From Nordic Neutrality to NATO The impact of alliance membership on convergence of military capability in Scandinavia University of Amsterdam Master thesis Political Science: International Relations Author: E.J. Runhaar Thesis Supervisor: Dr. P.A. van Hooft Second Reader: Dr. L.J.M. Seymour January 2015 Abstract A technological revolution in military capabilities since the end of the Cold War, and a changing security environment with wars against non-state actors, has led to the adaptation of new tactics, operation methods, command structures and ways of thinking in armed forces of advanced states. NATO changed its structure to improve interoperability between member states for a new role in international campaigns, and the European Union developed a security and defence policy that increasingly added a more institutionalized military element to the EU. Europe’s larger military powers France, United Kingdom and Germany have been subject of research as to why and how they converged with US doctrines and methods, and whether their behaviour within the EU is either balancing against US hegemony, or bandwagoning (Cladi & Locatelli 2012; Dyson 2008; Posen 2006). Reasons for convergence can be simply technological progress, the invention of new technologies and the necessity to emulate them from your rival. How fast a state’s military adapts to it, may be driven by the structure of its executive power (Dyson 2011). This research however focuses on the role alliance membership plays as a driver for convergence. To do this, the military convergence of four Scandinavian countries in the 21st century is being compared. Similarities in geographical position, power, culture, and historical cooperation, but differences in alliance membership, make Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland an interesting case. Taking a neoclassical realist approach and comparing NATO and EU as the alliances that possibly drive convergence within those states, we find that NATO does influence the convergence of not just its member states Denmark and Norway, but also partly that of Sweden. Swedish convergence is driven by the EU as well, through the Battlegroup framework. Finland still focuses mostly on territorial defence, and while it takes NATO and EU into account for interoperability, it does not follow the same path of denationalization of defence as its Scandinavian neighbours. While Denmark and Norway converged with NATO, non-ally Sweden wants to converge with NATO but runs into limitations, and Finland still prefers territorial defence capabilities with an eye on Russia. The EU has much less effect on the convergence of its member states. 1 Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Contents ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 Research Question .................................................................................................................. 5 Literature, Framework ................................................................................................................ 6 The EU as an alliance ............................................................................................................. 6 EU, US, CSDP and NATO: balancing or bandwagoning? .................................................... 8 The need for Defence Transformation ................................................................................. 11 Convergence: adding alliances to the equation .................................................................... 12 Scandinavian convergence ....................................................................................................... 14 Denmark ............................................................................................................................... 14 Norway ................................................................................................................................. 16 Sweden ................................................................................................................................. 18 Finland .................................................................................................................................. 20 Comparison and Analysis ......................................................................................................... 23 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 25 References ................................................................................................................................ 26 2 Introduction Similarities in social, cultural and economic development, a similar geographical position, historical cooperation and the similar threats – the Scandinavian neighbours Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark seem to be natural allies. After World War II, in 1948, Sweden therefore proposed the Scandinavian Defence Union to its three neighbours, based upon neutrality. It would fail: Finland signed a pact with the Soviet Union, while Denmark and Norway decided to join NATO. Sweden remained neutral. In 1973, Denmark joined the European Union’s predecessor, the EEC. In 1995 Sweden and Finland joined the EU, while Norway did not. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009, all EU member states except Denmark are bound to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which includes a mutual defence clause. Denmark negotiated to opt- out of the CSDP, and therefore is not part of the military alliance paragraph of the EU. These four Nordic states are very similar, but their alliance membership separates them, as shown in Table 1. Sweden is the framework nation of the Nordic Battlegroup, which includes Norway and Finland but does not include Danish contributions, there is a Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in place which focuses on military cooperation between these states, with the aim to pool and share wherever possible. Norway Sweden Finland Denmark NATO Yes No No Yes CSDP No Yes Yes No EU No Yes Yes Yes EU Battle Group Yes Yes Yes No Table 1: Scandinavian Alliance Memberships Alliances matter, as a relatively cheap way of creating deterrence for small powers, and as a means of influence for great powers. An in-depth look at how the alliance choices of the four Scandinavian states – Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – affects the outcomes in military convergence behaviour, could give us more insight in how alliance membership may or may not shape small power state behaviour. Membership of either NATO or EU doesn’t seem to have much effect on the actual behaviour of the four Scandinavian states at first sight. Sweden and Finland joined in several NATO-missions in the past 25 years even though they are not a NATO ally. Norway is part of the CSDP Nordic Battle Group, even though it is not an EU member. Denmark, being an EU 3 member, opted out of the ‘military’ chapter of the EU, and therefore cannot join in military cooperation within the EU framework, until the opt-out is lifted. And in the meantime Scandinavia is closely working together. These four similar small powers, with their reciprocal military cooperation but different alliance memberships, is then a chance to understand how being part of a formal alliance shapes the defence capability of a nation state. Does it for example matter to be a NATO member – and do we therefore see differences between the convergence of military capabilities of Norway/Denmark on one side, and Sweden/Finland on the other, in the 21st century? And if there is a an effect of the convergence, how does it look like? First we will discuss the necessity of small powers to join into alliances, and how realism explains that. The EU is being seen as an alliance in this research, mainly because of the mutual defence clause of the Common Security and Defence Policy that was adapted in the Lisbon treaty. There is debate on what the impact and role of the CSDP is, but that debate does not influence the potential the CSDP has to shape convergence of its member states through institutes like the European Defence Agency. Then we will assess the specifics of the relation between EU and NATO. Realists could either see the emergence of the CSDP as a way to balance the US, or as a form of bandwagoning. It is proposed that including Walt’s balance of threat theory (Walt 1985) and Dyson’s reformed bandwagoning (Dyson 2013) might be the best way of analysing the relation between European states, the hegemonic power of the US, the CSDP and NATO. The centrality of NATO to Europe’s security is acknowledged, and the inability of the Common Security and Defence Policy to take over that role is acknowledged as well. We should therefore not see the two alliances as competing, but rather as fulfilling different roles. Those different roles should be the main driver for differences in the way small powers that are member of either of those alliances, converge. The need for Defence Transformation is then being assessed as caused by both technological as strategic reasons, and defence transformation is operationalized as being a fundamental, rapid, mental and physical change to the defence system of a state. Adding alliances