very different. It is unlikely to be to suggest that the political leadership of the the national will in the U.S.S.R. Some may Soviet Union desires anything other than peace­ argue that it could be one of Clausewitz’s other ful coexistence; although their definition of that options: the capital city, especially in a highly condition may be open to different interpreta­ centralized bureaucratic state in which there tions. might be national minorities and others resent­ Assessments of intention, the essential in­ ful of the centralized control. This option, gredients of a “threat, are again the responsi­ however, would presume that an attack on the bility of the statesman. But no government in capital city would also destroy the central an uncertain age can afford to be vulnerable to CLAUSEWITZ 77 the whims of another, and military men in for appropriate allied political decisions to be both East and West must plan accordingly. In taken. so doing, they should bear one thought very Having reached this point, have we stressed much in mind: sufficiently the irreplaceable contribution of The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act allied air power to this scenario? In the geo­ of judgment that the statesman and commander graphically restricted territories of Western have to make is to establish by that test the kind Europe, it may well be that air power, using of war on which they are embarking; neither the third dimension, could most speedily mistaking it for. nor trying to turn it into, evade a first attack. And, certainly, only air something that is alien to its nature, (p. 88) power can concentrate firepower, either its In short, let us plan for the war vve are quite own, transported or distributed, quickly likely to have to fight, which is not necessarily enough both within a theatre or from beyond the war we would like to fight. it. Air power offers survivability, speedy reac­ In any foreseeable scenarios, war is likely to tion, and the ability to concentrate counter­ occur at a time and place of the enemy’s force with a high degree of accuracy, using a choosing. He is likely to possess the advan­ wide variety of precision and aerial weapons tages of at least an element of surprise and delivered, if necessary, from outside the range initial concentration ol force. Nor may he be of terminal defences—provided that our air­ deterred by the prospect of heavy losses. He craft are not dependent on several thousand is likely to attack with great speed, seeking yards of runway on a small number of airfields specific political objectives. If. on the other lacking hardened facilities for ground crew and hand, war should ensue as the result of a engineering support. spasm reaction to internal pressures or from any other act of political desperation, Clause- witz’s idea of war as an act of violence “without resources logical limit w'ould assume a reality that would Such reflections prompt further questions make the rest of his teaching irrelevant. about the provision and management of our So, assuming the first case, rationally expli­ resources, not just for the opening of a conflict cable in Clausewitzian terms, have we in fact but for its continuation. “We must gauge the placed sufficient emphasis on detecting surrep­ strength and situation of the opposing state. titious Soviet military deployments? Have we We must gauge the character and abilities of ensured that enough of our forces would sur­ its government and people and do the same in vive a surprise conventional attack along the regard to our own.” (p. 586) We must consider lines explained in Soviet military literature? “the governments’ strength of will, their char­ Have we adequately identified the essential acter and abilities.” Note, all governments, ingredients of blitzkrieg as speed and concen­ etc.—ours and theirs. tration of force and prepared our defences and How much effort and resources are our counterattacks accordingly? countries prepared to devote? Are our military If our assessment is correct, our military strategies in harmony with that assessment? objective may well be to neutralize the Soviet The assessment is difficult to make and, even military forces in the blitzkrieg as an instru­ when sought, may prove to be inaccurate. ment of Soviet policy. Ideally, that would be There is reason to assume that President done by destruction, but it may be accom­ Johnson and his advisers acted very circum­ plished equally well by stopping, blinding, spectly between 1965 and 1967 in Southeast dispersing, or, within the framework of NATO Asia, partly because of memories of Chinese Strategy 14/3, slowing them down sufficiently intervention in Korea and fear of Soviet re­ 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW spouse to heavy blows against North Vietnam. dropped mines? And how can the effects of But the subsequent policy of carefully gradu­ low yield nuclear devices and perhaps chemi­ ated escalation seems to have hardened North cal weapons be balanced in the equation? Vietnamese resolve, allowed for equally grad­ Overall, would Clausewitz, as a European, uated responses, and, above all, sapped the consider that we are in danger of fighting a determination of the American population to defensive war for the enemy’s objectives on or support what appeared to be an interminable over our territory at a time of his choosing conflict with no “victories. It is, therefore, while our ability to strike at his heartland is just as essential today that our choice of inhibited by optimistic arms agreements? military instrument is appropriate to the char­ acter of our governments and people. The friction and fog corollary of military subordination to political control would, however, seem to be the mili­ But however we choose (or are forced) to fight, tary right to seek assurance from those political we can be certain about two ideas as about no leaders that the military instrument, once others from Clausewitz: “Friction” and “the chosen, will be given the resources and sup­ Fog of War. Friction is the “force that theory port it requires to discharge its responsibilities can never quite define” which “is everywhere effectively. in contact with chance” (p. 120) and is “the resistant medium” that distinguishes real war from the theory itself. Fog is “the general offence and defence unreliability of all information,” which acts like If we are to be the chosen instrument, we twilight or moonlight “to make things seem must then carefully assess, with Clausewitz, grotesque and larger than they really are.” (p. the relative merits of offence and defence. 140) The two will interact in future wars as Could we, for example, choose to wait for a never before. “culminating point” in a Warsaw Pact offen­ Bad enough with World War II radios, sive? If our political objective is to preserve landlines, and signals—how much worse in an Western European territory, can we afford to environment saturated by electronic warfare. fight conventionally westward and then back Never will the individual airman have need to again, perhaps with nuclear weapons eastward? call on so much inner strength and common Would Clausewitz select a strategy that had a sense; never will he have been so required to good chance of stopping an offensive at the understand and remember exactly what is outset but with minimum risks of nuclear demanded of him. escalation? . Clearly, modern command, control, and How will the new generations of precision communication equipments are powerful force- munitions affect the relative merits of defence multipliers, but we must ensure that in war. and offence? For example, bearing in mind the as opposed to commercial displays or simulated likely size of a Warsaw Pact massed attack and peacetime exercises, they really do enhance the attrition rate which it is likely to accept, our strength without imposing a rigidity of can we provide an effective defence based on operation and dependence that would make us one-to-one weapon characteristics, or should vulnerable to blinding and paralysis. Indeed, if we be emphasizing area submunitions or air­ we believe that the potential opposition is dropped mines? If, on the other hand, we are heavily dependent on close control for its planning to reinforce rapidly threatened areas, military effectiveness, are we in fact devoting are we paying sufficient attention to counter­ sufficient effort to projecting fog and friction in measures against area submunitions and air­ his direction? clausewitz 79 cational than training. Perhaps the general’s leadership mind is indeed best formed by “the knowledge If there is to be political uncertainty, the need and the direction of ideas it receives and the to identify centres of gravity and. at the tactical guidance it is given," perhaps, indeed, "Great level, decisive points, to assess the defence/of- things alone can make a great mind, and petty fence equation, and actually to fight a war things will make a petty mind unless a man impeded by friction and enshrouded by fog, rejects them as completely alien.” (p. 145) I then what qualities should we be seeking to in­ should like to think the training and education culcate in our generals? Perhaps even the po­ that we provide bear that distinction in mind tential Pattons and Montgomerys can benefit a and encourage the emergence of leaders of little from advanced training on their'way to the who Clausewitz would be proud. top. In his chapter 'On Military Genius, Clause- T he recent edition of Clausewitz’s On War by witz asks for a harmonious combination of ele­ Professors Brodie, Howard, and Paret offers ments" (p. 100) that is almost superhuman: airmen the opportunity to read and reflect on courage, determination, imagination, intellec­ Clausewitz a little more easily. If we do, his tual gifts of “a power of judgment raised to a fundamental challenge will quickly become marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps evident. His importance to us will be meas­ and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities ured not so much by how deeply we think which an ordinary mind would labor to identify about him as by how deeply he makes us and wear itself out in so doing.” ip. 112) One think. The value of On War is not to help us wonders how often that catalogue of qualities decide precisely what he meant but to help us has appeared on an officer’s efficiency report. decide precisely what we mean today. Nevertheless, it presents quite an educa­ Royal Air Force Staff College tional and training target; perhaps more edu­ Bracknell. England

Croup Captain Mason writes as an individual Royal Air Force officer and not as a spokesman for any department of the British Ministry of Defence. commanding general had boycotted the entire /7 Z > books proceedings; the honor guard had turned out looking like “Coxey’s army," and the section chiefs had delegated their briefing responsibil­ ities to giggling, bashful aspirant-lieutenants. Furthermore, the instant the last speaker had finished his fumbling presentation, the prime minister and his entourage had been hustled back to the airstrip without even being af­ forded an opportunity to visit the latrine. The more bemused because a week earlier the staff had put on an impressive production for the American ambassador, I turned to my ARVN counterpart and demanded an explanation. With unaccustomed sharpness, the Vietnamese officer snapped, “Ky might look like George Washington to you Americans, but to us he’s just another small-time warlord.” That com­ ment jarred me into an unsettling realization. Despite lengthy preparatory schooling and eight months on the job, I still did not understand the people with whom I was work­ ing. Unfortunately, such ignorance was the norm. Practically every commentary on the THE SOUTHERN DUCK war makes it clear that few, if any, of the WANTS TO LIE DOWN Americans involved, from the President down to the private soldier, had more than a cursory appreciation of the Vietnamese people or the C olonel James L. Morrison, Jr ., USA (Ret) complexity of the task we were attempting in their land. The books discussed here are no exception. Each differs from the others in aim, NGERED and bewildered, I, an Ameri­ chronology, and scope, but all convey one Acan adviser, watched Nguyen Cao Kv’s common message: the chief attribute of the airplane take off from the Qui Nhon airstrip disaster unwittingly concocted by those who and disappear in the distance. For no fathom­ made and those who executed American policy able reason everything had gone wrong. Gen­ throughout the years of our involvement in erally, the staff of my Vietnamese division Vietnam was a deep-seated, persistent igno­ could he counted on to outdo itself in staging rance. elaborate dog and pony shows for VIPs. Yet on this occasion—a visit by the head of state, no less—the performance had been so perfunc­ PIIILIP CAPUTOt first went to tory and shabby that it bordered on insult. The Vietnam in 1965 as a rifle platoon leader in the tPhilip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1975, $10.95), 346 pages. 80 BOOKS AND IDEAS 81 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade; ten years and arrogance raise serious questions about the later he returned as a newspaper correspond­ author’s motives and values. ent to cover the fall of Saigon. While touching Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the on the unfortunate finale of the war. Caputo strengths of A Rumor of War set it apart from devotes most of his book to the year he spent the standard protest narrative. A compelling in combat during the initial stage of American­ writer with an acute descriptive eye and a ization In some respects, his story is merely keen understanding of soldier mentality, Ca­ one more, all-too familiar account of an ideal­ puto imparts a realism that literally transforms istic, “Camelot-generation” youngster the reader into a frontline “grunt.” In addition, undergoing the pain of progressive disillusion­ the author employs black comedy with a skill ment as he slogs through the jungle. Predicta­ seldom found among commentators on Viet­ bly, beloved comrades suffer mutilation and nam. Who can ever forget the colonel’s order death; generals make stupid and insensitive to exhume dead Vietcong and arrange them in demands; military tedium becomes excruciat­ parade formation in order to impress a visiting ing; and atrocities lose their capacity to shock. general? Of still greater singularity is the In a word, the corrosive effects of time and honesty with which Caputo views the combat reality transformed what in prospect had experience. Even though horrified by the seemed a brave crusade into a meaningless suffering and dehumanization the war evoked, nightmare. he nonetheless acknowledges the close cama­ Far more disturbing than the banality of the raderie, the narcotic exhilaration, and the narrative is the taint of self-service that per­ haunting nostalgia that were also its by-prod­ meates the book. Caputo strains to convince ucts. the reader that the murder of two innocent Vietnamese civilians, an incident in which he played a major part, was the work of some I I AD Lieutenant Caputo and his impersonal, battle-spawned demonic force marines read Herbert Schandler’s The Unmak­ rather than the result of such human frailties ing of a President,t they could at least have as frustration, poor judgment, and lack of enjoyed the solace of learning that the highest discipline. Similarly, he shamelessly plays for American officials shared their perplexity about sympathy in an effort to vindicate the disreput­ Vietnam. With the 1968 Tet offensive as a base able means he used to extricate himself from point, Schandler surveys the varied and com­ conviction by a court-martial for the heinous plex forces that influenced the conduct of the offense. Moreover, the author occasionally as­ war, his goal being to portray the intricacies of sumes an irritating Olympian pose, smirking at presidential decision-making in an era of pro­ the social and intellectual faux pas of his longed crisis. Combining exceptional exposi­ associates and demonstrating with ill-concealed tory talent, scholarly research, and insights delight his disdain for the humdrum of military gained from service in the Pentagon at the life. Yet, when an opportunity arises to sepa­ time, the author advances a thesis which, rate himself permanently from the environ­ though dispassionate in tone, is frightening in ment he finds so uncongenial, Caputo its implications. As he sees it, there was no unaccountably elects to remain on active duty coherent, agreed-on national strategy for pros­ with the Marine Corps. Such dissemblance ecuting the war from the earliest days of tHerbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), 419 pages. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW American intervention until after the Tet offen­ President valuable is the author’s facility- for sive. Up to that point, strategy had evolved isolating, analyzing, and explaining with lucid­ largely by default. In the absence of useful ity the labyrinthine factors that affected deci­ guidance from the President and the Secretary sion-making in the Johnson White House. of Defense, the military professionals had at Schandler also displays a remarkable capacity several critical junctures sought to impose for exploring the abstract without losing sight their own schemes for victory. In each in­ of the human. For that matter, his judicious stance, however, the civilian leadership de­ depiction of the ways in which sycophancy, murred, neither approving nor disapproving jealousy, fear, and ambition prejudiced what the plans of the military but at the same time should have been disinterested judgments refusing to suggest workable counterproposals. would of itself be sufficient to warrant careful The result was chaos, with bureaucratic whim, study of the book. executive hubris, domestic politics, and other This is not to say that The Unmaking of a peripheral considerations determining the President should be taken at face value. Schand­ manner in which the war was fought. It was in ler is unduly kind to the military leaders with this climate of indecisiveness and confusion whom he deals, particularly with regard to that the nonsensical on-again, off-again bomb­ their professional integrity. To be sure, he ing pauses, the crazy quilt approaches to dutifully records the sometimes sordid mach­ tactics and pacification, and the cavalier disre­ inations in which the Joint Chiefs engaged to gard for the strategic requirements of other win the support of civilian politicians, but the important areas were all engendered. Small author appears to believe that altruistic ends wonder that Caputo and his men failed to see somehow justified their clumsy Machiavellian­ the logic in what they were doing! ism, an untenable premise in this reviewer’s According to Schandler, the Communist at­ opinion. In a related vein, he passes lightly tack launched during the New Year’s holiday over a question which is of fundamental signif­ of 1968 proved to be a turning point. A costly- icance: What is the correct course for an officer tactical blunder for the North Vietnamese, the to follow when called on to execute policies he assault nevertheless served their strategic pur­ knows to be unsound? An inexperienced civil­ poses well. At one fell swoop the ambiguity, ian scholar might be forgiven for failing to ineffectiveness, and duplicity of American pol­ appreciate the relevance of that question, but icy were laid bare. The outcome was a loss of not Schandler. A “Duty, Honor, Country’ public confidence, which neither President West Pointer and a hard-bitten regular him­ Johnson nor his successors could regain. Ironi­ self, he knows better, and his reluctance to cally, the pain inflicted by this exposure forced deal candidly with the matter vitiates the the President and his advisers to devise a quality of an otherwise excellent piece of work. strategy that, given sufficient time, might have eventuated in victory, but by then it was too late; the military and political leadership had irrevocably forfeited their trust. /^ T FIRST glance it might seem The foregoing synopsis makes it clear that that Our Great Spring Victory, + written by Schandler’s book contains little new informa­ the commander of the Communist forces that tion. Rather, what makes The Unmaking of a conquered South Vietnam in the summer of tVan Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the t ail and Liberation of South Vietnam. Translated by John Spragens. Jr. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, $15.00), 275 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 1975, would prove a worthwhile supplement does not bother to define “special technological to the books by Caputo and Schandler; how­ unit.” A competent editor like Liddell Hart, ever, this is not the case. General Van Tien Burke Davis, or Martin Blumenson might have Dung’s primary aim is less to illuminate than been able to salvage Dung’s memoir; in its to tout his ideology, his party, and himself. present form, however. Our Great Spring Only inadvertently does the general shed light Victory is almost worthless. on the strategy and tactics that culminated in the surrender of Saigon. Thus, the professional reader in search of clues to the astonishing swiftness of the North Vietnamese success will CZa PUTO, in A Rumor of War, find himself sifting through page after page of foretells that future generations of West Point puerile bombast only to discover he could have cadets will not be taught the truth about the spent his time more profitably studying a field Vietnam conflict. To permit the fulfillment of manual. that prophesy would constitute the ultimate Dung begins with the assault on Ban Me folly of the whole dismal venture. Admittedly, Thuot in early March. He follows this with a now that Comrade Dung and his cohorts have brief and superficial exegesis of the 55-day re-educated the girls on Tu Do Street and Dr. onslaught that swept the ARVN forces from Spock’s young paladins have exchanged their the Central Highlands, engulfed the major jungle boots for platform shoes, it is tempting coastal enclaves, and finally overwhelmed Sai­ to consign the bitter experience to oblivion or gon. In classic Marxist-Leninist style, he attrib­ write it off as an aberration that never should utes these lightning victories to the justice of have occurred. But the professional soldier the cause, the spirit of the North Vietnamese cannot afford such indulgences. Wars similar people, the elan of the troops, inspired lead­ to the one in Vietnam are being fought in ership (presumably including his own), and to many areas of the world today, and if, as all that mystic strategic sixth sense with which the evidence attests, the trend continues, the Communism allegedly imbues its disciples. United States, sooner or later, may again find Not surprisingly, Comrade Dung either dis­ itself embroiled in another murky and exotic counts or denies the importance of several struggle. Faced with that likelihood, the mili­ other factors that tipped the scales in his favor: tary officer is duty-bound to learn all he can a demoralized and poorly led enemy army, a about the kind of warfare Vietnam typified, Saigon government abandoned by its only ally especially why the Herculean American effort and plagued by impotence, a South Vietnam­ went for naught. Granted an accurate compre­ ese population paralyzed by despair, and, cer­ hension of the reasons for our downfall in that tainly not least, a bountiful supply of captured particular conflict will not necessarily provide materiel. a blueprint for operating successfully in some Obsequious cant is by no means the only future struggle, but, even so, a searching, serious flaw in Our Great Spring Victory. objective analysis of the Vietnam debacle Whether through ignorance, gullibility, or po­ should, by enhancing the student’s perspective litical affinity, the American editor disregards and sharpening his powers of judgment, enable gross distortions, fails to explain esoteric mili­ him to think more creatively and act more tary terminology, and refrains from reducing effectively when the time comes. the reader s burden by excising repetitive and It is in the hope of prompting just such irrelevant passages. For example, he sees fit to contemplation that this reviewer presents the point out that Ho Chi Minh was especially reflections that follow. In no sense are these fond of leading groups in singing ‘Unity’ ” but musings definitive, nor, for that matter, are 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW they entirely original. Instead, they embody a makers relied on force alone to solve a problem synthesis of the experience, thought, and study that was as much political as it was military. of one fallible man. As such, they invite All but ignoring the transcendent issues of challenge from others more knowledgeable and pacification and governmental effectiveness, perceptive, indeed, if the ideas do provoke the Americans waged war in a manner that reasoned criticism, an important mission will more often than not seriously impeded the have been accomplished. feeble efforts that were being made to restore Leaving aside such egregious military sins as tranquility and maintain order in the country­ piecemealing forces and dividing command side. Surely, no great degree of sensitivity is responsibility, those who guided the American required to see that destroying an Asian peas­ effort in Vietnam committed several other ant s ancestral home, driving him off his land, blunders that, if perhaps less flagrant, were and leaving him to the tender mercies of inept equally devastating. As observers like S. L. A. and rapacious bureaucrats is hardly the most Marshall and Frances Fitzgerald have noted, efficacious way of “winning his heart and and as Caputo and Schandler imply, the force mind. Sad proof of this contention is to be structure from beginning to end was not tai­ found in the stark truth that at the end of a lored for the job at hand. Nor were the ten-year period, during which the Armed commanders chosen because of their ability to Forces of the United States won every battle deal with the special requirements that the they fought, pacification and governmental situation necessitated. On the contrary, while effectiveness were no further along than they paying lip service to counterinsurgency, the had been at the beginning. United States and its clients fought the entire In a way it would be comforting to maintain, war with conventionally organized units, utiliz­ as Fitzgerald and other commentators do, that ing techniques designed to combat a techno­ an unbridgeable culture gap foreordained the logically advanced enemy on the continent of disaster. However, the fact of the matter is Europe. Likewise, American generals in Viet­ that the failure stemmed from two deficiencies nam, with rare exceptions, were men whose that common sense and proper education could experience and professional education predis­ have prevented. On the one hand, present­ posed them to think in terms of World War II mindedness blinded Americans to the revolu­ and the Korean conflict. Under conditions that tionary and counterrevolutionary streams flow­ called for a George Crook, a T. E. Lawrence, ing deep through their own past, thereby or an Orde Wingate, the field commands were depriving them of the historical perspective given to hard-charging paratroopers, officers needed to place the modern-day, Vietnamese whose simplistic, “can-do’ attitudes made it counterparts of those streams in proper con­ veritably impossible for them to understand text. How ironic that twentieth-century Amer­ the ambiguities and subtleties of the upheaval icans felt obliged to coin the ugly phrase in Vietnam. These fallacies of organization and “counterinsurgency!” flow incredible that mil­ leadership were then magnified by adopting itary educators could construct courses to pre­ mechanistic and immaterial yardsticks for pare American officers for this so-called new measuring success. At best the emphasis on form of war without once calling to mind body count and "increasing the blue spots on Francis Marion, Tecumseh, Osceola, or Aguin- the map produced a dangerously unrealistic aldo! picture of progress; at worst it gave rise to On the other hand, cultural myopia distorted false official statements and atrocities, indelible the American perception of the way the Viet­ blots on the honor of the officer corps. namese viewed themselves. One fatuous out­ With similar persistence American policy­ growth of this defect was our ceaseless demand BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 for increasing participatory' democracy in a Saigon in the early days of our intervention, nation fractionalized by anarchy. Another was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave the childish assumption that those Vietnamese a speech honoring General Khan, the current w'ho related well to Americans were the best winner of the “coup sweepstakes. Lifting the men to command their armies and head their general’s arm in the boxer’s salute, the Secre­ government and. further, that they were rec­ tary proclaimed in English, “Here is the little ognized as such by their compatriots. Reminis­ guy who is going to win this war!’’ Then, cent of the manner in which agents of the carried away by the well-rehearsed cheers of United States government had once appointed the crowd, McNamara shouted, "Long live Indian chiefs, the Americans in Vietnam sus­ Vietnam!” in what he thought was the indige­ tained those native functionaries who spoke nous tongue. But the Secretary, as unversed good English and drank martinis, meanwhile in the language as in Vietnamese politics, overlooking honest, dedicated patriots w'ho missed a couple of tonal inflections and actually may have lacked these accomplishments but bellowed, “The southern duck wants to lie who, given the chance, might have unified the down.” Had the Communists not destroyed country' and expelled the Communists. the allied war memorial when they overran Saigon, they could have inscribed McNamara’s In KEEPING with the keynote of this article, it malapropism at the base. It would have made seems appropriate to close with an anecdote an eloquent epitaph for the American experi­ epitomizing American ignorance. On a visit to ence. York, Pennsylvania

Jack Anderson particularly, the authors pro­ POWER, CONTROL, vide as objective a look as may be possible at the world of foreign lobbyists. AND LEGITIMACY For the professional soldier or militarily oriented civilian scholar, however, this book Colonel Raymond E. Bell, Jr ., USAR has relatively little relevance from a military point of view. This is especially surprising considering that many foreign governments USSELL W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott lobby for money or credits to obtain weapons give us a carefully researched and very and equipment for their armed forces. The detailedR picture of “how lobbyists mold Amer­ book is more of a “people book" or even a ica’s foreign policy” in their book The Power “bank account book,’ highlighting the names Peddlers,t a “who’s who" in the world of of lobbyists and their finances, both of which lobbyists working on behalf of foreign govern­ are extreme enough to dazzle the eye. In fact, ments in Washington. W'ith the help of the it seems at times that this is more a personnel Fund of Investigative Journalism, and that of register than an attempt to explain how our tRussell W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott, The Power Peddlers: How lobbyists Mold Americas Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1977, $12.50), 569 pages. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW civil guy who helped save Israel in 1973 by government is influenced by gift seekers. running down U.S. Air Force stocks in Germany. Only two military personalities are discussed If he can be provoked into saying things like that, in the monograph: the late General George S. we have reason to be worried. . . . We should Brown, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of not overreact. Getting his scalp would . . . give Staff, and General Andrew Goodpaster, Super­ credence to his charges.” intendent of the United States Military Acad­ General Goodpaster’s presence in the book emy at West Point (in the grade of lieutenant results from less-publicized remarks about the general) and formerly Commander at Supreme Greek armed forces in 1974, when the mili­ Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). tary-installed junta government was in power. The two generals share a common misfortune: At that time the United States had adopted a comments they made moved lobbyists to fren­ more distant stance from the regime, and, zied activity. when General Goodpaster praised Greece for As might be expected, General Brown’s “maintenance of her forces to an excellent comments to a Duke University audience level of training and to a high degree of found a place in the book, and the handling of readiness, he was called to task by the United the incident hv the authors bespeaks their States ambassador in Athens, Henry Tasca, objectivity. The proffered explanation also who cabled Washington about the breach of helps to clarify the turgid situation. The scene the State Department’s hands-off policy. is lobbying in the context of the “Mideast The Greek lobby in Washington, in opposi­ conflict,” and the action is a description of “the tion to the junta, launched a campaign express­ white heat of a full Israeli lobby campaign ing “shock and dismay.’ Goodpaster was against a single individual. The campaign is summoned to Washington for a personal ap­ aimed at refuting the comments about Jewish pearance on 20 May 1974, before the House of control of the hanks and the press. Control of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe, to the former was rather easily disproved, hut the clarify his statement. In his testimony to the latter was tougher to handle since Jews head subcommittee. General Goodpaster explained “two of the three major TV networks and own he was "chagrined" that what he had said had the Washington Post, the New York Times, been used as proof of American support of the and the New York Post.’ The pressure by the Greek dictatorship. There was no objective Israeli lobby was intense. But, the writers Greek lobbyist around to buffer General Good­ argue, wiser heads prevailed who realized that paster against the storm, but then the public if General Brown lost his job, the general’s outcry to the Goodpaster incident was minimal point would be proved, and the pressure, as a compared with the uproar over General result, drop'ped off precipitously. Brown’s comments. The description of the Brown incident thus Aside from short discussions of Generals provides an interesting perspective of the risks Goodpaster and Brown and the outward ap­ of lobbying. Another perspective is the danger pearance of the book being a catalogue of of backlash. While the furor raged over the names and numbers. The Power Peddlers takes criticism of Israeli proponents by General an exhaustive look at the foreign lobbies, Brown, there were individuals in the Israeli starting with the China lobby and ending with camp who feared that gloating over the effec­ that of the South Molucca Islands. The book tiveness of Jewish pressure could boomerang literally takes one around the world through against Israel. Hyman Bookbinder, an influen­ Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, the Mid­ tial Israeli lobbyist, set about calming any east, Armenia, Tibet, and to the South Molucca Jewish reactions by taking this line. Islands (still regarded as Indonesian). By the I told people: "Here’s an intelligent, thoughtful. end of the book, the reader knows all the foreign BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 and American lobbyists on Capitol Hill pushing their number are two military professionals: their particular causes, but one wonders just Colonel Franklin D. Margiotta of Air Com­ why this is important. mand and Staff College and Dr. James H. If the book is significant for the military Buck on the Air War College faculty. At a time reader, it has to be that it points up the when civilians are not only emphasizing their intricacies of how a relatively unknown part of control over the military but seem to be the our governmental system works and that, as only ones who are publishing much about it, it part of a soldier’s overall education, he should is refreshing to see professional military men recognize how persuasive lobbying is. But the contributing to books being written about their book is not one that needs to be in your profession, if not writing the books themselves. library. Should you run for Congress, how­ Welch starts his preface with a quote from ever, I recommend you hasten to the nearest Clausewitz, arguing strongly for civilian control bookstore and purchase a copy. over the military. Clausewitz states that sub­ ordination of the military point of view to the political is the only possible relationship since war is an instrument of state policy and not vice versa. Unfortunately, he notes Clausewitz’s be­ THE other hand, Civilian lief in the supremacy of politics as being in­ Control of the Militaryt could very well oc­ creasingly disregarded while the “man on cupy a place on your professional bookshelves. horseback” has become more prominent. This It is a refreshing book in a couple of important historical background sets the framework for respects. Welch s effort; that is, an exploration of those First, for a book consisting of chapters by a exceptions to military rule while at the same number of commissioned authors, this is a re­ time showing the means for civilian control that markably cohesive book. The style is straight­ states might adopt. He concluded that the chief forward and the material well presented so that instruments for ensuring civilian control are a the reader obtains a clear view of the ramifica­ widely supported political party coupled with tions of civilian control over the military in a a self-imposed sense of restraint by officers and wide selection of countries. These countries are politicians alike. important because of the spectrum they cover Of particular interest in this respect is that and include India, Guyana, Malaysia, the Phil­ Lebanon, discussed in the book, has, since ippines, Japan, China, Finland, Mexico, Leba­ publication, had the underpinnings of a parlia­ non, and Chile. Claude E. Welch. Jr., who ment and a self-imposed sense of restraint by edited the book, excluded Africa because with politicians knocked from beneath it. At the the exceptions, as of late 1975. of Tunisia, Sen­ same time, the military has played an inconse­ egal, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zambia, quential role in the conflict between Lebanon’s "newly independent African countries have yet warring factions. So emasculated was the mili­ to establish means of civilian control that have tary that it was incapable of exercising any stood the test of time.” influence on the situation. As a result, one can Another aspect of the book is that although ask legitimately whether the army was simply its authors are not well known they represent the victim of “overcontrol” by civilians, a a great deal of experience, included among danger that is not discussed in the book but

tClaude E. Welch, Jr., editor, Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1976, $20.00), 337 pages. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW which represents a very real danger to the dent gives the military in his speeches; be­ security of a state. tween 1946 and 1972, he gave “effusive The excellence of Colonel Margiotta’s contri­ attention” to the military in 11 of his 13 bution on Mexico is typical of the chapters in speeches. this book. He has chosen a country that is Margiotta makes the point that although the much neglected in the military literature. For military has not received an inordinate propor­ most Americans, the military scene in Mexico tion of the country’s resources, what has been ends with the storming of Chapultepec in the received has been skillfully managed to “pro­ War with Mexico, though there are still alive vide economic incentives to political loyalty.” today some few who rode with General Persh­ For instance, military expenditures dropped ing in 191b against “Pancho” Villa. Mexico is a below 10 percent of total government expend­ major exception to the principal trend in Latin itures after 1950 (from 1938 to 1941 the America, where the military plays a powerful military portion represented 16.6 percent of role in the majority of governments. This is total government expenditures versus 8.7 per­ important, the author points out, because Mex­ cent from 1960 to 1965), yet pay has steadily ico has had a “long history of predatory mili­ increased, and the Mexican officer ratio of tary intervention into politics.” As late as 1929 earnings to average per capita income is at there was a revolt in the army. However, the least three times that of his United States political role of the military has become counterpart. smaller since then. Margiotta emphasizes that the military still Margiotta advances two schools of thought plays an important role in the political arena. on the role of the Mexican military: its removal The point, however, is that there is a very from politics and its viable but very diminished noticeable transition from military to civilian role. The latter role is further explained by the participation, even though the military holds military’s apparent acceptance of the psycho­ important “civilian” jobs in the executive logical and material situation, which means branch; in 1972, the military held a state improvement of the status is unnecessary and governorship, and there are military members that certain lesser political awards have re­ in Congress. duced the potential incentive for the military What emerges from this examination is a to intervene in politics. picture of subdued, yet real, military partici­ The author has selected for further exami­ pation in national politics. It is also clear that nation that relatively narrow area of psycholog­ the Mexican military receives benefits and ical, material, and political rewards received recognition that greatly lessen a more active by the Mexican military since 1946. when the role in trying to manipulate civilian control. first civilian president was elected. He does so Civilian Control of the Military is worth the in an effort to bring about a better understand­ professional soldier’s reading, especially in ing of the special and peculiar military-political light of General Brown’s controversial remarks, patterns in Mexico, and the reader will agree those of General Donn A. Starry, about the that he succeeds. possibility of future war, and Major General Margiotta provides an excellent picture of John K. Singlaub about Korea. In counterpoint the degree of involvement, both voluntary and to this book, the reader might be interested in mandated by custom, of the Mexican presi­ John W. Finney s article “The Military Has dent. Using a number of tables, he presents Always Known Who Is in Charge, in the May information on the allocation of resources to 4, 1977, issue of the New York Times. Regard­ the military. For example, a table of particular ing the Singlaub incident, Finney notes that interest shows how much attention the presi­ the “principle of civilian control is much better BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 understood and complied with than it was Forces’ by Emil Nagy and "Creek Service when President Truman fired Douglas Mac- Academies: Patterns of Recruitment and Orga­ Arthur.” Reading Welch’s book will further nizational Change by George A. Kouvetaris. enhance the understanding of what Finney is The introduction attempts somewhat unsuc­ talking about. cessfully to justify the inclusion of all the entries. For example, this reviewer found inclusion of the piece by Nagy (from the Military Academy, Budapest, Hungary) hard HEREAS Civilian Control of to justify- within the scope of the anthology: the Military can be recommended as a mind­ whether the traditional legitimacy of the mili­ broadening experience for the professional tary is still acceptable in today’s society, where military man unfamiliar with the control of the some see the military performing a destructive military in various nations of the world, en­ function. In his unevenly translated essay, dorsement of The Military and the Problem of Nagy seems to be saying the Communists have Legitimacyt must be more guarded. finally decided that television has merits in The book, edited by Gwyn Harries-Jenkins indoctrinating the armed forces. (Although it is of the University of Hull (United Kingdom) not intimated, Nagy could also be saying that and Jacques van Doom of Erasmus University television can be manipulated so that reception (Rotterdam, Netherlands), is one of the Sage from Austrian television stations just over the Studies in International Sociology, sponsored border will have a minimal impact on Hungar­ by the International Sociological Association. ian viewers.) Contributors to the book include the editors as There seems to be a distinct attempt at well as Morris Janowitz, who writes on “Mili­ balance in the book between Communist and tary Institutions and Citizenship in Western Western contributors. Although the purpose of Societies,’ and international authors from this review is not to "roast Nagy, the follow­ Communist countries, the United States, and ing quote makes one very suspicious of the Western countries. The international flavor of value of including selections on the basis of the book, although excellent in theory, is one “balance." thing about the work to be criticized. It should The sublime and deeply humanistic aims of so­ be noted, however, that these contributions cialism can be achieved by an historically high were selected from a limited number of papers standard of creative activity and by the ceaseless flow of the initiative of the mass of people. It is presented at the Eighth World Congress of So­ from the very essence of socialism that people’s ciology, in Toronto in August 1974, w'here 50 interest and political and public activity are grad­ sociologists from 24 countries took part in ses­ ually growing. We make every effort to develop sions of the Research Committee on Armed social democracy and involve masses of people in Forces and Society. the immediate direction and management of pub­ First, the title and the contents do not lic affairs. match. It appears that a book had to come out It is regrettable that party-political implica­ of this conference, and the title was the best tions have to appear in a volume that has one found to cover such divergent themes as excellent potential, but the reader must realize The Role of Mass Communications in the that not everything is viewed from a Western Political Socialization of the Hungarian Armed ethical standpoint. +Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques van Doom, editors. The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976, $12.00), 217 pages. 90 AIR UNIVERSm' REVIEW The international aspect of the book is national authorship, it is hard to agree that the flawed by poor translation. One no longer analyses are objective or, when the involved “heals up wounds, nor does one talk about vocabulary and sentence structure are stripped “picture-going.” On a different level the term from the writing, that the contributions are “not classified” has given way to “unclassified." really that scholarly. These small, seemingly insignificant examples are hardly earth shattering, but when com­ It is necessary to point out, however, that a bined with polemics and ponderous sentence serious attempt has been made to deal with a structure, w-hich can be hard to avoid in very tough problem and one which obviously translation, such vocabulary has the effect of is of concern. The military professional has a frustrating the reader to the point of “tuning vested interest in the military establishment, out.” and he naturally looks askance at those, espe­ The editors have been only partially success­ cially at those not themselves in the military ful in their efforts. They raise questions for regardless of how close their relationship to further consideration, and they do point out the military is, who even suggest questioning the complexity of the relationship between the their livelihood. But there is no question that military and the parent society that demands the book gives the military professional a continual analysis and questioning. The studies different perspective, which could lead to are not exhaustive, as the editors indicate, nor improving the quality of his or her professional do the authors present solutions to the prob­ calling. lems. But in spite of the distinguished multi­ Washington, DC.

Potpourri

speed. Then follows a brief review of the vehicles Jane’s World Armoured Fighting Vehicles by Chris­ development, a description of the vehicle, and a topher F. Foss. New York. St. Martin’s Press, discussion of the variants of the basic machine. 1976, 437 pages, $25.00. Jane’s World Armoured Fighting Vehicles con­ This volume deals with "all types of armoured tains a vast amount of material about a host of fighting vehicles,” including scout and armored fighting machines. The accessibility of the informa­ cars, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled ar­ tion is greatly enhanced by an index that enables tillery pieces, and tanks. A section is devoted to one to turn rapidly to the page containing tabular each type of contemporary armored fighting vehicle. data on the various vehicles. This book should be Within each, the vehicles are presented by country. helpful to anyone who is seeking a quick answer to Some of the major nations considered are China, a question about a current fighting vehicle. France, West Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Ja­ Major Donald R Baucom. L'SAF pan, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, and Department of History the United States. USAF Academy Foss's treatment of each vehicle begins with information on the manufacturer and a table of basic Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941: The Partner­ data on the vehicle, such as weight, armament, and ship that Saved the West by Joseph P. Lash. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

New York: W. VV. Norton & Company, 1976, 528 A New Yorker in Egypt by Hans Koning. New pages + index, bibliographical note, references, York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1976, 265 $12.95. pages, $10.95. The number of works covering World War II, or the events leading to it, continues to grow. As one 1 was taught to believe that a travel book tells might expect, the quality of these volumes varies, something about the culture and society of a people yet each offers the mythical general reader some­ and that the account is credible only when the thing. Joseph Lash uses the techniques of both an insights the author offers correspond to the growth oral historian and a bona fide researcher to present he experiences in the course of the encounter. If a well-balanced narrative of two individuals who this is so, Hans Koning’s book represents the worst contributed much to the war’s efforts in all arenas. kind of travel literature. Nowhere does the reader Covering the period from the outbreak of war in get the impression that the author understands Europe to Pearl Harbor, the book is an excellent Egypt or Egyptians at all. So imbued is Koning synthesis of both personal and well-researched in­ with the journalist’s slavish devotion to the imme­ sights by an author who was present at many of the diacy of the present that he reduces the Egyptian events described. Basically, the author set out to landscape to a uniform shade of gray. present a history through the personalities and Prominent in this book is the author s obsession policies of two men, Franklin Roosevelt and Win- with Egypt’s wretchedness, to the extent that it ston Churchill. Often, attempts to draw parallels haunts him wherever he goes. At every turn, the between the two are overdone. Still, Lash manages specter of squalor rises to assault his sensibilities. to stress the differences in their temperaments and No understanding of the sociology' of poverty can show the intricacies of the political systems in which temper his disgust or evoke his compassion. Bitterly both labored—one working in a checks-and-balances disappointed at the inability of the Egyptians to live system of democracy, the other wielding power in a up to his expectations and the rhetoric of Egypt's constitutional monarchy. Churchill appears to have own revolution, Mr. Koning lapses into the racism dealt with a free hand, while Roosevelt played a of the disenchanted liberal: he is forced to explain role within a constitutional framework that required away poverty as a self-inflicted vice. This he does his getting the American public on his side before with all the chic catch phrases at his disposal, the acting decisively. mordant jibes, the caustic barbs, the smugness of Clearly portrayed are the ingenious minds of both his own urban parochialism. men as one tried to involve the United States in a In support of these observations, I feel it necessary war to save Great Britain, and the other protested to point out a number of inaccuracies and half-truths coquettishly while taking measures that eventually which, no doubt, contribute to the author's bias and led to that same end. The manner in which both compound his ignorance. Mr. Koning dismisses the men used the available powers bestowed on them is decadence of the port of Alexandria with the assertion a marvelous presentation of research and writing. that the Arabs were never oriented toward the sea. Roosevelt, the bargainer, is shown at his best while (p. 19) What impulse then, one wonders, compelled building policies out of the divergent views of the Arab navies to dominate the Mediterranean basin advisers and shaping (although often in the back­ for most of the Middle Ages? Although Koning is ground) the policies that led inexorably to more and correct in contending that Cairo stands symbolically more aid for the beleaguered Britains. Churchill, for all of Egypt, Cairo is not called Misr, as he sug­ always one who sensed his greatness, is depicted as gests, but often Masr, Misr being the word used for a man carefully working with the English language the country itself, (p. 60) Anyone who had bothered to promote a solidarity in his nation, his flair for the to study a little Arabic before embarking on a trip to dramatic (heroic perhaps) in the many speeches Egypt would have been aware of this fact. before Parliament is well portrayed. The author claims, furthermore, that before Na­ Although at times one feels that the author may poleon brought his armies and a printing press to have overreached himself in describing how much Egypt in 1799 the country wallowed in primeval the two men complemented one another, there can darkness, (p. 63) From the Western point of view, be little doubt as to the amount of research that dominated as it is by a linear Idea of Progress, went into this well-written book, one that should be Egypt cannot compare to Europe. But is it fair for on the shelves of those who work in this field. the author not to recognize Egypt's paramount po­ Lloyd H. Cornett sition in the Middle East, for instance, as the intel­ Albert F. Simpson Historical and Research Center lectual capital of Islam since its founding in the tenth Maxwell AFB. Alabama century—or perhaps he simply doesn t know this? 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

One remark, however, stands out among the rest The wealth of photographs contained in Spitfire as illustrative of the author's prejudice. He asserts at War, many of them not published previously, that "one of Allah's epithets is the 'Merciful One,' gives this work aesthetic as well as historical value. but killing is a part of Islam. I should like to It should be noted, however, that Price overuses suggest that the history of Islam with respect to its illustrations at times. His chapter on the birth of treatment of non-Muslims is exemplary compared to the Spitfire, for example, is composed of six photo­ the barbaric punishment inflicted by the Inquisition graphs with no text other than six picture captions. on dissenters, Christian and non-Christian alike. To cover three years of an aircrafts development in Familiarity with basic historical data is sufficient to such an offhand manner is something of an injustice. prove the point. Another weakness of the study is a distinct lack of One wonders why the book was published, mis­ continuity in that the author neglects to integrate informed as it is and often bordering on the his collection of short accounts into a unified text. distasteful. The reader would be well advised to For example, in one chapter the reader is presented look elsewhere for an introduction to Egypt and its with a description of Spitfire accidents and in the culture. next with an account of a mock combat between the World War II fighter and the modern mach-2 BAC Dr. Lewis Ware Lightning. The author makes no attempt to bridge Air War College the gap. Maxwell AFB. Alabama However, readers looking for a new perspective on an aircraft about which much has been written will find it in Price’s volume. Yet the reader who is seeking a complete, authoritative account of Super­ marine’s Spitfire will be disappointed. Neverthe­ less, the flaws of Alfred Price’s book are outweighed Spitfire at War by Alfred Price. New York: Charles by its positive aspects. Spitfire at War should be a Scribner’s Sons, 1977, 160 pages, $10.95. welcome addition to the library of the aeronautical historian as well as the air power buff. Few warplanes have earned the fame of the Cadet James R. Smith, USAF Supermarine Spitfire. In the emotional environment USAF Academy, Colorado of the Battle of Britain, this nimble fighter became the virtual symbol of British resistance. Since World War II, the Spitfire has been the subject of many volumes by respected aviation historians. A recent volume by Alfred Price, Spitfire at War, is essen­ tially an anthology- of articles written from various viewpoints by men who knew the British fighter in war. Prelude to Disaster: The American Role in Viet­ Spitfire at War is by no means a complete study nam, 1940-1963 by Weldon A. Brown. Port of England’s most famous World War II fighter. It Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1975, is, however,, a new perspective on an old topic, and 278 pages, $15.00. a refreshing one at that. Price’s volume examines The Last Chopper: The Denouement of the Amer­ some of the lesser known aspects of this popular ican Role in Vietnam, 1964—1975 by Weldon A. warplane’s history. Few people, for example, re­ Brown. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat member the Spitfire as a naval artillery spotter for Press, 1976, 359 pages, $15.00. the Normandy invasion or as a counterinsurgency aircraft in the Malayan conflict of 1948. These are The so-called “Vietnam era” has already been but two uses of the Spitfire covered in the book. described in a multiplicity of books. More often Price s book avoids the standard, perhaps over­ than not the authors have taken sides, pro or con, used. sources such as Douglas Bader anil Alan on America’s involvement and used sources to back Deere. In an approach that enables the author to up their particular theses. Whipping boys have bring new material to light. Price turns to test ranged from presidents, through the military- estab­ pilots, aerodynamieists, and armorers who worked lishment, and even to the sometimes-violent college with the Spitfire. The amount of material already- student. Apparently, there is no middle ground; published on the aircraft makes this new approach each writer’s position seems destined to justify the the most pleasing aspect of the book. camp of either the "hawks or the doves. Readers BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 arc caught between in their quest for accurate entire Vietnam era, its heroes and its villains. The knowledge. carefully documented sources will provide scholars It is refreshing to discover a comprehensive look with a solid starting point for that inevitable but at Vietnam that is as nearly unbiased as possible yet distant definitive work on Vietnam. Future credita­ sufficiently sprinkled with the author s summations ble works on the subject will have to include these and opinions to be interesting. These two books by volumes in the bibliography. Professor Weldon A. Brown were published a year Dr. John H. Scrivner apart, yet they are actually two halves of the same El Paso Community College loaf. In the earlier book the author narrates the Colorado Springs, Colorado U.S. presence in Vietnam since 1940 and ends with the massive American involvement of 1963. He concludes his story in the second book by chroni­ cling, in almost painstaking detail, the gradualism’ of American involvement and final withdrawal. Guernica: The Crucible of YVorld YVar II by Brown has surveyed a vast amount of previously Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan YVitts. New published material. His organization of it is brilliant, York: Ballantine Books, 1977, xix + 283 pages, and his reportorial honesty in acknowledging his $1.95. sources is commendable. So pat is the journalistic detail with which incidents such as the Gulf of This is another in a series of documentaries by Tonkin, the Geneva Talks, and Linebacker II are Thomas and YY'itts dealing with selected episodes of reported that the pages begin to read like yester­ twentieth-century tragedy. In the tradition of their day’s newspaper. Though the reading may occasion­ Shipwreck and Voyage of the Damned, Guernica ally plot a bit, the end result is worth cheering. breathes new life into events that have been smoth­ The volumes are not totally impersonal, however. ered by time and the sterility of history. By re-cre­ The author characterizes the Gulf of Tonkin action ating the events of two days in a Basque tow n during as taken in "inexcusable haste’ and the congres­ the Spanish Civil YV'ar, the authors present a world sional support of the war at that time as “popular war in microcosm. Their purpose, though, is more emotionalism, spurred on by executive persuasion than symbolic. They present a clear, hour-by-hour that caused its members to vote the way they account of how and why the spiritual center of Basque thought the people felt rather than their “honest independence was destroyed by Franco through the convictions. However, he explains, his task in German Condor Legion. The myth, born out of na­ writing is to record "what was, not what ought to tionalist propaganda, that the carnage was under­ have been.” Professor Brown agrees that it will taken by Basque separatists has long since been "most likely be decades before the full storv can be discredited, but still the issue has been obscured by told.” tight-lipped governments in fear of embarrassment. He reconciles the ultimate fall of South Vietnam Thomas and YVitts, primarily through interviews with by summarizing: local survivors and German participants, have recon­ Surely eighteen years of aid and the sacrifice of fifty-six structed a touching human story of w ar’s tragic inef­ thousand lives were enough If freedom failed there ficiency. [South Y'ietnam] the fault would have to lie with the The aerial bombing of Guernica, a small-scale people of South Y'ietnam. Aid and men we could give blueprint for the raids of YVorld YY^ar II, marked the for a limited time, but the will we could never supply. beginning of a new era in modem warfare, but the The Y'ietnam conflict is still too fresh to permit authors are less concerned with historical move­ the author access to all the classified materials ments than with their victims. The purpose of the generated from it. YVhen declassification comes, it book is not so much to inform as to move its is hoped that Professor Brown will still be available, readers, and the subtle use of contrast is its vehicle. for he has the talent to take the myriad details and The juxtaposition of the innocence and silent cour­ assemble them into an understandable whole. Such age of Guernica’s citizens with the tactical calcula­ a talent will be needed and sorely tried before the tions and bravado of the Condor Legion creates a final story of Y ietnam satisfies the historians, the powerful effect. There is little doubt as to which is antiwar liberals, or the many participants. more admired by the authors. The stories of the Meanwhile, the most unbiased and informative townspeople are also woven in pairs—a technique two volumes on Y'ietnam and America’s role there which adds meaning to their fate. And always are these written by YVeldon Brown. Readers will looming in the background is the specter of Franco find them the best basis from which to judge the with Hitler at his side. Despite the inevitability of 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the terrible ending, the authors evoke the same weapon type. The book covers more than 170 false hopes of well-being in the reader as those held weapons and 40 pieces of ancillary equipment. The by the townspeople themselves. significant physical and operational characteristics The book is supplemented with notes, bibliog­ are listed for each weapon, and its unique features raphy, an excellent index, several photographs of are summarized in a paragraph or two. A photo­ people and places before and after, and an espe­ graph of each piece of equipment accompanies the cially helpful list of characters. The appendices add written description. The book also contains a glos­ perspective by revealing the authors methods of sary of artillery terms, a 15-page chart that outlines research and the obstacles they encountered. De­ by country the artillery weapons in service today, spite the "official strictures" imposed primarily by and an easy-to-use index. Franco's bureaucracy in Guernica, it is not likely Brassey s is a reference work, and its primary that the product would have been substantially strength is that it surveys every' artillery weapon different had the authors conducted their research currently in the field. The editor has done a sound in the more liberal atmosphere of present Spanish job in selecting which characteristics to include. politics, for their primary sources were not forbid­ However, if one is looking for the most detailed den archives but people with "hands that shake source available, one should refer to Brassey s major with emotion, eyes that shed tears over events no competitor, Jane's Weapon Systems of the World, human being has heard before. In view of all this, 1977, which covers fewer weapons but does so in Thomas and Witts are amazingly fair in their inter­ far greater detail. Brasseys is intended to be a pretations. catalogue of all artillery weapons in service today. Guernica is a story that deserves the devoted It fulfills this charge, and its comprehensive cover­ work its authors display. Packed with emotion, rich age should earn it a place in the reference section in literary technique, and faithful to its sources, the of every library. book does justice to “a chain of events that is still Major E. Paul Semmens, USA thrashing in the lives we lead today. Air Defense Artillery Lieutenant Scott W. Brennan, USAF USAF Academy Loring AFB, Maine

Brasseys Artillery of the World edited by Shelford Rise, and Fight Again by Charles Bracelen Flood. Bidwell. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1976, 464 1977, 274 pages + index, $39.95. pages, $12.95. Reportedly, Napoleon once said that “God fights In the afterglow of our Bicentennial celebrations, on the side with the best artillery,” and, as in the it is both refreshing and gratifying to discover nineteenth century, there are those of us even Charles Bracelen Flood s Rise, and Fight Again, a today who think artillery still can be decisive. balanced, colorful, and readable history of the Brassey s Artillery of the World seeks to provide rebellion and civil war that was our American the military man. the defence-oriented general Revolution. Written, no doubt, to take advantage ol reader, the military commentator, and the defence the Bicentennial market. Flood s narrative of the correspondent" with a comprehensive survey of war is well conceived and well researched. The artillery currently in service worldwide. The work genre and caliber of the book promise to place also attempts to define the “method of employment Flood in the ranks of such noted writers of historical for several general classes of artillery weapons. literature as Hervey Allen, Kenneth Roberts, The editor includes chapters on towed and self- Thomas Fleming, and Allan Eckert. propelled field artillery, mortars, surface-to-surface Rise, and Fight Again is popular history. It is an missiles, antitank guns and missiles, air defense easily mastered, well-integrated composite of geog­ guns and missiles, and coast artillery, for the term raphy, war strategy, battle tactics, personality artillery is broadly inclusive. Additionally, two sketches, and delightful anecdotes. The reader will short chapters are devoted to air defense and field also find numerous examples of the vagaries of war: artillery support equipment. The author, Brigadier courage, bravery, self-sacrifice, and camaraderie as Shelford Bidwell. prefaces each section with a short well as cowardice, desertion, looting, and atrocity. essay that comments on the general tactical employ­ Characteristic of these vagaries is the dramatic ment. design features, and system operation for that description of those who fought and those who ran HOOKS AND IDEAS 95 at Camden—from the gallant Major General the than glory. Rise, and Eight Again goes a long way Baron de Kalb, who remained in the fight until he toward destroying many of the myths surrounding dropped from the effects of eight blade and three the sunshine patriots of the Revolution. As Flood bullet wounds, to the ignominious flight of General clearly demonstrates, the- war was a long and Horatio Gates. arduous affair, pitting patriot against loyalist, and Not only is Flood's work a realistic portrayal of volunteer militia against professional regulars in a the leaders and soldiers who fought throughout the series of American defeats that should have tolled war hut it is also a testimonial to the spirit and faith the death knell for the patriot cause. But this was that motivated certain American commanders and not to be because of the spirit of those who their men, who, after enduring starvation, cold, concurred with Nathanael Greene’s assessment capture, prison, and exchange, returned for the "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again. ' It was next engagement. It was these qualities of elan and this indefatigable spirit that was the essence of the endurance that kept the ranks of those ragtag armies Revolution, and Flood's masterful account of the filled and eventually wore down the world's greatest war recognizes this. military establishment to win independence for the Captain Walter T. Hitchcock, L'SAF United States. With its emphasis on hardship rather Department of History USAF Academy

the contributors

Major Thad A. Wolfe USAFA. M.S.E.E. University of Wyoming) is with the Readiness Measurement Group. Directorate of Opera­ Major Tyrus W. Cobb, USA. (M.A . Indiana tions and Readiness, Hq USAF He has had First Lieutenant John \V. Jenson ( USA FA University) is an assistant professor in the assignments in England and Vietnam as a M.A., University of Michigan) is a Minute- Department of Social Sciences. United States signals intelligence officer, Scientific and man missile combat crew commander evalua­ Military Academy. His assignments have in­ Technical Intelligence Directorate. Defense tor. 341st Strategic Missile Wing. Malmstroin cluded tours in Vietnam and as an adviser Intelligence Agency, a tour as T-38 instructor ^FB. Montana At Malmstrom he has been a with the Italian Air Force, he has been on the pilot and (light commander at Vance AFB. deputy missile combat crew commander and Army Staff in Intelligence and Operations Oklahoma; B-52 commander, standarization a Mmuteman missile combat crew com­ Directorates and a member of the Chief of evaluation instructor pilot, and squadron op­ mander instructor, and he serves as base Staffs Strategic Assessment Group. Major erations officer. 325th Bomb Squadron, Fair- community services program officer. Lieuten­ Cobb has published articles on Soviet politics, child AFB. Washington. Major Wolfe is a ant Jenson is an avid student of military military strategy, and air defense, and he is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and history, strategy, and tactics. Ph.D candidate. Georgetown University. Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Elliott M A St. Mary's University) is Deputy Chief, Policy Colonel James L. Morrison, Jr., USA (Ret). Analysts Croup, Office of the Secretary of the (Ph D., Columbia University) is an associate Air Force. He has served as an intelligence professor of American History at York College officer at Headquarters TAG and USAFSS, an of Pennsylvania He has taught history at the EC-121 crew member in Thailand, served on U.S. Military Academy and served as an the faculty of Squadron Officer School, and as adviser with the 22d Infantry Division. Army a political-military affairs officer. Hq USAF of Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Morrison is Colonel Elliott is a graduate of Air Command editor of The Memoirs of Henry Heth (Green­ and StafT College and a Ph D candidate, wood Press. 1974) and a previous contributor Georgetown University to the Review and other military and historical journals.

Group Captain R. A. Mason, RAF. (M.A St Andrews University and London Univer­ sity) is Director of Defence Studies. Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell. England He has served in the Education Branch of the RAF. on the staff of the Air Officer Com­ manding in Chief. RAF Training Command, Brampton; as RAF Exchange Officer to the Department of History’, USAF Academy, and as Command Education Officer. RAF Support Command. He has lectured at several British universities and had articles and reviews pub­ lished in journals on both sides of the Atlan­ Colonel Raymond E. Bell. Jr., USAR, Colonel Murray Green, USAF (Ret), B s.S tic. including the Review. Group Captain (USMA; M.A Middlebury College' is a stu­ M S City College of New York. Ph D.. Mason is a graduate of USAF Air War College dent at the National War College and a American University) is living in retirement and the RAF Staff College. research consultant on leave from the Histor­ in the Washington area after thirty-four years ical Evaluation Research Organization, Dunn as a civilian employee of the Air Force, Loring. Virginia. He also heads a team study­ including service in the Office of the Air ing defense postures in West Germany, and Force Secretary. He has published numerous he teaches Army Command and General Staff magazine articles, including "Major General College courses to active and reserve compo­ Hugh J Knerr. Hard Campaigner for Air- nent officers at West Point Bell is a graduate power." Air Force, October 1978. Dr. Green of the Army War College Correspondence is currently working on a biographv of Gen­ Study Course and a previous contributor to eral H H Arnold. the Review.

V The Air University Review Awards Committee has seleeted "Master at Arms: Clausewitz in Full \ iew In Lieutenant Colonel David Maelsaae, USAF, as the outstanding artiele in the January-Fehruary 1979 issue ol Air ( niversity Review. editorial staff advisers

Lieut ena nt Colonel David R Mets, I’SAF C olonel Robert J. O 'B rien. J r . Editor Hq Aerospace Defense Command Major Theodore M Kliz. L'SAF M ajor G ener al J ohn W. Huston, Chief Associate Editor Office of Air Force History Jack H Moonev D r . H ar old M. Hel f nian Managing Editor Hq Air Force Systems Command John A W estcoit C olonel Ric h a r d A. I ngr am Art Director and Production Manager Hq Air Training Command E vjUQt e Gaston D r . K ennet h J G roves Associate Editor. Hq Air University (ATC) Spanish Language Edition L ieu t en a n t C olonel Louis a Torraca. J r . Lia Mid o s i May Patterson Hq Military Airlift Command Associate Editor. F rancis \V . Jennings Portuguese Language Edition Air Force Service Information L~ Sews Center Wil l ia m J De Paola C olonel D avid 0. Schillerstr om Art Editor and Illustrator Hq Strategic Air Command Rudolph W. Mow.an L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Stephen B H inder l iter Financial and Administrative Manager Hq Tactical Air Command L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Robert W. Hunter Hq United States Air Force Academy C olonel G lenn E. W asson Hq United States Forces. Japan P r of essor I. B. H olley Jr . , Duke University Major General. Air Force Reserve attention The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United Slates Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is lo present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Forte, Air Training Command, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.

Address manuscripts to Editor. Air University Review lo Superintendent of Documents, GPO. Washington DC Drv.sion. Bldg 1211 Marwell AF8 Al 36112 Printed 20402. yearly $11 60 domestic. $14 50 foreign; single by Government Printing Office Address subscriptions copy $2 00 Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2 t V

The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force MAY-JUNE 1979

MM