U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958-1975 Bryan Robert Gibson 30 April 2013 Supervised by Professor Nigel J. Ashton A thesis submitted to The London School of Economics and Political Science Department of International History for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,416 words. I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Marlene Gibson, Ashli Alberty, Nick McNally, Ranj Alaaldin, and Kelly Smith. 2 Abstract This thesis analyses the ways in which U.S. policy toward Iraq was dictated by its broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most historians have focused on ‘hot’ Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq’s significance as a Cold War battleground. This thesis shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War in the Middle East. It argues that U.S. decisions and actions were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf region. This was evident in the Eisenhower administration’s response to Iraq’s revolution in 1958, when it engaged in covert action to prevent communists from gaining control of the state; in the Kennedy administration’s efforts to bolster the first Ba’th regime during its war with the Kurds in 1963 because it perceived it as anti-communist; in the Johnson administration’s support for the anti-communist, Arab nationalist regimes during the mid-1960s; and in the Nixon administration’s decision to support the Kurdish rebels in 1972-75 after the second Ba’thist regime drew Iraq partially into the Soviet orbit. This suggests a clear pattern. Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this thesis reveals new details on America’s decision-making toward and actions against Iraq during a key part of the Cold War. Significantly, it raises questions about widely held notions, such as the CIA’s alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba’thist coup and the theory that the U.S. sold out the Kurds in 1975. Finally, it argues scholars have relied excessively and uncritically on a leaked congressional report, the Pike Report, which has had a distorting affect on the historiography of U.S.-Iraqi relations. This thesis seeks to redress these historiographical deficiencies and bring new details to light. 3 Acknowledgements Over the past four years I have received support and encouragement from a great number of individuals. Foremost, this thesis could not have been accomplished with out the unwavering support of my doctoral supervisor, Nigel Ashton. Bestowing upon me his considerable knowledge and assisting me with his careful eye and patient guidance, he has made the writing of this thesis a thoughtful and rewarding journey. I consider him a mentor, colleague, and friend and am thankful for the opportunity to publish a book with him. At the LSE’s Department of International History, I am thankful to Roham Alvandi for his support, willingness to engage me in discussions about the region, and the opportunity to teach on my subject; to Kirsten Schulze for her advice, support, and guidance; and Odd Arne Westad for his regular seminars on the Cold War. I am also indebted to my colleagues at LSE’s Middle East Centre and the Emirates PhD Award, which allowed me to conduct archival research in the United States. In particular, I am thankful to Professor Fawaz Gerges, whose advice, support, and seminars have helped advance my knowledge of the region. I also want to the MEC’s staff, Bob Lowe, Dania Akkad, and Ribale Haider for making the Middle East so enjoyable. I would like to acknowledge the following academics and colleagues for their invaluable help and support: Galen Perras, Gary Sick, Salim Yaqub, Toby Dodge, Hoshmand Othman, Jonathan Randal, Emma Sky, Johan Franzén, Malcolm Byrne, Piers Ludlow, Antony Best, Steven Casey, Kristian Coates- Ulrichsen, Brian Villa, Demetra Frini, Christopher Dietrich, Marc-Paul Williams, Chris Phillips, Emilia Knight, Christopher Parkes, Aurelie Basha, Chris Emery, Daniel Strieff, Charles William Nicholas Sorrie, Ranj Alaaldin, John Collins, Lakdar Ghettis, Mahon Murphy, Nick McNally, and Carsten Nickel. I would also 4 like to thank Brent Scowcroft, Ronald Neumann, Eliezer Tsafrir, Zury Sagy, and an unnamed intelligence contact. I would also like to give a special thanks to Jeffery Brideau and Mark and Andi Richards for opening their homes to me while I did my research. Finally, I want to express my deep appreciation to my family and friends who have fostered my intellectual growth and provided emotional support throughout this difficult process. I especially want to thank my parents, Marlene and Glenn Gibson, for their endless support, guidance, and love. My mother has read through every draft and redraft of every chapter. Without her patience and support this would never have come to be. I also want to thank my brother and sister and their families for always bringing a smile to my face, even from afar. I also want to thank my close friends from my home town: Jonathan Kirshenblat and Peter Spadoni for helping to foster my interest in international affairs. Finally, I want to thank Ashli Alberty for helping guide me through these last few months and patiently reading through every line. Without my friends and family, none of this would be worth it. 5 Acronyms and Abbreviations AAD Access to Archive Database AU Arab Union BNA British National Archives BPC Basra Petroleum Company CENTO Central Treaty Organization CFPF Central Foreign Policy Files CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPL Carter Presidential Library DCI Director of Central Intelligence DNSA Digital National Security Archive DoS US Department of State ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council EPL Eisenhower Presidential Library ET Electronic Telegrams FCO Foreign Commonwealth OfFice FPL Ford Presidential Library GOI Government of Iraq HSF Harold Saunders Files IAF Iraqi Air Force ICP Iraq Communist Party IDF Israeli Defense Force INOC Iraq National Oil Company INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research IPC Iraq Petroleum Company JCS Joint Chiefs of State 6 JPL Johnson Presidential Library KDP Kurdish Democratic Party KPL Kennedy Presidential Library KSF Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing OfFice Files KT Kissinger Transcripts MR Mandatory Review NARA National Archive and Record Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCRC National Council of the Revolutionary Command NDP National Democratic Party NEA Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs NIE National Intelligence Estimate NPL Nixon Presidential Library NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC National Security Council NSF National Security File OCB Operations Coordinating Board OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PHF Phillip Halla Files PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PRF People’s Resistance Force RCC Revolutionary Command Council RG Record Group RKF Robert Komer Files SAVAK National Intelligence and Security Organization (Iran) SCI Special Committee on Iraq 7 SN Subject Numeric Files SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate SOV–MAT Soviet Military Materials UAR United Arab Republic UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council USAID United States Aid USG United States Government USINT United States Interests Section USIS United States Information Service USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN United States Mission to the United Nations 8 Table of Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations 6 Introduction 10 Eisenhower and the Qasim Regime 24 July 1958 — January 1961 Kennedy and the Qasim Regime 66 January 1961 — February 1963 Kennedy and the First Ba’thist Regime 99 February — November 1963 Johnson and the Arab Nationalists 136 November 1963 — January 1969 NiXon and the Second Ba’thist Regime 177 January 1969 — July 1972 NiXon and the Kurdish Operation 215 August 1972-October 1973 Kissinger and the Kurdish War 234 October 1973-March 1975 Conclusion 271 Bibliography of Primary Sources 281 Bibliography of Secondary Sources 292 9 Introduction In a perceptive remark made during a meeting of the National Security Council in January 1959, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed that the U.S. was “not sufFiciently sophisticated” to meddle in the complex mix of internal Iraqi politics.1 This thesis will show how the U.S. moved from being an unsophisticated observer of events in 1958 to become a direct protagonist in Iraq during 1972-75, through its covert support for Iraq’s Kurdish rebels. The motive for America’s shift was Iraq’s increasing importance to its global Cold War strategy, which was designed to contain the Soviet Union.2 Traditionally, the U.S. had viewed the Gulf as a “British lake” and preferred to rely on Britain for its defense.3 But as tensions between Washington and Moscow escalated in the late-1940s, U.S. military planners recognized the vital role that access to Gulf oil would play in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. A U.S. military study from 1946 concluded that losing Iraqi and Saudi Arabian sources of oil would force the U.S. and its allies to Fight an “oil-starved war” against the Soviet Union and vice versa.4 This meant America’s regional strategy aimed to defend the Gulf, deny its oil resources from Soviet domination, and ensure the survival of the region’s Western-backed autocrats.5 To achieve this, the U.S.