REGIONS, POWERS AND SECONDARY STATE BANDWAGONING UNDER
UNIPOLARITY: THE CASE OF TURKISH-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
by
aban Karda
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
University of Utah
August 2010
Copyright © aban Karda 2010
All Rights Reserved The University of Utah Grad uate School
STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL
The dissertation of Saban Kardas has been approved by the following supervisory committee members:
Steven Lobell , Chair 4/1312010 bate Approved
Howard Lehman , Member 4/1312010 DateApproved
Adam Luedtke , Member 4/1312010 Date Approved
John Francis , Member 4/1312010 bate Approved
Hasan Kosebalaban , Member 4/1312010 Date Approved
______atthe rban and by _ _ w u k ______' :.:..:;:M "' "':..;:..;.;....=:B.= =.=. ==-- _ Chair of the Department of Political Science
and by Charles A. Wight, Dean of The Graduate School. ABSTRACT
Why do secondary powers cooperate with the United States in the post-Cold War unipolar international system and what factors determine their level and type of cooperation? Why did the United States have difficulties enlisting Turkey, a steadfast US ally, behind its military-political agenda in some cases, while it obtained Turkey’s support successfully in others? To answer these questions, this dissertation examined the boundary conditions of when secondary powers are likely to engage in bandwagoning strategies, i.e., follow the stronger side in a militarized international dispute taking place in a regional security complex (RSC).
The central claim of this dissertation is that what determines whether a secondary power will bandwagon is not the distribution of power at the global systemic level, i.e., independent variable, but the dynamics of the regional and domestic environments within which the foreign policy executive (FPE) operates to execute its country’s foreign policy, which this study treated as intervening variables, mediating systemic influences. I developed a multilevel foreign policy model that delineates the independent and intervening variables at different levels and identifies elaborate causal linkages between the systemic incentives and the dependent variable, i.e., different foreign policy outcomes in the form of secondary state bandwagoning. This model has been tested through a closer examination of Turkey’s alliance behavior in the context of two conflicts, with a particular focus on how Turkey conducted its relations with the United States: US invasion of Iraq (2003) and Russian-Georgian conflict (2008). These cases were chosen as most-likely candidates for defensive bandwagoning, a subtype of the overall bandwagoning strategy, because the primary motivation driving Turkish FPE was the perceived indirect threats from US actions.
The two case studies provide evidence that the intervening variables at the domestic and regional environments influenced state behavior, through the causal mechanisms identified in the model. I therefore conclude that although structural distribution of power exerts a major causal influence on state behavior, i.e., the systemic imperative of bandwagoning, the boundary conditions of the bandwagoning argument are set by the causal forces located at the domestic and regional environments.
iv To My Family TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...... iii
ABBREVIATIONS...... xii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... xiv
CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION...... 1
Statement of the Question and the Scope of my Argument...... 4 Alliances: Balancing vs. Bandwagoning ...... 4 Alliances Under Unipolarity...... 5 Indirect Threats and Defensive Bandwagoning...... 7 Regionally-differentiated Foreign Policy Model...... 8 Introduction of the Hypotheses...... 10 Relevant Literature...... 13 Why the Proposed Research?...... 14 Methodology...... 20 Case Study Method...... 20 Process Tracing Method ...... 21 Case Selection: Most-likely Research Design and the Logic of Inference...... 22 Introduction of Cases ...... 24 Specification of Key Concepts and the Coding and Measurement of Variables...... 28 Independent Variable: Polarity ...... 28 Dependent Variable: Bandwagoning ...... 29 Intervening Variables: Permissiveness of Relevant Environments ...... 30 Alliance Stimulant: Indirect Threats...... 30 Secondary Power Motivation: Security-seeking ...... 31 Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) ...... 31 Regional Security Complex (RSC)...... 32 Case Analysis and Hypothesis Testing...... 33 Structure of the Dissertation ...... 34 2. ALIGNMENT BEHAVIOR IN RESPONSE TO SYSTEMIC CONDITIONS.... 35
Review of Balancing vs. Bandwagoning Literature ...... 36 Balancing Hypothesis ...... 37 Bandwagoning ...... 38 Defensive Bandwagoning ...... 39 Balancing Predominates...... 40 Balancing Hypothesis Challenged ...... 41 Offensive Bandwagoning...... 43 Hegemonic Stability...... 44 Alignment Patterns Under Unipolarity: Responses to U.S. Power...... 46 Scope of My Approach: The Argument for Secondary State Bandwagoning Under Unipolarity ...... 52 Types of Bandwagoning Strategies in Response to Alliance Stimulant...... 53 Defensive vs. Offensive Strategies: Going Beyond the Rigid Division ...... 55 Bringing in Unipolarity...... 57 Established ‘Hegemony’ Eases Concerns Over Bandwagoning ...... 58 Distribution of Power Induces Bandwagoning...... 60 Interest Compatibility Under Unipolarity: Offensive Bandwagoning...... 61 Indirect Threats as a Stimulant of Alignment Behavior Under Unipolarity...... 62 Responses to Indirect Threats: Soft Balancing vs. Defensive Bandwagoning .... 65 Defensive Bandwagoning: Causal Mechanism ...... 66 Summary...... 71
3. REGIONS AS A DISTINCT LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ...... 72
Developments in Levels of Analysis Literature...... 73 Why Study Regions as a Distinct Level of Analysis? ...... 77 Approaches to the Study of Regions...... 79 The Ebb and Flows in the Comparative Study of Regions...... 81 Place of the Present Study in the Literature on Regions...... 85 Regions as Independent Variable...... 87 Definition of a Region: Borrowing from Regional Security Complexes ...... 88 Systemic vs. Ideational Definitions of Regions...... 89 Proximate Interactions vs. Security Externalities ...... 91 The Notion of Region to be Used in This Study...... 95 Great Power Involvement: Between Geography and Functionalism...... 95 Overlapping vs. Exclusive Conceptualizations...... 98 Systemic vs. Ideational Conceptualizations...... 99 Region as Understood in This Study ...... 100 Summary...... 101
4. A REGIONALLY-DIFFERENTIATED FOREIGN POLICY MODEL...... 103
The Conception of the State and the International System...... 106 State-centric Approach...... 107
vii Systemic Model ...... 109 State Types: Regional States...... 111 Why a State-centric and Systemic Theory?...... 115 FPE at the Nexus of Domestic and International Environments ...... 117 Identifying Regional Interests...... 121 Why Study Regional Goals?...... 121 Identifying Primary and Secondary Areas of State Action...... 124 What Exactly Do Domestic and Regional Intervening Variables Influence?.... 125 A Two-stage Model of Foreign Policy Behavior...... 127 Stage 1: Deriving Bandwagoning Strategies from External Environment ...... 129 International Environment: Structure of Threats and Opportunities ...... 129 Offensive vs. Defensive Strategies ...... 130 Regional vs. Global Threats and Opportunities...... 131 Secondary State Bandwagoning Strategies...... 133 Regional Balancing...... 134 Defensive Bandwagoning ...... 135 Regional Hegemony/ Sphere of Influence...... 136 Offensive Bandwagoning...... 137 Independent Variable: Distribution of Power...... 137 Stage 2: Implementation of Foreign Policy Strategy...... 140 Intervening Variables...... 140 Permissiveness of Domestic Environment: Congruence of Perceptions ... 141 Operational indicator ...... 143 Permissiveness of Regional Environment: Regional Costs...... 144 Operational indicators...... 146 Additional Hypotheses...... 148 Final Policy: From Bandwagoning as a Strategy to an Outcome ...... 148
5. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING US INVASION OF IRAQ (2003).... 152
A Chronological Account of the Iraq Crisis ...... 156 The Background of the Crisis ...... 157 Iraq as an Emerging Global Concern...... 159 Coalition Government Resists Forceful Solution of Iraq Crisis ...... 160 Coalition Government Turns More Cooperatative ...... 163 Deepening Domestic Political Instability and the Rise of the Bureaucracy ...... 165 AKP’s Electoral Victory and Restoration of Domestic Political Stability ...... 167 American Diplomatic Offensive: Three-stage Plan Revealed...... 168 Turkey’s Resistance to American Demands and Delaying Tactics...... 169 Stage One: Site Inspection Begins...... 171 Stage Two: Turkish Parliament Approves Site Modernization ...... 173 Failure to Launch Stage Three: Turkish Parliament Rejects the Motion...... 174 Attempts to Save the Northern Front...... 176 Settling for Limited Partnership: Turkey Grants Overflight Rights ...... 176 Explaining Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the Iraq Crisis...... 178 Stage 1- Deciphering Turkey’s Strategy...... 179
viii ‘Defensive Motivations’ in Response to ‘Extraregional Stimulus’ ...... 180 Sources of Indirect Threats ...... 181 Immediate Challenges to Turkey’s Security...... 181 Concerns Over the Future and Shifts in Relative Position ...... 184 Challenges to Turkey’s Economic Interests ...... 187 Turkey’s Preferences: Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing ...... 188 Details of Turkey’s Defensive Bandwagoning Strategy...... 191 Pillar I: Cooperation Out of Necessity and Linkage Politics...... 191 Pillar II: Unilateral Intervention...... 195 Stage 2- Strategic Interaction with Regional and Domestic Audiences ...... 198 Turkey’s Position as a Regional Power: Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? ...... 198 Sources of Regional Costs to Turkey’s Defensive Bandwagoning ...... 199 Perceptions of US actions by other regional actors ...... 199 Regional perceptions of Turkey’s motivations...... 201 Turkey’s Regional Diplomacy: Eliminating Regional Costs...... 205 Soliciting American help to untie its hands ...... 206 Regional diplomacy ...... 208 Domestic Support for Defensive Bandwagoning ...... 212 Operational Indicator: Intra-elite Consensus ...... 213 Chapter Summary and Assessment...... 219
6. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT (2008)...... 222
Background to the Crisis...... 225 Turkey in the Greater Black Sea Region and the Caucasus...... 225 Turkish-Georgian-American Strategic Partnership ...... 228 Defense Cooperation...... 232 The Balance Sheet: Achievements of the Turkish-American Partnership with Georgia...... 235 Russian Reactions to Western Military Cooperation with Georgia...... 237 Saakashvili and the Road to the 2008 War ...... 238 Accelerating Tensions...... 240 August 2008 War ...... 241 Turkish Policy During the 2008 Crisis: A Critical Chronological Account...... 243 Turkey’s Diplomatic Offensive ...... 245 Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP)...... 246 International Mediation Efforts...... 250 American Attempts to Contain Russia...... 251 Controversy Over Transit of American Warships Into the Black Sea...... 254 Russian Recognition of Breakaway Regions...... 256 Turkey Forges Closer Ties with Russia...... 258 Turkish-Russian Customs Crisis...... 260 Tensions Subdue ...... 262 Explaining Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the Russian-Georgian War...... 263 Stage 1- Deciphering Turkey’s Strategy...... 264
ix Alliance Stimulant: Russian Threat vs. Indirect American Threats ...... 265 Russian Threat in the Caucasus?...... 265 Russia in the Crisis: Limited Aim Revisionist...... 268 ‘Defensive Motivations’ in Response to ‘Extra-regional Stimulus’...... 271 Sources of Indirect Threats ...... 272 Explosion of Frozen Conflicts and Spread of Violence...... 272 Disruption of the Balance of Power...... 273 Undermining the Montreux Convention...... 275 Threat to Turkey’s Economic Interests...... 276 Turkey’s Preferences: Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing ...... 277 Details of Turkey’s Strategy: CSCP ...... 279 Conflict Prevention ...... 279 Engaging Russia...... 281 Exclusion of the United States...... 282 CSCP as an exclusive regional project ...... 283 Stage II- Strategic Interaction with Regional and Domestic Audiences...... 284 Turkey’s Position as a Regional Power ...... 284 Sources of Regional Costs to Turkey’s Prospective Bandwagoning...... 285 Russian perceptions of the American agenda ...... 285 Russian perceptions of Turkey...... 287 Turkey’s Regional Diplomacy: Eliminating Regional Costs...... 288 Inability to solicit American help to untie its hands ...... 290 Regional diplomacy: signaling Russia to build confidence...... 291 Domestic Support for Limited Cooperation ...... 294 Operational Indicator: Intra-elite Consensus ...... 296 Chapter Summary and Assessment...... 298
7. EVALUATION OF THE CASES AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING ...... 300
Testing the Hypotheses...... 300 Hypothesis 1: Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Outcomes...... 300 First Case ...... 301 Second Case...... 303 Hypothesis 1a: Effect of Unipolarity on State Preferences ...... 304 First Case ...... 305 Second Case...... 306 Hypothesis 2: Strategic Interaction with the Relevant Audiences...... 306 The FPE Facing the Domestic Context...... 307 First Case ...... 308 Second Case...... 309 Turkey Targeting the Region...... 309 First Case ...... 310 Second Case...... 312 A General Evaluation of the Hypotheses...... 313 Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Outcomes...... 314 Hypothesis 1a: The Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Preferences...... 315
x Hypothesis 2: The Boundary Conditions of Bandwagoning ...... 317 Summary...... 318
8. CONCLUSION ...... 319
Implications of the Case Studies...... 321 Intervening Variables as Transmission Belts: Contra Second Image and Third Image Theorizing...... 322 Indirect Threats ...... 323 Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing...... 325 Regionally-differentiated Foreign Policy Model...... 326 Systemic Positioning of Regional Powers and the Role of Proximity...... 328 Structural and State-centric Assumptions...... 329 Role of Domestic Political Context ...... 330 Policy Implications: The Importance of Indirect Threats...... 331 Implications for the Turkish-American Relations ...... 331 Implications for the Future of Unipolarity and American Power...... 334 Limitations of the Study and the Avenues for Future Research ...... 336 Conclusion ...... 342
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 344
xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANAP……….………... Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
AKP……….…………..Adalet ve Kalk nma Parisi (The Justice and Development Party)
BTC……….………….. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
BTE……….………….. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
CIA……….………….. Central Intelligence Agency
CIS……….………….. Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCP………………….Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform
DSP……….………….. Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
EU……….…………… European Union
FPE……….………….. Foreign Policy Executive
ISAF………………….. International Security Assistance Force
MFA………………….. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MHP………………….. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action)
NATO…………………North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC…………………... Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
OSCE………………….The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP……………………. Partnership for Peace
PKK………………….. Kurdistan Workers’ Party RSC……………………Regional Security Complex
TBMM……………….. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National
Assembly)
UN……………………. United Nations
UNMOVIC……………The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission
US……………………..United States
USSR………………….Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YA ………………….. Yüksek Askeri ura (Supreme Military Council)
xiii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research project took a good deal of effort to mobilize a broad coalition of excellent individuals whom I will remember with great respect. I was much more fortunate than the American strategists to form a coalition of great instructors whose joint efforts enabled me to successfully complete this dissertation. I am indebted to my dissertation chair Steven Lobell who stimulated my interest in alliance studies, neoclassical realism and most importantly the important role regions play in international security. I owe sincere debt to his guidance and assistance through the entire process.
Thank you.
Many thanks are also due to other committee members: John Francis, Howard
Lehman, Hasan Kosebalaban, and Adam Luedtke. I am indebted to you all for serving on my committee, supporting my studies, and being great friends. I look forward to your support in the future.
I also am grateful to many professors and friends at the University of Utah as well as the small but closely-knit Turkish community at the U and downtown. You created a welcoming environment and through your friendship and support eased my burden through graduate school. I will miss your company greatly.
I thank Matthew Burbank for all the support he provided since I arrived in Utah, first as the Director of the Graduate Program and the Chair of the Department. I learned a lot from Luke Garrott who served as a great teaching mentor. I am particularly grateful to many friends from the program who volunteered to become part of the loose coalition leading to this dissertation in different capacities: Kristian Alexander, Masaki Kakizaki,
Carrie Humphreys, Melissa Goldsmith, Koji Haraguchi, and Douglas Byrd.
I dedicate this dissertation to those who suffered the most through my graduate studies: my parents. Thank you for persevering my long years of absence. I also owe big time to my sisters, nieces and nephews, who not only endured my absence but also made up for my absences when my parents needed me the most. This dissertation will not have been possible, without their support and endless patience.
xv CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s refusal to open its territory to American forces before the Iraq war in
2003, after fifty years of close cooperation, shocked American war-planners.
Noncooperation of several countries, along with Turkey, complicated the planning,
execution, and costs of the war and its aftermath. Contrast this behavior with broad
international coalitions formed around the United States during the Gulf War in 1991 and
the intervention in Afghanistan in 2002, which not only provided those campaigns with
international legitimacy, but also facilitated their conduct and reduced their costs to the
United States. This contrast raises a question: why do secondary powers, countries which
can exercise impact on a regional level, follow great powers, countries capable of
intervening on a global scale, in some international crises, and not others?
Explaining this empirical puzzle requires revisiting the study of alliances, how
states select partners in conflicts, which revolves on the question of whether states
balance, ally with the weaker side, or bandwagon, ally with the stronger side.1 It already
has been pointed out that the research on alliances “has received less attention than it
1 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994). 2 deserves.”2 An even less examined issue pertaining to alliances is the alignment behavior of secondary powers that play a major role in their respective regional security complexes
(RSC). In more theoretical terms, therefore, the following question drives this study: what are the factors that account for whether and when secondary states –or regional powers - are likely to cooperate with global powers in the context of conflicts taking place in their regions?
The question of secondary power bandwagoning is particularly relevant for the unipolar structure of the post-Cold war international system that is characterized by US preponderance in indicators of material power. Since the patterns of interaction between the United States and secondary powers are likely to shape the future evolution of the international order, it is important to study what factors can ensure the cooperation of the lesser powers with the unipolar leader. As more and more states abandon bandwagoning strategies, it will be difficult to sustain the current structure of the international order.
Under unipolarity, unequal distribution of power, given the concentration of capabilities in one pole, leads some realists to expect lesser powers to bandwagon with the United States.3 This is mainly because the distribution of material capabilities is such that it makes counterbalancing the United States a futile strategy, and bandwagoning emerges as the predicted state response. In their dealings with the United States, the systemic imperative of dependence on the unipolar leader exerted by the distribution of power influences the behavior of secondary powers in conflicts in their region. Although one can recount many examples of regional powers joining the United States, empirically, however, bandwagoning is not always the observed outcome. Nor are all
2 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 1. 3 William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999). 3 cases of bandwagoning similar. Polarity predicts bandwagoning, but it fails to account for the full range of empirical outcomes.
I argue that the unipolar distribution of power in the post-Cold War era induces secondary power bandwagoning, but cannot explain: a) variations in bandwagoning behavior, and b) whether secondary states will bandwagon at all. Different forms of bandwagoning behavior as well as appropriate boundary conditions for bandwagoning hypothesis still beg proper examination, for which we need a theory of secondary state foreign policy.
Toward that end, I suggest a two-stage foreign policy model to study secondary power foreign policy in the context of militarized international disputes. It identifies independent, intervening and dependent variables at different levels of analysis, and lays out the causal chain from the systemic incentives and constraints to the actual foreign policy behavior. It also divides foreign policy process into two stages: preference formation and strategic interaction. I apply this deductive model to the Turkish-US relations. How Turkey, a key regional power which has been cooperating with the United
States in several regions, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia, conducts its relations with the United States lends itself to testing the major hypotheses of this study. In particular, I focus on one subtype of bandwagoning: defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats, which remains largely unexamined by the extant literature on alliances. I conduct two case studies where perceptions of indirect threats from the United States shaped Turkey’s alliance behavior: the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and 2008 Russian-Georgian war. 4
Statement of the Question and the Scope of my Argument
The international system in the post-Cold War period is described as unipolar because it was shaped around the primacy of the United States in several facets of power.
Although the United States acted in defense of the status quo in many cases, in other cases it has followed the dictates of offensive realism. To preserve the status quo as well as to change it, it carried out several military campaigns and pursued proactive security strategies. These actions have altered the external conditions for many lesser powers, and posed direct and indirect challenges to their security and interests. The resulting opening or closing windows of opportunity forced these lesser powers to readjust to these external shifts. Under unipolarity, these dynamics are present in various issue areas and different regions, and fluctuate from case to case and over time. Consequently, the American behavior produces incentives among second-tier states to engage in various strategies, as they seek to respond to the changes in their external environment.
Alliances: Balancing vs. Bandwagoning
How can we explain those strategies, especially the ones that involve cooperation with the United States? International relations theorists discuss several strategies that are available to states faced with significant shifts in the distribution of power or with significant increase of threat to their national security. Drawing on the balance of power theory associated with classical realism, structural realism set the terms of the debate. A state’s alignment behavior in response to systemic incentives was thought to range from balancing (checking the rising power) to bandwagoning (joining with the rising power). 5
Although several other strategies were identified, these two behaviors came to be considered as the endpoints on a spectrum.
The defensive variant of the structural realist school developed the hypothesis that when faced with these two options, states will prefer balancing to bandwagoning as it is the most relevant strategy for the security seekers in an anarchic world; hence the balance of power theory as the unchanging law of international politics. The study of bandwagoning behavior received less interest; in fact it evolved only as addenda to the balancing literature. Under certain conditions, some balance of power realists expect states to ally with the dominant power in a conflict for defensive purposes, though rarely.
Others, called offensive realists, predict that revisionist states will side with aggressive powers in order to further their nonsecurity goals. At the same time, power preponderance school realists expect weaker and secondary states to group around a global leader.
The problem with these theories was, however, that they were derived from the experience of the multipolar European international system of the 18th and 19th centuries; as a result whether balance of power hypothesis operates differently in other systems remains a matter of contention. Much of the scholarly debate on the effect of the system structure on state behavior revolved on the question of whether a significant difference existed between states’ alignment patterns in bipolar and multipolar systems.
Alliances Under Unipolarity
The gradual transition to a unipolar world system and the absence of any obvious attempt to address the growing power disparity between the United States and the rest of 6 the world altered the terms of the debate, sparking various responses, ranging from those arguing that as the essential feature of international relations balancing will undoubtedly make a comeback to those claiming that balancing as we know it is a relic of the past.
Despite the failure of their initial expectation, the supporters of the balance of power hypothesis were not ready to abandon their long-held canons so easily. The delayed resurrection of multipolarity (and balance of power politics by extension), nonetheless, forced the systemic balance of power theorists to refine their theories in an attempt to explain the new reality of international politics in the age of American primacy. They have come to the grips with unipolarity and moved beyond prophesying its demise.
Instead, particularly after the new trends in world politics in the wake of the US wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, they set out to explore new ways within which their old theories operate under a different kind of international system.
The parties in the debate focus on balancing strategies –strategies of restraint -4 and argue over whether new forms of balancing have emerged as new manifestations of state behavior and whether balance of power theory is still relevant to understanding international politics under unipolarity. They in particular highlight soft balancing strategies that avoid challenging US military preponderance directly but utilize international institutions, economic measures and diplomatic mechanism to delay, complicate and undermine US policies.5 These new forms of balancing are thought to be important as they precipitate states’ resort to conventional hard balancing through
4 This categorization of secondary power responses to unipolarity as strategies of restraint versus strategies of accommodation is borrowed from G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity (Discussion Paper: National Intelligence Council, 2003). 5 Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005). 7 alliances and military buildups to check the US power; hence they are likely to set in motion the eventual return of multipolarity.
In this research, I join this debate and argue that in this rush to uncover new forms of balancing, the bandwagoning end of the spectrum, i.e., strategies of accommodation to
US power, has been under-theorized. I expand on the earlier scholarship on bandwagoning and explore how the unipolar structure of international politics has affected bandwagoning behavior by secondary states in their interactions with the unipole. I show that the foreign policy behavior of the second-tier states that are unable or unwilling to check the unipole’s actions through hard balancing are better explained by various forms of accommodation – bandwagoning - than what is predicted by the soft balancing proposition.
Indirect Threats and Defensive Bandwagoning
For purposes of this study, bandwagoning is defined as an alignment strategy of siding with the dominant power for the pursuit of both security and nonsecurity goals. By modifying the conventional concept of bandwagoning, I suggest new forms of foreign policy behavior. Most importantly, I present a state behavior leading to bandwagoning in the absence of any direct threats, which is an additional pathway for defensive bandwagoning, ignored by defensive realists and largely unexamined by offensive realists.
As I will show in Chapter 2, a great deal of variation in secondary state alliance behavior is caused by indirect threats, i.e., negative externalities of American actions for the security interests of regional powers. Indirect threats are likely to emerge when the 8
United States becomes insensitive to the security concerns of its allies. The secondary power is not forced to lend support to American policies through coercive means, nor does it have offensive reasons to become part of US-led alliances. Yet the relative power concerns, as well as the perceptions of indirect threat, push it to join the United States, for this strategy is viewed as the most plausible way to adjust to the shifts in power.6
Regionally-differentiated Foreign Policy Model
To study the phenomenon of bandwagoning under unipolarity, I develop a foreign policy model that follows the insights of systemic theorizing and gives causal priority to the external environment. In a significant contribution to the level of analysis problem, however, I introduce regional security complex as a distinct level, and argue that a proper explanation of regional powers’ alignment behavior in general and bandwagoning behavior in particular has to take into account the regional context of state behavior and how it interacts with domestic and global level dynamics. Moreover, in line with the neoclassical realist research agenda, I also adopt a state-centric approach and put analytical emphasis on the role played by state leaders in formulating and conducting foreign policy. I, in particular, study the role of the foreign policy executive (FPE), i.e., the institutions and individuals tasked with conducting foreign policy. I assume that while choosing between different foreign policy strategies, FPE is driven by the dynamics of the international environment and seeks to uphold the collective interests, i.e., external goals, of the state in response to systemic influences.
6 In that sense, this kind of defensive bandwagoning can be seen as a rival hypothesis to soft balancing argument. 9
The foreign policy model is built through two analytical moves. First, I show that for a proper understanding of state behavior and policy outcomes, a theory of foreign policy needs to examine not only complex relationships at multiple levels, but also disaggregate different stages of foreign policy making process: a) ‘policy formulation’ which concerns how the FPE undertakes preference formation in response to external environment; b) ‘policy implementation’ which accounts for how the FPE engages in strategic interaction vis-à-vis relevant domestic, regional and global audiences to enact the externally-derived foreign and security policies. These two stages, in other words, correspond to two major tasks assumed by the FPE. While in the first stage the FPE observes the shifts in the external environment to devise relevant strategies, in the second stage it works to conduct foreign policy under domestic and regional constraints.
Second, I delineate my independent and intervening variables at different levels and develop more elaborate causal linkages between the systemic incentives and my dependent variable, i.e., different foreign policy outcomes in the form of secondary state bandwagoning. I maintain that the incentives and constraints presented to states by the distribution of power at the global level (independent variable) are mediated through two intervening variables at the domestic and regional levels: a) permissiveness of domestic environment which is a function of the congruence of perception between state leaders and societal groups, and b) permissiveness of regional environment which is a function of regional costs. Through this multilayered foreign policy model, I offer a robust framework to analyze foreign policy behavior of secondary states (dependent variable) in the context of military conflicts taking place in their regions. 10
Introduction of the Hypotheses7
The independent variable of this study, systemic polarity, suggests that the unipolar distribution of power rules out hard balancing and forces secondary powers to undertake bandwagoning strategies. In this study, I will look at only one form of bandwagoning, defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats. Secondary powers are more likely to ally with the source of the threat than stay on the sidelines, so that they could reduce negative externalities to their regional interests. Hence, the major hypothesis which will be subjected to empirical testing in this study is:
Hypothesis 1: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, secondary
powers are more likely to engage in defensive bandwagoning with the United
States than strategies of resistance.
This hypothesis, testing the structural realist argument for bandwagoning, leads to the behavioral assumption that, given the global distribution of power, secondary powers will cooperate with the United States, in line with the latter’s political-military agenda in a conflict.
Moreover, I will use an auxiliary hypothesis to measure the influence of the systemic distribution of power in a different way. In order to study fully the effect of the structural distribution of power, I will look at how unipolarity affected the initial policy preferences, in addition to measuring its effect on final policy outcomes.
Hypothesis 1a: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, FPE is more
likely to prefer defensive bandwagoning with the United States than strategies of
resistance.
7 The hypotheses will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. 11
This hypothesis suggests that unequal distribution of power will alter preference ordering and force secondary powers’ decision makers to prefer bandwagoning over other strategies.
The intervening variables of this study mediate the influence of structural distribution of power on state behavior. Their inclusion gives way to the next major hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: When FPE faces permissive environments at the domestic and
regional levels, it is more likely to act on the initial preferences.
Once the FPE formulates a foreign policy strategy in response to the international environment, it still has to engage in strategic interaction with relevant audiences at domestic and regional levels to enact its initial preferences. The prospects of realizing the initial strategy will be improved in regional and domestic settings that offer a minimum degree of limitations to the FPE’s freedom of action.
The first intervening variable, permissiveness of domestic environment, is operationalized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: A divided FPE will face a restrictive domestic environment.
It looks at the congruence between the FPE’s and society’s perceptions of national interests. If the definition of national interests adopted by the FPE indeed reflects a societal consensus, the FPE will not encounter major internal divisions; hence, it will be better positioned to implement foreign policy preferences. In such a situation, the resulting intra-elite consensus will facilitate the translation of the initial preferences into behavioral outcomes. If, however, the FPE’s perceptions of threat and opportunity diverge from its society’s perceptions, it is very likely to run into difficulties in reaching a 12 unified position. In this case, the FPE will confront major limitations on its foreign policy behavior.
The second intervening variable, the permissiveness of the regional environment, is measured through the concept of regional costs, i.e., how other regional actors react to a secondary power’s cooperation with extra-regional great powers. The FPE’s attempts to realize a bandwagoning strategy generates regional costs, which, in turn, create a constraining environment on its freedom of action. Regional costs are products of two distinct processes: regional actors’ perception of the American agenda and their perception of a regional country’s motivations. Each is operationalized in a separate hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: Secondary powers considering alliance with extra-regional
powers perceived as revisionist will face a restrictive regional environment.
Hypothesis 2c: Secondary powers perceived as revisionist in the region will face
a restrictive regional environment.
Depending on the neighboring countries’ evaluation of the role expected from the secondary power, the FPE will face constraining or permissive environments as it seeks to realize its preferred strategy. When regional costs are low or when the secondary power is in an advantageous position to defray them, the FPE is more likely to translate initial policy choices into behavioral outcomes. In situations where those costs are prohibitive, the FPE’s likelihood of acting on the initial preference will be extremely limited.8
8 The foregoing discussion is summarized in Chapter 4. 13
Relevant Literature
This dissertation builds on various categories of international relations literature to study bandwagoning under unipolarity. First, it is largely grounded in the realist tradition, especially realist alliance theories. It cuts through two major fault lines in realism: offensive vs. defensive realism and structural vs. neoclassical realism. It follows the precepts of neoclassical realism, by arguing for the inclusion of intervening unit level variables to supplement structural influences in the study of foreign policy. It however strikes a middle point in the offensive vs. defensive realist debate in order to avoid limiting the universe of empirical cases. Moreover, it revisits the realist balance of power literature on alliances as it pertains to balancing vs. bandwagoning behavior, and the recent debate on balancing under unipolarity. Second, this project expands on the literature on the levels of analysis, and argues for the inclusion of regions into the study of foreign policy behavior. In that context, drawing on the burgeoning literature on
‘regional security complexes,’ it makes a case for treating regions as a distinct level of analysis and develops a conceptualization of regions that will be used in this study.
In Chapter 2, I will review realist alignment literatures. I will first revisit the literature on balancing vs. bandwagoning and summarize the respective arguments of major contributors to the debate, with an aim to grasp how bandwagoning behavior is viewed by this scholarship. I then will review the literature on balancing - or lack of balancing to be more precise - under unipolarity. My aim in this inquiry is to show that this literature under-theorized the phenomenon of bandwagoning. With the insights gained from this unfolding debate, I will identify the structural inducements and 14 constraints on states in a unipolar structure that need to be taken into account in order to provide a proper understanding of bandwagoning behavior in the post-Cold War period.
The review on the levels of analysis and RSC will be undertaken in Chapter 3.
The goal in this chapter is to make a case for treating the regions as a distinct level of analysis. Toward this end, the chapter will review thoroughly relevant literature to offer a definition of RSC which will be employed in this study. Chapter 4 builds on the groundwork laid in the preceding chapters and introduces the regionally-differentiated, multi-stage foreign policy model. It also specifies the hypotheses that will be subjected to empirical testing.
Why the Proposed Research?
The application of this theoretical model to Turkish-American relations will help explain the broader issue of secondary state bandwagoning with the United States, which is central not only to security studies literature but also to current policy debates.
The discussion about whether the current unipolar structure of the international system is sustainable comes down to how one views relative propensity of states to counterbalance or jump on the US bandwagon.9 As Walt puts it cogently, a simple logic of “if you can’t beat ’m, join ’m.” cannot “capture either the different forms that accommodation may take or the different motivations that might lead states to align with the United States. Nor does it tell us much about how they will try to safeguard their lot
9 Thomas Ambrosio, "The Non-material Cost of Bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the Transformation of Russian Security Policy," Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 2 (2006): 258; Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American. 15
with Washington.”10 In the same spirit, I do not expect secondary states to bandwagon
categorically with the leading state in the system, independently of their own interests.
Various structural realists are right to argue that the behavior and intentions of powerful
states as well as distribution of power and other structural modifiers influence the foreign
policy options of the secondary states. For a proper understanding of the conditions under
which bandwagoning proposition is likely to hold, however, one also has to look at
factors internal to the follower that induce bandwagoning behavior, not the policies of the
leading state alone. It is, therefore, necessary to study systemic imperatives as well as
unit-level factors that enter into a decision to select between available strategies.
What effect the structure of the system has on bandwagoning behavior needs to be
reformulated. Partly because of the delays in the evolution toward multipolarity, the
burgeoning literature on new forms of balancing rightly questions the relevance of
conceptual models developed for a different kind of international system and explores
whether and how those assumptions and strategies that flow from them are relevant under
a unipolar system characterized by an established “hegemon.” As Layne correctly
observes “(p)recisely because counterbalancing against an actual hegemon is much more
complex than balancing against a rising one, a reconsideration of the types of state
strategies that should be categorized as balancing is needed.”11 In this endeavor,
however, the recent scholarship tends to under-theorize the other end of the balance-
bandwagon dichotomy. It is warranted to revisit how the factors that account for why
10 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 182-183. 11 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 29. 16
secondary states gravitate toward a stronger power operate differently in an international
system where a great power has already established its primacy.12
Whereas most of this new literature looks at why the balancing against the
preponderant US power has not taken place,13 this study will examine various patterns of
bandwagoning by the secondary states in the hegemonic order.14 Because the existing
scholarship is focused on how the US could maintain its primacy, the scholars in this
debate mainly look at how and what aspects of the US behavior influence secondary state
responses. But they pay relatively less attention to factors endogenous to the secondary
states. In line with them, I will explore the effect of threats emanating from the US
actions on lesser powers’ behavior. To provide a richer and more accurate account, I will
also study how variations in regional context of external alignments may play a role in
setting the boundary conditions of bandwagoning by secondary powers.
In this research, I will focus on a major stimulant of alliance behavior, indirect
threats. How secondary powers will respond to indirect threats lies at the heart of the
theoretical discussions on the alignment behavior under unipolar order. The advocates of
soft balancing argument believe that the level of aggressive intentions that others
perceive from the unipolar leader will determine their responses, if revisionist policies
pursued by the United States continue unabated. Although they expect secondary powers
to engage in soft balancing, I argue that such actions of the unipole produce incentives
among other states to engage in not only soft balancing but also different forms of
12 Recent scholarship has started exploring how the causal logic of various realist theories can be integrated into the new reality of American primacy. These discussions will be reviewed in detail in the second chapter. 13 A good example is the collection of essays in G. John Ikenberry, ed. America Unrivalled: The Future of Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). 14 The debate on how other actors are adjusting to American global preeminence will be examined closely in Chapter 2. 17
bandwagoning. I further contend that defensive bandwagoning under unipolarity, which
presents a causal pathway to security-driven cooperation with a revisionist power,
received insufficient attention, and I will elaborate it in this study.
Overall, this project will take its place in a vibrant research tradition, neoclassical
realism, filling important cracks in the literature. The neoclassical realist research agenda
aims to develop theories of foreign policy decision making to explain the process leading
from preferences to international outcomes.15 In their models, neoclassical realists
identify how incentives and constraints presented to states by the external environment
are mediated through intervening variables at the domestic level.16 In particular, I argue
for the inclusion of the mediating influences located at the regional level as an addition to
the domestic level intervening variables identified by neoclassical realists. This is an
important corrective to the neoclassical realist research tradition, because alliance
behavior, just like any other international outcome such as war, is a product of strategic
interaction between two or more political units. Since unit level process variables alone
are insufficient to explain dyadic or systemic outcomes,17 the second –regional-systemic
intervening variable I suggest can capture the strategic interaction between a secondary
state and the states it is closely interacting with, i.e., the regional system.
15 See, for instance, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 16 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 152. 17 Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War," in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 23. 18
At the same time, the study will make a significant contribution to the study of
Turkish-American relations as well, for most of the existing works on the subject are in
the form of historical narratives and lack an attempt to theorize.18 On the one hand, its
relationship with the United States has been the most valuable international connection
Turkey has developed starting with the Cold War years. Although Turkey maintained
security cooperation with the United States in the post-Cold War era, the bilateral
relationship was characterized by patterns of both conflict and cooperation. On the other
hand, Turkey has been increasingly referred to as a regional power that can exercise
influence in its surrounding regions. While Turkey’s proactive regional power role has
been promoted by the United States in many cases, in other cases, it led to conflicts of
interest. Consequently, Turkish-American relations ebbed and flowed throughout the
post-Cold war era, although the systemic distribution of power remained unchanged. The
regionally-differentiated foreign policy model can provide a useful framework to analyze
Turkish-American relations by taking into account both the structure of the international
system and the unique regional conditions shaping Turkey’s behavior.
The study is also justified for policy relevant reasons. Despite the relevance of
secondary power bandwagoning behavior for the sustainability of the unipolar
international system, only a handful of analyses exist that engage in a full treatment of
bandwagoning. Through a succinct analysis of the factors that might induce secondary
states to align with the United States, the conclusions of the study can lend fresh input to
the debates about the future of the unipolar politics, and the conduct of US policy. What
also makes the current study particularly relevant is its emphasis on the regional
18 Morton Abramowitz, ed. Turkey’s Transformation and American Foreign Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000). 19
dimension of international security. Most security problems today, such as cross-border
aggression, civil wars, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, take place at
regional level. Their management, however, needs the involvement of outside powers,
and most significantly the United States, because it is the only country that has the
wherewithal and global reach to handle the challenges posed by them, and it has vested
interests in various regions of the world, such as Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans,
and East Asia.
The United States needs to mobilize other states, particularly secondary regional
powers, which are essential to the exercise of US power and influence in the world. A
more effective policy against nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea on the one hand,
and the civil war in Sudan on the other cannot be executed without constructive
cooperation of key regional powers Turkey, South Korea, and Egypt, respectively. As the
Iraq war and Russian-Georgian war have shown, regional states respond to American
demands for cooperation in different ways. The military and economic superiority of the
United States does not help it enlist the cooperation of other countries. Since they do not
bandwagon automatically, the variation in regional powers’ responses begs a proper
theoretical reassessment because to maintain global order and stability as well as to
protect its strategic interests around the world, the United States will need the cooperation
of these powers in the future.19
Translating American power into influence and getting others to cooperate require
a more subtle understanding of secondary powers’ alliance behavior. The formulation and
conduct of American diplomacy has to be tailored to specific domestic and regional
19 Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999). 20 conditions within which secondary powers find themselves. The policy implications of the research, therefore, could be a welcome rejoinder to calls that American diplomacy has to be based on “an accurate assessment of how major regional actors see their own circumstances.”20
Methodology
In line with my research objective of delineating the boundary conditions of secondary state bandwagoning behavior,21 and identifying its subtypes, I will employ qualitative methods, namely the case study method.22
Case Study Method
I chose this method over quantitative approaches, because I believe that we need to have a good sense of how, and under what conditions, bandwagoning takes place.23
Moreover, I follow a problem-driven approach to identify middle range theories with substantial content rather than suggesting a universal theory of alliances. In short, I am not studying whether balancing or bandwagoning behavior prevails, which is the focus of
20 Martin S. Indyk and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Back to Balancing," The American Interest 3, no. 2 (2007): 42. 21 King et al. argue that “(t)he process of trying to falsify theories in the social sciences is really one of searching for their bounds of applicability.” Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 101, 100-103. Also see: Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1993), 13, 120-125. 22 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). As Levy argues, although qualitative methods cover a wide range of applications, in the field of international relations, methodology of qualitative research is mainly concentrated on “comparative and case study methods from a positivistic perspective.” Jack S. Levy, "Qualitative Methods in International Relations," in Millennium Reflections on International Studies, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 432. 23 Even if the predictions of a theory hold in a given case, we would want to know whether or not it is so for the right or wrong reasons, i.e., by the independent and intervening variables suggested by the theory. 21 most other scholars on alliance politics. Rather, I study how the causal mechanisms leading to bandwagoning behavior work.
Process Tracing Method
The process-tracing technique commonly used by case study researchers allows a researcher to map out the causal processes that lead to the outcomes of interest and specify the scope conditions for the hypotheses being tested. As Bennett and George underline, this research design provides more contingent and specified generalizations; hence it is good for middle-range theorizing. Moreover, it is relevant to empirical analysis of deductive theories, such as realism, which provide probabilistic predictions of state behavior. By helping control for rival theoretical explanations, and determine whether explanatory variables projected by a theory are necessary or sufficient conditions, this method helps establish causal relationships predicted by structural theories and obtain more accurate and empirically-rich theoretical account of social phenomena. Furthermore, process tracing is also a relevant strategy for a neoclassical research project, for one of the purposes of this scholarship is to supplement parsimonious structural variables with rich historical explanation and more focused predictions.24
In particular, I will use in-case process tracing suggested by George and Bennett.
I will employ their congruence method, method of structured, focused comparison, which suggests that the researcher focus on specific aspects of a set of events, categorize them
24 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). As George and Bennett underline, process tracing allows researchers to go beyond mere historical explanation. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory, 13. 22
analytically, and analyze them to study a well-elaborated set of theoretical questions.25
The idea is to hold constant as many variables as possible and examine whether the
correlation suggested by the operational hypotheses between the initial conditions and
outcome of interest holds. As such process tracing allows a researcher to study the
sequence of events within each case to single out intervening causal mechanisms between
the conditions suggested by the theory and outcomes predicted. Overall, this approach is
very useful for development of new hypotheses or refinement of existing hypotheses.
Case Selection: Most-likely Research Design
and the Logic of Inference
Random selection is an essential component of large-N studies to reduce selection
bias. When working with a small number of cases, however, case study researchers need
to select cases in a nonrandom manner guided by methodological concerns and in line
with the objectives of their study. I will follow the most-likely case design, and select
cases in which the conditions are most favorable for a secondary state to join the United
States.26 In other words, I will choose cases with close values on the independent
variable, i.e., factors that precipitate bandwagoning. Although many objections are raised
against selecting cases on a single variable,27 this approach is warranted under certain
25 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory, Chapter 9. 26 Levy, "Qualitative Methods in International." For applications, see, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005). Also see, contributions to Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 27 It is recognized in the field that one of the dangers in dealing with small number of nonrandom cases is to choose cases on a single variable, or over-represent cases from one variable. The most common manifestation of this problem is selecting on the dependent variable. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, Chapter 4; Levy, "Qualitative Methods in International," 440; Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003). 23 conditions. One is suggested by Levy: situations where the researcher is interested in studying “necessary conditions for the occurrence of a particular outcome.”28
The most-likely case design is based on the following logic of inference. In this design, if the hypotheses are valid, and if the researcher feels that most of the projected conditions are present, the theory’s predictions should hold. Whereas confirming evidence provides limited support to the strength of theory, disconfirming evidence undermines its reliability seriously. When undertaken together with careful process- tracing, one advantage of this approach is that in situations when the predicted outcome does not hold, the researcher gains the leverage to identify the factors that prevent the occurrence of bandwagoning in spite of those favorable conditions. As such, he can refine his hypotheses, or identify appropriate boundary conditions.
Given the theoretical model employed in the current study, one caveat is in order.
The logic of inference is modified as follows. In addition to the independent variable, which is the systemic polarity, this study highlights two intervening variables at the domestic and regional levels. The inclusion of intervening variables suggests that if the outcome predicted by the independent variable does not hold, we cannot discard it altogether. Instead, we need to study closely the causal weight of the intervening variables in producing the particular policy outcome. To separate the causal influence of the intervening variables, I propose an auxiliary hypothesis and measure the effect of the independent variable in two occasions. In addition to studying the impact of the systemic polarity on the final policy outcome, I also measure its impact on the initial preference formation. Therefore, a careful process tracing can help establish the extent to which intervening variables set the boundary conditions for the hypothesis that unipolarity
28 Levy, "Qualitative Methods in International," 441. 24 induces bandwagoning behavior. This design suggests that if the initial policy preference conforms to the expectation of the theory but the final outcome - foreign policy behavior
- does not support the main hypothesis, the difference between the two is accounted for by the causal influence of the intervening variables.
Introduction of Cases
I will undertake comparative case studies, using a broader case, Turkish American relations, which is a most likely case for bandwagoning for the following reasons. First, under unipolarity, secondary state bandwagoning is the predicted behavior for countries within the US-led international order. Similarly, the fact that Turkish-American relations take place within the preexisting alliance ties (particularly NATO) justifies our prediction for bandwagoning. Moreover, bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States, described by some as strategic partnership, as well as Turkey’s military and economic dependence on the United States add to its incentives for bandwagoning. Furthermore, maintenance of friendly relations with the United States has been considered as a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy for domestic and regional reasons, which induces
Turkey to cooperate with the United States in its surrounding regions. Finally, Turkey also is a most likely candidate to study the main focus of this project: how security- seeking secondary powers engage in defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats. In its respective regions, Turkey acted as a defensive positionalist, while at the same time endeavoring to assert its role as an influential regional power. These two characteristics suggest that Turkey would be likely to perceive indirect threats from the proactive involvement of the United States in its immediate neighborhood. 25
I will carry out two in-depth case analyses. My cases will be Turkey’s behavior in two militarized international disputes that took place in its surrounding regions: US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and American efforts to furnish a response to the Russian-
Georgian war in 2008. In the first case, the United States engaged in intense negotiations with Turkey to enlist it in the coalition against Iraq. Despite Turkey’s opposition to the war considering the negative consequences of the US policies for Turkey’s regional interests, it came under strong pressure to join the US-led coalition. The parties reached an agreement to allow for the transfer of American forces through the Turkish territory to open a ‘northern front’ against the Iraqi army, but Turkish parliament rejected the governmental motion which would have sealed the deal. The parliamentary decision forced a revision of Turkish-American accords, and consequently the invasion plans.
Eventually, Turkey’s assistance to the coalition was reconfigured into a limited form of cooperation where Turkey would provide overflight rights to the coalition forces.
In the second case, Russia’s heavy-handed response to Georgia’s military operations in the breakaway region South Ossetia put Turkish-American relations into a new test. Although there existed a strategic partnership between the United States-
Turkey-Georgia prior to the conflict, the United States failed to enlist Turkey’s support for its attempts to forge a unified Western response against Russia’s reassertion of its power in the Greater Black Sea region. Turkey avoided taking any steps that might sever its relations with Russia and provoke further Russian aggression in the region; it even did not forcefully protest Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions. Moreover,
Turkey acted with caution and followed a restrained policy vis-à-vis American demands to orchestrate a stronger response to Russia’s belligerence, since it was concerned mainly 26
about the destabilizing effects of the US policies in the Greater Black Sea area. Turkey
instead undertook extensive shuttle diplomacy to manage the conflict in Georgia and its aftermath.
I chose to look at these two cases for four compelling reasons. First, this selection is justified due to the substantial research questions of this study. Recall that one of the goals of this research is to examine why secondary powers bandwagon with the United
States when they are not directly threatened or pursue opportunities. In both cases, the primary motivation driving Turkish foreign policy behavior was indirect threats presented by US actions in Turkey’s periphery. Considering that the unipolar distribution of power remained unchanged during this time period, these two cases lead to the same behavioral prediction that Turkey should engage in defensive bandwagoning with the United States.
These cases lend themselves to critical investigation through structured focused comparison, and this strategy gives me leverage to illustrate the causal paths leading to foreign policy outcome.
The second and perhaps most compelling reason is that these two cases are suitable for understanding the systemic influences on state behavior, which are prioritized by this study given its realist focus. These international crises were important episodes in the evolution of the relationship between the United States and other second-tier powers in the post-Cold War era. They put the international system in a state of flux, sparking discussions on the future of long-term alliances and institutions and raising questions about the sustainability of the existing balance of power. It is in those situations that secondary powers are faced with systemic stimuli most starkly, and are forced to react to changes in their external environment. Moreover, in those situations entailing a risk of 27 conflict at the nation’s doorsteps, concerns over national security and survival are of paramount importance. Realist hypotheses on state behavior are particularly relevant in these “high politics” situations.
The third reason is that Turkey’s alliance behavior in those cases took place within the framework of different RSCs Turkey is a part of, i.e., the Middle East and
South Caucasus/ the Greater Black Sea area. These cases therefore facilitate my exploration of the effect of regional level of analysis on foreign policy behavior in different regional contexts. The differences in the security dynamics in these two cases will also allow me to explore how the structure of a RSC affects alliance choices.
Finally, these cases are useful to examine for some methodological reasons.
Although I seem to be using one single case, i.e., Turkish-American relations, in fact I am multiplying the number of observations, hence cases, in a broader time frame.29 By focusing on one big project I can hold constant various factors, and at the same time observe closely how my causal variables exert their influence. The broader case of
Turkish-American relations, as such, will allow me to map and identify numerous casual paths leading to bandwagoning outcome.30 At the same time, the case selection also serves the policy-relevant aspects of the study. Not only for Turkey, but also for several other countries, these cases share many commonalities and show variation in terms of the values of the causal variables. Therefore, the conclusions of this study could be generalized to other middle range powers, and enable useful between-case comparisons in the future.
29 Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles. 30 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory. 28
Specification of Key Concepts and the Coding
and Measurement of Variables
In this section, I will briefly identify the empirical indicators for the variables of this study so that we could measure them with as much validity and accuracy as possible.
In particular, the concept of bandwagoning needs to be defined carefully so that it could be differentiated unequivocally from other alignment strategies.
Independent Variable: Polarity
The independent variable is the systemic polarity, because a major goal of this dissertation is to study how power differentials shape a country’s external alignment patterns, i.e., the relationship between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior. To identify how countries rank vis-à-vis others in terms of their relative capabilities, existing scholarship has developed solid indicators for measuring power.
Most balance of power theorists treat power as an aggregate measure that combines a state’s entire resources that could be brought to bear in a confrontation with adversaries, such as military capabilities, population, industrial base, etc.31 Since this study covers the post-Cold War era, I will borrow from the recent literature on alliances which treats the structure of the system as unipolar. American preponderance in material indicators of power remained unchanged across my cases, which makes the coding of the independent variable relatively straightforward.32 Consequently, the relationship between the United
States and Turkey will be characterized by power asymmetry.
31 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967). International security scholars use other measures to study power, such as the Correlates of War (COW) database. 32 A categorization of states in terms of their power capabilities will be offered in Chapter 4. 29
Dependent Variable: Bandwagoning
For an analysis of any alignment strategy, it is helpful to start by defining
alliance. In line with Walt, I define it as “a formal or informal relationship of security
cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”33 Alignment or alliance, which will
be used interchangeably to describe a high degree of formal or informal security
relationship, involves a willingness to commit to bear some costs to offer the kind of help
specified in the original understanding forming the alliance. Though these commitments
may be unequal reflecting the relative power or degree of interests at stake between the
allies, they will involve mutual expectations of policy coordination on security issues.34
We need to identify actions that qualify as bandwagoning. Because this study
defines bandwagoning in terms of allying with the stronger side, a state balances if it
combines forces with the weaker of two sides in a crisis and bandwagons if it joins the
overwhelming coalition. I will measure it as follows. Since I seek to explain the political
behavior of secondary states in the context of unipolarity, my dependent variable will be
bandwagoning behavior, i.e., whether the secondary state politically supported the United
States and/or agreed to be part of a US-led military campaign in line with the latter’s
plans. The secondary power’s cooperation could be extended through a formal or
informal accord.
33 Walt, The Origins of, 1. 34 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 03 (1991): 370. 30
Intervening Variables: Permissiveness of Relevant Environments
This study also includes two intervening variables that filter the influence of the
systemic polarity: a) permissiveness of domestic environment which is a function of the
congruence of perception between state leaders and societal groups, and b)
permissiveness of regional environment which is a function of regional costs. The
operationalization of these intervening variables will be undertaken in Chapter 4.
Other key concepts that are relevant for this study will be introduced in the next
three chapters. Here, I will briefly discuss some of them.
Alliance Stimulant: Indirect Threats
The determination of the major stimulant that drives alliance behavior can only be
made through a very careful interpretation of how the FPE assesses a crisis and how it
perceives the country’s interests in the given case. In this study I will focus on alliance
behavior in response to indirect threats, as I seek to explore how secondary states respond
to the negative externalities generated by the United States. In order to establish indirect
threats, I will explore state responses case-by-case, rather than inferring them from some
aggregate measure.35 Indirect threats can be measured by examining the perceptions and
strategic concerns of the FPE. I will therefore study the statements of decision-makers to
decide whether and from what side they perceive threats or opportunities to their
country’s interests. Especially, for the determination of indirect threats, how they view
the US actions and their implications for the country will be crucially evaluated.
35 As Gause argues “state leaders’ definitions of threat cannot be assumed a priori and are contingent upon the particular domestic and regional contexts in which they operate.” F. Gregory Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2003): 274, footnote 7. Also see: Steve Yetiv, "The Travails of Balance of Power Theory: The United States in the Middle East," Security Studies 15, no. 1 (2006): 78-79. 31
Moreover, I will investigate the relevant literature to see how the foreign policy of the secondary power is defined in the region the crisis is taking place during the appropriate time period.
Secondary Power Motivation: Security-seeking
Since this study looks at security-driven – defensive - bandwagoning, it is also necessary to measure what goals drive state behavior. In order to establish whether a secondary state is security maximizer or power maximizer, I will follow a similar approach to coding threats. First I will start with how the existing literature classifies the country’s motivations in the issue under consideration. Then, I will ask what motivated the FPE as it devised the country’s involvement in the crisis. I will analyze statements by leaders to see how they frame the terms of the country’s involvement in the crisis and their cooperation with the powerful side: whether they emphasize the opportunities or challenges presented by the situation. If the emphasis is on the loss of maintaining the status quo and maintaining the country’s autonomy and immediate survival needs, I will assume it to be induced by defensive concerns, i.e., security maximizing goals.
Foreign Policy Executive (FPE)
In this study the major analytical focus is placed on the role played by the state institutions in formulating and conducting foreign policy and how they interact with relevant actors to advance the country’s national interests. This is a logical extension of this study’s subscription to the tenets of realism, which has a state-centric account of foreign policy behavior. The concept of foreign policy executive (FPE) is helpful to study 32
the state institutions tasked with foreign policy. It refers to “the head of government and
ministers and officials charged with making foreign security policy.”36 In the case of
Turkey, I will treat the following state institutions and individuals as comprising of the
FPE: prime minister, president, foreign minister, defense minister, and civilian-military
security establishment, by which I mean foreign ministry bureaucrats and high ranking
military officers involved in foreign policy formulation. I will study their individual
statements or in the context of the meetings of the National Security Council, the
Supreme Military Council, cabinet, as well as high level ad hoc meetings.
Regional Security Complex (RSC)
An important component of the foreign policy model is the regional security
complex. It will be defined as a set of states connected together by dense interaction
which makes them vulnerable to security externalities generated in the given zone and
forces them to include other members in the calculations for choosing between alternative
foreign policy strategies. While delineating the appropriate unit of analysis, I will focus
on the critical concept of proximity rather than a fixed geography, within which
constituent parts of the security complex are sensitive to each other’s actions. Therefore, I
will not necessarily take existing geographical categories used to divide the globe into
different regional zones as the basis of an inquiry into regional context of state behavior.
Rather, in analyzing each case, I will identify the relevant regional security context and
what states to include into this cluster. In the first case, the relevant unit of analysis is the
36 This also suggests that “domestic actors –including members of the legislature, political allies, and even the members of the cabinet that are not in national security-related ministries” are considered as societal groups that exert influence on the executive. Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups," in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 171. 33
Middle Eastern RSC, which comprises Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the
Gulf countries. In the second case study, I mainly look at the South Caucasus RSC, composed of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the adjacent powers, namely Russia,
Turkey and Iran and to a lesser extent Ukraine. Moreover, in order to explain Turkey’s behavior during the Russian-Georgian war properly, I also look at the implications of the war at a broader level, the Greater Black Sea RSC.
Case Analysis and Hypothesis Testing
I will test my hypotheses by examining Turkey’s response to US demands for cooperation in crises taking place in its surrounding regions. For this, I will trace
Turkey’s policy in two different cases, already introduced. Through the structured, focused comparison method, my goal is to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses derived from the model of secondary state behavior. Each case will be analyzed to examine the causal chain(s) between the independent, intervening and dependent variables hypothesized in this study. I will trace the Turkish FPE’s motivations and their evaluation of the crises to establish whether they were motivated by indirect threats and how they devised relevant strategies. Moreover, by tracing the dynamics of Turkey’s relations with the United States, and Turkey’s preferred policy and the final policy outcome, I will measure the values of my dependent variable in two instances. Through this examination,
I will be able to determine whether the cases lend empirical support to the hypotheses, i.e., whether the causal processes are present in the sequence predicted and values of the key variables are as expected. 34
The analysis of each case is based on primary and secondary sources. In line with the objectives of a process-tracing method, I studied the official documents, news sources and interview transcripts with decision makers. The public statements of FPE during those crises were examined closely. The interviews and public statements, though they suffer from certain inherent limitations, provide important sources of data to study state behavior. By subjecting them to careful content analysis, I endeavored to separate rhetoric from actual political statements. They are especially useful for establishing values for threat perceptions and state motivations.
Structure of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 will review the alliance literature to locate the current study in its relevant context. Chapter 3 will examine the literature on the RSCs to establish the case for including the regions as a distinct level of analysis into the study of foreign policy.
Building on this groundwork, Chapter 4 will introduce the foreign policy analysis model.
Then, I will dedicate one chapter to each case. In each empirical chapter, I will first give a background to Turkey’s policy in the region, followed by a detailed critical chronology of Turkey’s position during the crisis. In the second part of each empirical chapter, I will apply the theoretical model to the case at hand. The following chapter will undertake hypothesis testing, and engage in across-case comparison to assess the applicability of the model to these two cases. In the conclusion chapter, I will evaluate the results of the case studies. I will also undertake a cross-case comparison to reach further conclusions about the applicability of the model to other cases. CHAPTER 2
ALIGNMENT BEHAVIOR IN RESPONSE
TO SYSTEMIC CONDITIONS
A major purpose of this study is to isolate the conditions under which secondary states are most likely to pursue various types of bandwagoning strategies in response to different systemic pressures. To study this phenomenon, I will revisit the questions that have been discussed widely by the realist scholarship on alliances. How do states respond to changes in their external environments? And what effect does the structure of the international system have on state strategies? Driven by these broader theoretical questions, I will first start with a review of the realist literature on alliances to contextualize how bandwagoning behavior was studied by past scholarship. I will then discuss how the unipolar structure of the post-Cold War international system altered the terms of the debate. As part of this literature review, I will introduce my conception of different types of ‘bandwagoning’ behavior. I will also identify a new type of bandwagoning behavior in response to indirect threats that is particularly relevant for the unipolar distributions of power. 36
Review of Balancing vs. Bandwagoning Literature
State responses to changes in external environments have been one of the major
areas of interest for international relations scholars. Realists argue that a general
relationship exists between changes in external conditions and state behavior. Many
realists, therefore, explain foreign policy behavior by systemic variables. Although the
applicability of systemic theories that are developed to explain broad international
outcomes to the study of individual state behavior is debated, realists made every attempt
to supplement pure structural theories with additional systemic and unit-level variables to
offer a rigorous explanation of foreign policy.1 Foremost among such works are the
studies that explore the strategies that are available to states faced with significant shifts
in relative power or with significant increase of threat to their national security.
Drawing on the conventional concepts derived from classical realism, structural
realism has set the terms of the debate on alliance strategies. A state’s alignment behavior
in response to power or threat is therefore thought to be determined by the systemic
variables and range from balancing (checking the rising power) to bandwagoning (joining
with the rising power).2 Determining the relative tendency of states to choose either of
the two has been a prime concern to scholars, as it also has consequences for the
formulation of state strategies.3
1 Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996); Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996). 2 Various attempts to develop comprehensive lists of state strategies look at the motivations for a specific policy. See: John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). 3 Here I am reviewing the literature that offers a predominantly structural explanation for alignment behavior. Alternatively, several accounts grounded in second-image reasoning also explain bandwagoning behavior. For instance, Larson offers an institutionalist approach which expects the elites that lack domestic 37
Balancing Hypothesis
Kenneth Waltz popularized the notion that these two behavioral patterns were polar opposites.4 In what came to be called balance of power theory, Waltz put the emphasis on the changes on relative power as the main stimulant of alliance behavior.5
Waltz contends that under systemic pressures, states, particularly great powers, almost automatically will balance against, rather than bandwagon with other great powers whose material capabilities are on the rise. Or else, they risk losing their autonomy and jeopardize chances for survival. For Waltz, therefore, the recurrent tendency in international relations is to form balances of power and the constant emergence of equilibrium. This predicted outcome is expected to materialize as a result of the
legitimacy or are faced with unconsolidated national identity to ally with expansionist external powers. Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack L. Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Kaufman argues that alliance behavior is better understood if one adds the internal processes of states, ideology, and the perceptions of individual statesmen to the system level dynamics. Robert G. Kaufman, "“To Balance or To Bandwagon?” Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992). Similarly, Barnett and Levy offer an integrated theoretical framework that blends systemic explanations with unit level factors. They emphasize the function of external alliances to provide additional resources to counter internal threats to the regime especially in cases where the ability of the regime to extract resources from the society for mobilization (internal balancing) is limited. Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 03 (1991). David’s omnibalancing hypothesis, which combines domestic and external factors, also can explain external alignment with a powerful state in response to domestic imperatives of balancing. Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Ayoob, too, makes a similar argument. Mohammad Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998). Others who apply David’s theory to different cases include Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (1997); F. Gregory Gause, "Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2003); Eric A. Miller and Arkady Toritsyn, "Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States," Security Studies 14, no. 2 (2005). In his response to this scholarship, Walt, however, still asserts the primacy of the systemic factors. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and US Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufmann and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 462- 463. 4 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 126. 5 An increase in one state’s material capabilities in itself is believed to stimulate balancing behavior by other states, for threat inheres in power alone and increases in one’s power put other states’ security in danger. Ibid., 127; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of, 43. 38
assumption of security maximization which underpins Waltzian structural realism. Waltz
states that “(i)f states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side and
we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen
because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first
concern of states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the
system.”6 Consequently, under anarchy, the survival motive, which is a logical corollary
of security maximization assumption, socializes states to counterbalance, which in effect
curbs their expansionary policies or aggressive search for security, for offensive policies
will be counterproductive.7 Hence, defensive realists treat balancing as the unchanging
law of international politics.
Bandwagoning
In his review of Walt’s major work on alliances, Snyder credits Walt “for having
initiated theorizing about a phenomenon [bandwagoning] hitherto almost ignored,” and
notes that “(f)urther development would seek to understand bandwagoning as a systemic
process and to determine how it relates to other such processes.”8 For sure, subsequent
studies provided new insights into the structural processes that account for bandwagoning
dynamics in international relations. Nonetheless, except for a few studies, still, only a
6 Waltz, Theory of International, 126. 7 Waltz goes on to note that “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer.” Ibid., 126-127. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 74. Several other modern day structural realists cling to Waltz’s conclusions. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006); Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006). 8 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 (1991): 130. 39
handful of analyses exist that engage in a full treatment of bandwagoning: most
explanations of bandwagoning are offered as addenda to the analysis of balancing.
Defensive Bandwagoning
In a systematic test of Waltz’s balancing hypothesis through an extensive study of
alliance formation in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, Stephen Walt finds
substantial evidence that states - even secondary ones - prefer balancing strategy over
bandwagoning.9 Walt maintains, however, that states are sensitive towards threats more
than to sheer military capabilities. In a significant revision of balance of power theory, as
a result, Walt proposes balance of threat theory, whereby he defines threat as a composite
of power, offensive military capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived aggressive
intentions.10 Despite this amendment, Walt maintains the same distinction between the
two behaviors, as his test is based on whether states will choose to counterbalance or
align with the states posing increasing threat to other states in the system.11 More
important, Walt rephrases the terms as follows: confronted by a significant external
threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. “Balancing is defined as allying with
others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of
danger.”12 He recognizes that bandwagoning is empirically possible, but only under
unique conditions: in the case of weak states bordering a powerful neighbor, which do
9 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). 10 Ibid. Walt also applies the same theory to Southeast Asia and argues that the cases in this region also support his balance of threat theory. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in Jervis and Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons. 11 Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 4. Snyder, too, argues that “to bandwagon is to join the stronger side; thus it is the exact opposite of balancing.” Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 158. 12 Walt, The Origins of, 17. 40
not have available allies and believe that appeasement can succeed. This is what came to
be called defensive bandwagoning.13
Balancing Predominates
As Glenn Snyder notes, despite using different motivational assumptions both
offensive and defensive realists reach the same conclusion about the rarity of
bandwagoning, as opposed to prevalence of balancing.14 Eric Labs uses Walt’s
framework and the collective action theory to challenge a widely held belief that small
states prefer to distance themselves from great power conflict, and that when forced to
choose sides they are more likely to bandwagon.15 Labs studies the preference ordering
of weak states caught in the middle of a great power conflict. He rejects the conventional
rank-ordering and argues that it unduly exaggerated the incidence of bandwagoning as a
collective action theory phenomenon. Labs, instead, suggests that balance of threat theory
with its expectation of widespread balancing and rare occurrence of bandwagoning has a
superior explanatory power.16
In his theory of offensive realism, Mearsheimer concludes that bandwagoning
occurs rarely among great power strategies. He starts by criticizing both Waltz and Walt
for their assumption of security maximization; instead he argues for power maximization.
Mearsheimer’s reasoning suggests that since joining the stronger side will multiply the
power of the rising state it runs against “the basic canon of offensive realism—that states
13 Walt, "Alliance Formation in," 53. In his contribution to the recent debate on unipolarity, Walt insists on the same point that “there are in fact very few genuine examples of bandwagoning, even in the current situation of American primacy.” Walt, Taming American Power, 184. 14 Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer’s World- Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security," International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 162-163. 15 Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992). 16 Ibid., 389. 41
maximize relative power.”17 Therefore, bandwagoning is a futile strategy for great
powers confronted with threats or power shifts. For him, “the actual choice in a realist
world is between balancing and buck-passing, and threatened states prefer buck-passing
to balancing whenever possible.”18
Balancing Hypothesis Challenged
Others dispute these findings in support of balancing hypothesis on various
grounds, and give more credit for bandwagoning.19 Historian Paul Schroeder tests
balance of power theory through an extensive survey of European diplomacy from the
Napoleonic Wars through World War II; he finds little support for structural realism’s
balancing proposition in a period in which it is supposed to hold.20 He challenges
Waltzian realists by concluding that except for most powerful states in the system, other
actors preferred various strategies of accommodation over balancing most powerful
states. Far from balancing being the preference of weaker states, Schroeder contends
“other strategies were available and often tried,” and identifies several of them including
hiding from threats, transcending, and bandwagoning.21 Historically he finds
bandwagoning strategy more common than balancing, particularly by smaller powers,
defined as “joining the stronger side for the sake of protection and payoffs, even if this
17 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of, 163. 18 Ibid., 140. 19 This review concerns mainly realist balance-of-power scholarship on the subject. For a liberal critique of balance of power theory, for instance, see: T.V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-first Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 20 Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994). Also see: Kaufman for a similar argument for the failure of balancing proposition to explain the state behavior during the interwar period. He finds buck-passing more common than balancing. Kaufman, "“To Balance or." For Walt’s response, see: Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and." 21 Schroeder, "Historical Reality," 117. 42 meant insecurity vis-à-vis the protecting power and a certain sacrifice of independence.”22
Following Schroeder’s lead, Rosecrance and Lo test balance of power theory in the case of the Napoleonic international system, the textbook example of balancing by the standard accounts of the theory and compare it to the Cold War case, which is Waltz’s ideal case for balancing. They find it puzzling that the balance of power restraints were not applied against Napoleonic aggression from 1798 on.23 When Napoleon conquered one European state after another from 1798 to 1812, “other states sought to co-opt, reward, avoid, or bandwagon with France instead of balancing against Napoleon.”24
Levy and Thompson offer what they call “first systematic empirical test of the proposition that states balance against hegemonic threats,” through an extensive quantitative analysis of great power balancing behavior throughout the period between
1494 and 1999.25 They find that, as traditionally formulated, the hypothesis about balancing against the most powerful state in the system “is almost certainly false.”26
Weaker states instead engaged in hiding or bandwagoning when confronted with a
22 Ibid. Based on the findings of a recent large-scale project bringing together several scholars studying eight historical international systems, Wohlforth, et al., too, find little support for the tendency of the system toward balance, and claim to have disproved the balance of power scholarship. For instance, they argue that in Ancient Greece there is more evidence for bandwagoning than balancing among the Greek city states confronting Persia. William C. Wohlforth et al., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History," European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 163. 23 Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, "Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996): 482. 24 In order to explain why the Continental states preferred this generally quiescent and ‘bandwagoning’ policy, which appears to be a case of delay in balancing, they propose a ‘nested game’ to compare the two periods, wherein the game dynamics among the potential balancers on the hand and between the balancers and the hegemonic candidate on the other led to the failure of balancing against France and formation of balancing against the Soviet Union. For a critique of Rosecrance and Lo, see Daniel J. Whiteneck, "Long- term Bandwagoning and Short-term Balancing: The Lessons of Coalition Behaviour from 1792 to 1815," Review of International Studies 27, no. 02 (2001). 25 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 3. 26 Ibid.: 29. 43
situation of rising power. After their specification of scope conditions and reformulation
of the balancing hypothesis, however, they find significant support to the argument that
in continental systems hegemonic threats by a leading land power which possesses
significant edge over other great powers will be balanced against.
In his attempt to explain international conflict by developing a formal model,
Powell studies how states respond to threats.27 In his analysis of how states deal with
threats through alignment with other states drawing on their resources,28 he compares
three possible responses: balancing, bandwagoning, and waiting. Similar to Schroeder, he
also finds little support for “the claim that states generally balance.” Rather his analysis
suggests that waiting and bandwagoning occur more frequently than balancing. All three
strategies were in fact common throughout the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. But he notes
that “which of these three behaviors occurs depends in a complicated way on the
distribution of power and benefits, the technology of coercion, and the states’ relative
resolve.”29
Offensive Bandwagoning
In a significant revision of the debate between earlier “balancing predominates”
school and its contenders, Schweller suggests a new theory which he labels balance of
interests. Schweller charges participants in the debate for getting the balancing vs.
bandwagoning dichotomy wrong. He argues “that all sides in the debate have mistakenly
assumed that bandwagoning and balancing are opposite behaviors motivated by the same
27 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 28 Ibid., Chapter 5. 29 Ibid., 152. 44
goal: to achieve greater security,” which stems mainly from neorealism’s status quo
bias.30 He expands the range of state motivations for choosing between balancing or
bandwagoning and argues that the two behaviors are induced by different considerations
on the part of the responding states. To Schweller, “the aim of balancing is self-
preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of
bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted.”31 Through his
ingenious move of “bringing the revisionist state back in,” and redefining bandwagoning
as allying with the more powerful party for nonsecurity goals, i.e., opportunities for gain,
Schweller finds it much more widespread than suggested by Waltz or Walt. Sweeney and
Fritz expand on Schweller’s argument and subject balance of interest theory to
quantitative tests.32 They too find significant evidence that under certain conditions
satisfied great powers are likely to engage in bandwagoning. This kind of expansionary
behavior is called offensive bandwagoning.
Hegemonic Stability
Another variant of structural realism, hegemonic stability,33 rejects the balancing
hypothesis altogether and offers a diametrically opposed explanation for the major
dynamics in international relations as far as both behavioral assumptions and systemic
outcomes are concerned. This perspective argues that counter-hegemonic coalitions being
far from the norm, secondary states have gravitated toward a dominant power and as a
30 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 74. Also, see: Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996). 31 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 74. 32 Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, "Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances," The Journal of Politics 66, no. 02 (2004); Paul Fritz and Kevin Sweeney, "The (de)Limitations of Balance of Power Theory," International Interactions 30, no. 4 (2004). 33 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 45
result an international order created around a preponderant power has been the main
mechanism of governance in international relations. The power transition approach
advocated by Organski suggests a similar logic for bandwagoning as accumulation of
power reduces the incentives and ability of the weaker side to fight a war and pushes
them to concert with the stronger side.34 The leader wields its power capabilities in a way
to produce positive and negative incentives for other states in the system, which in turn
brings them within the orbit of the hegemonic order.35
In one of the boldest expressions of this position, Wohlforth proposes what he
calls “hierarchic understanding of balance of power theory, which highlights a different
set of laws and regularities in world politics [than Waltzian/ neorealist balance of power
theory]: concentrated, hegemonic distributions rather than equilibria; the possibility of
translating power into political preeminence; a greater tendency to bandwagon; and an
eternal struggle among the leading states for control over the international system.”36 He,
then, offers a reinterpretation of the history of the Cold War, which rejects Walt’s reading
that several secondary powers were allying with the United States and forming an
overlarge coalition to balance the greater threat posed by the Soviet Union. To
Wohlforth, who studies closely the Soviet elite’s perceptions of the global balance, West
European powers bandwagoned with the superior, self-interested US power.37
34 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965). Also see: Douglas Lemke, "Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power. 35 For different versions of this argument, see: G. John Ikenberry, "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy," Review of International Studies 27, no. 05 (2001): 195-197. 36 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 24. 37 Ibid., 156. 46
From the perspective of different variants of hegemonic stability theory, the
geopolitical and strategic implications of power disparity between the hegemon and other
states alters alliance dynamics. The convergence of interests between the lead state and
followers in ensuring the continuation of the hegemonic order induces secondary states to
climb aboard the leading state’s bandwagon. In the post-Cold War period, Wohlforth
claims that “(t)he raw power advantage of the United States means that … second-tier
states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power.”38
The criticisms of balancing hypothesis based in this genre of reasoning, and
various offspring of balance of threat theory, underpin most of the post-Cold War debate
on unipolarity and alignment patterns.
Alignment Patterns Under Unipolarity: Responses to US Power
Most of the studies on alliance formation and state strategies of alignment are
conducted in multipolar systems. Waltz, challenging earlier scholarship, showed that for
balance of power politics dynamics to operate, the existence of at least three actors –
poles - is not necessary.39 As he argued, balancing hypothesis holds, even more
powerfully, in a bipolar system which is therefore more likely to be stable.40 Walt’s test
of balancing hypothesis builds on the same assumptions. As noted by Snyder, implicit in
Walt’s treatment of his subject is the belief that his generalizations apply to both
multipolar and bipolar systems equally.41 In one of the major works on alliance politics,
38 William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 7-8. 39 Waltz, Theory of International. 40 Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and," 130. 41 Walt describes the systemic condition of his case study as “multipolar, regional subsystem embedded within a bipolar global system,” and recognizes the impact of this global condition on the regional alliance dynamics. Walt, The Origins of, 266. Snyder however criticizes Walt for not exploring fully the structural differences, which might have enriched his theory. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and," 130. 47
Glenn Snyder claims that “systemic reasoning [of Snyder’s theory] concentrates on the
multipolar system, on the ground that multipolarity has been the structural norm during
most of international history, that deviations from this norm during bipolar and unipolar
periods can be quite easily accommodated from a multipolar base, and that the
international system in the foreseeable future is most likely to be multipolar.”42
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual advent of US primacy shattered
the conceptual map of international relations scholars; at least the kind of prediction
Snyder expected has yet to materialize. As Owen puts it, US primacy presented “two
puzzles: the endurance of unipolarity and the endurance of the imbalance of power”
because no attempts to offset American power were in place.43 Initially, balance of power
theorists, especially those following Waltz’s lead, i.e. power-oriented structural realists,
predicted that the United States would not be able to escape the fate of earlier great
powers; the unipolar moment would be illusionary and, if it pushed for it, its bid for
hegemony would be doomed to failure as a result of the formation of counter-hegemonic
alliances (external balancing) and investments by other countries in military capabilities
(internal balancing)44 and shifts in the distribution of power,45 or due to the secular
processes of power transition or the American public’s growing uneasiness about paying
42 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 3. He goes on to note that he makes “no claim for the theory’s applicability to the post-cold war world, which many believe is evolving toward a multipolar structure.” 43 John M. Owen, "Transnational Liberalism and US Primacy," International Security 26, no. 3 (2002): 117. The view that this situation presents a puzzle is challenged. For one, Levy argues that “characterizing the absence of balancing against the United States as a puzzle constitutes an erroneous interpretation of balance of power theory.” Jack S. Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power, 30. According to this second group of scholars, for a proper evaluation of the proposition, the scope conditions for balance of power theory need to be delineated properly. This debate will be revisited below. 44 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17, no. 4 (1993); Waltz, "The Emerging Structure "; John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic Monthly August (1990); John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990). 45 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/2001). 48
for the costs of an imperial grand strategy,46 or simply because multipolarity has been the
norm throughout the modern history.47
As the US primacy went unchecked by the secondary states in ways familiar to
the world, the empirical reality favored what Layne calls ‘primacists.’48 According to the
critics, due either to the unprecedented power disparity between the United States and
other major actors and the positive externalities created by the US hegemonic
leadership,49 or to the benevolent nature of American ‘hegemony,’ the web of
international institutions on which the US-led world order is built, and the liberal
democratic norms and institutions of the unipole that give secondary powers a voice
opportunity,50 or to the exercise of American power in a nonthreatening manner51 or
through a careful52 neo-Bismarckian ‘hub and spokes’53 diplomacy, or to shared liberal
and democratic norms54 the balancing hypothesis lost its explanatory power.
Significant divisions remain among those who argue for the primacy of the
unipolar system. Whereas for power-oriented strand of hegemonic stability55 the
imbalance of power, hence the absence of counterbalancing, stems from the objective
46 Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security 23, no. 2 (1998). 47 Snyder, Alliance Politics. 48 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 7. 49 Wohlforth, "The Stability of"; Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of American Hegemony," International Security 28, no. 1 (2003); Lemke, "Great Powers in"; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1997). 50 G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of Postwar Order," International Security 23, no. 3 (1998/99). 51 Walt, Taming American Power. 52 Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 4 (1997). 53 Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997). 54 Owen, "Transnational Liberalism." 55 William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of." 49 material conditions, i.e., “the deep structure of unipolar power,”56 for others, for instance
Walt, these unique historical conditions have to do more with the way American post-
Cold War grand strategy was formulated and implemented. In other words, whereas for the former the particular American policies will have little impact on the response of secondary states, the latter contend that the specific ways within which the preponderant
US power is wielded are likely to influence others’ attitudes toward unipolarity and imbalance of power. For them, to the extent that the United States escapes the restraints on power and starts to undermine its benevolent image, and come to be seen as threatening secondary states’ interests through unilateral exercises of military power, it could unintentionally precipitate a counter-hegemonic coalition.57
The scholars in the second group, who were overall sympathetic to US hegemonic grand strategy or have applauded the US practitioners for their successful handling of unipolarity through multilateral and nonthreatening policies, are now uneasy with the recent course of American foreign policy. They argue that several cases of secondary power behavior sparked by the US policies of go it alone as part of the war on terror in general and Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in particular are best described as balancing strategies, though in an untraditional way, which are intended to constrain the exercise of
US power and curb the negative externalities created by it without necessarily challenging the US primacy and confronting the US power directly.58 Foremost among
56 G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction," in America Unrivalled: The Future of Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 14. 57 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 8. Within this category, a difference between Walt and others exists. For Walt, the power benignity is a product of careful foreign policy and is not necessarily embedded in domestic or international institutions – as liberals would argue - hence more fragile. See: Ikenberry, "Introduction," 16. 58 Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power. 50 these strategies are soft balancing,59 pact of restraint,60 and economic balancing,61 to name a few.62
Conceptually, these scholars, who argue for the relevance of balancing under unipolarity, capitalize on another burgeoning debate: the distinction between balancing behavior at unit level vs. balanced outcome at the systemic level.63 Drawing on this discussion, they contend that the delayed occurrence of a balanced international outcome cannot be taken as a sign of the absence of balancing behavior on the part of secondary states. Moreover, they also point to the factors that may hinder timely and effective balancing responses64 and delay the balanced outcomes at the systemic level, which also account for the failure of balance of power to form. This line of research on balancing failures has in fact been a new area of interest for balance of power theorists. It is promising to the extent that it goes beyond identifying impediments to balancing and engages in a constructive effort to specify the boundary conditions for the balancing hypothesis to hold.
59 Walt, Taming American Power, 126-132; Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq," International Politics 42, no. 2 (2005). 60 Galia Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity," Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006). 61 Mark R. Brawley, "The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power. 62 It needs to be noted that some of the structural realists, who argue that unipolarity is a temporal state, insist that elements of both internal and external hard balancing have been present in post-Cold War Europe. Posen, "European Union Security." Layne also argues for the ongoing relevance of counterbalancing dynamics. He identifies a new strategy which is supposedly used by the secondary powers to offset US power, which he labels as “leash-slipping.” Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited." 63 Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design," in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, eds. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 2003); Colin Elman, "Introduction: Appraising Balance of Power Theory," in Vasquez and Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing; Paul, "Introduction," 2; Levy and Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and "; Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited"; Posen, "European Union Security." 64 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 14, footnote 25. 51
As a result, what came to be popularized as a law-like generalization by Waltz
and was seen as an almost automatic equilibrical mechanism is now treated as a
conditional and probabilistic argument. The earlier understanding that a more or less
direct linear relationship exists between balancing and the changes in threat and/or power
has very few supporters, if any. It is now widely agreed that either states do not resort to
balancing proportional to threat/ power, or a significant lag exists between the stimuli and
the response due to some complicating mechanisms, such as those emanating from the
provision of public goods and solving collective action problems,65 or domestic politics –
especially in democracies.66 As a result whether, when, and how efficiently great powers
will balance is now believed to be subject to significant scope conditions. Moreover, the
incidence of balancing is believed to be less common than it used to be presumed.
The power-centric argument advanced by Wohlforth, in contrast, points to the
permanence of unipolarity and how it transformed the nature of international relations in
a way to negate balancing logic. This line of research not only explores the roots of
unipolarity, but also makes a case that unipolarity is durable and likely to be around for
some time to come.67 Therefore, the main objection to soft balancing argument is also
raised by Brooks and Wohlforth68 along with others,69 who maintain that balancing
hypothesis – including both variants of balancing behavior and balanced outcome - either
as in the 19th century alliances, or in the sense of the supposed new manifestations is far
65 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?"; Richard Rosecrance, "Is There a Balance of Power?," in Vasquez and Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing. 66 Kaufman, "“To Balance or." 67 Wohlforth, "The Stability of," 8; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005). 68 Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for." 69 Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon." 52 off the reality of unipolar politics. For them, as well as for many others, secondary states engage in various forms of bandwagoning, or are forced to develop strategies to manage the new challenges of the alliance security dilemma, which should not be conflated with balancing.
Scope of My Approach: The Argument for Secondary
State Bandwagoning Under Unipolarity
As this brief review demonstrated, various structural realists agree that the distribution of power and other structural modifiers influence the foreign policy options of secondary states. Given the unique characteristics of the unipolar world order, the recent alliance literature explores the effect the structure of the system has on alliances.
Building on this scholarship, this dissertation examines one unique category of alliance behavior: various patterns of bandwagoning by the secondary powers.
For purposes of this study, bandwagoning is defined as an alignment strategy of siding with the dominant power for the pursuit of both security and nonsecurity goals.
Developing a comprehensive model of bandwagoning which includes both the offensive and defensive variants in line with this definition is the task I will be undertaking in the remainder of this section.
The next section offers a classification of bandwagoning behavior that expands on the earlier scholarship. It, in particular, highlights one form of bandwagoning that is most applicable in unipolar systems: defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats. 53
Types of Bandwagoning Strategies in Response
to Alliance Stimulant
Much of the discussion about relative incidence of balancing vs. bandwagoning in state practice stems from the lack of consensus on a proper definition of bandwagoning behavior. The literature is divided by “conflicting theoretical and empirical claims about the relative prevalence of balancing and bandwagoning”70 as well as mutual accusations that the other has betrayed the common usage. The first requirement is a working definition of bandwagoning behavior in line with the question to be studied here.
The literature review identified two different forms of bandwagoning: defensive and offensive. In this section these two types will be subject to a closer scrutiny. One way to categorize different bandwagoning strategies is to look at the primary motivation that stimulates alignment behavior. The motivations of states under anarchy inevitably have implications for states’ propensity to choose between various strategies, and bandwagoning is no exception to them. Walt identifies two distinct motives behind the bandwagoning hypothesis. “First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of appeasement. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory… these two motives for bandwagoning are quite different. In the first, bandwagoning is chosen for defensive reasons, as a means of maintaining independence in the face of a potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state chooses the leading side for offensive reasons, in order to acquire territory.”71
70 Powell, In the Shadow, 155. 71 Walt, "Alliance Formation and," 7-8. 54
This categorization based on motivations is important because it ties to a larger
debate between defensive and offensive realism.72 One of the broad divisions in the field
concerns the implications of anarchy on state motivations. Both the balance of power and
balance of threat theories are based on the logic of security maximization, which forms
the basis of defensive realism. In their view, because states are risk-averse and guard their
autonomy jealously they will above all be concerned to maintain their existing position in
the international system. That is why states will prefer to balance against overwhelming
threats or power instead of bandwagoning with them. As far as the motivation for
bandwagoning concerns, security maximization is apparent in their understanding of
bandwagoning. Walt’s security maximization assumption leads him to treat
bandwagoning as a strategy of appeasement, which is where offensive realist Schweller
takes issue with defensive realists’ position on the relative incidence of bandwagoning
behavior. For Schweller, Walt’s definition as “giving in to threats” captures only one part
of the picture: the coercive or compulsory aspect involved in a decision.73 For Schweller,
state motivations can hardly be reduced to security seeking behavior, and this is where
other contemporary realists are mistaken, because they “view the world solely through
the lens of a satisfied, status-quo state.”74 Based on his argument for power
maximization, Schweller highlights the opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning especially
in the case of states that are dissatisfied with the existing distribution of power and are
longing for revising it.75
72 As Snyder highlights “(p)art of the problem is that the balancing-bandwagoning dualism cuts across two other forms of dualism-offensive versus defensive alliances and resistance to versus accommodation of an opponent-but it does not match either one.” Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and," 129. 73 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 81. 74 Ibid.: 85. 75 Following Schweller’s lead, Sweeney and Fritz, too, offer an-interest based explanation for alliance formation. Sweeney and Fritz, "Jumping on the Bandwagon." Mearsheimer, another offensive realist, 55
Defensive vs. Offensive Strategies: Going Beyond the Rigid Division
One problem that bedevils this literature is that whereas offensive realists treat
bandwagoning as a strategy of power maximization (Schweller), defensive realists
relegate it to security-maximization (Walt). In the final analysis, Walt reduces
bandwagoning behavior to a form of accommodation to the source of threat and drop
from analysis unthreatened states’ alignment in pursuit of gains with a rising power. This
move not only risks reducing bandwagoning to a form of ‘capitulation,’ but also limits
the variation on dependent variable, as it unnecessarily limits the universe of cases to
which bandwagoning hypothesis might apply.76
Schweller’s critique of neorealism’s status quo bias, hence defensive realism,
advances our understanding of state behavior. Nonetheless, Schweller’s distinction
between “balancing [as] driven by the desire to avoid losses; [and] bandwagoning by the
opportunity for gain”77 is unnecessary. His suggestion and classification of a spectrum of
state goals is a welcome corrective to neorealism’s treatment of states but his excessive
focus on offensive bandwagoning is unfortunate.78 In the final analysis, Schweller and
his followers’ idea of expanding state goals turns out to be a tactical move to open room
for their argument for bandwagoning driven by profit maximization. They end up
however, counters Schweller for conflating the meaning of the term bandwagoning and departing from the conventional usage. “According to the conventional definition, bandwagoning is a strategy that threatened states employ against their adversaries, and it involves asymmetrical concession to the aggressor. Bandwagoning in Schweller’s lexicon is explicitly not a strategy employed by threatened states but one employed by states looking for opportunities to gain profit through aggressor.” For Mearsheimer, the kind of opportunistic behavior described by Schweller is captured by the strategy of war in his repertoire of great power strategies. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of, 462-463, footnote 54. 76 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." Sweeney and Fritz argue that “(a)rguing threat alone as the motive for alliance decisions, Walt misses half the picture by considering only security-driven alliances.” Sweeney and Fritz, "Jumping on the Bandwagon," 436. 77 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 74. 78 Sweeney and Fritz, too, suggest a broader range of state goals. In the final analysis, however, in their rush to define the scope conditions for great power balancing and find support for the balance of interest theory, they too end up with the same conclusions as Schweller’s. 56 perpetuating the notion that balancing is a strategy available to great powers when significantly threatened, and bandwagoning is preferred when the security is abundant and states are free to follow nonsecurity interests.79 In other words, they are suffering from the same selection bias that Schweller is charging Walt for.80
On the question of categorizing bandwagoning according to state motivations, this study challenges the dichotomic way the existing scholarship has approached to the subject. It is misleading to limit state motivations stimulating alliance behavior to either security-maximization or pursuit of nonsecurity goals.81 This is particularly so in a neoclassical realist research as the incorporation of the full range of empirical richness of state goals is an important goal of this research tradition. In order to capture full variation in the dependent variable, i.e., states bandwagoning for profit or out of fear, and uncover various causal mechanisms leading to a bandwagoning outcome one needs to reject reducing a priori states’ decision to join in with stronger or more aggressive parties to either offensive or defensive motivations. Therefore, this study will adopt a comprehensive typology of bandwagoning that includes alignment strategies of siding with the dominant power for the pursuit of both security and nonsecurity goals.82
79 Sweeney and Fritz, "Jumping on the Bandwagon," 436-437; Fritz and Sweeney, "The (de)Limitations of," 286. 80 Although Snyder finds rare empirical incidence of bandwagoning behavior relative to balancing, he wants to retain the concept to capture both the offensive and defensive aims of states. He therefore disagrees with what he calls Schweller’s attempt to “limit the concept of bandwagoning to the offensive type.” Snyder, Alliance Politics, 390-391, footnote 53. For Snyder, “the concept of defensive bandwagoning should be retained but defined and used with care.” Snyder, Alliance Politics, 161. 81 As Donnelly argues “(w)e cannot know whether states will balance (pursue relative gains) or bandwagon (pursue absolute gains) without knowing their motivations. And there is no good reason why a general theory of international relations should assume one or the other. In fact, to the extent that it does, it excludes a large and important part of international relations from its coverage.” Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61. 82 Walt still jealously reserves the concept for threatened states; hence he concludes that especially given the nonthreatening nature of US power, bandwagoning is extremely rare. Walt, Taming American Power. Others employ the concept in a less rigid manner to describe various forms of secondary state alignment in support of the overwhelming power of the United States; hence they find that it is widespread. See for 57
Developing a comprehensive model of bandwagoning that includes both the offensive and defensive variants in line with this definition is the task I will be undertaking in Chapter 4. Here, I will discuss a different form of stimulant that is particularly relevant for unipolar distributions of power.
Bringing in Unipolarity
My discussion so far engaged mainly the classical literature on the subject and analyzed discussions on bandwagoning behavior in the context of multipolar systems. As this study argued earlier, however, in order to have a more accurate understanding of this behavior, we need to include in our analysis the differences the unipolar structure will have on state strategies.
In the remainder of this section, I will examine how this new geopolitical reality affects bandwagoning behavior. In particular, I will discuss how the imbalance of power in the unipolar era alters preference ordering between different strategies. I will emphasize the concept of indirect threats as one of the main variables affecting alliance behavior under unipolarity. I will show that interest compatibility between the United
States and other powers creates incentives for offensive bandwagoning, while indirect threats from the United States force secondary powers to engage in different forms of defensive bandwagoning. I will conclude with a discussion of the causal mechanism behind a new form of defensive bandwagoning behavior.
instance, Ikenberry, ed. America Unrivalled; G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity (Discussion Paper: National Intelligence Council, 2003). 58
Established ‘Hegemony’ Eases Concerns Over Bandwagoning
The unipolar distribution of power weakens the rationale for several arguments raised against bandwagoning. One major argument defensive realists use to support their case for the rarity of bandwagoning is grounded in concerns of bandwagoning behavior paving the way for hegemony. Defensive realists argue that, since states are wary of hegemony, the norm in international relations has been the recurrent formation of balances of power, rather than bandwagoning. Balancing mechanism serves as the main vehicle for increasing chances for survival, as drives for hegemony over the system pose existential threats to smaller powers. Since anarchy is the rule and states value their survival and autonomy, they will oppose the emergence of a preponderant state that may risk transforming the system into a hegemonic one. Therefore, defensively positioned states will refrain from riding on a rising state’s bandwagon, especially if it has intentions to dominate the system.83
In contrast, hierarchical systems that are based on power disparity are most amenable to secondary state bandwagoning behavior behind a preponderant state, which was underlined during the literature review. Waltz also admits that under hierarchic orders, secondary states are more interested in increasing absolute gains and toward that end they would bandwagon with the more powerful parties. Therefore, the empirical question that facilitates our inquiry into the systemic inducements for bandwagoning behavior is the degree to which a given system has some characteristics of a hierarchic order.
83 Waltz, Theory of International, 126; Snyder, Alliance Politics, 18. 59
Whether one can call the current international system shaped around US primacy
hegemonic is contested. However, what almost all contributors to the debate on unipolar
politics agree on is that it is qualitatively different from multipolar politics, and though it
may share many features of a hierarchic structure, it is short of hegemony par excellence.
They also underline that US preponderance, whether one calls it hegemony or not, is an
established one.84 However one labels the current power imbalance, as Brooks and
Wohlforth argue, “(b)ecause American primacy is an accomplished fact, it cannot be
treated similar to the revisionist aspirations of the past.”85 This is also where Layne
makes an important observation that “(p)recisely because counterbalancing against an
actual hegemon is much more complex than balancing against a rising one, a
reconsideration of the types of state strategies that should be categorized as balancing is
needed.”86
This observation captures the crux of the debate on soft balancing. My intention
here is not to discuss the durability of unipolarity, nor the future of power balancing. My
interest in this debate on balancing under unipolarity, particularly soft-balancing, stems
from a concern to identify “novel features of American hegemony,”87 and see how they
have a bearing on bandwagoning behavior.
84 Wohlforth et al. are careful not to equate a unipolar system in which balancing the hegemon is prohibitively costly and hierarchical relationships that exist in systems dominated by one overwhelmingly powerful state. Wohlforth et al., "Testing Balance-of-Power," 160. 85 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism," Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 03 (2005): 511. 86 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 29. Paul, too, believes that the United States is not a rising power as in standard balance of power accounts, but “it is an established hegemonic power [whose] capabilities have been rapidly improving vis-à-vis other great power states, giving it the wherewithal to become an overwhelmingly preponderant state in the medium term.” Paul, "Soft Balancing," 51, footnote 16. 87 As Ikenberry argues although scholars diverge on whether American power is different and less threatening than standard accounts of power balancing, whether and the extent to which American power solves problems for other states, and whether the real meaning of balancing in today’s global system is different, most of them agree that “novel features of American hegemony complicate or render unlikely the 60
Distribution of Power Induces Bandwagoning
Structural realism argues that the distribution of power and where states fall in
this distribution will influence their foreign policy behavior. The concentration of power
in the hands of the United States and the autonomy it derives from these capabilities
increase its position vis-à-vis others, undermining their power position, and forcing them
to scale down their own aspirations. Consequently, states’ rank ordering among available
strategies when they are confronted with external shifts might have to be fundamentally
reconsidered. This new geopolitical reality inevitably puts enormous pressure on other
states to adjust themselves to the unbalanced US power and the uncertainties and
insecurities that flow from it.88
Overall, it seems that whereas the returns to accommodation with the dominant
power increase enormously for the countries in the hegemonic zone, the utility of – hard -
balancing is severely limited to impossible.89 Balancing as in siding with the weaker side
is discouraged by the power asymmetry. Since the deep structure of the unipolar order
does not grant any one state or coalition of many to hard balance against the United
States, this alternative loses its relevance.90 Consequently, state responses will oscillate
between bandwagoning, distancing and soft-balancing.
automatic return to a traditional balance-of-power.” Ikenberry, "Introduction," 5. Also see: Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power. 88 Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to. 89 It was already discussed that many scholars emphasize the declining utility of hard balancing. In particular they highlight two dynamics that hinder power balancing. First, for scholars such as Wohlforth and Brooks, it is simply too costly to organize a counterbalancing coalition given the secular power trends and the enormous collective action problems that need to be overcome, i.e., the unmatched coercive power at the disposal of the United States renders the costs to balancing unacceptable. For other scholars, such as Ikenberry, Walt and Pape, the consensual and benign nature of US power, the unthreatening exercise of the US power, the positive externalities of hegemony, and US willingness to accept constraints on its leadership result in lower levels of demand to balance, for the expected payoffs from opposition are reduced. 90 The underlying assumption here is that while choosing its partners in an approaching conflict, a state is driven by a concern to maximize its chances for being on the victorious side. Given the asymmetric nature 61
Interest Compatibility Under Unipolarity: Offensive Bandwagoning
American preponderance produces incentives for secondary powers to engage in
offensive bandwagoning, at least through two distinct causal pathways. First, many
countries derive benefits from the US-led international order, for it provides collective
goods. Since unique characteristics of American hegemony help reduce the worries about
power asymmetries, secondary powers are focused on the opportunities created by US
preponderance. This new reality leads us to expect that others are more likely to
bandwagon with American power.91 In other words, nonsecurity driven bandwagoning
should be more frequent under unipolarity especially when the lead state is interested in
the preservation of the status quo and allows others to benefit from it.92 As Wohlforth
argues, in situations similar to those, “for their part, the second-tier states face incentives
to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain
prohibitive.”93
Second, even in situations where the United States engages in revisionist policies,
there will be incentives for some states to bandwagon. The risk-taking or adventurous
states will likely see opening windows of opportunity. If their interests are compatible
with the unipolar leader’s revisionist agenda, their returns to jumping on the bandwagon
of today’s conflicts, payoffs from hard balancing will be extremely limited because through aligning with the weaker side, being part of the winning coalition is difficult, if not impossible. A corollary of this situation is the conclusion that passing the buck of resisting the United States to another power is no longer possible, because no state is capable or willing to catch the buck. Pape, "Soft Balancing," 16. 91 Ikenberry, "Introduction," 20. Ikenberry also notes that in many regions American power is seen more as a useful tool than as a source of domination. Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to, 10. A related stream of thought also argues that the common liberal and democratic norms enable a positive identification between the countries in the hegemonic zone and negate the concerns for relative gain. Owen, "Transnational Liberalism." 92 For a counter opinion, see: Posen, "European Union Security." 93 Wohlforth, "The Stability of," 8. 62
will increase relative to distancing or lower forms of balancing; hence, they will
cooperate with the United States.
Indirect Threats as a Stimulant of Alignment Behavior Under Unipolarity
Another peculiar aspect of unipolar politics is the altered nature of threat. The
way threat is conventionally understood is becoming less of a reality of modern day
international relations. Concerns for autonomy and survival, as well as concerns about
hegemonic drives, matter in state perceptions of threat. It already has been pointed out
how the ‘established hegemony’ of the United States eliminated some of these concerns.
Moreover, most contributors to the debate on balancing under unipolarity agree that the
character of American power demonstrates substantial differences from earlier
conceptions of power. They argue that either due to realist reasons (careful conduct of US
foreign policy) or nonrealist, liberal or ideationalist factors (democratic peace, economic
interdependence, international institutions) the way US power is exercised is less
threatening to secondary and weaker powers.94
Does the rarity of direct threat also herald the scarcity of defensive
bandwagoning? As discussed earlier, this form of bandwagoning is driven by threat, not
opportunity. Walt, who is overall skeptical about the occurrence of bandwagoning,
concludes that it indeed is rare under bandwagoning. One reason why he reaches this
conclusion is his definition of threat. For Walt, the kind of direct threat that will force a
94 Paul, "Introduction," 16. Also, see: Paul, "Soft Balancing," 47; Ikenberry, "Introduction," 22. Layne, in contrast, objects to the argument that US power is less threatening. Others also argue that the fact that the United States is a distant hegemon helps reduce other powers’ worries about the gap in overall power, rendering it less threatening. Brooks and Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory," 511. This mode of thinking also underpins the off-shore balancing explanation for the absence of balancing. See: Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," International Security 22, no. 1 (1997); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of. 63
state to capitulate into bandwagoning involves severe punishment, such as threat or use of
military force, or intense diplomatic pressure.95 He, therefore, reasons that “(a)lthough a
number of countries do have reason to worry about US intentions, the vast majority need
not fear that US military power might be directed at them.”96 Hence, his conclusion that
“very few – if any - states will feel compelled to bandwagon with the United States in
order to avoid its wrath.”97
However, such a narrow operationalization of this term sets the threshold too
high. Since threats play a major role in explaining alignment behavior, the altered nature
of threats calls for a reformulation to reflect the unique conditions of unipolar politics.
Although unipolarity remained as a constant, the interests of the United States and other
powers were not necessarily compatible in all cases.98 As a result, even the responses of
secondary powers that are not directly threatened by the United States changed over time.
Precisely because we have variations in how lesser states respond to US behavior,
apparently an intervening variable has to be at work. A possible cause is the level of
indirect threat generated by US actions, which varied across cases. Consequently, there is
ground to examine the hypothesis that a great deal of variation in state behavior is caused
by immaterial threat, as the literature on soft balancing attests.99
95 Walt, Taming American Power, 183-187. 96 Ibid., 187. 97 For Walt, soft balancing is important because it signals that if the United States continues its current course, it will come to be perceived as posing direct threats and trigger hard balancing responses. 98 The differences in security outlooks between the lead country and lesser powers are a major reason for variations in state responses. For instance, Press-Barnathan examines how the strategic uncertainty produced by the gradual shift towards unipolarity has led to divergence in threat perceptions between the United States and its European allies, with significant implications for the perspectives on the use of force. Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon." 99 Some power-centric realists claim that even without any threat mere power disparity should be enough to spark balancing responses. Layne, for instance, attributes those variations in state responses to the perception of US power as threat by other great powers. “Even in a unipolar world, not all of the other major powers will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon. 64
Pape defines indirect threat as “the threat of indirect harm, in which the military actions of a major power undermine the security of another, even if unintentionally.” 100
This form of threat is more relevant in unipolar structures than other forms of balance of power systems. Indirect threats are based on the assumption that the leading state in a system produces negative externalities for the security of other actors, which are most likely to emerge in case of revisionist or proactive policies.101 It is these proactive security strategies of the United States, either for the purpose of preserving or tilting the status quo to its own advantage, that alter the external conditions for many lesser powers in a way to create risks for some and windows of opportunity for others. In other words, the negative externalities of a leading power’s policies for the actors in the regions in which it operates force them to readjust to the external shifts. Although these countries are not fearful of a direct attack on their homelands, they are still disturbed by the consequences of US policies.102
Eventually, however, some are bound to regard the hegemon’s power as menacing.” Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 22. 100 Pape, "Soft Balancing," 13-14, 29. He classifies security problems that states respond to in a balance of power system under three headings: a) direct threat; b) indirect threat; c) and transformation of the system into a hegemonic one. 101 This argument is developed mainly by the advocates of soft balancing argument. For instance, Paul, after noting that the United States no longer poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of others, argues that though not through direct means, the United States has followed quasi-imperial strategies. In some cases, for instance, it did not refrain from changing regimes in other countries. T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing," 55. Others also recognize the indirect threats, though implicitly. Brooks and Wohlforth, two advocates of unipolarity, point out that whereas the leading state produces several public goods for others, it might as well produce public bad. Brooks and Wohlforth, "International Relations Theory," 518. Moreover, though writing in a different tradition, one of Layne’s main starting points is that the United States is not necessarily unthreatening to other states. On the question of whether the United States is a status quo power, Layne thinks that while it prefered status quo in many cases in quite others it has acted in line with the dictates of offensive realism. Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 9, 13, 24. For Walt, too, throughout the post-Cold War period, “(t)he United States has not acted as a ‘status quo’ power: rather, it has used its position of primacy to increase its influence, to enhance its position vis-à-vis potential rivals, and to deal with specific security threats.” Walt, Taming American Power, 23. 102 As Taliaferro argues, the infamous security dilemma, signifying defensive realists’ skepticism, continues to operate under unipolarity. Any step the United States takes toward strengthening its own security will result in a decreased sense of security among at least some other states given the almost 65
Responses to Indirect Threats: Soft Balancing vs.
Defensive Bandwagoning
One line of argument highlights strategies of resistance adopted by secondary powers to eliminate indirect threats generated by the actions of the unipolar leader.
Because the unipolar structure is not a rigid hierarchic order, weaker and secondary states still have room for mounting lower levels of individual or collective resistance through distancing or engaging in the kind of activities that are now called as soft balancing. For instance, one form of soft-balancing highlighted by this scholarship is secondary powers’ decision to withhold cooperation by staying outside the conflict.103
However, several factors might curb the effectiveness of soft balancing in the form of avoiding. First, as Press-Barnathan underlines, the utility of this strategy depends on whether the withheld cooperation makes a substantial difference in the hegemon’s policies.104 Second, a distinct feature of the current distribution of power is that the unipolar leader has the wherewithal to act unilaterally in many cases. In others, although multilateral and bilateral alliance ties provide it with important leverage to execute its policies, it is at liberty to switch allies when needed. As a result, although others can complicate or slow down its actions, they cannot stop it. Third, as Powell showed through a formal model, when the returns to scale in the aggregation of military capabilities are high, waiting becomes costly and states are forced to choose between balancing and bandwagoning.105 In other words, there is a deep asymmetry of dependence between the
inevitable incompatibility between the imperatives at the global and regional levels. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 160. 103 Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation." She is careful, though, to underline that not all noncooperation is strategic. 104 Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon," 304, footnote 82. 105 Powell, In the Shadow, 151. 66
unipole on the one hand and secondary and weaker states on the other, which makes the
cost-benefit calculations of the latter even more intricate.106
As an alternative to soft balancing, secondary powers may find safety in siding
with the stronger and revisionist unipolar leader, hoping that it would be “more
benign.”107 Instead of distancing themselves from the hegemon and alienating themselves
completely from how American power is exercised, lesser powers might find it more
worthwhile to work with it in order to offset the negative consequences for their own
security by obtaining a better relative position in the winning coalition. Therefore, as
Ikenberry notes, because alternative coalitions are difficult to materialize, the main
alignment challenge in unipolar times could be “how to get some leverage over American
exercise of power.”108
Defensive Bandwagoning: Causal Mechanism
The purpose of this section is to elaborate the causal mechanisms behind the
defensive bandwagoning strategy in response to indirect threats. Although he is
associated with the notion of states bandwagoning for profit, Schweller in fact recognizes
that fear may drive bandwagoning. In his critique of Walt, Schweller correctly argues that
even in the absence of an imbalance of threat, the imperatives for bandwagoning might
106 However, in such situations of asymmetrical bargaining, the advantage of the weaker parties is the unequal costs from the failure to agree. Hopmann suggests that, despite the availability of better alternatives, because a stronger party may have more at stake, it may be more vulnerable to noncooperation, hence be forced to concede. P. Terrence Hopmann, "Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," International Organization 32, no. 01 (1978). Cited in Kelley, "Strategic Non-cooperation," 159. 107 This phrase is borrowed from Walt who uses it to describe the motivation for the weaker power bandwagoning behavior. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and," 471. 108 Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to, 8. Powell’s formal model also supports this conclusion. In order to maximize its returns, a state will be forced to become part of the aggressive coalition and get the best deal out of it, if conflict is inevitable. Powell, In the Shadow of. 67 be present. His hypothetical case is a perfectly reasonable candidate for another alternative causal mechanism for bandwagoning outcome:
Consider Walt’s first motive for bandwagoning: to avoid attack. For him, this means appeasing the most dangerous side. This need not be the case, however. Suppose war is coming, and a state caught in the crossfire must choose sides, but there is no imbalance of threat. Seeking shelter from the storm, the state may align with the stronger coalition because there is safety in numbers and its survival depends on its being on the winning side. Here, the source of greatest danger to the state does not come from one side or the other but from the consequences of being on the losing side, whichever that may be.109
But Schweller does not explore this causal path in detail, especially how the power dynamics function to force a state to bandwagon in the absence of direct threats to its survival. For him overall, “(b)andwagoning is commonly done in the expectation of making gains; balancing is done for security and it always entails costs.”110 In the final analysis, as far as great power behavior is concerned, both Schweller and those who follow his lead treat bandwagoning as a strategy of power maximization alone.
What leads them to this troubled conclusion is that the balancing vs. bandwagoning or offensive vs. defensive balancing cut through another dichotomy: smaller powers vs. great powers. Defensive bandwagoning in Schweller’s lexicon is limited only to lambs, “countries that will pay only low costs to defend or extend their values. In a world of predators and prey, these states are prey.”111 Balance of interest scholars operate on the assumption that since small powers do not have wherewithal to engage in costly balancing, small countries “are more likely than great powers to
109 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 82. 110 Ibid.: 106. 111 Ibid.: 101. Interestingly, this is very similar to how Walt understands bandwagoning. Bandwagoning with powerful outsiders according to David’s omnibalancing theory, which in his parlance is better defined as balancing internal enemies, also applies only to threatened states that are extremely vulnerable. Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991). 68 bandwagon out of fear.”112 What they lack is great power or secondary power bandwagoning motivated by security maximization logic.
The challenge is to model the behavior of secondary states that are security- seekers. Many secondary states that are satisfied with the status quo can pay a relatively high price to defend their possessions and “maintain their relative positions and prestige in the system” even though they may not be able to stand against the revisionist powers and bear the costs of balancing on their own.113 As Schweller would also admit, these status quo states that seek to preserve their possessions will be concerned about
“preventing relative losses in power and prestige,” and they will make everything to ensure that “everyone else does not gain relative to them.” 114 But is balancing the only way to achieve this outcome?
I argue that, just as balancing, secondary powers might adopt bandwagoning strategies to maximize their security.115 As defensive realists rightly argue, the pursuit of security need not necessarily lead to balancing policies, however, especially when one factors other variables into the equation. For instance, security seeking motivations such as concerns for relative power, the role of uncertainty in anarchy, or the perceptions of
112 Fritz and Sweeney, "The (de)Limitations of," 303. 113 For a similar argument, see: Takafumi Ohtomo, "Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War," International Relations Asia Pacific 3, no. 1 (2003). 114 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 87. 115 In other words, they can engage in seemingly expansionist policies in the form of bandwagoning. The point made here is analogous to Taliaferro’s critique of Schweller in that he ignores “the incidence of security-driven expansion in world history.” Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 145. As I argue here, this stems mainly from the fact that Schweller equates opportunistic and expansionist behavior with offensive state goals and treats it as incompatible with defensive strategies. Hence Schweller’s problematic contention that in a perfect world of security seekers there is no room for aggression. Schweller, "Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias." 69
offense-defense balance116 might force states to engage in not only balancing but also
bandwagoning, which might at first glance appear opportunistically driven.117
In particular, concerns over relative power shifts may create conditions that
induce states to prefer bandwagoning, in the absence of direct threats. To make my point,
I borrow Schweller’s critique of the neorealist position on relative gains. If we extend his
argument to the bandwagoning discussion, we see that even if one assumes that some
states are security seekers and are sensitive to relative power concerns, the same concern
may force them to join the dominant power that put the system in flux. I also borrow
from Snidal’s critique of neorealist case of relative gains: “Motives of defensive
cooperation explain why defensive positionality does not destroy cooperation. Defensive
positionality argues that states won’t cooperate because they fear others will make
relative gains. Defensive cooperation argues that states will cooperate for fear that other
states will get ahead by cooperating among themselves.”118 In other words, the key here
is to factor in the costs of staying on the sidelines for security maximizing states in
situations of significant changes in their external environments.
My argument runs as follows. Imagine that an extra-regional power, country A,
leading an overlarge coalition, is contemplating a war on a regional country B for which
it seeks the support of another regional country C. Country C is not threatened by either
A or B. Most realists will have us believe that country C will shy away from cooperation
due to concerns for relative gains or other dangers inherent in a bandwagoning strategy.
If country C is a perfect defensive positionalist and is in no way threatened by the
116 See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 187- 194. 117 See Posen, "European Union Security," 155. 118 Duncan Snidal, "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1991): 401, emphasis in original. 70 overwhelming coalition, a strategy of avoiding by staying on the sidelines would be the ideal course of action for it. However, because of the concerns for relative balance of power at the regional level, in which country C is located, the alignment dynamics might operate differently. If country A is bent on pursuing its aggressive strategy anyway and can have access to other allies in the region that are opportunistic enough to rise up to the challenge, this situation will come to present shifts in relative power between country C and the new-found ally (let’s say country D). Although country D may concede to unequal exchange with the powerful coalition, it will come out of this cooperation strengthened at the regional level. Country D’s increments from this cooperation will make country C worse off in relative power terms, and depending on the nature of the relationship between the two, its security might be jeopardized seriously, not to mention the erosion of power imbalance between country A and country C. More importantly, country C will have to bear the negative consequences of country A’s military actions.
Under unipolarity, the same pressures are likely to intensify, especially when the leading state starts to act in a revisionist manner. As discussed before, whereas the risks associated with bandwagoning, such as the concerns for survival and fear of the powerful partner turning against the weaker one, are reduced to a minimum, the secondary state will have to suffer the adverse implications of the hegemon’s behavior in its region anyway (such as the relocation of military bases to a neighboring country, losing the hegemon’s favor, etc.). As a result, the trade-off between strategies of avoiding and bandwagoning may become costly to tolerate. Those power dynamics might force a secondary power to perceive US actions as indirect threats which, in turn, force it to 71 cooperate with the United States.119 This outcome leading to security-driven cooperation with a revisionist power is an additional pathway for defensive bandwagoning, which is completely ignored by Walt and largely unexamined by Schweller.
Summary
In this chapter, I have underlined that whereas bandwagoning appears as a defensive strategy in Walt’s lexicon, Schweller highlighted offensive motivations of bandwagoning at the expense of defensive bandwagoning. I instead argued for broadening the definition of bandwagoning to include both the offensive and defensive types. I also made a case that in a unipolar system, because balancing in its conventional form is not a feasible option, and the dominant power holds the trump card of unilateral action, secondary state responses will vary between soft balancing and different forms of accommodation. I underlined a new causal pathway for defensive bandwagoning where perceptions of indirect threats induce lesser powers to pursue cooperation with the United
States. In the next two chapters, I will develop a foreign policy model to analyze secondary power foreign policy behavior in response to systemic pressures. The model takes into account variations in state motivations as well as domestic and regional costs of external alignments.
119 Powell captures these dynamics: “Larger returns to scale undermine the strategy of waiting. The more military forces cumulate, the more distribution of power shifts against a state if it stands aside while others fight. This adverse shift makes waiting more costly relative to aligning and induces a state to join the conflict… One state’s attack on another compels a third state to enter the fray in order to prevent an adverse shift in the distribution of power.” Powell, In the Shadow, 151-152; also see 177-178. CHAPTER 3
REGIONS AS A DISTINCT LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Theorists of international relations, including neorealists and their critics, discuss domestic and systemic factors that influence state behavior. What they mean by
‘systemic’ level variables refers mostly to the distribution of power. Consequently, they contend that where a state falls on this distribution is the main force that shapes a state’s foreign policy conduct. They usually rank states according to their capabilities and differentiate between great, middle or small scale powers. The current study agrees with the argument that a state’s positioning in the system and structure of the system create constraints and opportunities for a state’s behavior.
This study, however, takes issue with realist scholars’ tendency to position states on a planetary scale. Implicit in realists’ conceptualization of the international system is the notion that irrespective of their location, all states are part of a single system, and hence are affected by the same systemic dynamics. Would it be correct, however, to think that Uzbekistan and Uruguay are subject to the same set of systemic influences? A major contention of this dissertation is that states, depending on the particular regions they are located in, face different systemic influences. Therefore, the influence of the global system on state behavior is likely to be filtered through the proximate relationships states 73 are a part of, which are called regional security complexes, i.e., a set of states connected together by dense interaction which makes them vulnerable to security externalities generated in the given zone and forces them to include other members in the calculations for choosing between alternative foreign policy strategies.
The purpose of the current chapter is to lay the groundwork for integrating the regional context into foreign policy analysis. Toward this goal, it first makes a case for treating regions as a distinct level of analysis. It then turns to the question of how regions have been treated in the relevant literature. It demonstrates that regions have become essential to a proper understanding of the world politics and that they possess substantial autonomy from interactions at the level of the global system. After a detailed analysis of various scholarly arguments to the effect that the globe is populated by multiple systems operating parallel to - and in some cases overlapping with - each other, the chapter proposes ways to differentiate those various regional systems from the global system.
Moreover, it discusses different ways through which the global system and regional systems interface with each other. Building on those foundations, the next chapter will develop a regionally-differentiated foreign policy analysis model in order to account for different ways through which the regional level factors exert causal influences on state behavior.
Developments in Levels of Analysis Literature
My research differs from and expands on earlier studies on alliances in general and bandwagoning in particular, at least in one important point. Despite the renewed interest in alignments, a significant theoretical gap remains: the proper level of analysis in 74
studying state behavior. Theorists of international relations developed level of analysis as
a heuristic device to categorize sources of explanation for observed phenomena,
depending on whether state behavior is thought to be explained by factors at the level of
individual, state, or the international system.1 Originally developed to explain the causes
of war, subsequent scholarship extended the level of analysis framework to study other
aspects of state behavior. Recently, the same framework is utilized in analyzing the
behavior of nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups. The level of analysis framework
helps scholars, who work on a particular subject, organize the myriad of sources of state
behavior into simpler and more manageable categories.2
Initially scholars seeking to explain various aspects of state behavior preferred to
use a single level of analysis in line with Singer’s warning against switching levels in a
single study.3 Later, attempts at bridging levels of analysis depending on the research
question being examined, and identifying the optimum combination of various levels and
the causal chain among the levels became fruitful areas of research.4 Most of these
studies sought to study the interactions between the international (systemic) and domestic
(unit) levels, as popularized by Putnam’s notion of ‘two-level games’ developed to
explain the dynamics of international bargaining situations.5 George Tsebelis expands on
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); David J Singer, "The Level-of-analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14, no. 1 (1961); Barry Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered," in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Steve Smith and Ken Booth (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995). 2 Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War," in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 23. 3 Singer, "The Level-of-analysis Problem." 4 James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science 1, no. (1998). 5 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988); Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double- Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 75 the same idea and maintains that political actors are acting in a network of games simultaneously and generalizes his framework of ‘nested games’ to nonbargaining situations as well.6
The literature on security policy in general, and the alignment behavior in particular, conforms to this pattern. Unlike the earlier scholars who highlighted largely a single level,7 recent studies attempt to combine insights from multiple levels of analysis to explain the determinants of security policies. Neoclassical realists, in this respect, are distinguished by their research program whose primary goal it is to supplement systemic modifiers with unit-level variables.8 Some neoclassical realists, however, are criticized for prioritizing the systemic level over the unit-level and treating international factors as causally prior to domestic variables. In other words, unit-level factors are brought into analysis to explain only anomalies and residual categories that are not properly accounted for by systemic modifiers.9 The challenge for this scholarship is to offer explanations of foreign policy behavior which give equal causal weight to different levels, without unduly prioritizing one over others.
6 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 7 Neorealists prioritize systemic level of analysis: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Second-image approaches, in contrast, explain alignment behavior through factors situated at the domestic level: Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack L. Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 03 (1991). 8 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998); Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 9 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999). 76
The recent turn toward adopting multilevel analysis in security studies is
promising for my research question of delineating conditions under which bandwagoning
proposition is likely to hold. Exploring the domestic-international divide helps us go
beyond focusing exclusively on the distribution of power and the impact of US policies
on secondary powers. As such, it allows for the exploration of factors internal to the
follower, inducing bandwagoning behavior, without abandoning the focus on systemic
level.
Absent in the research agenda on the proper level of analysis for explaining state
alignment behavior, however, is the regional context of state behavior. The dearth of
studies on the regional level of analysis is surprising given that it already has been
pointed out that particularly in the post-Cold War era politics at the regional level has
become more pronounced for states seeking to achieve security.10 Bringing regions into
realism and security studies is necessary, especially for analyzing secondary states
embedded in regional level networks of interaction. A secondary state’s formulation of its
security policy is affected by not only domestic and international conditions but also the
specific regional security complex - sometimes called as subsystem - in which it is
located.11
10 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997). 11 Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics 10, no. 3 (1958); Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics 15, no. 2 (1963); William Howard Wriggins, ed. Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Steven E. Lobell, "Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism. 77
Without taking regional influences into account, the analysis of the dynamics of a secondary power’s interactions with global powers will remain incomplete. When regions are included in analysis, the same propositions may produce different behavioral patterns on the part of secondary states. Through a reformulation of conventional theories to take into account regional considerations, we can gain leverage for suggesting richer theories of foreign policy behavior, which are more consistent with the empirical reality.12 To fill this theoretical gap, and provide a richer and more accurate description of alliance behavior, the deductive multilevel framework that I will offer will treat regions as a distinct level of analysis, and integrate domestic, regional and global levels.
Before laying out my theoretical framework in the next chapter, I will first elaborate more on the regional level of analysis and make a case for treating regional context as a distinct level, as it is the one that is sparsely analyzed.
Why Study Regions as a Distinct Level of Analysis?
Treating regions as a separate level of analysis that is integrated closely to domestic and regional levels is warranted at least for two reasons. First, ‘region’ is the most relevant environment that influences a regional state’s security interests. Realists might be correct to argue that systemic influences affect a country’s foreign policy. In order to fully delineate those systemic influences, regions should be differentiated from the global system. Although two states nominally are part of a single global system, the systemic effects on their behavior will vary. The degree to which their behavior is shaped by the systemic influences will depend on the specific regional security complex they are
12 Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64; Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 43. 78 a part of, rather than a planetary scale system. In some cases, mutual interactions among states and the degree of their integration with the global order might be so low that it will not make sense to conceive them as components of a single international system.
For many states around the world, the local security dynamics emerging out of their interaction with other states with which they are closely connected are the main determinants of foreign policy behavior. These ‘intraregional dynamics’ will mediate the systemic influences on state behavior. To the extent that such local constraints and opportunities on state action come to constitute regularized patterns with well-defined boundaries in terms of their membership, rules of interaction and behavioral effects, they might be conceived of as distinct systems. This proximate locale, in most cases, creates the direct threats and opportunities confronting the state leaders in their formulation and conduct of foreign policy. It is those regional systems, rather than a single global system, that is relevant to a systemic analysis of state behavior, for some states may feel the constraints of the former more than those of the latter.
Second, a regional perspective can help us better comprehend state behavior by enabling a more differentiated treatment of different state types and the motivations they seek in international politics. This point is particularly relevant for the overall goal of the current research, which seeks to analyze foreign policy behavior of secondary regional powers. If one bases his analysis on the overall distribution of power at the level of the global system, a state might be considered as a minor actor. If its behavior is analyzed at global scale, that state may be conceptualized to be seeking survival only, for its capabilities will not allow for the pursuit of extended nonsecurity goals worldwide.
Within its own region, though, the very same state may rank as a major player, pursuing 79
proactive policies and nonsurvival goals.13 The dual identity of such nations may have
significant implications for the way they conduct their foreign relations, including
relationship with the unipolar leader.14 Bringing the regional level into analysis will lead
to a more nuanced analysis of state behavior. This task will be accomplished in the next
chapter.
Approaches to the Study of Regions
At the heart of this argument for a regional perspective lies the idea that the globe
is populated by multiple systems operating parallel to - and in some cases overlapping
with - each other. Equally important are the notions that regions are essential to a proper
understanding of world politics and possess substantial autonomy from interactions at the
level of the global system. This argument brings to the fore the question of how regions
have been treated by the past scholarship. The literature on regions relevant to
international relations theory and the research questions of this study approached regions
in three distinct ways.15
In the first group are studies that are indifferent to regions. The literature on
international relations in general and international security in particular has paid sparse
attention to the regional level of analysis. The mainstream approach to international
13 The idea that minor powers may behave as major players in their own regions is also suggested by Lemke as part of his reformulation of the two-goods theory. Lemke, Regions of War, 61-63. Moreover, Ayoob notes that most regional systems inhabit pivotal powers that are “perceived as having hegemonic, or at least managerial, aspirations within the region,” and that drives for hegemony and local responses to such attempts shape much of the substance of regional politics. Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order," Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 253. 14 For instance, the need to maintain its image as an influential player in its own region may prevent a regional power from following conciliatory policies in its dealings with the outside great powers. The concern not to lose face in the region may force a regional power to act more aggressively against the global leader than it would otherwise. 15 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, "The New Regionalism in Security Affairs," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders, 8-9. 80
relations, Waltzian structural realism, ignored regions as a distinct unit of analysis,
mainly because its followers sought to explain not only international politics but also
regional politics in terms of the distribution of power at the global – systemic - level.16
Moreover, one of the basic assumptions of realism, that the nature of international
politics is the same everywhere, also accounts for the lack of interest in regions.
According to this view, certain structural conditions and behavioral patterns on the part of
units “hold at whatever level states cluster; regions are smaller but otherwise identical to
global system.”17 As a result, if regional dynamics are to be studied separately, general
theories of IR would be sufficient for this purpose, eliminating the need for distinct
regional level theorizing. An example of this approach would be Walt’s application of
systemic balance of power theory to the Middle East. As his emphasis on the proximity
as an important component of threat attests, local dynamics in fact play an important role
in his explanation of alliance behavior. But he treats the region as the main external
environment operating similar to the systemic balance of power logic, and lacks a
coherent theory to explain the unique dimensions of regional systems. More importantly,
he fails to explore the ways in which the two levels interact in complex ways, except for
acknowledging that regional states may balance through seeking superpower support
instead of allying with other regional actors.18
16 For reasons for this neglect, see: Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 68-69. 17 Lake and Morgan, "The New Regionalism," 8. 18 Walt defines his case as a “multipolar, regional subsystem embedded within a bipolar global system.” Walt, The Origins of, 266. Similarly, in his recent work on strategies of accommodation under unipolarity, he identifies regional balancing as a strategy of seeking enhanced relations with the United States against any form of regional threat including internal challenges to the regime. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 187-191. 81
A second group of studies appreciate the importance of regions yet approach each
region as a sui generis entity. The emphasis on the uniqueness of regions has been a
common theme running through the traditional area studies scholarship. Focusing
predominantly on providing rich descriptive accounts of existing political dynamics in
well defined regions of the world, those scholars eschewed explicit theorizing. Most
research in security studies conducted on different regional systems is atheoretical
descriptive studies of security dynamics in a particular region.19
The third approach seeks to strike a middle ground between these two
perspectives through comparative and theoretically-driven studies of regions. On the one
hand, they emphasize the differences between the international system and regional
systems so that they can identify how regions influence state behavior. On the other hand,
they endeavor to capture the variations across regions, by developing criteria that explain
the structure of regional systems and nature of regional politics. For these scholars,
variations across regions do not call for unique theories but can be reconciled through
comparative theorizing of regional systems.
The Ebb and Flows in the Comparative Study of Regions
Calls for comparative study of regions are not new and have been suggested by
various scholars in different forms. However, what has really determined the academic
interest in regions is the empirical question of the extent to which an international order is
characterized by the dominance of regions or global level forces, or in the words of
19 L. Carl Brown, ed. Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2001). 82
Buzan and Waever, “relative levels of power between the region and global actors.”20 As
they further emphasize “except when global powers are extremely dominant … regional
security dynamics will normally be a significant part of the overall constellation of
security in the international system.” 21
In a review of the study of regions written in the 1980s, Vayrynen22 makes a case
for recognizing the role of the regional level. He underlines that a gradual rise of
regionalism influenced international relations from the 1950s onward. Indeed, regions as
distinct units of analysis became subject of investigation in the 1960s and 1970s. As early
as the 1950s, Binder maintained that “we are confronted not with a single global system,
but with several in a variety of relationships.”23 He moved on to argue that whereas the
bipolar international system created by the US-USSR rivalry sat atop these multiple
systems, various regions constitute smaller subordinate systems.24 Binder allowed for the
possibility that whereas bipolarity may shape US-USSR relations, it does not necessarily
characterize their relations with third powers; hence regions have their autonomous
dynamics that cannot be explained by bipolarity alone. Similarly, another advocate of the
concept of subordinate system, Brecher, criticized the excessive focus on the dominant
bipolar bloc system of superpower conflict and underlined how it distorted the
understanding of “an array of interstate problems, conflicts, and relationships among
actors outside the blocs that have nothing or little to do with the bloc system, in the
20 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 68. Vayrynen makes a similar point: “whether the global system is subsystem dominant or system dominant.” Raimo Vayrynen, "Regional Conflict Formations: An Intractable Problem of International Relations," Journal of Peace Research 21, no. 4 (1984): 342. 21 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 11. 22 Vayrynen, "Regional Conflict Formations," 339. 23 Binder, "The Middle East," 409. 24 Wriggins criticizes this concept because it “misrepresents the extent to which each has a life of its own, driven by domestic and security requirements.” William Howard Wriggins, "Scope and Purpose," in Wriggins, ed. Dynamics of Regional, 9. 83
Americas, Africa, Asia, and even in Europe.”25 He, instead, suggested a multilayered
conception of international system: in an ascending order, subordinate systems, the
dominant system, i.e., the bipolar system, and the world or global political system.
The tight bipolarity during the Cold War, however, dwarfed study of regions and
regional level theorizing, after the brief interest in the 1960s and 1970s. The discipline’s
excessive focus on the polarity at the systemic level and the failure to develop robust
theoretical models and effective research designs with clear operational definitions to
explain the complex reality of regional subsystems and their interaction with the global
level forestalled the evolution of the study of regions into new directions.26 With the
disappearance of the Cold War and its defining feature of systemic bipolarity,
comparative study of regions gained renewed interest, particularly in the field of
international political economy. Despite the arguments made to the effect that
globalization leveled out differences across the globe rendering regions meaningless, a
powerful stream of thought emphasized growing salience of regional variations.27
In the post-Cold War era, growing autonomy of regional problems from the
global level forces led to the reawakening of the study of regions. Most studies on regions
or regionalism deal with regions in the context of economic and trade related issues, in
particular regional integration.28 The localization of security issues and growing salience
25 Brecher, "International Relations," 217. 26 For extensive reviews of the study of regions and regional subsystems, and the reasons behind the failure of earlier studies to develop a robust research agenda, see: Lemke, Regions of War, 57-60; David A. Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders, 46-48; Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 77-78; Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25. 27 Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). For reviews of globalization versus regionalization debate, see: Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 7-13; Miller, States, Nations, and, 9. 28 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999). For an extensive review of the waves of the study of regions in economics, 84
of regional level concerns also led to the flourishing of ‘regional security’ studies.29 If
regional conflicts and their resolution became the main security challenges confronting
the international community, then, the argument goes, understanding their sources at the
regional level would be in order. In his review of the growing interest in regional
architecture of world politics, Acharya notes that this scholarship raises two interrelated
points: “regions are central to our understanding of world politics… [and] they have
acquired ‘substantial’ autonomy from the system-level interactions of the global
powers.”30 Increasingly, because most conflicts and security challenges emanate at
regional level in the post-Cold War era, security studies scholars have also started to treat
regions as discrete systems that deserve to be studied on their own terms.
In this new wave of studies, several works come close to the approach followed in
this research in that they explicitly discuss regions in the context of level of analysis
problem and explore the dynamics between the regional and global levels. These studies
are also relevant to my research because they specifically focus on security related
regions, unlike the majority of the work on regions examining regionalization in
economic relations. One major contribution of this genre of scholarship is its argument
for treating regions as separate from the global system and the constituent units. As Lake
see: Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, "Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New," New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000). 29 Arthur A. Stein and Steven E. Lobell, "Geostructuralism and International Politics: The End of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International Security," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders; Paul A. Papayoanou, "Great Powers and Regional Orders: Possibilities and Prospects After the Cold War," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders; Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997); Miller, States, Nations, and. 30 Amitav Acharya, "The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics," World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 629. In a similar vein, Lake and Morgan argue that “analysis pitched at the level of the global system, as a result, will have less explanatory power than before. Regions will and must become a greater focus of our attention as we seek to unravel, understand, and possibly influence the choices states make.” David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, "Building Security in the New World of Regional Orders," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders, 348. 85 and Morgan argue “the regional level must be studied on its own and, in turn, integrated into the broader study of international relations and foreign policy.”31 Consequently, for most of these scholars, the key issue at stake is not whether there are regional systems, but their relationship to the global system on the one hand, and the domestic level on the other. Then, two major tasks being undertaken by this scholarship are to identify ways in which the global system and regional systems interface with each other and how intra- regional dynamics affect foreign policy behavior.
The current study builds on the same foundations, but differentiates itself from other major work on regions in significant respects.
Place of the Present Study in the Literature on Regions
The present research parts company with the major theoretically-driven studies on regions in one important sense: while they examine regions and different regional-level phenomena, I study how regional context constitutes a separate level for foreign policy analysis. Although existing studies acknowledge that intraregional dynamics affect states’ foreign policy behavior, only limited analyses exist that show the causal linkages for how regions make a difference in behavioral outcomes.
The major theoretically-driven studies that advance general theories of regions focus on two broad themes: different forms or structures of regions and the creation of regions. First, a common theme for these studies is their concern for developing a framework to explain regional security dynamics and certain regional outcomes. Most of these studies treat regions as bounded systems, and hence, explore the patterns of security relations in regional systems. The studies conducted under this genre explore the
31 Lake and Morgan, "Building Security in," 347. 86 characteristic of security dynamics - such as the type of security issues and the regional mechanisms to deal with security problems - in various regions of the world through comparative or single case studies.32 For instance, they explore whether and how the structure of a regional system will affect its ability to develop effective mechanisms to control violence. These studies emphasize how the type of regional system generates distinct security dynamics. Therefore, many studies attempt to develop taxonomies of regional security orders, which use the distribution of power within regions as their basic criterion.33 A large number of those studies on security regionalism examine how different regional security institutions, such as NATO, function and in particular contribute to regional peace. They explore security cooperation at regional level and how different institutional designs will facilitate or complicate regional security arrangements.34
Second, another theme that runs through this literature is the origins of regions: what leads to the creation of regions in the first place. The responses to this question ranges from those arguing that great powers and hegemonic construction are the main
32 For instance, most contributors to Lake and Morgan’s edited volume explore the factors that explain the emergence of regional security orders, i.e., mode of conflict management, and cause variations across different security orders. Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders. Writing in a similar vein, Miller engages in a project to explain the causes behind the peacefulness of some regions while others are more war-prone. After noting that “with the exception of the great powers and their involvement in wars, war is largely a regional phenomenon,” he advances a theoretical framework whereby he combines factors located at domestic/regional and global levels to explain regional outcomes, i.e., variation in the level of violence among regions and within regions across time. Miller, States, Nations, and, 9. Ayoob also focuses on regional orders and patterns of conflict management in regions. He seeks to identify the key domestic, regional and global variables that explain transition from a regional system to a regional society. Ayoob, "From Regional System." Lemke seeks to explain the causes of war in different regions to ascertain whether the factors leading to war among great powers hold for nongreat power cases. Lemke, Regions of War. 33 For instance, Buzan and Waever analyze regions in terms of polarity; their categories range from unipolar to multipolarity. Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, Chapter 3. 34 Charles Kupchan, "Regionalizing Europe's Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa," in The Political Economy of Regionalism, ed. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 87
determinant of regions to those who claim that regions are endogenous constructions to
mount responses to power.35 A related line of research focuses on ‘regionalism’ or
regionalization in world politics. Hence their research question is when and how different
geographic zones are regionalized, i.e., emerge as distinct and integrated entities.36
Regions as Independent Variable
As this brief makes it clear, these scholars still study regional level outcomes or
regions as their dependent variable to be explained. Although benefiting enormously
from these studies, my research departs from this body of scholarship on an important
aspect: my focus in this study is to explain not regional outcomes but the foreign policy
behavior of individual states, and how it is affected by the regional context. Hence, I take
regions as independent/ intervening variables whose behavioral effects on foreign policy
making need to be explored.
Other studies that examine state behavior in the context of regions are available
but they are focused mainly on great power behavior. For instance, Papayoanou37
develops a framework to explain the approaches great powers adopt to address RSCs.
Miller and Kagan38 examine the involvement of great powers in regional conflicts,
focusing on the impact such involvement has on the resolution of these conflicts. They
underline the insufficiency of realist perspectives that use international anarchy and
systemic polarity. Miller39 studies the variations in the conflict management strategies
35 Acharya, "The Emerging Regional," 640-642. 36 Fawcett and Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics. 37 Paul A. Papayoanou, "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997). 38 Miller and Kagan, "The Great Powers." 39 Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Changes in US Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq," Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010). 88 adopted by the United States in addressing regional conflicts in the Middle East, through a modified application of the balance of threat theory.
My research, in contrast, seeks to explain secondary powers’ foreign policy behavior. One can identify other studies that analyze the policies of smaller powers within a regional system. Contributors to an edited volume by Wriggins,40 in particular, seek to accomplish a similar goal and they in fact include factors from domestic, regional and global levels. However, they endeavor to retain the empirical richness and variety of the real world and describe regional dynamics as well as the foreign policies of individual states. They stop short of suggesting a parsimonious theoretical model that identifies clearly what factors at each level are relevant and how they are integrated. The present research, in contrast, proposes a deductive framework.
To summarize, the main unit of analysis and the dependent variable for most existing studies on regions is still regional phenomena, such as the particularities and unique features of security relationships at the regional level, regional security institutions, the determinants of regional conflict and regional conflict resolution mechanisms. My focus is instead on the foreign policy behavior of secondary states, as I seek to inquire how intraregional security dynamics, in conjunction with domestic and international factors, influence a country’s foreign policy.
Definition of a Region: Borrowing from Regional Security Complexes
My concern in this research is with regional level of analysis, not regions per se.
Nonetheless, one issue that begs clarification is what constitutes a region, without which any inquiry into regional systems will remain incomplete. I will review past
40 Wriggins, ed. Dynamics of Regional. 89
conceptualizations of regions and seek to develop essential attributes of a region that will
constitute the basis of my analysis. Various attempts to operationalize regions suggested
a set of criteria which included cultural similarities, trade patterns, common membership
in international organizations, alliance patterns, demographic similarities, self-
identification of units, and geographic proximity.41
Systemic vs. Ideational Definitions of Regions
Earlier attempts to study regions as a separate level were influenced by the
systems theories. This systemic approach left the legacy of examining regions in terms of
interactions among a set of actors. For instance, Brecher’s focus was more on subordinate
states systems than regions per se.42 Another major contribution is Thompson’s study in
which he introduces a definition of a regional subsystem which he conceptualizes as
regularized and dense patterns of interaction between at least two actors, noting that
changes at certain parts of the system will influence other parts of the system. Into the list
of criteria, he also adds proximity and internal and external recognition of the region as
constituting a distinct area.43 In another major contribution from the 1970s, Cantori and
Spiegel define regions in reference to geographic proximity and the mutual interaction
among the units without which their foreign policy behavior cannot be understood
41 Brecher, "International Relations," 220; Lake and Morgan, "The New Regionalism," 11; Lemke, Regions of War, 59; Acharya, "The Emerging Regional," 633-634. 42 He also makes an important contribution by including the nature of relations between the subordinate system and the dominant system in his list of conditions for defining a region: “the units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System, using a sliding scale of power in both; and … changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than the reverse.” Brecher, "International Relations," 220. 43 William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1973). He also reviews the criteria offered by other scholars. Russett’s study on regions offers an earlier attempt to categorize regions but he follows an inductive approach, offering description of existing regions. Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967). 90
properly.44 Vayrynen also argues that “a regional subsystem is characterized by a certain
distinctiveness and proximity, not only in geographical but also in the economic and
political sense. Proximity is institutionalized by means of mutual interaction and common
organizations.”45 Ayoob also notes that the notion of interaction should be understood in
terms of not only cooperation but also competition and conflict in order to capture
security aspects of regions.46
In short, common to these various efforts at delineation of a region is the notion of
geographic proximity which fosters interaction, distinctiveness, and mutual
interdependence to the changes in the conditions of other actors and the system.47
Needless to say, such interactions of states are assumed to take place under conditions of
anarchy. In line with the renewed interest in regional dimensions of international
relations in the post-Cold War era, as stated, various studies on regions have been
conducted, which expand on the same notions.
In the recent genre of scholarship, however, a visible trend is observed whereby
regions are no longer viewed in exclusively geographic terms. Rather, references to
certain common and shared nonterritorial threads increasingly became the basis of
definitions.48 Especially under the influence of constructivist thinking in IR, newer
44 They argue that, for the states in a region, “their primary involvement in foreign affairs ordinarily lies in the region in which they find themselves.” Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 4. More importantly, they suggest several reasons to justify the study of regions. In particular, they underline the role regional contact plays in shaping a state’s foreign policy. 45 Vayrynen, "Regional Conflict Formations," 340. 46 Ayoob, "From Regional System," 250. 47 Miller, States, Nations, and, 41-42. 48 Mansfield and Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," 591. Vayrynen gave signals of this trend in his argument that study of regional subsystems in social sciences, unlike mere study of geographical regions, “means that the territorial perspective is married with social dynamics.” Vayrynen, "Regional Conflict Formations," 337. Similarly, Brecher argued that “the Subordinate System is a political as well as a geographic concept; the region is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for definition.” Brecher, "International Relations," 220. 91
approaches increasingly emphasize how regions are socially constructed and how
collectively shared ideas play a role in the creation of regions.49 In a similar vein, writing
within the tradition of the English school, Ayoob50 attempts to escape the excessive focus
on regions as ‘systems’ understood in material terms. Instead, he suggests the notion of a
regional society, a step toward a true regional community that is based on cognitive
factors, most importantly consciousness of common interests and values. The theory of
security communities developed by Adler and Barnett (1998) along the lines of
Deutschian integration theory also underlines the role that the clusters of states play in
international politics. The construction of such communities requires a thick social fabric
to emerge as a result of positive communication and shared understandings among
members. Kupchan also emphasizes the importance of “conceiving of a certain group of
states as a region” and how this idea may induce agents to behave in ways to change their
structure into a region. “A region is conceived of, then it comes to exist.”51
Proximate Interactions vs. Security Externalities
The normative twist of social constructivists approaches which focus mainly on
building positive security at regional level is not shared by the current study. Rather, my
work comes closer to the first approach that studies regions from a systemic perspective,
because I treat regions as analytical entities with positive and negative security
relationships. This emphasis on security relationships lies behind the notion of regional
security complexes, developed first by Buzan and adopted by various others. I will
49 Acharya, "The Emerging Regional," 634. 50 Ayoob, "From Regional System." 51 Kupchan, "Regionalizing Europe's Security," 211. Also, Katzenstein makes a constructivist argument to explain economic regionalism. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005). 92 discuss in detail different approaches to regional security complexes in order to develop my own notion of region.
The idea that geographical proximity and security interdependence create a smaller system, which then creates behavioral constraints on state behavior, forms the basis of my inquiry into regions. Two major works on regions created new avenues for extending the study of regional context of state behavior: Lake and Morgan52 and Buzan and Waever.53 The debate between these two approaches constitutes the basis of my operationalization of the regional level of analysis that will be employed later in this study.
These two works share many commonalities. First, they approach regions through a comparative perspective, which makes it possible to capture unique characteristics of regions and retain the strengths of area studies on the one hand, and develop general theories of regions and connect their inquiry to the wider IR scholarship, on the other.54
Moreover, they study regions in the context of security relationships created by interdependence among a set of states. Furthermore, they are careful not to apply simply the IR explanations of international system to the regional systems and treat the latter merely as smaller versions of the former. Rather, their starting point is the fundamental difference between an international system and a regional system: the former being a closed system vs. the latter being an open system. This assumption enables exploration of
52 Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders. 53 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers. 54 One major contribution of the comparative approach to regions is its claim for synthesizing area studies and mainstream international relations, a theme which has been around since the interest in regional subsystems started in the 1960s. As early as the 1950s, Binder was claiming that his purpose was “to establish a link between system/structure theory and the area studies approach.” Binder, "The Middle East," 409. Also see: Brecher, "International Relations," 218. In that regard, recent approaches maintain commitment to the same goal: Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 468. Acharya, "The Emerging Regional," 635. 93 the extent and form of penetration by the international system into the regional system, which also will be the basis of multilevel analysis in this study.
These two works differ in significant respects, especially regarding their understanding of the primary mechanism behind the RSC. Buzan and Waever expand on
Buzan’s earlier concept, ‘regional security complexes:’ “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another.”55 Buzan contends that the interaction of states in a geographic area under anarchy will create security interdependence between proximate states making it impossible to conceive the security of one country without considering the security of another. Geographic proximity is important in that it is where primary threats emerge and are tackled.56
Lake and Morgan share the basic thrust of Buzan’s original argument and recognize the importance of mutual interaction and security interdependence in defining a region. They elaborate it further through Lake’s ingenious concept borrowed from economics, security externality, which come to replace interaction.57 One of their
55 Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 106. 56 Buzan and Waever apply this regional perspective to their securitization theory, by maintaining that “substantial parts of the securitization and desecuritization processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters.” Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 44. Others also expand on the role of geographic proximity, as the earlier review of definitions showed. For instance, contributors to a volume edited by Wriggins believe that under anarchy states in a region are locked into a distinct and local self-help system which they call ‘regional security systems. Most importantly, the imperatives of such systems act in a way to limit the range of policy choices available to state leaders. See: Wriggins, "Scope and Purpose," 8. Also see: Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). These scholars add behavioral constraint on units as an important element of regional systems. Lemke, offering a revised version of power transition theory to explain nongreat power cases, introduces an alternative concept, local hierarchies. His operational definition of a local hierarchy also rests on proximity and interaction. In line with his goal, however, he focuses on “the ability to interact militarily” that approximates the two concepts. As a result, a local hierarchy is a group of states that “take each other’s likely courses of action into account when formulating military contingency plans,” or their foreign policies. Lemke, Regions of War, 71. 57 Lake, "Regional Security Complexes," 48-52; on externality versus interaction, see: 51. 94
purposes behind suggesting this new concept as the main ingredient of definition is
Lake’s contention that earlier conceptions of regions, including Buzan’s, fail “to
distinguish adequately how regional interactions are distinct from global interactions.”58
They define a RSC “as a set of states continually affected by one or more security
externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area.”59 Because they put the
explanatory weight on security externalities, they downplay the role of geographical
proximity as a condition for inclusion of a state into a region. As a result, membership
into a regional complex is determined by whether a state is affected by transborder yet
local security threats, which implies that a state’s ability to project power in a region will
count it as a member. As a result, they allow for the possibility of overlapping regions in
that states may be part of different security complexes simultaneously. More importantly,
they are inclined to view great powers as members - not outsiders - of different security
complexes in which they have interests at stake and can exercise power. The key here is
that such great power action is driven not by global-system but regional incentives.60
Buzan and Waever disagree with this move, and find it analytically problematic
for two reasons.61 First, they charge the contributors to the Lake and Morgan volume
with conflating the global and regional levels into one by treating great powers as
members of different regions. Second, they oppose an overlapping understanding of
security complexes and insist on defining regions exclusively. Therefore, they reassert
geographical proximity as the defining feature of a region and maintain that the world is
composed of mutually exclusive regions. They define the cases where outside actors -
58 Ibid., 48. 59 Lake and Morgan, "The New Regionalism," 12. 60 Patrick M. Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders, 28-29. 61 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 80-81; 48-49. 95 great powers - are involved in a regional complex as ‘penetration’ or ‘overlay’ rather than treating those external actors as members of a complex. If a state is closely intertwined with two or more regions, they do not allow for overlapping membership and instead describe such states as insulator.
The Notion of Region to be Used in this Study
My approach to regions strikes a middle ground between the two positions.
Great Power Involvement: Between Geography and Functionalism
I agree with Buzan and Waever’s concern to maintain the analytical distinction between regional and global levels, and reasserting the role of geography. Therefore, their question is well taken: “if remote great powers are ‘in’ the regions, how can one differentiate between global and regional level security dynamics in order to investigate their interplay?”62 As they rightly argue, being physically part of a region makes a difference in terms of policy options available to states: whereas outside actors have the choice to pull out -or be excluded-, truly ‘regional’ countries are locked ‘in’ their regions.
Hence, the latter cannot escape the security externalities while the former can do so when push comes to shove.
As true as this may be, however, I am not sure if the concern to maintain the analytical distinction between the levels warrants their extreme attitude of sticking dogmatically to a territorial and geopolitical notion of international politics and regions.
Based on Lake and Morgan’s functional approach, we can develop a more moderate way to conceptualize the involvement of great powers in different regions without conflating
62 Ibid., 81. 96
regional and global levels. This perspective prevents us from going to Buzan and
Waever’s extreme position on geographical contiguity.63
First, following the functional approach to security complexes, one could
differentiate between types of involvement by global actors in different regions. If a great
power’s involvement in the region is sparked by truly local threats and is carried out in a
way to generate security externalities only for the actors in the particular region without
altering the balance of power among the great powers, then it might be more appropriate
to treat it as a member of the regional security complex.64 The case for treating ‘outside’
powers as members will be further strengthened in situations where the vested interests of
outside powers in a region are so high that their withdrawal from that region becomes
almost impossible. Further, the structure of a region in terms of whether it is contiguous
to a great power or whether it ‘physically’ hosts one or more great powers or no great
power at all have to be taken into account in deciding how to conceptualize the
involvement of great powers in a region. As Ayoob correctly observes, “great power
involvement based on close identification with a region in which it is not physically
located has been the exception rather than the rule.”65 Such a high degree of penetration
which makes withdrawal from a particular region impossible because a great power’s
security and prosperity are closely tied to a distant region is a rare occasion, maybe
except for the US involvement in Europe.
63 Nonetheless, we should beware the other extreme of Lake and Morgan’s functionalist argument. They argue for treating great powers as members of each region in which they have durable “military forces, major security commitments, and profound security involvements over a lengthy period.” Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes," 30. If we follow this reasoning strictly, we may end up losing sight of the global systemic level. 64 The same reasoning is also used by Lake and Morgan as a justification for their argument against Buzan and Waever’s overlay argument. Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes," 28. Buzan and Waever appear to miss this point. 65 Ayoob, "From Regional System," 252-253. 97
Moreover, the degree to which a region is integrated into the global system has to be taken into account in separating the dynamics of regional and global levels. To the extent that a region plays a critical role in global politics and has more than one great power involved, then great power involvement in such cases will inevitably affect and be affected by the global level dynamics. Therefore, when outside involvement creates externalities for the international system at large, it may be more appropriate to operationalize it as an instance of penetration or overlay, in which case preserving the analytical leverage of levels of analysis becomes easier. In contrast, when a great power exerts influence in a region without altering the global balance of power - as in the US involvement in Latin America - then it might be more appropriate to drop the overlay argument and start conceptualizing such involvement in terms of ‘membership.’
Therefore, the role of the United States in Latin America and Russia in the CIS, or the role of the United States in Europe will be different from the role of various great powers in the Middle East, which begs for a more differentiated analysis and speaks against
Buzan and Waever’s rigid commitment to territoriality.
Regarding the involvement of great powers in specific regions, in most cases, it will be more appropriate to view them as ‘external actors’ which penetrate into different regional orders – overlay - at varying degrees. Great powers may engage and disengage in a security complex but ‘regional countries’ are bound to remain in their locality.
Moreover, even if we accept that great powers respond to local threats, we have to remind ourselves that they have linkages in mind: the balance of power among great powers themselves and their commitments in other regions of the world. Since they have interests worldwide, they have to rank order different regions. Consequently, the 98 externalities in one region may not have the immediate effect on them that they would have on the local countries.
Hence, treating great powers as external actors is more relevant and also allows for drawing a distinction between the regional and global levels of analysis. This is also relevant for the research question in this study: how the dynamics between global and regional levels affect secondary states’ foreign policy behavior. Even if the United States is deeply involved in a region, its relationship to a secondary state will have a dimension apart from that particular regional context. At the global level, the systemic distribution of power, i.e., the balance of power between secondary states and the great powers and among great powers, will shape secondary states’ policy options.
Overlapping vs. Exclusive Conceptualizations
The other point made by Buzan and Waever that regions should be defined exclusively so that RSCs can be separated from each other also needs some elaboration.
They believe this move is necessary to “cast maximum light on the distinctiveness of security dynamics at each level and within each RSC.”66 Although this decision might be useful to investigate each region as a distinct subject, the problem arises in the case of countries located at the border of more than one RSC. They seek to avoid this problem by calling these cases as insulator, i.e., “a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back.”67 But if a country is strongly embedded in different RSCs given its geographic position, and is affected closely by the security externalities in those regions where its presence is taken into account in the
66 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 82. 67 Ibid., 41. 99
calculations of other members of the RSC, there is no point in imposing such rigid
categorizations. If the two security orders are distinct anyway, the inability of an insulator
state to merge these two worlds into one is no ground to claim that it is member to none.
Therefore, on the question of overlapping vs. exclusive conceptions of regions, I
believe it is warranted to adopt a pragmatic approach and subscribe to the former notion.
As Wriggins elaborates elegantly, drawing the boundaries between regions might be
difficult by its very nature.68 A state may be responding simultaneously to threats and
opportunities emanating from two different security complexes which are clearly
differentiated from each other in the sense that the security situation in one does not
generate externalities for the other. In such situations there is no reason to stop thinking
that a state cannot be part of two clusters of states with distinct regional security systems.
If this is what its geography meant for the state, so be it.69 Otherwise, it will be difficult
to understand a state’s policy on different issues, for in every issue it may have to play a
different role given the nature of the particular regional system involved.
Systemic vs. Ideational Conceptualizations
As discussed earlier, another major definitional issue concerns ideational vs.
material conceptions of regions. The key question is whether purposeful action on the
part of members to create a regional order or to conceive themselves as constituting a
shared regional identity is necessary to define an interdependent set of states as
constituting a region. Most treatments of regions influenced by systems approach believe
68 Wriggins, "Scope and Purpose," 13-14. 69 As Brecher argues, states are located at different levels and are part of various associations. In addition to their membership in the global system, they might be members of one or more subordinate systems. Because “different actions and decisions derive from different associations; it is useful to separate and correlate policy acts with specific membership roles.” Brecher, "International Relations," 219. 100 that such a self-understanding of regionness is not a necessary condition. While Lake and
Morgan maintain this perspective,70 Buzan and Waever have a different take. Without denying the role of the materialist elements such as distribution of power and territoriality, they espouse a constructivist understanding of regions and emphasize that regions are socially constructed by their members, consciously or not, hence their contention that they synthesize neorealism with securitization theory.71 I will subscribe to a functionalist- systemic perspective and will not require a cognitive understanding on the part of units to perceive themselves as parts of a region. The mere recognition of other states in weighing the pros and cons of various strategies available to states will be sufficient to qualify such states as constituting a region.
Region as Understood in This Study
Based on the foregoing account, the concept of region that will constitute the basis of the regional level of analysis in this study will be understood as follows. Regions form a separate system between the states and the global system, binding together a group of states into a structure of security interdependence. In line with Lake and
Morgan, as well as Lemke, I will mainly adopt a functional understanding of regions in that a region is understood as comprising a set of states connected together by dense interaction which makes them vulnerable to security externalities generated in the given zone and forces them to include other members in the calculations for choosing between alternative foreign policy strategies. Nonetheless, Buzan and Waever’s emphasis on
70 Lake, "Regional Security Complexes," 48. 71 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 48, 13. Acharya, however, finds this syncretism problematic. Acharya, "The Emerging Regional," 636. He instead seeks to develop an agency-oriented perspective that explains endogenous construction of regions. 101 geographical notion of regions cannot be discarded altogether, for, in most cases, such mutual interdependencies exist among states clustered in a proximate geographical area.
The key here is to focus on the critical concept of proximity rather than a fixed geography. Therefore, though acknowledging the importance of territoriality, I do not necessarily take existing geographical categories used to divide the globe into different regional zones as the basis of an inquiry into regional context of state behavior. Rather, in analyzing each case, I will identify the relevant regional security context and what states to include in this cluster.
Summary
To summarize, the causal influences realist theories of international relations discuss under “the systemic influences on state behavior” in fact operate at the regional rather than global level. Security interdependence and mutual interaction that cluster a group of states operating under anarchy into a distinct system take place more in proximate locales than around the entire globe. In particular, the security dilemma under anarchy can take place among states whose security is sufficiently integrated to each other through proximity. The mutual interactions of constituent units generate a security environment which helps us identify a group of states as forming a region. This region, in turn, constitutes a relevant security context that needs to be taken into account in analyzing how state leaders formulate and implement their countries’ foreign policies.
The goal of the next chapter will be to offer a framework that will help examine the interplay between the regional level and domestic and global levels. The regional context of state behavior will be incorporated into the two-stage theoretical model in two 102 distinct ways. First, at the policy formulation stage, I focus on the regional interests of secondary powers in response to the threats and opportunities from either other regional actors or global powers penetrating into the specific RSC. Second, I study regional costs as a distinct intervening variable that acts as a constraint on the foreign policy executive at the policy implementation stage. CHAPTER 4
A REGIONALLY-DIFFERENTIATED
FOREIGN POLICY MODEL
This chapter suggests a foreign policy model to explain the behavior of secondary states in the context of military conflicts that involve extra-regional global powers and directly affect their national interests. The discussion in the previous chapter sought to make a case for including regional context into the study of secondary state behavior. The analysis of foreign policy behavior is complicated by the myriad roles played by the foreign policy executive (FPE). Situated at the intersection of domestic, regional and global levels, FPE acts on multiple influences simultaneously. It makes intuitive sense to argue for taking those various factors into account for a complete explanation of state conduct. The challenge, however, is suggesting a framework that incorporates those multiple levels without losing parsimony. A multilevel framework requires elaboration of how domestic, regional, and global factors are related to each other in a logical causal chain.1 However, as the literature review in the third chapter also underlined, except for a few studies, most research on regions does not suggest a coherent framework of analysis
1 For a similar critique, see: Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11. Zakaria (1992: 198) argues that “a good account of a nation’s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of policy can be explained by what factors.” Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 198. 104
that explicitly identify variables at each level, how they are related to each other and,
eventually, how they lead to behavioral outcomes.2
The framework I suggest here follows the insights of systemic theorizing and
gives causal priority to the external environment. In line with the neoclassical realist
research program, this study posits that “relative power distributions and trends set broad
parameters for states’ external behavior.”3 However, it also recognizes that “the impact
of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic
pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.”4 For a study
that follows those basic premises, the challenge is to identify the imperatives set by the
structural distribution of power, which exerts the primary causal influence of state
behavior, and the relevant intervening variables that mitigate the influence of global
systemic conditions.
As the discussion in Chapter 2 emphasized, many realists maintain that, under
unipolarity, given the concentration of capabilities in one pole, bandwagoning emerges as
the predicted state response. However, this study argues that polarity predicts
bandwagoning, but it fails to account for the full range of empirical outcomes. In
particular, systemic distribution of power cannot explain: a) variations in bandwagoning
behavior, and b) whether secondary states will bandwagon at all. To explain different
2 For instance, Lake and Morgan acknowledge the complexity of such an endeavor and how daunting a task it might turn out to be. They suggest that this could be accomplished through a three-level game but fall short of developing one. Instead they suggest extension of the study of regions in the direction of multi- level games. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, "The New Regionalism in Security Affairs," in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 14. 3 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 4 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 146. 105 forms of bandwagoning behavior, as well as appropriate boundary conditions for bandwagoning hypothesis, one primary goal of this study is to develop a theory of foreign policy.
In this chapter, specifically, I suggest a regionally-differentiated foreign policy model by accomplishing two tasks: a) delineating my independent variable at the global level and intervening variables located at domestic and regional levels, b) and developing more elaborate causal linkages between the systemic incentives and my dependent variable, i.e., different foreign policy outcomes in the form of secondary state bandwagoning. Moreover, I argue that for a proper understanding of state behavior and policy outcomes, a theory of foreign policy needs to examine not only complex relationships at multiple levels, but also disaggregate the different stages of the foreign policy making process. Therefore, the framework I propose consists of two stages: a)
‘policy formulation,’ which concerns preference formation in response to the external environment;5 and b) ‘policy implementation’ which accounts for strategic interaction vis-à-vis relevant domestic, regional and global audiences to enact policies so selected.6
In essence, what I am suggesting is an alternative conceptualization of the foreign policy process, which explains how the influence of structural distribution of power is filtered through the intermediation of domestic and regional level process variables at different stages.
5 Here, I identify the factors that account for how FPE assesses the country’s national interests in response to the relevant international environment of threats and opportunities, and devise corresponding foreign policy strategies. 6 Here, in addition to explaining the role of the global distribution of power as the independent variable, I also analyze the domestic and regional constraints on the FPE when it embark on implementing foreign policy strategies. 106
The chapter consists of three sections. In the following pages, first, I will discuss the nature of the state in relation to the international system and the regional security complex (RSC) to set the context of the analysis in this research. I will also discuss the peculiar features of regional powers to facilitate my inquiry into secondary state foreign policy behavior. Second, I will show how FPE, situated at the intersection of domestic, regional and global levels, pursues a variety of goals through their actions on different levels. Moreover, I delineate the universe of cases to which the model is applicable - the cases in which FPE promotes regional interests through their interactions at global, regional and domestic levels. In the third and main section, I introduce the two-stage foreign policy model.
The Conception of the State and the International System
Foreign policy behavior can be described as “the individual policies a state adopts in pursuit of interests.”7 An explanation of state behavior requires understanding of what state interests are, and how they are related to the selection of corresponding strategies.
Before discussing these issues, we first need a theory of state action in relation to the relevant domestic and external environments. In this section, therefore, I will discuss the conceptions of the international system and the state, which constitute the basis of the case analyses in the subsequent chapters. The concept of RSC, which forms the basis of the regionally-differentiated framework, has been already introduced in Chapter 3.
7 Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan, A Theory of Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3. 107
State-centric Approach
The regionally-differentiated model being suggested here is both state-centric and
systemic. It is state-centric for two intertwined reasons: it looks at the state as an actor in
the international system and the state as an actor in domestic politics. First, it treats the
group as the major actor of international politics; hence, the main focus of this model is
on the nation-state, the founding block of modern international relations, and its actions
in the realm of foreign policy. The state possesses national interests reflective of the
collective preferences of myriad of individuals and domestic actors, interacting with other
similar entities.8 Second, it disaggregates the nation-state into the state and society at the
domestic level, and places the analytical emphasis on the former. The state has interests,
goals, and preferences that cannot be reduced to those of its units. However, both in the
domestic and international realms the state, as an abstract entity, acts only through its
national executive or the government. The state, as represented by the national executive,
enjoys a large degree of autonomy vis-à-vis society in terms of defining its own goals and
interests; hence, the conception of the state in this research is top-down.9 Nonetheless, it
is also the case that various societal actors make up the domestic political environment in
which the state operates. Whereas domestic groups are mainly driven by a concern to
advance their “personal, parochial, or domestic political motivations,” the executive,
given its control over “all the relevant information available on international strategic
affairs,” represents state interests and “determines its preferences largely in accordance
8 David A. Lake, "The State and International Relations," in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 42-43. 9 Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction," 25-28. Here, like neoclassical realists, I depart from neorealism and draw on classical realism. Since they focus on structural sources of international outcomes, neorealists tend to collapse the state and the nation-state together, with the result that they disregard domestic politics and the dynamics of state-society relations. Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 460. 108
with international constraints and incentives.”10 Hence, the state can be treated “as
distinct from society, with distinct preferences.”11
Although the major analytical focus is placed on the role played by the national
executive and other state organs tasked with foreign policy making, and this research
treats those organs as relatively autonomous,12 it also recognizes the limitations on their
autonomy. The autonomy of the state is constrained domestically by the fact that, in
conducting foreign policy, the FPE has to draw on society for resources and legitimacy.
In the domestic political system, the executive is merely one of many political actors that
harbor their own preferences. Given the domestic distributional consequences of external
strategies, just as FPE has its assessments of the country’s national interests, so will other
societal groups. In other words, although the executive is privileged in terms of officially
devising and implementing a country’s foreign policy strategies, this situation does not
negate the fact that societal groups will maintain an interest in the conduct of external
relations, and have their own input into the foreign policy processes based on their own
assessment of the external environment. Consequently, society’s response to their FPE’s
call for support will depend on whether the policies formulated by the executive
correspond to the societal groups’ own evaluations of national interests. To the extent that
assessments of international conditions diverge, FPE will face difficulties in acting
autonomously.
10 Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, 172. 11 Ibid. Also, see: Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, 203, 224-225. 12 In that sense, this research is in line with the neoclassical realists’ search for ‘bringing the statesmen/ leaders back in.’ Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 109
Systemic Model
The model developed here is, at the same time, systemic. What does a systemic or
third-image explanation mean? It basically maintains a commitment to the realist notion
that the forces driving state behavior are located at the systemic level.13 Following the
realist premises on international politics, this study treats systemic anarchy and
distribution of power, i.e., polarity, as the major elements of the international system
which, in turn, condition state behavior. The enduring power of anarchy and uncertainty
makes the international realm one of self-help in which conflict and war remain constant
possibilities. Consequently, states struggle for security and power, and are forced to
navigate the uncertain waters of the anarchic international environment in order to uphold
their national interests.14
As Levy summarizes, “if a state acts on the basis of national-interest calculations,
defined in terms of threats and opportunities in its external environment, we say that the
state is influenced by system-level factors.”15 Therefore, in the following sections, I will
proceed on the assumption that operating within an anarchic international system,
national executives seek to uphold the collective interests, i.e., external goals, of the state
in response to the systemic influences. Although there is an objective distribution of
power at the international level, it can only set broad parameters for state action, and
alone cannot explain the entire range of state behavior. Rather, threats and opportunities
13 In other words, on the question of the direction of the causal arrows across the domestic-international divide, this model gives causal primacy to the external structural environment. 14 Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory," 459.; Rose, "Neoclassical Realism"; Randall L. Schweller, "The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t’ Arise," in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction," 28-31. 15 Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War," in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 21. 110
engendered by the changes in the international environment are the effective cause of
state behavior and they can explain variations in alignment behavior.16
I will derive the inventory of state goals and corresponding strategies from the
systemic conditions to which states are subject. However, any inquiry into identifying the
national interests of states will have to encounter a perennial debate within realism: the
implications of anarchy on state motivations and goals, and, consequently, behavior.
There is no consensus on the primary goal(s) of states under anarchic international
system, but a broad division exists among realists, which posits survival/security
(security-maximization) against power/prestige (power-maximization) goals. In more
concrete terms, the distinction is between responding to threats vs. opportunities. As I
discussed in great length in Chapter 2, the debate between defensive and offensive
realists emphasizes that foreign policy behavior is shaped by a concern to evade threats or
a desire to achieve gains.17 To capture the entire range of state motivations in a theory of
foreign policy, I will argue later in this chapter that states mainly pursue two sets of
external goals: security-maximization in response to threats, and power-maximization in
response to opportunities. Consequently, in its external relations, the major concern of a
secondary power is to deter threats through defensive strategies and to take advantage of
opportunities through offensive strategies.
16 Since I look at one type of bandwagoning behavior only, I hold threat/opportunity constant. 17 As Taliaferro notes, the divide between offensive realism and defensive realism is a reflection of this “fundamental divergence on the implications of anarchy.” Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/2001): 134. 111
State Types: Regional States
At this stage, it is also necessary to clarify what is meant by regional powers or secondary powers whose foreign policy behavior is the subject of the current study. Even after the movement toward bringing the state back in to security studies, the concept of the state remains underdeveloped in realism.18 A particularly relevant question concerns the relationship between the types of states and their alliance behavior. Neorealist theory uses the structural distribution of power and relative state capabilities to differentiate between states, offering distinctions along small vs. great powers. Sometimes, middle powers are also offered as a third category. Yet such distinctions based on the conception of a single planetary scale international system are generally insufficient to capture the empirical reality of state behavior. As I will argue in the following paragraphs, by categorizing states based on regional-level markers, we can gain better insights into the behavior of secondary states.
In line with this study’s argument for disaggregating the international environment into regional and global levels, there is also a need to develop elaborate conceptualization of regional powers, and situate their behavior against the background of different influences stemming from global and regional levels. This study argues that external environment, particularly relative power, conditions state behavior. If we evaluate states on a planetary scale, a secondary state may rank as an insignificant player on the global distribution of power, which would lead us to a certain set of behavioral assumptions as far as its relations with global powers are concerned. However, the same state may rank as a preeminent actor in the regional balance of power, defining the regional polarity. Such a positioning of a secondary state in its proximate environment
18 Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction," 13. 112
will lead us to a different set of behavioral assumptions in its relations with other states in
the region and with global powers.
Given my focus on the cases in which secondary powers interact militarily with
the extraregional great powers and, most importantly, unipolar leader, Buzan and
Waever’s suggestion of a three-tiered scheme is particularly relevant: superpowers, great
powers and regional powers. Superpowers possess capabilities at a broad spectrum and
they exercise power across the whole of the international system, including various
regions.19 Great powers do not have such big capabilities in all sectors, nor are they
present in all aspects and areas of the international system. Their distinguishing character
is that “they are responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the
present and near-future distribution of power.”20 To put it differently, “a great power is
treated in the calculations of other major powers as if it has the clear economic, military,
and political potential to bid for superpower status in the short or medium term.”21
Together, superpowers and great powers make up global level players.
Regional powers or secondary powers control considerable capabilities in their
regions, but they cannot exercise influence at the global level. This is first reflected in
how they are treated by global players. Global powers interact with the regional powers
in particular regions and take the latter’s capabilities and influence into consideration in
those regions only. What differentiates regional states from great powers is that the
former “are … excluded from the higher-level calculations of system polarity whether or
19 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34-37. 20 Ibid., 35. 21 Ibid. 113
not they think of themselves as deserving a higher ranking.”22 In contrast, in their own
regions, regional powers are the “local great powers” that define the polarity of the
regional security complex. To put it differently, whereas superpowers can project power
across the globe and in all major regions, great powers mainly project power in their own
regions, and to a limited extent, outside their regions, and regional powers project force
within their own geographic proximity. To those three, one can also add small powers
“states that cannot project power, that cannot provide for their own security, except vis-à-
vis each other, and that cannot, even in coalition with one another, contest or defend
against states of the other types.”23
It is this dual positioning of secondary powers in regional and global levels that
needs to be taken into account for a proper understanding of their foreign policy
behavior. In terms of their international roles, secondary powers abhor more ambitious
goals than smaller powers in their regional subsystem, sometimes striving to achieve
regional hegemony. As Ayoob notes, in some cases, the actual or latent presence of a
“pivotal regional power that is often perceived as having hegemonic, or at least
managerial, aspirations within the region”24 might be taken as the evidence of the
existence of a security complex.25 Secondary states inhabiting a region that occupies a
major role in global politics may become involved in global level developments. They
probably will not be able to shape global level dynamics and, in the case of a
confrontation with global powers, they are likely to be out-powered. Nonetheless, since
22 Ibid., 37. 23 Brian L. Job, "Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders, 178. 24 Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order," Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 253. 25 Depending on the number of such actors in a region, or whether one has already achieved regional hegemony, the structure of a regional system can be determined. 114 they are the preeminent actors in their own locale, global powers penetrating into different regions will have to take them into account. They are, thus, often subject to the dynamics of global politics when major powers penetrate into different regions, or engage in proxy wars by throwing their weight behind rival regional powers. Unlike small powers, however, secondary powers will not accept imposition without putting up resistance and seek to avoid domination by global powers to protect their regional interests.
The domestic attributes of secondary states also are likely to differ from those of small powers and global powers. On the one hand, compared to small powers, regional powers would rank as ‘strong states,’ possessing more established state traditions and better tools to act autonomously from society. Their relative success in pacifying domestic threats and achieving mobilization and extractive capabilities will enable them to play more extended foreign policy goals in their proximate external environment. On the other hand, compared to global powers, secondary states have rather limited latent and actual capabilities and may depend on external assistance to realize their domestic and regional objectives.
The international roles and the domestic attributes of the regional powers discussed here, thus have important implications for our discussion on secondary power bandwagoning. On the one hand, their limited capabilities compared to great powers, might force them to bandwagon with extra-regional global powers, for they rely on such partnership to realize their ambitious objectives. On the other hand, their self-perception as significant regional players will force them to filter their cooperation with the global powers through the prism of their own regional priorities. Consequently they will have a 115
unique mix of positive and negative incentives, as they are forced by the global dynamics
to engage in various forms of bandwagoning strategies. The foreign policy model to be
offered in this chapter will integrate these unique characteristics into the explanation of
secondary state bandwagoning behavior.
Why a State-centric and Systemic Theory?
The preference for a state-centric and systemic approach is justified by
substantive and pragmatic reasons. In substantive terms, the specific research questions
of this study call for such an approach. First, this study examines state behavior in
situations of conflict where “high politics” concerns are likely to predominate. When a
nation-state is on the brink of war, in the short run, immediate threats or opportunities
will receive the utmost priority in a national executive’s policy agenda, forcing it to
mobilize the nation’s resources towards the defense of the national interests. In those
high-threat environments where stakes are high, moreover, FPE is more inclined to
ignore domestic political interests, and resist the influences of domestic groups.26
Another reason that justifies the state-centric approach is a long-running realist argument
that officials in charge of national security policies have access to privileged information
about international conditions compared to ordinary citizens or societal groups.27 Given
the nature of the cases, analytically it is safe to proceed on the assumption that external
factors drive the behavior of statesmen.
26 Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and," 186. Conversely, in periods of relative security, the leaders might be more attuned to follow domestic preferences. 27 Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction," 25; Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource," 224-225. 116
Second, this study deals with secondary powers. The discipline is divided over the
influence of systemic and domestic level constraints on different types of states. Most
discussions on this subject, particularly in the neorealist tradition, focus on great powers
vs. small powers.28 A line of argument, which is also embraced by this study, maintains
that middle or secondary powers are more exposed to the constraints of the international
system, which makes it even more urgent for them to manage the challenges of balancing
the domestic and external influences.29 As discussed before, given the dynamics of the
tension between their capabilities and self-ascribed international roles, as well as their
unique positioning at the intersection of regional and global levels, secondary powers are
more likely to experience the challenges of the external structural conditions.
Third, this choice is justified because of the ontological assumptions of this study,
borrowed from realist research agenda. For realists, preferences are exogenous, meaning
they are given by the external environment. This contrasts liberals’ argument that
preferences are endogenous, meaning state goals are products of domestic processes.30
Through its emphasis on the primacy of systemic imperatives, neoclassical realism also
proceeds from an environment-based ontology. As will be discussed below, I will deduce
28 Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard," British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 (1995). 29 C. Gerry Alons, "Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints," Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 3 (2007): 212. 30 A liberal theory will seek to deduce goals from the preferences of societal groups. Such an approach will definitely fall outside the contours of this study because it will run against the role ascribed here to state executives. As Sterling-Folker argues, realism “assumes that the environment in which actors exist is a primary determinant for their interests, behaviors, and outcomes.” Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and DomesticLevel Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 4. Alternatively, Schweller, another realist, deduces state preferences from the identity/type of states by differentiating them as pro status quo versus revisionist. To maintain the state-centrism and parsimony, however, he takes state identity as given and cannot explain what makes a state revisionist or status quo-oriented, or how those identities change over time. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994). 117
the goals, interests and particular strategies that states employ from the nature of the
international environment.31
Last but not least, several analytical and pragmatic reasons also justify following
a state-centric approach. As Lake argues, state-centric theory enables parsimony and
provides researchers with analytical leverage.32 Similarly, drawing a distinction between
national security executives and other domestic actors comes with analytical advantages.
For instance, it can enable an examination of the conditions under which domestic or
international influences condition state behavior and when domestic actors can exert
influence on national security policies.33 This approach is in line with the level of
analysis perspective that is followed in this study. As Levy underlines, a level of analysis
framework can be used to study actions of any actor, with an important caveat: “the
framework assumes that the actor in question is sufficiently coherent that it has a
decision-making body that has the authority to act on behalf of the group.”34 This
research’s treatment of the FPE as a coherent decision-making body representing state
interests makes such an inquiry possible.
FPE at the Nexus of Domestic and International Environments
For succinct analysis of state behavior, a good theory of foreign policy has to
identify its scope conditions - in this case, the type of goals political actors pursue and the
31 For some realists, ‘top-down’ or ‘outside-in’ conceptions of the international system and the state imply that “(s)ystemic forces shape domestic processes within states… Put differently, unit-level variables are themselves dependent variables of prior structural conditions.” Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource," 211. No such assumption about the source of the internal traits of states is made in this study. The influence of the systemic conditions is limited to choice of national preferences only. The preferences of myriad domestic actors may or may not reflect structural conditions. 32 Lake, "The State and." 33 Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic," 172-173. 34 Levy, "International Sources of," 22. 118
specific environment to which those actors are believed to respond. As far as their role in
the making of foreign policy behavior is concerned, this model assumes that national
executives are positioned at the nexus of internal and external environments. To
understand the goals states pursue and the environments in which they act, we have to
remind ourselves of another point made earlier about the dual roles of statesmen. Since
the nation-state is composed of a nation and a government apparatus that is distinct from
society, two analytical demarcation lines can be drawn between the interests of the state
and the interest of statesmen on the one hand, and the interests of the state at home and
the interests of the state abroad, on the other. First, given their unique role, the statesmen
may seek to promote different goals, and they may do so simultaneously. On the one
hand, as representatives of the state, they pursue national goals. On the other hand, as one
of many actors struggling for power in domestic politics, they seek to realize parochial
group or individual interests. Second, given their position, statesmen enact policies at
both domestic and international - regional and global - levels. Therefore, the FPE’s
unique positioning and role make national executives Janus-faced, acting on different
levels to realize manifold motivations.35
It was commonplace to assume that state leaders acted on their individual/group
interests on the domestic level, and acted on national interests on the international level.
In other words, they are believed to promote interests of the governing coalition in
domestic politics, and interests of the nation-state in international politics. However, after
the discipline of international relations recognized the permeability of different levels of
analysis and started to incorporate the notion of executives advancing manifold agendas
35 Steven E. Lobell, "Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, 43. 119 into theoretical models, many studies have explored mixed patterns of relationships between the environments in which the statesmen act and the interests they pursue. It is now widely accepted that national executives may act on goals at one level, yet seek to realize them through their behavior on another level.36 This reasoning underpins various studies that employ multilevel or nested games frameworks to explain alliances. These studies are particularly useful for demonstrating how what seems to be an odd outcome at one level (game) could make sense when what goes on at other levels (games) is taken into account. The thrust of these game theoretical models is that they draw attention to a major challenge in studying foreign policy behavior in the context of complex interactions across multiple levels: the need to identify the primary game being played by the actors in question.37
As the chapter on regional level of analysis emphasized, this study argues for disaggregating the external environment into regional and global levels.38 This alternative
36 Lobell contends “Leaders often act on one level, but the target is to influence the outcome on another level.” Ibid., 46-47. Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry argue that “states may both respond to international events through domestic actions and attempt to solve domestic problems through international actions.” Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory," 471. To put it more specifically, for instance, statesmen may conduct their country’s foreign policy on the international level to advance their parochial interests in domestic politics. Conversely, they may initiate various projects at home to advance the state’s foreign policy goals in the external environment. For an attempt to develop a framework to explain when one set of factors will be prioritized, see: Alons, "Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints." A slightly different question concerns the relative causal importance of domestic and systemic level variables. For a neoclassical study that seeks to explain those differences, see: Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic." 37 Identifying the primary game is also important for a proper categorization of alliance behavior as bandwagoning or balancing. For instance, a state’s decision to cooperate with a powerful external power might appear as bandwagoning, but if this decision is driven by a concern to respond to domestic threats, it might be considered as balancing. Alternatively, even at the international level, states might achieve more than one goal in one move simultaneously: They might ally with a stronger party to deter threat coming from a smaller party. Although that decision appears like bandwagoning, it might still be considered as balancing if the real stimulant of alliance behavior is taken into account. Those nuances will be taken into account in the typology of bandwagoning behavior which will be offered later in this chapter. 38 In that regard, the framework suggested here is differentiated from the approach that otherwise comes closest to mine: Miller, States, Nations, and. Miller tends to merge domestic and regional levels together and examines how they together interact with the global level. In the present study, in contrast, I tend to combine the regional and global levels together as part of the ‘external environment,’ which helps me 120 conceptualization suggests that a state may have distinct interests at both levels, in addition to domestic interests. Consequently, we obtain several combinations of the relationship between the type of interests statesmen pursue and arenas in which they act to realize those interests. These combinations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 illustrates possible combinations between the interests the FPE might follow and the primary and secondary areas in which it acts to realize their goals. The
FPE operates on domestic, regional and global levels to realize various objectives, including the promotion of the country’s foreign policy objectives. More importantly, it could act on one level to advance objectives on quite another level. For instance, state leaders may seek to promote their group (governmental) interests through their interactions on the regional or global levels. Or, alternatively, they may advance the country’s regional interests through their actions on domestic or global levels.
Table 1: State interests and areas of state action
Interests pursued (Stage-1) Domestic Regional Global (governmental) (national) (national) Domestic X Y- secondary X interv. var. Level acted on Regional X Y- secondary X (Stage-2) interv. var. Global X Y- primary X indep. var.
maintain the distinction between internal/domestic and external/international levels. Levy also suggests that it might “be useful to distinguish between global and regional systems,” but does not elaborate on that point. Levy, "International Sources of," 21. 121
Given the particular research questions of this study, I will focus on cases in which FPE targets primary outcomes on the regional level through cooperation with extra-regional global powers. In other words, this research examines cases in which a secondary power acts primarily on the global level by cooperating with the United States, but its target, i.e., the main game being played, is to realize regional interests. In this conceptualization, FPE still operates on domestic or regional levels but these levels serve as secondary arenas. The two dimensions of Table 1, regional interests and primary and secondary areas of state action, will be discussed in greater detail.
Identifying Regional Interests
The first challenge is to determine what level is causally prior in explaining the source of state motivations in general and secondary state bandwagoning behavior in particular. I will argue that regional actors respond mainly to local developments, and
FPE primarily advances its country’s regional interests in response to the threats and opportunities from other regional countries or extraregional global powers.
Why Study Regional Goals?
The conventional distinction between the domestic and external realms is a useful starting point to discuss alternative approaches to studying state motivations. One approach would be to put emphasis on the domestic level and posit that FPE initiates the regional and global level policies to achieve their national-political goals. Such an approach will prioritize domestic process over external environment and deduce the 122 preferences or motivations of the executive from the executive’s domestic role.39 In line with the systemic approach outlined previously, however, this research looks at the cases in which the main game being played is external, i.e., regional or global. As discussed before, while studying cases of “high politics” where external imperatives and the impetus for upholding national interests are pronounced, proceeding on the assumption that states act on external goals is justified.40
Therefore, it is more appropriate to look at the related question that asks whether the external interests of a secondary state are primarily regional or global. On this question, I argue that secondary states pursue regional interests. In most cases primacy of regional level is self-evident. Given its power projection capabilities, a secondary state has narrow reach in its own region. Therefore, it can only set limited goals for itself, and interact with states in its immediate neighborhood.41
39 For instance, the idea that national security policy might target domestic audiences underpins the diversionary theory of war: Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989). This second-image approach is commonly adopted by liberal theories of international relations. Especially research that seeks to explain foreign policy choices by referring to the profiles of domestic coalitions and their sectoral interests falls under this category. For a review of this scholarship, see: Colin Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, 142. In the study of alliances, one can identify the influence of this tradition in the works of scholars who demonstrate forcefully that the concern to remain in power may force leaders to enter into external alliances, which may provide them with additional resources against their domestic rivals. Several studies also explain balancing and bandwagoning behavior in reference to second-image reasoning. See the review in Chapter 2. 40 Moreover, since secondary powers are relatively successful in maintaining domestic order and stability, internal threats to regime survival might not be as acute as in the case of small powers. Therefore, they are better positioned than small powers to embark on ambitious regional policies in response to external stimuli. 41 Also, as will be discussed later, the external threats and opportunities driving secondary state behavior primarily originate from the immediate regional security complex. In those circumstances, the regional security complex may resemble a closed system in which local actors compete to advance their respective regional interests with limited intervention from extraregional actors. 123
Even in cases when great powers penetrate into regional subsystems, the regional
context still plays an important role in a second-tier power’s behavior. The implications
of great powers’ actions for a secondary state will be confined to the particular region in
which it is located. Extraregional great powers can threaten a secondary power or offer it
opportunities only in the latter’s close proximity. Secondary state behavior might be
induced by actions of great powers, and they might cooperate with extraregional great
powers inside and outside their region. The crucial point here is to bear in mind that the
primary motivations driving their behavior are still regional in the sense that, through
such collaboration, a secondary state seeks to obtain the support of the extra regional
great powers to realize its regional interests (i.e., improve its position vis-à-vis other
countries in the locale, or thwart adverse shifts in the regional balance of power), rather
than acting as a global player.42
Irrespective of whether a secondary state is responding to threats and
opportunities generated by the involvement of extra-regional powers in its region, or it is
motivated by the threats and opportunities stemming from its neighbors, it principally
defines its interests regionally. In the first stage of the foreign policy model to be
introduced below, a typology of secondary power bandwagoning strategies to realize
regional interests will be offered on the basis of the nature of the external security
environment of threats and opportunities.
42 This study examines cooperation between regional powers and great power in the former’s region. Alternatively, it is possible to imagine cases in which a regional state joins great powers in ‘out of area’ operations (for instance, by participating in international peace operations and collective security operations led by global powers, or joining alliances that are part of an intra-great power balance of power). A different version of such behavior, in the form of confrontation rather than cooperation, is identified by Lobell: “the FPE [foreign policy executive] can act at the global level, with the leaders of second-tier states defying the great powers in order to flex their muscles and thereby gain status amongst regional competitors.” Lobell, "Threat Assessment," 54. 124
Identifying Primary and Secondary Areas of State Action
So far, it has been suggested that secondary state leaders seek to advance regional interests of the nation-state, and toward this end they act on domestic, regional or global levels. Their interactions on those various levels subject them to different influences that are treated as the causal variables in this study. Since I look at cases in which secondary powers are predicted to protect their regional interests through cooperation with global powers, the global level is the primary area of state action. In its interactions with extra- regional powers, the major determinant of a secondary power’s behavior will be its relative power position vis-à-vis global powers. By treating the systemic polarity as the independent variable, this study prioritizes the global system.
Despite this systemic approach, however, the influence of the international system is treated in a different way than in purely structural approaches such as neorealism. State actions on the other two levels constitute the secondary areas of state action. Therefore, this research assigns a significant causal weight to the variables located at those levels, and explores how they mediate global influences. In particular, the model that will be suggested below highlights how broad parameters of state behavior are set by the nature of the global system, but those global influences are also filtered through the intervening variables at domestic and regional levels.
The intervening variables of this study incorporate the causal effect of the processes that emanate from the fact that FPE interacts strategically with relevant audiences at two environments, in addition to its actions on the global level: domestic groups and regional states. First, in the domestic political system, FPE bargains with societal actors to extract resources and obtain legitimacy. Although national executives 125 act autonomously in responding to international imperatives, they also have an important domestic motivation. The necessities of preserving their power position and extracting resources force them to negotiate with societal actors and respond to domestic preferences.43 Second, the actions of a secondary state create security externalities for other states in the region with which it is tightly interconnected. To the extent that those intraregional dynamics limit the state autonomy, FPE bargains with neighboring countries to eliminate such negative feedback from the regional security complex.
The constraints and inducements that stem from the domestic and regional level processes influence the manner in which the global systemic factors are translated into behavioral outcomes. In particular, the domestic political system and regional dynamics may present states with permissive or restrictive environments that influence foreign policy behavior. The foreign policy framework, which will be put forth later in this chapter, incorporates those causal influences in the second stage.
What Exactly Do Domestic and Regional Intervening Variables Influence?
Indeed, few would object to the statement that domestic and regional political considerations matter in alliances. The question is not whether, but exactly how and to what extent they influence patterns of secondary power alignment behavior.44 “Do they affect the way states define their national interests, the means that are used to implement those interests, or merely the timing and style of the response?”45 In other words, at what stage do we need to insert our intervening variables into foreign policy making process?
43 Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic," 173. 44 Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National," 145. 45 Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic," 191. 126
For analytical purposes, this study identifies two stages of foreign policy making
process: a) preference formation/ policy formulation; and b) strategic interaction/ policy
implementation. Given the multitiered nature of state behavior and the permeability of
different levels, it is a challenging task to delineate exactly at what stage causal variables
from what level have their impact on foreign policy making process.46 Neither separating
different variables from each other, nor stages in which they exert influence is as
seamless and straightforward as it appears. It is absolutely possible to imagine cases in
which domestic, regional and global level factors are mutually constituted, or the
intervening variables exert influence at different stages. Nonetheless, a decision to isolate
variables from different levels at different stages is justified on analytical grounds. For
concerns of parsimony, therefore, I will maintain a distinction between stages.
Disaggregating causal factors from different levels is useful to develop testable
assumptions as to when and under what conditions one set of influence will predominate
over others in policy processes. It is also helpful to theorize about the relative causal
weight of different considerations on actual policies.
46 Neoclassical realists who emphasize domestic level intervening variables disagree among themselves on the question of when to include those intervening influences in analysis. For some, domestic interests cannot drive decisions of war and peace in particular and external conduct in general, but they may come to “affect the timing of war and the manner in which it is conducted.” Ibid. Dueck also adds that in addition to the form, domestic pressures can also influence the leaders’ framing/ public representation of those foreign policy decisions. Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National," 148. In other words, most neoclassical realists conceive of a national executive that is autonomous in defining national interests. Domestic level factors are brought in at the implementation stage, especially when leaders work to mobilize resources to pursue national interests. Others, such as Lobell, concede that domestic level variables may set constraints on threat identification. Lobell, "Threat Assessment." Likewise, Taliaferro argues that unit-level variables affect the choices states make. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource." 127
This study, thus, follows an additive approach, which suggests that intervening variables exert their influence at the policy implementation stage.47 In other words, although FPE, acting autonomously, assesses the country’s regional interests and formulates relevant strategies in response to external security conditions, it is subject to domestic and regional constraints when it works to implement those preferences.
However, similar to the interactive model advocated by Fordham, I refrain from integrating the intervening variables in a static manner. I, therefore, allow room for interactive approach in the following manner. At the preference formation process, I assume that FPE also calculates the repercussions of a certain option at the domestic and regional level. As such FPE’s anticipation of regional and domestic costs of a given choice also affects its policy preferences in the first stage.48
A Two-stage Model of Foreign Policy Behavior
Having identified the position of FPE at the nexus of the domestic and international environments, I will now lay out a theory of foreign policy that accounts for the factors that are involved in the process leading from assessing threats and
47 Fordham criticizes the manner in which neoclassical realists insert intervening variables into their models. He calls their way of combining “arguments made at different levels of analysis into a single theory of foreign policy” as an ‘additive’ approach, and finds it conceptually flawed. Benjamin O. Fordham, "The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, 253, 255. For Fordham, it, in particular, distorts a proper analysis of state motives. To understand state motives, Fordham calls for doing away with inserting international considerations into the model additively alongside unit- level factors. Instead he suggests their inclusion interactively with the domestic level variables. In other words, Fordham argues that international conditions determine the interests of not only the incumbent regime, but also other domestic groups, and an interactive approach should take into account those influences and how interests and motives of those domestic groups influence state preferences. 48 As will be explained later, especially the approach followed here recognizes that just like the national executives, domestic actors too have their own policy preferences and assessments of the country’s national interests and relevant strategies. The policies such groups prefer depend on both their parochial interests in domestic politics and their evaluation of international conditions. It is the interactive relations between domestic groups and national executives that mediate systemic influences. 128 opportunities to devising appropriate policy responses, and implementing actual policies.
Given the multitiered nature of secondary state behavior, the model integrates variables from different levels in a deductively consistent fashion along the lines suggested so far.
Stage 1 identifies states’ regional goals and corresponding strategies in response to a realist environment. It incorporates how FPE assesses changes in the external security environment and devise relevant strategies. At this stage, preferences are derived from prevailing external conditions. The model treats the state as a black box, for it implicitly assumes that faced with similar environments, all secondary states will prefer similar strategies, i.e., FPE perceiving opportunities will prefer offensive policies to expand power and influence, whereas the FPE perceiving threats will be induced to maximize their security through defensive policies. In other words, the first stage looks at how the FPE will behave under ideal conditions, without being restrained by environmental factors.
Stage 2 concerns the constraints and inducements on statesmen as they seek to enact externally-derived strategies to promote the regional interests. Here, the hard shell of the state is cracked and the FPE has to negotiate with other domestic actors to realize its preferred strategy. In other words, whereas the first stage looks at the influence of realist environment on state behavior, the second stage also incorporates the influence of domestic level variables, highlighted by the first intervening variable.49 Moreover, the second intervening variable factors in the constraints imposed on state behavior by the security interdependencies stemming from the regional subsystem. The pattern and degree of security interdependence varies across regional subsystems, presenting FPE with different degrees of constraints.
49 In a sense, this reflects the influence of domestic level variables identified by liberal theories. 129
It is at the second stage that variations across secondary states, which are similarly positioned globally in terms of their ability to respond to global systemic conditions, are controlled for. Over time and across states, FPE differ in terms of its autonomy vis-à-vis society, control over domestic policy agenda, the capacity of resources mobilization and extraction, and the ability to overcome regional obstacles. Those differences have implications for whether and the manner in which states respond to the demands of extra- regional global powers.
Stage 1: Deriving Bandwagoning Strategies
from External Environment
Based on the foregoing discussion on the position of statesmen at the nexus of domestic, regional, and global realms, the first task is to identify the strategies states choose in line with their goals. The main focus of this study has been identified as a secondary state’s collaboration with extra-regional global powers to promote its regional interests. The purpose of this section is to explore different patterns of this relationship.
This task resonates well with a central question underpinning neoclassical research tradition: what explains variations in alignment strategies, i.e., balancing, bandwagoning, buck-passing, chain-ganging, or remaining neutral.
International Environment: Structure of Threats and Opportunities
In line with the systemic approach adopted here, strategies that secondary powers can follow will be derived from the characteristics of the external environment in which they operate. Next, I will present a typology of bandwagoning behavior along two 130
dimensions: a) the nature of the international environment, i.e., the structure of
opportunities or threats presented to states by the external environment; and b) whether
they are located at the regional or global level, i.e., the location of external impetus.50
Offensive vs. Defensive Strategies
In many studies, foreign policy strategies are derived from state preferences. The
motivations of states under anarchy inevitably influence states’ propensity to choose
between various strategies, and bandwagoning is no exception to them. As discussed
earlier, the international level, in particular the structure of threats and opportunities in
the external security environment, enjoys causal primacy over the domestic level in
selecting state preferences, and, consequently, foreign policy strategies. The choice of
threats and opportunities as the major elements of a state’s external security environment
serves particularly well to categorize different forms of alignment behavior in general and
bandwagoning outcomes in particular. As the discussion in Chapter 2 underlined, this
division captures the substance of the ongoing debates on alignment strategies. Realist
studies on alliances choose either of these motivations as the major stimulant of alliance
behavior. Most scholars tend to focus on only one motivation and drop the other from
analysis - hence, the division between defensive and offensive realism.
50 The first dimension is important because existing categorizations of bandwagoning use the goals states pursue to differentiate between different forms of bandwagoning; hence it also captures an important debate in the field that revolves around the question of what external goals derive state behavior. The second dimension in this typology is relevant for the purposes of the current study that explores the implications of the complex relationship between different levels of analysis; hence, it differentiates state strategies based on the relevant international environment to which states respond. 131
The model developed here, however, seeks to capture full variation on the
dependent variable, i.e., states bandwagoning out of fear/ threat (security maximization)
or for profit/ opportunity (power maximization) and uncover various causal mechanisms
leading to a bandwagoning outcome.51 Therefore, two major types of bandwagoning
outcomes will be considered in this model: defensive bandwagoning and offensive
bandwagoning. These broad categories will be further differentiated based on a second
dimension, i.e., the relevant international environment.
Regional vs. Global Threats and Opportunities
The question that begs an answer is what constitutes the ‘relevant international
environment’ of state behavior. Further breaking down the international environment into
regional and global levels will enable us to suggest a more discriminating treatment of
variations within the two broad types of bandwagoning strategies identified before, i.e.,
defensive and offensive bandwagoning. We can draw an analytical distinction as to
whether it is the immediate regional level or the wider global level that presents states
with restrictions or incentives.52 Depending on the source of the particular threats and
opportunities a secondary state is responding to (i.e., from the region or the extraregional
great powers), we can identify different types of strategies adopted by secondary powers.
51 I will, therefore, assume that states seek to maximize security in response to threats, and power/ prestige in response to opportunities. Consequently, in its external relations, the major concern of a secondary power will be to deter threats through defensive strategies and take advantage of opportunities through offensive strategies. 52 As my discussion on the regional level of analysis demonstrated, the international environment needs to be further differentiated. First, given the embeddedness of a secondary state in a particular region, the regional context constitutes the primary external environment of state behavior in most cases. Moreover, extraregional global powers usually develop security interdependence with secondary states located in various regions in which they are actively involved; hence, the global level also constitutes a secondary state’s relevant external environment. 132
First, in most cases, the primary sources of opportunities and threats that drive
state behavior are located in the proximate regional context. Consequently secondary
states mainly interact with their neighbors, and their external relations take place within
the context of regional politics. In those circumstances, the regional subsystem may
resemble a closed system with limited intervention from extraregional actors.
Nonetheless, regional actors often tend to take advantage of the involvement of the extra-
regional global powers in their regions (and invite them where necessary), or capitalize
on the developments in the global balance of power to realize their regional interests vis-
à-vis neighbors.53
For our purposes here, when a secondary state cooperates with global powers
such as the United States as part of its attempt to respond to challenges and opportunities
presented by other states located in the same region, we can conclude that its behavior is
primarily driven by regional-level forces.54 Alternatively, since great powers pursue
assertive security policies in different regions, in some cases, extraregional involvement
itself may come to constitute the primary source of challenges and opportunities to the
regional interests of secondary states. Consequently, when a regional power is motivated
to advance its regional interests in response to threats or opportunities engendered by
extra regional powers’ actions in its region, we can conclude that it reacts to the forces at
the global level.
53 Likewise, state leaders can expend similar efforts on the global level to advance their own domestic interests. These actions across domestic-regional-global divide generate interesting examples of intermingling of various levels. Ayoob, "From Regional System," 251-152. 54 In that regard, we can modify two international strategies that leaders can use to advance their domestic goals, identified by Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry’s “external extraction” and “external validation.” Here, we could introduce “extraregional extraction” that refers to state actions to obtain resources from outside the region that can be used in achieving regional objectives, and “extraregional validation” that refers to state leaders’ efforts to use their countries’ status in global politics to enhance their positions regionally. Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory," 464. 133
In order to establish the relevant international environment shaping the FPE’s response, I will study each case to decide where the most immediate threats or opportunities originate from.
Secondary State Bandwagoning Strategies
Table 2 summarizes the foregoing discussion. Based on the variations in the external motivations and the source of the primary threats or opportunities, we can identify the following strategies FPE can pursue to realize regional interests. It is important to remind ourselves that statesmen enact these strategies through their behavior in global, regional and domestic realms, but the important point is that their behavior on all these levels essentially serves the regional interests. While the interactions at the global level constitute the independent variable of the current study, the interactions at the domestic and regional levels will exert their causal influence on foreign policy behavior as intervening variables.
Table 2: Bandwagoning strategies
Relevant international environment Source of motivation Regional Global Motivation Threat Regional balancing Defensive bandwagoning (Modified defensive)
Iraq-2003; Russian-Georgian war Opportunity Regional hegemony/ Offensive bandwagoning Sphere of influence 134
On the one hand, secondary states perceiving direct and indirect threats to their security will be concerned mainly about survival goals and be driven to enhance their security. In these cases, they will prefer defensive strategies such as balancing or forms of defensive bandwagoning. On the other hand, states perceiving opening windows of opportunity in their external environment will act in a more risk-taking or adventurous manner and seek to increase their power position or prestige. They will thus prioritize offensive strategies such as expansion and creation of regional spheres of influence or forms of offensive bandwagoning. Both threats and opportunities can also be categorized along the regional-global axis. Defensive strategies can be further differentiated on the basis of whether a secondary power is threatened by other regional states or the extra- regional great powers. Similarly, the opportunities triggering expansionary policies could be generated either by the dynamics of a secondary power’s relationship with its own region or the dynamics of the extraregional great powers’ actions.
Regional Balancing
Secondary countries perceiving immediate threats from their own neighborhood will act to maximize their security through engaging in internal and external balancing activities. In situations where local avenues to contain the source of danger are limited, secondary powers may solicit the assistance of outside powers. Sometimes, they may ally with an extraregional global power that is intent on counterbalancing a regional country that poses threats to its own security interests. Regional balancing is encountered widely under unipolarity because the presence of US power in different regions serves as leverage for secondary powers seeking to deter local threats. The defining feature of this 135 strategy is that the proximate threat that induces alignment behavior comes from a third party in the locale, rather than the global power with which a secondary power allies.
Defensive Bandwagoning
In regions where the involvement of extraregional great powers creates negative externalities for the security of local actors, the great power itself may come to be the source of proximate threats. Aggressive US policies in the region of a secondary power that prioritizes status quo may create dynamics of change, which, in turn, pose serious challenges to the interests of the secondary power. Concerned to maximize their security, secondary powers will seek ways to offset the effects of American policies, and engage in strategies of resistance. However, as the discussion in second chapter underlined, under unipolarity, because balancing in its conventional form is not a feasible option, the options of secondary states are significantly reduced, and they are forced to engage in defensive bandwagoning, i.e., allying with the very source of threats.
Chapter 2 underlined two distinct forms of defensive bandwagoning. If the United
States threatens a secondary power into cooperation through coercive instruments, then we would have a classical case of defensive bandwagoning, because its behavior is triggered by direct threats. However, under unipolarity, the United States rarely uses or threatens force to induce cooperation of secondary powers, especially those within the hegemonic zone. Although it may not coerce secondary states into cooperation, the negative externalities of American policies and the implications of its actions may come to constitute a significant source of threat for the security of secondary states. These indirect threats and concerns for relative power may induce a lesser power seeking to 136 maximize its security to bandwagon with the United States even in the absence of direct threats. This alignment pattern is another causal pathway for defensive bandwagoning which might be called modified defensive bandwagoning.
Regional Hegemony/ Sphere of Influence
Though they are not major actors in the global distribution of power, secondary states usually harbor ambitious goals to play leadership role in their proximity. When they perceive permissive international environments to extend their influence, such states will be prompted to enhance their nonsecurity goals in their neighborhood. They may be induced to follow assertive foreign policy strategies to create a sphere of influence in their respective regions. Where possible, they will pursue unilateral policies to reach these objectives. However, several factors also may force them to cooperate with extra- regional great powers to advance their agenda.
For one thing, these lesser powers may not have the wherewithal to achieve their power-maximization goals through unilateral action alone. Moreover, even if they have the necessary military capabilities, international norms against a unilateral exercise of power may constrain them. Quite another reason concerns the fear of triggering regional counter balancing. The prospective costs of those counter-balancing dynamics may prevent them from unilateral action, and force them to seek a safer multilateral cloak and great power backing for their national security goals. Since the United States courts local partners to penetrate into different regions, it also has incentives to support the expansionist strategies of secondary powers that pursue a pro-American line in 137 international affairs. In such cases, the cooperation between a secondary power and the
United States is driven mainly by the former’s preexisting sphere of influence policy.
Offensive Bandwagoning
The penetration of extraregional great powers alters the security dynamics in respective regions, creating challenges for some and opportunities for others. In response to the revisionist policies of external actors, leaders of secondary powers may perceive opening windows of opportunity that may induce them to act in a more risk-taking or adventurous manner to enhance their power position. Especially in conflicts initiated by extraregional great powers where the interests of secondary powers and external actors converge, the former’s returns from jumping on the bandwagon will increase significantly relative to avoiding or lower forms of balancing. Such situations of compatible interests will resemble the ideal case of offensive bandwagoning for profit, identified by Schweller.55 As underlined in Chapter 2, these dynamics also operate under unipolarity, especially in situations where the United States pursues proactive security policies in various RSCs.
Independent Variable: Distribution of Power
So far I have argued that FPE defines long-term national interests of their countries in international politics. I also noted that they formulate foreign policy strategies to advance specifically regional interests in response to systemic - regional and global - influences. The kind of strategies considered in this model involves second-tier powers’ cooperation with extraregional global powers, irrespective of whether this
55 Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." 138
behavior is driven by regional or global level threats or opportunities. Earlier, it was
underlined that the distribution of power in the global system, i.e., polarity, is the major
systemic influence on alliance behavior. The trade-offs involved in state choices as well
as motivations for alignment differ significantly depending on the polarity of the
international system. The constraints and inducements a multipolar structure presents to
individual states are different from those offered by a bipolar structure. Consequently,
states will face fundamentally altered incentives and challenges in a unipolar structure,
compared to other forms of international structure. One strategy that is appealing to states
under a multipolar system might become unattractive under a unipolar system.
As the extensive review in Chapter 2 underlined, this study examines secondary
state behavior in the context of the unipolar international system in the post-Cold War
era. It also has been emphasized that this study will test the hypothesis that
bandwagoning behavior is rewarded by the unequal distribution of power, while other
strategies, especially strategies of resistance, are punished. It was also underlined that this
dissertation will focus on one subtype of bandwagoning behavior, defensive
bandwagoning in response to indirect threats.56
Hypothesis 1: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, secondary
powers are more likely to engage in defensive bandwagoning with the United
States than strategies of resistance.
This hypothesis tests the structural realist argument that the unipolar distribution
of power in the post-Cold War era induces secondary powers to cooperate with the
United States. In other words, it predicts a certain outcome - foreign policy behavior - on
56 Therefore, the presence of threats or opportunities in the external security environment, which act as the major systemic variable determining the choice of specific type of bandwagoning strategy, will not be treated as an independent variable. 139 the part of secondary powers. However, my model here, in line with neoclassical realists, argues that the process leading from systemic variables (distribution of power) to policy outcomes is similar to an imperfect transmission belt, in the sense that outcomes may not reflect the initial systemic imperatives, because of the constraints exerted by the intervening process variables. In such situations, focusing on the behavioral outcome alone may be misleading while seeking to establish the causal effect of the systemic polarity. Therefore, although I am eventually interested in the causal influence of unipolarity on the final policy outcome, I will also measure its impact on preference formation to have a more accurate account of systemic influences. As I underlined in the first chapter, this decision will enable me to separate the influence of structural factors from the effect of intervening variables. Toward this end, in addition to the first hypothesis, I will also test a second auxiliary hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, FPE is more
likely to prefer defensive bandwagoning with the United States than strategies of
resistance.
As underlined, unipolarity alone cannot explain whether a particular bandwagoning outcome will be achieved, because the dynamics of the relationship between the unipolar leader and the secondary powers are necessary but insufficient conditions for explaining foreign policy outcomes. We need to incorporate intervening process variables that translate the global systemic influences into behavioral outcomes, and explain the causal chain from bandwagoning as a strategy to bandwagoning as an outcome. This task will be undertaken in the next section. 140
Stage 2: Implementation of Foreign Policy Strategy
Given the multitiered nature of foreign policy making, FPE has to engage in strategic interaction with a web of global, regional and domestic actors, as it works to realize its preferences devised in response to the external environment. Although the primary level on which they act is global, i.e., cooperation with extraregional powers, state leaders, still, are part of a dense net of interactions on domestic and regional levels.
Consequently, in their cooperation with global powers in pursuit of regional interests,
FPE is facing domestic and regional audiences that are sensitive to the developments on the global level. The regional and domestic level conditions mediate the influence of the global distribution of power on state behavior. Even if the FPE decides to pursue a bandwagoning strategy, it is far from certain that the country will eventually cooperate with the United States. The final policy will depend on the intervening variables, i.e., the
FPE’s strategic interaction with relevant domestic and regional audiences, for security dynamics are essentially relational.
Intervening Variables
The bandwagoning strategy chosen by FPE will have distributional consequences at domestic and regional levels. FPE acts simultaneously in domestic and regional environments to realize other goals, as well as the specific regional goals for which they are allying with extra regional powers. They cannot remain indifferent to the consequences of their foreign policy preferences for those domestic and regional audiences. These two environments set constraints or present inducements for the FPE, as it seeks to enact strategies it formulated in response to the external environment. 141
In situations of an international crisis that begs an immediate foreign policy adjustment, FPE will select a policy that corresponds to the exigencies of the case at hand, based on its assessment of the external conditions. Since FPE will have to negotiate its policy choices with domestic and regional audiences, the prospects of realizing the initial policy preferences hinge on whether domestic and regional levels present permissive or prohibitive environments. By permissive environment, I mean situations in which FPE will face few constraints on its freedom of action, as it conducts foreign policy. Prohibitive environments, in contrast, will set heavy limitations on FPE’s actions.
To the extent that FPE operates in a permissive environment, it will be unrestrained in acting on the initial preferences. Otherwise, it will be constrained from translating its initial preferences into foreign policy outcomes. In other words, the final policy outcome to be implemented will be the product of the permissiveness of the environment within which the strategic interaction between the leaders the domestic and regional audiences takes place.
Hypothesis 2: When FPE faces permissive environments at the domestic and
regional levels, it is more likely to act on the initial preferences.
Permissiveness of Domestic Environment: Congruence of Perceptions
Domestic level factors can facilitate or hinder FPE from behaving in the manner that it has contemplated as a result of its assessment of the external security situation.
Although unipolarity may dictate bandwagoning, statesmen will have to interact with domestic groups as they work to implement their preferences. At the domestic level, since the actors making up the FPE is accompanied by many political actors with distinct 142 preferences about the proper international conduct of the country, the FPE’s preferences will have to be filtered through those of other relevant domestic actors. For reasons of ideational orientation or material interests, domestic groups will have different perceptions of the international conditions, and their interests and motives will vary from those of their leaders. They will consequently favor different courses of action, which may or may not correspond to the FPE’s preferred strategies. At this stage, the degree to which perceptions of the country’s national interests by FPE and societal groups overlap will come to determine whether the domestic environment is permissive or prohibitive for the realization of the initially preferred policies.
The first intervening variable, the compatibility of perceptions of external security environment by FPE and societal groups, exerts its influence on state behavior through two distinct processes: state leaders need to garner necessary societal support to maintain their legitimate rule, and extract resources from society to implement external security policies.57 Whether FPE is confronted with a permissive or prohibitive environment in terms of these two factors is a major determinant of how successfully a security preference from the first stage will be translated into actual behavioral outcomes.58
57 As Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry argue, “in the pursuit of foreign policy, the state must draw upon the society and economy for material resources and political support.” Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory," 460. Also see: Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73," International Organization 45, no. 03 (1991); Paul A. Papayoanou, "Great Powers and Regional Orders: Possibilities and Prospects After the Cold War," in Lake and Morgan, eds., Regional Orders; Paul A. Papayoanou, "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997). 58 The point being made here is that FPE operates against the background of several domestic level processes that are likely to pose constraints or facilitate cooperation with extraregional global powers. As understood here, the inclusion of domestic environment as an intervening variable serves as a proxy to control for the realist assumption that executives reflect the aggregation of national interests and states can be treated as unitary actors. Such a relaxation of the unitary actor assumption is necessary, because, since the ability of the FPE to mobilize resources and achieve ratification depends to a large extent on how societal stake holders view the country’s position in a particular issue, the permissiveness of the domestic environment varies across cases and influences the state’s external behavior. 143
Operational indicator: In order to measure the congruence of perceptions between the FPE and the society, I will look at the elite consensus, i.e., whether “elites agree or disagree about the external environment and the type of strategic adjustment … that is required to meet the threat and protect the state’s strategic interests.”59 The choice of this operational indicator to account for the influence of the domestic environment is justified considering the presence of the democratically accountable political actors inside FPE.
The members of the incumbent government holding posts pertaining to the making of foreign policy are also sensitive to their government’s domestic political standing. While making foreign policy decisions, they will also take into account the society’s preferences on the issue. Especially in situations requiring domestic ratification and parliamentary discussions, the concern to avoid costs to a government’s legitimacy will affect the executive’s response to the crisis. When there is a congruence of perception between the foreign policy elite and the societal interest groups, FPE will also enjoy internal unity.
The elite consensus will create a permissive environment, facilitating the implementation of foreign policy strategies.
To the extent that there is congruence between leaders and society, the state will be unconstrained to act on the initial preferences formulated by FPE in response to the systemic conditions, and the final policy will reflect those preferences.60 The incongruence between the leaders and societal actors, in contrast, will translate into
59 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princenton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 11. 60 In case of permissive domestic environments, i.e., when major domestic factions, including the governing coalition, share similar interests and motives and respond to external conditions in similar manner, the foreign policy process will approximate realist model of unitary actor. Lobell, "Threat Assessment." Similarly, Ripsman also argues that states with autonomous executives are more likely to behave in accordance with structural realist expectations. Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic," 177. Also, see: Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National," 146. 144 greater constraints on state behavior, posing obstacles to the FPE’s ability to act in unity on its initial preferences.61
Permissiveness of Regional Environment: Regional Costs
The permissiveness of the regional security context constitutes the second intervening variable in this model. As underlined as part of the discussion on the regional level of analysis, since a regional state is strategically interacting with states in its proximity, its actions create security externalities for other regional states. This is also the case when a regional power interacts with global powers outside its own RSC. The penetration of outside powers alters the regional balance of power, which forces states in a region to reposition their policies in an attempt to maintain their relative power position and ward off against adverse shifts. One important constraint on state behavior generated by such intraregional dynamics is what I call regional costs: the repercussions of a particular strategy in regional balance of power, particularly in the form of resistance to a secondary state’s bandwagoning with outside powers. The feedback coming from neighbors to a secondary power’s cooperation with extraregional global powers will shape the permissiveness of regional environment for FPE, which, in turn, will determine whether it can act on initial preferences or will have to depart from them.
The significance of these intraregional dynamics stems from the effect of the
‘security dilemma’ and ‘uncertainty’ identified by defensive realists. As my discussion for treating regions as a distinct level emphasized, these defensive realist variables are
61 The need to bargain with societal actors as well as the intraelite divisions will force the FPE to compromise from their original positions and the final outcome will be different from its preferences. The possibility of suboptimal outcomes will be more likely in such cases. In cases of divergence, we might need to look at domestic preferences to explain the final policy, in which case liberal theories might have more explanatory power. 145 particularly operative in proximate environments, and most importantly, anarchical regional systems. Once these variables are added into the equation as well, we see that the prospective bandwagoner will face a countervailing pressure against jumping on the bandwagon of extraregional global powers, without which a proper analysis of foreign policy behavior will remain incomplete. Despite the temptations of bandwagoning, a secondary state will be under an enormous burden of proof vis-à-vis other regional actors, as the edge it will gain through cooperation will alter the local balance of power and give others the reason to doubt its intentions. If it is indeed a power-maximizing opportunistic state, others might be warranted to be wary of its intentions and reciprocate. It will likely foresee these responses and calculate its pay-offs from bandwagoning accordingly. Even if it is a security-maximizing state that contemplates defensive bandwagoning to offset the shifts in relative power, this prospective gain will put others that are uncertain of its intentions in a security dilemma from which it is trying to escape. Hence, what appears as a defensively driven act on the part of the initiator may come to be perceived as an offensive bandwagoning of a revisionist power by other parties that feel threatened by this very defensive move, because bandwagoning with the outside power will play a resource providing function at the regional level. These concerns naturally are likely to be exacerbated depending on the particular history, perception and the role of the secondary state in the region, as well as the availability of regional mechanisms for reducing uncertainty and security dilemma.
As a result, the country may have to overcome what can be called the “sheep in wolf’s clothing” problem, by sending costly signals and investing in the prevention of eventual counter-regional balancing, which it may have to discount from its potential 146
absolute and relative gains.62 Under certain conditions, it might even have to desist from
such a defensive cooperation with global powers, realizing the offensive perceptions of
its actions in the region. In any case, a regional power contemplating cooperation with
extraregional powers will have to invest a significant part of its energy to having others
approve its initial policy. To this end, it will have to devise appropriate strategies to
eliminate regional costs. In this study, two unique strategies available to regional powers
will be discussed: soliciting the assistance of extraregional powers and engaging in
regional diplomacy.
Operational indicators: The regional costs are, to a large extent, a function of how
other local powers perceive the motivations of extraregional powers and the secondary
power.
The first indicator is the perceptions of extraregional powers’ actions by other
regional countries. Just as our secondary power will have its own assessment of the
regional security environment and its corresponding regional interests vis-à-vis the
penetration of extraregional great powers, its neighbors will also view the structure of
threats and opportunities in the region from their own position and define their regional
interests accordingly. The response of regional countries to the involvement of extra-
regional global powers will depend on whether the global powers promote regional status
quo or harbor revisionist goals. When outsiders are seen as engaging in a region to
eliminate a source of threat posed by local revisionist actors, extraregional powers are
more likely to mobilize a broader coalition behind their policies, because they will be
62 Takafumi Ohtomo, "Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War," International Relations Asia Pacific 3, no. 1 (2003). 147
seen as providing a public good on the cheap.63 In contrast, if extraregional great powers
come to be perceived as a revisionist force, countries in the region will be prompted to
follow defensive policies. Outsiders pursuing aggressive policies in a region will trigger
dynamics of change which may create serious challenges to the interests of regional
powers. In those circumstances, neighbors will view local collaborators of extraregional
actors as opportunists, hence, as a source of threats, and will resist to their bandwagoning
strategy.
The second indicator is the perceptions of the regional power’s motivations by
other regional actors. Another major variable generating regional costs is the dynamics
of the relationship (patterns of enmity and cooperation) between our secondary power
and other countries in the region, prior to the involvement of outside powers. Since
regional countries are tied into unique security relationships with their neighbors, their
reaction to one of their fellow members seeking alliance with outside powers will depend
on the preexisting alignment patterns and historical and cultural characteristics of the
RSC. Therefore, it is necessary to look at how neighbors perceive a secondary power’s
motivations, irrespective of their perception of the motivations of extraregional powers.64
63 This is similar to the idea of concert or collective security. Moreover, since external powers that value the status quo will be unlikely to let a maximalist secondary state have free reign over the windows of opportunity opened up by its actions, fearing that such actions may further destabilize the situation, they will exert constraints on their regional partners and curb the latter’s strategic goals. These dynamics will allay the regional countries’ suspicions vis-à-vis each other. In such a situation, regional powers will not mount a strong opposition to each other’s cooperation with outsiders. 64 For instance, even when countries in the region view global powers’ policies as driven by a concern to uphold the status quo, they might perceive a secondary power as opportunist given its previous role and image in the regional security complex. Its cooperation with outsiders may exacerbate others’ fears and lead them to oppose its bandwagoning strategy, even though extraregional senior partners might be viewed positively. 148
Overall, larger regional costs will be generated against the regional countries that are perceived to be harboring revisionist goals by their neighbors. Low levels of regional opposition will facilitate a secondary power’s prospects for acting on initial preferences, whereas higher levels of resistance will make revisions in the policy necessary.
These two operational indicators require a categorization of both the secondary power’s and the United States’ actions, hence motivations, as driven by either status quo or revisionist goals. In assessing these values, I will study closely how the relevant actors in the region perceived their policies of the United States and the regional power, rather than assuming them a priori.
Additional Hypotheses
Together, the three operational indicators used to measure the two intervening variables help us further expand the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: A divided FPE will face a restrictive domestic environment.
Hypothesis 2b: Secondary powers considering alliance with extra-regional
powers perceived as revisionist will face a restrictive regional environment.
Hypothesis 2c: Secondary powers perceived as revisionist in the region will face
a restrictive regional environment.
Final Policy: From Bandwagoning as a Strategy to an Outcome
So far I have identified the factors that will influence strategic calculations of FPE when it formulates and undertakes security policies. As I noted earlier, I will mainly 149 follow an additive approach and incorporate the intervening variables at the policy implementation stage. The foregoing discussion is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1 disaggregates the two stages of foreign policy making, identified earlier.
The causal variables of the model are identified by the third set of solid arrows. In the first stage of policy formulation, when it devises a foreign policy strategy, I assume that the FPE acts upon national interests and reflects societal preferences. Since the origins of
Stage-1 Preference formation Stage-2Policy implementation Bandwagoning (regional interests) (strategic interaction) Outcome
Regional environment Yes Distribution of power Int. Var. Ind. Var.
FPE Initial preference FPE
Int. Var. No
Domestic environment
Policy output:
Anticipated reactions
Repurcussions of initial preferences:
Causal variables identified by the model:
Causal influences not identified by the model:
Figure 1: A regionally-differentiated foreign policy model 150 state preferences and interests are located in the international realm, I expect FPE to evaluate external threats and opportunities, and calculate the consequences of alternative strategies. Save for miscalculations, misperceptions and information failures, the preferences FPE agrees on represent the optimal outcome for the state in the crisis. The distribution of power - independent variable - exerts the main causal influence on state leaders at this stage. The power asymmetry inherent in the unipolar distribution of power creates systemic pressures on the secondary powers to pursue bandwagoning strategies.
In the second stage, the FPE interacts with relevant audiences to enact the initial strategy. At this stage, the FPE is subject to the two intervening variables: permissiveness of domestic environment and permissiveness of regional environment. When both the domestic and regional levels present FPE with permissive conditions, it is more likely to realize the preferences formulated in the first stage. Conversely, if the domestic and regional environments are prohibitive, their combined effect might complicate the FPE’s task of acting upon the systemic incentives. The final policy outcome, i.e., whether a secondary power will bandwagon or not, will depend on how the relevant domestic and regional audiences will react to this strategy.
Nonetheless, I also recognize that the integrative approach cannot be disregarded altogether. While the FPE evaluates a particular bandwagoning strategy, it will also anticipate the causal effect of the intervening variables at the implementation stage.
These influences are explained in Figure 1 by the second set of arrows. FPE will most probably factor in how its initial strategy would be met by the relevant domestic and regional audiences. What I am suggesting is that an FPE contemplating joining global powers will have to confront the implications of its decision at the domestic and regional 151 levels. Whether it is a defensive bandwagoning with the aggressive coalition, or any form of offensive bandwagoning to further some nonsecurity goals, the leaders of a potential bandwagoner will have to assess the reverberation of their decisions in regional affairs and in domestic politics, already at the policy formulation stage. The anticipated reactions of the regional and domestic audiences to a prospective bandwagoning strategy will generate countervailing pressures against systemic imperatives for pursuing a bandwagoning strategy. When these anticipated domestic or regional costs are low or when the FPE is in an advantageous position to defray them, it is more likely to follow systemic pressures, hence choose a bandwagoning strategy at the preference formation stage. In situations where those anticipated costs are prohibitive, the likelihood of choosing a bandwagoning strategy will be reduced.
The next two chapters will undertake two case studies through the foreign policy model developed here. Chapter 7 will engage in more detailed discussion to test the hypotheses formulated earlier in these two cases.
CHAPTER 5
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING
US INVASION OF IRAQ (2003)
In the run-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Turkey was involved in intense negotiations with the United States over basing of American forces. Although the parties reached an agreement to allow for the transfer of American forces through the Turkish territory to open a ‘northern front’ against the Iraqi army, Turkish Parliament rejected the governmental motion which would have sealed the deal. The decision of Parliament, which contradicted the decades-old pattern of harmonious cooperation between the two allies, came as a shock to domestic and international observers, as well as American war planners. Prior to the parliamentary vote, plans for moving some 60,000 troops through
Turkey were in place, while cargo ships carrying the 4th Infantry Division’s equipment were awaiting off Turkish coast for offloading into Turkey. As a result of Parliament’s decision, the invasion plans had to be revised, and eventually Turkey’s assistance to the coalition was reconfigured into a limited form of cooperation where Turkey would provide overflight rights. Turkey’s policy during and in the aftermath of the Iraq war had long-lasting implications and transformed the course of Turkish-American relations, as 153
well as Turkey’s place in the Middle Eastern regional security complex (RSC), in the
years to come.
Studying the case of Turkish foreign policy during the Iraq crisis can help us
understand the dynamics of alignment strategies resorted by regional powers vis-à-vis the
United States. The responses of Turkey and many international actors to the US plans to
invade Iraq generated a lively debate in policy and intellectual circles as to the future of
the international order and alliance behavior. The inability of the United States to
generate a broad-based coalition and the opposition of several great powers and
secondary states to American policies were interpreted as the return of balancing
behavior following the unchallenged reign of the United States in the post-Cold War
unipolar order. Many experts on alliances argue that miscalculated American
interventions produced negative externalities to the security interests of many secondary
states, called indirect threats which force second-tier powers to reconfigure their relations
with the United States.
Alliance scholars utilizing the concept of indirect threat argue that when
confronted with such circumstances, a state will be induced to engage in strategies of
resistance. They, however, maintain that given the difficulty of challenging the US
primacy through traditional hard balancing strategies, secondary powers are forced to
consider new strategies, which are commonly termed as ‘soft balancing.’1 Turkey’s
behavior during the Iraq war, too, is taken as a case of soft balancing by IR theorists2 and
1 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005); Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005); T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005). 2 Pape, "Soft Balancing," 39. 154 area specialists,3 since Turkey resisted US demands for cooperation despite the long- running alliance relations between the two countries.
In this chapter, I will argue that although the advocates of the soft-balancing argument might be correct in that Turkey’s behavior was driven by ‘indirect threats,’ it would be a misnomer to describe Turkish policy as a form of balancing. Rather, the policy formulated by the Turkish foreign policy executive (FPE) could be best classified as a form of ‘defensive bandwagoning.’ Throughout the crisis, the FPE operated on the assumption that cooperation with the United States would be the most effective way to protect the country’s national interests from the indirect threats produced by the
American actions in the Middle Eastern RSC.
I challenge the proponents of the soft balancing argument at least on two counts.
First, what leads them to such faulty conclusion is their problematic interpretation of
Turkey’s resistance to US demands and Turkish Parliament’s objection to the use of
Turkish territory as part of the military campaign. They take the intense negotiations and the stalling tactics, as well as Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to seek a peaceful solution, as indicators of ‘balancing’ behavior. Second, as a result of their problematic definition of
Turkey’s policy, they also fail to explain the final outcome, i.e., limited cooperation that took place between Turkey and the United States despite the fact that the initial strategy failed.
On the first point, I argue that they fail to appreciate how Turkey’s obstructive tactics during the negotiations with the United States were driven more by a concern to improve the conditions of Turkey’s entry into the coalition for defensive purposes than a
3 Murat Ye ilta , "Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War," Perceptions, forthcoming. 155 concern to ‘check the American power’ per se. A closer examination of the evolution of
Turkey’s policy and its position during the negotiations leading to the parliamentary vote suggests that there was a clear strategy of defensive bandwagoning formulated by the
FPE which instructed Turkey’s behavior throughout the crisis. Through a regionally- differentiated framework, moreover, I show that Turkey’s active regional diplomacy and much of its interactions with the United States, which is dubbed as soft balancing behavior to check American power, in fact, targeted regional audiences for quite different reasons. These policies could be best conceptualized as strategies to eliminate the
‘regional costs’ generated by the defensive bandwagoning strategy, rather than treating them as balancing strategies to contain the exercise of unipolar power. Without inserting regions as a distinct level of analysis, such policies targeting regional audiences cannot be meaningfully accounted for.
On the second point, i.e., explaining the final outcome, I show that the agreement reached between Turkey and the United States regulating Turkey’s granting access to its territory in fact would have formalized the defensive bandwagoning as originally envisaged by the FPE. The impermissive domestic and regional environments, however, complicated the realization of this strategy and the government failed to obtain the domestic ratification. Nonetheless, despite the ratification failure, Turkey finally assisted the coalition, by opening up its airspace for military operations and allowing the supply of the US forces in Iraq through Turkey. This outcome, which fell short of the initial strategy, could be considered as a case of limited cooperation.
156
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Turkey’s policy throughout the Iraqi crisis to answer the following questions: a) what motivations drove Turkey’s behavior and its choice of Iraq policy; and, b) how can we explain Turkey’s behavior to realize its objectives and the final policy outcome. To do so it tests two major hypotheses advanced in this study.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a detailed chronological overview of the Iraq case. The second sectionexplains the Iraq case through the application of the theoretical framework developed in this study. In the first stage of the foreign policy model, I identify Turkey’s interests and motivations in the crisis and show that as a defensive positionalist Turkey settled for defensive bandwagoning as the optimal strategy to respond to the crisis. In the second stage of the model, I situate Turkey’s behavior in the context of regional and domestic environments and discuss the strategic interaction between the FPE and the regional audiences as they sought to implement the initial strategy. The third section summarizes the findings of the case.
A Chronological Account of the Iraq Crisis
The purpose of this section is to critically examine the evolution of the Iraq crisis as an issue in Turkish foreign policy. This review simultaneously traces two interrelated processes: First, I cover how Turkey’s prospective role in the invasion of Iraq came to the agenda of Turkish-American relations. Second, I analyze the involvement of the policy actors constituting the FPE - prime minister, president, foreign minister, defense minister, and civilian-military security bureaucracy - in the making of Turkey’s Iraq policy, as well as the developments in Turkish domestic political scene. I study, in particular, the 157 meetings of National Security Council (MGK), Supreme Military Council (Yüksek
Askeri ura- YA ), cabinet meetings, high level ad hoc meetings, as well as statements of the FPE members in other settings.
The Background of the Crisis
Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis Iraq was heavily conditioned by its most precious international connection, the longstanding relationship with the United States. To better comprehend the centrality of Turkish-American relations during the war, one has to recall the evolution of American strategic thinking in the post-Cold era, and how Turkey fits into this picture. With the disappearance of a major conventional threat, the American global strategy increasingly prioritized preventing the emergence of regional challengers to its worldwide interests, preventing the eruption of regional disputes that would pose serious threats to its own and its allies’ interests, and spreading the Western liberal values of liberal market economy, and democratic pluralist political systems. In that regard, so- called rogue-states, with their anti-American outlook and intention to acquire WMD increasingly attracted US attention. The Middle East, a strategically important region owing to its oil reserves, was a host to many of them. Turkey’s geographical proximity to the region, and its track record of cooperation with the US compelled the American policymakers to reevaluate Turkey’s geostrategic value, which was downgraded in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, Turkey’s cooperation with the
American interests in Southeastern Europe and other regions, which was best exemplified in its constructive approach to the resolution of the conflicts in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, provided further impetus to elevate Turkey’s 158
strategic importance. In return, Turkey also benefited from American assistance in some
of its international disputes, as well as in tackling its economic crises at home.4
Nonetheless up-and-downs never disappeared, and the real peak in the relationship came
after the September 11 terror attacks.
With the war on terror increasingly dominating American strategy, Turkey came
to be seen as a critical country whose support and cooperation was essential for
successful conduct of the war on terror. First of all, there was a strong belief in the United
States that supporting moderate Muslim countries that oppose terrorism and extremism
was the key to winning the war on terrorism. The Turkish model, which embeds Islam
within a secular system, appeared to be the best candidate to fit this role. In addition,
Turkey’s geographical location and experience in fighting terrorism made its cooperation
essential to the international coalition against terrorism. Furthermore, Turkey was more
than willing to contribute to the US agenda in Afghanistan and went as far as providing
troops to and leading the stability force, ISAF. As a result, the Turkish-American
relations started to receive renewed interest. Turkey was, in the eyes of American
politicians, “a steadfast partner in [the] war on terrorism.”5 These heightened emotions
were in no doubt one-way. As Faruk Lo o lu, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, DC,
4 This past record of cooperation raised expectations that Turkey would support the American agenda in the region. Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey’s Strategic Future: A US Perspective," in Turkey’s Strategic Future, ed. Francois Heisbourg (Brussels: European Security Forum Working Paper No. 13, 2003). 5 US Department of State, "Grossman: Change in the Value of Enduring Alliances," Remarks to the American Turkish Council by US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, 19 March 2002. For further elaboration of the renewed mood of cooperation, see: Hüseyin Ba c and aban Karda , "Post-11 September Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited," in Francois Heisbourg, ed. Turkey’s Strategic Future, 40-43. 159 underlined, Turkey was “at the forefront of the war, as a friend, as an ally and in reciprocation for the US understanding of [its] own fight against terrorism.”6
This blanket mutual understanding, however, did not eliminate fine-grained differences and diverging interests on certain issues. Although Turkey pursued a pro-
Western and pro-American position in its external relations, its interests in the Middle
East were not necessarily identical to those of the United States, particularly as far as the
Iraq crisis was concerned. In the case of Iraq war, despite the positive mood dominating the ties between the two countries, diverging mutual interests, and the asymmetric nature of the Turkish-American relationship due to their positioning in the balance of power, set the contours of their partnership.
Iraq as an Emerging Global Concern
The political situation in Iraq gradually emerged as a major issue for Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The ongoing uncertainty about the future of Iraq following the Gulf War engulfed Turkey in discussions on the region. Shortly after the
9/11 incident in September 2001, as Iraq came under international spotlight, it also started to dominate Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. In an effort to root out the sources of international terrorism, the United States shifted its focus to rogue states; President Bush took this policy one step further by declaring Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the axis of evil in January 2002. Even before this speech, extending military operations against Iraq was on the US agenda.7 When the US military operations succeeded in overthrowing the
6 Ben Ball, "Turkey is Definitely in a Tough Neighborhood," Office of Public Affairs- Fletcher School, 14 March 2002. Retrieved from: http://www.tacsne.org/Past%20Activities/Fletcherhaber.htm. 7 Press reports indicated that Bush’s foreign policy team had planned the war before the 9/11. Scott Lindlaw, "Fired Official: Iraq War was Planned before 9/11," Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 2004. 160
Taleban regime in Afghanistan, subsequent developments such as the alleged Iraq-al
Qaeda links, and the dispute over UN arms inspections in the country increasingly made
Iraq the next target for the US fight against terrorism. These developments inevitably brought Turkey to the forefront again, owing to its geostrategic value in any future war against Iraq. In particular, from July 2002 on, several press reports started talking about the Pentagon’s plans to open a second – northern - front through Turkey. In the event of a war, Turkish territory would be used as the staging ground which would require stationing of a significant number of American forces in the country, in addition to the utilization of Turkish airspace and bases.8
Coalition Government Resists Forceful Solution of Iraq Crisis
American determination to intervene in Iraq and mounting American demands from Turkey, however, were an unwelcome development for Turkey. Turkey’s dissatisfaction stemmed mainly from the security and economy related concerns that the
Turkish security elite had about a possible war in the region. The country was ruled by a weak coalition government, which was led by Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party
(DSP) and included two junior coalition partners the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and
8 For a good account of the discussions taking place inside the Bush administration about Turkey’s role, see: Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Woodward (Chapter 30) shows that in early 2002, the idea of opening a northern front was initially rejected and the war planning proceeded on the basis of a southern front only. Over time the feasibility of a northern front option was also discussed, which eventually was accepted as an auxiliary front to the main battlefront in the south. However, the differences of opinion regarding the feasibility of this option inside the administration never disappeared as late as early 2003. For one, Powell did not find it a realistic option, considering the risks that the Turks might eventually fail to allow the transfer of American forces given the political costs. Rumsfeld and Franks believed the discussions on Northern front at least tied down Saddam’s forces in the North, reducing the burden of American invasion forces marching northwards through the southern front. Moreover, for the details of what role was foreseen for Turkey in Iraq planning and Turkey’s contributions to the overall strategy, see: “Iraq: Political-Military Strategic Plan- Briefing to Turkish Delegation,” 15 October 2002, reprinted in Mustafa Balbay, Irak Batakl nda Türk Amerikan li kileri ( stanbul: Ça , 2004), 426-440. 161
the Motherland Party (ANAP). The Ecevit government initially resisted fiercely US
pressures on Turkey, and this policy was largely supported by the military establishment,
which was worried about the eruption of violence in the region with damaging
consequences for regional security. Already in November 2001, in the context of
discussions on Turkey’s participation in the Afghanistan operations, the possibility that
the US war on terrorism might be extended to Iraq was raised. Turkish officials expressed
their opposition to such a development, citing the enormous costs of the Gulf War on
Turkey, and arguing that it could lead to territorial dismemberment of Iraq.9
During Colin Powell’s visit to Ankara on 5 December 2001, there were
speculations that the United States demanded Turkey’s cooperation on Iraq, though
Powell denied those claims.10 Ecevit’s visit to Washington on 14-19 January 2002 was
another diplomatic encounter, where the Iraq issue was discussed openly for the first
time. In fact, the visit was marking the climax of the new era of enhanced cooperation
between the two countries and provided an important occasion to cement the ‘strategic
partnership.’11 Despite all the mood of optimism to deepen the partnership in various
fields, Ecevit was uncompromising on the issue of Iraq. Nonetheless, the Turkish
government recognized American concerns regarding Iraq and sought to alleviate them
by providing good offices to convey Washington’s demands to the Baghdad regime.
Ankara indeed worked hard to convince Saddam’s government that it should relax its
uncooperative position on the weapons of mass destruction, and cooperate with the UN
9 For Turkish Chief of Staff K vr ko lu’s remarks, see: "Irak’ta Sava stemiyoruz," Milliyet, 10 November 2001. 10 lnur Çevik, "No Attacks on Iraq for the Time Being But What about the not too Distant Future?" Turkish Daily News, 6 December 2001. 11 For the coverage of the trip, see: "Ecevit’s Washington Visit Highlights Turkey’s Increased Value," Turkish Daily News, 15 January 2002; "Turkish-US Relations," Newspot, No.31, January-February 2002; Disisleri Güncesi January 2002. 162 weapons inspection regime.12 However, Turkey objected to US calls for using coercive instruments to ensure Iraqi compliance. Ecevit and Foreign Minister smail Cem noted that “Iraq does not pose threat to any of its neighbors,” and an intervention in the region would deal a serious blow to regional peace and stability.13 In the meantime, Iraq was declared by the Bush administration as constituting the infamous axis of evil.
Despite subsequent American pressures, Turkey did not agree to ‘full and complete cooperation’ with the United States on Iraq, which led several Turkish analysts to criticize the government for mishandling the crisis. Already after Ecevit’s visit, some
Turkish analysts persuasively argued that managing divergence and reaching a common position on the Iraqi issue would be the ‘test case’ for Turkish-American partnership.
Reporting on the optimism following Prime Minister Ecevit’s Washington visit, Cengiz
Çandar, who had developed close personal ties with the foreign policy team of the Bush administration, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld, was bluntly critical:
“Turkey’s protection by America on ‘political and economic platforms’ depends to a large extent on Turkey’s ability to act in tune with America on the issue of Iraq. …
Saddam is the ‘gist’ of the calculations on Turkish-American relations and ‘strategic partnership.’”14
US Vice President Dick Cheney visited Ankara in March 2002 as part of his
Middle Eastern tour, and informed Turkish statesmen about their determination to ensure
Iraq’s compliance with the UN resolutions and demanded Turkey’s full cooperation, which heated the debate on Iraq.15 One analyst was arguing that “an attack on Iraq has
12 "Ecevit Issues Warning to Iraqi Leader," NTVMSNBC, 4 February 2002. 13 "Karar Net, Vakit De il," Radikal, 21 March 2002. 14 Cengiz Çandar, "‘Stratejik’ De il ‘Aday Ortak’..." Yeni afak, 22 January 2002. 15 Hüseyin Ba c , "US Policy and the Iraq Time Bomb," Turkish Daily News, 25 March 2002. 163
long passed the ‘if’ stage, and is only a matter of ‘how’ and ‘when.’”16 In fact, during this
visit, although Cheney underlined that a strike against Iraq was not imminent, he never
removed the possibility of an operation from the table, for which Americans would need
Turkey’s close cooperation.
Coalition Government Turns More Cooperative
Despite the staunch opposition of the coalition government to a possible war,
sometimes equated with the Prime Minister Ecevit’s personal views about the region and
the relations with the United States, the government started to consider the country’s
possible involvement seriously. On the one hand, particularly after the realization that the
United States might proceed with the war plans irrespective of Turkey’s participation,
over the summer of 2002, Turkish military and the foreign ministry officials evaluated
likely scenarios about the future of Iraq in the event of a war, laid down Turkey’s red
lines, and proposed several policy options about Turkey’s cooperation with the United
States. In a high level meeting at the Foreign Ministry, civilian-military security
bureaucrats agreed on the country’s red lines which constituted the basis of discussions in
the subsequent meetings on the subject bringing together military-civilian bureaucracy
and political authorities in the months to come.17 At the same time, several contacts took
place between the Turkish and American politicians, which were paralleled by talks
between civilian and military delegations. Turkish officials conveyed Ankara’s concerns
16 lnur Çevik, "Editorial," Turkish Daily News, 21 March 2002. 17 For the details of a 20 June 2002 meeting, see Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü ( stanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), 51. Also see: Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi ve Ankara’da Irak Sava lar (Ankara: Ümit Yay nc l k, 2004), 165-166. Bila talks about a series of meetings in July 2002 during which several plans were prepared. For the content of these documents, see Appendix 3 in the same book. 164 and objections to their American counterparts, but they also discussed Turkey’s possible contribution to American war plans.
After a Pentagon leak about the US invasion plans, Undersecretary for Defense
Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy State Secretary Mark Grossman visited Turkey in July 2002 and informed Turkish civilian and military officials about US plans and specific expectations from Turkey. Wolfowitz also underlined the Bush administration’s determination to exercise the military option against Saddam’s regime and asked his
Turkish counterparts to submit their demands and conditions in return for Turkish alignment with the coalition. Most importantly, he assured the Turks regarding the US respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq after the war, meaning an independent Kurdish state in the north would not be tolerated. Realizing that the United States was intent on toppling the Saddam regime, Ecevit gave up his categorical rejection of the military option and accepted implicitly that the country might have to be involved in the process.
In return, Wolfowitz also expressed that the Bush administration would be sensitive to
Turkey’s concerns. The Turkish side specified the requests from the United States on financial, military and diplomatic issues,18 which constituted the basis of the future negotiations.
The attitude of the American delegation during their visit and their commitment to satisfy Turkish demands were interpreted by senior political analysts as “extending
Turkey a blank check.”19 The conclusion of Turkish FPE after these contacts was that the
United States would continue with its plans and Turkey should act accordingly. Mesut
Yilmaz, the deputy prime minister and the leader of the junior coalition partner ANAP,
18 Sedat Ergin, " te Kritik Pazarl n Dökümü," Hürriyet, 19 July 2002. 19 Sedat Ergin, "Ecevit bu Kez ABD’ye Esnek," Hürriyet, 8 July 2002. 165 argued that Turkey should take part on the side of the United States. The other junior coalition partner, nationalist MHP, advocated a more independent foreign policy so that
Turkey could defend its interests in Iraq, if necessary by taking unilateral military actions. The MHP representatives, including the defense minister Sebahattin
Çakmako lu, were calling for unilateral Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq, which heightened the tensions in the region, raising suspicions about Turkey’s motivations.
Deepening Domestic Political Instability and
the Rise of the Bureaucracy
Turkey’s objections to American plans stemming from its worries about the implications of the war were already causing delayed responses, which were exacerbated by divisions inside the coalition government. Indeed, the troubled course of Turkish domestic politics emerged as a major variable that might have affected the making of
Turkish foreign policy and hindered the development of effective responses. The internal weaknesses of the then coalition government gave way to a series of political crises over the summer of 2002. Once the coalition started to dissolve, the government had nothing but to call for early elections to be held in November 2002. During this troubled course of
Turkish domestic politics, the military-civilian bureaucracy concluded that the Americans were dependent on Turkey’s participation in the coalition and Turkey should work to facilitate their war-planning within the spirit of traditional alliance ties. They also acknowledged the domestic political situation, and decided to work closely to ensure that the impending political instability in the country would not affect Turkey’s response to this external challenge. 166
Civilian-military bureaucracy was thus taking a lead in the policy making process.
Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry, U ur Ziyal, paid a visit to Washington, D.C., on 18
August 2002. During his meeting with Cheney and Powell, he explained that Turkey would be willing to support its strategic partner provided that its concerns were met.
During his contacts, he was given detailed information regarding American plans for invasion. The Turkish delegation for the first time was told about “the northern front,” and most importantly the extent of US ground forces to be transferred through Turkish soil.20 Working in tandem with the civilian and military bureaucracy, the government authorized the initiation of a process for studying the details of Turkey’s role in the war.
The contacts between politicians, and civilian and military delegations from the two countries continued at various levels.
In September, Turkey was provided with a clearer outline of US demands, which prompted the Chief of Staff to request political directives from the government on how to respond to such demands. The foreign ministry also proposed a series of policy options in
September.21 The military-civilian bureaucracy organized a meeting of the country’s top security bureaucrats, which was held at the presidential palace under President Sezer’s patronage on 4 October 2002, entitled Turkey’s short and middle term policies on Iraq.
The statement following the meeting emphasized that efforts for peaceful resolution of the crisis should be furthered. The statement also reiterated a point which was emphasized by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer: Turkey’s cooperation would be conditional on international legitimacy behind the use of force. Sezer insistently repeated this condition in the subsequent months and did not hide his opposition to US
20 Murat Yetkin, "Irak Krizinin Perde Arkas - II," Radikal, 19 January 2004 21 See: Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, 179-181. Also see Appendix 4. 167 intervention. Nonetheless, on 7 October 2002, the government authorized the military to engage in detailed consultations with their American counterparts, short of giving any commitment. Through the dialogue between US European Command and Turkish military, American authorities forwarded their demands from Turkey, including the stationing of forces, opening of Turkish military facilities and using Turkish airspace.
The election atmosphere, nonetheless, prevented the incumbent government from providing the civilian-military bureaucracy with a clear mandate to put into practice the proposals they brought before the government. The uncertainty generated by the upcoming parliamentary elections led Turkish military to refrain from committing to many demands coming from their American counterparts on the grounds that the issue under consideration was within the jurisdiction of the ‘political authority.’ Nonetheless, the civilian-military bureaucracy became the main carrier of Turkey’s Iraq policy and served as the link between the successive governments.
AKP’s Electoral Victory and Restoration of
Domestic Political Stability
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the November general elections with a landslide victory to enable it to form a single-party government, signaling that the era of domestic instability might be coming to an end, and a strong political authority might act more effectively to address the crisis. Shortly after the elections, even before the new government was fully formed, the Bush administration, which was waiting eagerly for the emergence of a new and powerful political authority to emerge in Ankara, intensified diplomatic campaign to secure Turkey’s support. Because the AKP leadership 168 had taken an overtly pro-American stance between the establishment of the party in
August 2001 and its electoral victory in November 2002, Turkey’s support for the United
States was thought to be forthcoming.
The period between the establishment of the new AKP government and its assuming full control over Turkish politics partly contributed to delays in Turkey’s taking a clear stance on Iraq. Meanwhile, however, the military and civilian bureaucrats maintained dialogue with the American side. The Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök and deputy undersecretary of foreign ministry visited the United States in early
November 2002, where they met several high-ranking military and civilian officials, including Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. Turkish President Sezer met Bush and other members of American administration on the margins of the NATO summit in Prague on
20 November 2002, where he communicated his sensitivities about the ongoing discussions on Iraq war. He emphasized that Turkey’s participation into the coalition would require international legitimacy behind the use of force. The same day, however,
General Tommy Franks who was overseeing the Iraq campaign accompanied by other military officers was in Ankara to discuss Turkey’s contributions. Once the new government of Abdullah Gül received a vote of confidence on 28 November 2002, negotiations over the conditions of Turkey’s participation in the warring coalition were accelerated.
American Diplomatic Offensive: Three-stage Plan Revealed
An American delegation including Wolfowitz and Grossman visited Ankara on 3
December 2002, soon after the parliamentary vote of confidence for the government, to 169
discuss a detailed roadmap for the use of the Turkish territory. American military
demands from Turkey were based on a three-staged plan: inspection of existing military
facilities, modernization of the facilities and stationing of the American military forces.
During this first official meeting with the AKP government, Wolfowitz was reported to
have acted impatiently and eagerly, yet at the same time behaving as though the AKP had
been also ready and desirous to cooperate, which irritated Gül, who convinced other
members of the FPE to engage in more comprehensive deliberations on Turkey’s role in
the coalition.22 Wolfowitz and his team also held a meeting with the AKP leader Recep
Tayyip Erdo an and his advisors, in expectation of using this channel to accelerate
Turkey’s decision making process.23 During Erdo an’s trip to Washington in December,
too, despite the inflated expectations of the Bush administration, Turkey did not make a
concrete commitment to finalize a deal. While the Turkish side conveyed their
expectation for financial and political compensations, Bush expressed his support for
Turkey’s EU membership ahead of the historic Copenhagen summit of the EU.
Turkey’s Resistance to American Demands and Delaying Tactics
Turkey, at the insistence of Gül, preferred a gradual, step-by-step approach to
negotiate each specific Turkish contribution separately, hence maximize compensation.24
At the same time, Gül initiated his regional diplomacy to find a nonmilitary solution to
22 Murat Yetkin, "Irak Krizinin Perde Arkas - III," Radikal, 10 January 2004. 23 Erdo an could not run in the elections due to his political ban, but he continued to exercise influence in the shaping of domestic and foreign policies. The close relationship between Erdo an’s advisors and the US administration officials heightened the expectations of the Bush administration from Turkey. American ‘miscalculations’ to over-utilize this channel to get quick results, however, backfired, as it caused irritation on the part of not only the government but also the military-civilian bureaucracy. Erdo an afterwards maintained a lower profile, leaving the scene to Gül. 24 Sedat Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar - VI," Hürriyet, 22 September 2003. The civilian-military bureaucracy argued for a package deal to finalize all aspects of Turkey’s collaboration with the coalition in one single governmental motion. 170 the crisis, as well as seeking to reach out to the Baghdad regime. Moreover, Turkey was closely following the developments regarding the work of the The United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which would have affected the discussions on the legitimacy of the US war plans. Nonetheless, negotiations with the United States on economic and political/strategic issues were also conducted simultaneously as a joint project between the government and the civilian-military bureaucracy. These attempts eventually paid off and Turkey received most of the concessions it demanded from the United States to secure its interests, yet, the government failed to obtain parliamentary authorization for this policy. The process leading to the government’s decision to obtain domestic ratification was long and reflective of divisions inside the FPE.
The positions of Gül and Sezer somehow coalesced in avoiding a prompt response. In a meeting at the presidential palace on 17 December 2002, bringing together president, prime minister, chief of staff, foreign minister and other officials, it was decided to continue deliberations on American proposals and await the conclusions of
Gül’s summit meeting with regional countries. On 21 December 2002, the US
Ambassador to Ankara delivered Bush’s message to Gül, which was interpreted as a covert ultimatum, enforcing Gül’s urge to explore peaceful alternatives. In a 23
December 2002 consultative meeting in Gül’s office, the range of policy options before
Turkey were discussed, which seem to be derivative of earlier reports.25 The YA meeting of 26 December 2002 acknowledged seriously the possibility that Turkey may not be able to prevent the war and should take measures to prevent being sidelined in discussions regarding the future of Iraq.
25 Sedat Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar - IV," Hürriyet, 20 September 2003. 171
Nonetheless, confusing signals coming from Ankara prompted Powell to call his
Turkish counterpart Ya ar Yak and tell him that the time frame for war was narrowing,
and to demonstrate the value he attached to Turkey’s concerns he would dispatch two
special envoys to Ankara. He added, though: “Turkey has to take a decision immediately.
Otherwise, we will have to evaluate options not involving Turkey.” In response, Yak
emphasized that Turkey’s decision would come out of the democratic process.26 The
monthly meeting of the MGK, dated 27 December 2002 emphasized its support for
efforts for the resolution of the crisis through the peaceful avenues and within the
framework of the United Nations.27 There was an expectation in Turkey to wait until the
UNMOVIC inspectors published their report on 27 January 2003. The day after the MGK
meeting, Grossman and American Treasury undersecretary paid a visit to Turkey to give
economic and political assurances, and reiterated American demands. Turkish-American
negotiations under military, political and economic chapters started soon after, while Gül
embarked on his regional diplomacy.
Stage One: Site Inspection Begins
In line with the step-by-step approach, first, American advance teams consisting
of 150 technicians arrived in Turkey in mid-January 2003 with one month delay to
explore possible Turkish military facilities for use in the operations. As this infrastructure
worked continued, American diplomats and military officials also pursued their efforts to
enlist Turkey officially in the coalition. During his visit to Ankara on 20 January 2003,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers was reminded by Turkish officials that the final
26 "Powell: Bir an Önce Yan t Verin," Radikal, 28 December 2002. 27 Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterli i, Press Brief- December (27 December 2002) Available at: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html. 172
decision on Turkey’s support rested with Parliament. While Gül pursued his regional
diplomacy, he also maintained communication with Bush through exchange of messages.
Gül and Erdo an met US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Davos, Switzerland, on 26
January 2003, where they were urged to accelerate Turkey’s efforts to finalize the
negotiations. Hopeful of the possibility of a peaceful solution, they expressed the
necessity of obtaining parliamentary approval for which international legitimacy behind
the use of force was needed.
The UNMOVIC report of 27 January 2003 fell short of American expectations as
it could not establish the existence of prohibited weapons and required more time for
proof. Despite the not-so-supportive conclusions of the UNMOVIC report, the United
States pursued its plans and increased pressure on Turkey, occasionally sending
threatening messages to Ankara that it might be left out of the equation. At the same time,
American efforts to activate NATO security guarantees to protect Turkey against a
possible attack from Iraq were vetoed by France, Germany and Belgium. The monthly
MGK meeting on January 31 reflected the effect of the changing international
environment. It elaborated on the developments and reiterated Turkey’s commitment to
peaceful solution and the requirement of legitimacy. However, the statement issued at the
end of the meeting also emphasized that “in the event that a military operation becomes
inevitable, Turkey will not hesitate to take precautions to protect its national interests.”
The MGK advised the government to take steps that would enable the activation of
military measures necessary to protect national interests against unwanted
developments.28 Meanwhile, Gül’s efforts for convincing Saddam regime to cooperate
28 Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterli i, Press Brief- January (31 January 2003). Available at: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2003/31ocak2003.html. 173
with UN weapons inspectors and using regional channels to prevent war did not bear any
fruits, either.
Stage Two: Turkish Parliament Approves Site Modernization
Consequently, Gül eased his opposition and declared that Turkey would assist the
United States to protect the nation’s interests. He initiated the process for obtaining
parliamentary authorization for the two remaining stages of American military actions in
Turkey, for which a governmental decree was needed first. During the cabinet
discussions on 4 February 2003, the idea of giving ‘step-by-step’ concessions gained
prominence. As a result, the Turkish government received Parliamentary authorization
for the so-called modernization motion, dated February 6 2003.29 Based on the work of
the advance US teams, this motion enabled the government to invite ‘additional’
American personnel for three months to modernize harbors and bases to be used in Iraq
operation. Gül underlined clearly that this decision did not commit Turkey in any way to
the last stage, i.e., inviting American combat forces. The American administration did not
welcome the idea of splitting the motions, as it was worried that doing so might cause
further delays in the conclusion of war preparations. In a phone conversation, Cheney
urged Gül to hold the vote on the second motion soon, to which Gül responded
diplomatically, underlining it would depend on reaching a consensus on the ongoing
negotiations. It was also reported in early February that rules of engagement for the
Turkish forces entering Iraq were decided. Due to mounting public opposition and the
29 TBMM, Karar No: 759 (6 February 2003). Available at: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tbmm_kararlari/karar759.html. 174 dissatisfaction with the progress of the talks with the American delegations, the cabinet delayed the forwarding of the second motion to Parliament.
The fast approaching war, nonetheless, imparted urgency on Turkish FPE to formalize Turkey’s prospective role in the coalition. To streamline the negotiations, a meeting at the Prime Ministry, bringing together members of the government and civilian-military bureaucracy, decided to have direct talks with the Americans. On
February 13, Yak and Economy Minister Ali Babacan travelled to the United States to meet President Bush and other officials. The financial aid package to be offered to
Turkey was improved, which included $6 billion in grants and up to $20 billion in loan guarantees. Yak also announced that Parliament would discuss the second motion soon.
Failure to Launch Stage Three: Turkish Parliament
Rejects the Motion
As the prospects for preventing the war were weakening worldwide, the Turkish government was running out of arguments to stall the negotiations any further, and its resistance to American pressures was weakening. In mid-February, Gül solicited the signatures of the cabinet members so that he could forward the authorization decree to
Parliament. On a 24 February 2003 session, the discussions inside the cabinet were extremely intense, and ministers supportive of the government’s declared policy and those opposed to it were divided about the substance of the policy. Gül was using his personal credibility to convince cabinet members to sign on to the motion and let
Parliament make the final decision. Turkish and American diplomatic delegations achieved progress in the negotiations pertaining to political and military aspects of 175
Turkish-American cooperation, which, among others, would have regulated the status of forces to be stationed in Turkey. Finally, the United States and Turkey reached a memorandum of understanding concerning the modalities of Turkey’s cooperation with the coalition, which eliminated Turkey’s last objection. Nonetheless, there were also reports that some elements within the military establishment were not satisfied with the progress of talks with the United States. Most importantly, considering Turkish society’s opposition to the war, there was an expectation that it would be difficult to obtain
Parliament’s authorization. The opposition parties were clearly against the motion and although the government commanded the majority of parliamentary seats, antiwar feelings were running high among the AKP deputies. To convince deputies from his party, Erdo an held a party meeting on February 25-26 urging them to support the motion.
All eyes were turned to the MGK meeting on 28 February 2003 which was expected to issue clear recommendations in support of the motion to remove remaining question marks of many deputies so that the government would not run into problems in obtaining parliamentary authorization. In defiance of such expectations, the press brief released at the end of the meeting made no mention of these developments. President
Sezer objected to the inclusion of references to the ongoing process in Parliament, arguing that MGK could only advise the government and the MGK’s position was already laid out in earlier meetings. On 1 March 2003, Parliament finally debated the motion for the invitation of foreign combat units and for sending Turkish military forces abroad. A few hours before the vote, Erdo an again spoke to his deputies and asked them to follow the country’s national interests and not to be misled by their feelings. Following 176 a closed session, Parliament failed to authorize the motion, with a vote of 264 (yes) to
251 (no) and 19 abstentions.
Attempts to Save the Northern Front
The Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök expressed his support for the policy laid down in the motion, and urged the government to support the coalition. The American side also expressed similar demands, and still considered the Northern front as a viable option, and expressed their hope that basing rights would be granted. The American pressure on the
Turkish government to resubmit the motion was mounting, as the cargo ships were still waiting off Turkey’s coast to land troops and equipment en route to Iraq. Nonetheless, the American military also revised its plans to execute a Southern front only option, which would require Turkey only to grant overflight rights and access to bases. In the meantime, Erdo an was elected to Parliament and was given the mandate to form a new government. Erdo an’s election somehow raised the expectations that he would secure
Turkey’s commitment. “Turkey will be with us eventually. Erdo an is learning,” said
Bush.30 He however emphasized that the United States could also manage this challenge without Turkey’s participation, but in this case Turkey would be deprived of the generous aid package.
Settling for Limited Partnership: Turkey Grants Overflight Rights
On 13 March 2003, Erdo an was communicated a message from Bush through
American ambassador in Ankara, Robert Pearson. Also, he held a phone conversation with Cheney. He told Cheney that opening the airspace would also depend on
30 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 369. 177
parliamentary approval, and he would not be able to initiate this process before the new
cabinet was formed. Undersecretary and deputy undersecretary of foreign ministry visited
President Sezer and urged him to approve the new cabinet without any delay so that the
foreign policy making process would not slow down due to governance problems at such
a critical juncture. Erdo an was appointed as Prime Minister on 14 March 2003, two days
before the Azores meeting between Bush, Tony Blair and Aznar. Despite their failure to
obtain a UN Security Council resolution, Bush went ahead with the war plans following
the Azores meeting. Realizing the urgency of the situation, the president, prime minister,
chief of staff and the undersecretary of the foreign ministry met at the presidential palace
on 17 March 2003, where they reached on consensus to open Turkish airspace. The next
day, President Bush issued an ultimatum asking Saddam to leave Iraq in two days. The
Turkish government decided to forward a new motion to Parliament for opening Turkish
airspace to the coalition on 19 April 2003. However, until the last moment it was not
clear what form Turkey’s support would take, and the possibility of granting basing rights
was on the table. When the operation was launched on 20 March 2003, the United States
requested Turkey to open its airspace and the Turkish Parliament approved a motion
authorizing the government to open Turkish airspace to coalition forces for airborne
operations.31 Moreover, it also authorized government to dispatch Turkish forces to
Northern Iraq.
31 TBMM, Karar No: 763 (20 March 2003). Available at: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tbmm_kararlari/karar763.html. 178
Explaining Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the Iraq Crisis
The purpose of this section is to explain Turkish foreign policy throughout the
Iraq crisis with the help of the theoretical framework developed in this study. Although
Turkey’s response to American plans shared many similarities to great powers and other secondary powers, the regional context of Turkey’s external security environment affected its response in ways that rendered it unique. For a better explanation of Turkey’s policy throughout the crisis, it is necessary to capture the ‘regional dimension’ of its foreign policy process.
I will show that the basic motivation driving the Turkish FPE was the fear of unwanted consequences - indirect threats - which would be generated by the American military campaign in the region. I will argue that, as a defensive positionalist prioritizing status quo and stability over revisionism, Turkey’s major concern was to eliminate the indirect threats to its regional interests. To this end, Turkey opted for a strategy that could be best described as defensive bandwagoning. Then, I will turn to explain Turkey’s foreign policy behavior by situating it into the context of the RSC. I will argue that the negative externalities created by Turkey’s preferred defensive bandwagoning with the
United States generated significant ‘regional costs,’ and to a large extent Turkey’s policies were driven by a concern to eliminate these obstacles through the utilization of different strategies which constituted much of the substance of Turkish diplomacy in the crisis. Although others view these policies as a form of soft balancing, I will conceptualize them as part of a broader defensive bandwagoning strategy. In order to explain the policy outcome, moreover, I will bring in the domestic context of foreign 179
policy, and show how the divisions inside the FPE posed major ratification obstacles,
with the result that the final policy fell short of the initial plans.
Stage 1- Deciphering Turkey’s Strategy
Despite the changes in government, Turkish behavior was driven by similar
considerations throughout the crisis. Almost the same set of concerns shaped Turkish
foreign policy toward Iraq and determined the calculations of Turkish actors.32 After the
AKP government initiated talks with the United States, the parameters of Turkey’s policy
throughout the negotiations were largely based on the groundwork already prepared
during the previous government. The FPE actively pursued the regional interests of
Turkey in the Middle East within the context of the Iraq war. Turkey’s regional interests
are nicely summarized in the concept of ‘red lines,’ formulated during the Ecevit
government in collaboration with the security establishment. These guidelines instructed
Turkish policymakers’ evaluation of the country’s options under subsequent
governments, and eventually shaped the final strategy adopted by the AKP government:
a) maintenance of Iraq’s territorial integrity, b) preservation of Iraq’s unitary structure
and prevention of an independent Kurdistan, c) protection of the rights of Turkoman in
Northern Iraq, and d) maintenance of Baghdad’s control over oil-rich cities of Mosul and
Kirkuk.
32 In fact, one could discern a continuity in the main principles of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq, throughout the post-Cold war era. The lessons learned from the Turkish experience with the almost unconditional support for the United States in 1991, and the negative consequences of the war for Turkey partly explain this continuity. 180
In the rest of this section, in line with the theoretical framework outlined in
Chapter 4, I will examine closely the thinking of Turkish FPE to determine the major stimulant of Turkey’s alliance behavior, i.e., whether threats or opportunities to Turkey’s regional interests motivated FPE, and at what level they originated.
‘Defensive Motivations’ in Response to ‘Extraregional Stimulus’
From the Turkish perspective, overall, the crisis presented the country more with uncertainties and vulnerabilities than opportunities. Turkey did not perceive a direct threat from the Saddam regime, for, unlike the first Gulf War, Iraq had no apparent aggressive intentions towards its neighbors, including Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s military capabilities had improved significantly since 1990/1 and far surpassed those of
Iraq, ruling out any concerns on the part of Turkey to ward off its interests against shifts in the regional balance of power. Nor did Turkey harbor any revisionist goals against
Iraq, ruling out offensive motivations as the major driving force of Turkish foreign policy.
The primary stimulant of Turkey’s alliance behavior was located at the extra- regional level, i.e., the penetration of the United States into the Middle East. Since
Turkey did not act as a country that coveted the spoils of a US victory against the
Baghdad regime, however, one cannot describe Turkey’s policies as driven by opportunistic or offensive motivations. Rather, a close examination of Turkey’s priorities toward Iraq reveals it as a perfect defensive positionalist, which focused mainly on threats to its national security caused by the US plans to invade Iraq. What shaped Turkey’s behavior were the dangers posed by the US actions, i.e., the security challenges and 181 economic hardships to be caused by a war in its own region. Such dangers can be best captured by the concept of ‘indirect threat,’ explained in Chapter 2.
Sources of Indirect Threats
Immediate Challenges to Turkey’s Security
Almost all members of the FPE agreed that the danger of instability as a result of a war in the region was the biggest challenge to Turkey’s national security. American military intervention was expected to create many direct security threats to Turkey. The most immediate threat was the Turks’ worries about the future status of Northern Iraq, which was an offspring of Turkey’s greatest headache, the Kurdish problem. According to the official line of reasoning, the indeterminate status of Northern Iraq posed several challenges to Turkey’s national security. The authority vacuum, created by the policy of no-fly zones and safe havens imposed by the Allies in the aftermath of the Gulf War, had led to a situation whereby the separatist Kurdish elements in Turkey, organized under the
PKK, used the region as a rear base to conduct terrorist activist inside Turkish territory.
As a result, countering this threat stemming from the region was one of the priorities of
Turkey throughout the 1990s. Another by-product of the situation in Northern Iraq had been the embryonic Kurdish state that slowly but gradually took shape within the de facto autonomous region imposed by the American policy on Iraq.
The eventual emergence of an independent Kurdistan had been one of the nightmare scenarios for Turkey. Turkey had employed a number of different policies in tackling with the double-edged Kurdish challenge, ranging from intervening in Northern 182
Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants and maintaining a military presence in the region to
manipulating different Iraqi Kurdish groups against each other, and using its leverage vis-
à-vis Western powers to prevent them from engaging in policies that may strengthen Iraqi
Kurds’ autonomy. In the event of a war, first, Turkish policy makers were worried that
the Turkish army might have to suspend its military operations against PKK formations
or abandon its military positions in the region. Second, they were concerned about the
outbreak of a refugee problem due to war. The flow of refugees fleeing the war was seen
as a major risk, considering the experience of the Gulf War, when many PKK militants
infiltrated into Turkey by blending among the Kurdish refugees, which later triggered the
escalation of violence in Turkey.33 In the worst case scenario, if the Iraqi Kurds gained
independence following the war, in the perception of Turks, they could have ignited
separatist feelings inside Turkey which would have accelerated the PKK’s terrorist
campaign.34
Turkey’s concern to protect the rights of Turkomans in Northern Iraq emerged as
another pillar of its policy toward Iraq.35 Promoting the cultural and social rights of a
Turkish-speaking community had a certain rationale of its own. However Turkey’s real
motives lay elsewhere. Turkey was worried that the Kurdish majority might dominate the
politics of Northern Iraq in the post-Saddam era and could establish full control over the
region. In this sense, strengthening the role of Turkomans was seen in the interest of
33 Setting up a security zone was seen as the most effective measure to address this challenge. The military developed contingency plans to prevent a refugee disaster to be caused by the Iraqi Kurds marching northwards to escape the operations of the Iraqi army in the event of a war. As will be explained later, most official statements substantiated Turkish insistence on the military deployment in Iraq as a precautionary measure to avoid such a risk. 34 For Defense Minister Çakmako lu’s remarks, see: "Son Uyar ," Ak am, 10 October 2002. 35 See: H. Tar k O uzlu, "The Turkomans as a Factor in Turkey’s Foreign Policy," Turkish Studies 3, no. 2 (2002). 183
Turkey, as it would counterbalance the power of the Kurds in the region.36 Therefore a significant deal of Turkey’s demands from the United States concerned the representation of the Turkomans in the post-Saddam government, and the prevention of Kurds from acquiring the control and administration of Mosul and Kirkuk.37
On both issues, from the Turkish perspective, the restoration of Baghdad’s full control over the whole of the country, ending the authority vacuum in the Northern Iraq, would have been the ideal solution. Alternatively, the continuation of the status quo in the region was more preferable to a process which might present many challenges to
Turkey’s regional interests. Particularly, to the extent that American military planners considered a close partnership with the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey’s concerns in this regard were exacerbated. It was those considerations that led Turkey to declare the respect for the sovereignty, and maintenance of territorial integrity of Iraq as the guiding principle of its Iraq policy.38 Turkey therefore opposed war in the region, by default. As the United
States insisted on going to war, without convincing the Turks of the American vision for the future of the region, Turkey’s suspicions about the value of assisting the US plans to invade Iraq grew even further.
36 Moreover, because the oil-rich cities of Mosul and Kirkuk were traditionally seen as Turkish cities, and part of the National Pact (Misak- Milli), constituting the territorial basis of modern Turkey, the control of those cities by Kurds and their Kurdification at the expense of Turkomans posed a related challenge for Turkey. 37 The importance of Mosul and Kirkuk in Turkish debate was somehow speculative. Aside from the symbolic political value of those cities, the Turkish nationalist view argued that if Iraqi Kurds were to control those cities and acquire significant degree of autonomy, this would lead to the independence of the region by exploiting the revenues from oil resources. The growing welfare in the new Kurdish state would create a center of attraction for Turkey’s poor Kurds in South East Anatolia as, according to their estimates, the oil revenues would create huge gaps in the per capita GDP. This would eventually spur the separatist sentiments within Turkey. 38 Cognizant of Turkey’s soft belly, Iraqi officials also capitalized on possible implications of an American intervention in Iraq for Turkey’s own territorial integrity, after American demands on Turkey accelerated. "Irak’tan Türkiye’ye Kuzey Irak Uyar s ," NTVMSNBC, 6 March 2002. 184
Concerns Over the Future and Shifts in Relative Position
As a defensive positionalist, a related factor that affected Turkey’s thinking on the
Iraq war was the uncertainty regarding the future of Iraq after American invasion. Given the course of the American interventionism in the post-9/11 period, and the earlier experiences in Afghanistan, it appeared that American presence in the region would adversely affect Turkey’s regional interests. On the one hand, successful conclusion of
US military campaign in Iraq might have tilted the regional balance of power against
Turkey’s favor. If the United States was to succeed in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, as in Afghanistan, it would likely open new military bases in the country. In this case, as the
Turks liked to say, once Turkey had ‘the superpower as its neighbor’ the strategic value of Turkey in the American calculations was likely to decline. Needless to say, once the threat posed by the Saddam regime was over, America’s need for Turkish support would cease to exist as well. Moreover, America’s presence in Iraq would reduce its dependence on using Turkey as a base of operations in the Middle East, which would have further diminished Turkey’s geopolitical value to the United States.
On the other hand, the prospects of any US failure to conclude the war successfully were also detrimental to Turkey’s short- and long-term interests in the
Middle East. A bitter lesson learned from the Afghanistan case concerned the American competence in postconflict peacebuilding operations. Like many in the world community,
Turks were not content with the US enthusiasm in taking on Iraq after declaring victory in Afghanistan with the job half finished. The repetition of the same scenario in Iraq could have caused extreme troubles for Turkey in the region. Added to this, the Turkish political community was worried about the US comprehension of Iraqi politics, and the 185 local dynamics in the country. Therefore, even if the US military forces could successfully handle the war, the possibility that they would not be able to manage the postconflict phase caused an additional worry for the Turks as this would lead to the break-up of Iraq unintentionally, pitting the United States and Turkey against each other.
Moreover, in the Turkish thinking, if the postconflict political processes were mishandled, they might lead to territorial dismemberment of the country and result in a civil war which might engulf major regional countries, Turkey, Iran and Syria.39
The concerns over the shadow of future, given new American alignment with the
Kurds, also fed Turkish politicians’ perception of indirect threats. Turkey’s worries about an independent Kurdistan already have been underlined. Notwithstanding Turkey’s key strategic position, from an American point of view, Turkey was only one of several allies it approached to pull into its bandwagon. As they searched for partners in Iraq, American strategists strived to cement good relations with the Iraqi opposition, particularly Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. Just like the Turks, the Kurds also had some negative memories dating back to the Gulf War. They needed to be strongly convinced that this time they would not be left in the cold having to confront Saddam’s forces after being agitated by
America. Thus, they also sought firm American guarantees, making the US balancing act particularly fragile, and more sensitive to Kurdish demands. Because Turkey had its own agenda in the region, Turkish policy makers were worried about direct American presence on their borders, and American collaboration with the Iraqi Kurds. In particular, the Turks were anxious that to ensure the support of the Kurds, the United States might grant them concessions at the expense of Turkey.
39 "Ecevit: Ba kas çin Sava a Girmeyiz," NTVMSNBC, 13 October 2002. 186
The warm relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the United States raised the
possibility of the regional power balance shifting to the Kurds’ advantage, which
bedeviled Turkish-American ties.40 To name one, former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit
was strongly convinced of American intentions to create an independent Kurdish state,
and did not refrain from voicing his ideas before the public. The courting between the
United States and the Kurds was one of the reasons behind his vehement opposition to
the US demands until he left the office after November 2002 elections.41 Also, when the
discussion on Iraq intervention intensified already in March 2002 following Cheney’s
Middle East tour, Turkish Chief of Staff Hüseyin K vr ko lu was arguing that American
intervention might raise the possibility of the creation of an independent Kurdish state in
Northern Iraq, a development Turkey would not be able to tolerate. Foreign Minister
Cem also concurred with this statement and said that it reflected Turkey’s official
position.42 These worries did not fade away after the AKP’s rise to power either. The
obscure US cooperation with the Kurds prior to the war, taken together with other
concerns, rang alarm bells in Ankara that the Kurds would strengthen their position vis-à-
vis Turkey in the region. Their reluctance to set sail to an uncertain war, which was likely
to alter the political and geographical map of the region and undermine Turkey’s national
interests, fed the aversion of Turkish FPE to American plans.
40 This courting even resurfaced an old narrative. Looking at the evolution of the situation in Northern Iraq under Allied protection - through Operation Provide Comfort, which in 1996 was restructured to be confined to air component only and renamed Operation Northern Watch - many conspiracy theories had been circulating in the country. This was seen as part of a plot by Turkey’s Western allies to create an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, paving the way for the breakup of the country. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 135; Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 320; Bask n Oran, “Kalk k Horoz”: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti, 2 ed. (Ankara: Bilgi, 1998). 41 Bülent Alir za, Turkey Update: Turkey’s Iraq Jitters (CSIS Turkey Project, 18 October 2002). 42 " smail Cem’den K vr ko lu’na Destek," Yeni Mesaj, 31 March 2002. 187
Challenges to Turkey’s Economic Interests
A related set of factors concerns economy. The first Gulf War dealt a great loss to
Turkey economically; much of Turkey’s trade with the region diminished as it lost the lucrative Iraq market, and was deprived of the revenues from pipelines running through its territory. Once the war was over, Turkey’s demands were forgotten and it was left alone to deal with the mounting economic problems. The continuation of the UN- imposed sanctions regime demanded by the United States further aggravated these challenges. Therefore, in many instances the Turkish governments had been lobbying for the phasing out of UN sanctions on Iraq, and seeking to enhance relations with Baghdad in order to compensate for economic losses that had resulted from the embargo. Most of these attempts were met with American criticism. With all these memories in mind, possible implications of the war on Turkish economy were a major worry at a time when
Turkey was seeking to improve its economic ties to the Middle East. The instability was estimated to curb Turkey’s trade with the region, reduce its tourism income and increase prices for hydrocarbon imports, hence undermining Turkey’s economic development.
The prognoses of such negative consequences of the war for Turkish economy contributed to Turkey’s desire to prevent the war. As in the security-related concerns, whereas Turkey’s stakes lay in the normalization of economic relations with Baghdad regime and reinstating its authority over the country, the United States insisted on toppling the Saddam regime.
On several occasions, Turkish FPE acknowledged how perceptions of indirect threat shaped Turkey’s policy. For instance, prior to the December MGK meeting, Bush sent a letter to Gül on 20 December 2002, complaining about Turkey’s lingering in the 188 negotiations and delaying the work of the American advance engineering teams. The tone of the letter was so bitter that Gül likened it to notorious Johnson’s letter, which implied that the letter was perceived as an implicit threat.43 Also during the YA meeting on 26
December 2002, which prepared the agenda for the MGK meeting the following day, the impact of indirect threats in affecting the FPE’s evaluation of the crisis was visible. The
YA meeting, headed by Gül and joined by the minister of defense and top brass of the
Turkish military, revised the National Military Strategic Concept (Milli Askeri Stratejik
Konsept), and elevated the US plans to strike Iraq to the high-priority security threats.
Similarly, the MGK meeting on 31 January 2003 was making the same point when it advised the government “to take necessary steps for the activation of military precautions
… to protect Turkey’s national interests against unwanted possible developments.”44
Finally, the justification used in the governmental motions put before Parliament reflected clearly the effect of indirect threats on the thinking of the Turkish decision makers.45
Turkey’s Preferences: Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing
Turkish FPE explored different defensive strategies to eliminate the threat of unwanted possible developments, and contain US aggression, ranging from soft balancing to defensive bandwagoning. Turkey actively joined international opposition to the US policies and supported efforts for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Turkey’s involvement in such initiatives, as well as its resistance to US demands during the negotiations, led some scholars to describe the Turkish foreign policy as an instance of
43 Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar – IV." 44 Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterli i, Press Brief- January, emphasis mine. 45 TBMM, Karar No: 763. 189 soft balancing. Indeed, the world-wide debate on American foreign policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 in general and American position on Iraq in particular became incorporated into the making of Turkish foreign policy. In particular, the developments regarding the role of the UN in the management of the crisis, and the opposition of certain European powers to the stubborn American power politics, as well as the regional antiwar dynamics prior to the war, heavily influenced the calculations of Turkish actors.
The US policies caused divisions within Europe and the two big countries of the E.U.,
France and Germany, along with some others and Russia, openly took position against the United States at the United Nations.
Turkey too underlined the necessity of the UN Security Council approval behind the use of force in Iraq and undertook several regional diplomatic initiatives to mobilize regional countries against an impending war. The transatlantic drift and divisions in world politics offered some window of opportunity for Turkey, which could be utilized as an avenue for balancing the indirect threat posed by American war plans. Because Turkey saw a chance in the opposition of other major powers to avert the war, it dragged its feet on US demands out of the expectation that the antiwar coalition could deliver.
To a certain point, it might be justified to describe such policies by Turkey as soft balancing, as some elements within the FPE believed they could contain US aggression through these diplomatic initiatives. Prime ministers Ecevit and later Gül were clearly proceeding on this assumption. Both Ecevit’s attempts to convince the Baghdad regime to cooperate with the UN inspectors and be more compliant vis-à-vis the United States and Gül’s regional diplomacy and delaying tactics were based on the assumption that the war could be avoided; hence Turkey should engage in strategies of resistance. 190
After toying with the idea of soft-balancing and realizing its unfeasibility, however, Turkey had to drop it, and defensive bandwagoning was increasingly embraced by the wider elements in the FPE. The American disregard of the international opposition and Washington’s diplomatic pressure on Ankara to enlist Turkey’s support for the coalition eliminated the no-war option, forcing Turkish decision makers to take seriously the implications of the indirect threats to Turkey’s regional interests, if the country stayed out of the war. The potential costs of noncooperation consequently forced them to come to terms with the reality of bandwagoning with the United States. However, the anticipated costs of the defensive bandwagoning at the regional and domestic levels also rendered Turkey’s cooperation with the United States extremely difficult. Turkey’s regional diplomacy and balancing tactics, which appeared as strategies of resistance, were redefined as part of the bandwagoning strategy to reduce the regional costs.
The thought process behind the making of the Turkish foreign policy was very well summarized by the Chief of Staff Özkök’s support for the government’s policy soon after the rejection of the motion on 1 March 2003.
We had to calculate what to do if the war was to break out. Unfortunately, our choice… was between bad and worse. We would either completely stay out, or we would help the combatants [meaning the coalition forces] and join the process. For months, these two courses of actions have been examined systematically by all institutions and organizations in close coordination. By not participating at all we will suffer the same costs of the war. But, it will be out of question to have our costs compensated and to obtain a say in post-war developments. If we help the combatants, part of our costs will be compensated… .
[We thought] Because a new front from North would be opened, the war would last shorter. Suffering would be reduced. Unexpected developments would not occur. And, much less people would die.46
46 "TSK: Hükümet’le Ayn Görü teyiz," NTVMSNBC, 05 March 2003. 191
Details of Turkey’s Defensive Bandwagoning Strategy
Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning strategy with the United States was based on two distinct pillars. First, realizing that irrespective of its participation, the United States would go to war, Turkish FPE decided to reduce the unwanted consequences of the war, by cooperating with the United States and gaining some leverage in the US-led coalition.
Second, Turkish FPE viewed the activation of some military precautions independent of the coalition’s campaign, including the dispatch of Turkish forces to Northern Iraq, as necessary to protect Turkey’s interests against future uncertainty in the region. Although they would have ideally preferred to act unilaterally, due to the structural dependence on the United States, Turkey had to coordinate its military contingency plans with the coalition forces, which in practice meant obtaining American approval for Turkish troop deployment. Since American approval was contingent on Turkey’s cooperation with the coalition, the second pillar of Turkish strategy also necessitated a defensive bandwagoning strategy. In the remainder of this section, I will study in detail how these two concerns led Turkish FPE to adopt defensive bandwagoning.
Pillar I: Cooperation Out of Necessity and Linkage Politics
First, cooperation with the United States emerged as the inevitable option to respond to the threats posed by the crisis. According to Turkish strategic thinking, if the war was going to happen irrespective of Turkey’s objections, it then would need solid economic and political guarantees to minimize the likely damage. In the event of a war, the injection of significant external financial resources into the Turkish economy would be necessary to avoid any economic catastrophe. In a similar vein, it was essential that 192
Turkey’s political concerns in Iraq be recognized and it would be provided with sufficient leeway to protect them when necessary. Ironically, it was also the case that once the
United States decided to go to war against the international opposition, Turkey was more interested in seeing it succeed than fail, for, if the Americans mishandled the postconflict stabilization, the dismemberment of Iraq could have emerged as even a greater problem.
The first pillar of the Turkish strategy thus was to act in cooperation with the
United States in order to minimize the possible damage to Turkey’s national interests, and compensate for economic losses. In other words, Turkish policy makers were confronted with an unwanted situation of reluctantly cooperating with the United States.
The catch phrase of the time, “we have to be on the table at any cost” because the map of the region would be redrawn reflects this sense of cooperation out of necessity. The basic lines of this policy were formulated by the foreign ministry bureaucracy, supported by the military, when the coalition government confronted with the crisis during Wolfowitz’s visit to Ankara in the summer of 2002.47 As discussed earlier, divisions within the coalition government and the domestic political turmoil prevented the implementation of this strategy. Although the ANAP leader and Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz advocated this course of action most vocally,48 Prime Minister Ecevit still believed that Turkey could avert the war. Following the formation of the AKP government, during the meetings between the cabinet and the civilian-military bureaucracy, the same reasoning underpinned the basis of Turkey’s policy.49
47 Sedat Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar - I," Hürriyet, 17 September 2003. 48 "Y lmaz: Türkiye, Irak Hakekat n n çinde Olmal ," NTVMSNBC, 13 October 2002. 49 The MGK’s advice to the government in January 2003 employed the same justification as well: See: Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, 197-198, 212. 193
Indeed, Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning granted it limited leverage to have its
priorities recognized by the United States. For instance, anxious that war might lead to
Iraq’s territorial dismemberment, Turkey constantly requested the United States to inform
it about the planning and implementation of the war and its aftermath clearly. When the
advance American intelligence teams were dispatched to Northern Iraq through Turkey to
conduct covert actions against Saddam’s forces, Turkish military imposed strict rules on
their status and movement. Although there were occasions of suspicious activities
conducted by the CIA paramilitary teams, Turkey, by agreeing to cooperate, gained a
certain degree of control over their operations.50 Regarding the political developments,
opening the channels of cooperation with America helped Turkey to a certain extent. The
Turkish side was desperately seeking whether Iraq’s political integrity would be
preserved or whether a federal structure was foreseen for Iraq in the aftermath of the
war.51 The Turks were not content with the US ties with the Iraqi National Congress, the
Iraqi opposition in exile, with which they had rather tense relations, given the promotion
of a federalist solution by some groups. Through its cooperation with the United States,
Turkey gained partial leverage over the Iraqi opposition on the eve of the war. The Iraqi
opposition groups, which were originally scheduled to meet in Northern Iraq,52 convened
in Turkey on 19 March 2003 and issued the Ankara Declaration, which partly helped
allay Turkey’s concerns.53
50 Indeed, Woodward shows how CIA operatives felt extremely constrained by the Turkish security forces. Woodward, Plan of Attack, chapter 13. 51 During the negotiations, at times Turkish representatives did not find the answers of their American counterparts satisfactory, which undermined their trust even further. Yetkin, Tezkere, 101. 52 "Ankara Güvence Ar yor," Radikal, 15 March 2003. 53 They declared their commitment to maintain Iraq’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity and did not mention a federal solution. Moreover, US special representative Zalmay Khalilzad promised Iraqi Turkomans they would join the transition government following the invasion. Ferai T nç, "Türkmenlere Son An Oyunu," Hürriyet, 15 September 2003. 194
The corollary of Turkey’s reluctant cooperation policy was asking for linkages in
other issue areas. In the lengthy quote above, Özkök unequivocally justified the military’s
support for the government’s policy of assisting the United States on the basis of similar
reasoning. He also added that “the economic assistance is not a price for our cooperation.
It is at least a partial compensation for the damage to be caused by combatants.”
Nonetheless, a careful examination of Turkey’s position in negotiations reveals that
Turkey demanded more than mere ‘compensations.’ Given the multiregional nature of the
Turkish foreign policy, it was experiencing difficulties in other regions along with the
challenge to deal with the Iraq crisis in the Middle East. In return for its alignment with
the coalition, Turkey sought American support not only for economic compensation,54
but also in other foreign policy problems.
Foreign Minister ükrü Sina Gürel acknowledged such linkages in a TV show.55
Similarly, during his visit to Washington in August 2002, the Undersecretary of the
Foreign Ministry, U ur Ziyal, openly expressed Turkey’s expectations for American
support on the country’s major foreign policy issues. Although his American counterparts
did not establish a direct linkage, he was left with the impression that American support
on all these issues was conditional upon Turkey’s response to American demands on
Iraq.56 The AKP government also followed the same approach, which apparently was
reciprocated by the United States. For instance, American backing for Turkey’s E.U. bid
was tacitly related to Turkey’s cooperation with the United States, as was reflected during
Erdo an’s visit to Washington on the eve of the historic Copenhagen Summit in
54 The idea of asking for economic and financial compensation was advocated by Kemal Dervis, state minister responsible for economics. Sedat Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar – I." 55 Yetkin, "Irak Krizinin Perde Arkas - II." 56 Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, 172. 195
December 2002, which paved way for Turkey’s closer integration into the EU.57
Similarly, in his correspondence with President Bush in January 2003, Prime Minister
Gül openly asked for American assistance of Turkey on Cyprus dispute in return for
Turkey’s support for the northern front option.58
Pillar II: Unilateral Intervention
The second pillar of Turkey’s strategy was to guarantee Turkey’s right and ability
to take unilateral military and political precautions, when necessary independently of the
warring coalition, to protect its interests in Iraq, hence forestalling the Kurds’ tilting of
the regional balance against Turkey. In more concrete terms, this policy first meant that
Turkey would be in a position to take military action to prevent the Northern Iraqi Kurds
from controlling Mosul and Kirkuk and driving toward independence. Second, it was
understood as Turkey’s maintaining of its own military presence in Northern Iraq and
deploying additional military forces to fight against the PKK formations there. Third, the
Turkish army could form a security zone inside Northern Iraq to prevent the refugees
fleeing the war from entering Turkey and provide them with humanitarian assistance in
the camps there.59
57 One could even argue that as far as the AKP leadership was concerned, cooperation with the United States also served their parochial interests. As a party grounded in political Islamist tradition, their legitimacy was questioned by the domestic establishment and Western institutions. Their close partnership with the United States was seen as a tool to boost their legitimacy. For instance, Erdo an’s invitation to Washington at a time his political liberties were restricted in Turkey was an important symbolic expression of this support. 58 Sedat Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar - V," Hürriyet, 21 September 2003. 59 In most public deliberations of Turkish officials, this argument constituted the declared justification for Turkey’s demands for the deployment of additional military formations in Northern Iraq. This was particularly the case during the diplomatic negotiations with the United States. Although this argument had merits and the Turkish Army and other humanitarian aid teams indeed made contingency planning for that purpose, it largely served to conceal the power political dimension inherent in Turkish policy 196
This policy was also laid down during the last days of the Ecevit government in
power, following Foreign Minister ükrü Sina Gürel’s visit to Washington.60 After a
summit meeting of the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Chief of Staff
on 5 October 2002, the military started contingency plans to enhance Turkish military
deployment in Northern Iraq to army corps level, even before the start of American
operations as a preventive measure. The implementation of the decision was postponed
due to the political uncertainty created by the upcoming elections.61 The AKP
government, too, maintained its commitment to the same policy.62
The emphasis on independent action from the United States appeared to be the
single most important concern driving the FPE throughout the crisis. Moreover, even the
opposition parties that were against cooperation with the United States advocated
Turkey’s unilateral intervention. As American plans for the invasion of Iraq became more
pronounced, Turkish decision makers realized that Turkey’s military activities in the
region could not be carried out ‘unilaterally’ and needed to be coordinated with the
American war agenda. Therefore, the deployment of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq
became part of Turkey’s portfolio in negotiations with the United States.
Indeed, a great deal of the negotiations between Turkey and the United States
revolved on Turkish demands for the deployment of Turkish troops to Northern Iraq in
cooperation with American forces, the controlled distribution of weapons to Kurdish
factions by Americans and Turks simultaneously and the disarmament of the Kurdish
60 Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, 179-183. 61 Ibid., 182-183. 62 Speaking at a briefing to the members of Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, for instance, Foreign Minister Yak underlined that if the United States would act unilaterally without a clear UN mandate, Turkey would not stand idle by just because America is the Turks’ ally. Turkey would take necessary steps to protect its national interests, including entering Northern Iraq. "Yak : Kuzey Irak’a Girebiliriz," Yeni afak, 27 December 2002. 197
fighters after the war. Particularly, the dispatch of additional Turkish forces to Northern
Iraq to foreclose any prospect that Turkey might be excluded from the region was a sine
qua non for the Turks.63
Due to other priorities of balancing the demands of the Kurds, however, the
American side did not concede to Turkey’s demands upfront, which undermined the basis
of trust between the two allies. In the calculations of American military planners, Turkey
was to be given a rather narrow functional and geographical role, confined to providing
air and land corridor. Beyond that, additional Turkish military presence in the region was
found unnecessary and troublesome. The Kurdish groups were also important for
American war planning, and American strategists wanted to avoid complications that
could have been generated by the incursion of the Turkish army into the Northern Iraq.
They feared that such a development was likely to result in skirmishes between the Iraqi
Kurds and the Turkish forces, and invite counter-intervention by other regional powers,
most notably Iran, hence undermining whole American strategy.64 American reluctance
to allow Turkish troop deployment added to the delays in the negotiations, and, hence,
reinforced the Turkish suspicions about the American vision for the future of the region.
This state of affairs, in turn, further augmented Turkey’s worries and perceptions of
indirect threat.
63 Owen Matthews, Sami Kohen, and John Barry, "Risking a Civil War," Newsweek 141, no. 8 (2003): 9. 64 Mehmet Ali Birand, "ABD Ankara’n n ne Yapt n Anlam yor," Hürriyet, 07 January 2003. Especially after realizing that Turkey might not authorize the Northern front, Bush reportedly said “We’ll win without Turkey. It would be nice to have Turkey. The issue is how to make sure they don’t go into northern Iraq.” See: Woodward, Plan of Attack, 369. It appears the Bush administration wanted to involve neither the Turks nor the Kurds in combat operations against Iraqi forces, but sought the affirmative cooperation of both. After noting that he had talked personally with the Turkish leaders Cheney said, “In no uncertain terms, we don’t want them … I think they’ll behave. We’ve got to keep a lid on the Kurds too.” Woodward, Plan of Attack, 369. 198
The twin-pillar policy was crystallized in the governmental motion put before the
Turkish Parliament on March 1, after the negotiations with the United States were
formalized in a memorandum of understanding.65 Turkey’s hard bargaining paid off and
it received the concessions it had demanded, including the right to create a security zone
inside Northern Iraq. The motion contained two complementary proposals: authorizing
the government to allow for the stationing and transfer of American forces en route to
Iraq to form the northern front, and authorizing the government to deploy Turkish forces
abroad. However, after the failure of the government to obtain parliamentary
authorization, only a limited version of this strategy could be implemented. Following the
second vote on 20 March 2003, Parliament approved a revised motion. As a result,
Turkey cooperated with the United States by opening its airspace. Although the
government was authorized to dispatch Turkish forces to Northern Iraq, it could not
realize this objective because of the collapse of the memorandum of understanding
regulating Turkey’s entry into the region.66
Stage 2- Strategic Interaction with Regional and Domestic Audiences
Turkey’s Position as a Regional Power: Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?
Turkey’s twin-pillar policy initially formulated to respond to the external
environment raised the anxieties of other members of the RSC, pushing them into a
security dilemma. The regional reactions to Turkey’s initial strategy - negative feedback -
65 The exact details of Turkey’s negotiations were not made public then –even the MPs did not have access to them when they voted on the governmental decree. However, in September 2003, a senior Turkish columnist, Fikret Bila, who is famous for his close connections with the military establishment, published a series of articles in which he laid out the details of the memorandum of understanding between the US and Turkish military delegations. According to Bila, the concession Turkey gained in those negotiations hinted at a successful bargaining on Turkey’s part because Turkey had acquired solid American guarantees on almost all of its ‘red lines.’ See: Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, Appendix 7. 66 TBMM, Karar No: 763. 199 put Turkey in a delicate position, threatening to strain its ties with both the United States and other actors in the Middle East. Much of Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives, therefore, targeted regional audiences to eliminate these regional costs.
Sources of Regional Costs to Turkey’s Defensive Bandwagoning
I will study in detail two causal paths - operational indicators - through which
Turkey’s attempts to realize its initial preferences, which in some cases took a very aggressive turn, inadvertently exacerbated its image as a revisionist country and generated regional costs: regional countries’ perception of US invasion plans and their perception of Turkey’s motivations in the Middle East.
Perceptions of US actions by other regional actors: First, the worldwide perceptions of America’s actions affected other countries’ responses to Turkey’s decision to cooperate with the United States. Unlike the first Gulf War and other American interventions in the post-Cold War era, Iraq’s neighbors and other regional states, as well as the international community, did not rally behind the US invasion plans. While the discussions led to major divisions within the transatlantic community, even the long- standing alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the region was put into question. In this environment, the very act of cooperation with the United States was likely to incur a significant regional cost to Turkey’s regional interests. Ankara was anxious not to be viewed as cooperating closely with the US agenda given the obvious negative publicity of such an act on Turkey’s image in the international community and the region. As one scholar observes based on his review of the Arab media, “any regional initiatives taken by Turkey in conjunction with the US arouse distrust among Egyptian 200
circles… the Egyptian media, often reflecting the official state view, tends to depict a
hidden Turkish-American agenda to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Arab states.”
Such views were shared by other Arab media as well.67
Obviously, by taking a pro-American stance Turkey did not want to alienate itself
from the international community in general and regional countries in particular.68 Given
that there were various international initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the crisis,
taking a premature stance might have left Turkey in an awkward position. Turkey could
have run the risk of being accused by the international community of warmongering in its
region. Turkey’s support for American plans for resorting to military option before the
attempts for finding a peaceful settlement had been exhausted would have had a symbolic
diplomatic value as well. By granting the United States the right to open the northern
front, Turkey then would have been one of the few countries to provide a de facto
legitimacy, and enable the United States to form a ‘coalition of the willing’ outside the
formal multilateral channels.69
However, to the extent that the prospects for preventing the war through
worldwide initiatives appeared dim, Turkey sought to protect its interests by accelerating
the process for formalizing the modalities of its acting alongside the coalition. As
underlined before, the government initiated the diplomatic negotiations with the United
States to acquire sufficient guarantees to compensate for its strategic, political and
67 Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Middle Eastern Perceptions of US-Turkey Relations after the 2003 Iraq War," Turkish Policy Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2005): 127. 68 In that context the opposition of France and Germany to American plans needs to be underlined. Given their leverage over Turkish-E.U. relations, Turkey was also sensitive to their positions. 69 Gül clearly expressed this concern. Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, 215. It was mainly for that reason that once Turkey asked for the activation of NATO security guarantees against a possible attack from Iraq in February 2003, France, Germany, and Belgium caused the biggest rift in NATO’s history by opposing on the grounds that doing so would be tantamount to declaring a war and undermine the diplomatic attempts at the UN. 201
economic losses from a possible war. In this context, one cannot overlook the fact that
Turkey’s policy of asking for linkages from the United States, which was an outgrowth of
the first pillar of its strategy, ignited concerns about Turkey’s cooperation with a
‘revisionist’ power. As a matter of fact, Turkey drove a very tough bargain with the
United States, which was interpreted as horse-trading by many outside observers and
President Bush. Some Turkish demands from the United States throughout the
negotiations exceeded reasonable limits and went beyond mere compensations of
Turkey’s immediate war-related costs, which strengthened the impression that Turkey
might be pursuing opportunistic gains.70
Regional perceptions of Turkey’s motivations: Irrespective of their perception of
American motivations, regional actors’ evaluations of Turkey’s motivations in the region
also affected their responses to Turkey’s policies. A close examination of the statements
coming out of Ankara shows that an emphasis on Turkey’s strength and special position
in the region as a significant regional power shaped the thinking of Turkish decision
makers, as they sought to respond to the crisis. This self-perception of Turkey as having
its own priorities and agenda, which was reflected in the second pillar of the Turkish
strategy, not only increased Turkey’s desire to pursue a hard bargaining position vis-à-vis
the United States, but also further undermined its image as a defensive positionalist in the
eyes of other regional countries.
In an illustrative example of how Turkish FPE perceived their country as a major
player with its own agenda, Ankara insisted that the United States recognize its right to
intervene in Northern Iraq, hence the second pillar of the Turkish policy. American
70 For instance, Turkey’s never ending appetite regarding the financial aid package surprised many outside observers and American negotiators. Similarly, Turkey sought American assistance in modernization of its military infrastructure. 202
resistance to Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq angered Turkish policy makers,
both government officials and military bureaucrats, because they perceived the military
option as the only policy instrument to protect Turkey’s own interests, i.e., to prevent the
Kurdish drive for independence and control of Mosul and Kirkuk. On many occasions,
they expressed their discomfort with what they called “reducing Turkey to a Gulf
sheikhdom,” meaning that Turkey’s role could not be limited to providing bases alone,
and Turkey could not be treated as a minor player.71
As discussed above, the most crucial part of Turkey’s policy concerned the
Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq to protect the country’s national interests, if
necessary independent of the United States. Both ensuring American acquiescence to
Turkey’s demands and convincing regional countries for the nonaggressive nature of
Turkey’s military precautions became major challenges to be overcome. Overall,
although they held the value of the country’s international standing at high esteem,
Turkish policy makers were extremely cautious for not giving an appearance to the
regional countries that Ankara was pursuing a selfish agenda in Iraq even when they were
engaged in negotiations with the United States. Indeed, a broad consensus existed on the
part of the Turkish foreign policy establishment to follow a status quo policy and avoid
revisionism. Nonetheless, structural uncertainty in the anarchical RSC suggests that
irrespective of Turkey’s ‘benevolent’ motivations, its unique position in the RSC and
Turkish leaders’ self-perception of the country as a major power had major implications
71 When specific American demands were put forward before Turkey in October 2002, they were found shocking and unacceptable. This even led to speculation that the deployment of American forces in Turkey and the conditions within which this deployment was to take place would have been tantamount to the operation of occupation forces. A good account of such concerns is provided in: Balbay, Irak Batakl nda Türk. 203 on the behavior of other regional countries, generating regional costs toward its bandwagoning strategy.
To better understand the effect of Turkey’s demands on the regional security order, one has to take into account a number of additional factors. For one, Turkey’s historical legacy as the imperial ruler of Iraq raised suspicions about its motivations to join the war coalition. Particularly, prospects of Turkish military intervention ignited fears of Turkey’s ‘return to the region.’ Moreover, a second-image factor also needs to be discussed. Despite the defensive motivations shaping the thinking of the Turkish foreign policy makers throughout the crisis, one cannot rule out a strain of thought in the Turkish body politic that saw the fortunes of the war, rather than the challenges presented by it.
Taken together with the effect of the historical legacy, the presence of such arguments in the Turkish body politic further augmented outside concerns about Turkey’s motivations in the region. The revisionist view was represented largely by the nationalist circles which either saw the crisis as an opportunity to reclaim Turkey’s historical rights, or follow a hawkish policy to advance Turkey’s extended interests in the region.
Turkey’s plans to deploy additional forces to Northern Iraq became a matter of contention and created discomfort within the region on various occasions throughout the crisis. The discussions on Turkish military deployment in most cases were related to the oil-rich cities of Mosul and Kirkuk over which some nationalists claim historical Turkish rights. Since the Iraqi Kurds also laid claims to these cities, Turkish nationalists advocated Turkey’s intervention into Northern Iraq as a preventive action, even before the American invasion. They argued that by acting early on, Turkey could prevent possible Kurdish control and keep the natural resources of the region under control in 204
case of Iraq’s dismemberment.72 Although such arguments remained as a minority view
and did not make headway into the entire security establishment, they were from time to
time voiced by some members of the FPE.
For instance, the Defense Minister of the coalition government, Sabahattin
Çakmako lu, who was from the nationalist MHP raised eyebrows through his remarks in
the summer of 2002. He maintained that Northern Iraq was within the borders set by the
historic National Act (Misak-i Milli) and the region was left to Turkey’s protection.73
Later, he again stated that Turkey would never allow the creation of an independent
Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, arguing that it would generate security challenges to
Turkey’s territorial integrity and undermine its economic interests in the region. He
added that Turkey would take all necessary measures, including military precautions, to
prevent this from happening.74 The expression of such opinions about Turkish military
deployment at the governmental level triggered reactions from the Middle Eastern
countries which viewed Ankara’s intentions as provocative. They argued that such
statements interfered with the internal affairs of Iraq and were indicative of the revisionist
goals Turkey harbored toward the region. They therefore suggested that Ankara’s official
declaration of its respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq was no more than a fig leaf to
cover its selfish interests.75
After the AKP government took office, the MHP was no longer in power. Even
under the AKP’s rule, there were some occasions when the actions and statements of
Turkish government officials raised suspicions about Turkey’s true intentions in Iraq. In
72 "Yaz c o lu: Kerkük ve Musul’a Girelim," Yeni afak, 15 October 2002. 73 "Sava n Neresindeyiz?," Sabah, 21 August 2002. He was referring to the presence of Turkomans and a possible Kurdish drive to confiscate their properties. 74 "Çakmako lu: Kürt Devletine zin Vermeyiz," NTVMSNBC, 14 October 2002. 75 "Çakmako lu Gitsin!," Radikal, 28 August 2002; "Ankara’n n Aç klamalar Çeli kili," NTVMSNBC, 15 October 2002. 205 early January 2003, Foreign Minister Yak announced that the MFA was examining the existing agreements on Mosul and Kirkuk to find out whether Turkey still held any legal rights over the oil fields.76 Yak underlined that even if Turkey had any treaty-based rights, it would not seek revision through forceful means, rather preferring persuasion and international consensus. Nonetheless, his remarks created a small diplomatic crisis. Given that his interview came at a time when the PM Gül was touring the Middle Eastern countries, Gül took pains to correct any misunderstandings that might arise among Arab countries regarding Turkey’s expansionist aims. Gül underlined that official Turkish policy was to uphold Iraq’s territorial integrity and help distribute Iraq’s natural resources equally to its citizens.77
Turkey nonetheless did not drop its demands, and, at the end of the Turkish-
American talks, it eventually secured its right to set up a security zone inside Northern
Iraq. In the course of these discussions, the Kurds made every attempt to publicize
Turkey’s intentions as aggressive, which exerted major pressure on Turkish diplomacy.78
Turkey’s Regional Diplomacy: Eliminating Regional Costs
The foregoing discussion has shown that as the contours of Turkey’s strategy became clearer, it had to overcome yet another hurdle: the repercussions of its defensive bandwagoning strategy in the RSC. To the extent that Turkey’s demands were seen as excessive, and it appeared to be pursuing its independent agenda, it had to confront the image of an opportunistic country seeking to exploit the US campaign to its own
76 "3 Hassas Mesaj," Hürriyet, 06 January 2003. 77 " kinci Ya ar Yak Krizi," Milliyet, 07 January 2003; "Gül: Ortak Hareket Edece iz," Milliyet, 06 January 2003. The AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdo an too needed to make a similar intervention to clear misunderstanding. After that, it was told that Yak was asked not to talk too much by the PM Gül. "Bu Sözler de ‘Yak ’t r lamad ," Milliyet, 08 January 2003. 78 Matthews, Kohen, and Barry, "Risking a Civil War," 9. 206 advantage. Other regional countries’ evaluation of Turkey as a revisionist power and the resulting intraregional dynamics came to generate significant regional costs to Turkish foreign policy, which set obstacles to the realization of its defensive bandwagoning strategy.
The regional costs, combined with the opposition to Turkey’s cooperation with the coalition, coming from Turkish society, tied the hands of the government in its attempts to reciprocate to American demands. The concern to eliminate the regional costs affected the course of Turkey’s dealings with the United States as well as its conduct of foreign policy toward other countries in the region. Toward this end, Turkey pursued two complementary strategies:
Soliciting American help to untie its hands: First, Turkey sought to eliminate regional costs by seeking to influence the United States. As underlined earlier, the lack of diplomatic support behind the US-led coalition was a major factor affecting Turkey’s deliberations on whether to support the military campaign. Since the United States was seen as the revisionist power, Turkey did not want to be associated with the American agenda in the region. In an environment where there was no clear international legitimacy, and the US-led coalition barely gathered any diplomatic and political support from the international community, Turkey could not take an explicit stance as it did in the first Gulf War, or in allied operations in Afghanistan.
As it realized that the no-war option was not viable, and started considering taking part in the coalition’s war plans in one way or another, Turkey moved to absorb negative consequences of its policies, by asking the United States to reciprocate to the international diplomatic initiatives to find a nonmilitary solution, which would have 207 eased Turkey’s concerns. The resolution of the crisis short of war would have eliminated the source of threat, and Turkey would have been relieved of the pressure of taking a painful decision with all the costs it entailed. When this was not possible, Turkey emphasized that the United States needed to ensure the international legitimacy, and the support of other regional countries for the military coalition. In other words, Turkey’s position moved from “we don’t want any war in the region,” to “we can join you, if it is legitimate.”
If the United States was intent on going to war regardless of political opposition from key allies and international society, from this perspective, Turkey’s support would be conditional upon international legitimacy behind the use of force. Because the international legitimacy would have come about as a result of a consensus between the
United States and other major powers, Turkey would have dealt with a unified West, a situation which it was used to doing business with.79 Thus, it would have found itself in a less difficult situation to balance its relationships with both sides of the Atlantic.80 As the war further approached, Turkey signaled that it could cooperate with the United States even without the fulfillment of the international legitimacy condition.81
79 Turkey was accustomed to working with a unified West throughout the Cold War years, and much of the post-Cold War period. Ali. L. Karaosmano lu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000). 80 Domestically, since the Turkish constitution stipulated international legitimacy as a precondition to take the kind of actions requested by the United States, a solid international legal blessing would have made the government’s job of obtaining ratification easier as well. As a reflection of Turkey’s desire to achieve at least a transatlantic unity, if not a broader international consensus, in January 2003, Prime Minister Gül was conveying to the United States that a NATO decision would also satisfy Turkey’s concerns for legitimacy. Yet, given the strong opposition of Germany and France, let alone obtaining a NATO resolution, the United States even ran into difficulties in activating NATO’s Article-4 and Article-5 security measures to guarantee Turkey’s security against a retaliatory attack from Iraq. 81 This changing attitude on international legitimacy is very well reflected in Prime Minister Gül’s contacts with his American counterparts: After he came to terms with approving the northern front, he sent a letter to President Bush on January 16, 2003, wherein he expressed his government’s commitment to cooperation with the United States. He however rendered Turkey’s support conditional on international legitimacy, and NATO’s support. Ten days later, he met Colin Powell at Davos World Economic Forum. In response to 208
As part of this policy, moreover, Turkey asked the United States to acquire the
support of other influential countries in the Middle East, most notably Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia to establish a broad-based coalition. Already when the initial meetings
between Turkish and American delegations started in July 2002, the Turkish side
conveyed to their American counterparts the importance of mobilizing a larger regional
coalition.82 Especially after the diplomatic negotiations between the two countries
accelerated, this point was pronounced more forcefully. When the AKP leader Erdo an
met President Bush in December 2002, he raised this issue and underlined that
cooperation of other regional countries would remove the barriers before Turkey’s entry
into the coalition.83
Regional diplomacy: Second, Turkey had to pursue a proactive regional
diplomacy which served basically two complementary goals: to resolve the crisis short of
war by convincing Iraq to drop its uncompromising position in the crisis, and to project
Ankara’s collaboration with the US-led coalition as a defensive act. While the first aspect
of Turkey’s regional diplomacy was more prevalent initially, after it became obvious that
a peaceful solution would be difficult to accomplish, the second concern became more
pronounced in Turkish diplomatic initiatives.
Indeed, soon after Turkey found the crisis on its doorstep, it endeavored to
forestall the negative effects of a war by facilitating a peaceful solution to the crisis. So
far, it has been underlined that part of Turkey’s efforts to solve the crisis short of war
targeted the United States. The corollary of these efforts was Turkey’s attempts to
Powell’s statement that the United States might have to act without UN authorization, Gül said that “a UN decision would have made things easier for us… . Short of such a decision, however, we would not be a spectator to the developments in Iraq.” Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar – V." 82 Bila, Sivil Darbe Giri imi, Appendix I. 83 Murat Yetkin, "Irak Krizinin Perde Arkas - IV," Radikal, 21 January 2004. Also see Erdo an’s correspondence with Colin Powell at Davos: Ergin, "Bizden Saklananlar – V." 209
convince the Saddam regime of complying with the American demands. Prime Minister
Ecevit took many steps toward this end soon after the discussion on war started in 2002.
He sent a letter to Saddam asking him to comply with the international community.
Similarly, the Gül government also kept the channels of communication with Baghdad
open through secret meetings between Turkish and Iraqi envoys.84
In order to render the Saddam regime more cooperative, Turkey also worked to
mobilize the regional countries to exert a similar pressure on Baghdad so that the crisis
could be quelled through a peaceful solution. Gül, for a while, sincerely believed that
Turkey could play a constructive role in preventing the war. As the war came to be seen
as imminent, Turkey’s geographical proximity to the region heightened the sensitivities
for the suffering of coreligionist Iraqi people to be caused by the incoming conflict.
Turkey tried to use its regional diplomacy to raise attention to this problem. Turkey
distanced itself from Saddam’s regime, yet expressed its worries about the humanitarian
catastrophe that would be inflicted upon the innocent Iraqi people.85
A large part of Turkey’s regional diplomacy was based on a concern to facilitate
peaceful solution, while simultaneously stalling the progress of the negotiations with the
United States. The regional diplomacy provided an excuse for delaying Turkey’s
affirmative response to American demands, as on many critical decision occasions Gül
postponed taking a decision until the conclusions of his regional diplomacy could be
84 Turkey even proposed Saddam leave Iraq to prevent a war and assured him about providing a safe refuge in Turkey. 85 In his address to the Extraordinary Summit of the OIC shortly after his government forwarded the motion authorizing the transfer of US forces through the Turkish territory, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül reiterated Turkey’s initiatives to prevent the war. Without challenging the American position on regime change, he called on the Baghdad regime to fully comply with the UN weapons inspections system unconditionally. He opined “Why do we find ourselves discussing Iraq under such gloom? Who is primarily responsible? Excellencies, there is broad agreement today that the Iraqi leadership is responsible for the current state of affairs.” "Zirve’den ‘Hay r’ ç kt ," Yeni afak, 6 March 2003. 210
ascertained.86 The idea of using regional channels to pressure Baghdad and find a
peaceful solution continued until Gül’s last attempts to convince Saddam failed in early
February 2003.87 Then, Turkey accelerated the negotiations with the United States and
Turkey’s regional diplomacy was geared toward receiving the affirmation of the regional
countries for the defensive bandwagoning strategy.
As part of Turkey’s policy to reach out other regional countries, Gül initiated his
regional diplomacy. Gül advocated this idea initially at a minisummit at the President’s
residence on December 18, 2002. To convince the foreign ministry about the plan, he
utilized the President’s objection to the war, and his sympathy with the idea of
international legitimacy and consensus.88 Before the launch of regional diplomacy,
Turkish diplomatic sources underlined that Turkey did not want to be seen as the only
Muslim country supporting the war, other than Kuwait. Before proceeding with
cooperation with the United States, they wanted to take the pulse of the regional countries
and reach a political decision accordingly.89
In early January 2003, Gül initiated a diplomatic peace offensive in the Middle
East. He toured key powers in the region to discuss the developments bilaterally and
prepare the ground for a regional peace conference. His original idea was to convene a
summit of the heads of states and governments in Turkey. However, due to the reluctance
of Arab states, the meeting took place at foreign ministerial level in Istanbul on 23
86 A good example is the declaration issued at the end of the December 2002 MGK meeting mentioned earlier. Despite the pressures from the United States to take urgent action, MGK did not prompt the government to bring the matter before Parliament and expressed its support for diplomatic solution. 87 This was Taha Yasin Ramazan’s secret visit to Ankara on 3 February 2003. This secret meeting was publicized by Sedat Ergin, "‘Bar a Son ans’ çin Gizli Diplomasi," Hürriyet, 06 February 2003. 88 Murat Yetkin, "Irak Krizinin Perde Arkas - V," Radikal, 22 January 2004. This was indeed a good example of how the AKP utilized the available practical justifications shared by - and cleavages within - the FPE to garner support for its antiwar position, without resorting to an identity-based justification. 89 "Gül Bölgede Nab z Tutacak," Radikal, 28 December 2002. 211
January 2003. The diverging interests and lack of consensus on fundamental issues
prevented the meeting from producing any concrete results. Although Turkey wanted to
have follow-up meetings, the support for this idea was missing on the part of its Arab
partners. This could be interpreted as a sign of their reluctance to follow Turkey’s
regional leadership,90 or as their recognition that, despite Turkey’s continuing optimism,
the war was inevitable. Through this diplomatic initiative, Turkey tried to exert a regional
pressure on the Baghdad regime to comply with American demands, and prevent the war.
Moreover, Turkey also tried to garner support for a possible incursion in Northern Iraq,
which it was simultaneously negotiating with the Americans, by assuring the regional
countries of the defensive character of its plans.
Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the March 1 motion made it difficult to put the
performance of Turkey’s regional diplomacy to a real test. Although the regional
reactions to Turkey’s granting of overflight rights remained limited, it was not clear how
other countries would have responded if Turkey had proceeded with its plans to deploy
military forces in Northern Iraq. In the aftermath of the war, such policies partly paid off
and Turkey maintained a dialogue with the countries neighboring Iraq, through the
institutionalization of regular meetings.91 This process helped transform the conflictual
relations in the region, contributing to a more stable neighborhood.
90 This point is made by Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq," International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): 563. 91 Ali Balc and Murat Ye ilta , "Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4 (2006). 212
Domestic Support for Defensive Bandwagoning
The approaching war eased the external constraints on Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning, and the center of gravity for Turkish foreign policy shifted to domestic politics, which put a burden on the government to obtain parliamentary ratification. Both through their dialogue with the United States and the regional diplomacy, Turkish FPE had worked to contain the United States by finding a peaceful solution short of war. The failure of Turkey’s attempts to avert the war at the regional level removed much of the rationale behind resisting to American demands. In the meantime, the chances for preventing the war through global pressures on the United States and Iraq had been weakened, further narrowing Turkey’s options. The inevitability of the war also reduced the effect of the regional costs, as Turkey’s concern to shelter itself from a storm was nothing to be blamed for. The concern to avoid a narrowing window of opportunity forced the government to receive necessary domestic authorization to implement the defensive bandwagoning strategy.
Despite their declared commitment to international legitimacy, expression of political and moral discomfort with the possible conflict in a neighboring country and sensitivity to the domestic public, when push came to shove government officials were prepared to prioritize Turkey’s national interests. They resorted to Realpolitik arguments and justified Turkey’s support for American war plans as a last resort in the face of an inevitable war even if it was lacking in international legitimacy. Both Gül and Erdo an - first as the party leader and later as the Prime Minister in the second AKP government - used this discourse to justify Turkey’s acting alongside the United States in several public 213
appearances.92 Nonetheless, due to the Parliament’s rejection of the March 1 motion,
Turkey was able to implement only a limited version of its defensive bandwagoning. To
explain this outcome, I will focus on the divisions within the FPE.
Operational Indicator: Intra-elite Consensus
The translation of the initial strategy into the final policy outcome depends on the
permissiveness of the domestic environment. In situations where there is a congruence of
perception between the foreign policy elite and the societal interest groups, the likelihood
of acting on the initial preferences is enhanced. Considering the conditions prevailing in
the Turkish domestic politics, the prospects for cooperation with the US on Iraq were
bleak. Turkish public and almost all societal interest groups were overwhelmingly
opposed to the war, which posed further constraints to cooperation with the United
States. The global antiwar and/or antiAmerican sentiments were largely shared by the
Turkish people; many surveys indicated that over 90 percent of Turks were opposed to
the war. There were demonstrations in many cities, and civil society organizations
exerted enormous pressure on politicians and lawmakers to prevent them from supporting
the war. As a result, the developments in Turkish politics were factored into the already
complicated relations between Turkey and the United States and exacerbated the
difficulties of taking any clear stance on American demands.
92 After his attempts to convince Saddam failed, on 5 February 2002, Gül was reported to have said: “We have exhausted peaceful avenues... . We can no longer be considered sinful for our actions... . From now on, we will act alongside our strategic ally... . Tomorrow we will forward the - modernization - motion to the parliament.” Fikret Bila, "Art k Amerika ile Hareket Edece iz," Milliyet, 06 February 2003. Similarly, in his address to the Parliament, after the formation of the second AKP government, Tayyip Erdo an was arguing that for the survival of the state and welfare of the nation, his government would take all actions necessary. "Ç kar m z Koruyaca z," Yeni afak, 19 March 2003. 214
So far it has been underlined that perceptions of indirect threat shaped Turkey’s behavior, and defensive bandwagoning eventually came to be considered the most relevant strategy. Nonetheless, differences of opinion remained between the branches of the government and the security establishment on cooperation with the United States. As discussed during the chronological overview, when the country was first confronted with the crisis, divisions within the Ecevit-led coalition government hindered a unified response. Whereas Prime Minister Ecevit was categorically opposed to military cooperation with the United States, the ANAP leader advocated supporting the United
States in order to limit the unwanted consequences of the war. The nationalist MHP also raised objections to cooperation with the coalition, yet promoted the idea of independent military action to protect Turkish interests in the region. Despite the political instability created by the inner troubles of the coalition government, the military and civilian security establishment set the parameters of Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning strategy which, then, constituted the basis of the country’s policy during the negotiations with the
United States under the AKP government. The security establishment served an important role in socializing the new government to the idea of defensive bandwagoning, but Gül considered seriously the possibility of preventing war through soft balancing tactics.
Given their background in Islamist politics, there were questions as to whether the
AKP leadership might act on ideological grounds and reject cooperation with the United
States categorically. The AKP leadership, nonetheless, employed a discourse that dismissed an ideological-ideational approach to foreign policy and prioritized the country’s national interests, paying due attention to the material and practical 215 considerations. Moreover, they operated from a similar mindset to that of the security bureaucracy as regards the definition of the crisis, specification of the country’s national interests, and formulation of the policy. The AKP leadership continued to approach the problem from the same perspective, focusing exclusively on the security challenges, and economic hardships to be caused by the war on Iraq. Nonetheless, differences between the AKP leadership and the establishment over the details of Turkey’s policy persisted. In particular, although he recognized the indirect threats to Turkish national interests, Gül objected to Turkey’s involvement in the coalition militarily and insisted on his policy of preventing the war.
Although the developments at the regional and international level undermined whatever opposition the Gül government had to the two-pillar policy developed by the civilian-military bureaucracy, differences remained between its approach and that of the security establishment. Gül government’s oversensitivity to the regional costs and insistence on regional diplomacy not only hardened Turkey’s position vis-à-vis American demands, but also contributed to delays in taking a decision on the issue, because it came at a time when quick and decisive action was necessary. As the American pressures on
Turkey through several public ultimatums mounted, and Gül could not extract any concrete results from his attempts for a peaceful solution, divisions emerged within the security elite as to the course of Turkish foreign policy, and how to protect Turkey’s strategic priorities in Iraq. The government’s lingering, coupled with its slow pace in lobbying for the motion within the AKP party group, drew the civilian-military bureaucracy further anxious that the country would be completely left out of the equation and fall short of materializing its defensive bandwagoning with the United States. 216
When the Gül government was unwilling to act against domestic and regional opposition, the civilian-military security bureaucracy acted as the major promoters of the two-pillar policy. The military-civilian bureaucracy made their position clear on many occasions and when they realized that the government was slow in responding to developments and obtaining domestic ratification, they prompted it to initiate legal processes and take necessary political decisions. As discussed earlier, the military- civilian bureaucracy was not comfortable with Gül’s step-by-step plan to respond to
American demands so that extra time could be gained to give a chance to peaceful initiatives. At the YA meeting of December 2002, the military underlined that given the inevitability of American intervention, the country was at a critical juncture and a political decision was needed urgently so that it could start contingency planning. After the return of Gül from Middle East tour, on January 6, 2003, representatives of the MFA and General Staff briefed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly TBMM. The military officers provided detailed information about the stand of
Turkish-American relations, the American military activities in Turkey and the preparations of the Turkish army. They urged Parliament to take a decision as soon as possible lest Turkey face a fait accompli and jeopardize its red lines in the region.93 The
MGK meeting, dated January 31, 2003, was another critical occasion where the Turkish army conveyed its message clearly and asked the government to take steps towards the military cooperation with the United States and inform the public opinion about the necessity of this action.94 This push from the military was an important signal to end
Gül’s insistence on peaceful solution and force him to turn to military option.
93 "Askerden Meclis’e: Saddam Vurabilir," Milliyet, 07 January 2003. 94 "Asker, Sava Yetkisi stedi," Milliyet, 01 February 2003. 217
Similarly, the AKP’s leader Erdo an, too, stepped in to convince the Gül government for the necessity of cooperation after the failure of Gül’s last-ditch effort on
February 3, 2003. On February 4, Erdo an addressed the AKP group and warned against the dangers of being left out of equation. He told the AKP deputies that if Turkey was to protect its interests, Turkey had to be part of the process. This speech, according to
Turkish media, meant that the war was inevitable and “we are joining the war.”95 These strong interventions prompted Gül to announce that Turkey would act along the United
States to protect the country’s national interests.96 Only after then, did the Gül government ‘hit the button’ and finally initiated the legal process for receiving authorization from the TBMM. Moreover, the negotiations between Turkey and the
United States were also streamlined after this episode, and a Turkish delegation met
President Bush. It is instructive to note that this decision came on the same day as Colin
Powell’s notorious address to the UN Security Council, where he presented evidence for
Iraq’s noncompliance with Resolution 1441. This coincidence also shows Turkish decision-makers’ sense of urgency for a closing window of opportunity: if the country was to protect its interests in an approaching war, it would need to align with the coalition.
Nonetheless, the government maintained its reluctance to seek parliamentary approval for a motion that would have ratified the deal reached with the United States.
Troubled by Gül’s ‘salami tactic’ and his ongoing hope for finding a peaceful solution through regional diplomacy, the security establishment once again stepped in. To end the
Gül government’s indecisiveness, the foreign policy establishment had to push the
95 "‘Sava a Giriyoruz’ Mesaj ," Milliyet, 04 February 2003. 96 Bülent Alir za and Seda Çiftçi, Turkey Update (CSIS Turkey Project, 14 February 2003). 218 government to bring the matter before Parliament, though the PM himself was not confident about the likely support from the MPs of his own party for the governmental motion which would have materialized Turkey’s policy of defensive bandwagoning.97
The government, however, could not succeed in its attempt to garner domestic ratification for its international deal. When the government had to pass the legal hurdles for cooperating with the United States, it acted unwillingly. Inside Parliament, there was already strong opposition to Turkey’s joining the coalition, and many members of the
AKP, including the Speaker of the Parliament Bülent Ar nç and deputy Prime Minister
Ertu rul Yalç nbay r, were leading a campaign against the government’s declared policy.
Added to the position of the civilian political authority, the military bureaucracy also showed signs of divisions. Although it was reported that Turkey’s hard bargaining eventually paid off and it received most of the concessions it demanded from the United
States to secure its interests, on the eve of the vote, speculations arose that some elements in Turkey’s high brass were not convinced with the contents of the deal. The MGK’s refrain from issuing a statement in its February meeting in support of the motion was the last straw to demonstrate the extent to which the Turkish elite was divided on the Iraq policy. Those divisions and indecisiveness on the part of the members of the FPE affected the decisions of the AKP deputies. The first AKP government led by Abdullah
Gül was unable to channel its parliamentary majority to an affirmative vote on 1 March
2003. Parliament’s refusal of the governmental motion forced a redefinition of Turkey’s place in the coalition.
97 This point was later admitted by Gül in an interview: “I would not call it pressure, but there were recommendations from both the General Staff and the MFO that the motion should be forwarded. For the purpose of protecting our interests better in case war breaks out. It was a shared opinion of the state institutions.” Murat Yetkin, "Genelkurmay stedi," Radikal, 12 March 2003. 219
Attempts to save the Northern front option with Turkey’s full participation continued until the last moment before the start of the war. The Gül government and, later, the new government formed by Erdo an continued with the negotiations. During the final countdown following Bush’s 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam, foreign ministry bureaucracy communicated to the government that a decision had to be taken soon and staying out of the operation could create serious problems for Turkey. The government could no longer delay the process. As the government was contemplating sending a new motion to Parliament, all options, including the possibility of granting basing rights, were on the table. In the final hours before the launch of the operation, the United States only requested overflight rights, which Turkish parliament granted, in addition to authorizing the government to dispatch Turkish forces to Northern Iraq. This unexpected outcome resulted in a situation of limited Turkish support for the coalition. Due to the collapse of the deal, however, Turkey could receive neither the economic compensation package, nor
American permission to enter Northern Iraq.
Chapter Summary and Assessment
This chapter argued that Turkey opted for a strategy of aligning with the United
States to prevent a closing window of opportunity, which is best defined as defensive bandwagoning. To explain the roots of this strategy and Turkey’s efforts to realize it, which constituted the substance of Turkey’s foreign policy behavior throughout the Iraq crisis, the chapter focused on two interrelated sets of policies pursued by Turkey: those targeting the United States - global level - and those targeting the regional audiences – regional level. 220
First, I looked at the interactions between Turkey and the United States at the global level to explain Turkey’s evaluations of the crisis and its basic motivation that shaped the strategy formulated initially: perceptions of indirect threats posed by the negative externalities of American war plans for Turkey’s short and long term position in the region. I then studied how, as a defensive positionalist, Turkey responded to this challenge, by seeking to contain American aggression through peaceful means, and pressing for a stubborn bargaining strategy to secure solid guarantees from the United
States.
In that context, I demonstrated how Turkey’s initially preferred strategy affected the course of Turkish-American relations. Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning strategy was based on two intertwined pillars: reluctant cooperation with the United States to eliminate indirect threats and using this cooperation as leverage in the negotiations with the United States to carve out space for independent – military - action to prevent relative power shifts. As the war became inevitable, cooperation with the United States in return for concessions, and securing Turkey’s right to unilateral intervention became the basis of the country’s policy. To the extent that taking the measures to realize those ends were essential for Turkey, its demands led to the delay of diplomatic negotiations as they were incompatible with the American calculations of the role expected from Ankara.
Second, I situated Turkish foreign policy into the context of the regional security complex and examined its efforts to address the implications of Turkey’s initial strategy in the region, which was incurring significant regional costs. Thus, if one part of
Turkey’s policy was to conduct negotiations with the United States about the modalities of its support for the coalition to secure its interests, and explore a peaceful solution to 221 the crisis, the other part of the strategy was to present Turkey’s activities in the event of an unavoidable war as defensive in nature. In order to explain the final outcome, I turned attention to a domestic level intervening variable, and studied the divisions within the
FPE on the Iraq policy. I concluded that the lack of a unified position on the defensive bandwagoning strategy resulted in Turkey’s pursuit of a suboptimal outcome, which could be labeled as under-bandwagoning.
CHAPTER 6
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT (2008)
The 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict and ensuing developments brought to the forefront the discussions on the structure of the international system. As much as it was about territorial and ethnic problems in the Caucasus, the conflict also had broader implications for the operation of the international system. In particular, it helps us put to test different theoretical arguments on the alliance behavior in the unipolar world order.
The absence of any obvious attempt to address the growing power disparity between the
United States and the rest of the world already had generated a lively debate on balancing and alliances in the post-Cold war era. Now that Russia challenges US primacy and interests in ways more directly than was the case before, the adjustment of other states to this shift provides a good case to test realist theories on the alliance behavior under unipolarity.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain a) the motivations that drove Turkey’s behavior and its choice of strategy throughout the Russian-Georgian conflict, and, b)
Turkey’s regional diplomacy to realize its objectives and the final policy outcome. As such, this case can provide important insights to study how regional powers will respond 223
to the changes in their external security environment, sparked by the rise of a challenger to US-led international order. How will they reconcile the conflicting demands of cooperating with the unipolar leader and responding to an assertive power in their region?
At first glance, Turkey’s position in the crisis appears to be presenting a most likely case for testing regional balancing, for the crisis was characterized by Russia’s heavy-handed reaction to Georgia, one of Turkey’s key allies, and Moscow’s efforts to assert a sphere of influence in the region. The regional balancing hypothesis will lead us to expect that Turkey would be concerned with both Russian belligerence against Georgia and its subsequent efforts to create regional hegemony. For one, Turkey had pursued a pro-Western orientation and maintained close relationship with Georgia, which enabled the formation of a Turkish-Georgian-American strategic partnership in the years preceding the war. Georgia emerged as the key component for the advancement of
Turkey’s regional interests in the Caucasus and beyond. Therefore, the reassertion of
Russian influence in the Greater Black Sea regional security complex (RSC) and Russian interference with Georgia’s sovereignty threatened the strategic interests of Turkey. The regional balancing hypothesis, thus, predicts Turkey to check Russia through counterbalancing actions, including alignment with the unipolar leader United States.
Turkey’s policy during the Russo-Georgian crisis defies the predictions of regional balancing hypothesis. On the one hand, Turkey failed to mount a credible challenge to the Russian aggression. On the contrary, Turkey avoided taking any steps that might sever its relations with Russia and provoke further Russian aggression in the region; it did not even forcefully protest Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions. Turkey instead undertook extensive shuttle diplomacy to manage the conflict in 224
Georgia and its aftermath. As part of its response to the conflict, Turkey proposed a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) which aspired to bring together
Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. On the other hand, Turkey failed to utilize the availability of American assistance as a lever against Russia. It instead acted with caution and followed a restrained policy vis-à-vis American demands to orchestrate a stronger response to Russia’s belligerence.
To explain this seemingly anomalous outcome, I will highlight the concept of
‘indirect threats’ as the primary stimulant of Turkey’s alignment behavior throughout the
Russian-Georgian war and test the defensive-bandwagoning hypothesis. Through a detailed examination of Turkish foreign policy elite’s (FPE) perception of the penetration of the United States into the Greater Black Sea RSC, I will show that the United States presented more immediate and greater challenges - indirect threats - to Turkey’s regional interests than threats from Russia. Consequently, the main motivation of the Turkish FPE during the crisis was to contain the indirect threats presented by any miscalculated
American involvement in the crisis, for Turkey essentially acted as a defensive positionalist to uphold the regional stability. Consequently, this case also lends itself for testing the main hypotheses of this study.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a detailed discussion of the strategic partnership between Turkey, the United States and Georgia. Having identified Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus, it traces the evolution of this strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era, as well as setting the background to the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The second section offers a detailed chronological overview of Turkey’s policy during the Russian-Georgian conflict. The third section explains this 225
case through the application of the theoretical framework developed in this study. In the first stage of the foreign policy model, I identify Turkey’s interests and motivations in the crisis and show that as a defensive positionalist Turkey resisted robust involvement of the
United States in the crisis, and hence did not opt for defensive bandwagoning. Instead,
Turkey preferred limited cooperation as the optimal strategy to respond to the crisis. In the second stage of the model, I situate Turkey’s behavior in the context of regional and domestic environments and discuss the strategic interaction between the FPE and the regional and domestic audiences as it sought to implement the initial strategy.
Background to the Crisis
Turkey in the Greater Black Sea Region and the Caucasus
For a proper explanation of Turkish foreign policy during the Russian-Georgian war, first it is necessary to study Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus RSC which was the immediate venue of the conflict. Moreover, since the conflict had immediate implications for the military balance in the Greater Black Sea RSC, the case study will focus on this broader RSC as the relevant unit of analysis.
South Caucasus, both as a source of opportunity and threat, occupies a major place in Turkey’s multiregional foreign policy agenda. Overall, Turkey pursued a stability-based foreign policy toward the region to promote its economic and strategic objectives. Turkey’s interests in the region are considered to be largely in the economic realm, as it is driven by a concern to penetrate into these new markets and gain access to 226
the energy resources of the surrounding regions.1 However, Turkey’s policies toward the
region cannot be reduced to ‘strictly-business’ relations, and for a proper understanding
of Turkey’s Caucasus policy, one has to bring in the political and strategic dimensions of
Turkey’s motivations.2
Turkey’s political interests are products of the strategic value the Caucasus region
possesses for the formulation and conduct of Turkish foreign policy.3 First, the region
serves as a gateway to Central Asia which Turkey considers as a potential ‘sphere of
influence’ in the East. Because Turkey was in an undeclared competition with Iran and
Russia to increase its political influence over the newly independent Turkic and Muslim
nations in Central Asia, the land corridor through the South Caucasus, and the Caspian
Sea offered it the direct passage to the Central Asian hinterland. Second, the region acts
as a buffer zone between Turkey and Russia, the two major players in the region. Third,
the region provides direct access to the Caspian oil and gas reserves, and is considered a
key corridor for the transportation of these resources to the European and global
consumer markets. Considering Turkey’s ambitions to act as a hub in the global energy
business, Turkey sought to gain a foothold in the region in order to ensure the
construction and later secure operation of oil and gas pipelines that originate from the
Caspian basin and reach their final destinations via the Turkish territory.
1 Scott A. Jones, "Turkish Strategic Interests in the Transcaucasus," in Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, eds. Gary K. Bertsch et al. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 58; Okan Mert, Türkiye’nin Kafkasya Politikas ve Gürcistan ( stanbul: IQ Kültür-Sanat Yay nc l k, 2004), 83. 2 Karaosmano lu argues that Turkey’s primary long-term objective is political. Ali L. Karaosmano lu, "Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region," in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 152. 3 Ibid., 151-152. 227
Given its many economic and political objectives, Turkey has a vested interest in the political developments in the Caucasus region and the countries in the locale. Both the economic and political objectives induced Turkey to develop its regional policies with a concern to foster a stable and peaceful neighborhood and facilitate the consolidation of the new countries into independent nations. Obviously, Turkey’s ability to improve economic and trade ties to the region would have been difficult if the region was beset with vicious conflicts. Likewise, if the region was destabilized, there would have been little chance for Turkey to advance its political objectives in the Caucasus and beyond.
As a result, especially in regard to its involvement in ethnic conflicts, and later frozen conflicts, Turkey valued dearly caution over adventurism and risk-taking.4 Instead of using its ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural ties to the region, as well as its growing economic leverage, as part of an irredentist foreign policy agenda, Turkey utilized those assets to promote a stable neighborhood. Turkey therefore can be nicely considered as a defensive positionalist that prioritizes maintenance of security and stability over expanding power and influence through revisionist policies.
In many ways, the South Caucasus region could be considered a subregion within the Greater Black Sea region. Turkey has acted as a major power in this region and made it a task upon itself to maintain the status quo created by the 1936 Montreux Convention
Regarding the Regime of the Straits, which regulated the passage of military and commercial sea vessels through Turkish Straits. Turkish strategic thinking toward the 4 The case in point is Turkey’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite its paying special attention to developing close ties with Azerbaijan, Turkey did its utmost not to challenge Russia directly, which subjected the government of the time to heavy criticism both at home and in Baku. Nonetheless, as one Turkish analyst noted, the Turks harbored a desire to expand their influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia at the expense of Russia in the long run and supported Azerbaijan proactively in that regard. See: Süha Bölükba , "Ankara's Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?" Middle East Journal 51, no. 1 (1997). 228
Black Sea basin is predicated on the assumption that maintenance of the Montreux regime on the passage of military vessels is essential to uphold regional stability, and advance Turkish interests.5 In the post-Cold War era, the risk of instability posed by the frozen conflicts and nonconventional threats in the Greater Black Sea area has been a constant source of worry for Turkish foreign policy. However, since Russia lost its dominant position, as it was confined to two ports only, in the emerging balance of power, Turkey perceived no direct threat from the Black Sea region and has since valued the continuation of the current military and political balance. Moreover, parallel to the emergence of the Black Sea as a vital corridor for transportation of hydrocarbons from the Caspian basin and Russia, Turkey also considered this region a key component of its energy security. As a result, Turkey followed a cautious policy in the Black Sea, and underscored the importance of maintaining the balance of power.6 In short, Turkey’s
Black Sea policy and position on the Montreux regime are the best examples of Turkey’s behavior as a status quo power in the region.
Turkish-Georgian-American Strategic Partnership
As Turkey worked to advance its role in the post-Soviet space, it was engaged in an unfolding pattern of alliances, involving the regional powers, smaller powers in the region and other extraregional great powers. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey pursued an ambitious Eurasia policy. However, over time it watered down the parameters of its Eurasia policy and concentrated its efforts on
5 Ali L. Karaosmano lu, "Naval Security in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean: A Turkish View," The International Spectator 28, no. 4 (1993). 6 Bülent Karadeniz, "Security and Stability Architecture in the Black Sea," Perceptions 12, no. 4 (2007). 229
deepening ties with the more proximate South Caucasus and the Black Sea. As Turkey’s
major gateway to the Caucasus and Central Asia, Georgia increasingly gained
prominence in Turkey’s strategic priorities in the region.7 For Turkey, Georgia provides
access to the Caucasus and enables direct territorial ties to Azerbaijan. Moreover, major
existing and proposed gas and crude pipelines which are promoted by Turkey pass
through the Georgian territory. As a result, Georgia became “‘the most important
country’ for Turkish security, whose independence should be protected at all cost.”8
In the emerging political geometry of the Caucasus, Georgia constituted the
weakest link of the chain of the pro-Western alliances. The country was composed of
myriad ethnic groups which had links with their kin in neighboring countries. Beset with
political instability, and the challenges posed by the separatist rebellions and civil war
since the independence, Georgia’s major security predicament was to ensure nation-
building and expand the control of the central government throughout the country.9 The
civil war in the immediate aftermath of the independence, in particular, left two
interrelated legacies: the issue of breakaway regions and the presence of Russian military
bases on Georgian soil.
7 Turkey and Georgia share a 112-kilometer long land border, and are connected through a growing number of land and rail transportation networks, power grids and pipelines. Mehmet Dikkaya and Deniz Özyak r, "Developing Regional Cooperation among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects," Perceptions 13, no. 1-2 (2008). 8 This is how one Turkish scholar summarized the importance of Georgia, based on his discussions with officials from the Foreign Ministry and Turkish Armed Forces. See: Mustafa Ayd n, "Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus," Turkish Studies 5, no. 2 (2004): 12. 9 Naturally, the situation was no different for Azerbaijan and Armenia, and they also went through similar troubles. For an overview of these challenges, and different paths taken by these countries in the initial years of independence, see: Alexander Rondeli, "Regional Security Prospects in the Caucasus," in Bertsch et al., eds., Crossroads and Conflict. 230
The Georgian foreign policy, consequently, was driven by a concern to ally with
external powers to quell domestic threats to the survival of the regime.10 To contain the
threat of territorial dismemberment, Georgian interim administration and later President
Shevardnadze solicited Russia’s assistance, which initially helped pacify the conflicts
through the signing of the Sochi agreement. However, this development came at the
expense of the independent foreign policy course advocated by Georgia. By 1994, Russia
was able to regain four bases in strategic locations, deploy its forces in Georgia under the
cloak of ‘peacekeepers’ in the separatist regions, and jointly patrol Georgia’s
international borders with Turkey. Moreover, in 1993, Georgia had to join the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).11
Georgia’s fragile state structure and the constant Russian attempts to destabilize
Georgia and regain control over this nation constituted the biggest challenge to American
and Turkish policies to elevate Georgia as a central component of their policies in the
region. Any erosion of independence and Western-orientation of Georgia and its drift
toward Russia would also endanger Turkey’s connection to the region and increase
Azerbaijan’s exposure to Russian influence.12 Increasingly, therefore, the foundations for
a strategic partnership between Turkey, Georgia and the United States were laid.
10 Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Mohammad Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998). 11 For a history of this period, see: Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 155-215; Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Etnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2001), Chapter 4. 12 Therefore, many area experts writing at the time were calling on the Western policy community to pay attention to the ‘geopolitical pivot’ role of Georgia and engage this country as much as Azerbaijan. 231
After the initial phase of soliciting Russia’s patronage, Georgian central
government pursued closer relations with the United States and other European
institutions to resolve its ethnic challenges. By the mid-1990s, a process was underway
whereby Georgia reoriented its foreign policy toward Ankara and the West and
disengaged from the Russian orbit. This process was paralleled by changes in Turkish
and American policies toward Georgia and the Caucasus. Following a brief period (1991-
1994) of avoiding confrontation with Russia in its backyard, Washington moved on to
extend its influence in the region.13 What led to a reevaluation of Georgia was the
realization of the strategic value of the Georgian territory.14 Since Turkey and Azerbaijan
worked to alienate Armenia through geographic isolation, Georgia remained the only
option for Turkey to have direct territorial connection to Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
Consequently, Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the United States in the subsequent
years, advocated the Georgian territory as the major outlet for the pipeline projects from
the region.
The unfolding energy geopolitics provided the fragile Georgian leadership with a
golden opportunity. In this new setting, Turkey and the United States increasingly had a
stake in the stability and territorial integrity of the Georgian state in order to ensure the
security of the energy infrastructure. To reduce the risks posed by Georgia’s
vulnerability, they worked to bolster the political restructuring of the central government
13 Brenda Shaffer, "US Policy," in The South Caucasus: A challenge for the EU, ed. Dov Lynch (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper No.65, 2003), 54-57. Especially the announcement of the Silk Road Strategy Support Act in 1999 marked the change in US engagement toward the region. Full text is available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html. 14 The most direct route to Ceyhan from Azerbaijan would run through Armenia and Eastern Turkey, but the Azeri-Turkish-Armenian disputes made this option obsolete. American objection to Iran also removed it from the table, leaving Georgia as the only route for the alternative main export line, bypassing Russian- dominated traditional networks. 232
and boost its military capabilities, which became a precondition for economic prosperity.
Turkey aligned its policies with the United States to maintain Georgia’s, along with other
new states’, independence and stable economic and political transformation.15
Georgia’s growing ties with Turkey and the United States and the substantial
amount of assistance it received from them helped consolidate the Georgian central
government and prevented it from falling down the path of state failure. Especially after
1994, when the parameters of the new energy transportation routes took shape, Turkey
abandoned its negligent attitudes and started to support the Georgian government. As a
reflection of this changing policy, Turkey also revised its position on the ethnic conflict
in Georgia and threw its weight behind the central government.16
Turkey thus played a pivotal role in the reorientation of Georgian foreign policy.
While improving its own ties with Georgia, Turkey also facilitated the American-
Georgian partnership and the integration of Georgia into the Western world. By the end
of the 1990s, Turkey and Georgia carried their relationship to a level of strategic
partnership.
Defense Cooperation
In addition to deepening economic partnership with Turkey and joining Western
energy transportation projects, Georgia enhanced defense cooperation with Turkey and
the United States both at a bilateral level and within the framework of NATO’s
15 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 115. 16 During the civil war, Turkey adopted rather a neutral approach. The presence of the Caucasian diaspora in Turkey prevented Turkey from an active involvement on the side of the central government. At times, Turkey even implicitly supported the cause of the separatist regions. 233
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Defense cooperation with Georgia had the
instrumental value of integrating Georgia into the transatlantic security architecture.
Moreover, it provided an additional impetus for maintaining and deepening commercial
relations. Following the signing of the first Turkish-Georgian defense cooperation
agreement in March 1997, which envisaged the construction of military training centers
by Turkey, the two countries concluded various other agreements over the subsequent
years, under which Turkish army contributed to the modernization and training of the
Georgian army and navy, and held various joint exercises. Georgia built an efficient
military force, capable of operating at NATO standards, as a result of the various joint
military projects with the Western powers.17 Moreover, through these military assistance
programs, the pro-Western regime of Shevardnadze brought the military under its
control, consolidated its position in domestic politics and established relative stability in
the country.
Turkish and American military assistance was driven by their concern to improve
the control of the Tbilisi regime over its territory and boost the security of the multi-
billion dollar pipeline infrastructure projects.18 Partnership with Georgia also served the
joint and unilateral interests of Turkey and the United States in the Caucasus. Georgia, in
return for the assistance it received from the West, acted as a perfect conduit for NATO’s 17 Mitat Çelikpala, "From a Failed State to a Weak One? Georgia and Turkish-Georgian Relations," The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 36, (2006). 18 Many of the potential pipeline routes through Georgian territory were going to pass near regions of Georgia which were populated by ethnic minorities and were sites of recent or potential ethnic separatist conflicts. Without addressing the volatile security situation in Georgia, it would have proved difficult, if not impossible, to convince international financial circles to invest in these projects. There were even proposals for the deployment of special peacekeeping forces, either under the banner of PfP or GUAM to protect the pipeline infrastructure and transportation routes in order to render the Georgian alternative feasible. Many of US and Turkish joint programs with the Georgian forces involved training to ensure the security of the pipeline infrastructure. The improved security conditions in the region eased the concerns of multilateral corporations and enabled the construction of the BTC. 234
expansion into the Caucasus.19 The United States also treated Georgia as a reliable
partner to implement its unilateral military initiatives in the region.20 Moreover, from
Turkey’s perspective, military cooperation served Ankara’s objective of curbing
Moscow’s military presence in the region. Turkish military planners were wary of
Russia’s military activities in the Caucasus in the early post-Cold War era. Russia still
maintained military bases in Georgia and exercised control over Georgia’s international
borders, including those with Turkey. Both through its unilateral initiatives and in
coordination with the American and NATO military assistance programs, Turkey hoped
to not only consolidate the Georgian regime domestically but also bolster its standing in
the region, so that it could switch Tbilisi to its own side in the regional balance of
power.21 Turkey trained Georgian military officers, equipped Georgian army, and built or
modernized its military bases to undercut its dependence on Moscow.22 These programs
improved Georgia’s military capabilities and reduced its dependence on Russia, paving
the way for the closing of Russian military bases in Georgia and transferring of border
controls to Georgian forces. Turkey even acquired the right to use the Marneuli base,
which it modernized, as a logistical center.
19 For instance, Tbilisi was eager to provide a venue for many of NATO’s important conferences, training programs or workshops on regional security, as well as hosting Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises. Reflecting this mood, the first destination of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana’s February 1997 historic visit to the Caucasus was Georgia. 20 For instance, bolstering the military capabilities of Georgia served the US counter-proliferation efforts in the Caucasus, of which Georgia became the centerpiece. Glen E. Howard, "NATO and the Caucasus," in NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 165. 21 Kamil A acan, "Gürcistana Yönelik Artan Rus Bask lar ve Türkiye," Stratejik Analiz 1, no.4 (August 2000): 35. 22 As an expression of its support for Georgia in order to curb Russia’s role in the region, Turkey declined to sign protocols with the Russian forces in control of Georgia’s borders with Turkey. Ali Faik Demir, Türk D Politikas Perspektifinden Güney Kafkasya ( stanbul: Ba lam, 2003), 292. 235
The Balance Sheet: Achievements of the Turkish-American
Partnership with Georgia
The availability of the Western anchor rendered Georgia more confident in
regional affairs, and helped it steer away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. The
seismic transformations taking place in the global balance of power also worked to
Georgia’s advantage, as it sought to break free of its former patron. Georgian leader
Shevardnadze, nonetheless, still avoided any direct confrontation with Russia and
preferred to maintain a balanced relationship with rival powers.23 Shevardnadze’s
cautious policy was understandable, especially considering the resurgence of Russian
imperial policy in the region in the late-1990s and early-2000s.24 After coming to power
in 1999, the new Russian President Vladimir Putin embarked on a campaign to turn the
tide and regain the ground lost to the West. For small regional countries such as Georgia,
therefore, the most feasible strategy to protect themselves against Russian threat was to
seek the patronage of the United States, yet at the same time avoid agitating Moscow.25
At the turn of the millennium, the Turkish and Georgian leaders were
unequivocally describing the bilateral relations as ‘strategic partnership,’ as they
continued to sign new military cooperation agreements and deepen bilateral economic
ties.26 Turkey’s flourishing relationship with Georgia was facilitated by the active
23 Jones, "Turkish Strategic Interests," 58; Çelikpala, "From A Failed State," 196. 24 Shevardnadze even escaped several assassination attempts, which he blamed on the forces that did not want to see the realization of the pipelines passing through the Georgian territory. 25 Nonetheless, one analyst notes that Georgia adopted a more aggressive and spoken criticism toward Russia than Azerbaijan. Svante E. Cornell, Georgia after the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for US Policy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 27. This fact might partly explain why Russia especially focused on Georgia, despite the fact that both countries in essence followed the same pro-Western and anti-Russia policy. 26 For instance during Shevardnanze’s visit to Turkey in January 2001, the two parties signed a military- industrial cooperation agreement. 236
encouragement and assistance of the United States. To institutionalize these
multidimensional ties, in addition to the Turkish-Georgian and American-Georgian
bilateral agreements,27 Turkish-American-Georgian trilateral mechanisms were launched
in 2001 to foster cooperation both in economic and security affairs. Moreover, a parallel
trilateral process among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan was also initiated.28
Though its pro-Western orientation contributed to state consolidation in Georgia,
such efforts overall irritated Russia which viewed the involvement of outside actors as
attempts to curb its influence in the region. Moreover, the unfolding geopolitical struggle
in the Caucasus between the West and Russia, of which Georgia became one of the main
battlefronts, exacerbated the transformation of this weak state into a stable country.
Georgia’s emergence to a central role in pro-Western groupings in the Caucasus invited
the ire of Moscow which then in some cases worked to undermine the central government
and support the separatist regions.29
The Georgian leadership increasingly came to believe that Russia was
purposefully perpetuating the ‘frozen conflicts’ to maintain its grip over Georgia, and
justify its military presence in the country. Due to the presence of Russian troops on the
Georgian soil and Russia’s patronage of the breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South 27 Kamil A acan, "ABD'nin Gürcistan’a Asker Göndermesi: Terörle Mücadelede Üçüncü Cephe mi, Yoksa Köprüba m ?," Stratejik Analiz 2, no. 24 (April 2002). 28 The joint fight against terrorism and cooperation in energy security especially constituted the basis of the trilateral process. In April 2002, presidents of the two countries signed several agreements. "Caucasus Cooperation Agreement against Terrorism Signed," Turkish Daily News, 1 May 2002. An agreement was reached on holding the summit regularly in the coming years: Disisleri Güncesi, April 2002. For more on the impact of the summit on the region, see: Hasan Kanbolat, "Türkiye-Azerbaycan-Gürcistan Zirvesi ve Bölgedeki Ortak: Ermenistan," Stratejik Analiz 3, no. 26 (2002). In July 2003, a protocol was signed among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on cooperation in the safety of the East-West energy corridor. They agreed to establish a Joint Pipeline Security Commission and cooperate in the mutual training of members of security units. "Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia Speed up Security of the East-West Energy Pipeline," Anatolia News Agency, 14 October 2005. 29 Güner Özkan, "Gürcistan’da Yeni Yönetim, Etnik Ayr l kç Bölgeler ve Güvenlik," in Orta Asya ve Kafkasya’da Güç Politikas , ed. M. Turgut Demirtepe (Ankara: USAK Yay nlar , 2008), 212. 237
Ossetia remained outside the de facto authority of the Tbilisi regime.30 Therefore, subsequent Georgian administrations pursued two interrelated goals of solving the minorities problem and reintegrating Georgia by expanding Tbilisi’s effective control over the breakaway regions, and ending the Russian military presence in the country.
Russian Reactions to Western Military Cooperation with Georgia
Despite the Russian acquiescence to the dispatch of American military advisors to
Georgia in the aftermath of the September 11,31 the subsequent pace of bilateral defense cooperation between Georgia and the United States increased the concerns of Moscow over the growing American military presence in the Caucasus. Especially after Georgia submitted its application for membership into NATO in the fall of 2002, Russia started to perceive the Western military presence in the country as directed against itself, and increasingly as a source of threat to its security interests. Since Russia viewed the South and North Caucasus as part of the same security system, the growing visibility of the
30 Although Adjara avoided the carnage of the civil war, under the leadership of a local strongman, Aslan Abashidze, it declared autonomy unilaterally. The presence of a Russian military brigade in the region and Shevardnadze’s reliance on Abashidze’s political support facilitated Adjara’s de facto autonomy from Tbilisi. Turkey has special ties with Adjara. Russia also manipulated its military presence in another region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, populated by majority ethnic Armenians, which also created another source of ethnic tension for Georgia. Since this region was home to Meskhetian Turks, who were deported by Stalin to Central Asia during the Second World War, it also constitutes another area of interest for Turkey. See: Resul Yalç n, "Turkey’s Primary Concerns in Georgia: An Analysis of Three Cases," Insight Turkey 6, no. 2 (2004). 31 The collegial relations between Washington and Moscow in the aftermath of September 11, and the new geopolitical setting led some analysts to claim that “the fact that Turkey and the US, on the one hand, and Russia on the other, are no longer seen to be in opposing camps after 11 September has transformed the South Caucasus from an object of competition among the three powers to a potential arena for mutual contact and cooperation.” Fiona Hill, "Seismic Shifts in Eurasia: The Changing Relationship Between Turkey and Russia and its Implications for the South Caucasus," in Strategic Developments in Eurasia after 11 September, ed. Shireen Hunter (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 69. 238
West in the region was viewed as an unwanted development, which might eventually
weaken Russia’s control over North Caucasus as well.32
Saakashvili and the Road to the 2008 War
Meanwhile, domestic turmoil in Georgia resulted in a change of government,
which set the background for a path of vicious cycles of escalation involving Tbilisi,
Moscow and the breakaway regions. Shevardnadze’s inability to solve governance
problems and the shortfalls in the democratization process brought a new leadership to
power on a prodemocratization agenda, following the so-called Rose revolution.33 The
new President Mikhael Saakashvili initiated major reforms, which further consolidated
Georgia’s Western orientation. He maintained Georgia’s commitment to the joint energy
projects with the West, and continued to value the partnership with Turkey, as reflected
in the fact that he paid one of his first visits to Turkey.34 Georgia also deepened defense
cooperation with the West in order to bolster its military capabilities against domestic and
regional threats. The American assistance was decisive in Georgia’s military
restructuring, and the new government in Tbilisi did everything to gain Washington’s
favor to sustain it. Georgia increasingly relied on bandwagoning with the United States to
32 Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper No.86, 2006), 50; "Georgia is a Bridgehead for US Offensive against the Russian Caucasus," Pravda, 4 June 2005. 33 For an overview of domestic governance problems, shadow and conflict economy, corruption and organized crime which undermined the power of the Georgian regime, see: David Darchiashvili, "Georgian Security Problems and Policies," in Lynch, ed., The South Caucasus, 111-116. 34 Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Georgia: Hopeful President Pays First Official Visit To Turkey," RFE/RL, 20 May 2004. In the “National Security Concept of Georgia’ announced in 2005 after years of preparation, Turkey was defined as ‘strategic partner’ along with the United States and Ukraine. Calling Turkey the ‘leading regional partner of Georgia,’ the document praised Turkey’s contributions to the economic restructuring and enhancement of defense capabilities of the country. Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia (2005) Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12&info_id=9052. 239
obtain diplomatic and military backing in regional affairs and consolidate its domestic security.35 In response, Russia adopted a critical rhetoric toward Western plans, sending warnings that it would be forced to take defensive precautions.36 However, rather than backing down in the face of Russian threats, Georgia remained defiant, and further accelerated defense cooperation with the United States and NATO, including intelligence sharing.
Meanwhile, independent of Georgia’s ties with the West, Putin continued his policy of reasserting Russian influence in the near abroad, of which Georgia again became one of the main targets.37 Georgia’s defense cooperation with the West failed to balance the Russian threat, and in fact increasingly turned out to be self-defeating. Far from deterring Moscow’s bullying, Western security assistance to Georgia invited harsher military reactions from Moscow. Russia dragged its feet on the withdrawal from its bases in Georgia, and more importantly it demonstrated a greater willingness to manipulate Georgia’s weaknesses to subjugate this country. Russia in particular resorted to two different instruments at its disposal: economic coercion and manipulation of ethnic tensions. In particular, by manipulating its military presence in the Caucasus, Russia 35 As part of these efforts, Georgia increasingly participated into US-led military operations, including the postconflict stabilization force in Iraq and other NATO peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. 36 "Russia Slams US Reconnaissance Flights in Georgia," RFE/RL Newsline, 10 July 2003. 37 Among the area studies experts, there are basically two different accounts of Russia’s increasingly assertive tone against Georgia, both of which depend on different assumptions about what drives Russian- Western relations. One line of argument assumes inherent imperialistic and offensive tendencies in the Kremlin’s policies and sees Russian bullying of Georgia simply as a product of Russia’s attempts to ‘re- conquer’ the sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and achieve long-term domination. Cornell, Georgia after the Rose; Vladimir Socor, "Georgia under Growing Russian Pressure ahead of Bush-Putin Summit," Eurasia Daily Monitor 2, no. 32 (2005). Another school of thought assumes that it is the West, not Russia, that is on the offensive, hence emphasizing the reactionary nature of Russian policies and tending to view them as driven by Russia’s fear of Western encroachment in its neighborhoods. Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Obstacles to US-Russian Cooperation in the Caucasus and Ukraine," in Prospects for US- Russian Security Cooperation, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). In the IR theoretical terms, in essence, the first group assumes that Russia acts as an offensive realist, while the second group attributes defensive realist motivations to Russia. 240
continued to arm the separatist regions and warned Tbilisi against resorting to military
instruments to regain control over breakaway regions.
Accelerating Tensions
As Russia was seen as the main stumbling block before the reintegration of
Georgia, and the major threat to the independence of this nation, the Russian-Georgian
bilateral relations were increasingly set on a collision course. The escalation of the
confrontation wove them into a security dilemma, which culminated in the August 2008
war.38 Moreover, the reduction of the region’s role in American foreign policy to
America’s global interests led to a situation whereby American policy makers gave little
consideration to the implications of the American penetration into the South Caucasus
RSC. Although the militarization of Georgia by the United States continued under
different programs,39 American policymakers did not pay enough attention to how such
policies would alter the local security dynamics.
Against the background of reckless policies pursued by the Saakashvili regime,
Turkey’s policy on Georgia also went through a major transformation. Despite the
continuation of Turkish-Georgian cooperation, Turkey’s commitment to the Turkish-
Georgian-American alignment gradually deteriorated in this period owing to various
interconnected reasons: the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, as opposed to Turkish-
38 For a detailed analysis of the shift from engagement to confrontation in the Russian policy toward Georgia after the Rose revolution in 2003, see: Andrei P. Tsygankov and Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, "Duelling Honors: Realism, Constructivism and the Russia-Georgia Divide," Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 4 (2009). The authors identify four distinct stages in this escalation ranging from nascent cooperation (November 2003-June 2004), passive containment (August 2004-September 2006), active containment (September 2006-March 2008) to military confrontation (March 2008-August 2008). 39 Theresa Freese, "Georgian Defense Minister Visits Washington, Seeks to Strengthen US-Georgian Security Ties," Eurasia Insight, 23 May 2005. 241
American disengagement; Turkey’s concerns over the growing confrontation between the
United States/Georgia and Russia;40 Turkey’s reservations about the wave of colored
revolutions;41 and Turkey’s relative disengagement from the South Caucasus.42
August 2008 War
The spiraling of escalations continued unabated. For a brief period following his
reelection in January 2008, Saakashvili appeared to be making overtures to Russia.
However, his short-lived efforts to start a more cooperative era with Russia were soon
replaced by a renewed wave of crises, which descended bilateral relations to their lowest
ebb. Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 brought the Russian-
Western relations to a tipping point, as Russia forcefully protested this development and
soon announced that it would withdraw from the sanctions regime imposed on Abkhazia
by the CIS. In the subsequent months, Russia reinforced its peacekeepers in the
breakaway regions, and deepened direct ties with them, circumventing the Georgian
central government.43 In the meantime, Georgia also increasingly engaged in its own acts
of provocation and bullying against the breakaway regions, while at the same time
accusing Moscow of moving toward de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
through acts of tightening Russian jurisdiction. In an environment where Moscow acted 40 Oktay F. Tanr sever, "11 Eylül 2001 Sonras Dönemde Gürcistan’ n ç ve D Siyasetinde Meydana Gelen Son Geli melerin Türkiye Aç s ndan Önemi," Stratejik Ara t rmalar Dergisi 2, no. 4 (2004): 115- 116; Mustafa ahin, "Gürcistan Ziyareti ve Mikhail Saaka vili’nin Göreve Geli i," Stratejik Analiz 4, no. 47 (2004). 41 Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey and the Greater Black Sea Region," in Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey, ed. Nur in Ate o lu Güney (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 130. 42 Mustafa Ayd n, Beklenen Sava Sonunda (Yanl Yerde!) Ba lad (Ankara: TEPAV Politika Notu, No.11, 2008), 5. 43 For instance, Russia issued a directive in April 2008 to accelerate government-to-government ties with the separatist regions, while at the same time beefing up its consular presence there and announcing that it would recognize the documents issued by the separatist regions as legitimate. 242
as the patron of the breakaway regions and expressed its determination to protect them
against Georgian aggression, the growing number of incidents involving mutual
accusations between the Tbilisi government and the breakaway regions of violations of
ceasefire and of war preparations made the security situation in the region highly fragile
through June and July. Georgian shelling of South Ossetia escalated tensions in July. The
involvement of the international actors could not prevent the subsequent rounds of
escalation, as each side maintained their provocative actions.
On the evening of August 7, 2008, Georgian forces launched their assault on the
South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali to “reestablish the constitutional order.” During the
shelling of the city by heavy artillery, the Georgian forces killed scores of civilians as
well as several Russian peacekeepers and soldiers. Long awaiting such an opportunity to
arise, Russian forces responded promptly and advanced into Georgian territory, backed
by armored battalions, and Russian air force and navy units. At the end of the six-day
war, Russia defeated Georgia, inflicting heavy damage on the Georgian army and
advancing into Georgian territory. Following the war, Russia also recognized the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite the criticisms coming from the
international community.44
44 For chronologies of the crisis, see: Nicolai N. Petro, "Crisis in the Caucasus: A Unified Timeline, August 7-16, 2008". Available at: http://www.npetro.net/resources/Crisis_in_the_Caucasus.pdf; "The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy," Spiegel International Online, 25 August 2008. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,574812,00.html. The following website also provides a comparative account of the Russian and Georgian accounts of the events: http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/gordon-hahns-underground-.html. 243
Turkish Policy During the 2008 Crisis:
A Critical Chronological Account45
The conflict caught Turkey by a surprise, and during the first few days of the
crisis, Ankara largely pursued a reactive policy. When the clashes between Georgian and
South Ossetian forces broke out, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a
statement underscoring that Turkey was following the developments with great concern.
The MFA also emphasized that Turkey was supporting peaceful resolution of the dispute,
and called on the parties to refrain from accelerating the tensions further and to engage in
direct talks. On the same day, Prime Minister Erdo an spoke to Georgian President
Saakashvili on the phone and expressed similar concerns. Though reiterating Turkey’s
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, Erdo an called on Saakashvili to declare
ceasefire and explore nonmilitary avenues to address the problem. In response to
Georgia’s request, Turkey provided additional electricity to Georgia to prevent the
shortages in this country caused by the Russian counter-offensive on Georgian
infrastructure. On August 10, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan telephoned his Georgian and
Russian counterparts and expressed his concern about the escalation of the conflict.
Noting that the clashes posed a serious threat to the regional peace and stability, he
offered Turkey’s readiness to provide humanitarian assistance. Without criticizing the
violation of Georgian sovereignty by Russia, Babacan underscored the importance of
preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity and political unity.
45 The chronological account here is based on the author’s review of MFA’s official statements and press releases, Turkish newspapers, as well as the secondary sources. 244
During the first days of the crisis, Russian media repeatedly published reports blaming Turkey and the United States for arming Georgia and provoking it against
Russia.46 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov maintained that those countries that had provided arms to Georgia despite Moscow’s warnings shared the responsibility for
‘Georgian atrocities.’ In an illustrative development, Russian jets were bombing the
Georgian bases that were modernized by Turkish armed forces, including the Marneuli base which Turkey had a right to use. Abkhaz politicians visiting Ankara were also blaming Turkey for having provided military equipment and training to Georgian forces in the past, which in their view encouraged Georgia to adopt more aggressive policies against the separatist republics. They also criticized Turkey of failing to condemn unequivocally Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia.47
Immediately after the outbreak of the crisis, the representatives from the MFA and Chief of Staff held emergency meetings to develop contingency plans. They underlined that if the conflict could not be contained it would present two challenges to
Turkey: inflow of refugees into Turkey and disruption of oil and gas transportation through Georgian territory. Therefore, Turkey decided to join international efforts to prevent the crisis from escalating into a large scale war. To forestall unwanted consequences in the event that mediation efforts failed, Turkish armed forces prepared contingency plans to respond to refuge movements and protect the pipeline infrastructure.48
46 Ahmet Ba çeci, "Rusya Sava tan Türkiye'yi Sorumlu Tuttu," Gazeteport, 10 August 2008. 47 "Gürcistan Türkiye’den Ald Silahlarla Vuruyor," Radikal, 10 August 2008. 48 "Ankara’n n Derdi BTC Petrol Boru Hatt ile Göç," Radikal, 10 August 2008. 245
Turkey’s Diplomatic Offensive
Later, the Turkish government adopted a proactive policy centered on the provision of mediation services in the crisis. Initially, Turkish press speculated that Putin did not return Erdo an’s call and Lavrov called Babacan back only two days after
Babacan tried to contact him. Though Turkish government denied these reports, it appeared that during the height of the military operations, Russian leaders were not enthusiastic for dialogue with Turkey. By the time the Tbilisi government admitted defeat, Russia did not show interest in mediation efforts. Despite Georgia’s announcement that it would halt its military activities in South Ossetia, Russia continued the offensive, extending its operations into Georgian territory. Meanwhile, the Abkhazian attack on Georgia to drive out Tbilisi’s forces from the region put Turkey on high alert, considering Turkey’s ties to Abkhazia.
The continuation of Russian military operations prompted Turkey to assume a larger role to pacify the conflict. As the Turkish FPE was assessing the rapidly unfolding developments, initially it was not clear what position Turkey would take, and how it would define its involvement in the conflict. Soon, there emerged a consensus that
Turkey should maintain a neutral position among the combatants and confine its role to mediation efforts alone.49 Within this framework, on August 11, Erdo an spoke to the
UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon, exploring the possibilities of putting an end to the hostilities. He called on the UN to play a more effective role to restore peace and stability in the region. Erdo an also gave indications of his plans to form a new regional initiative among the Caucasian countries to address such crises in the future. 49 This was in line with Turkey’s efforts to interject itself as a peace-broker in regional affairs, which became especially visible in the Middle East. 246
On August 11, Saakashvili called Erdo an, asking for Turkey’s assistance in ending the armed conflict. Although the details of Georgia’s requests beyond humanitarian assistance were not available, a representative from the Georgian embassy in Ankara underlined that Georgia had requested formally military assistance from all friendly countries, including Turkey.50 Though accelerating its humanitarian aid, Turkey, however, did not commit to supply any military equipment in response to this call. On
August 12, Turkish president Abdullah Gül emphasized Turkey’s interest in the preservation of Georgia’s territorial integrity, and added that Turkey would do its utmost to restore peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Gül also expressed support for
Erdo an’s proposal for an alliance of Caucasus countries, arguing that the region urgently needed conflict prevention mechanisms. The following day, Gül spoke with his Russian and Georgian counterparts to evaluate the developments. He repeated Turkey’s position on the conflict, called on all parties to maintain dialogue, and emphasized the need for conflict resolution mechanisms to stabilize the region. A statement from the Russian embassy in Ankara noted that Russia appreciated Turkey’s concerns.51
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP)
As part of Turkey’s efforts to play a more active role in the crisis, Erdo an first raised the possibility of forming a Caucasus ‘alliance’ on August 11, which would bring together countries of the Caucasus along with the United States, the EU and Russia. He also added that for this idea to be practical, it needed to be discussed under UN auspices.
However, in his subsequent contacts on the issue, he opted for a narrow definition of the 50 "Gürcistan, Türkiye’den Askeri Yard m stedi," Milliyet, 12 August 2008. 51 "Rusya: Türkiye'nin Endi elerini Anl yoruz, Tutumundan Memnunuz," Zaman, 13 August 2008. 247
organization’s membership so that it could be composed of regional countries only, though being based on the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).52
Erdo an’s publicizing of this project came during his trip to Moscow, which captured the attention of the international community, because the project increasingly appeared as an instrument to exclude the Western powers from the region. As a ceasefire agreement was reached, Erdo an, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, travelled to Moscow on August 13, where he met the Russian president and prime minister. During his working dinner with Russian leaders, he conveyed the proposal for the Caucasus alliance to his Russian counterparts. Erdo an later told reporters that the foreign ministers of both countries would continue to work on the project, so that a mechanism for solving disputes before they broke out could be developed. As it became clear that Turkey would not go along with the US plans in Georgia, Russian leaders for their part expressed their satisfaction with Turkey’s attitude and praised the constructive role Turkey was playing in the crisis. Russian media also ceased its anti-Turkish rhetoric and started to argue that Turkey prioritized its economic interests with Russia over
Georgia and decided to support Russian policy.53
Erdo an solicited the participation of the regional countries to this organization during his diplomatic tour, while Foreign Minister Babacan and President Gül also promoted it through their contacts with other stakeholders. On August 14, Erdo an travelled to Tbilisi, where he emphasized the value Turkey placed on Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Erdo an committed to provide 52 "Erdo an Acil Önlem çin Devreye Girdi," Sabah, 12 August 2008. 53 "Türkiye Israrla ‘Kafkas Pakt ’ Diyor," Radikal, 16 August 2008. 248
humanitarian aid and assist the reconstruction of the war-torn provinces in Georgia.
Saakashvili also thanked Erdo an for Turkey’s help in this regard, and asked Turkey to work together with Georgia for the country’s recovery and ending the occupation.
Erdo an extended the Caucasus pact idea to Georgia as well. He also discussed the security of pipelines, an issue which became a central concern for Turkey, amidst news reports that pipeline infrastructure also came under attack. Erdo an added that this issue would be handled in coordination with Azerbaijan, which was his next station. On
August 20, Erdo an visited Baku to discuss the developments with the Azeri president
Elham Aliyev. Considering the threat the conflict posed to the joint projects with
Georgia, ensuring the safety of the pipelines occupied a major part of their agenda.
Erdo an also extended his invitation for the Caucasus pact idea to Aliyev, who expressed an interest to join. Following his contacts in Baku, Erdo an was maintaining clearly that the CSCP should be based on ‘geography’ and bring together regional countries to achieve regional peace and security, as well as boosting economic cooperation and energy security.54
Over time, the CSCP emerged as an end in itself for Turkish diplomacy in the
Caucasus, for most of Turkey’s contacts with regional countries were centered on attempts to realize this project. Meanwhile, Babacan maintained communication with his counterparts from the United States and Europe, who were also seeking to mediate in the crisis, to inform them about Turkey’s contacts with the combatants. During the emergency NATO summit, which will be discussed later, Babacan clarified that Turkey understood it as a ‘platform,’ because ‘alliance’ would be an inappropriate term. The
54 "Kafkas ttifak Önemli," Milliyet, 21 August 2008. 249
follow-up work on the project was pursued at foreign ministerial level, as Babacan
pursued in coordination with Lavrov and other foreign ministers to materialize it.
Turkish officials and press presented extensive shuttle diplomacy in the midst of
the conflict and the CSCP proposal as a great achievement on the part of Turkish
diplomacy.55 The Speaker of Parliament was arguing that Erdo an’s visits to Moscow
and Tbilisi played a major role in convincing the parties to sign the peace agreement. He
added: “the fact that Turkey’s influence in the region is recognized and our help is
solicited for the solution of problems vindicates Turkey’s importance to the world.”56
Despite this rhetoric of grandiose, however, Turkey’s efforts failed to change Russian
plans in Georgia.57 On the same day Erdo an was visiting Tbilisi where he was
underlining the need for preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity, Lavrov was telling the
international community that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not be able to remain as
part of Georgia, adding that the world could “forget about Georgia’s territorial integrity.”
This development highlighted the fact that not only Turkey, but also the international
community were unable to exert any pressure on Russia.
55 Many press reports were maintaining that Erdo an used his influence over Moscow and Tbilisi to prevent the escalation of the conflict. "Türkiye Art k Büyük Oyuncu," Sabah, 15 August 2008; "Kafkaslara Bar Getirdi," Yeni afak, 15 August 2008. 56 The Speaker of Parliament was maintaining that the crisis once again vindicated that Turkey was surrounded by regions that were ready to explode at any time and therefore it should be prepared meet such challenges through proactive diplomacy. "Dünya Önemimizi Anlad ," Anadolu Ajans , 16 August 2008. 57 In some private conversations, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials said that during their summit with Russian leaders, Erdo an and Babacan urged them “to cease the hostilities and certainly not march on Tbilisi.” Andrew C. Kuchins and Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey, Russia, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia," in Turkey's Evolving Dynamics: Strategic Choices for US-Turkey Relations, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 62. 250
International Mediation Efforts
Just like Turkey’s, the response of the international community, including the
Western powers and various international organizations, was largely confined to offering
mediation services in the Georgia-Russia conflict.58 Many countries appeared to have
believed that both sides in the conflict shared the blame and the most immediate issue
was to institute a ceasefire regime between the combatants and ensure the delivery of
urgent humanitarian relief. American officials most vocally condemned Russian
aggression on Georgian territory, to no avail. Although the United States sought to
involve the United Nations in this crisis, Russia effectively blocked such efforts. Russia,
in particular, referred to Western policies in Kosovo to counter criticisms coming from
the United States and other European members of the UN Security Council.
Even after Georgia withdrew from South Ossetia and called for a ceasefire,
Russia refused to reciprocate, and took its offensive into Georgian territory, leaving a
wreckage in the Georgian city of Gori and shelling its Black Sea port of Poti. As almost
two-thirds of Georgian territory came under Russian occupation, French president
Nicolas Sarkozy made a successful attempt to reach out to Russia, which paid some
dividends. Following his meeting with Medvedev and Saakashvili, Sarkozy was able to
broker a ceasefire deal. The ceasefire was often violated, while the EU endeavored to
play a larger role in the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement and pacify the region.
The OSCE also decided to increase the number of observers serving in its mission in
Georgia to monitor compliance with the ceasefire terms. As an indication for its support
58 For a review of international mediation efforts, see: Congressional Research Service, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for US Interests (3 March 2009), 17-23. 251
for the international community’s efforts, Turkey, moreover, responded to the OSCE’s call and sent two observers to take part in the initial emergency deployment.
Russia halted its operations inside Georgia, yet it openly supported the statements coming from the leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the effect that they would consider declaring independence. Lavrov’s statement that the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity was passé was a slap on the face of American officials who repeatedly expressed that the United States stood firm behind Georgia’s independence and Russia could face international isolation. To protest Russia’s actions, Georgia withdrew from the
CIS, while at the same time maintaining his criticism toward the Western powers, arguing that they had failed to integrate Georgia into NATO. Finally, the peace plan brokered by the European powers was signed on August 16. Nonetheless, Russia announced that its withdrawal from the Georgian territory could take some time.
American Attempts to Contain Russia
Following the cessation of conflicts, the major concern of the United States was to restore the status quo ante. Russia failed to live up to its pledges to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory promptly, under the EU-brokered 6-point peace plan. It also blocked the deployment of the OSCE-mandated observer team to monitor the ceasefire agreement. On the contrary, there were reports that Russia was moving short-range ballistic missiles into South Ossetia, which would boost its military presence in the region. More important, Russian forces occupying Georgia carried out operations to destroy Georgia’s remaining military assets and gain control of buffer zones inside the
Georgian territory close to the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not to mention 252
reports by international media that Russian troops and paramilitaries were engaged in acts
of destruction and looting against civilian infrastructure with the result that they were
creating ethnically-cleansed enclaves.59
Against this background, the United States also intensified the dose of criticism
against Russia’s intentions, giving signals that it could flex muscles to force Russian
compliance. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was accusing Russia of playing a ‘very
dangerous game’ with the Western community and sent warnings that NATO would not
let Russia realize its strategic objectives in Georgia, undermine the stability in Europe, or
draw a new Iron Curtain through the continent separating the new nations from the
transatlantic community. She went as far as maintaining that to thwart Russia’s
ambitions, NATO would if necessary punish Russia and rebuild Georgia.60 However, to
utilize many of those punitive instruments, such as preventing Russia’s bid for WTO
membership or barring it from the G-8, the United States needed the support of the
European allies.
As part of its efforts to form a joint position against Russia within the transatlantic
community, the United States called for an emergency NATO meeting to discuss the
situation in Georgia. Although the European allies all shared similar concerns about
Russian aggression and subsequent policies, and condemned Moscow’s noncompliance
with the peace plan and later recognition of the breakaway regions, they cautioned
against adopting a harsh reaction to Russia or seeking to isolate it politically. For
instance, Germany was maintaining that the Alliance should keep the channels of
59 Ibid. 60 Matthew Lee and Pauline Jelinek, "Rice: NATO Won't Let Russia Succeed in Georgia," The Seattle Times, 18 August 2008. 253
communication with Russia open.61 Only some East European countries were supportive
of American policy of giving a strong response to Russia, including dispatching
AWACSs to Georgia and suspending the NATO- Russia Council. As the United States
was seeking to obtain strong language critical of Russia, Russian diplomats warned that
any punitive action against Russia might undermine the existing security cooperation
with the West under the framework of the NATO-Russia Council.
The emergency NATO ministerial council on August 19 produced a weak
declaration condemning Russia and noting that relations with Russia would not normalize
before it withdrew its forces from Georgia. The NATO Secretary General warned
Russian leaders that unless they took concrete steps to abide by the peace-plan, they
should not expect ‘business as usual’ in relations with the West, also adding that NATO-
Russia Council meetings would be put on hold. NATO also decided to initiate a
consultation mechanism with Georgia (NATO-Georgia Commission), similar to the one
with Ukraine.
Babacan attending the meeting emphasized the unique position of Turkey in this
crisis, underlining that Turkey was the only NATO ally that shared borders with Georgia,
which made it extremely concerned about the developments. He called for political and
diplomatic dialogue with the parties in order to bring sustainable peace to the region. He
also briefed the Allies about Turkey’s proposed Caucasus platform and requested them to
support this project.62 Most important, on the American proposal for the dispatch of
AWACS to Georgian airspace, Turkey raised objections on the grounds that it would
61 Henrik Boesen and Lindbo Larsen, The Russo-Georgian War and beyond: Towards a European Great Power Concert (Copenhagen: DIIS Working Paper 32, 2009). 62 "Kafkasya stikrar ve birli i Platformu'na Destek Var," Sabah, 19 August 2008. 254
heighten the tensions between Russia and the West. Like many other European allies,
Turkey also objected to the freezing of the NATO-Russia Council.63
Controversy Over Transit of American Warships into the Black Sea
Following the cessation of clashes, American plans to send humanitarian assistance to Georgia emerged as the battleground for the unfolding confrontation between Washington and Moscow. When evaluated against the background of the rather hawkish discourse coming from Washington, such steps were raising tensions in the region. Especially American Vice President Dick Cheney was arguing for not letting
Russia get away without a punishment. The United States first airlifted medical supplies and humanitarian assistance with military aircraft. Since Russian forces were still present in Georgia, this development was interpreted as the most severe confrontation between
Russia and the West since the Kosovo incident in 1999.
Later, the discussions focused on sending two navy hospital ships to carry humanitarian aid to Georgia, which eventually put Turkey in a difficult situation and forced it to take a clearer position in the conflict. The Turkish government declined to issue permission, referring to the provisions of the Montreux Convention. While the total limit allowed by Montreux Convention for foreign ships was 45 thousand tons, the tonnage of only one of the ships was 69 thousand. Following consultations with Turkey, the United States finally decided to dispatch three smaller ships, namely the US destroyer
McFall, the coast guard cutter Dallas and the command ship USS Mount Whitney.64
63 "Bo azlar ve AWACS S k nt s ," Hürriyet, 20 August 2008. 64 Mike Mount, "Navy Ships Wait to Deliver Aid to Georgia," CNN, 20 August 2008. 255
As the three ships passed into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits on August
22, 2008, tensions were heightened in the Black Sea. Coincidentally, military vessels
from the Spanish, German, Polish and American navies were sailing through the Straits
in order to take part in a NATO exercise, which was planned one year earlier. The heavy
traffic in the Black Sea around the same time was a cause of major concern. The deputy
chief of the Russian General Staff immediately accused NATO of ratcheting up tensions
in the Black Sea. The Russian side even speculated that American ships were carrying
nuclear missiles with a range to hit Russian targets as far away as St. Petersburg. Russia
reminded Turkey of its duties under the Montreux Convention that ships from nonlittoral
countries were not allowed to stay longer than 21 days. Russian deputy chief of staff
added that if this stipulation was violated, Russia would hold Turkey responsible.65
In the height of these discussions, the MFA issued a statement on August 22,
underlining that all naval traffic through the Straits, including the passage of American
ships, was conducted according to the Montreux Convention. It also emphasized that the
activities of the ships attending the NATO exercise were consistent with the convention.
The next day, MFA released a special information note, in which it clarified the
Montreux provisions on military vessels, reiterating that Turkey had been implementing
them with great attention for 72 years. The statement also underlined that the Convention
was an essential element of maintaining ‘peace, security, and stability’ and the balance of
power in the Black Sea.66 Similarly, Turkey’s Chief of Staff and the Commander of the
65 "Rusya Karadeniz'deki Sava Gemilerinden Türkiye'yi Sorumlu Tuttu," Hürriyet, 28 August 2008. However, technically it is difficult to claim that it is only Turkey’s responsibility to ensure the evacuation of the naval forces from nonlittoral states, as the duty falls on all littoral states. 66 D i leri Bakanl , "Press Brief 11: Montrö Sözle mesi Uygulamalar Hakk nda Özet Not," (23 August 2008). 256
Navy underlined that Turkey studied the issue in great detail and implemented Montreux
properly. Erdo an also reiterated the same arguments, noting that Turkey would expect
everyone to remain committed to the existing agreements. Indeed, Turkey upheld the
spirit of the Convention and strictly enforced relevant provisions.67 The Russian side was
also pleased to see Turkey’s strict attachment to Montreux, which boosted the mutual
confidence between the two countries.68
Russian Recognition of Breakaway Regions
On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, arguing that it was dictated by humanitarianism. This move was against the
European-brokered six-point plan which called for international talks on the future of the
separatist regions. American and European officials expressed their regret about this
development and hinted that Russia might face the consequences of this action. Since this
development coincided with the increasing naval activity by NATO and American forces
in the Black Sea and Russian navy’s close surveillance of these ships, the tensions were
extremely high in the region.69 As a reaction to Western criticisms, Russia further
curtailed its relations with the West, signaling that it was not bothered by any Western
67 On 31 August 2008, the Turkish press speculated that the MFA miscalculated the tonnage of the ships. However, the MFA issued a note on the same day, denying those allegations. 68 The Russian ambassador to Ankara also criticized Washington’s behavior, and in response to the growing talks that the Montreux Convention might need to be modified, he underlined that Turkey and Russia shared the same position on the issue and they both believed that there was no need for a revision. "Russia calls full compliance to Montreux Convention," Turkish Daily News, 2 September 2008. 69 American ships carrying humanitarian aid arrived in Georgian ports around the same time. Initially American Embassy sources in Tbilisi announced that US forces were headed to the Georgian port of Poti despite the fact that it was under Russian blockage. Later, American ships were redirected to the Georgian port of Batumi to avoid a confrontation. 257
retaliation. At the same time, Russia also sought to obtain diplomatic backing of China
and other Asian countries by mobilizing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Russian recognition came as a shock to Ankara, as Turkish diplomats were in
direct talks with their Russian counterparts to discuss the CSCP,70 through which they
were hoping to make a tangible contribution to the solution of the problem. As underlined
earlier, Turkey’s growing visibility in regional diplomacy following Erdo an’s visits to
Moscow and Tbilisi and promotion of CSCP had somehow inflated Ankara’s self-
confidence that it was playing a leading role and could help restore the status quo ante.
The Russian move shattered this highly-inflated self-evaluation of Turkish diplomacy.
Following an emergency meeting of top state officials on the same day Russian
recognition was announced, the MFA released a statement saying that “Turkey attaches
importance to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and is
highly concerned about the recent developments. Turkey is of the opinion that this
conflict should be resolved through peaceful means.”71 Next day, Babacan held several
phone conversations with American, European and NATO officials to discuss this
development. In addition to conveying Turkey’s concerns, Babacan also exchanged
opinions with his counterparts on the CSCP.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev further shook the agenda, as the Western
political community was still trying to come to grips with the shock of Russian
recognition. On August 31, Medvedev laid out the new Russian foreign and security
70 The Deputy Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry responsible for Caucasus was in Moscow to discuss the CSCP. 71 D i leri Bakanl , "Press Release 158: Press Release Regarding the Independence of Georgia," (26 August 2008). 258
policy doctrine, which demonstrated Russia’s attempt to redefine the basic operating principles of the regional and global systems. Though underlining his respect for international law and cooperation, the doctrine questioned the legitimacy of an international system dominated by the United States and claimed Russia’s unhindered right to maintain a sphere of privileged interests in areas of strategic importance.72
Subsequent statements by Russian leaders reiterated similar arguments. Later, Medvedev proposed an alternative security pact that would circumvent the existing European security architecture built around the US and NATO, and would curb the monopoly of one country over European security.73
Under these conditions, even the European countries did not take any major punitive actions against Russian policies in Georgia, and over time came to terms with the new reality in the region. Turkey, then, mainly focused its attention on saving ties with Russia from the storm.
Turkey Forges Closer Ties with Russia
Russia’s blatant disregard of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity did not discourage Turkey from maintaining cooperation with Russia. On the contrary, Turkey appeared to be using the new developments to further deepen Turkish-Russian ties.
Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to realize the CSCP provided the rationale for sustaining active ties with the parties to the crisis, including Russia. Despite growing concerns that it would be impossible to realize the Caucasus platform idea, the government insistently
72 Paul Reynolds, "New Russian World Order: The Five Principles," BBC News, 1 September 2008. 73 "Russia Seeks Security Pact," The Independent, 9 October 2008. 259
argued that the project was still alive.74 During his visit to Ankara on August 29,
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Memmadyarov lent his country’s support for the
project. Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili’s visit to Ankara on August 31
was crucial to test the viability of Erdo an’s proposal. During Erdo an’s earlier visit to
Tbilisi, the Georgian side had expressed interest in supporting the CSCP. However,
against the background of Russian recognition of the breakaway regions, Tkeshelashvili
showed reluctance to proceed with cooperation on a platform of which Russia was a part.
Nonetheless, she did not reject it outright, which highlighted the importance Georgia
placed on maintaining collegial ties with Turkey.75
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also visited Turkey on September 2 to hold talks
with his Turkish counterpart on the bilateral and regional issues. Following their meeting,
Babacan and Lavrov announced their willingness to develop Turkish-Russian relations on
the basis of ‘enhanced multi-dimensional partnership.’76 Lavrov extended his support to
Turkey, adding that they wished to see the continuation of the talks to materialize the
CSCP. Arguing that Turkey acted with common sense and in line with international
norms to pacify the region, Lavrov praised Turkey’s position throughout the crisis and
underscored that Turkey and Russia shared similar perspectives on upholding the status
quo created by the Montreux convention. Nonetheless, Lavrov reiterated Russia’s
criticism of NATO and Western powers which armed Saakashvili in the past. This time,
however, he was careful not to put Turkey in the spotlight on this issue, and underscored
that Turkey’s NATO membership and the two countries’ differing opinions on Georgia’s 74 U ur Ergan, "Türkiye: Kafkasya Platformu Çökmedi," Hürriyet, 28 August 2008. 75 "Bakan Babacan ile Gürcü Meslekta Kafkasya Platformu Projesi ile Son Geli meleri De erlendirdi," Cihan Haber Ajans , 31 August 2008. 76 Hilal Köylü, "Rusya ile Çok Yönlü Geli tirilmi Ortakl k," Radikal, 03 September 2008. 260
territorial integrity would not prevent them from furthering their bilateral relations.
Expressing Russia’s appreciation of Turkey’s unique conditions in the crisis, Lavrov maintained that other countries should stop imposing their agendas on Turkey.77 Russia’s reiteration of support for the CSCP saved it from collapsing, and as such helped the
Turkish government continue to present itself as actively involved in regional diplomacy.
During the joint press briefing, Babacan reiterated Turkey’s sensitivity on maintaining Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, though at the same time noting its unique position as the only NATO country bordering the region.
When asked, however, how he reconciled Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions with Turkey’s declared policy of supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity and how
Turkey would be able to sustain the multidimensional partnership with Russia under these conditions, Babacan maintained that “undoubtedly friends may differ on some issues, and have different approaches. We are evaluating the issue on the basis of regional approach and the importance Turkey places on OSCE’s principles, particularly territorial integrity.”78 He, nonetheless, underlined that Turkey and Russia were joined by a shared vision to maintain stability in the region, and Turkey would pursue its efforts to foster dialogue among regional stakeholders.
Turkish-Russian Customs Crisis
Coincidently, a customs crisis, which had already been in the making since the beginning of summer, reached its peak following the flare-up over the passage of
American ships. Russian border posts held up thousands of Turkish trucks carrying goods 77 "Rusya ile Gümrük Krizi A l yor," Zaman, 03 September 2008. 78 "Dostlar n Baz Konularda Farkl Dü ünceleri Olabilir," Sabah, 03 September 2008. 261
to Russia for safety inspections. Although officials from both sides underlined that the crisis pertained to customs procedures alone, there was a widely held belief that the timing and evolution of the crisis, compared to similar disagreements in the past, reflected Russian desire to manipulate Turkey’s vulnerability for geopolitical reasons.79
For many, the Russian ban on Turkish goods was meant as a warning to curb
Turkey’s support for American assistance to Georgia. Especially since this crisis reached its peak during the discussions concerning the passage of American ships into the Black
Sea, attention was focused on the political motivations behind the Russian action.
Although some members of the cabinet called for retaliation against Russia, the government avoided confrontation on this issue.80 Instead, Turkey sought to resolve this issue through direct talks with Russia, as Lavrov was due to visit Ankara to discuss the details of the CSCP.81 Lavrov made an attempt to comfort Turkish officials that Russia would not use energy as a weapon and promised to adopt a flexible and cooperative approach to resolve the customs problems. He was largely successful in allaying his counterparts’ concerns. Consequently, both sides decided to avoid ‘politicizing’ this issue and let the technical committees to solve the complaints of Turkish exporters.82
79 Semih diz, "Rusya’ya Ba ml l n Sak ncalar Görülüyor," Milliyet, 1 September 2008. 80 As Turkish trucks were forced to wait for weeks at Russian borders, Turkish trade minister Kür at Tüzmen maintained that Turkey’s losses due to this row might reach as much as several billion dollars. He labeled this move as political and charged Russia with seeking to punish Turkey for allowing the passage of the American ships. Tüzmen even publicly announced that as of September 1 Turkey would start retaliation against Russia, adding that “if Turkey is hurt, it will hurt back.” He laid out a gradual plan which would involve several measures including the imposition of similar curbs on imports from Russia, limiting the movement of Russian commercial vessels through the Straits, and dropping Turkey’s support for Russia’s bid to join the WTO. Although some ministers also supported this option, Tüzmen’s proposal was rejected by the cabinet, on the grounds that doing so would sever Turkish-Russian ties and might trigger Russia to disrupt energy supplies to Turkey. "Türkiye'den Rusya'ya Misilleme," Voice of America Turkish, 29 August 2008; "Ruslar TIR bekletiyorsa, bo azlar keseriz," Vatan, 30 August 2008. 81 "Rusyaya K rm z Hat Resti Hükümetten Döndü," Hürriyet, 02 September 2008. 82 "Rusya: Ticareti Kesmek Yok, Gümrük Sorunu 'basitle en yöntem’le A l r," Hürriyet, 3 September 2008. 262
Commenting on Lavrov’s visit, Erdo an also maintained that initially the severity of the
customs issue was exaggerated and he believed that a solution would be found soon.83
Tensions Subdue
The talk of a new Cold War between Russia and the West soon came to an end.
Despite some Russian moves that seemed to heighten tensions, such as the dispatch of
Russian warships to the Caribbean, the United States avoided any direct confrontation
with Russia over Georgia. Russia completed the withdrawal of the bulk of its troops from
the Georgian territory by early September, though some Russian checkpoints inside
Georgia still remained intact until early October. When the tensions over the transit of
American warships ebbed and the transatlantic community slowly moved on to
accommodate to the new status quo, the issue of Georgia was also put on the backburner
on the Turkish diplomatic agenda. Rather, Turkey’s regional diplomacy focused on
normalization with Armenia and promotion of the CSCP.
The United States also showed appreciation of Turkey’s Caucasus policy.
Initially, American officials expressed their discomfort with Turkey’s denial of passage
through the Straits, underlining that they expected more from an ally like Turkey in such
a crisis. The United States did not insist on the transit of the two hospital ships to
Georgia’s Black Sea coast for planned aid operations, and opted for the three lighter
83 However, Tüzmen maintained his criticisms, arguing that the costs already exceeded $ 500 million, and might reach $ 1 billion. "Rusya’yla Krizin Zarar 1 Milyar Dolar Bulacak," NTVMSNBC, 15 September 2008. Despite Russia’s promises, this problem could not be resolved until summer 2009, when Putin visited Turkey. 263
warships.84 Similarly, in the aftermath of the conflict, it was speculated that the United
States would mobilize other littoral countries, especially Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine,
to advocate the revision of the Montreux convention toward a more favorable regime.85
Nonetheless, the American side avoided taking such steps, which might have further
deteriorated relations with Turkey, and pushed it even closer to Russia. Instead,
American officials sought to reassure Turkey that, while seeking to obtain a presence in
the Black Sea, they would respect Turkey’s priorities and would not demand changes to
the Montreux.86 Secretary of State Rice, following his meeting with Babacan in late
September, called Turkey a “perfect ally” and maintained that “Turkey is a very
important country” to achieve peace and stability in the Caucasus.87
Explaining Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the Russian-Georgian War
In this section, I will propose an explanation of Turkish foreign policy during the
war through the theoretical framework developed in this study. Turkey, like many other
European countries, was concerned about Russia’s policy during the crisis. Again, similar
to other European powers, Turkey objected to the American response to the crisis, in a
way to create more trouble than it solved. As Turkish FPE expressed on many occasions,
however, Turkey occupied a unique position in the crisis. Given its ties both to the West 84 Ümit Enginsoy, "US in Talks with Turkey for Straits Passage of its Naval Vessels," Turkish Daily News, 20 August 2008. 85 The revision of the Montreux came to the agenda in the years 2004-2006, following the democratic revolutions and accession of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO. Although the United States preferred a revised regime, concerted actions by Turkey and Russia were effective in blocking this development. Kamer Kas m, "Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Politikas : Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler," Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Ara t rmalar 3, no. 5 (2008): 176-177. 86 Ali Akel, "Montrö'yü Delmeyece iz," Yeni afak, 09 September 2008. Also see the statements of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his visit to Turkey: "Karadeniz Uluslararas Biz de Var z," Hürriyet, 16 September 2008. 87 "Türkiye Mükemmel Müttefik," Sabah, 23 September 2008. 264
and to Russia, Turkey came under pressure to engage in delicate diplomatic maneuvers which reflected clearly the causal weight of the ‘regional dimension’ of its foreign policy.
I will show that the basic motivation driving the Turkish FPE was concerns over indirect threats which might have been generated by a punitive American response to
Russian actions. I will argue that, as a defensive positionalist prioritizing status quo and stability over revisionism, Turkey’s major concern was to eliminate the indirect threats to its regional interests. To this end, Turkey opted for a strategy that sought to limit the penetration of the United States into the region. Turkey however still cooperated with the
United States to a limited extent. Then, I will turn to explaining Turkey’s foreign policy behavior by situating it in the context of the RSC. I will argue that Turkey’s limited cooperation with the United States put it in a situation whereby it was likely to incur significant regional costs. Consequently, many of Turkey’s policies were driven by a concern to eliminate these obstacles through the utilization of different strategies which help us explain the substance of Turkey’s regional diplomacy in the crisis. Although
Turkey’s policies resemble soft balancing, I will conceptualize them as part of a limited cooperation strategy. In order to explain the policy outcome, I will argue that since both the regional and domestic audiences were opposed to Turkey’s active cooperation with the United States, the FPE’s choice of limited cooperation was translated into final foreign policy behavior.
Stage 1- Deciphering Turkey’s Strategy
The major concern of the Turkish FPE throughout the crisis was to protect
Turkey’s regional interests: preservation of stability and balance of power in order to 265
create a conducive environment for advancing Turkey’s economic and security interests in the Greater Black Sea region. More specifically, since the inflammation of frozen conflicts posed the most immediate threat to regional security, the Turkish security elite approached the developments from the perspective of their concerns over the destabilizing effects of frozen conflicts.
Alliance Stimulant: Russian Threat vs. Indirect American Threats
Identifying the major stimulant of Turkey’s behavior in this crisis becomes a rather daunting task. Russia’s military response to the Georgian attempt to regain control of breakaway regions and subsequent developments, considering Turkey’s preexisting political and strategic ties and economic interests, posed a direct challenge to Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus. Consequently, an important concern of Turkish foreign policy throughout the crisis was to contain the ‘resurgent Russia.’ However, Turkish FPE perceived Russia as a limited aim revisionist and focused rather on the negative consequences of a possible miscalculated American reaction to Russian aggression.
Russian Threat in the Caucasus?
Both the long term trends in the region and the Russian aggression against
Georgia imparted balancing imperatives on the part of Turkey to contain Russian power and threat. On the one hand, the long-term developments presented challenges to
Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Despite the improvement of bilateral relations in the decade preceding the crisis, an underlying strategic competition continued to characterize the state of affairs between Ankara and Moscow. For one thing, 266
in the context of energy geopolitics, the rivalry between the two countries became visible when the discussions on the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Caspian basin to Europe gained pace. Whereas Turkey was promoting the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline, Russia sped up its efforts to thwart such initiatives which triggered a new era of competition between the two countries. Moreover, although Turkey overall pursued a pro-status quo position in regional affairs and supported the territorial integrity of the
Caucasus countries, Russia continued to get involved in ethnic tensions and manipulate its grip over the separatist movements in the Caucasus and beyond. In that regard, the situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan remained a major area of conflicting interests between Ankara and Moscow. Those divergent approaches by the two powers constituted an important constraint on furthering their relations, as they were positioned on the opposing sides in the frozen conflicts. Furthermore, Russia’s drive to reassert its influence and play the power politics game in the shared RSCs and invest in military modernization programs threatened to tilt the balance of power against Turkey.
On the other hand, Russia’s aggression against Georgia and its behavior in the aftermath of the conflict were direct challenges to Turkey’s interests in many ways. First,
Russia’s disproportional military response and attempt to cast itself as a regional hegemon contradicted Turkey’s policy of supporting regional countries’ sovereign statehood in order to create a stable and autonomous regional system in the Caucasus and facilitate the region’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The explosion of frozen conflicts and Russia’s willingness to use force imposed upon Turkey difficult alignment choices, complicating the fragile balance it established between the
West, Russia and regional countries. Russia’s declaration of the Caucasus as part of its 267
new sphere of privileged interests especially presented further challenges to Turkey as it in effect encompassed the countries with which Turkey had developed close strategic cooperation in order to embolden the balance of power in the Caucasus.
Second, the war also ran against Turkey’s economic interests, as it undermined the reliability of the Georgian route for the transportation of natural gas and oil from the
Caspian basin. Russia’s invasion of Georgia enabled it to regain some of the lost control over this strategically important region and enhance its position in energy geopolitics at
Turkey’s expense. On the one hand, during the war, oil and gas exports from Azerbaijan through non-Russian lines were halted, and Azerbaijan’s only operational connection was the Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline. Later, deliveries through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines were resumed, but Russian military activities around the pipeline routes altered the strategic calculations of players in the energy business. On the other hand, the regional instability and Georgia’s vulnerability affected discussions on future pipelines from the region. The press reports published around that time underscored the damaging consequences of the war, arguing that multinational corporations and Western countries would be unlikely to consider building another pipeline through the Georgian corridor. Given the close alignment of Turkey and
Georgia’s positions in energy geopolitics, Georgia’s loss meant Turkey’s loss.
In short, in the broader picture, Russian actions contradicted Turkey’s strategic objectives,88 and Turkey’s interests coincided with those of the United States which was seeking to contain Russia.89 Both the balance of power and balance of threat theories
88 Cengiz Çandar, "Ç rp n rd Karadeniz..." Radikal, 01 September 2008. 89 Fadime Özkan, "Kafkasya Çökerse Türk Kap s Kapan r," Star, 19 August 2008; Ayd n, Beklenen Sava Sonunda. 268
predict that Russia’s new near abroad policies and its actions against Georgia should have made Turkish strategists uncomfortable. Moreover, since the United States was also willing to counter Russian aggression and was seeking ways to support Georgia, Turkey should have utilized this avenue and engaged in acts of balancing against Russia.
Such a major reorientation of Turkish foreign policy away from partnership with
Russia did not take place, let alone engaging in acts of directly balancing Russian power and aggression during the war. At the beginning of the conflict it was argued that Turkey would perceive Russian actions as a revisionist move, hence a direct threat to its interests, and would stand behind Georgia and the United States in order to contain Russia.90 In contrast, Turkey objected to American demands for greater assistance to Georgia, and appeared to be accommodating Russia.
In order to explain this seemingly anomalous outcome, we need to look at the actual motivations of the Turkish FPE throughout the crisis. In Turkish perceptions,
Russian policies presented challenges to Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus, but they constituted the lesser of two evils. Turkish FPE thus carefully avoided singling out Russia as an aggressor, and focused instead on indirect threats presented by American policies.
Before discussing how the United States emerged as a source of indirect threat, one more issue needs to be discussed.
Russia in the Crisis: Limited Aim Revisionist
To better understand Turkish perceptions of threat and opportunity, it is also necessary to look at Turkey’s assessment of the causes of the August 2008 conflict. Like
90 Cengiz Aktar, "Türkiye Gürcistan' n Yan nda," Vatan, 10 August 2008. 269
many countries, Turkey also avoided blaming Russia singlehandedly for the outbreak of the conflict. At least, the initial Russian response to Georgia’s offensive into South
Ossetia was thought to be based on some legitimate arguments. More importantly,
Turkey also attributed the crisis to Georgia’s own misdoings. Prior to the war, the overall situation in the region was not perfect but the status quo was providing a minimum peace to foster economic and security cooperation. Neither the United States nor other actors could undo the stalemate that emerged in the early-1990s following Russia’s involvement in Georgian domestic affairs, and Turkey also had adapted itself to this new reality of having to live with frozen conflicts. As a result, Turkey achieved a significant degree of economic penetration into the region even under those adverse conditions. Putting a high premium on maintaining a stable neighborhood and reaping the benefits of economic cooperation, Turkey even had acquiesced to Russia’s seemingly revisionist policies to avoid confrontation.
In the case of Georgia, Turkey refrained from involvement in the ongoing standoff between Tbilisi and the breakaway regions in order not to further complicate the security situation in the region. From the Turkish perspective, the major weakness of this state of affairs was that the regional stability was based on a delicate balance created through mutual interdependencies and quid pro quos among regional countries, substate actors and extraregional actors. Turkey, therefore, had grown concerned about what it viewed as Saakashvili’s reckless policies which had the potential to threaten this precarious balance and undermine the very foundations of Turkey’s policies. Indeed, proving the validity of such concerns, Saakashvili acted in haste and in an uncalculated manner, even against the advice coming from Washington. 270
Restraining Georgia became a major goal of Turkey throughout the crisis, for
open support to this country might have bred its desire for reckless policies, further
undermining regional security. Indeed, Georgia sought to manipulate its relations with
the United States and Turkey on many occasions. For instance, while the United States
was working to deliver humanitarian aid through military vessels, the Georgian side
endeavored to present those efforts as indications of American willingness to protect
Georgia’s airspace and maritime boundaries.91 American officials in contrast underlined
that their role was strictly humanitarian and there did not exist any reason for the United
States to use force. Similarly, the Georgian side sought to capitalize on the sensitivity of
the Western nations and Turkey on the energy issue. Although Georgia disseminated
news that Russian jets attacked the pipelines, such reports were not confirmed by
independent sources.92 The BP, operator of BTE, halted deliveries during the war but no
physical Russian attack took place against the pipeline infrastructure.93
Since Saakashvili’s own policies invited the heavy-handed military reaction,
Turkey was less critical of Russian policies and therefore viewed Russia as a limited aim
revisionist.94 Moreover, it is also important to remember that the crisis took place against
the background of a decade of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia, which
significantly reduced Turkey’s perceptions of direct threat from the latter. As will be
discussed in detail, Russia also carefully avoided challenging Turkey’s interests directly. 91 "Saaka vili’den ok Aç klamalar," Hürriyet, 13 August 2008. 92 Russian sources also argued that Georgia was spreading such news to drag Turkey into war. They underlined that Russia was aware the consequences of any attack on pipelines and did not consider such a possibility at all. "Türkiye’yi K k rtmak stediler," Milliyet, 13 August 2008. 93 "Rusya'dan Türkiye'ye Çifte Mesaj," Anadolu Ajans , 12 August 2008. 94 Davuto lu was therefore arguing that Turkey did not “want to pay the bill of strategic mistakes or miscalculation by Russia, or by Georgia.” Greg Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign Policy Aide Worries about False Optimism in Iraq," Council on Foreign Relations Interview with Ahmet Davuto lu, 19 September 2008. 271
Through the dialogue taking place between the two countries throughout the crisis,
Russia allayed Turkey’s concerns over Georgia’s allegations concerning the destruction
of the pipeline infrastructure or undermining of Turkey’s economic interests in the
region.95 Turkey thus came to believe that Russia acted with restraint and would not take
adventurous steps to destabilize the entire region, unless provoked.
‘Defensive Motivations’ in Response to ‘Extra-regional Stimulus’
As a result of the transformations in the security environment in the years
preceding the crisis, Turkey increasingly perceived the United States as a source of
indirect threat. Not only did the United States and Turkey lose the common bond -
interest compatibility - in the form of shared threats, but also, more importantly, Turkey
came to perceive the United States as the source of instability because of the
consequences of misguided American policies on Turkey’s periphery. Whereas
previously cooperation with the United States served as a resource-generating function at
the regional level, US penetration increasingly emerged as a source of liability, as
reflected in Turkey’s growing concerns about American military activities in the Black
Sea basin. Consequently, despite the continuation of Turkish-Georgian cooperation,
Turkey’s commitment to the Turkish-Georgian-American alignment gradually had
deteriorated in the years preceding the crisis.
95 Gül noted that pipelines were peaceful projects and Turkey believed that neither party would attack them. "Bar çin Gereken ne Varsa Yapaca z," Yeni afak, 13 August 2008. 272
Sources of Indirect Threats
In the 2008 crisis, three factors account for Turkey’s perceptions of US actions as indirect threats.
Explosion of Frozen Conflicts and Spread of Violence
One reason why Turkish FPE perceived American intervention as a major source of indirect threat was their sensitivity to frozen conflicts and their resulting concern to contain the conflict in Georgia. As President Gül remarked, “the events in Georgia demonstrated that the frozen conflicts could explode at any time, and they might have damaging consequences.”96 As a result, the very first statement issued by Turkey raised concerns about possible spread of hostilities. While calling on the parties to overcome the crisis through restraint, common sense and dialogue, the MFA defined the situation as potentially threatening to “regional peace and security.”97
In the Turkish view, a possible American intervention in the crisis might have exploded other frozen conflicts in the region, most notably the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As underlined before, for the Turks, Russia was not a spoiler that was determined to exploit frozen conflicts recklessly. Yet, if Russia was challenged, it could have stirred ethnic problems in the region. Therefore, the crisis had to be handled carefully to avoid making Russia feel encircled and turn its attention to other frozen conflicts. The most immediate threat in that regard was presented by an unwarranted
American response which might have agitated Russia, and result in a wave of conflicts in the region. 96 Abdullah Gül, "Address Delivered at the USAK," 04 November 2009. 97 D i leri Bakanl , "Press Release Regarding the Armed Clashes in South Ossetia," (08 August 2008). 273
Disruption of the Balance of Power
A second way American policy was seen as a source of indirect threat was the fear of American-Russian confrontation and the risk that it could alter the balance of power in the region. Turkey’s concern over the Greater Black Sea region turning into a new theater of Russian-Western confrontation predated the crisis. Especially after the coming to power of Saakashvili, Turkey grew anxious over Georgia’s tendency to use its partnership with the West as leverage against Russia and the breakaway regions.98
Moreover, Turkey expressed reservations over US policies to gain a naval presence in the
Black Sea in order to support new democratic nations in the wake of colored revolutions and joining of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO. Turkey argued that these US plans would disrupt the balance of power in the Black Sea. Consequently, Turkey invoked the provisions of the Montreux Convention and successfully forestalled US plans, in close coordination with Russia.99 Though the cancellation of such plans in the mid-2000s eased
Turkey’s concerns, Turkey’s sensitivity to this issue continued and manifested itself from time to time.100 As a defensive positionalist, Turkey was not content with the looming risk of instability imparted by Georgia’s confrontational policies toward Russia on the one hand, and the danger of US-Russian tensions threatening to undermine the balance of power in the Black Sea region, on the other.
98 Tanr sever, "11 Eylül 2001 Sonras ." 99 Karadeniz, "Security and Stability." 100 F. Stephen Larrabee, "The United States and Security in the Black Sea Region," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9, no. 3 (2009): 305. 274
Therefore, in Turkish perceptions of the crisis, a major threat to regional security was presented by the risk of escalation rather than the Russian-Georgian conflict per se.101 During the crisis, Turkish FPE expressed concerns over discussions on isolating
Russia as a punitive measure for its behavior against Georgia. Any attempt to confront
Russia, in Turkish perceptions, would result in greater penetration of the United States into the region in a way to alter the regional status quo. As Davuto lu underlined in an interview, Turkey did not “want to see a Russian-American or Russian-NATO confrontation.”102
A careful analysis of how Turkish leaders and security bureaucracy assessed the threats and opportunities shows that they defined the crisis as a situation that could
‘potentially’ destabilize the region and undermine the regional balance of power. They carefully avoided making an argument to the effect that the balance of power was
‘already’ violated.103 As a direct outcome of this interpretation, while some regional countries were willing to invite the United States into the region to ‘restore’ the balance of power, Turkey opposed such proposals, arguing that it could further destabilize the region. On many occasions throughout the crisis, Turkish FPE expressed concerns that penetration of the Western powers would be more likely to result in confrontation in the region, hence undermining regional balance of power and stability. Therefore, they 101 Babacan reflected how this motivation shaped Turkish policy during the crisis: “It was essential for Turkey to preserve the balance of power between Russia and the United States… . Turkey’s principled and transparent behavior and maintaining good relations with both sides helped it manage the crisis successfully… By this way, we prevented an American-Russian dispute in the Black Sea.” "Gerilimi Önledik!," Türkiye, 18 September 2008. 102 Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign." Davuto lu also added that given its geographic conditions and trade ties with Russia, Turkey could not afford to adopt isolationist policies toward Moscow. 103 For instance, during his August 2008 State of the Union address, Erdo an was underlining that “we are deeply concerned with such conflicts because they create a fertile environment for dangerous developments which can disrupt stability in the region.” Recep Tayyip Erdo an, Ulusa Sesleni (August 2008). Available at: http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/p_NationAnouncemet.aspx. 275
maintained that regional countries should be primarily responsible for handling the security challenges.104
Undermining Montreux Convention: The case in point that illustrates how Turks perceived American penetration as an indirect threat was Turkey’s position on the passage of American warships to the Black Sea. When the issue first came to the agenda, it was interpreted in Turkey as an extremely unwelcome development. American demands were seen as reincarnations of the earlier debate on the extension of US/NATO naval presence into the Black Sea.105 Similarly, this discussion reminded many of the
March 1 episode, giving way to arguments that Turkey and the United States might be bogged down in another crisis over the passage of American ships. Since Montreux was viewed as the centerpiece of the regional balance of power, the concern to prevent the undermining of the Montreux regime was a paramount factor shaping the thinking of the
Turkish FPE. As a result, Ankara insisted on enforcing the Convention strictly, even at the expense of severing ties with Washington. When the smaller American ships moved into the Black sea, Turkish FPE grew extremely anxious about a risk of escalation. Russia also dispatched its own warships to track the movement of American vessels as they delivered humanitarian aid. During his State of the Union address in the height of these discussions, Erdo an was expressing his hope that “the delivery of humanitarian aid 104 For instance, during his visit to Turkey on August 21, the Romanian president was arguing that the armed clashes altered the regional balance in the Black Sea basin and therefore the balance of power should be restored through a new institutional arrangement and the United States should also play a role in this restructuring. Gül, in contrast, argued that there existed no need for a new arrangement, and the littoral countries, working around the Montreux Convention, had managed to maintain peace, stability and tranquility in the region, and they could do so without the involvement of outside powers. "Karadeniz’de Yeni Düzenleme Olmaz," Star, 22 August 2008. Similarly, Chief of Staff Ya ar Büyükan t complained about attempts to solve all regional problems through greater outside involvement in the Black Sea. He added that Turkey should watch the developments carefully to prevent the destabilization of the Black Sea. "Montrö'ye Uygun," Sabah, 28 August 2008. 105 Ali Akel, "Amerika Ankara ile 'Gemi' Pazarl nda," Yeni afak, 20 August 2008. 276
through Straits would be concluded without causing tensions in the Black Sea.”106 The
ongoing tensions in the region highlighted the delicacy of Turkey’s position in the crisis.
Commenting on this development, President Gül reflected Turkey’s concerns clearly:
if the Montreux Convention had not been fully implemented during the war in Georgia, if huge ships had been allowed to enter the small Black Sea; if they had encountered each other there; and if those bulky warships had engaged in actions similar to ‘dog-fight,’ what would have happened?107
Threat to Turkey’s Economic Interests
Turkey’s economic objectives in the region further energized the FPE’s efforts to
pacify the conflict. An overreaction to Russia would have not only undermined Turkey’s
strategic priorities, but also posed threats to Turkey’s economic interests. The escalation
of tensions and isolation of Russia would have resulted in short term and long term
economic consequences for Turkey which was acting as a ‘trading state’ in its recent
foreign policy initiatives. It would hit Turkey’s trade in the region and eventually create
adverse conditions for the flourishing of regional economy, not to mention the disruptive
effect of any conflict on the pipelines.108 The thought process behind Turkey’s policy
was very well captured by President Gül:
to our west we have the Balkans. To our east we have the Caucasus. Both of these regions and their stability are important for us because if you have stability in the Caucasus, and added to that if you have trust and confidence, then you have the right climate for economic cooperation. And the Caucasus is key as far as energy resources and the safe transportation of energy from the east to the west. That transportation goes through Turkey… . If there is instability in the Caucasus, it would be sort of like a wall between the East and West; if you have stability in the region, it could be a gate [to regional prosperity].109
106 See: Erdo an, Ulusa Sesleni . 107 Gül, "Address Delivered at the USAK." 108 Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign." 109 "Turkey's Gul: Stability in Caucasus to Open Gate for Energy Resources," Anatolian News Agency, 6 October 2008. Also see Foreign Minister Ali Babacan’s op-ed: Ali Babacan, "Calming the Caucasus," International Herald Tribune, 24 September 2008. 277
Turkey’s Preferences: Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing
Confronted with indirect threats to its interests in the Greater Black Sea RSC,
Turkey had basically two options: defensive bandwagoning with the United States -which would have appeared like regional balancing against Russia-, or soft balancing against
American policies –which would have appeared like appeasing Russia. One option before
Turkish FPE was bandwagoning with the United States which might have enabled
Turkey to have a say in the conduct of American policy in the region. At the same time, the full cooperation with the United States might have helped Turkey retort to Russian aggression and calm the region. However, Turkish FPE came to the conclusion that cooperation with the United States, rather than stabilizing, might further destabilize the
RSC. Moreover, this option would have forced Turkish FPE to incur enormous regional and domestic costs, as will be discussed later.
These concerns, in turn, shaped Turkey’s position on American requests for assistance, and Turkey, consequently, objected to proactive penetration of its global partner into this region. Turkey also manipulated the discomfort of the European powers with a forceful American reaction to its advantage. In the discussions taking place in
NATO, Turkey cooperated with European allies to thwart US efforts to use the transatlantic security structures to punish Russia. To a certain point, it might be justified to describe such efforts by Turkey as soft balancing. Indeed, this interpretation underpinned most of the discussions taking place among policy circles. Many Western commentators criticized Turkey for shifting its foreign policy orientation away from the transatlantic community and siding with Russia.110
110 Zeyno Baran, "Will Turkey Abandon NATO?" 29 August 2008. 278
It will be difficult to unequivocally call Turkey’s policy either soft balancing or allying with Russia. Though avoiding direct confrontation with Russia, Turkey preferred indirect and more subtle ways to contain the resurgent Russia. Turkey objected to harsher
American reactions to Russia, but it still furnished lower levels of balancing acts to limit
Russian power in the region. Moreover, despite its failure to lend full support to the
American agenda, Turkey could not completely isolate itself from the American efforts to assist Georgia and conceded to limited cooperation. Turkey objected to a strong NATO response to Russian aggression, but it still supported other measures in the aftermath of the conflict including the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission and suspension of NATO-Russia Council.
As a result, Turkey’s final policy could be called limited cooperation rather than soft balancing whereby it partly accommodated Russia, partly cooperated with the United
States, and sought to contain the threats presented by both powers through its efforts to bolster regional security mechanisms. Erdo an summarized this thinking very well:
In the aftermath of the Georgia [war] they are trying to push us to one side; some solely to the United States and others solely to Russia. Yet, one is the United States, our closest ally, and the other is Russia with whom we have a large trade volume [accounted] primarily by energy. I won’t let Turkey being dragged to one side only… . When you talk of Russia; it is an important energy supplier. Moreover, we have high level of trade… . Our need for natural gas and energy imports is obvious. Can you disregard all these? You cannot [ignore] Russia when you take into account our economic and commercial relations. Therefore, Turkey will [seek to] maintain balance in line with its interests. It is not prudent to be pushed either side.111
111 Fikret Bila, "Erdo an: Rusya'y Göz Ard Edemeyiz," Milliyet, 02 September 2008. 279
Details of Turkey’s Strategy: CSCP
Turkey largely focused on preventing the deterioration of regional stability as a result of any miscalculated American overreaction to the crisis. It opted for conflict mitigating measures to reduce the tensions in the region and contain violence.
Considering the volatility of the regional security environment due to the ongoing threat posed by frozen conflicts, Turkey turned its attention to their resolution. In line with its long-held argument that regional security should be handled by regional countries themselves, Turkey moved to institutionalize a mechanism for the resolution of frozen conflicts. The CSCP, which was the outcome of these considerations, served many of
Turkey’s objectives in the crisis: containing violence and explosion of frozen conflicts, engaging Russia, and limiting American involvement in the region.
Conflict Prevention
The CSCP above all serves Turkey’s broader objective in the region, i.e., maintaining a stable neighborhood through the inclusion of all regional players under one framework. By suggesting a mechanism for addressing regional conflicts in the midst of the war, Turkey hoped to reduce tensions and stabilize the region in the short term, so that it could minimize the consequences of the war. Despite Turkey’s optimism to restore the status quo ante through this initiative, however, the Russian decision to recognize the breakaway regions eliminated this option. Later, Turkey slowly adjusted to the new geopolitical reality, and sought to use the CSCP as a tool to address the frozen conflicts in the medium to long term. 280
Turkey’s goal was to find a solution to all frozen conflicts through almost a great bargain, so that it could eliminate the uncertainty over the future stability of the region, due to the volatility of the security environment. The explosion of other frozen conflicts would have destabilized the entire region. Under such conditions Turkey would have a hard time maintaining its economic penetration and it would have lost its leverage in energy geopolitics. Consequently, in addition to finding a solution to Georgian-Russian problems, Turkey wanted to use this crisis as an opportunity to develop a comprehensive and long-lasting mechanism to address other stalemated conflicts in the region. Because the region is already beset with perennial bilateral problems, in the Turkish perceptions, a multilateral initiative such as the CSCP could rebuild confidence and achieve a breakthrough to address protracted problems.112 For Turkey, the dispute that needed the most immediate attention was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and resolution of its own problems with Armenia. Turkey needed Russia’s help to use its leverage over Armenia in order to facilitate the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while it utilized its own leverage over Georgia to bring it to the same table with Russia. Hence, the CSCP provided Ankara with a tool to form a broad-based platform that would help resolve territorial conflicts and reach region-wide consensus on various intra and interstate problems.
112 The best expression of this concern can be found in an op-ed by Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. After listing various bilateral disputes among regional countries, he notes that the major priority is to “address the profound lack of confidence among the states in the region.” Babacan, "Calming the Caucasus." Also, see: Erdo an, Ulusa Sesleni . 281
Engaging Russia
The CSCP also served another priority of Turkey during the crisis: saving its relations with Russia, while curbing Russian influence indirectly. Turkey’s preference for discussing the proposal with Russia first, without even informing the United States and
NATO, demonstrated the extent to which Turkish FPE were willing to obtain Russia’s support for the project.113 In Turkish perceptions, if this project was seen as a Western initiative by Russia, it would have been stillborn from the outset. As one Turkish diplomat, who is the head of the Eurasia desk at the foreign ministry remarked, “it is impossible to institute peace in the region by competing with Russia… . CSCP is one of the most concrete examples of this.” Consequently, Turkish leaders developed the project in coordination with Russia.114
Moreover, the CSCP accorded with Turkey’s concern to address the challenges presented by resurgent Russia. Since Russia was instrumentalizing frozen conflicts to gain leverage in regional politics, from the Turkish perspective, the resolution of these conflicts would serve as a means to contain Russian influence in the region, without countering it directly. Through its preference for multilateral initiatives to prevent the eruption of similar crises in the future, Turkey also worked to bind Russia into the same institutional framework.
113 As the details of Turkey’s project became clearer, it was revealed that the United States was not even informed of Turkey’s plans while Turkey was discussing the matter with Russia. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matt Bryza, though praising Turkey’s efforts to stabilize the Caucasus, emphasized how the United States was caught by surprise following Turkey’s announcement of this proposal. Akel, "Montrö'yü Delmeyece iz." 114 Hüseyin Alt nalan, "Kafkaslar'da Önemli Geli meler Olabilir," Milli Gazete, 22 December 2009. 282
Exclusion of the United States
The CSCP also became an instrument for Turkey’s policy of regulating American involvement in the region both in the short term and in the longer term. Turkey was seeking to avert a miscalculated American response to the Russian aggression on
Georgia, which it largely managed to accomplish. In the longer term, for Turkey, the challenge was how to minimize the negative consequences of Western policies to deal with the resurgent Russia. Since Russia’s actions in Georgia were motivated by a concern to stop further Western expansion in the Greater Black Sea area, it was widely believed that the next area of confrontation would be Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of
Georgia and Medvedev’s assertions of a Russian sphere of privileged interests in post-
Soviet geography, there was a determination on the part of the United States to restate
American commitment to the region. Concerned about the implications of Russia’s possible attempts to reassert influence over the pro-Western countries in the region,
American officials reassured Kyiv that the United States would support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence.115 In the longer term, therefore, the challenge for Turkey was to avoid any potential flashpoints in the region due to Russian-Western confrontation on its immediate periphery.
Turkey justified its argument that the United States should avoid a stronger response to the crisis on the principle that local actors could manage regional security.
Moreover, Turkish FPE constantly argued that the local balance of power was preserved well by the existing arrangements, and the military penetration of the United States would 115 Office of the Vice President, Remarks by Vice President Cheney and President Yushchenko of Ukraine After Meeting (5 September 2008). In December 2008, the United States signed ‘US-Ukraine Charter’ to extend some economic incentives and security cooperation. A similar charter with Georgia was signed in January 2009. 283
disrupt the regional balance of power. Despite this rhetoric, the very fact of the outbreak
of the Russian-Georgian war demonstrated the shortcomings of the regional institutions
to prevent such conflicts.116 Through the CSCP, Turkey initiated a process for bolstering
regional institutions’ capacity to address similar crises in order to forestall the rationale
for outside involvement.
CSCP as an exclusive regional project: Turkey decided to develop the CSCP on
the basis of geographic exclusivity, due to such considerations. Although the Turkish
prime minister initially raised the possibility of forming a broad-based regional
organization involving Western powers, later he advocated a narrowly-defined grouping
based on ‘geography.’ Consequently, Russia welcomed the CSCP proposal, since it
correlated nicely with its political objective of excluding the involvement of Western
powers in regional affairs, and creating divisions within the transatlantic community to
limit US leverage in the region. Russia continued to emphasize the argument that the
regional countries should solve local security problems, not distant global powers. Since
Turkish initiative was also based on similar founding premises, Russia backed it up. As
Lavrov’s statements during his September 2008 trip to Turkey showed once again, as
long as Turkey’s position served Russian objectives, Russian leaders publicly praised
what they called ‘the maturity of Turkish diplomacy.’117
116 Mustafa Ayd n, "Geographical Blessing versus Geopolitical Curse: Great Power Security Agendas for the Black Sea Region and a Turkish Alternative," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9, no. 3 (2009): 282. 117 The Russian press interpreted Lavrov’s support as follows: Turkey’s proposal aligned with Russian interests because “it is a cooperative effort of Caucasus countries without the involvement of outside powers. Since it is a local initiative it earns Russia’s supports.” "Türkiye’nin Projesi Oldu u çin Destek," Star, 4 September 2008. 284
However, it was obvious that managing regional security on this principle would
not only exclude the West and weaken American influence, but also put Russia in a
dominant position in the region, considering its power capabilities in the local balance of
power. Such steps, though helping Turkey gain Russia’s confidence, raised suspicions in
the West that Turkey was seeking to drift away from the transatlantic community.
American officials, thus, expressed discontent with Turkey’s proposal.118 Ankara,
however, pursued this path, disregarding Washington’s criticisms.
Overall, thus, the CSCP presented the clearest example of how Turkey’s priority
in the crisis was to limit the involvement of the United States so that it could avoid
indirect threats to its interests.
Stage II- Strategic Interaction with Regional and Domestic Audiences
Turkey’s Position as a Regional Power
Turkey’s limited cooperation with the United States and its efforts to interject
itself as a major stakeholder of the regional security generated negative externalities in
the Greater Black Sea region. Prospective regional reactions to Turkey’s cooperation with
the United States put Turkey in a delicate position of having to balance its relations with
the United States on the one hand, and other regional actors on the other. Throughout the
crisis, a major focus of Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives, therefore, was to reach out to
regional audiences to eliminate the anticipated regional costs.
118 Following his meeting with Babacan in Ankara, Senator Richard Lugar, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was leading a congressional delegation on a nine-nation trip in the wake of the Russian-Georgian conflict, expressed the American desire to have the negotiations on the proposed platform postponed “until Russia fully pulls out its soldiers from the region, and peace and stability have completely been established in Georgia.” "Bakan Babacan, Lugar’la ‘Kafkas ttifak ’n Görü tü," Türkiye, 27 August 2008. 285
Sources of Regional Costs to Turkey’s Prospective Bandwagoning
Given the structure of the Greater Black Sea RSC and Russia’s dominant role in it, the major regional costs to Turkey’s limited cooperation with the United States were generated by Russian reaction to such policies. I will identify two causal paths, highlighted by the operational indicators of this study, through which Turkey encountered regional costs: Russia’s perception of both the American agenda and Turkish motivations in the Greater Black Sea area.
Russian perceptions of the American agenda: When considered against the backdrop of the transformations in the Russian strategy in the years preceding the crisis,
American involvement in the region emerged as the major challenge for Russian interests.119 Russia’s major concern was to stop further Western encroachment into its former periphery so that it could end what the Russian security elite perceived as a geopolitical retreat. Moscow viewed the developments following the Rose revolution carefully and continued to interpret Georgia’s behavior under this light. From the Russian perspective, Georgia’s daring policy leading to the August war was part of American- orchestrated plans to limit Moscow’s geopolitical turf in the Caucasus. While the Bush
Administration sources maintained that they advised caution and ‘strongly recommended’ to Tbilisi that it should avoid any direct military engagement with
Moscow, Russian leaders expressed clearly their conviction that Georgia was being manipulated by the United States. Both in the run up to the crisis and throughout the war,
Russian leaders issued statements putting the blame on the Western powers for having armed Georgia in the past. Putin, for instance, went as far as arguing that the United 119 As underlined earlier, many in the Russian political community perceived a threat from what they considered Western encroachment into Russia’s vital spheres of interest. 286
States not only encouraged Georgia to attack South Ossetia but also US citizens were assisting the Georgian forces in the conflict zone, executing orders from American leaders.120
During the conflict and in its aftermath, Russia was particularly sensitive to the
US actions in the region. As reflected by their reaction to the American plans to send humanitarian assistance with warships, Russian leaders perceived the United States as a revisionist force in the Caucasus.121 This development was enough to irritate Russia, which viewed the US/NATO naval presence as a direct threat to Russian interests.122
Russia did not find American argument that they were carrying humanitarian aid sincere, and put its Black Sea fleet on alarm to track Western warships in the Black Sea.123 The
Russian navy went as far as mining the port of Poti to prevent the United States from using it in aid efforts.
Consequently, Russian leaders were critical of the support of regional countries for the American agenda. Russia as a matter of fact did not refrain from throwing open threats against regional countries which, in Moscow’s opinion, equipped Georgia militarily, including Ukraine and Turkey, and going as far as accusing them of assisting
Georgia’s “state-run atrocities against the separatist regions.” Moreover, Russia threatened Turkey openly in the context of discussions concerning the passage of
American warships to deliver humanitarian assistance. Russian officials warned Turkey
120 Matthew Chance, "Putin Accuses US of Orchestrating Georgian War," CNN, August 28 2008; for Medvedev’s remarks to that effect, see: Dmitry Astakhov, "Medvedev: EU monitors to deploy to Georgia," Associated Press, 8 September 2008. 121 "Rusya'n n Silah Do algaz," Yeni afak, 31 August 2008. 122 One Putin aid argued that, from Russian perspective, “it’s not a common practice to deliver humanitarian aid using battleships.” "Tension on the Rise in Black Sea, Turkey Stuck in the Middle," Turkish Daily News, 29 August 2008. 123 "ABD’nin Karadeniz Giri imi üpheli," Radikal, 23 August 2008. 287
starkly against the violations of the Montreux convention, arguing that Turkey would face the consequences of its actions. Given Russia’s unique position as a regional power and aspirant for global power status, the costs of countering Russia by bandwagoning with the United States were very high for the regional countries, including Turkey.124
Russian perceptions of Turkey: Turkey’s regional power status and its ambitions to play a proactive role in regional affairs affected Russian thinking on Turkey’s cooperation with the West. Turkey’s unique ties to the West and Georgia, and its previous record of supporting Western agenda further added to Russian concerns over
Turkey’s possible cooperation with the United States. In energy geopolitics, Turkey-
Georgia-Azerbaijan axis had already managed to bypass Russia in oil transportation. As the discussions on the construction of new pipelines to transport the region’s natural gas reserves to the West through non-Russian alternative routes were underway, of which
Turkey was again at the epicenter, Russia was further viewing Turkey’s regional ambitions with suspicion. In security affairs, too, the pro-Western forces made significant advances. Georgia and Azerbaijan’s accession to NATO would have formalized their departure from the Russian orbit, hence Russia’s loss of influence in the South Caucasus.
Although Turkey increasingly questioned American policies in the Greater Black Sea
Area and was concerned about Saakashvili’s reckless policies, it at the same continued to deepen economic and defense partnership with Georgia, especially in terms of providing military training and equipment.
124 It could be said that Ukraine was the only country that openly sought to balance Russia, by seeking to constrain the activities of Russian warships and maintaining its assistance to Georgia. 288
At the outset of the war, thus, it was far from certain what position Turkey would have taken. Given Turkey’s self-perception as a regional power, it was obvious that
Turkey would have sought to play a proactive role, but from the Russian perspective the challenge was to find out exactly how Turkey would have interjected itself into the crisis.
Since Turkey was the lynchpin of the Western strategy in the region and it could affect the regional balance of power, curbing Turkey’s cooperation with Georgia and the United
States was crucial for Russia. Throughout the war, Russia imposed a naval blockade on
Georgia to intercept ships carrying weapons and military equipment, which effectively left Turkey’s border with Georgia as the only outlet for the latter to receive military support. Therefore, ensuring Turkey’s neutrality was also important for Russia from a military perspective. As a result, it was possible to hear statements coming from Russian officials that they would perceive any overt Turkish support to the American agenda as a direct challenge to their interests, and would respond accordingly. Thus, Russia’s perception of Turkey’s position in the region further increased the costs of Turkey’s cooperation with the United States.
Turkey’s Regional Diplomacy: Eliminating Regional Costs
Russia’s perceptions of the United States and Turkey’s role in the Greater Black
Sea area generated significant regional costs to Turkey’s prospective bandwagoning with the United States. The dynamics of Turkish-Russian economic relations particularly exacerbated Turkey’s concerns about the costs of going along with the United States and rendered it sensitive to the regional costs. In the preceding decade, an asymmetric dependence between Turkey and Russia had developed at the former’s disadvantage. 289
Turkey was dependent on Russia for energy supplies, needed to access to the Russian
market to maintain its economic growth, and, most importantly, lacked any significant
economic leverage against Russia. Turkey’s economic vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia, due
to fears of provoking Russia’s resort to economic instruments, heightened the regional
costs for Turkey’s possible bandwagoning with the United States.
How Turkey was vulnerable to Russia became evident during the customs crisis.
As underlined as part of the chronological overview, this row demonstrated starkly the
lack of effective leverages at Turkey’s disposal against Russia’s use of economic
instruments for political gains. Russia showed willingness to exploit Turkey’s
dependence, especially in energy supplies, to limit its policy options. When the Turkish
government came under pressure to take harsher measures against Russia’s policy on
Georgia, Erdo an admitted Turkey’s vulnerability unequivocally. Speaking at a military
ceremony, Erdo an underlined that while two-thirds of Turkey’s natural gas came from
Russia, which was needed for power generation, Turkey was not at liberty to act against
Russia freely. “We might have to sit in darkness,” he added.125 At the official level,
Turkish and Russian officials downplayed the political motivations behind the customs
crisis. However, at any rate, this crisis demonstrated that Turkey felt vulnerable to
Russia. The lesson drawn by Turkish leadership was that if Russia wished to do so, it
could hurt Turkey. Therefore in case of an unconditional support to the United States,
Turkey would have incurred high regional costs.
125 "Rusya Bizim çin Önemli," Sabah, 31 August 2008. As underlined earlier, due to such concerns, the Turkish cabinet could not follow Tüzmen’s proposal for undertaking retaliatory measures against Russia in the customs crisis. Also, Davuto lu was underlining that considering Turkey’s trade relations with Russia, it could not afford isolating Russia. Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign." 290
Regional costs further curbed Turkey’s motivation to cooperate with the United
States. This study highlights how a concern to eliminate regional costs shapes the course of a regional power’s conduct of foreign policy toward the United States and other countries in the RSC. Toward this end, two complementary strategies were identified.
Inability to solicit American help to untie its hands: One instrument that is available to regional countries is soliciting the help of the United States. In order to overcome the regional costs, Turkey might have mobilized American backing. Such a strategy might have been understandable, as the balance of power in the Russian-Western relations previously had served as an asset in Turkey’s relations with Russia. Previously, an assertive American attitude against Russia and Russia’s declining power position made it easy for Turkey to take steps that challenged Russian interests, which was exemplified in Georgia’s orientation toward Turkey and the West throughout the late
1990s and early 2000s.126 Considering the changing geopolitics of the region in the intervening period, Turkey’s prospects of using the West as a lever against Russia diminished.
Throughout the 2008 conflict, the position of the West in general and the United
States in particular heightened the regional costs of bandwagoning for Turkey. Although
American officials vowed that they would not let Russia consolidate its gains in Georgia, the United States was unable to forge a unified position within the Transatlantic alliance.
Even if it had been, it was far from certain whether the United States could have 126 For instance, when Russia started bullying Georgia due to its pro-Western orientation in the late 1990s and early-2000s, Turkey, in coordination with the United States, expressed clear support for Georgia. Again, in response to Moscow’s persistent attempts to seek to intervene in Georgia for the Tbilisi regime’s alleged support for the Chechen rebels, Turkey and the United States initiated military assistance programs to limit Russian influence in this country. "Turkey Donates Vehicles, Communications Equipment to Georgian Military," Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; "Turkey Gives Military Aid to Georgia," Turkish Daily News, 12 June 2002; Çelikpala, "From A Failed State," 193-195. 291
mobilized coercive instruments to punish Russia. The Western powers consequently could not furnish a resolute response to Russia’s use of force and implicitly recognized its geopolitical gains. The Western-orchestrated mediation efforts between Tbilisi and
Moscow had the effect of justifying implicitly the new geopolitical reality being created by assertive Russian policies. Under these conditions, regional countries realized that
Russian brinkmanship might pay off, and the West was hardly in a position to reverse the new status quo in the region.127 In an environment where the United States could not mount a credible counterbalance to Russia, regional countries, including Turkey, were increasingly unwilling to counter Russia on their own, out of their fears of regional costs.128 On many occasions, Turkish FPE expressed these concerns to American officials who were soliciting a stronger Turkish reaction to Russia.129
Regional diplomacy: signaling Russia to build confidence: In order to allay
Russia’s concerns over Turkey’s intentions and eliminate Russian reaction to its limited cooperation with the United States, Turkey rather undertook confidence building measures. As underlined, in the initial days of the crisis, it was not clear what position
Turkey would have taken, and the Russian side was concerned to prevent Turkey from lending assistance to Georgia. Since Georgia was eager to drag the United States and
Turkey into the conflict, these concerns were understandable and partly explain the statements coming from the Russian leaders which involved veiled threats against Turkey 127 The major response by the Bush administration was withdrawal of consideration by Congress of the US- Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, submitted to Congress in May 2008. Congressional Research Service, Russia-Georgia Conflict, 27. 128 Indeed, after the crisis, the inability of the United States to protect Georgia, and hence its strategic and economic interests in the region, had a demonstration effect on other countries’ attitude on cooperation with the West. Russia increasingly became a center of attraction for the regional countries if they wanted to reach their regional objectives. 129 See Erdo an’s remarks following his meeting with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns: " stanbul'da Gürcistan Mesaisi," Zaman, 06 September 2008. 292
and other countries. Turkey had no interest in inviting the ire of Russia, and consequently worked to gain Russia’s confidence that it would not take a pro-Georgian position.
On the one hand, Turkish leaders acted with caution to avoid antagonizing Russia.
As was clearly observed in the context of the customs crisis, they refrained from giving a rushed response to Russia, and instead preferred to address those crises through dialogue.
On the other hand, they used the CSCP process as an effective instrument to counter regional costs. Seen from this perspective, one could interpret Erdo an’s Moscow visit as an effort to establish a channel of communication with Russia to send clear signals about
Turkey’s motivations so as to avoid misunderstanding and eliminate uncertainty in bilateral relations. What was instructive with this trip was that Turkey announced its proposal for the CSCP in Moscow and later it was revealed that the United States was not informed about this proposal previously. The exclusion of the United States from the project appeared to be a deliberate choice on Turkey’s part. Though it invited criticism from American government officials, it correlated nicely with Turkey’s policy of avoiding Russia’s enmity.
A retroactive analysis shows that Turkey was able to ‘gain’ Russia’s confidence.130 Erdo an was welcomed at the highest level and the Russian president, prime minister and foreign minister all met him, reflecting the premium the Russian leadership placed on ensuring Turkey’s neutrality in the crisis. In return, Russian leaders continuously praised Turkey’s efforts and maintained that the dialogue that developed between Turkey and Russia served as the main guarantor of the security and stability in
130 "Rus Bas n : 'Türkiye, Rusya'y Destekleyecek'," Cumhuriyet, 15 August 2008. 293
the Black Sea and the Caucasus.131 Consequently, Turkey’s policy throughout the crisis
gained the sympathy of Russian leaders, as they constantly referred to ‘Turkey’s
independent Caucasus policy’ and willingness to act in close coordination with Russia.
For its part, Russia also demonstrated sensitivity to Turkey’s priorities in the
crisis. The evolution of the customs crisis generated uncertainty in Ankara, raising
questions if Russia was using punitive measures, as it coincided with the heightened
tensions due to passage of warships and Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions.
Lavrov’s trip to Turkey demonstrated that the Russian side was able to regain Turkey’s
confidence. Lavrov and subsequently Russian ambassador to Ankara repeatedly
underlined that they would not seek to use Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy as a
weapon and Turkish-Russian relations would proceed on the basis of commercial
considerations.132 Babacan, for his part, acknowledged publicly Turkey’s content with
Russia’s intentions. “Our relations with Russia are based on mutual confidence. Russia
will continue to remain Turkey’s reliable partner. As Mr. Lavrov underlined, there won’t
be problems [regarding energy supplies]. We do not believe it will be a problem.”133
Again, a retrospective analysis shows that, despite speeding up efforts to diversify its
energy suppliers, Turkey overall preferred to deepen energy partnership with Russia
signing several agreements with this country.
As a result, although Russia might have preferred to see Turkey acting in
complete neutrality, eventually Turkey followed a middle-way policy of preserving its
ties with all major stakeholders. While Russia appreciated the Turkish position in the 131 "Rusya-Türkiye li kileri Karadeniz ve Kafkaslar' n Güvenlik Teminat ," Zaman, 19 September 2008; "Lavrov'dan Türk D Politikas na Övgü," Zaman, 08 October 2008. 132 "Rusya Türkiye çin Güvenli Tedarikçi Olacak," Radikal, 13 September 2008. 133 "Gerilimi Önledik!." 294
crisis, Turkey also was content with Russia’s recognition of Turkey’s legitimate concerns. The dialogue taking place between the leaders of the two countries was the major reflection of this mutual understanding. The bilateral meetings between the leaders and diplomats from the two countries during the crisis went beyond a mere peace- brokering effort and turned into Turkish-Russian summits where the two sides discussed various other issues on the agenda of the bilateral partnerships, including economic cooperation.134 Similarly, in a symbolic development, the chiefs of Turkish and Russian navies met aboard a Turkish warship on September 1, in the midst of the discussions on the transit of American ships.135
Domestic Support for Limited Cooperation
The conflict in the Caucasus had repercussions in Turkish domestic politics, as several domestic audiences sought to shape Turkey’s response to the crisis. Two domestic groups in particular had a keen interest in the conflict between Georgia and
Russia: ethnic lobbies and the pro-Russian business lobby. On the one hand, the
Caucasian diaspora in Turkey supported the struggle of the separatist regions against
Georgia.136 Previously, they had been critical of the Turkish government’s extensive military and economic assistance to the Tbilisi regime. Throughout the crisis, they not
134 "Erdo an’ atoda A rlad lar," Milliyet, 14 August 2008. Such summits between Erdo an and Putin became common in the following months. 135 "Türk-Rus Komutanlar Görü tü," TRT, 02 September 2008. 136 Historically, many conflicts in Caucasus resulted in waves of emigration into Anatolia, and left a legacy of many Turkic and/or Muslim diasporic communities in Turkey. The vibrant ‘Caucasian diaspora’ was very sensitive to the developments in their forefathers’ homeland and exerted influence in the Turkish domestic scene. Despite various Turkish government’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, Turkish people have been supportive of the separatist regions within Georgia, given the presence of a large number of Turkish citizens of Abkhazian origin. There are more Abkhaz people living in Turkey and than in Abkhazia. 295
only called on the Turkish government to refrain from further assistance to Georgia, but
also went as far as asking Turkey to play a more active role in support of the
independence of Abkhazia.137 On the other hand, substantial interest groups within the
Turkish business community, which are sometimes referred to as the Russian-lobby,
strictly opposed to confrontation and favored accommodation to Russia in the crisis.138 In
general, since the business community favored stability to advance its economic interests,
it was troubled by the outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus. Indeed, significant amount
of Turkish business interests in Georgia were affected directly by the conflict.139
However, Turkish economic activities in Russia were much greater, which over time had
forged a strong pro-Russian business lobby. In order to protect their multibillion dollar
investments in and trade with Russia, they advocated a nonconfrontational course of
action toward Russia.
Consequently, the preferences of domestic groups, too, were against Turkey’s
bandwagoning with the United States to balance Russia. Moreover, considering the
Turkish public’s attitude on the role of the United States, Turkey’s prospects for
cooperation with the US on Georgia were bleak. Anti-Americanism was running rampant
in Turkish society, and no significant societal group was enthusiastic about supporting
the American agenda in the Black Sea RSC. Turkish public and almost all societal 137 The Abkhazian parliament declared that Turkey was also responsible for Georgia’s belligerence. "Gürcistan Büyükelçili i ve D i leri’ne Siyah Çelenk," Milliyet, 09 August 2008. The representatives of the Caucasus diaspora criticized the Turkish government for providing military assistance to Georgia, by using their taxes. They also referred to what they called Turkey’s double standards, noting that while Turkey supported Kosovo’s independence, it remained silent on Abkhazia’s plight. "Gürcistan Türkiye’den Ald Silahlarla Vuruyor." 138 Gareth Winrow, "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," in Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kiri çi (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 183-184; Karaosmano lu, "Turkey’s Objectives," 159; Hill, "Seismic Shifts in Eurasia," 63. 139 "Yat r mc Sava K skac nda," Taraf, 10 August 2008. 296
interest groups were overwhelmingly opposed to the involvement of the United States in
Turkey’s periphery, which posed constraints to the FPE’s cooperation with the United
States. Especially on the question of the enforcement of the Montreux Convention, there was a universal consensus across the political spectrum.
In this environment, if the FPE had opted for regional balancing, it would have incurred sizeable domestic costs, in addition to regional costs.140 The anticipation of those costs was an important determinant of the FPE’s preference for limited cooperation strategy, a central component of which was the limitation of the US penetration into the region. Once this strategy was chosen, Turkish FPE was at liberty to implement this preference, for it operated against unconstraining domestic environment, and did not face major opposition from domestic groups. Moreover, the government’s policy of stabilizing the region through mediation services and maintaining relations with Russia also received the appreciation of domestic groups, as this policy served the interests of the ethnic and business lobbies.
Operational Indicator: Intra-elite Consensus
So far it has been underlined that perceptions of indirect threat shaped Turkey’s behavior, and a limited cooperation strategy eventually came to be considered as the most relevant response Turkey could adopt in the Russian-Georgian crisis. In order to account for the influence of the domestic environment, this study treats the consensus within the
140 The opposition parties were highly sensitive to the implementation of the Montreux convention to its smallest detail. Noting that the entire nation should embrace it in a spirit of solidarity, the leader of the Republican People’s Party emphasized that if the government failed to enforce the terms of the Convention, they would hold the government responsible and initiate a parliamentary inquiry on the subject. "Erdo an: Gemilerin Geçi i Montrö'ye Uygun," Zaman, 24 August 2008. 297
FPE as its operational indicator. There existed no major divisions within the Turkish FPE
in terms of their perceptions of the penetration of the United States into the immediate
neighborhoods, and Turkey’s relations with Russia. In the years preceding the crisis, both
the civilian-military bureaucracy and the elected government were largely content with
the country’s growing rapprochement with Russia, while they increasingly grew
concerned about the American penetration into the Greater Black Sea area, fearing that it
might result in Russian-Western confrontation on Turkey’s periphery. In particular, the
FPE expressed sympathy with the criticism of unipolarity and US-led international order,
coming from Moscow.141 A stream of thought, called Eurasianism, existed in the Turkish
body politic, which argued for disengagement from the West and closer political ties with
Russia. Although it was claimed that some pro-Russian groups existed within the ranks of
the Turkish military, overall, Turkish FPE perceived that there existed a managed
competition with Russia. Therefore, they stopped short of viewing the deepening ties
with Russia as an alternative to Turkey’s relations with the United States.142
Despite Turkey’s Western orientation, however, the FPE were concerned about
the negative consequences of American policies for Turkey’s regional interests.
Operating under this mindset, throughout the crisis, they focused largely on the more
immediate issue: the indirect threats to Turkey’s interests in the Greater Black Sea posed
by an uncalculated American response to the crisis. Turkish government received the 141 In an illustrative example, Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he was criticizing the United States and NATO, was put on the website of the Turkish Chief of Staff. "Putin'in Münih Konu mas Genelkurmay' n Sitesinde," Yeni afak, 15 February 2007. Throughout the August 2008 crisis, President Gül underlined the need to bring an end to the unipolarity and move to a more participatory international system: Stephen Kinzer, "US Must Share Power in New World Order, Says Turkey's Controversial President," The Guardian, 16 August 2008. 142 See the interview with the head of the Eurasia desk at Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Alt nalan, "Kafkaslar'da Önemli Geli meler Olabilir." Also see Davuto lu’s remarks along similar lines: Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign." 298
support of other segments of the FPE, including the military leadership. The Chief of
Staff lker Ba bu , commenting on the situation in Georgia, emphasized that Turkish foreign policy from the very beginning was conducted in a balanced manner and the military leadership was supportive of the state policy. He, in particular, underlined
Turkey’s determination to implement the Montreux without any exceptions and added that security of the Black Sea was a responsibility that fell on the littoral countries.143
Acting against this unconstraining domestic environment, the FPE could proceed with its limited cooperation strategy.
Chapter Summary and Assessment
Russia’s heavy-handed response to the Georgian offensive into South Ossetia and its subsequent recognition of the breakaway regions posed direct challenges to Turkey’s interests in many ways. Turkey nonetheless avoided mounting a balancing response to
Russia. In order to explain this seemingly anomalous outcome, the regionally- differentiated framework of analysis developed in this study highlighted how regional threats acted as the primary impetus of Turkey’s behavior throughout the crisis. This chapter argued that Turkey pursued a limited cooperation strategy to contain indirect threats presented by American penetration into the Greater Black Sea RSC. The chapter focused on two interrelated sets of policies pursued by Turkey to realize this strategy: those targeting the United States - global level - and those targeting the regional audiences - regional level.
143 Fikret Bila, "Org. Ba bu Döneminin Çizgileri," Milliyet, 17 September 2008. 299
First, I looked at the interactions between Turkey and the United States to explain
Turkey’s evaluations of the crisis and the basic motivation that shaped Turkey’s strategy.
I underlined that Turkey for sure disagreed with Russia’s policies toward Georgia.
However, since it prioritized regional stability so dearly, it left aside those differences and sought to ensure Russia’s commitment to the creation of a peaceful neighborhood.144
Turkey, therefore, acted as a defensive positionalist that focused mainly on challenges to its national interests presented by possible intervention of the United States in the conflict in a way to undermine the precarious balance in the Greater Black Sea region. I then studied how Turkey responded to this challenge through a limited cooperation strategy of which proactive diplomacy, as epitomized by the CSCP, became the main element.
Through this strategy, Turkey sought to limit American involvement in the region, engage Russia and pacify the region.
Second, I situated Turkish foreign policy in the context of the regional security complex and examined its efforts to eliminate the regional costs to its strategy. Thus, if one goal of Turkey’s proactive diplomacy was to stabilize the region and contain the conflict, the second pillar of Turkey’s regional diplomacy was to eliminate regional costs.
I also showed that since no major divisions existed within the FPE on the country’s policy during the crisis, the final outcome reflected the initial preferences.
144 Alt nalan, "Kafkaslar'da Önemli Geli meler Olabilir."
CHAPTER 7
EVALUATION OF THE CASES
AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this chapter, I will undertake in-depth across-case comparisons to test the hypotheses of this study, formulated in Chapter 4. I put forth two main hypotheses for empirical testing. While the first hypothesis studies the structural realist argument for the effect of unipolarity on bandwagoning behavior, the second hypothesis factors in the regional and domestic level forces in order to highlight the boundary conditions for the bandwagoning hypothesis to hold. Each will be examined in detail.
Testing the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Outcomes
The main hypothesis of this study suggests that, under unipolarity, the distribution of power, i.e., independent variable, rules out hard balancing as in allying with the weaker side. As a result, the options of secondary powers range between avoiding as a form of resistance and different forms of accommodation. When faced with indirect threats, secondary powers are more likely to ally with the source of the threat than stay on 301
the sidelines, so that they could reduce negative externalities to their regional interests.
Hence,
Hypothesis 1: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, secondary
powers are more likely to engage in defensive bandwagoning with the United
States than strategies of resistance.
This hypothesis, testing the structural realist argument for bandwagoning, leads to the behavioral assumption that, given the global distribution of power, Turkey would cooperate with the United States in order to counter indirect threats to its regional interests.
First Case
The power asymmetry between Turkey and the United States created strong systemic pressures on Turkey to support the US-led coalition against Iraq. However, its superior position in the global distribution of power did not help the United States have its way with Turkey smoothly, as it sought to enlist Ankara in the coalition against Iraq.
Despite the longstanding alliance ties with the United States, Turks were neither convinced about the necessity of the war, nor did they share converging interests with the
United States. Moreover, the long-term consequences of the war for Turkey’s position in the region seemed unpromising, since the Turks harbored suspicions over the exact
American plans concerning the future of Iraq. The negative externalities likely to be created by the war came to constitute a major source of indirect threat to the country’s security and national interests in the region. The anticipated negative responses from the domestic and regional audiences, which were unfavorable to actively assisting the 302
American agenda in Iraq, further augmented Turkish executives’ cautious policy.
Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to describe Turkey as a defensive positionalist in this case.
Operating under this mindset to advance the country’s regional interests, the first policy choice of the foreign policy executive (FPE) was to maintain the status quo and oppose US revisionism in the region. Since countering the indirect threats through hard balancing was unlikely to succeed, the choice of Turkey was between avoiding as a form of resistance, i.e., soft balancing, and different forms of accommodation. Turkish FPE’s thinking reflected the vision of a regional power that can guard its interests in the region jealously, and consequently it toyed with several soft balancing strategies to contain the indirect threats posed by the penetration of the United States. Indeed, as a regional country likely to suffer from the war, and given its prioritization of stability over change,
Turkey was ready to do its utmost to avoid a conflict in the region. A peaceful solution to the crisis would have helped Turkey evade war; hence, it supported international and regional efforts to this end, and objected to US plans.
Nonetheless, the global power imbalance and the asymmetric relationship between Turkey and the United States meant that Turkey was not in a position to change the US position on Iraq. For Turkish policy actors, American plans to go to war was a constant, not a variable. Consequently, the FPE came to recognize the reality of having to cooperate with the United States and engaged in negotiations to formalize Turkey’s joining the coalition. Despite the FPE’s choice of defensive bandwagoning strategy, however, it could not act on this preference. Consequently, Turkey did not lend support to the coalition operations, in line with the initial projections by American war planners. 303
The Turkish Parliament’s refusal to the stationing and transfer of coalition forces on or through its territory prevented the formation of the northern front, and complicated the coalition operations.
This case, thus, fails to support the first hypothesis.
Second Case
In this case, too, the preexisting alliance ties with the United States and unipolar distribution of power were not enough to convince Turkey to support the US agenda.
Despite the Turkish-Georgian-American strategic partnership predating the crisis, Turks did not welcome American involvement in the crisis in support of Georgia. For Turkey, the involvement of the United States presented greater and more immediate challenges than threats from Russia’s heavy-handed response to Georgia’s initial attack on South
Ossetia. While seeking to address Russian resurgence through indirect balancing acts,
Turkey’s behavior throughout the crisis was primarily shaped by a concern to regulate the penetration of the United States into the Greater Black Sea basin, and forestall any miscalculated US action. In Turkish perceptions, if the United States sought to contain
Russia forcefully, an American-Russian confrontation would have further destabilized the region, perhaps triggering other frozen conflicts. Thus, the primary motivation of the
Turkish FPE during the crisis was to contain the indirect threats presented by any miscalculated American involvement in the crisis, for Turkey essentially acted as a defensive positionalist to uphold the regional stability. Moreover, Turkey demonstrated clearly the qualities of a regional power that can risk confrontation with global powers to protect its regional interests. 304
As the United States sought to mount a forceful response to Russia, it failed to obtain Turkey’s full cooperation. Confronted with indirect threats, Turkish FPE resisted calls for assisting American agenda in the region. Turkey’s geographic position afforded it the advantage to deny American access to the Greater Black Sea RSC. As was the case during the earlier discussions concerning the extension of American naval presence into the Black Sea in the 2005-2006 period, Turkey used its geographic location as an effective instrument to limit the passage of American warships into the Black Sea.
Turkey enforced strictly the terms of the Montreux convention regulating the naval traffic through the Turkish Straits, which set restraints on the US response to Russian belligerence. Turkey, moreover, used its veto power within NATO to thwart an American proposal to send AWACS aircraft to the Black Sea region.
This case, too, fails to support the first hypothesis. Although unipolarity induced bandwagoning, Turkey did not opt for full cooperation with the United States.
Hypothesis 1a: Effect of Unipolarity on State Preferences
This study proposed an auxiliary hypothesis to measure the influence of the systemic distribution of power in an alternative way. Although unipolarity may not produce certain behavioral outcomes, we cannot automatically reach the conclusion that structural polarity does not exert any causal impact on state behavior. In order to understand fully the effect of the structural distribution of power, it is also necessary to study how unipolarity affected the initial policy preferences. 305
Hypothesis 1a: Under unipolarity, when faced with indirect threats, FPE is more
likely to prefer defensive bandwagoning with the United States than strategies of
resistance.
This hypothesis suggests that unequal distribution of power will alter preference ordering and force Turkish decision makers to prefer bandwagoning strategy.
First Case
Turkish FPE, despite its discomfort with supporting the US agenda in Iraq, had to concede to defensive bandwagoning. As underlined, Turkey seriously considered soft balancing strategies to prevent the United States from going into the Iraq war. The supporters of soft balancing proceeded on the assumption that worldwide efforts for resolution of the crisis could succeed and Turkey’s noncooperation could make a difference in US policy. Seen from this perspective, if Turkey could have forestalled the formation of the northern front, or gained enough time for the exploration of nonmilitary measures, it might have managed to prevent the war. Sharing this perspective, some elements within the FPE resorted to tactics of obstruction and delaying in the Turkish-
American negotiations, with the expectation that they could resolve the crisis short of war.
Nonetheless, in the final analysis, thanks to its structural position, the United
States was able to deflate such opposition by Turkey and other powers and press on with the invasion plans. For Turkey, American determination to go ahead with its plans irrespective of global and regional pressures further removed preventing the war through resistance strategies as an option from the table. Its geographic location and critical 306
position in American war plans, moreover, made it difficult for Turkey to isolate itself from the discussions on the war. Furthermore, Turkey’s total disengagement and staying on the sidelines was highly unlikely given its long-standing alliance relations with and dependence on the United States for linkage politics.
These factors undermined soft balancing as an option for Ankara and increasingly left defensive bandwagoning as the inevitable strategy. Turkey’s collaboration with the coalition, in other words, appeared as the last resort option to minimize the possible risks to the country’s national interests. The inevitably of the war and the perception of a
‘closing window of opportunity’ forced Turkish FPE to adopt a defensive bandwagoning strategy, despite the high anticipated costs at the domestic and regional levels. Hence, the
Iraq case lends support to Hypothesis 1a, suggesting that unipolarity exerts a strong causal influence on state preferences.
Second Case
In the second case, unlike the Iraq war, Turkish FPE succeeded in its endeavor to resist American demands for cooperation. From the very beginning of the crisis, Turkish
FPE maintained its objections to the penetration of the United States into the region, and did not choose defensive bandwagoning as the preferred policy. Hence, the second case, too, fails to support Hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 2: Strategic Interaction with the Relevant Audiences
Although the unipolar distribution of power rewards bandwagoning behavior, whether a state can pursue a preferred bandwagoning strategy depends on two 307
intervening variables. While the first intervening variable accounts for the constraints set by the domestic level forces, the second intervening variable factors in the constraints presented by the RSC on the FPE. Considering the strategic interaction the FPE engages at domestic and regional levels, the prospects of realizing the initial strategy will be improved in regional and domestic settings that offer the minimum degree of limitations to the FPE’s freedom of action. Hence,
Hypothesis 2: When FPE faces permissive environments at the domestic and
regional levels, it is more likely to act on the initial preferences.
The FPE Facing the Domestic Context
At the policy implementation stage, the FPE has to interact strategically with the domestic actors to realize its preferred strategies, which exert a significant constraint on its freedom of action. Although the state has been treated as a black-box that is represented by the FPE at the policy formulation stage, this study also recognizes that other influential groups in society will have their own assessments of the external dangers and opportunities as well as proper security strategies, independent of those of their leaders. Since state leaders need to extract resources and obtain legitimacy from society to realize external goals, it is important to crack the hard shell of the state and relax the unitary actor assumption. The second intervening variable studies how forces located at the domestic level filter the effect of unipolarity. In order to account for the influence of the domestic environment, this study treats the consensus within the FPE as its operational indicator. Since the democratically accountable political actors that are part of the FPE are sensitive to their domestic standing and they respond to societal 308
developments, their behavior helps us incorporate the causal impact of the domestic environment. Hence,
Hypothesis 2a: A divided FPE will face a restrictive domestic environment.
The first intervening variable, thus, looks at the congruence between the FPE’s and society’s perceptions of national interests. If the definition of national interest adopted by the FPE indeed reflects a societal consensus, the FPE will not encounter major internal divisions; hence, it will be better positioned to implement foreign policy preferences. In such a situation, the resulting intra-elite consensus will facilitate the translation of the initial preferences into behavioral outcomes. If, however, the FPE’s perceptions of threat and opportunity diverge from its society’s perceptions, it is very likely to run into difficulties in reaching a unified position. In this case, the FPE will confront major limitations on its foreign policy behavior.
First Case
The necessity of obtaining domestic ratification for the deal with the United States confronted the FPE with the domestic political context. The lack of congruence between the official policy and the societal groups’ preferences affected the behavior of the democratically accountable segments of the FPE, most notably Prime Minister Gül. As a result, he ran into difficulties in ratification of the initial motion, which would have formalized the defensive bandwagoning strategy. Eventually, Turkey still assisted the coalition’s military campaigns, but that final cooperation fell short of the level of support envisaged by the initial strategy formulated. The intervention of the domestic environment hindered the translation of the systemic pressures into the final outcome. 309
Second Case
The FPE had a unified position on what Turkey’s priorities should be during the
Russian-Georgian conflict. Moreover, broader segments of Turkish society were strongly opposed to Turkey’s collaboration with the United States in the crisis. Since the invitation of foreign troops or sending Turkish troops abroad were not on the agenda in this crisis, parliamentary ratification for the government’s policy was not needed. Still, in the context of discussions concerning the passage of American warships into the Black Sea, the opposition parties questioned Turkey’s overall policy in the crisis before the
Parliament. Such discussions only affirmed the point that full cooperation with the United
States was not embraced by the Turkish political community at large. If the FPE had chosen a defensive bandwagoning strategy, it would have run the risk of countering significant opposition from the domestic political context. However, the FPE did not take such a route and its preferences overlapped largely with those of the Turkish society. The resulting unified position of the FPE facilitated its ability to materialize the initial preferences.
Turkey Targeting the Region
Moreover, as the leaders of a secondary power, the FPE is at the same time subject to the constraints of the RSC. Other members of the RSC will evaluate a neighbor’s cooperation with extraregional players from the perspective of their own regional interests. The perception that the secondary state’s cooperation with outside actors alters the local distribution of power will spark resistance among regional actors, which this study conceptualized as regional costs. I identified two operational indicators - 310
causal paths - through which the FPE’s attempts to realize its initial preferences generate regional costs: regional actors’ perception of the American agenda and their perception of
Turkey’s motivations. Hence,
Hypothesis 2b: Secondary powers considering alliance with extraregional powers
perceived as revisionist will face a restrictive regional environment.
Hypothesis 2c: Secondary powers perceived as revisionist in the region will face
a restrictive regional environment.
Depending on the neighboring countries’ evaluation of the role expected from the secondary power, the FPE will face constraining or permissive environments as it seeks to realize its preferred strategy. When regional costs are low or when the secondary power is in an advantageous position to defray them, the FPE is more likely to translate initial policy choices into behavioral outcomes. In situations where those costs are prohibitive, the FPE’s likelihood of acting on the initial preference will be extremely limited.
First Case
Turkey’s ambitious portfolio in the Turkish-American talks to materialize its bandwagoning strategy reverberated in the Middle Eastern RSC, generating significant regional costs. Structural uncertainty in the anarchical RSC suggests that irrespective of
Turkey’s ‘benevolent’ motivations, Turkey’s bandwagoning strategy had major implications on the behavior of other regional actors, for Turkey’s initial preferences inadvertently exacerbated its image as a revisionist country. Turkey’s aggressive bargaining to realize both pillars of its preferred strategy made Ankara appear to be an 311
opportunistic country seeking to exploit the crisis, hence, undermining its image as a defensive positionalist. Moreover, its unique position in the RSC as the imperial ruler of the region historically and Turkish leaders’ self-perception of the country as a major regional actor further exacerbated these concerns.
The regional costs, combined with the restrictive domestic environment, tied the hands of the government in its attempts to reciprocate to American demands at least in two different ways. Initially, the anticipation of the restrictive domestic and regional environments was an important factor, limiting the Turkish FPE’s ability to prefer defensive bandwagoning, hence, the delays in Turkish-American negotiations. Later, when Turkey decided to cooperate with the coalition, it had to work toward the elimination of those domestic and regional obstacles. Because Turkey had no interest in being viewed as a revisionist power, it had to send clear signals to clarify its intentions and offset the regional constraints on its freedom of action. In other words, overall, the concern to defray regional costs affected the course of Turkey’s dealings with the United
States, as well as its conduct of foreign policy toward other countries in the region. I identified two complementary strategies Turkey pursued to eliminate regional costs: soliciting American assistance to untie its hands, and pursuing a regional diplomacy.
To eliminate regional costs, first, Turkey asked the United States to obtain legitimacy for the war and mobilize a broader regional coalition. As it slowly became clear that the international legal blessing for the war was not forthcoming, and the regional countries would not mobilize behind the coalition, Turkish FPE was confronted with the challenge of striking the right balance between the demands of the regional constituencies on the one hand, and protecting the country’s national interests paying due 312
attention to the contingencies of the relationship with the United States, on the other.
Second, it embarked on several diplomatic initiatives to clarify Turkey’s position on Iraq to the international community, especially the countries in its region. In particular, it took pains to convince regional countries of the nonaggressive, precautionary nature of the demands Turkey put forward in negotiations with the United States. Faced with the severity of the structural pressures, Turkey eventually disregarded the regional costs and agreed to join the coalition. However, the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the governmental motion prevented the realization of Turkey’s defensive bandwagoning strategy.
Second Case
The heavy regional costs forced Turkey to tread carefully during the Russian-
Georgian war. Although Turkey declined to pursue bandwagoning in the crisis, it could not adopt a completely neutral position on Russian aggression and partially cooperated with the United States. Even Turkey’s limited assistance to the American agenda was perceived as a possibly hostile act by Russia. Russian reactions starkly presented the severity of regional costs of bandwagoning for Turkey. If Turkey had chosen to support
Georgia in coordination with the United States, it would have encountered a harsh response from Russia. The anticipated costs of seeking to isolate Russia strengthened
Turkey’s preference for pursuing more subtle forms of balancing against Russian policies in the Caucasus and keeping its cooperation with the United States at a rather limited level. 313
Moreover, in the second case, Turkey had few tools at its disposal to defray anticipated regional costs. As underlined earlier, the Western acquiescence toward
Russia’s blatant actions during the war and its aftermath limited Turkey’s room of maneuver, as Turkey was not in a position to rely on American assistance to overcome the regional costs. Therefore, Turkey again mobilized its regional diplomacy to engage
Russia in order to overcome the regional costs. Turkey’s proactive diplomacy throughout the crisis to stabilize the region and contain the conflict also became an important instrument to engage Russia, which had at least two justifications. Turkey worked hard to convince Russia that its proactive diplomatic initiatives were not directed against Russian interests; rather, they were defensive moves undertaken to restore regional stability, in which Russia was also a major stakeholder.
A General Evaluation of the Hypotheses
These two cases overall support the central argument underpinning the model developed in this study. This study has argued that although systemic polarity predicts certain outcomes, i.e., alliance strategies pursued by secondary powers, it alone cannot explain the richness of secondary power foreign policy behavior. In the case of secondary power bandwagoning, the unipolar distribution of power induces bandwagoning behavior, but it cannot fully account for the boundary conditions for the bandwagoning hypothesis to hold. A proper explanation of secondary state alignment behavior in general and bandwagoning behavior in particular has to take into account the regional context of state behavior and how it interacts with domestic and global dynamics. The 314
case studies show that the regional and domestic level factors exerted significant causal influences, mediating the effect of the systemic distribution of power.
Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Outcomes
The model provides a robust explanation of both Turkey’s behavior during both crises and the final policy outcome. These two cases overall fail to support the structural realist argument that unipolarity prompts secondary powers to undertake bandwagoning strategies with the United States. Nonetheless, a close examination of the final policy outcomes in both cases suggests that unipolarity still plays a major role in shaping foreign policy behavior. Indeed, in both cases, Turkey could not afford complete neutrality on the
American agenda, and eventually undertook limited cooperation with the United States.
Therefore, the constraints set by the unipolar distribution of power cannot be discarded altogether and have to be included in analysis.
Turkey’s foreign policy strategy during the Iraq crisis in general and its regional diplomacy in particular are falsely dubbed as ‘soft balancing,’ but my analysis concludes that they can be better explained as part of defensive bandwagoning strategy. Although some actors within the Turkish FPE toyed with the soft balancing idea in response to indirect threats, overall, Turkish strategy conforms to bandwagoning pattern of joining the stronger and threatening party in a conflict. Turkey’s failure to realize the defensive bandwagoning strategy due to ratification failure at Parliament did not prevent it from cooperating with the coalition altogether. Turkey still lent assistance to the coalition, by opening up its airspace for military operations and allowing the supply of the US forces 315
in Iraq through Turkey. This outcome, which fell short of the initial strategy, could be
considered a case of limited cooperation.
In the second case, Turkey’s behavior resembles soft balancing. Still, it is hard to
describe it as such. As Turkish FPE underlined on many occasions, it wanted to manage
the crisis according to Turkey’s ‘regional priorities’ and could not simply follow policies
formulated by the country’s Western allies.1 Turkey did not necessarily seek to counter
the United States, nor could its behavior be described as appeasing Russia. Turkish
leaders believed in the need for containing Russia, because the war and its aftermath
posed challenges to Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus. Despite Turkey’s discomfort with
the Russian policy in the crisis, Turkish FPE believed that seeking to isolate or punish
Russia would be a big mistake and would generate bigger –indirect- threats to Turkey’s
national interests. Consequently, faced with these multiple sources of threats, Turkish
FPE opted for limited cooperation strategy which was based on two complementary
objectives: regulating the American response to the crisis, and containing resurgent
Russia through lower forms of balancing, most notably through institution building at the
regional level.
Hypothesis 1a: The Effect of Unipolarity on Foreign Policy Preferences
What also begs an explanation is why Hypothesis 1a held in the first case, while it
failed in the second one. A comparison of the different outcomes shows that the irresolute
1 Ahmet Davuto lu was thus underlining that “In our foreign policy orientation, our place is clear. But, the difference is how to deal with these questions. .. Turkey is … part of Western bloc; there is no doubt about it. But you can't say that Turkish-Russian relations can be like Danish-Russian relations, or Norwegian- Russian relations, or Canada-Russian relations…” Greg Bruno, "Turkey's Top Foreign Policy Aide Worries about False Optimism in Iraq," Council on Foreign Relations Interview with Ahmet Davuto lu, September 19 2008. 316
commitment of the United States to Georgia strengthened Turkey’s ability to avoid bandwagoning in the second case. In the first case, in contrast, the American determination to execute the invasion plans altered the calculations of the Turkish FPE, coming to exert significant systemic pressures. Despite the preference of some members of the FPE for soft balancing, the supporters of the defensive bandwagoning with the
United States gained the upper hand in the formulation of Turkey’s Iraq policy. The latter operated under the assumption that if Turkey did not initiate appropriate policies, it could be left out of the military and political processes that would shape the future of the region following the Iraq war. They also argued that Turkey’s assistance to the coalition would shorten the war, hence reduce the material and humanitarian costs to Iraq, as well as indirect threats to Turkey. At critical junctures, ‘the fear of exclusion’ from the American agenda imparted urgency on the FPE to take decisions along the defensive bandwagoning strategy and helped the supporters of defensive bandwagoning to silence the proponents of the soft balancing option.2
Unlike in the Iraq war, the United States did not insist on enlisting Turkey’s cooperation forcefully, nor could it go full length to support Georgia and counter Russia.
The United States could not furnish a resolute response to Russia’s use of force and implicitly recognized its geopolitical gains. The Western-orchestrated mediation efforts between Tbilisi and Moscow had the effect of justifying the new geopolitical reality being created by assertive Russian policies. If the United States had opted for confronting
Russia, it might have been difficult for Turkey to maintain the tight balance between the 2 For a good illustration of the concerns over indirect threats and fear of being left out of the equation in the reshaping of regional order following the war, if Turkey failed to develop appropriate policies, see the YA meeting in December: "Öncelikli Tehdit Sava ," Ak am, 27 December 2002. 317
West and Russia, which it had managed rather comfortably prior to the crisis by avoiding taking sides. Under such a scenario, Turkey would have been forced to consider more seriously bandwagoning with the United States.
In an environment where the United States had little leverage to revert the new status quo, however, Turkey did not see any ‘closing window of opportunity.’
Meanwhile, the United States over time expressed appreciation of Turkey’s concerns and did not seek to use power asymmetry to mobilize Turkey’s support. Consequently,
Turkey settled for limited cooperation as its preferred strategy, because systemic pressures on Turkey were not as strong as the first case.
Hypothesis 2: The Boundary Conditions of Bandwagoning
Both cases overall support the second hypothesis which suggests that constraining regional and domestic environments complicates the ability of the FPE to act on its initial preferences. In the first case, although Turkish FPE opted for a bandwagoning strategy, it failed to materialize it, due to the constraints presented by the regional and domestic environments, especially the divisions within the FPE. In the second case, in contrast,
Turkish FPE initially chose to follow only limited cooperation, rather than defensive bandwagoning, in response to indirect threats. Since that strategy was largely in line with the preferences of the key regional and domestic audiences, the FPE was able to implement this policy without major opposition.
The first case clearly demonstrates the causal effect of the intervening variables.
Despite the FPE’s choice of defensive bandwagoning, the objections coming from the regional and especially domestic level shaped Turkey’s final behavior in a different 318
direction. In the second case, too, the effect of the domestic and regional level intervening variables was undeniable, even though they manifested themselves through different causal paths. Indeed, a factor that forced the Turkish FPE to choose limited cooperation over defensive bandwagoning strategy in the first place was the anticipated costs of bandwagoning with the United States at the regional and domestic levels. If the
Turkish FPE had opted for full cooperation with the United States, it would have encountered extremely restrictive domestic and regional environments. The constraining effect of the intervening variables rendered Turkey’s prospective bandwagoning with the
United States costly to undertake.
Summary
Together, the two cases considered in this study provide evidence that the intervening variables at the domestic and regional environments influenced state behavior, through the causal mechanisms identified in the foreign policy analysis model, which was developed in Chapter 4. I therefore find support for my main contention that the boundary conditions of the bandwagoning argument are set by the causal influences located at the domestic and regional environments. In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail further implications of the two case studies. CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The central claim of this research is that, in many cases, what determines whether a secondary power will bandwagon with the United States is not the distribution of power at the global systemic level, but the dynamics of the regional and domestic environments within which the foreign policy executive (FPE) operates to execute its country’s foreign policy. Such dynamics, which this research has treated as the intervening variables mediating the global systemic pressures, are products of how the relevant audiences at the regional and domestic levels interpret the secondary power’s contribution to the
American military-political agenda in the regional security complex (RSC) in which a conflict takes place.
This argument has been tested through a closer examination of two cases from
Turkish-American relations. I have studied the alliance behavior of Turkey in the context of two conflicts taking place in its surrounding regions, with a particular focus on how
Turkey conducted its relations with the United States: Turkey’s policy during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and US efforts to respond to Russian-Georgian conflict in the summer of 2008. 320
In both crises, the primary motivation driving Turkish FPE was the perceived indirect threats from US actions in the Middle East and the Greater Black Sea regions, respectively. These cases, therefore, were chosen as most-likely candidates for defensive bandwagoning, a subtype of the overall bandwagoning strategy which has received scant attention in the extant literature. The scholarship on alliances and bandwagoning has not paid enough attention to how secondary powers will devise alliance strategies in response to indirect threats, i.e., the negative externalities created by the proactive security policies of the unipolar leader. This study, thus, makes an important contribution toward understanding different reactions to indirect threats.
Moreover, together, the two cases considered in this study provide evidence that the intervening variables in the domestic and regional environments influenced state behavior, through the causal mechanisms identified in the foreign policy analysis model, which was developed in Chapter 4. In particular, both the presence and anticipation of constraining domestic and regional environments set significant obstacles to Turkish FPE as it contemplated whether to bandwagon with the United States to protect the country’s national interests. Although the unequal distribution of power at the global level exerted strong pressures on Turkish leaders to cooperate with the United States, they failed to act on those influences, due to the resistance coming from domestic and regional audiences.
I therefore find support for my main contention that the boundary conditions of the bandwagoning argument are set by the causal influences located at the domestic and regional environments. In other words, the incentives and constraints presented to states by the global distribution of power (independent variable) are mediated through two intervening variables: a) permissiveness of domestic environment which is a function of 321
the congruence of perception between state leaders and societal groups, and b) permissiveness of regional environment which is a function of regional costs. Hence, this study concludes that although structural distribution of power exerts a major causal influence on state behavior, i.e., the systemic imperative of bandwagoning, whether and what bandwagoning strategies a secondary power will pursue depends on the regional and domestic level forces.
This chapter consists of three sections. First, I will discuss the theoretical implications of the current research, followed by a brief inquiry into the policy implications by highlighting the relevance of indirect threats to the study of Turkish foreign policy and the future of unipolarity. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the limits of the current study and the future research agenda.
Implications of the Case Studies
These two cases have broader implications for the study of secondary state alignment in general and Turkish foreign policy in particular. This study advances our understanding of secondary state bandwagoning with the United States, which is central not only to security studies literature but also to current policy debates. Theoretically, the study of secondary state bandwagoning will make significant contributions to the relevant literatures identified earlier. 322
Intervening Variables as Transmission Belts: Contra
Second Image and Third Image Theorizing
First, in line with neoclassical realists, this research highlighted the role of the intervening process variables in foreign policy behavior. Thus it has criticized both third- image, i.e., structural realist, and second-image, liberal, approaches. Third-image theorizing alone cannot explain variation in foreign policy behavior of states that are exposed to similar structural - global systemic - conditions. Since they overlook the differences across regional powers, they fail to account for the full range of empirical reality. Conversely, second-image theorizing runs the risk of reducing state behavior to preferences of domestic actors only. They fail to appreciate the autonomous role of the statesmen in defining state interests. More importantly, they downplay the constraints set on different states by the systemic distribution of power.
This research, in contrast, has argued that we can neither reduce state behavior to domestic factors, nor single out systemic constraints. Therefore, the model highlighted how broad parameters of state behavior are set by the nature of the global system but they are filtered through intervening variables. The intervening variables of this study incorporate the causal effect of the processes that emanate from the domestic and regional environments. As such, they can account for differences across secondary powers that are similarly positioned.
Since the outcomes in both cases are predicted by the intervening variables of the model, it offers an important corrective to the structural realist foreign policy model and as such establishes the boundary conditions of the bandwagoning hypothesis. Therefore, this study confirms neoclassical realists’ argument that the process leading from systemic 323
influences to policy outcomes can be compared to an imperfect transmission belt, in the sense that outcomes may not reflect the initial systemic imperatives. By including intervening process variables, which operate as constraints on the FPE, into analysis, this model can account for not only the conditions under which the systemic imperatives are likely to prevail, but also the appropriate context of domestic level variables to influence alliance behavior. However, as underlined in the introduction chapter, by proposing a second intervening variable, i.e., regional costs, this study also offers a corrective to the neoclassical realist research tradition. Since unit level process variables alone are insufficient to explain dyadic or systemic outcomes, the inclusion of a regional-systemic intervening variable helps capture the strategic interaction between a secondary state and the states it is closely interacting with, i.e., the regional system.
Indirect Threats
Second, this study underscores the importance of considering ‘indirect threats’ as a major variable in the study of alliance behavior under unipolarity, although some alliance scholars, such as Stephen Walt, continue to disregard it as a distinct variable. As the foregoing account shows, indirect threats instructed the formulation, content, and execution of Turkey’s policy throughout both crises. These cases, therefore, justify the conclusion that regional states are sensitive to the actions of the United States, and, even in the absence of direct coercion, they feel threatened and engage in defensive strategies such as soft balancing or defensive bandwagoning.
Given the causal impact they have on alliance decisions, indirect threats cannot be discounted from alliance studies. This kind of threat at the least can be treated differently 324
than direct military threat and included in analysis as a distinct variable to explain state behavior. By incorporating indirect threats into the analysis of alliance strategies, we could gain leverage to compare - and possibly test - competing theoretical claims on secondary power alignment strategies. The inclusion of indirect threats into analysis allows researchers to capture the empirical diversity of secondary power bandwagoning strategies in response to the variations in the behavior of the United States under unipolarity. Particularly, indirect threats can explain not only the behavior of states that may be on rather adversarial terms with the United States, but also variations in the responses of states that maintain friendly relations with the unipole due to their becoming part of the US-led unipolar order or because of their attachment to the United States through preexisting alliance commitments. Whereas the latter will not necessarily perceive a direct threat from American actions or will not be coerced into cooperation, they still perceive indirect threats to which they respond in unique ways.
The problem of indirect threats is likely to surface when the United States becomes insensitive to interests of other actors and uses its power in a manner that comes to produce negative externalities for their security. Since secondary powers that are concerned about maintaining the status quo or shifts in relative power cannot contain
American power through external or internal hard balancing strategies, they are forced to either mount lower levels of - soft - balancing or engage in strategies of accommodation, i.e., defensive bandwagoning. 325
Defensive Bandwagoning vs. Soft Balancing
Third, these cases uncover a new alliance strategy for secondary states under unipolarity: defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats. When Turkish FPE formulated foreign policy strategies, the primary motivation driving its behavior was perceived threats from the United States. However, as the United States solicited
Turkey’s partnership, it did not seek to coerce Turkey into cooperation through direct threats in these cases. Therefore, Turkish actions cannot be discussed as defensive bandwagoning in the conventional sense, i.e., cooperating with the very source of threat out of fear of punishment. Rather, they should be considered as a subcategory of the overall defensive bandwagoning strategy, since what drove Turkey’s foreign policy behavior were the prospective indirect threats that would be generated by the American policies in the region.
The cases considered here show that soft balancing and defensive bandwagoning, which are available to defensive positionalists confronted with indirect threats, flow from two contradictory assumptions. As a strategy of resistance, soft balancing assumes that the unipolar leader’s proactive security policies can be contained. As a strategy of accommodation, in contrast, defensive bandwagoning proceeds on the assumption that given the power asymmetry, containing the United States through political and diplomatic channels is unlikely to produce any results. Seen from this perspective, the best course of action under the circumstance of an inevitable conflict would be to take part on the side of the unipolar leader to minimize unwanted damage and protect the country’s interests. As the discussion under the cross-case comparison underlined, the critical factor that determines the choice between defensive bandwagoning and soft 326
balancing is the perception of a closing window of opportunity due to the fear of exclusion from how the American plans are executed. To the extent that the FPE perceives that the actions of the unipolar leader cannot be contained, and the country will be losing ground in the future balance of power, it will come under pressure to engage in defensive bandwagoning strategy.
Regionally-differentiated Foreign Policy Model
Fourth, the cases support a basic postulate of the current study: a large part of secondary powers’ foreign policy behavior cannot be fully explained without a regionally-differentiated foreign policy model that pays special attention to the regional context and how it interacts with domestic and regional environments. The multilayered framework proposed here provides a more accurate explanation of alliance behavior.
Treating the regions as a distinct level of analysis uncovers new causal mechanisms to study alliance behavior, which cannot be captured by the conventional distinction between domestic and international levels of analysis. In particular, we could gain a better understanding of how the involvement of global powers alters the foreign policy behavior of regional powers in their immediate security environment. As Chapter
3 emphasized, most threats and opportunities that affect the interests of secondary powers are located at the immediate regional system. Therefore, states enter into security relationships with their regional and global counterparts predominantly at local proximities, rather than at a global system, which, in most cases, plays virtually no role in state behavior. To the extent that secondary powers are subject to the constraints and opportunities of the global distribution of power, it still takes place within the confines of 327
the immediate RSC rather than a planetary scale system, as structural realism would lead us to believe. Therefore, studying state behavior through a regionally-differentiated model provides a useful recipe for scholars of international relations.
Moreover, treating regions as a distinct level of analysis allows for differentiating the policies targeting regional audiences from those targeting the global actors, most notably the United States. Such a distinction is particularly vital for a proper categorization of alliance strategies. The framework developed in this study suggests that most of what advocates of soft balancing would construe as ‘balancing behavior’ to contain American actions can be better described as strategies that targeted regional audiences to eliminate regional costs. As an intervening variable translating the effect of the global systemic causal influences into final outcomes, regional costs created constraining environment for Turkey’s prospective bandwagoning strategy, which triggered much of Turkey’s diplomatic activism. A great deal of Turkey’s resistance to
US demands for cooperation and its interactions with the United States were motivated by a set of considerations quite different from checking the American power per se. The major function of regional diplomacy initiatives, especially in the first case, was rather to eliminate the ‘regional costs’ to Turkey’s cooperation with the United States, rather than mounting opposition to the United States. Therefore, a proper classification of regional countries’ alliance behavior with the United States requires the consideration of the dynamics of the RSC. 328
Systemic Positioning of Regional Powers and the Role of Proximity
Fifth, Turkey’s behavior also supports this study’s argument for taking the unique structural position of regional powers into account. The theoretical discussions on the subject suggested that such actors are keen on preserving their interests and cannot accept outside imposition without putting up resistance; hence, they will resist to extraregional penetration when it threatens their interests. It was for these reasons that Turkey did not settle for defensive bandwagoning easily without first exploring the possibility of resistance through soft balancing strategies in the first case and chose limited cooperation in the second case. In both cases, Turkey used its geopolitical position to deny access to the region to American forces.
Moreover, the theoretical discussions also underlined that given their capabilities and managerial ambitions in the locale, other members of the RSC tend to perceive regional powers as the most probable source of threat to their foreign policy interests.
This dynamic, too, explains the generation of regional costs to Turkey’s prospective bandwagoning strategy in both cases, which have been discussed in great length so far. In short, an analysis that recognizes the dual position of regional powers vis-à-vis other countries in their neighborhood and vis-à-vis global powers enables a more comprehensive inquiry into Turkey’s behavior throughout both crises.
A related conclusion concerns why Turkey was sensitive to these regional reactions. As the discussions in the third chapter pertaining to the RSCs underlined, geographic proximity matters in state calculations of their foreign policy options. It was underlined that the behavior of extraregional powers and regional powers in a RSC will demonstrate different patterns. Whereas the outsiders penetrating into a RSC have the 329
luxury of withdrawing, local actors are bound to live together in the region. The immediate security interdependencies and the shadow of the future inevitably render them sensitive to each other’s behavior. As a regional country embedded in the Middle
Eastern and Greater Black Sea RSCs, in both cases, Turkey was forced to respond to the regional perceptions of its actions. In both cases, it was almost a cliché for Turkish FPE to reiterate Turkey’s unique position in the crises as a country that is bordering the conflict zone, and as such it had to be mindful of the consequences of its actions.
Structural and State-centric Assumptions
Sixth, this case lends partial support to structural and state-centric assumptions of this study. First, realists’ emphasis on central executives in conducting foreign policy appears to be justified. In both cases, the FPE operated largely in an autonomous manner from the society, as regards the definition of the crisis, the specification of the country’s national interests and formulation of the policy. Domestic pressures on the leaders were exerted after they agreed on certain strategies in response to the international environment. If the domestic dynamics alone were to motivate the FPE, as liberal theories would want us to believe, we should have observed an entirely different set of policy preferences and behavioral outcomes. For instance, if Innenpolitik forces were to drive foreign policy, Turkey should not have cooperated with the United States at all, in both cases. Despite calls for total disengagement from the American agenda coming from powerful domestic constituencies, however, Turkish leaders still prioritized systemic pressures and maintained balanced relations with the United States. Here, it will be 330
helpful to recall that in the first case the Turkish FPE opted for defensive bandwagoning despite the opposition coming from society.
Moreover, these cases also support the structural realist tenets of this study. As the FPE evaluated Turkey’s alignment options, it was driven by largely external factors, rather than acting on the basis of domestic political reasons to promote group interests. In both cases, systemic forces, namely the distribution of power and the structure of threat and opportunities, acted as the major determinant of Turkey’s alignment options. It is also worth noting that the FPE undertook policies that promoted national interests, rather than their group interests in domestic politics. The relative power distribution between
Turkey and the United States on the one hand, and between Turkey and its neighbors, on the other, constrained Turkey’s options in defining its national interests. Similarly, whether Turkish FPE perceived threats or opportunities in the external security environment also conditioned the kind of strategies it chose to enhance Turkish national interests in respective regions.
Role of Domestic Political Context
Lastly, one argument, which is already made forcefully by neoclassical realists, needs to be reiterated here. The foregoing discussion does not suggest that domestic factors should be discarded altogether and secondary powers’ foreign policy strategies should be explained solely with reference to systemic forces. The domestic context of foreign policy making, too, has to be included in analysis as an important intervening variable mediating the influence of the external security environment. Especially in the first case, as the process leading to the final policy outcome suggests, domestic level 331
factors played a major role in affecting Turkey’s external behavior. The divisions inside the FPE, aggravated by the antiwar attitude of the Turkish public, affected the content and evaluation of the negotiations with the war coalition, and set further constraints on
Turkey’s external behavior. Unlike the military-civilian security bureaucracy, the members of the FPE that were democratically accountable were more sensitive to the pressures coming from the domestic political context. Therefore, they could not act decisively to enact the initial strategy. Hence, the defensive bandwagoning strategy failed to receive endorsement from Parliament and Turkish FPE had to settle for a limited form of bandwagoning strategy. Nonetheless, the role of domestic level factors should be carefully delineated and be placed in a relevant context set by the constraints of the regional and global systems.
Policy Implications: The Importance of Indirect Threats
The notion of indirect threats highlighted in this research has important implications for understanding both the future of Turkish-American relations and the future of the unipolar international system.
Implications for the Turkish-American Relations
Employing a regionally-differentiated framework helped me offer a strong explanation of Turkey’s behavior in the two cases studied here. Moreover, the same framework can give us important clues about how Turkey will regulate its relationship with the United States in Turkey’s surrounding regions. The crucial factor that will 332
determine whether Turkey will support American policies is whether it perceives US involvement as a source of threat or opportunity.
Types of offensive bandwagoning, driven by perceived opportunities, have not been considered in this study. However, a brief survey of likely candidates for offensive bandwagoning, such as Turkey’s support for NATO’s interventions in Bosnia and
Kosovo, as well as the US-led coalition of the willing in Afghanistan will show that
Turkey pursued bandwagoning strategies. When Turkey viewed the penetration of the
United States as an opportunity that enhanced its capabilities and room for maneuver in its surrounding regions, Turkey did not refrain from cooperating with its superpower partner. It was this convergence of interests between Turkey and the United States in
Eurasia, the Middle East and the Balkans that provided the basis for the so-called
‘strategic partnership’ between Turkey and the United States throughout the 1990s.
The case in point is Turkey’s proactive Eurasia strategy that was based on a pro-
Western orientation. Turkey’s formulation of its regional policies in line with the
Western world had a pragmatic rationale for Turkey’s positioning in the region. Turkey harbored ambitious goals to spread its influence and create a stable neighborhood.
However, alone it lacked sufficient resources to play such an extended role. Acting alongside the West provided Turkey with much needed financial and political assets to penetrate into new regions, despite the occasional restrictions imposed by its Western partners on its freedom of action. More importantly, cooperation with the United States had a resource-generating function at the regional level, in that it helped Turkey counter the opposition to its policies coming from its major rivals in the region, namely Russia and Iran. Indeed, in many cases Turkey undertook initiatives that directly challenged the 333
interests of Russia. A good example of this policy was demonstrated in Turkey’s extensive military assistance to Georgia and other post-Soviet states, intended to curb the
Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Without the political backing from its Western allies, it would have been hardly imaginable for Turkey to play a proactive role in Eurasia in general and the Caucasus in particular. Correspondingly,
Turkey’s perception of American power as opportunity facilitated US penetration, as
Turkey served as a ‘pivotal’ country to advance Western interests in the region.
In contrast, in cases where US actions constituted sources of indirect threats,
Turkey refrained from cooperation with the United States. Turkey’s sensitivity to such indirect threats, overall, conforms to a common trend in Turkish foreign policy whereby the penetration of extraregional powers into the surrounding regions is viewed as a major source of instability by the Turkish political actors. While, as the unipolar leader, the
United States tends to conduct its policies in different regions through its global agenda,
Turkey has been driven by immediate neighborhood issues, i.e., how to ensure regional security and develop economic and trade ties with its neighbors. Turkey has grown unwilling to let the global agenda of the United States to overshadow its regional interests and alter the dynamics of the respective RSCs. These dynamics were clearly manifested in the two case studies. In the future, too, given the immediacy of its regional concerns,
Turkey will approach the rhetoric coming out of Washington that calls for proactive policies in Turkey’s neighborhood with skepticism. 334
Implications for the Future of Unipolarity and American Power
The foregoing observations about indirect threats segue into a wider debate on the roots of unipolarity and the exercise of American power. A major division in the scholarly discussions concerns whether the objective material conditions or the particular ways within which American power is exercised sustains unipolarity. This study has shown that the distribution of material power alone does not determine the response of secondary powers toward the United States. Moreover, the conduct of US foreign policy in a manner that does not take into account the interests of others is likely to deepen the resentment among secondary powers which, according to the scholars of soft balancing, is on the rise in the aftermath of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the unequal distribution of power did not lead to counterbalancing coalitions against the
United States throughout the 1990s, the exercise of US power in a threatening way in recent years might either undercut the secondary powers’ rationale for supporting the US- led international order or lead to counterbalancing coalitions. In either case, the sustainability of unipolarity will be increasingly difficult, if the United States continues to pose indirect threats to the security interests of secondary powers.
However, it is also the case that the United States might be facing a dilemma as regards the exercise of its power in different regions. While its proactive security policies produce indirect threats and undercut secondary powers’ motivations to follow its agendas in different regions, it also comes under pressure to demonstrate its resoluteness to protect its interests and allies worldwide. Self-restrained use of American power, if it comes to be seen as a sign of weakness by other actors, can be equally damaging to the sustainability of unipolarity. The irresolute response of the United States to Russia’s 335
policies against Georgia seemed to have undermined its credibility as a balancer against regional powers and threats. Turkey’s inability to defray regional costs by using the
United States as leverage was an important factor curbing its desire to support the
American agenda. Since the Russian-Georgian war, Turkey and many other European countries have been seeking accommodation with Russia to readjust their policies to the new geopolitical reality in the region where the United States could enjoy little leverage.
To the extent that the United States maintains its timid attitude in confronting rising or revisionist powers in different regions, it might run into difficulties in mobilizing other regional actors behind its own agenda.
The future of the unipolar international system will hinge on whether the United
States can strike the right balance between self-restrained and proactive policies, as it conducts itself in different regions. It will be interesting to follow if the United States will be able to advance its security interests without generating indirect threats on the one hand and giving the impression that it is too weak to counter regional challengers, on the other. However, the conclusions of this study suggest that, at any rate the United States will have to cease approaching different regions through the lenses of its global agenda and develop a better appreciation of the local security dynamics and how regional powers see their security situation.
A discriminating treatment of the subject will suggest that a country’s past record of cooperation cannot guarantee blanket support for the United States in all cases because not all bandwagoning behavior is the same. In particular, the explanatory variables of the study suggest to policy makers that the American diplomacy needs to be attentive to the interests of secondary states, and avoid taking actions that will come to pose direct and 336
indirect threats to their security, and put them in a situation to incur significant domestic and regional costs due to their cooperation with the United States
Limitations of the Study and the Avenues for Future Research
The model provided a robust explanation of Turkey’s foreign policy behavior, by focusing on a limited range of cases. The typology and the foreign policy analysis model developed in Chapter 4 are comprehensive enough to study the foreign policy strategies pursued by other regional powers in similar situations. However, in this study, I prioritized depth over breadth, and focused on only one subtype of bandwagoning behavior: defensive bandwagoning in response to indirect threats. This choice was justified, considering the relevance of indirect threats for the evolution of the unipolarity.
Moreover, the detailed case studies allowed me to engage in extensive process tracing and map out the causal pathways identified by the model. As such, these cases have lent themselves particularly well to theory development. In the future, my research will evolve by further elaborating the model through closer examination of other subtypes of bandwagoning identified in my typology. The applicability of the model could be further examined, by testing it against a wider range of cases drawn from the interactions of the
United States with other secondary powers.
A major limitation of this model pertains to how to identify which intervening variable plays a larger causal role. This model argues that when the FPE faces adverse environments at the domestic and regional levels, its ability to act on the initial preferences will be constrained. However, no deductive assumption is made as regards what level enjoys primacy in terms of affecting the final policy outcome. Since the causal 337
chains manifest themselves in unique ways in different cases, I preferred to make this decision case by case, only through a careful process-tracing after the fact. In the first case, it appears that the divisions within the FPE at the domestic level played a larger role in Turkey’s failure to pursue a defensive bandwagoning with the US-led coalition against
Iraq. In contrast, the heavy regional costs of bandwagoning were the major factor leading to Turkey’s limited cooperation with the United States in the Russian-Georgian crisis.
Nonetheless, provisionally, it could be suggested that in cases where parliamentary ratification is required to authorize foreign policy decisions, the domestic level constraints are most likely to predominate. In that regard, it could also be added that the assumptions of this study might be more applicable to democratic systems.
In that context, it is also worth mentioning another possible limitation. This study defined the domestic level intervening variable too narrowly. I looked at only the divisions within the FPE as a proxy to help measure the permissiveness of the domestic environment, rather than measuring society’s perceptions of the country’s priorities in a crisis independently. This choice was made for two interrelated reasons. First, it enabled parsimony and prevented me from delving deeper into the complex dynamics of Turkish domestic politics in each case. Second, since there is already a vibrant literature exploring how various domestic level intervening variables filter structural forces shaping state behavior, I preferred to put the explanatory weight on the second intervening variable at the regional level which received less attention in the literature. In the future, my model could borrow from the neoclassical realist research agenda in order to explore what other domestic level factors affect secondary powers’ interaction with the United States. 338
Another limitation of this study stems from the unique ways regional level variables are utilized. As part of this study’s broader argument that secondary powers’ foreign policy behavior should be situated within the context of specific RSCs, regional factors have been included in analysis in two distinct ways. First, at the policy formulation stage, I focus on the regional interests of secondary powers in response to the threats and opportunities from either other regional actors or global powers penetrating into the specific RSC. Second, I study regional costs as a distinct intervening variable that acts as a constraint on the FPE at the policy implementation stage.
In some cases, differentiating regional threats from regional costs analytically and measuring them separately might prove to be difficult. This was partly the challenge encountered in the second case on Turkey’s policy during the Russian-Georgian war, considering the unique position Russia occupied in the crisis, both as a party to the conflict and as the quasiregional hegemon with aspirations for acting at the global level.
On the one hand, Russian actions presented a major source of threat that Turkish FPE had to take into account at the policy implementation stage. On the other hand, given Russia’s dominant position in the RSC, the regional costs to Turkey’s initial strategy were also generated by how Russia perceived Turkey’s actions and how it would respond to
Turkey’s possible cooperation with the United States.
Provisionally, it could be argued that this model is more likely to hold in RSCs that resemble balance of power systems than hierarchical regional orders. When an RSC is formed by several powers with capabilities close to each other, separating regional costs from the sources of threats becomes easier. One line of research in the literature on regions looks at the types of regional security orders, using various criteria including but 339
not limited to the distribution of power at the regional level. My future research could benefit from this literature, by expanding in the direction of how regional costs operate in different forms of RSCs.
In that context, it is worth discussing the challenges by the question of how to delineate the boundaries of the RSCs as the relevant unit of analysis in the case studies.
As the discussions in Chapter 3 underlined, significant divisions remain among scholars as to how to understand RSCs. Overall, the operationalization of the RSCs on the basis of the security externalities has provided me with neat guidelines throughout my research.
Both cases confirmed the point made in Chapter 3 that instead of taking existing geographical definitions as the basis of analytical inquiry, it would be more appropriate to identify the applicable RSCs in the context of the specific crisis under study.
Nonetheless, as the second case study showed, for instance, the proximity of the
Caucasus to other regions and the presence of security issues cross-cutting across geographical boundaries blurred distinctions and made a clear-cut categorization difficult.
Based on tight security interdependencies connecting the Caucasus to the neighboring regions, I located it instead within the broader regional system in the Greater Black Sea area. Again, my research agenda will closely follow the lively discussions taking place in the literature on RSCs to borrow from their discussions on how to define RSCs.
As yet another limitation of the current model, some caveats could be inserted to qualify this study’s structural and state-centric assumptions, discussed in the previous section. While discussing the implications of the cases, I already alluded to how the divisions inside the FPE might exert limitations on the realist unitary actor assumption.
Here, it is important to underline that in some cases first image factors might also play a 340
role in shaping foreign policy preferences, or transmitting the effect of the systemic incentives into foreign policy outcomes. For instance, in the first case, the religious and cultural affinity between the populations of Turkey and Iraq, given the ideological leanings of the party in power, made certain members of the FPE, especially Prime
Minister Gül, more sensitive to the perceptions of Turkey’s actions in the region than other segments of the FPE. The Turkish government was interested in developing cultural and economic ties with the region, and did not want to isolate itself from what it perceived as Turkey’s own ‘cultural’ hinterland. Such observations, therefore, suggest that ideological factors and nonmaterial costs of alignment strategies may need to be taken into account in alliance studies, including this one on bandwagoning behavior.
A related caveat concerns ‘learning’ by leaders and how it affects foreign policy behavior. Although the model did not specifically treat learning as a distinct variable, it came up in both cases very often, as a significant force affecting Turkish FPE’s evaluations of the crises and the country’s options. For instance, in the Iraq case, negative memories from Turkey’s cooperation with the United States in the First Gulf War in 1991 haunted Turkish decisions makers, as they formulated and conducted Turkey’s policy during the process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Similarly, the Iraq case had a demonstration effect on the second case. The lessons learned from the Iraq experience and the post-Iraq war travails in the bilateral relations dramatically altered Turkey’s position on the penetration of the United States into its neighborhoods. As the destabilizing effects of the US policies to Turkish interests in the Middle East became clearer, Turkey lost its enthusiasm to align with the United States in other regions, including the greater Black Sea. Therefore, further research might look closely into how 341
the accumulated experiences from past crises or the demonstration effects across crises affect secondary power bandwagoning in particular and alignment behavior in general.
Another concept that played an important role in the case studies is international institutions. As major actors in contemporary international relations, institutions alter states’ preferences, since the various functions they perform in the regional and global systems present states with different constraints and opportunities. In line with my state- centric ontology of the international system, I looked at the alliance relations largely at an interstate level, though recognizing the possibility that some alliances might be formal.
For sure, Turkish-American relations did not take place in a vacuum in both cases, as the preexisting alliance ties within the context of NATO provided the context within which
American efforts to enlist Turkey took place. Moreover, Turkish FPE had to take into account the developments pertaining to the United Nations and other regional organizations in Europe, the Middle East and Black Sea, as it conducted Turkey’s foreign policy.
The impact the international institutions had on secondary power alliance behavior was not included in the theoretical model as a distinct variable. Still, it is necessary to recognize that international organizations exerted causal influences, which are in fact implicitly subsumed under the variables of the model. Especially, institutions were a major factor shaping the permissiveness of the domestic and especially regional environments. Given that one function performed by institutions is to grant legitimacy to use of force in the international society, to the extent that the United States is able to obtain authorization from international organizations or mobilize a coalition around a preexisting security organization, its actions are more likely to be seen as pro status quo, 342
hence garner larger levels of support from regional countries. In those situations, secondary powers contemplating cooperation with the United States will also face permissive regional environments. In contrast, in the absence of international legitimacy, the United States is more likely to be seen as a revisionist force, which will create constraining environments for the would-be bandwagoners. In both cases, these dynamics were clearly in play, as the failure of the United States to mobilize the United Nations and NATO in Iraq and Georgia, respectively, undercut Turkey’s ability to follow a bandwagoning strategy. One line of future research could study more closely how international institutions could expand or contract the permissiveness of regional environment.
Conclusion
This research project set out by a concern to understand how secondary powers located in different regions will conduct their relations with the United States in the unipolar international system. My own knowledge on Turkish foreign policy led me to study these dynamics in the particular case of the Turkish-American relationship, which has proved useful to understand secondary power bandwagoning behavior. Despite the declining weight of the unipolar international order and growing relevance of security dynamics at the regional level, we are still far from a pure world of regions. The United
States remains a major actor in various regional systems around the world and the global distribution of power continues to influence security affairs at different regions. The ongoing presence of various security challenges in Turkey’s immediate neighborhoods, which involve the United States in one way or another, such as the Middle East peace 343
process, the Iranian nuclear issue or the Russian resurgence in Central Asia, demonstrates the relevance of further research into the patterns of cooperation between regional powers and the global powers under different global, regional and domestic conditions. I hope this research could make a modest contribution toward this end.
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