DOCSLIB.ORG

From Nordic Neutrality to NATO

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
From Nordic Neutrality to NATO From Nordic Neutrality to NATO The impact of alliance membership on convergence of military capability in Scandinavia University of Amsterdam Master thesis Political Science: International Relations Author: E.J. Runhaar Thesis Supervisor: Dr. P.A. van Hooft Second Reader: Dr. L.J.M. Seymour January 2015 Abstract A technological revolution in military capabilities since the end of the Cold War, and a changing security environment with wars against non-state actors, has led to the adaptation of new tactics, operation methods, command structures and ways of thinking in armed forces of advanced states. NATO changed its structure to improve interoperability between member states for a new role in international campaigns, and the European Union developed a security and defence policy that increasingly added a more institutionalized military element to the EU. Europe’s larger military powers France, United Kingdom and Germany have been subject of research as to why and how they converged with US doctrines and methods, and whether their behaviour within the EU is either balancing against US hegemony, or bandwagoning (Cladi & Locatelli 2012; Dyson 2008; Posen 2006). Reasons for convergence can be simply technological progress, the invention of new technologies and the necessity to emulate them from your rival. How fast a state’s military adapts to it, may be driven by the structure of its executive power (Dyson 2011). This research however focuses on the role alliance membership plays as a driver for convergence. To do this, the military convergence of four Scandinavian countries in the 21st century is being compared. Similarities in geographical position, power, culture, and historical cooperation, but differences in alliance membership, make Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland an interesting case. Taking a neoclassical realist approach and comparing NATO and EU as the alliances that possibly drive convergence within those states, we find that NATO does influence the convergence of not just its member states Denmark and Norway, but also partly that of Sweden. Swedish convergence is driven by the EU as well, through the Battlegroup framework. Finland still focuses mostly on territorial defence, and while it takes NATO and EU into account for interoperability, it does not follow the same path of denationalization of defence as its Scandinavian neighbours. While Denmark and Norway converged with NATO, non-ally Sweden wants to converge with NATO but runs into limitations, and Finland still prefers territorial defence capabilities with an eye on Russia. The EU has much less effect on the convergence of its member states. 1 Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 Research Question .................................................................................................................. 5 Literature, Framework ................................................................................................................ 6 The EU as an alliance ............................................................................................................. 6 EU, US, CSDP and NATO: balancing or bandwagoning? .................................................... 8 The need for Defence Transformation ................................................................................. 11 Convergence: adding alliances to the equation .................................................................... 12 Scandinavian convergence ....................................................................................................... 14 Denmark ............................................................................................................................... 14 Norway ................................................................................................................................. 16 Sweden ................................................................................................................................. 18 Finland .................................................................................................................................. 20 Comparison and Analysis ......................................................................................................... 23 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 25 References ................................................................................................................................ 26 2 Introduction Similarities in social, cultural and economic development, a similar geographical position, historical cooperation and the similar threats – the Scandinavian neighbours Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark seem to be natural allies. After World War II, in 1948, Sweden therefore proposed the Scandinavian Defence Union to its three neighbours, based upon neutrality. It would fail: Finland signed a pact with the Soviet Union, while Denmark and Norway decided to join NATO. Sweden remained neutral. In 1973, Denmark joined the European Union’s predecessor, the EEC. In 1995 Sweden and Finland joined the EU, while Norway did not. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009, all EU member states except Denmark are bound to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which includes a mutual defence clause. Denmark negotiated to opt- out of the CSDP, and therefore is not part of the military alliance paragraph of the EU. These four Nordic states are very similar, but their alliance membership separates them, as shown in Table 1. Sweden is the framework nation of the Nordic Battlegroup, which includes Norway and Finland but does not include Danish contributions, there is a Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in place which focuses on military cooperation between these states, with the aim to pool and share wherever possible. Norway Sweden Finland Denmark NATO Yes No No Yes CSDP No Yes Yes No EU No Yes Yes Yes EU Battle Group Yes Yes Yes No Table 1: Scandinavian Alliance Memberships Alliances matter, as a relatively cheap way of creating deterrence for small powers, and as a means of influence for great powers. An in-depth look at how the alliance choices of the four Scandinavian states – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – affects the outcomes in military convergence behaviour, could give us more insight in how alliance membership may or may not shape small power state behaviour. Membership of either NATO or EU doesn’t seem to have much effect on the actual behaviour of the four Scandinavian states at first sight. Sweden and Finland joined in several NATO-missions in the past 25 years even though they are not a NATO ally. Norway is part of the CSDP Nordic Battle Group, even though it is not an EU member. Denmark, being an EU 3 member, opted out of the ‘military’ chapter of the EU, and therefore cannot join in military cooperation within the EU framework, until the opt-out is lifted. And in the meantime Scandinavia is closely working together. These four similar small powers, with their reciprocal military cooperation but different alliance memberships, is then a chance to understand how being part of a formal alliance shapes the defence capability of a nation state. Does it for example matter to be a NATO member – and do we therefore see differences between the convergence of military capabilities of Norway/Denmark on one side, and Sweden/Finland on the other, in the 21st century? And if there is a an effect of the convergence, how does it look like? First we will discuss the necessity of small powers to join into alliances, and how realism explains that. The EU is being seen as an alliance in this research, mainly because of the mutual defence clause of the Common Security and Defence Policy that was adapted in the Lisbon treaty. There is debate on what the impact and role of the CSDP is, but that debate does not influence the potential the CSDP has to shape convergence of its member states through institutes like the European Defence Agency. Then we will assess the specifics of the relation between EU and NATO. Realists could either see the emergence of the CSDP as a way to balance the US, or as a form of bandwagoning. It is proposed that including Walt’s balance of threat theory (Walt 1985) and Dyson’s reformed bandwagoning (Dyson 2013) might be the best way of analysing the relation between European states, the hegemonic power of the US, the CSDP and NATO. The centrality of NATO to Europe’s security is acknowledged, and the inability of the Common Security and Defence Policy to take over that role is acknowledged as well. We should therefore not see the two alliances as competing, but rather as fulfilling different roles. Those different roles should be the main driver for differences in the way small powers that are member of either of those alliances, converge. The need for Defence Transformation is then being assessed as caused by both technological as strategic reasons, and defence transformation is operationalized as being a fundamental, rapid, mental and physical change to the defence system of a state. Adding alliances
Load more

Recommended publications
  • John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power
    John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power Peter Toft Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Østerfarimagsgade 5, DK 1019 Copenhagen K, Denmark. E-mail: [email protected] With a number of controversial publications behind him and not least his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer has firmly established himself as one of the leading contributors to the realist tradition in the study of international relations since Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Mearsheimer’s main innovation is his theory of ‘offensive realism’ that seeks to re-formulate Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist theory to explain from a struc- tural point of departure the sheer amount of international aggression, which may be hard to reconcile with Waltz’s more defensive realism. In this article, I focus on whether Mearsheimer succeeds in this endeavour. I argue that, despite certain weaknesses, Mearsheimer’s theoretical and empirical work represents an important addition to Waltz’s theory. Mearsheimer’s workis remarkablyclear and consistent and provides compelling answers to why, tragically, aggressive state strategies are a rational answer to life in the international system. Furthermore, Mearsheimer makes important additions to structural alliance theory and offers new important insights into the role of power and geography in world politics. Journal of International Relations and Development (2005) 8, 381–408. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065 Keywords: great power politics; international security; John J. Mearsheimer; offensive realism; realism; security studies Introduction Dangerous security competition will inevitably re-emerge in post-Cold War Europe and Asia.1 International institutions cannot produce peace.
    [Show full text]
  • Balancing Versus Bandwagoning : the Strategic Dilemma of Australia’S China Policy
    Lingnan University Digital Commons @ Lingnan University Theses & Dissertations Department of Political Sciences 9-7-2016 Balancing versus bandwagoning : the strategic dilemma of Australia’s China policy Man Kwong YEUNG Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd Recommended Citation Yeung, M. K. (2016). Balancing versus bandwagoning: The strategic dilemma of Australia’s China policy (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd/17 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Sciences at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. Terms of Use The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING: THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY YEUNG MAN KWONG MPHIL LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 2016 BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING: THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY by YEUNG Man Kwong 楊民光 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Political Science Lingnan University 2016 ABSTRACT BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING: THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY by YEUNG Man Kwong Master of Philosophy Recent research on power shift, or the change in relative power of states in an international structure, has focused on how states adapt to strategic difficulties. As a key change in international politics, scholars have long discussed how states react strategically to power shift.
    [Show full text]
  • Norway: Defence 2008
    Norwegian Defence 2008 Norwegian Defence 2008 2 CONTENT NORWEGIAN SECURITY And DEFEncE POLICY 4 1. Security Policy Objectives 5 Defence Policy Objectives 5 2. Defence Tasks 6 3. Areas of Government Focus 7 4. International Cooperation 8 UN 8 NATO 9 EU 10 Nordic cooperation 11 5. National Cooperation 12 DEFEncE STRUCTURE And AcTIVITIES 14 1. Constitutional Division of Responsibility in Norway 15 2. The Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces 15 The Ministry Of Defence 16 3. The Defence Agencies 17 The Norwegian Armed Forces 17 4. The Norwegian Armed Forces 18 5. The Service Branches 19 The Norwegian Army 19 The Royal Norwegian Navy 20 Royal Norwegian Air Force 21 Home Guard 22 6. Personnel Policy 23 7. National Service 23 8. Materiel and Investments 24 Overview of Forces Engaged in International Operations 25 SUppLEMENt – THE FACTS 26 1. The Defence Budget 27 2. International Operations 27 3. Ranks and Insignia 28 4. Non-Governmental Organisations 29 5. Addresses 32 Norwegian Security and Defence Policy 4 1. SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES The principal objective of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard and promote national security policy interests. This is best achieved by contributing to peace, security and stability both in areas adjacent to Norway and in the wider world. Nationally Norway must be in a position to uphold its sovereignty and sove- reign rights and to exercise authority in order to safeguard our interests. At the same time, the progress of globalisation means that geo- graphical distance is no longer a determining factor for potential threats to our security.
    [Show full text]
  • Finnish Defence Forces International Centre the Many Faces of Military
    Finnish Defence Forces International Finnish Defence Forces Centre 2 The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field Edited by Mikaeli Langinvainio Finnish Defence Forces FINCENT Publication Series International Centre 1:2011 1 FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FINCENT PUBLICATION SERIES 1:2011 The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field EDITED BY MIKAELI LANGINVAINIO FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES INTERNATIONAL CENTRE TUUSULA 2011 2 Mikaeli Langinvainio (ed.): The Many Faces of Military Crisis Management Lessons from the Field Finnish Defence Forces International Centre FINCENT Publication Series 1:2011 Cover design: Harri Larinen Layout: Heidi Paananen/TKKK Copyright: Puolustusvoimat, Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus ISBN 978–951–25–2257–6 ISBN 978–951–25–2258–3 (PDF) ISSN 1797–8629 Printed in Finland Juvenens Print Oy Tampere 2011 3 Contents Jukka Tuononen Preface .............................................................................................5 Mikaeli Langinvainio Introduction .....................................................................................8 Mikko Laakkonen Military Crisis Management in the Next Decade (2020–2030) ..............................................................12 Antti Häikiö New Military and Civilian Training - What can they learn from each other? What should they learn together? And what must both learn? .....................................................................................20 Petteri Kurkinen Concept for the PfP Training
    [Show full text]
  • Re Energising Europe S Security and Defence Policy
    ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ������������������������ ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������������������ ��������������������������� ���������������������������� ����������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������ ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������� ���������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������������������������
    [Show full text]
  • Pivot, Hedger, Or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught Between Hegemons
    11 Pivot, Hedger, or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons Yu-Shan Wu Taiwan is strategically situated between the United States and the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC). It is impossible to understand cross-Strait relations without looking into this global strategic context. Although one may not agree with the pessimistic prediction of the power transition theory, namely that the closing gap between the United States and China will result in a titanic clash between the world’s hegemon and its challenger, it is nevertheless undeniable that the two strongest nations in today’s world have been locked in tense strategic competition. China wants to reclaim its lost central place in the world, a wish that is naturally resisted by today’s hegemon, the United States. This is not to deny that Washing- ton and Beijing collaborate in many aspects of their relationship, such as the fight against international terrorism and their joint efforts to deal with climate change. However, as the capabilities of the two giants are getting closer and closer, the relation is strained, with China understandably striving for an equal say on inter- national affairs and the United States hesitant to grant such status to its challenger. The refusal to give China a voting weight in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that reflects its economic clout is one vivid example, and the competition between the two over the issue of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is another. The main geopolitical fault line for Sino-American competition is found in East Asia. Another great strategic conflict in today’s world is between the West and Russia over Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • Den Nordiska Stridsgruppen – Nordic Battlegroup 2011 Den Nordiska Stridsgruppen - Nordic Battlegroup 2011 Riksrevisionen Granskar: Försvarets Förmåga
    riksrevisionen granskar: försvarets förmåga RiR 2012:11 Den nordiska stridsgruppen – Nordic Battlegroup 2011 den nordiska stridsgruppen - nordic battlegroup 2011 riksrevisionen granskar: försvarets förmåga till riksdagen datum: 2012-04-25 dnr: 31-2010-1467 rir 2012:11 Härmed överlämnas enligt 9 § lagen (2002:1022) om revision av statlig verksamhet m.m följande granskningsrapport över effektivitetsrevision: Den nordiska stridsgruppen – Nordic Battlegroup 2011 Riksrevisionen har granskat Försvarsmaktens uppsättande av den nordiska stridsgruppen 2011 (NBG11). Resultatet av granskningen redovisas i denna granskningsrapport. Företrädare för Försvarsdepartementet och Försvarsmakten har fått tillfälle att faktagranska och i övrigt lämna synpunkter på utkast till slutrapport. Rapporten innehåller slutsatser och rekommendationer som avser Försvarsdepartementet och Försvarsmakten. Riksrevisor Jan Landahl har beslutat i detta ärende. Revisionsdirektör Charlotta Edholm har varit föredragande. Revisionsdirektör Johan Brandström och revisionsdirektör Alexander von Gussich har medverkat vid den slutliga handläggningen (revisionsledare Katarina Johansson var projektledare t.o.m. 2011-12-18). Jan Landahl Charlotta Edholm För kännedom: Regeringen, Försvarsdepartementet Försvarsmakten Försvarets materielverk den nordiska stridsgruppen - nordic battlegroup 2011 riksrevisionen granskar: försvarets förmåga Innehåll Sammanfattning 9 1 Inledning 13 1.1 Motiv till granskningen 13 1.2 Granskningens syfte och avgränsningar 14 1.3 Bedömningsgrunder 15 1.4 Granskningen
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018
    NATO Summit Guide Brussels, 11-12 July 2018 A stronger and more agile Alliance The Brussels Summit comes at a crucial moment for the security of the North Atlantic Alliance. It will be an important opportunity to chart NATO’s path for the years ahead. In a changing world, NATO is adapting to be a more agile, responsive and innovative Alliance, while defending all of its members against any threat. NATO remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. At the Brussels Summit, the Alliance will make important decisions to further boost security in and around Europe, including through strengthened deterrence and defence, projecting stability and fighting terrorism, enhancing its partnership with the European Union, modernising the Alliance and achieving fairer burden-sharing. This Summit will be held in the new NATO Headquarters, a modern and sustainable home for a forward-looking Alliance. It will be the third meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government chaired by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. + Summit meetings + Member countries + Partners + NATO Secretary General Archived material – Information valid up to 10 July 2018 1 NATO Summit Guide, Brussels 2018 I. Strengthening deterrence and defence NATO’s primary purpose is to protect its almost one billion citizens and to preserve peace and freedom. NATO must also be vigilant against a wide range of new threats, be they in the form of computer code, disinformation or foreign fighters. The Alliance has taken important steps to strengthen its collective defence and deterrence, so that it can respond to threats from any direction.
    [Show full text]
  • Nederlands-Belgische Militaire Samenwerking in De European Battlegroup Noodzakelijke Investering Voor De Toekomst?
    NEDERLANDS-BELGISCHE MILITAIRE SAMENWERKING Nederlands-Belgische militaire samenwerking in de European Battlegroup Noodzakelijke investering voor de toekomst? Nederland en België voelen de spanning tussen de behoefte aan operationele capaciteiten en de daling van defensiebegrotingen. In de huidige tijd van bezuinigingen op het defensieapparaat moeten zij optimaal gebruik maken van hun militaire middelen. Een verdere intensivering van bestaande en het aangaan van nieuwe samenwerking ligt dan ook voor de hand. Zo zullen Nederland en België in de tweede helft van 2014 samen deelnemen aan de European Battlegroup (EUBG). De EUBG biedt een specifieke rapid response- eenheid die de Europese Unie militair in staat kan stellen om met militaire middelen snel te reageren op ontluikende crises. Wat zijn de precieze beweegredenen van Nederland en België geweest om deel te nemen aan de EUBG en wat zijn de te verwachten voor- en nadelen? Eerste luitenant (R) drs. T.J.A. Collas* e website van het ministerie van Defensie Nederlandse en Belgische F-16’s voor luchtruim - Dmeldde enige tijd geleden: ‘België en bewaking. Toenmalige minister van Defensie Nederland verdiepen militaire samenwerking’ .1 Hillen gaf in het artikel aan dat internationale Het bewuste bericht ging in op de langdurige militaire samenwerking een speerpunt vormde samenwerking van beide landen op marine- van zijn defensiebeleid en dat hij deze vorm gebied en verkennende mogelijkheden voor van samenwerking graag wilde uitbreiden. 2 het opzetten van een Quick Reaction Force van In april 2012 tekenden de ministers van Defensie van Nederland, België en Luxemburg * De auteur, reservist bij 10 NATRES-bataljon, is onlangs afgestudeerd aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen en is tijdelijk werkzaam bij ude Afdeling Reservisten Aangelegen - een visiedocument waarin zij zeiden te streven heden binnen staf CLAS.
    [Show full text]
  • Enter the EU Battlegroups
    Chaillot Paper February 2007 n°97 Enter the EU Battlegroups Gustav Lindstrom cp97-cover.qxp 29/03/2007 16:09 Page 2 Chaillot Paper Paper Chaillot n° 97 In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) became an autonomous Paris-based agency of the Enter the EU Battlegroups European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further develop- ment of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels. Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member of the EUISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a semi- nar or study group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the paper is considered by the EUISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Gustav Lindstrom Chaillot Papers are also accessible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss.europa.eu cp97.qxp 29/03/2007 16:05 Page 1 Chaillot Paper February 2007 n°97 Enter the EU Battlegroups Gustav Lindstrom Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris cp97.qxp 29/03/2007 16:05 Page 2 Institute for Security Studies European Union 43 avenue du Président Wilson 75775 Paris cedex 16 tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30 fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31 e-mail: [email protected] www.iss.europa.eu Director: Nicole Gnesotto © EU Institute for Security Studies 2007.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2010 the State Enterprise LFV Is Responsible for Air Navigation Services in Sweden
    Annual report 2010 The state enterprise LFV is responsible for air navigation services in Sweden. LFV is active at 38 locations all over the country. LFV had sales of about SEK 3.4 billion during 2010 and reports a result of SEK -12 million. During the fourth quarter the number of full-time employees was 1,179. LFV’s mission is to provide safe, efficient and environmentally- adapted air navigation services for civil and military aviation. LFV shall also work to achieve political transportation goals. TABLE OF CONTENTS . Page Important events ................................................1 The Director General on aviation, LFV and the future . .2 Organization and employees.....................................4 More aviation operations during 2010............................6 LFV’s operations.................................................8 Income statement with comments ..............................13 Balance sheets and financing analyses with comments ...........16 Notes . .20 Accounting documents . .26 Reporting according to the Appropriations Directive for LFV.....30 Proposal for allocation ..........................................32 Auditors’ report ................................................33 Board of Directors ..............................................34 Group Management ............................................35 This is LFV......................................................37 Important events The division remote-controlled air navigation services opens new career paths in the industry On 1 April 2010 LFV was
    [Show full text]
  • The Leave Alliance
    THE LEAVE ALLIANCE Flexcit The Market Solution to leaving the EU Dr Richard A E North with Robert Oulds of the Bruges Group and the assistance of readers of EUReferendum.com Dedicated to Peter Troy 9 February 2016 final v. 04 Our vision Our vision is for a United Kingdom as a self-governing, self-confident, free trading nation state, releasing the potential of its citizens through direct democratic control of both national and local government and providing maximum freedom and responsibility for its people. The history of Britain for a thousand years has been as a merchant and maritime power playing its full role in European and world affairs while living under its own laws. It is our view that the UK can flourish again as an independent state trading both with our friends in the EU and the rest of Europe, while developing other relationships throughout the world as trading patterns evolve. For an age, the United Kingdom has freely engaged as an independent country in alliances and treaties with other countries. It has a long history of entering into commercial agreements and conventions at an inter-governmental level. We wish to uphold that tradition. The ability of the people of the United Kingdom to determine their own independent future and use their wealth of executive, legislative and judicial experience to help, inspire and shape political developments through international bodies, and to improve world trade and the wellbeing of all peoples will only be possible when they are free of the undemocratic and moribund European Union. The prosperity of the people depends on being able to exercise the fundamental right and necessity of self-determination, thus taking control of their opportunities and destiny in an inter-governmental global future with the ability to swiftly correct and improve when errors occur.
    [Show full text]