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Countering the Contagion Effect of COVID-19

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Countering the Contagion Effect of COVID-19 Countering the Contagion Effect of COVID-19: An Appraisal of China’s Influence Operations AND WAR R L FAR O E Vivek Verma F S E T R U T D N IE E S C Abstract For China to realise its millennium goal, it needs to radiate its influence globally and simultaneously engage internally with the local population to ensure social stability. COVID-19 has disrupted China’s dream of showcasing to the world a model state with Chinese characteristics. Influence operations thus form the basis of curating and presenting a credible image of the Communist Party of China (CPC) besides altering the behaviour of its adversaries.CLAWS China has tried to firewall the western influence besidesV making inroads into other countries’ economic, political IC ON and societal institutions.TO At the time of COVID-19I Scrisis,I it is employing RY H V leverages to correct the narrative THR whileOU gainingG situational awareness through revamped structures and employment of technologies. It is thus imperative to appraise China’s influence operations capabilities. Introduction On 8 September 2020, China celebrated the success against the COVID-19. Chinese President Xi Jinping in his lengthy speech at the Brigadier Vivek Verma is a Senior Research Fellow at The United Services Institution of India, New Delhi. He was the former Deputy Director at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. CLAWS Journal l Winter 2020 167 VIVEK VERMA Great Hall of the People used the occasion to recount the merits of the one-party rule and emphasised the need for strong leadership as “the most reliable backbone” for the Chinese people in times of crisis.1 According to World Health Organization (WHO), there have been 45,942,902 cases with 1,192,644 deaths worldwide; while in China, there have been 91,921 cases with 4746 deaths, as on 1 November 2020.2 Though China may be rejoicing and showcasing to the world and their local populace that it has beenD W ableA to tame the pandemic, but LAN RFA it is aware of the headwindOR facing it. The originR Eand delay in sharing F S COVID-19 specimenE details with the world and namingT it as ‘Wuhan Virus’ or the ‘ChinaR Virus’ has tarnished China’s image. ChinaU does not T D want historyN to be unkind to it, and it is set to face the worldIE squarely through its Einfluence mechanism. S C With the United States (US) being affected the most under COVID-19, with more people lost to a pandemic than it did during the raid on Pearl Harbour during World War II or the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2000; the US is leading the charge against China over handling of COVID-19 by manipulating the WHO. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even justified the US unilateral action of quitting the WHO.3 The sequence of events leading to the pronouncement by the WHO ofCLAWS declaring COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of InternationalV Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020, has IC ON been at the centre ofT theO debate. Incidentally, theIS initialI WHO timeline RY H V was replaced on 29 June 2020, TH withRO theUG curated version by the WHO to set the record straight.4 According to WHO’s initial statement the cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown cause was noticed by Chinese authorities in its Wuhan City, Hubei Province, on 31 December 2019, and genetic sequence of identified COVID-19 was shared on January 12, 2020; and it was only on 11 March 2020, WHO declared COVID-19 as a ‘pandemic.’ 168 CLAWS Journal l Winter 2020 COUNTERING THE CONTAGION EFFECT OF COVID-19 Contextualising COVID-19: The Pre-COVID Actions by China Quelling the Truth China’s core national defence aim is to safeguard national political security, people’s security and social stability.5 China seemed to be well aware of the pandemic fallout on the society and had probably assessed the capability degradation toA NadministerD WA Rand control the movement 6 L FA of populations. TheO foremostR priority for the CPC,RE therefore, was to F S deal with societalE turbulence and to quell any noise withinT the medical and media fraternity.R This was evident from the quick reactionU by the T D China PublicN Security Bureau to suppress Dr. Li Wenliang’s warningIE of a SARSs-like Evirus in Wuhan on 30 December 2019—an issue thatS had the C potential to disturb the social order. The timing of disclosure and messaging are of importance to the CPC. By mid-December 2019, the guidelines for the local journalists were issued by the CPC to ensure content sanctity includes cinema, TV, journalism, music, radio, social media and all the new ways to consume content. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the Chinese government’s watchdog, has set up supervision on platforms that include those run by microblogging serviceCLAWS provider Sina Weibo, short video and news apps operatorV ByteDance, and Tencent Holdings, WeChat app IC ON known as Weixin in TmainlandO China where it hasIS Imore than 1 billion RY H V users. “WeChat account shutdowns” THRO becameUG a trending topic on Weibo before the discussion page was removed on 6 February 2020.7 Ramping up the Effort Despite growing cases in Wuhan, China carefully weighed the pros and cons with the nurtured support at the WHO. While the flurry of activities was taking place at WHO emergency committee to submit the report, China used the period to ramp up the state machinery in a quasi- CLAWS Journal l Winter 2020 169 VIVEK VERMA warlike mode to deal with the virus which it knew to be pandemic. The leadership was probably aware of the unknown virus. Hence, it used the time to secure the supplies of epidemic related medical equipment from the worldwide market, including the US, which exported 2.4 million pieces to China between 24 January and 29 February 2020.8 Almost a week before the WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic, Xi Jinping on 25 January, on the eve of the Chinese New Year of Rat, declared the tough measures to tackleD W theA COVID-19 threat which had LAN RFA Wuhan at its epicentre.OR Within a day Premier Li RKeqiangE was made the F S head of the leadingE small group of epidemic control withT 32 departments established underR its wing, mobilisation of the People’sU Armed Police T D (PAP), activationN of PLA Logistics Command at Wuhan andIE pairing of 19 provincialE regions with 16 cities to prepare for Hubei-like outbreakS of C the COVID-19. Pushing the Narrative in the Post-COVID-19 World by the CPC The CPC intended to showcase the existence of strong command governance system under Xi. The agile governance narrative was woven to tell the citizen in China and the world community at large that the CPC cared for its people and the willing participation by the people helped in stemming the pandemicCLAWS outbreak. The WeChat and Weibo were put under Vvigilance. Amidst global destabilisation, the strategic IC ON objective for Xi JinpingTO is clear—to protect the IsupremacySI of the CPC RY H V and prevent the snowballing of T crisis.HRO ItU endeavoursG to localise the impact due to COVID-19 while ensuring social stability within its borders so that its millennium goal of prosperity remains intact. For the CPC, its image is very important to it. It needs to be seen as the champion of the Chinese cause. China recognises that the stigmatisation due to COVID-19 will add another humiliation narrative attributing to the CPC rule—a narrative it can ill afford. Hence, employing the ‘three warfare’ strategy is the only choice available to it to control the opinion, 170 CLAWS Journal l Winter 2020 COUNTERING THE CONTAGION EFFECT OF COVID-19 legal and psychological space to correct the battle of perceptions both locally and internationally. The CPC’s bigger concern rested on handling of the narrative coming out from Wuhan. As a result of which, Ms Sun Chunlan, the Vice Premier and former United Force Work Department (UFWD) minister,9 was appointed instead of an epidemic expert to deal with the Wuhan crisis. A Big-Data surveillance plan through mobile applications like AliPay and WeChat were usedD toW enforceA restrictions and allowed LAN RFA the government to keepOR track of people’s movement.RE The news of the F 10 S mysterious disappearanceE of 21 million mobile users atT the start of the pandemic had Rto be refuted. To communicate the curatedU images and T D assuage the localN population apprehensions, daily briefings IbyE the State Council wereE undertaken. Chinese prowess in dealing with theS epidemic C was showcased by building of a 1000-bed hospital over ten days with the two-pronged aim—firstly to calm the population about the lack of medical facility and secondly to market Chinese healthcare systems to the countries tied to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).11 To further control the narrative, Research Paper Sanitisation Directive was promulgated for the research scholars.12 Sponsored research such as “China’s Fight against COVID-19” was jointly compiled by China Daily, Tsinghua University and PekingCLAWS Union Medical College was published to showcase agile governance, strong leadership of President Xi and applause VI N C 13 O people’s contributionT inO containing the virus. Besides,ISI China’s National RY H V Library has been tasked to record TH theRO historyUG of COVID-19.14 The world, distanced, divided and destabilised, is being shaped by geoeconomics and geopolitical tumult.
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