Summer, 1989), Pp

Berlin: Forty Years On Author(s): Robert E. Hunter Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 41-52 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044007 . Accessed: 05/08/2011 18:21 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs. http://www.jstor.org Robert E. Hunter BERLIN: FORTY YEARS ON JLn the romance of the cold war, Berlin has occupied a on unique place. Debate continues whether postwar Europe would have been different if American and British forces had raced to the capital of the German Reich ahead of the Soviets. The Berlin blockade in 1948-49 seemed to settle a key dispute between European and American supporters of the Marshall Plan about whether the Soviet Union had aggressive ambitions toward the West; and the blockade's end, agreed to by Moscow was 30 days after the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949, validated the need for this far-reaching commitment to mutual security. The drawn-out Berlin crisis of 1958-61 brought the world closer to cataclysm than any other event of era save the the Cuban missile crisis; it ended only with the construction of the Berlin Wall, which remains the most poi gnant symbol of East-West confrontation, of Europe's division and of human aspirations blunted by the communist system. By contrast, Berlin also became the focus of the first compre hensive East-West agreement produced by the Ostpolitik and d?tente that began in the 1960s?an agreement essential to the Federal Republic of Germany's later treaties with Eastern states, the Helsinki Final Act, and talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. II With this heady and consequential history in the cold war, it seem may remarkable that Berlin now commands so little attention in the West. That fact cannot derive simply from the details of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. On its face, some this accord tidied up provisions regarding life in, and access not to, West Berlin that had been adequately dealt with by the Western occupying powers during the 1940s. It gave mutual pledges that "disputes shall be settled solely by peaceful Robert E. Hunter is Vice President for Regional Programs and Director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in to was Washington, D.C. From 1977 1979, he Director of West European Affairs at the National Security Council. 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS and it some reassurance about customs and means," provided Western rights, in the words that "the situation which has in the area . shall not be developed changed unilaterally." The unresolved issues of a divided Berlin, however, did not go remain frozen more or less where the away. They diplomacy of 1971 left off, although there has been amelioration of some human problems related to the city, its status and West Berlin's the German Democratic Re relations with others, especially public (G.D.R.). The symbolism of the Quadripartite Agreement counted for was much more: the Soviet Union implicitly declaring its inter est in developing a form of relations with the West that was not likely to be fostered through Moscow's periodically holding West Berlin hostage. And in doing so, the Soviets were placing a value on a broad East-West than on higher pursuing agenda pressing East German interests (although, in part because of the Quadripartite Agreement, the Democratic Republic was soon accorded added international legitimacy and in 1972 signed a basic treaty with the Federal Republic, which normal ized relations between the two Germanies). Through the succeeding years?even during the return of deep hostility to East-West relations?Berlin remained rela tively calm. Despite occasional nibbling around the edges of the agreement, by both the Soviets and the East Germans, the re basic understandings held. Indeed, had the Soviet Union turned to its old ways regarding Berlin after the invasion of Afghanistan, erosion of Soviet relations with the United States would no doubt have had a far greater impact in Western war n" never bit as hard in as Europe. As it was, "cold Europe it did in America. With a reduction in Berlin's active role in shaping East-West or ill?it was not that its relations?for good surprising sym bolism also became less compelling. In 1963, John F. Kennedy in bin ein the could four words?"Ich Berliner"?encapsulate entire postwar struggle in Europe, underscoring its problems come and perils, as well as the possibilities that might from Western solidarity. Fifteen years later, the phrase chosen by Jimmy Carter to follow suit?"Was immer sei, Berlin bleibt frei" ("Whatever will be, Berlin will stay free")?unconsciously de even as to personalized the significance of Berlin it sought reinforce Western political and spiritual unity regarding this to the city-symbol. By the time of Ronald Reagan's visit Berlin nur Wall in 1987, words had become ritual?"Es gibt ein BERLIN: FORTY YEARS ON 43 Berlin" ("There is only one Berlin")?almost an exercise in one nostalgia, although still well appreciated by the city's residents. By the same token, West Berlin has become less critical to own the Federal Republic's definition of its legitimacy and a aspirations to wholeness of the German nation. The city has always been heavily subsidized by the Federal Republic, through both direct subventions and financial inducements for West Germans to live there. But time has taken its toll: once as a on heralded show-window the West, its neon lights glitter ing in the sky next to drab East Berlin, the western part of the now city seems a bit shabby compared to any bustling metrop even olis in the Federal Republic; the comparison with the city across the wall is no as stark. longer quite Meanwhile, money from Bonn is harder to come by. Indeed, last year the Christian Democratic Union-led federal government reduced its pay ment to CDU Berlin, although the then controlled the city government. recent In years there have been fewer efforts by Bonn to take practical steps to strengthen ties to Berlin. Several times between October 1955 and April 1965 the Bundestag met there, and four times, until 1969, the federal president was chosen there?often provoking loud Soviet and East German were protests. These practices ended by the Quadripartite Yet to Agreement. today, when actions enhance Berlin's role inWest German life would cause fewer ripples, there is both less need to engage in such symbolism and greater resistance to causing any ripples with the East. Nor has there been much to ambitious to turn a follow-up Reagan's proposal Berlin into center "U.N. or on major for meetings, world conferences human arms or rights and control, other issues that call for international The decided cooperation." preference among West Germans of virtually all political stripes is to preserve the status to quo in Berlin and keep it from again becoming an issue in East-West relations. Ill Recent in political developments Berlin may have strength ened the reluctance of Bonn to continue subsidizing Berlin at same rate. on the The surprising electoral defeat January 29 of Governing Mayor Eberhard Diepgen's CDU government has to a led the creation of "Red-Green" government?a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (spd) and the Alternativen (West 44 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Berlin's "Green" party). The election also resulted in the emergence of the new right-wing Republican Party. It gained 7.5 percent of the total vote (and 11 seats in the Berlin House of Representatives), thus surpassing the five percent needed to acquire seats, while the centrist Free Democratic Party (fdp) fell beneath this critical level. With these political developments, West Berlin has become less a harbinger of change in East-West politics?from deteri orating relations in the 1940s to the onset of d?tente?than of trends in domestic German politics. Within a month, similar results emerged from municipal elections in Hesse: major slip page by the CDU and the rise of the Republicans, showing that the first serious incursion by the political right in West Ger in two was not a to many decades just phenomenon peculiar Berlin. Both sets of election results, and particularly those in Berlin, an were most significant because of element that went beyond a the usual cycles to be expected in politics, with government in Bonn that is starting to outlive its mandate. That element was the major influx of ethnic Germans from the East (i.e., the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). An estimated 200,000 as migrated to the Federal Republic in 1988, and half again are in 1989. In the these newcomers many expected main, most unlike from the who have been immigrants G.D.R., share German and collective clearly culture, language experi ence, even if they have been separated for 40 years by the the new come inner-German border. By contrast, immigrants areas predominately from Poland and from in the Soviet Union?such as the Volga River basin, to which many skilled two centuries at the invitation of Germans emigrated ago Catherine the Great.

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