Reacting to Hitler: Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian Foreign Policy, 1933-1939 Geoffrey K

Eastern Michigan University DigitalCommons@EMU Master's Theses, and Doctoral Dissertations, and Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations Graduate Capstone Projects 2008 Reacting to Hitler: Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian foreign policy, 1933-1939 Geoffrey K. Krempa Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.emich.edu/theses Part of the European History Commons Recommended Citation Krempa, Geoffrey K., "Reacting to Hitler: Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian foreign policy, 1933-1939" (2008). Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations. 191. http://commons.emich.edu/theses/191 This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses, and Doctoral Dissertations, and Graduate Capstone Projects at DigitalCommons@EMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Reacting to Hitler: Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian Foreign Policy, 1933-1939 By Geoffrey K. Krempa Thesis Department of History and Philosophy Eastern Michigan University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in History with a concentration in Modern Europe Thesis Committee: Robert M. Citino, PhD, Chair Pamela Graves, PhD Ronald Delph, PhD July 15, 2008 Ypsilanti, Michigan For Mom and Dad ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In researching and writing this work, I would like to extend a much appreciated thank you to Drs. Robert Citino, Pamela Graves, and Ronald Delph, all of whom provided the guidance and encouragement necessary to bring this thesis to its conclusion. Without their advice, none of this would be possible. I would also like to extend a special thanks to Dr. Citino, as over the past three years, he has been both a mentor and friend. Of course, none of this would have been possible at all were it not for my family, especially my mother and father, who have always supported and encouraged me to follow my own path in life. Thank you for the love and allowing me to be who I am. The same sentiments are also extended to my brother Sean and Brooke Stevenson, as they have endured countless late evenings discussing the various intricacies of German, Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian foreign policy and allowed to me go to bed unharmed. The same must be said for David Walton, and also a special thanks extended to him as well, as were it not for a particular conversation, I might not have made the decision to be where I am today. iii ABSTRACT The nations of East Central Europe have traditionally been portrayed as “victims” of Nazi German expansionism. In this work the foreign policies of Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania from 1933 to 1939 were examined through the paradigm of Hitler's major foreign policy achievements to explore this prevalent notion and to discern why the foreign policies of these governments failed. These included his rise to power in 1933, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the invasion of Poland. Specifically, the reactions of these four nations to German action and their relationships with each other were examined. It was found that their foreign policies ended in failure due to their inability to substitute shortsighted national objectives that focused on regional revision at the expense of their neighbors for regional security directed against German expansionism. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication………………………………………………………………………………..ii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...iii Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….iv Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: Away From the West………………………………………………………....8 Chapter 2: In the Middle………………………………………………………………..61 Chapter 3: Towards Germany………………………………………………………….104 The End………………………………………………………………………………...167 Notes……………………………………………………………………………….......172 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………198 v INTRODUCTION In 1919 the victorious powers of the First World War convened at Versailles to decide the fate of the post-war world. Before them was no easy task. In their triumph, three great empires had collapsed under the strain of four years of the most horrendous warfare the world had yet seen. It was now their job to reconstitute Europe from the rubble of the old. New nations were created. Existing ones were enlarged and expanded. All this was done primarily at the expense of the defeated Central Powers. Poland and Lithuania were returned to the map of Europe and, with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, an independent Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria were created. Romania also benefited, receiving Transylvania for its participation during the war. All told, from the Baltic to the Black Sea in 1919, seven countries existed where three had been. While unthinkable at the time, the treaty intended to preserve the peace would be shattered by war within twenty years. On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler again plunged Europe into conflict in his bid to impose German hegemony across the continent and secure his Third Reich’s thousand year future. His war would last until 1945, resulting in the deaths of more than forty million Europeans.1 Unlike the previous conflict, the Second World War was not the result of a complicated chain-reaction that dragged the continent into war. Rather, it was initiated by Hitler, with the singular purpose of conquest and extermination. The spark that characterized the origins of the first was also absent from the second, as the crescendo that led to the German invasion of Poland was long in duration. Given Hitler’s focus on East Central Europe with an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, the question was when, not how. This work focuses primarily on the foreign policies of four of those East Central European nations: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania during the interwar period from January 1933 until September 1939. During this period, each of the four countries followed the continent as a whole in the long, slow slide towards war. Their relationships with the Hitler regime were, however, fundamentally different from those of the other European Great Powers, in that they were active participants in the revisionist process that eventually culminated in the Second World War and the region’s downfall. This leaves us, then, with the question: why did these four independent nations, each either new to the map or newly configured by the treaty of Versailles, slowly succumb to Germany and Hitler from 1933-1939? The answer is rooted in the complexities of the region. The tumultuous aftermath of the First World War deeply affected the development of East Central Europe, with political power eventually becoming consolidated by reactionary, authoritarian regimes. The governments of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania were each fervently nationalistic and, through their political aims, sought to give expression to that sentiment. For Hungary and Romania, this meant actively seeking or maintaining, respectively, their historic frontiers. The Polish and Lithuanian regimes were equally committed to restoring their nations’ historic territories and influence. Because their policies and political aims were directed against each other, however, as a whole, the region was profoundly committed to collective security as a means of protection from the ambitions of their neighbors. 2 With Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, all that changed. The relative stability that had characterized East Central European international politics was jolted by the emergence of a regime that, at its core, was expressly revisionist and committed to overturning the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler’s Germany was a threat to the established order. But in that danger, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania each saw opportunity. The dynamism of the Third Reich’s foreign policy could be utilized as a catalyst for their own national agendas. Initially, the risks were minimal. Germany, in 1933, was not yet the military power it would become later in the decade. Hitler needed calm, amicable relations with his neighbors while he consolidated his hold on power at home. This afforded the Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian governments the occasion to advance their own foreign policy aims. However, as the decade progressed and German foreign policy successes accumulated, each nation began altering its policy goals in response to Hitler’s advance. They began reacting to Hitler, and, in doing so, each found itself either outmaneuvered, outfoxed, or overpowered by the Third Reich. In the end, all four countries became subjugated by Germany, willingly or not. The opportunities provided by a revisionist Germany were, however, a double- edged sword. In working with Hitler in myopic pursuit of the rapid realization of their individual foreign policy goals, each became complicit in the undermining of the region’s already weak commitment to collective security. Without this system of support, however weak or ineffectual it may have been, Hitler was able to exploit their national interests and regional aims for his own purposes and slowly but surely isolate them from each other. United, perhaps they could have checked German expansionism. Divided, 3 they hardly stood a chance. Working with Hitler, they became instruments of their own downfall. This process was gradual, taking place over six years in three distinct stages. To reflect

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