File 1 Overlord Cover Plan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Overview 1943 - 1944 BIGOT BRITISH — MOST SECRET U.S. — SECRET Copy No. _______1 OVERLORD COVER PLAN1 Document BIGOT G-3 1 Document Document 2 Document Document 2 Document overlord cover plan Overview An admirer of strategic deception, convincing him that the real invasion Great Britain’s Prime Minister, Winston was just a diversion for a larger Churchill established the London imminent invasion. Controlling Section (LCS) in mid-1942. To achieve this, Bodyguard This was a secret bureau that met within proposed a war plan that was just close Churchill’s underground Cabinet War enough to the truth to seem credible to Rooms to plan stratagem against Hitler’s Hitler, but would mislead him completely Nazi regime. As Chief of the LCS in July, about the time, place, and force of the 1943, Colonel John Bevan submitted invasion. Therefore, Bodyguard created “Plan Jael,” the overall deception policy no less than 36 subordinate deception for the Overlord invasion. plans with peculiar names to keep the Plan Jael, named after a woman in Nazi forces spread out and guessing the Old Testament who committed acts of where and when the Allies would invade treachery, contained ﬁve main spheres of western Europe. For example, Operation secret activity: offensive intelligence, Ironside presented the threat of an counter-intelligence and security, special assault at Bordeaux, France, while operations, political warfare, and Operation Vendetta threatened the deception. After many revisions and region of Marseilles, France, and names, Jael became “Bodyguard” and Operation Ferdinand kept Nazi troops was presented to General Eisenhower occupied in the Genoa region of Italy. when he reported to duty as the Supreme Operation Fortitude was a major Allied Commander in January, 1944. piece of Bodyguard and it was also The codename “Bodyguard” was divided into two sub-plans, Fortitude chosen due to the following quote said by North and Fortitude South. Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin in The objective of Fortitude North 1943: “In wartime, truth is so precious was to convince Hitler to keep the 27 that she should always be attended by a divisions he had stationed in Norway, bodyguard of lies.” Denmark, and Finland in place until the Bodyguard was the overall Allies invaded Normandy. This was to be strategy for a number of cover and accomplished through threats of an deception operations intended to mislead Allied invasion from Scotland. the enemy and protect the Overlord S i m i l a r ly, t h e o b j e c t i v e o f invasion. It had two objectives: Fortitude South was to convince Hitler to First, Bodyguard operations would keep his 15th Army at Pas de Calais need to convince Hitler to disperse his before, during, and after the Allies forces so that they would not be invaded at Normandy. This was to be concentrated in the real invasion area, accomplished by presenting Hitler with the beaches of Normandy, France. the threat of an Allied invasion from the Secondly, Hitler’s response to the Dover, England area. invasion needed to be delayed by .

Copy Link

Recommended publications

1 Introduction
Notes 1 Introduction 1. Donald Macintyre, Narvik (London: Evans, 1959), p. 15. 2. See Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 3. Reflections of the C-in-C Navy on the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939, The Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 37–38. 4. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 10 October 1939, in ibid. p. 47. 5. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 8 December 1939, Minutes of a Conference with Herr Hauglin and Herr Quisling on 11 December 1939 and Report of the C-in-C Navy, 12 December 1939 in ibid. pp. 63–67. 6. MGFA, Nichols Bohemia, n 172/14, H. W. Schmidt to Admiral Bohemia, 31 January 1955 cited by Francois Kersaudy, Norway, 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 42. 7. See Andrew Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–40: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (1994), pp. 86–108. 8. For the importance of Swedish iron ore see Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981). 9. Churchill, The Second World War, I, p. 463. 10. See Richard Wiggan, Hunt the Altmark (London: Hale, 1982). 11. TMI, Tome XV, Déposition de l’amiral Raeder, 17 May 1946 cited by Kersaudy, p. 44. 12. Kersaudy, p. 81. 13. Johannes Andenæs, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin, Norway and the Second World War (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1966), p.
[Show full text]
The Allied D-Day Deception Campaign and Media Use
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-EAU CLAIRE OPERATION FORTITUDE: THE ALLIED D-DAY DECEPTION CAMPAIGN AND MEDIA USE THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY FOR CANDIDACY FOR THE BACHLEORS DEGREE OF ARTS BY LUKE E. ANDERSON EAU CLAIRE, WI MAY 2010 Copyright for this work is owned by the author. This digital version is published by McIntyre Library, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire with the consent of the author. For my grandfather, and all others who served Abstract Throughout the Second World War, the Allies focused much of their war effort on Operation Fortitude, a campaign strictly for the purpose of misinforming the Axis Powers. One extensive use of misinformation came before and after the assault on Normandy in June of 1944, more popularly known as D-Day. The Allies’ goal was to make the Germans believe the attack would be coming at Pas de Calais, much further east and closer to England. The Allies used a number of different strategies to accomplish this, including extensively bombing the Calais area, using General George Patton as a commander “decoy,” and even creating a fake invasion force. This paper examines how the media was used to carry misinformation. The Allies used both newspapers and radio broadcasts to influence the Germans into believing an attack would be coming at Calais, not Normandy. By withholding the secret details of the invasion, the American public was also led to believe an attack was coming at Calais. I argue, although double-agents were also an important way to transmit false information, without the use of media an effective campaign would have been much more difficult.
[Show full text]
Hall of Remembrance Library Holdings WORLD WAR II 'Against
Hall Of Remembrance Library Holdings WORLD WAR II ‘Against all odds’: The British Army of 1939-40. National Army Museum, 1990. Aircraft of World War 2. Jade Bks., 1984. Aline, Countess of Romanones. The spy went dancing. Century, 1991. Are we at war? Letters to The Times. Times Bks, 1989. Arnold, Gladys. One woman’s war: A Canadian reporter with the Free French. Lorimer, 1987. Badsey, Stephen. D-Day: from the Normandy beaches to the liberation of France. Colour Library, 1993. Barnett, Corelli. Engage the enemy more closely: the Royal Navy in the Second World War. Norton, 1991. Barnett, Corelli. The desert generals. Indiana Univ. , 1960 Barris, Ted. Behind the glory: the plan that won the allied air war. Macmillan, 1992. Bartov, Omer. Hitler’s army: soldiers, Nazis, and war in the Third Reich. Oxford Univ. 1991. Bailey, Chris Howard. The battle of the Atlantic; the Corvettes and their crews: an oral history. Sutton, 1994. Barker, Ralph. The RAF at war. Time-Life, 1981. Barnett, Corelli. (ed).Hitler’s Generals. Grove Weidenfeld, 1989. Barris, Ted. Days of victory: Canadians remember: 1939-1945. Macmillan, 1995. Bell, Ken. Not in vain. Univ. of Toronto, 1973. Bell, Ken.The way we were. Univ. of Toronto, 1988. 1 Bell, Ken.100 years: the Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1983. Collier Macmillan, 1983. Belote, James H. Titans of the seas. Harper & Row, 1975. Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the West: TheNormandy campaign 1944-45. Scribner’s, 1979. Bernadac, Christian. The naked puppets: Auschwitz. Ferni Pub., 1972. Bishop, Arthur. Our bravest and our best: the stories of Canada’s Victoria Cross winners.
[Show full text]
Art of Deception: Selling a Story to the German Army
NATIONAL EISENHOWER MEMORIAL EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS LESSON Art of Deception: Selling a Story to the German Army Duration One 45-minute period Grades 7–12 Cross-curriculum Application U.S. History, World History, Geography, English, Media Arts NATIONAL EISENHOWER MEMORIAL LESSON: ART OF DECEPTION | 1 EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS Historical Background As Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower later remarked, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” Operation Overlord, also known as D-Day, was a massive undertaking involving unprecedented planning and meeting challenges in execution. The operation consisted of 2,700 ships manned by 195,000 sailors. The fleet carried 156,000 troops, 12,000 vehicles, 2,000 tanks, and nearly 10,000 tons of stores across the English Channel. In addition, thousands of military aircraft supported the amphibious invasion. The success of the Normandy invasion also depended on the element of surprise. All the plan- ning and effort that went into the operation could have been undone if German military leaders knew the location and timing of the landing ahead of time. German military leaders worked hard to determine what General Eisenhower and the Allies planned to do. In order to keep this important information secret, Eisenhower and his advisors initiated Operation Bodyguard (part of a larger deception plan called Operation Fortitude) to confuse the German forces about the exact location of the landing. Objective Students will examine primary sources related to some of the Allied plans to deceive the German Army as to the time and location of the invasion of northern Europe. What techniques of decep- tion were used? What role does deception play in military strategy? What can these deceptions tell us about how the German military viewed the Allies? Students will take on the role of documentary filmmaker and develop a plan for a short video promotion for a film on Allied military deceptions during World War II.
[Show full text]
Confidence Men the Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 By
Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 by Brett Edward Lintott A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto © Copyright by Brett Edward Lintott, 2015 Abstract Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 Brett Edward Lintott Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto, 2015 This dissertation provides an analysis of the Mediterranean double-cross system of the Second World War, which was composed of a number of double agents who were turned by the Allies and operated against their ostensible German spymasters. Utilizing many freshly released archival materials, this study assesses how the double-cross system was constructed, why it was an effective instrument, and how it contributed to Allied success in two areas: security and counter-intelligence, and military deception. The focus is thus on both organization and operations. The chapters cover three chronological periods. In the first — 1941-42 — the initial operational usage of a double agent is assessed, along with the development of early organizational structures to manage and operate individual cases as components of a team of spies. The second section, covering 1943, assesses three issues: major organizational innovations made early that year; the subsequent use of the double agent system to deceive the Germans regarding the planned invasion of Sicily in July; and the ongoing effort to utilize double agents to ensure a stable security and counter-intelligence environment in the Mediterranean theatre. The third and final section analyzes events in 1944, with a focus on double-cross deception in Italy and France, and on the emergence of more systematic security and counter-intelligence double-cross operations in Italy and the Middle East.
[Show full text]
The Double Cross System and MI-5'S Supremacy in World War II
“A Game of Human Chess”: The Double Cross System and MI-5’s Supremacy in World War II By Adamya Sharma History Departmental Undergraduate Honors Thesis University of Colorado at Boulder April 7, 2015 Thesis Advisor: Dr. Thomas Zeiler Department of History and International Affairs Defense Committee: Dr. Fred Anderson Department of History Dr. Thomas Metcalf Department of Philosophy Abstract World War II featured monumental battles, such as the Normandy invasions, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, El Alamein, and Kursk. While historical scholarship of the World War II generally focuses on the war’s grand military engagements, it is imperative to note that Allied and Axis intelligence units battled for supremacy in a war of deception. The Double Cross system employed by the British military intelligence division (MI-5) was, virtually from the war’s onset, successful in overwhelming its German opponent, the Abwehr by turning its agents into supportive double agents. Traditional historiography follows the classic spy narrative and credits the success of MI-5 to its daring agents, brilliant creators, or stalwart handlers who used wit and guile to deceive their German adversary. In this thesis I will argue that the success of the Double Cross system should be attributed to more than solely the actions of the Double Cross team. Though the operatives played an invaluable role, the existence of an overriding, well-structured system determined their success. By examining the uniqueness of the Double Cross system, this thesis will seek to illustrate that the victorious outcome of the British in the intelligence war was due to their tireless effort to perfect a system of counterespionage.
[Show full text]
The Commander's Dilemma: Using Ethical Denial and Deception
The Commanders Dilemma: Using Ethical Denial and Deception Kailah M. Murry Introduction Denial and deception have played an essential role in military operations since the inception of warfare; there is no refuting their relevance to operations and their benefit when used successfully. Seldom examined in relation to denial and deception are the ethical considerations the commander must take into account when conducting operations. Ethics is a crucial area of research and study as the military moves into a world hyper aware of political correctness, international opinion, and legal issues. When viewing denial and deception through the lens of ethics and morality, do the ends in fact justify the means? The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to make practitioners aware of the ethical consequences of denial and deception, and second, to suggest an ethical framework for future operations. For the purpose of this article, the definitions for denial and deception come from joint doctrine. Deception, in broad terms, is the manipulation of information and perceptions to induce the target of that deception to take or not take an action, thereby benefiting the deceiver.1 Denial includes methods used to conceal state and military secrets, particularly from foreign intelligence collection.2 John Yurechko noted, “Denial and deception are interrelated. Denial is the basis for successful deception. One cannot manipulate or blur the truth or lie convincingly unless the truth is first concealed.”3 To focus the discussion in this paper, Joint Publication 3-13.4 defines military deception as “actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”4 In all current and previous campaigns, denial and deception are important facets of the overall strategy.
[Show full text]
Allied Deceptions in WWII Shelby Mason Junior Division Individual
Allied Deceptions in WWII Shelby Mason Junior Division Individual Exhibit Project: 497 Process paper: 500 My original topic was going to be about female spies and how they communicated to each other in World War II. When I was reading a book about spies, I came across information which interested me about a ghost army. I found out that the Allies were deceiving the Nazis with a fake army. I decided to change my topic to Allied Deceptions in World War II because the idea of the Allies tricking or deceiving the Axis powers attracted me. I liked the different ways that they communicated false information to make the Axis powers believe something that was not true even if it involved a dead body or fake dummies. I started my research by searching the public library catalog to find books on the ghost army and on WWII deceptions. I also searched for websites, videos, and pictures with information on military deceptions. At first, it was hard to find books at my level, but the information I found gave me the names of Allied deception campaigns. I used these names to search for more articles, documentaries, and online videos. I told my grandma about my project and she found a book she had on WWII covert operations. While getting information, I wrote down what I thought was interesting and this information led me to other areas to research. I also found a number of books and websites with interesting information on deception used by the U.S. military before and after WWII.
[Show full text]
Voices of the 20Th Century 20Th of the Voices
Wednesday December 6, 2017 Wednesday New York VOICES OF THE 20TH CENTURY VOICES OF THE 20TH CENTURY | New York | Wednesday December 6, 2017 24254 VOICES OF THE 20TH CENTURY Wednesday, December 6, 2017 at 1pm New York BONHAMS BIDS INQUIRIES ILLUSTRATIONS 580 Madison Avenue +1 (212) 644 9001 New York Front cover: lot 1027 New York, New York 10022 +1 (212) 644 9009 fax Ian Ehling, Director Inside front cover: lot 1128 bonhams.com New York Session page 3: lot 1008 To bid via the internet please visit +1 (212) 644 9094 Session page 35: lot 1034 [email protected] PREVIEW www.bonhams.com/24254 Session page 53: lot 1074 Saturday, December 2 Darren Sutherland, Specialist Session page 71: lot 1170 12pm to 5pm Please note that telephone bids +1 (212) 461-6531 Session page 97: lot 1254 Sunday, December 3 must be submitted no later than [email protected] Inside back cover: 1180 12pm to 5pm 4pm on the day prior to the Back cover: 1068 Monday, December 4 auction. New bidders must also Tom Lamb, Director 10am to 5pm provide proof of identity and Business Development Tuesday, December 5 address when submitting bids. +1 (917) 921 7342 10am to 5pm [email protected] Wednesday, December 6 Please contact client services Tim Tezer, Junior Specialist 10am to 12pm with any bidding inquiries. +1 (917) 206-1647 [email protected] Please see pages 147 to 152 for bidder information including Mary-kate Grohoski, SALE NUMBER: 24254 Conditions of Sale, after-sale Administrator Lots 1001 - 1265 collection and shipment.
[Show full text]
Operation Fortitude
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY OPERATION FORTITUDE: THE CLOSED LOOP D-DAY DECEPTION PLAN by Ernest S. Tavares, Jr., Major, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Instructor: Dr. Richard Muller Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 2001 Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government of the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. ii Contents Page DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................... II ILLUSTRATIONS............................................................................................................IV PREFACE .......................................................................................................................... V ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................VI INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1 BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................3 The XX Committee......................................................................................................3 The Double Cross System............................................................................................4
[Show full text]
International Spy Museum
SPY-BIBLIOGRAPHY Page 1 of7 DUCATE Bibliography Permanent Exhibition Nazi Espionage • Breuer, William B. Nazi Spies in America: Hitler's Undercover Martin's, 1990. • Farago, Lad is las. The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story c the United States and Great Britain During World War II. f'l McKay, 1971. • Kahn, David. Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in W< Macmillan, 1978. • MacDonnell, Francis. Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column a Front. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. • Paine, Lauran. German Military Intelligence in World War II: T Hale, 1984. • Waller, John H. The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and C Second World War. New York: Random House, 1996. • Wires, Richard. The Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to Brit War II. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. • See also: http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi. Soviet Espionage Lucy Ring/maroon Orchestra • Accoce, Pierre, and Pierre Quet. A Man Called Lucy, 1939-19 McCann, 1967. • Foote, Alexander. Handbook for Spies. London: Museum Pre! • H?ne, Heinz. Codeword: Direktor: The Story of the maroon 01 Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan, 1971. • Kesaris, Paul. The Rote Kapelle. Lanham, MD: University Put 1979. • Kilzer, Louis. Hitler's Traitor. Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000. • Perrault, Gilles [pseud., Jacques Peyroles]. The maroon Orch 1968. • Read, Anthony, and David Fisher. Operation Lucy: Most Secfi Second World War. New York: Coward, McCann & Gheo~ • Tarrant, V.E. The maroon Orchestra: Soviet Spy Network lnsi1 London: Arms & Armour Press, 1995. http://www. spymuseum. org/educate/resources/resources_ wwii. asp 11123/2005 SPY-BIBLIOGRAPHY Page 2 of7 • Trepper, Leopold. The Great Game: Memoirs of the Spy Hitle ~ York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
[Show full text]
DUDLEY W. CLARKE, the BIRTH of "A" FORCE, and ALLIED DECEPTION OPERATIONS in WORLD WAR II: the REMEMBRANCES of DAVID MURE by David Mure (1912-1986) T
DUDLEY W. CLARKE, THE BIRTH OF "A" FORCE, AND ALLIED DECEPTION OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: THE REMEMBRANCES OF DAVID MURE by David Mure (1912-1986) T. L. Cubbage II, Editor1 ___________________________________________________________________ This paper is addressed, altogether, to four subjects, all based on the Writer's experience in World War II.2 Expressed in the form of questions, these broad subjects are: 1. Do military organizations fully appreciate the contribution of deception to the support of military operations, and, if not, how can that attitude be changed? 2. Should deception operations be run by officers experienced in staff work, operations and planning, or by intelligence officers or special Commands? 3. What is the best organization for management of deception operations (Who should be responsible for organizing deception operations? Where should such a Unit be located as far as administration is concerned? Who is to be recruited?) 4. Are counter-deception operations likely to be successful: can deception be avoided? These four questions will be examined primarily in the context of the work of one man—Brigadier Dudley Wrangel Clarke, the man chosen by Lord Wavell to set up "A" Force— he military deception organization in Cairo in World War II. This author has endeavored to answer the four questions, not from a theoretical point of view, but by way of a detailed study of the manners, merits and convictions of the key man, Brigadier Clarke. It is my hope that this study will assist some future Command to seek and find, if necessary, obviously not an individual, but the kind of man who can undertake, in the future, what Wavell's choice carried out successfully from 1940 to 1945.
[Show full text]