Daf Ditty Pesachim 98- Silence Final

Daf Ditty Pesachim 98: Silence

Munich Manuscript 95 (1342 CE) Location: Cod. hebr. 95 pg. 0129

Source: www.digitale-sammlungen.de

Pirkei Avot 1:17

Rumi wrote much about silence. Does that seem strange?

Poets live with silence: the silence before the poem; the silence whence the poem comes; .

the silence in between the words, as you drink the words, watch them glide through your mind, feel them slide down your throat towards your heart;

the silence which you share with the poet when the poem ends, sitting side by side, feeling one another being one heart;

the silence after the poem, when you are a different person from the person who started reading the poem, think differently, move differently, act differently; know Rumi a little better as a friend; know yourself a little more as a friend.

Rumi was asked, why do you talk, talk, talk, so much about silence?

2 He said, the radiant one inside me has said nothing.

And that’s the silence which we listen to and hear in Rumi’s heart, here, sitting in the cool shade which the scent of roses seems to love, while the fountain gently plays like a poet with sound and silence.

Michael Shepherd

If the paschal lambs of two groups get mixed up each group shall select one of the animals. One person from each group must join the other group. And this is their declaration: If this paschal lamb is ours, you hereby secede from yours and subscribe to ours; and if this paschal lamb is yours, we hereby secede from ours and subscribe to yours. The same applies even to five groups or five people or ten groups of ten people: one person secedes from each group and they make the declaration.

If the paschal lambs of just two people get mixed up, each must select one animal. Then each must get another person from the market to subscribe to his animal. Now one from each group must approach the other and declare: If this paschal lamb is mine you hereby secede from yours and subscribe to mine; if the paschal lamb is yours I hereby secede from mine and subscribe to yours.

Rabbi Simchah Roth writes:1

1: The two last mishnayot of Chapter 9 require us to consider certain regulations concerning the paschal lamb and to imagine certain conditions as prevailing. I have combined these two mishnayot, as it were, since essentially they deal with one and the same topic. This topic is how to deal with a situation in which paschal animals have become mixed up.

2: Once a paschal animal has been selected as the intended sacrifice every effort must be made to prevent a situation in which it becomes ownerless. The term 'ownerless' here does not refer to the person from whose flock the animal was selected; it refers to the fact that from the moment of selection the animal is designated as belonging to anyone and everyone who subscribes to its group. Once selected a paschal lamb should only be offered by a representative member of that particular subscription group, and, having been sanctified as it were by virtue of its being designated the animal must not be allowed to fail to fulfill its designated function.

3: Let us imagine a situation which was hinted at in the previous mishnah. It is the afternoon of Nisan 14th; we are members of a subscription group assembled in the Outer Court of the Bet Mikdash awaiting the turn of our representative to enter and slaughter our lamb. There is an immense throng of animals - both human and ruminant. In the crush we momentarily lose contact with our animal at the same time as the same thing happens to an animal of another group. We all discover our two lambs in mutual communion and now it is not possible to know which of the two animals is the one we have

1 http://www.bmv.org.il/shiurim/pesachim/pes09.html

5 designated and which the one that they have designated. We have a double halakhic quandary. We can only sacrifice the lamb that we have designated and we don't know which one it is. On the other hand, we cannot let both animals loose and buy two more animals in the handy market which is doing a roaring trade in this very courtyard because a designated animal must meet its fate.

4: The solution outlined in Mishnah 10 is now clear. Each of the two groups takes charge of one of the two animals. One person from each group must now 'cross the lines' and join the other group. A situation has now been created in which at least one person in each group 'owns' the lamb in question. In order to verbally clarify the situation all the other members of the group must address the new member (presumably in chorus) the the following effect: 'If this paschal lamb is, in fact the one that we originally designated, you are hereby deemed to have seceded from your original lamb and to have subscribed to ours; on the other hand, if this paschal lamb was originally designated by you as a member of your previous group, we are hereby deemed to have seceded from our original lamb and have now subscribed to yours.' Problem neatly solved.

5: This solution would apply even if it were not just two groups that were involved, but five groups or even ten groups: the groups must be reconstituted so that at least one person in each group could have been an original owner, in theory, of the animal now associated with the group.

6: The problem is compounded, however, if we are only two people whose lambs have become mixed up; and this is the situation addressed by mishnah 11. The solution outlined in mishnah 10 will not work in such a situation for obvious reasons. Therefore, it is necessary to create a situation in which its provisions can be applied. Each of us invites one other person in the marketplace to join us; thus we now constitute two discrete groups of two. Now that each group consists of more than one person it is possible to apply the solution outlined in mishnah 10: one of the two in each group changes groups and they can make their mutual declarations as outlined in the mishnah.

MISHNA: With regard to a group whose Paschal lamb was lost, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal lamb, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and he went and found the missing offering and

7 slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but in the meantime they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal lamb, the halakha is as follows:

If his Paschal lamb was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, as he is considered to be registered specifically for that offering, and they eat with him from his offering, because he included them in his offering and it belongs to the entire group.

The second animal does not have any registrants and is therefore burned. And if theirs was slaughtered first, they eat from theirs because they withdrew from the original offering through the act of slaughtering a replacement, and he eats from his because he was not registered for the replacement offering sacrificed by the remainder of his group.

And if it is not known which of the offerings was slaughtered first, or if both the group and the individual slaughtered them together, he eats from his and they do not eat with him in case theirs was slaughtered first, and theirs must be taken out to the place designated for burning. The offering slaughtered by the group may not be eaten due to the concern that it was slaughtered second and the members of the group would therefore have been included in the first offering.

However, they are exempt from performing the offering of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ, because they were included in the slaughter of whichever animal was slaughtered first. It is only due to external circumstances that they cannot complete the mitzva by eating the Paschal lamb, and this does not prevent them from fulfilling their obligation.

A somewhat different case of a lost Paschal lamb would occur if the group had sent one member as an agent to search for the lost animal, and the agent said to the other members of the group before he left: If I am late, go and slaughter a Paschal lamb for me.

He then went and found the lost Paschal lamb and slaughtered it, and they took another animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal lamb. In that case, if theirs was slaughtered first, they eat from theirs and he eats with them, because he requested to be included in their offering and they registered him for their Paschal lamb.

And if his was slaughtered first, he eats from his and they eat from theirs, because the fact that they slaughtered a different animal indicates that they have withdrawn from the original offering.

And if it is not known which of the animals was slaughtered first, or if both the group and the individual slaughtered them together, they eat from theirs because they definitely withdrew from the original offering by slaughtering a different one, and he does not eat with them because he also intended to be included in the animal he slaughtered and it is not clear which was slaughtered first. Therefore, his must be taken out to the place designated for burning; and he is exempt from performing the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ.

If he said to them that if he is delayed they should include him in their Paschal lamb, and they said to him that if he finds the original offering he should slaughter it on their behalf, all of them eat from the first sacrifice that was slaughtered. And if it is not known which of them was slaughtered first, both of them must be taken out to the place designated for burning, and the entire group is exempt from participating in the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ.

Two groups whose Paschal lambs have become intermingled and they do not know which one belongs to which group should act in the following manner: These members of the first group draw one of the animals separated as a Paschal lamb for themselves, and those members of the second group draw one for themselves.

One of these, a member of one group, comes to those, the members of the other group, and one of those members of the second group comes to these members of the first group.

And this is what each group says to the member of the other group who has come to join them: If this Paschal lamb that is now in our possession is ours, you are withdrawn from the Paschal lamb that was yours, and you are registered for our Paschal lamb and you may eat from it.

And if this Paschal lamb is yours, meaning that it actually belongs to the other group, including this individual, we are hereby withdrawn from ours and we are registered

14 for your Paschal lamb, which you agree to share with us. The other group makes the same statement.

Steinzaltz

GEMARA: The Sages taught: If he, the agent, said to the other members of the group that if they slaughter their Paschal lamb first they should include him, and they said to him that if he slaughters his Paschal lamb first he should include them, all of them eat from the first Paschal lamb that was slaughtered, and the second one must be burned. If he did not say this to them and they did not say this to him, they are not responsible for each other, and each side eats its own Paschal lamb.

From here the Sages stated: Silence is fitting for the wise, and a fortiori the same is true for fools. In the case under discussion, had neither side appointed the other to slaughter the Paschal lamb on its behalf, both offerings would be valid and would be consumed. When each side appointed the other to slaughter the Paschal lamb on its behalf, only the first one slaughtered may be eaten while the second one must be burned. This is as it is stated:

15 Even a fool, when he holdeth his peace, is counted 28 חכ םַגּ ליִוֱא ִרֲחַמ ,שׁי ָ ח ָ כ ם םָכָח שׁ wise; and he that shutteth his lips is esteemed as a man ;בֵשָׁחֵי םֵטֹא ויָתָפְשׂ .ןוֹבָנ ויָתָפְשׂ םֵטֹא of understanding. Prov 17:28

“Even a fool, when he holds his peace, is considered wise; and he that shuts his lips is esteemed as a man of understanding”

Tosefta Pesachim 9:2

RASHI

Steinzaltz

RAMBAM

The following rules apply when the Paschal sacrifices of two companies become intermingled before they are slaughtered. One company takes one lamb from the mixture and the other takes the second. One of the members of one company should go to the other and one of the members of the second company should go the first. Each of the companies say to the person who came to join them: "If this Paschal sacrifice is ours, you are removed from your Paschal sacrifice and enumerated on ours. If, however, this Paschal sacrifice is yours, we are removed from our Paschal sacrifice and enumerated on yours."

Similarly, if there were five groups with at least five persons in each or ten groups of at least ten, a member of every company is taken to each other company and such stipulations are made. Afterwards, they slaughter the sacrificial animals.

Kessef Mishneh on Mishneh Torah, Paschal Offering 3:6:1

ד( - )ו הרובח דבאש החספ וכו ' דע יא םנ םיארחא הז .הזל הנשמ 'פב ימ היהש אמט אמט היהש ימ 'פב הנשמ םיחספ( ףד :ח״צ ) י״שריפו םא ולש טחשנ ושאר ן ליאוה םהו ורמא ול טוחש ילע נ ו לע לע ו נ ילע טוחש ול ורמא םהו ליאוה ן ושאר טחשנ ולש םא י״שריפו ) :ח״צ ףד םיחספ( ולש םה נמנ םי בושו יא ן םילוכי נמהל תו לע ןהלש םהלשו ףרשי חספד אלב םילעב אוה אוה םילעב אלב חספד ףרשי םהלשו ןהלש לע תו נמהל םילוכי ן יא בושו םי נמנ םה ולש םילכואו םלוכ ולשמ . םאו םהלש טחשנ ושאר ן אוה לכוא ולשמ ירהש אל הנמנ לע םהלש םהלש לע הנמנ אל ירהש ולשמ לכוא אוה ן ושאר טחשנ םהלש םאו . ולשמ םלוכ םילכואו םהו םילכוא מ םהלש ירהש ורזח םהב ןמ דובאה וכשמו םהידי נממ ו . םהו יא םנ םילכוא םילכוא םנ יא םהו . ו נממ םהידי וכשמו דובאה ןמ םהב ורזח ירהש םהלש ומע אמש םהלש טחשנ ושאר ן ו וכשמנ .הזמ םהלשו אצי תיבל הפירשה אמש ולש טחשנ טחשנ ולש אמש הפירשה תיבל אצי םהלשו .הזמ וכשמנ ו ן ושאר טחשנ םהלש אמש ומע ושאר ן יאו ן נמנ י ן לע נשה י . םירוטפו חספמ נש י נ״ממד ושארב ן ונמנ הליכאו אל .אבכעמ.בע להיא ננ ןואב ״מ ינ סמםרטו .ינהל ןיננ ןיו ןוא

רמא םהל םא יתרחיא וטחש ילע . דיחי ךלהש ושקבל רמאו נבל י הרובח םא יתרחיא תחאם רב ינלרא וטחש ילע ינונמהו םכמע םהו אל ורמא טוחש ונילע . אוה לכוא םהמע ולשו ףרשי יכד ו ן ןוידףש לו העלו ו .ויעטח ומ לםו כע ננה ל וח נמהש והו לע םהלש ירה ךשמנ ןמ ושארה ן וחו רז וב ותוחילשמ . ולשו אצי תיבל הפירשה הפירשה תיבל אצי ולשו . ותוחילשמ וב רז וחו ן ושארה ןמ ךשמנ ירה םהלש לע והו נמהש אמש ןהלש טחשנ ושאר ן ו ךשמנ ולשמ ירהש ןאשע .םיחולש רוטפו חספמ נש י נ״ממ ״מ שחפ ופ םחל ןש יה וש שנו ןוא חנ ןל מ ושארב ן י צ .א רמא םהל וטחש ילע םא יתרחיא ורמאו ול שקב טוחשו ילע נ ו ולכאי םלכ ןמן ל וכי וניעטחו ק ו ומו ירי א ל וח ה מ . ושארה ן םהד יחולש ו אוהו .םחולש אוהו ו יחולש םהד ן ושארה

םאו יא נ ו עודי יא הז טחשנ ושאר ן ופרשי םהינש ירוטפו ן חספמ ינש . יא םנ יארחא ן הז הז ן יארחא םנ יא . ינש חספמ ן ירוטפו םהינש ופרשי ן ושאר טחשנ הז יא עודי ו נ יא םאו הזל יא ן ירחא תו נעטו ה הז לע הז יאו ן ןיששוח יא הז טחשנ ןושאר אלא םה םילכוא םילכוא םה אלא ןושאר טחשנ הז יא ןיששוח ן יאו הז לע הז ה לשמ םה ו ה או לכוא ולשמ :ל״כע ולשמ לכוא או

WHEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF KORBANOS BECAME MIXED UP

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

The Mishnah says that when different types of Korbanos become mixed together and are indistinguishable from each other, such as a Korban Pesach, an Asham, and an Olah, one must wait until they all develop blemishes. Then, he must transfer the Kedushah of each animal onto money, and use that money to buy three new animals. Since he does not know which animal was which Korban, he must add to the value of the lesser two so that all three new animals are each worth the same as the most expensive of the former animals.

2 https://www.dafyomi.co.il/pesachim/insites/ps-dt-098.htm

18 The wording of the Mishnah is, "They must graze until they get a blemish, and then they must be sold, and the value of the most expensive one is used [to buy the new Korbanos]." Why must he sell the old Korbanos and use the money to buy new ones? Let him simply transfer the Kedushah of each of the three old animals onto three new animals (each of which is worth the same as the most expensive of the old animals). He should say, "Wherever the Korban Pesach is, its Kedushah shall be transferred to this new animal," and "Wherever the Korban Olah is, its Kedushah shall be transferred to this other new animal," and so on. Why does he have to transfer their Kedushah onto money first?3

Perhaps the Mishnah merely means to give a practical suggestion. If he wishes, of course he may transfer the Kedushah from the old animals directly to the new animals, without the use of money. In fact, when the Gemara later (98b) discusses a Korban Pesach that became mixed up with a Bechor, Rava says that the animals are left to graze until they become blemished. Then, a fat animal is brought and the person says, "Wherever the Korban Pesach is, its Kedushah shall be transferred to this animal" (which is then offered as the Korban Pesach, and the other two animals are both eaten as if they were Bechoros which became blemished). That Gemara implies that one may transfer the Kedushah directly from the old animal to the new animal, as the RAMBAM (Hilchos Korban Pesach 4:8) rules.

Accordingly, the Rambam might explain the Mishnah here in the same manner. The Mishnah recommends that the animals be sold only as a matter of convenience. In order to transfer the Kedushah directly to new animals, one must first wait for all three original animals to become blemished (otherwise he cannot redeem any specific Korban, since he is not sure which Korban is the one that has become blemished). Furthermore, he does not want to wait any more time than necessary before he redeems the blemished animal, lest something happen to it in the interim. Therefore, the most convenient solution is to sell each animal as soon as it becomes blemished. In this way, he can store the sanctified money until all three animals have been sold, and then he can buy three new Korbanos. In the Gemara's case of a Korban Pesach and a Bechor, there is only one animal that needs to have its Kedushah transferred, so the Gemara does not suggest that one should redeem it with money first.

Alternatively, ha'Ga'on Rav Moshe Shapiro shlit'a suggests that the words of the Mishnah may not mean that the animals must be sold for cash. Rather, when one redeems the blemished animals directly onto other animals, he effectively "sells" the blemished animals for new ones. This is why the Mishnah calls it "selling" the blemished animals.4

However, RASHI (98b, DH v'Neima) says that in the case of the Korban Pesach and the Bechor, the Gemara clearly means that one must transfer the Kedushah of the blemished animal onto money before he buys a new animal. According to Rashi, the Mishnah means that one must redeem the animals with money, and not with other animals. Why can one not transfer the Kedushah from the old animal itself directly onto a new animal?

3 See RASHASH 98b, on Rashi DH v'Neima. 4 In such a case, the new animals should have only Kedushas Damim (like Bedek ha'Bayis) and not Kedushas ha'Guf (like a Korban). However, because of the rule that "when the value of an animal becomes Kadosh, the Kedushah 'spreads' and becomes Kedushas ha'Guf (i.e. a Korban)," the second animals also become usable as Korbanos.

19 Perhaps Rashi is of the opinion that one cannot transfer Kedushah from a cheaper animal onto a more expensive one. That is, while the original animals are all worth different amounts, the new animals must all be equal in value to the most expensive of the old animals, as explained earlier. Consequently, if one would transfer the Kedushah directly from the old animal to the new one, he would sanctify only part of the new animal, but not the entire animal. Perhaps Rashi compares this to one who sanctifies only half of an animal. One should not sanctify an animal, or transfer an animal's Kedushah, in such a way.

Once the animals have been redeemed for money, one must add more money to the lesser piles, so that he has equal amounts in each pile (and each amount is equal to the most expensive of the original three animals). Afterwards, he can sanctify each entire pile of money, and then use the money to buy a new animal. (Rav Moshe Shapiro, however, pointed out that because "Ein Ona'ah l'Hekdesh" (Bava Metzia 56b), one should be able to redeem an item of Hekdesh of any value with another item of Chulin of any value.

Nevertheless, it is possible that the Gemara uses the rule of "Ein Ona'ah l'Hekdesh" only to protect the interests of Hekdesh. In this case, where the one who buys the animal from Hekdesh is shortchanged (he has to pay more than the actual value of the animal), the rule does not apply. Perhaps Hekdesh of smaller value cannot be transformed into Hekdesh of greater value through redemption.

Alternatively, Rashi may assume that Hekdesh cannot be transferred from one object to a like object directly. There must be a stage in between where the Kedushah is passed to a different item (in this case, money), and then back to the like object (the second animal). The precedent for such an assumption can be found with regard to Ma'aser Sheni, where the Chachamim (Ma'aser Sheni 2:6) rule that one cannot redeem silver Ma'aser Sheni money with other silver coins.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 56a) explains that the logic for their ruling is that the transfer of Kedushah from silver coins to other silver coins "is not a proper form of Chilul" (transfer of Kedushah). The same may be suggested with regard to animals; perhaps the transfer of Kedushah from one animal directly onto another is not the proper form of Chilul (except in the case of Temurah, which, of course, is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv).

Groups That Have Intermingled

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:5 he Mishna on our daf discusses the case of a korban Pesah that was misplaced, and while one member of the group goes out and finds it, the rest of the group purchases a replacement.

5 https://steinsaltz.org/daf/pesahim98/

20 As a follow-up to this discussion our Gemara talks about two or more groups whose sacrifices become intermingled to the extent that they do not know which animal belongs to whom. The suggestion of the Gemara is to have one person from each group announce his intention to leave the group and join another. Once each of them has agreed to join the other group, both groups makes the following conditional statement to the new member of the group:

If this Paschal lamb that is now in our possession is ours, you are withdrawn from the Paschal lamb that was yours, and your are registered for our Paschal lamb and you may eat from it. And if this Paschal lamb is yours, meaning that it actually belongs to the other group, including this individual, we are hereby withdrawn from ours and we are registered for your Paschal lamb, which you agree to share with us.

By doing this, the people of both groups succeed in arranging to sacrifice the animal belonging to the group that they had joined.

The Tosafot Ri”d points out that this is not the usual procedure when two sacrifices get mixed up. If two similar korbanot are confused, we usually rule that both should be brought normally and that each one will fulfill the role that it needs to, even if we do not know which korban belongs to which person. The situation is different with a korban Pesah. As noted before, a person must join a group in order to participate in the Passover sacrifice. The korban that will be brought must belong to that group, or else the korban is invalid. It is therefore essential that we ascertain who the animal belongs to. When it is impossible to sort it out we solve the problem by recommending that the exchange described above takes place in order to ensure that the sacrifice is eaten by the group to which it truly belongs.

R. Lauren Tuchman writes:6

On today’s daf, the Talmud is deep in the weeds of a discussion about what happens if a person purchases a variety of animals designated for different sacrifices, and then can’t remember which animal was designated for which sacrifice. We learn in a mishnah:

If a paschal lamb that was intermingled with other offerings (such as guilt-offerings and burnt-offerings, and it is not known which animal was designated as which offering) all of them are left to graze until they develop a blemish and become unfit; and they are then sold, and with the proceeds of the choicest of them he must bring this type of sacrifice, and with the proceeds of the choicest of them he must bring this other type of sacrifice. And he loses the difference from his own pocket.

6 Myjewishlearning.com

Intention, as always, matters for the rabbis. When you designate an animal to be a peace offering, you cannot then offer it as a paschal offering even if, in theory, it would have made a valid paschal offering. Rather than risk offering the wrong animal as a sacrifice, all the animals are put out to pasture until they develop blemishes and can no longer be sacrificed. Now they can be sold and the money used to purchase replacement sacrifices that are each equal in value to the most valuable among the lot (because, of course, the person does not know which sacrifice had the greatest value to begin with). This ends up costing the person a bit more money but in this way God gets the animals that are due and no mistakes are made.

Obviously, with the Temple now gone for nearly 2,000 years, Jews don’t put this into practice anymore. The rabbis of the Talmud didn’t either, and famously said that study and prayer are equally valid ways to serve God. And sometimes, they encourage us to study and pray specifically on sacrifice.

The traditional daily morning liturgy contains a series of biblical and talmudic references to the ancient sacrifices — a sort of combination of both study and prayer that meditates directly on the sacrificial cult in the Temple. But for those of us who are quite happy that prayer has entirely replaced sacrifice, the idea of even studying or praying with the sacrificial system in any fashion may disturb or make us uncomfortable.

At the end of the Amidah, the thrice-daily standing prayer, there is a personal meditation that traditionally concludes with a prayer for the rebuilding of the Temple — speedily and in our days. There we will offer the sacrifices as of old and in ancient days. We pray for this. And yet, do we really want it?

The rabbis of the Talmud were living during a profoundly liminal moment in Jewish history. The trauma of the Temple’s destruction and the loss of the religious life that pulsed throughout it was still fresh. Yet the desire remained strong to retain what they could and remake tradition so that it would endure. How blessed we are to be heirs of their genius. As the rabbis embraced a new way of being and doing Jewish, which we today call rabbinic Judaism, they were careful not to erase the old. We may not wish to return to animal sacrifice (I don’t, anyway) but it is a blessing to have deep knowledge of where we have come from.

Maharal on Pirkei Avot: SILENCE

Chapter 1: Mishna 17

Rabbi Shaya Karlinsky writes:7

Shimon his (Rabban Gamliel’s) son says: During my entire life, I grew up among the scholars, and I never found anything better for the physical body than silence. And inquiry is not the foundation, but rather actions. And all who engage in excess words bring sin.

After Rabban Gamliel taught a lesson on how a person’s behavior should be fitting for a human being with a spiritual/intellectual dimension, not allowing himself to walk in the darkness of confusion, his son came to teach a lesson on rectifying his physical dimension.

7 https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/GXws35

23 There are a number of questions in this Mishna. First, the introduction is difficult, for why was it necessary to tell us where he grew up. Furthermore, the relationship between the various elements of the Mishna isn’t clear. If we begin by praising silence, why does the Mishna continue with a discussion of inquiry and action. And it would have been more accurate for the Tanna to teach us the value of silence for the PERSON, rather than for the physical body! Finally, the end of the Mishna simply repeats what is already known through an explicit verse:

;In the multitude of words there wanteth not transgression 19 טי בֹרְבּ ,םיִרָבְדּ אֹל לַדְּחֶי - .but he that refraineth his lips is wise ָפּ ;עַשׁ ֵשׂוֹחְו ויָתָפְשׂ .ליִכְּשַׂמ ויָתָפְשׂ ֵשׂוֹחְו Prov 10:19

“In an excess of words, sin will not cease.” What has been added by the Tanna?

Rashi explains that the intention of the introductory sentence was to teach that even scholars (who have wise things to say) are used to behaving in a manner of silence, which is the most appropriate behavior. All the more so is silence appropriate for the average person. See our daf above!

(I have translated the word “shtikah” as silence, even though it does not do justice to the full meaning of the word. We are used to thinking of silence as being the result of having nothing to say. But keeping silent when there is nothing to say should be obvious. We shouldn’t need a Mishna to teach us that. The true implication of “shtikah” is to refrain from speaking even when there IS something to say, for it is not always appropriate to say everything that there is to say.)

The power of speech is attached to man’s physical dimension, despite its source being in man’s spiritual/intellectual dimension. Therefore, the lesson of silence is taught in relation to the physical body, as opposed to simply teaching that silence is good for man. The force of man’s physical dimension stands in opposition to the force of his “sechel,” his spiritual/intellectual dimension. Speech is the physical activity that is the maximum utilization of man’s sechel, but is still in essence an activity built on the physical dimension of the human being. While he is talking, his physical dimension is activated, and this prevents the complete functioning of his “sechel.” For man to operate with the force of his sechel, he must be in a state of silence. It is only when man is led by his sechel that he can avoid mistakes.

(We were always taught that we had to disengage the mouth before the brain could begin working � .)

The language of the Mishna is quite precise. It doesn’t say that speech is bad for man. Rather it is teaching that silence is the best thing for man, due to the limitations of his physical dimension, in order to enable his sechel to operate to the maximum of its ability.

The physical and the spiritual begin as opposing forces within man, and either the spiritual controls the physical or vice versa. Silence enables the spiritual/intellectual force of the human being to exert its control, which is actually beneficial for man’s physical dimension, since it enables his behavior to transcend its animal nature, and to reach perfection by serving as a vehicle for the

24 sechel. But if man increases his talk, the physical dimension is in control, nullifying the spiritual/intellectual dimension of the human being.

This is why “The voice of a fool is a multitude of words” (Prov 5:2; also see ibid 10:14). A wise person’s actions are governed by his intellectual/spiritual dimension, and this is of benefit even for the physical dimension. Therefore, there is nothing better for the physical body than its own silence, allowing man’s sechel to operate unhindered.

After learning this lesson, however, one might think that the foundation is for man to operate primarily on an intellectual plane, which would mean that intellectual inquiry is superior to action which is accomplished through the physical dimension. Therefore, the Tanna teaches that it is not intellectual inquiry which is the foundation (“ikar,” which literally means the root), but rather it is action which is the foundation. Only after the foundation has been established, which is done through deeds, can one reach, step by step, for the higher levels, which are accessed through the sechel.

The final lesson of the Mishna is that excess talk brings one to sin. While we have been taught that silence is the best thing, allowing the sechel rather than the physical dimension to direct man’s behavior, it does not mean that speech is a sin. It is certainly legitimate — even if not the highest level — to operate with the force of speech, which mixes the physical and the sechel. However, if man chooses speech to be the foundation of his activity, he weakens the ability of his sechel to govern his behavior, since the sechel cannot operate with all its intensity concurrently with a force that conflicts with it. An inadequacy in a person breeds further inadequacies. So excessive speech causes and inadequacy, leads to progressive deterioration, and brings with it sin.

The word for sin is “cheit,” the root of which implies “inadequacy.” (See Kings I 1:21; Gen 31:39.) The implication of the language “excess speech brings cheit” is that it creates deficiency in the person, which is the cause and result of sin, because the person allows himself to be directed by his physical dimension.

The verse in Proverbs that teaches that in excess words resides sin means that a person who talks a lot will certainly sin in his speech with all the nonsense and irreverent things he speaks. Our Tanna goes beyond that, teaching that in the wake of excess speech a person is brought to a state of deficiency which leads to other sins.

This is the precise explanation of our Mishna to one who understands, rather than the more general way that others (Rambam and Rabbeinu Yonah) understand it. But our way is the logical imperative of wisdom.

(The final paragraph is representative of what the Maharal writes in response to those who are satisfied with what he considers a superficial understanding of lessons of Chazal, where they fail to make distinctions between the ways that similar lessons are taught. See the last paragraph of the Maharal’s introduction to Derech Chaim for the most succinct presentation of this idea, which repeats itself frequently in the Maharal’s writings.)

Last night I became mad. Love saw me and said:

I am here. Don’t shout, don’t wail. Just be silent!

Don’t talk about the mundane, talk of nothing but beauty. I am the servant of this magnificence. Just be silent!

I said: O Love, what I fear is something else. Love said: There’s nothing else. Just be silent!

I will whisper great secrets in your ear. Just nod yes. And be silent.

I said: Love! Is this face angel or human Love Said: Neither angel nor human. It is other. Just be silent.

I said: I will lose my mind if you don’t tell me. Love said: Then lose your mind, and stay that way. Just be silent.

You who sit in this house filled with images and illusions, Get up, walk out the door. Go, and be silent.

–Rumi