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The Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill Cleanup Operations–An Section III CASE HISTORY: THE AMOCO CADIZ Session 22 Chairman: KenBiglane Environmental Protection Agency Co-Chairman: Wilmot Hess National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration THE AMOCO CADIZ OIL SPILL CLEANUP OPERATIONS- AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION, CONTROL, AND EVALUATION OF THE CLEANUP TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED Pierre Bellier (CEDRE) and Georges Massart (CEDRE-CNEXO) B. P. 337 29273 Brest Cedex France ABSTRACT: The organization used for work on the Amoco Cadiz were as harmless as possible. All told, less than 3,000 tons of disper- oil spill, and the changes in this organization required by the size of sants was used; some chalk, used as a sinking agent, was also em- the disaster, are explained and details are provided on the techniques ployed but only to protect the Bay of Brest which was threatened by used in the cleanup. These techniques had as their goals: protection of some oil patches a few days after the spill. selected areas; pumping of oil where possible; and cleanup of the The onshore operations organizations for the Departments of Finis- beaches, the shingle shores, rocky areas, and harbors, and disposal of tere and Cötes du Nord were different because the responsibility came the oily debris. The spill involved some 223,000 tons of oil spilled under the "Prefet" (the Government's representative) in each depart- along 400 kilometers of coast. Almost 10,000 persons worked on the ment. After a few days of reflection, hesitation, and improvising, the project during the busiest period. As a result, almost 200,000 tons of Finistfcre Department became organized in this way: a managing staff oil and debris were pumped and gathered. However, less than 20,000 set up in Ploudalmézeau, a small town near Portsall, while a technical tons of oil was finally retrieved after separation from the total mass team worked in Brest. This team gathered people belonging to the of material obtained from the coastal zone. Ministry of Equipment, to the Institut Francais du Petrole (IFP, the French Petroleum Institute) and to the Centre Oceanologique de Bre- tagne (Research Center of the French National Agency for Ocean Ex- ploitation). This team tried to find appropriate answers to the numer- ous questions coming in from the people working on the coast who The cleanup organization faced difficulties and problems never encountered before. The prevailing winds for a month after the disaster were from the When the A moco Cadiz went on the rocks on March 16, 1978 (Fig- southwest to the northwest (except for the two first days after the acci- ure 1), it soon became evident that her 223,000 tons of light crude oil dent during which it had been blowing from the north) and spread the would spoil a large part of the Brittany coast. What administrations oil to the east of Portsall. Less than one week after the accident, the were concerned and on what organization could the French authorities oil reached the Cötes du Nord Department area which, of course, had rely to coordinate and manage all the cleanup operations? been forewarned. In this department, the headquarters were in Lan- Based on previous experiences which we had to deal with in France nion and included both technical and operational teams, thereby (Torrey Canyon, Olympic Bravery, and Boehlen having been the most allowing these specialties to work more closely than in the Finistlre important), it had been previously decided in the "Polmar Plan" that Department. However, even though, the solutions found and tech- the French Navy would be responsible for the fight against pollution niques used differed in some details, cleanup operations between the at sea, and Civil Safety Services would be responsible on shore. How- two departments were accomplished by a small staff at Rennes. This ever, a few days after the grounding of the Amoco Cadiz, it became unit provided and distributed wagons and trucks used to evacuate the obvious that the onshore cleanup operations would require a great wastes from the theater of operations, and provided all types of items deal of people from different administrations, particularly from the which had to be shared between Finistfcre and Cötes du Nord as neces- Army. An overall national coordinator was therefore needed for the sary. operations, which were conducted in the following way: (a) The Navy kept the responsibility for all the offshore operations; and (b) A Civil Safety Representative had the responsibility for all the on- shore operations which utilized firemen from the Civil Safety Attempts to minimize the spill and protect the shore Organization, civil officers from the Ministry of Equipment who have, in France, the responsibility for harbors and other public The first ideas entertained immediately after the accident were to works along the coast, and different Army corps (military engi- burn the oil, to lighten the wrecked ship, and to protect the most vul- neering, communications, transportation, and, of course, infan- nerable parts of the shore. Burning the oil seemed too dangerous, be- try). cause the smoke and unburned oil carried by the smoke would have Weather conditions did not permit use of one or more of the numer- polluted a large inland area. A lot of oil would not have burned and ous kinds of devices which have been successfully used elsewhere in would have remained to pollute the sea. In addition, the experts the open sea. If the weather had been more favorable, the Navy would thought that the part of the oil which would burn would eventually have decided which of these to use. As it turned out, adverse meteoro- evaporate anyway. Lightening the ship by pumping the oil ashore was logical conditions and weathering of the oil reduced these options very not feasible because the 2.5 kilometers (1.5 mile) pipe needed for this quickly to the use of only a few types of dispersante complying with would be almost impossible to lay down due to the roughness of the the recommendations of the Ministry of Environment. The Institut sea. Pumping the oil into a smaller tanker would have been difficult, Scientifique et Technique des Peches Maritimes (ISTPM or Scientific dangerous, and a very long process. In fact, the Amoco Cadiz was and Technical institute for Marine Fisheries) had conducted disper- completely broken up and almost empty before lightening operations sant toxicity tests and was able to indicate those dispersants which could have been attempted eight days later. 141 142 1979 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE Lee Sept. lies Brehat lie Grande *>^*a, Roscoff Cfcerros-Guirecft Paumpol lie d'Ouessant ft Pte. de St. Mathieu \ 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Figure 1. Chart showing place names associated with the^moco Cadiz oil spill of March 1978; heavy offshore lines indicate the approximate distribution of beached oil The most vulnerable parts of the shore were the places where oysters Sufficient boom was not available, and the time left for deploying and were grown, especially in the rivers called Aber Bencít and Aber mooring before the oil arrived would have been too short. In addition, Wrach, the Carantec River and the Morlaix River. These places also by so using the booms, only a few places could have been protected, seemed, to many people, the easiest to protect. In fact, booming thereby making it difficult to explain to the people concerned and re- across these rivers proved useless because of the speed of the tidal cur- quiring a political decision for which the public was not prepared. rents. The whole Bay of Morlaix was protected by a 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) long boom, the maintenance of which required a number of persons under almost permanent alert. This action was considered as Pumping operations successful. It should be noted that the Bay of Morlaix was rather shel- tered, both from severe weather conditions and from the arrival of The other obvious idea was to try to pump as much oil as possible excessive quantities of oil. The boom was laid far enough from the from the shore. Some skimmers were used in the harbors and pro- mouth of the river so as not to be exposed to strong currents and tected areas (Figure 2). Whatever type they were (and a lot of different therefore work efficiently. kinds of devices were used), their efficiency was limited because of the This situation did not exist across the Aber Benoít and Aber Wrach seaweed which blocked the pumps and hoses. Layers of weed two Rivers, where the booms that were deployed were very quickly broken inches thick or more were observed; in fact, in some places pumping up by strong winds and waves during the two weeks after the accident. was possible only with vacuum devices. Vacuum cleaning tanks came It would certainly have been possible to protect some places by using from everywhere in France and even from Belgium and The Nether- the booms in the deflector mode, but this would have required a very lands. These trucks did a good job, but were limited by their weight large amount of boom to protect all the places needing protection. which obliged them to work from piers, boat slips, or roads (Figure 3). CASE HISTORY — THE AMOCO CADIZ 143 Figure 2. ACME skimmers being used in Portsall Harbor dur- Figure 4. Pumping the oil trapped in a small beach pond by ing the first few days after the spill incident use of a "honey wagon's" vacuum pump Figure 3. Pumping oil from the surface of the water using vac- Figure 5. Temporary storage of oily residue in a lined dug pit uum trucks near Portsall. near Roscoff Often, when a pumping possibility existed, that is, when the oil was after the accident, the surface oil layers became very thin and dis- gathered in a bay, access was rather difficult.
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