Airpower won its first victory over a land force. The Tuskegee Airmen saw their first combat. Not bad for one battle. Pantelleria, 1943

Pantelleria

Tunisia Linosa Malta Lampioneo Lampedusa

Pantelleria was a stepping stone to the Italian mainland.

N 1943, the World War II Allies Mediterranean Sea. Some 53 miles By Herman S. Wolk launched Corkscrew, a military to the west was Tunisia. To the north- operation whose aim was to east, 63 miles away, was Sicily. Thus, seize the Mediterranean island Pantelleria lay astride the route from of Pantelleria. It was an armed North Africa, where the Allies ear- Iaction meant to pave the way for an lier in 1943 had routed Axis forces, Allied invasion of Sicily and then and Italy, the next target for inva- the Italian mainland, but it turned sion. out to be far more than that. By the Between May 8 and June 11 in time Corkscrew was finished, it had 1943, Allied aircraft flew 5,285 become a case study in the devastat- bombing sorties against targets on ing uses of airpower and a major Pantelleria and dropped 6,313 tons milestone in the exploits of the famed of bombs on Italian and German Tuskegee Airmen. forces ensconced there. The opera- The importance of Pantelleria Is- tion called for using sustained aerial land itself stemmed from its loca- bombardment to crush enemy power tion—smack in the middle of the on the island and therefore reduce

64 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 the number of Allied ground forces needed to capture and hold it. The plan succeeded—dramatically so. In fact, the aerial offensive marked the first time in history that an enemy land force was compelled to surren- der in the absence of an accompany- ing ground invasion. Saturation bombing, plus limited shelling by the Royal Navy, broke the enemy’s defenses and will to resist. For all that, it was an offensive that almost didn’t happen.

Road to Pantelleria Allied leaders convened at Casa- blanca in January 1943 to draw up plans to take the offensive against the Axis powers where they were most vulnerable—in the south of Europe. In addition to approving an Primary responsibility for the bombing of Pantelleria fell to the Northwest around-the-clock strategic bombing African Strategic Air Forces, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle— offensive against Nazi Germany, shown here preparing to take off on a flight over Tunisia. Allied leaders, including Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided that they reasoned that Allied fighter aircraft heavy bombing on a defended coast- must conquer Sicily before pushing based at Marghana airfield on Pan- line.” on to Italy and that the Sicily cam- telleria would then be in good posi- Eisenhower directed Spaatz to paign would have to wait until the tion to support the invasion of Sicily concentrate everything and then use Allies had crushed German resis- when it did come. his force to pound the island so that tance in Tunisia. The Allied Com- Eisenhower’s planners, however, its defenders would not be able to bined Chiefs of Staff concluded that concluded that attacking Pantelleria contest a landing. The assault, Eisen- the Sicily operation, code-named would be too tough and advised their hower emphasized, should be a Husky, would secure the Mediterra- commander not to take the chance. “rather simple affair.” He thought of nean sea lanes and airspace and ease They wanted to postpone the inva- the effect of the massive artillery the invasion of the main Italian pen- sion until the Allies had on hand pounding of Corregidor in the Phil- insula. forces substantial enough to defeat ippines. His objective, he said, was This plan did not win universal the Axis units in Sicily in full-scale “to see whether the air [forces] can support, however. Other senior of- combat. do the same thing.” ficers—most notably Gen. George By May, however, Eisenhower had Under Corkscrew, Britain’s 1st C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of made up his mind. He concluded Infantry Division, supported by na- Staff—didn’t want to wait. They ar- that the advantages of occupying val forces, was to occupy the island. gued for launching an attack on Sic- Pantelleria outweighed the disadvan- The nearby Pelagian Islands of Lam- ily even before the final defeat of tages of mounting the operation un- pedusa, Linosa, and Lampione would Nazi forces in North Africa. Marshall der the existing circumstances. By also be blasted and occupied, giving told Eisenhower that he was taking seizing Pantelleria, the Allies could the Allies control of all the islands an overly conservative approach to provide air cover and remove a seri- of the Sicilian strait. his planning and that it lacked bold- ous Axis threat to the invasion of Earlier, in 1941, British leaders ness and adaptability. Sicily, he affirmed, and on May 13, had actually considered seizing Pan- The final complication came from 1943, the CCS approved the Pan- telleria—eight miles long and five none other than Winston Churchill telleria operation. Operation Cork- miles wide with sheer cliffs—so as himself. The British Prime Minister, screw was born. to eliminate it as an enemy base for eager to carry the war to the enemy aircraft and submarines interfering in Europe itself, argued for bypass- Concentrated Bombing with British air and sea traffic in the ing Sicily altogether and mounting a Perhaps thinking about Marshall’s Mediterranean. Churchill described direct attack on the Italian mainland comment that he lacked adaptabil- Pantelleria as “a thorn in our side.” from Tunisia. ity, Eisenhower decided the Allies The problem had been in the mak- By February 1943, Marshall had would take the island without a heavy ing since the midÐ1920s. Italian dic- come to realize that, with North Af- investment in ground power. He tator Benito Mussolini, describing rican combat still going on, the Navy sought advice from Lt. Gen. Carl A. the Mediterranean as “mare nos- would not be in any position to pro- “Tooey” Spaatz, commander of trum,” or “our sea,” set Italians to vide aircraft carriers in support of Northwest African Air Forces. His building fortifications on the island. Operation Husky. He therefore rec- goal: to make the reduction of Pan- By the midÐ1930s, construction of ommended to Eisenhower that the telleria “a sort of laboratory to de- naval and air bases was well under Allies first seize Pantelleria. Marshall termine the effect of concentrated way. As many as 100 Axis aircraft

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 65 had been kept at Marghana airfield Extensive aerial reconnaissance a concentrated air bombardment. during the Tunisian campaign. proved a critical element throughout Their objective was to shatter the Although the Allied victory in the operation. morale of the troops and civilian North Africa greatly diminished Pan- population. telleria’s value as an Axis staging Daily Coverage For the duration of Corkscrew, point, it still contained an under- Beginning in late May, the North- Eisenhower’s air arm was headed by ground hangar with large repair and west African Photographic Recon- Mediterranean Air Command. This was maintenance shops. naissance Wing made at least one and a small planning headquarters com- As Corkscrew began taking more sometimes two daily swings over the manded by British Air Chief Marshal definite shape, it garnered additional island. Coverage increased during Arthur W. Tedder. MAC oversaw opponents. At least one major player, June. And on June 11, the day ground Northwest African Air Forces headed Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, forces landed, as many as five photo- by Spaatz and comprising several op- commander of the Northwest African graphic missions were flown. erational units—Northwest African Tactical Air Force, did not share the The reconnaissance film was in- Strategic Air Forces commanded by enthusiasm of Eisenhower and Spaatz terpreted at NAAF headquarters, Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle; North- for the operation. Coningham found where targets were assigned daily. west African Tactical Air Force headed it difficult to take seriously the planned Intelligence experts were assisted by by Coningham; as well as coastal, ser- massive bombardment of the island. Solly Zuckerman, an Oxford scien- vice, and training commands. Also In fact, he made light of it, prompting tist on loan from the British Com- under Tedder were the Royal Air Force Spaatz to recommend bluntly that he bined Operations Staff. They ana- Middle East, with the US Ninth Air correct his attitude. lyzed the aerial photographs for each Force and the RAF Malta. No one doubted that taking Pan- bombing mission for the relation Eisenhower directed Spaatz to telleria by air would be a significant between effort and effect. throw the full resources of the North- challenge. Aerial reconnaissance NAAF intelligence experts relied west African Air Forces into the task. over the rocky 42-square-mile is- almost exclusively on aerial recon- For Corkscrew, a joint command di- land revealed more than 100 gun naissance, working closely with the rectly responsible to Eisenhower emplacements, embedded in rock or reconnaissance units to ensure im- consisted of Spaatz; Rear Adm. R.R. concrete. Additionally, pillboxes mediate delivery of prints, to make McGrigor, Royal Navy; and Maj. were scattered in the mountains and target assignments. “The mainte- Gen. Walter E. Clutterbuck, com- in the sides of cliffs. nance of a constant check through manding the British 1st Infantry Di- The strength of the garrison was aerial reconnaissance of this kind vision. estimated at 10,000. This led Allied constituted an essential part of the The US Twelfth Air Force and a planners to worry that, if these troops operation,” stated the official Army number of groups from Ninth Air were skillful and disciplined, the Air Forces history. Force also took part in Corkscrew. Pantellerian defense could be formi- The effect was sustained destruc- One of the Twelfth units seeing its dable. They took some comfort in tion of key targets, specifically first action was the TuskegeeÐtrained the fact that, during the Tunisian coastal batteries and gun emplace- 99th Fighter Squadron. The airmen campaign, anti-aircraft gunners on ments. Eisenhower and Spaatz were of that unit—the first African–Ameri- the island made a poor showing convinced that the Pantellerian gar- can airmen to fly in combat for the against Allied air attacks. rison could not hold up under such Army Air Forces—became known later as the Tuskegee Airmen. The 99th, which had just arrived in North Africa to reinforce the XII Air Sup- port Command, flew P-40s as part of Corkscrew.

Doolittle’s Command However, the major responsibil- ity for the attacks fell to the North- west African Strategic Air Forces, flying from Tunisian bases, under Doolittle’s command. The NASAF comprised four groups of B-17 bombers (2nd Bomb Group, 97th BG, 99th BG, and 301st BG); two groups of B-25 bombers (310th BG and 321st BG); three groups of B-26 bombers (17th BG, 319th BG, and 320th BG); three groups of P-38 fighters (1st Fighter Group, 14th FG, and 82nd FG); one group of P-40 The AAF’s first African–American fighter pilots—later called the Tuskegee fighters (325th FG); and several wings Airmen—flew P-40 Warhawks in support of the operation. Members of the 99th of Wellingtons from the RAF Middle FS had arrived in North Africa from Tuskegee, Ala., in April 1943. East Command.

66 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 While primarily providing escort for the bombers, fighter groups also conducted sweeps and dive-bomb- ing missions. The mission of NAAF was basi- cally tactical—the support of land and amphibious operations. This sup- port might be delivered by airplanes of the NATAF or by long-range bomber aircraft of the NASAF. (Ex- cept for several attacks on Ploesti, Romania, and Wiener Neustadt, Aus- tria, in August and October 1943, MediterraneanÐbased aircraft did not conduct strategic operations until after creation of Fifteenth Air Force in November 1943.) Although Doolittle’s units were totally committed to the operation, the NATAF, commanded by Coning-

marily directed against the airfield and the port of Pantelleria. There were some reports of anti-aircraft fire. Reconnaissance in late May con- firmed heavy damage to the island’s airfield. Craters were evident, the main barracks and buildings near the underground hangar were destroyed by direct hits, and supply dumps had been heavily damaged. Moreover, damage to aircraft on the ground had been considerable. Coastal batteries and gun emplacements were con- tinuously bombarded. Indications were that the bombing had badly disrupted life on the island. On June 1, heavy bombers entered the fray, 19 B-17s, together with Wellingtons, pounded the island. By B-17 Flying Fortresses (top) were among the Allied aircraft that flew more than June 6, daily sorties increased to 200 5,000 sorties against Axis positions on Pantelleria, dropping more than 6,000 or more. The number doubled or tons of bombs. Here, an AAF photo gives a bird’s-eye view of a bombing raid on the island’s airfield. tripled over the next five days. Simi- larly, bomb tonnage greatly in- creased, 231 tons being dropped on ham, was only partially devoted to would be attacked around the clock, June 5 and June 6 and intensifying the air offensive. Only units of the the weight of daily attack increasing with 600 tons on June 7. XII Air Support Command, based on from 200 sorties to between 1,500 Also during the first week of June, the east side of Tunisia’s Cape Bon and 2,000 sorties on the 11th. At the British naval vessels bombarded the peninsula, and the Tactical Bomber same time, to confuse the enemy, harbor area of Pantelleria. On June Force were available to Coningham. targets would also be bombed in Sic- 8, a naval task force consisting of The AAF, RAF, and South Afri- ily, Sardinia, and points on the main- motor torpedo boats, cruisers, and can Air Force began flying scattered land of Italy. Simultaneously, a na- destroyers carried out a full-scale sorties against Pantelleria in early val blockade of Pantelleria would be bombardment of coastal batteries and May. In late May, in consultation carried out by British Adm. Andrew the harbor’s docks. with Tedder, both Spaatz and Coning- B. Cunningham’s forces. The B-17s, along with medium, ham decided that the air onslaught The Corkscrew air offensive began light, and fighter bombers, dropped should be conducted in two parts. May 18, led by 42 B-25s, 44 B-26s, almost 700 tons of bombs on June 8, From late May through June 6, the and 91 P-38s and P-40s of Doolittle’s followed the next day by more than heavy bombing would be incremen- NASAF. Attacks were stepped up in 822 tons. Meanwhile, surrender leaf- tally intensified. In the second phase, late May against little enemy fighter lets were also dropped on the island. from June 7 to June 11, Pantelleria opposition. These attacks were pri- Enemy fighter opposition, ex-

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 67 roads had been obliterated; electric power had been destroyed; and water mains were broken. At Marghana airdrome, the air- field was cratered. Although the un- derground hangar had withstood a number of direct hits, except for two aircraft, all of the 80-plus enemy airplanes had been either destroyed or damaged. The 1943 Pantellerian experience pointed the way toward the Allies’ future strategy: Intensive air bom- bardment, increasing in tempo, and naval bombardment would precede landing operations. As the AAF of- ficial history noted: “The pattern set here was probably one that would be followed in other island operations and perhaps in the invasion of the Allied bombing of Pantelleria was an effective demonstration of what airpower continent itself.” could achieve. It set the pattern for a strategy of increasingly intensive air and Churchill hailed the Pantellerian naval bombardment to pave the way for land forces. triumph, and Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Commanding General, AAF, tremely light at first, picked up dur- During the next 12 minutes, the For- emphasized “the tremendous amount ing the June 5Ð7 period when Me- tresses dropped tons of bombs, result- of bombs dropped and the negligible 109s and FW-190s appeared along ing in “simultaneous flashes and a losses of airplanes, which speak well with Italian fighter aircraft. Again, great roar,” stated the AAF official for planning, preparations, and ex- on the 10th and 11th, SicilyÐbased history. “Suddenly the whole harbor ecution.” enemy aircraft appeared but failed area appeared to rise and hang in mid- The official AAF history noted, to impede the Allied air offensive. air, while smoke and dust billowed “The surrender of the Italian–held Of several hundred enemy airplanes high, dwarfing Montagna Grande, islands furnished a spectacular il- seen in June, 57 were definitely de- Pantelleria’s tallest peak.” lustration of the intense and violent stroyed and 10 probably destroyed. At about 11 a.m. on June 11, Al- force that the Allies could bring to lied airplanes spotted a white cross bear upon the enemy. The reduction The Crescendo on the airfield. Shortly thereafter, of the islands furnished the first proof On June 10, the air offensive the first British assault wave hit the of the power of such bombardments reached a crescendo. The Army Air beach. The commander of the land- to induce surrender.” Forces official history described ing force contacted Pantelleria’s The fact was that Eisenhower’s how “wave after wave of bombers military governor, Vice Adm. Gino laboratory concept had paid off. swept over former Tunisian battle- Pavesi, who surrendered the island Pantelleria had been conquered pri- fields and out across the Mediterra- and the garrison of 78 Germans and marily by airpower. An invasion had nean.” It went on to note that ob- 11,121 Italians. not been necessary. servers were “struck by the power A small number of captured Ger- In a letter to Marshall, Eisenhower of the aerial weapon which the Al- man technicians maintained that pointed out that many had opposed lies had forged.” German soldiers and anti-aircraft Corkscrew, noting, “I am particu- The onslaught continued day and gunners would have made a much larly pleased that the operation turned night, except for a three-hour lull better showing than the island’s gar- out as it did because I personally had during which another surrender call rison. On the other hand, the sheer to make the decision for its capture was made by the Allies. By the close intensity of bombing and its increas- in the face of much contrary advice, of the day, more than 1,760 sorties ing weight, according to the testi- but I predicted that the garrison would had been flown by heavy, medium, mony of prisoners of war, made it surrender before any infantry sol- light, and fighter bombers. On June doubtful that the outcome would have dier got ashore.” 10 alone, 1,571 tons were released. been different. The Allies now intensified prepa- It was one of the heaviest air attacks The harbor facilities at Pantelleria rations for the assault on Sicily in of the war up to that time. had been badly damaged; the town July 1943. Allied airplanes operating With the failure of the second sur- itself had been practically destroyed; from Pantelleria would play a critical render call to meet with a response, communications were a shambles; role in that assault operation. ■ the British 1st Infantry Division embarked on the night of June 10Ð11 Herman S. Wolk is senior historian in the Air Force History Support Office. He to assault and capture Pantelleria. is the author of The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943–1947 (1997), As landing craft headed toward the and a coauthor of Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United island, B-17s delivered a final pound- States Air Force (1997). His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “The ing to the Pantelleria harbor area. Genius of George Kenney,” appeared in the April 2002 issue.

68 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002