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Airpower won its first victory over a land force. The Tuskegee Airmen saw their first combat. Not bad for one battle. Pantelleria, 1943 Pantelleria Tunisia Linosa Malta Lampioneo Lampedusa Pantelleria was a stepping stone to the Italian mainland. N 1943, the World War II Allies Mediterranean Sea. Some 53 miles By Herman S. Wolk launched Corkscrew, a military to the west was Tunisia. To the north- operation whose aim was to east, 63 miles away, was Sicily. Thus, seize the Mediterranean island Pantelleria lay astride the route from of Pantelleria. It was an armed North Africa, where the Allies ear- Iaction meant to pave the way for an lier in 1943 had routed Axis forces, Allied invasion of Sicily and then and Italy, the next target for inva- the Italian mainland, but it turned sion. out to be far more than that. By the Between May 8 and June 11 in time Corkscrew was finished, it had 1943, Allied aircraft flew 5,285 become a case study in the devastat- bombing sorties against targets on ing uses of airpower and a major Pantelleria and dropped 6,313 tons milestone in the exploits of the famed of bombs on Italian and German Tuskegee Airmen. forces ensconced there. The opera- The importance of Pantelleria Is- tion called for using sustained aerial land itself stemmed from its loca- bombardment to crush enemy power tion—smack in the middle of the on the island and therefore reduce 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 the number of Allied ground forces needed to capture and hold it. The plan succeeded—dramatically so. In fact, the aerial offensive marked the first time in history that an enemy land force was compelled to surren- der in the absence of an accompany- ing ground invasion. Saturation bombing, plus limited shelling by the Royal Navy, broke the enemy’s defenses and will to resist. For all that, it was an offensive that almost didn’t happen. Road to Pantelleria Allied leaders convened at Casa- blanca in January 1943 to draw up plans to take the offensive against the Axis powers where they were most vulnerable—in the south of Europe. In addition to approving an Primary responsibility for the bombing of Pantelleria fell to the Northwest around-the-clock strategic bombing African Strategic Air Forces, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle— offensive against Nazi Germany, shown here preparing to take off on a flight over Tunisia. Allied leaders, including Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided that they reasoned that Allied fighter aircraft heavy bombing on a defended coast- must conquer Sicily before pushing based at Marghana airfield on Pan- line.” on to Italy and that the Sicily cam- telleria would then be in good posi- Eisenhower directed Spaatz to paign would have to wait until the tion to support the invasion of Sicily concentrate everything and then use Allies had crushed German resis- when it did come. his force to pound the island so that tance in Tunisia. The Allied Com- Eisenhower’s planners, however, its defenders would not be able to bined Chiefs of Staff concluded that concluded that attacking Pantelleria contest a landing. The assault, Eisen- the Sicily operation, code-named would be too tough and advised their hower emphasized, should be a Husky, would secure the Mediterra- commander not to take the chance. “rather simple affair.” He thought of nean sea lanes and airspace and ease They wanted to postpone the inva- the effect of the massive artillery the invasion of the main Italian pen- sion until the Allies had on hand pounding of Corregidor in the Phil- insula. forces substantial enough to defeat ippines. His objective, he said, was This plan did not win universal the Axis units in Sicily in full-scale “to see whether the air [forces] can support, however. Other senior of- combat. do the same thing.” ficers—most notably Gen. George By May, however, Eisenhower had Under Corkscrew, Britain’s 1st C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of made up his mind. He concluded Infantry Division, supported by na- Staff—didn’t want to wait. They ar- that the advantages of occupying val forces, was to occupy the island. gued for launching an attack on Sic- Pantelleria outweighed the disadvan- The nearby Pelagian Islands of Lam- ily even before the final defeat of tages of mounting the operation un- pedusa, Linosa, and Lampione would Nazi forces in North Africa. Marshall der the existing circumstances. By also be blasted and occupied, giving told Eisenhower that he was taking seizing Pantelleria, the Allies could the Allies control of all the islands an overly conservative approach to provide air cover and remove a seri- of the Sicilian strait. his planning and that it lacked bold- ous Axis threat to the invasion of Earlier, in 1941, British leaders ness and adaptability. Sicily, he affirmed, and on May 13, had actually considered seizing Pan- The final complication came from 1943, the CCS approved the Pan- telleria—eight miles long and five none other than Winston Churchill telleria operation. Operation Cork- miles wide with sheer cliffs—so as himself. The British Prime Minister, screw was born. to eliminate it as an enemy base for eager to carry the war to the enemy aircraft and submarines interfering in Europe itself, argued for bypass- Concentrated Bombing with British air and sea traffic in the ing Sicily altogether and mounting a Perhaps thinking about Marshall’s Mediterranean. Churchill described direct attack on the Italian mainland comment that he lacked adaptabil- Pantelleria as “a thorn in our side.” from Tunisia. ity, Eisenhower decided the Allies The problem had been in the mak- By February 1943, Marshall had would take the island without a heavy ing since the mid–1920s. Italian dic- come to realize that, with North Af- investment in ground power. He tator Benito Mussolini, describing rican combat still going on, the Navy sought advice from Lt. Gen. Carl A. the Mediterranean as “mare nos- would not be in any position to pro- “Tooey” Spaatz, commander of trum,” or “our sea,” set Italians to vide aircraft carriers in support of Northwest African Air Forces. His building fortifications on the island. Operation Husky. He therefore rec- goal: to make the reduction of Pan- By the mid–1930s, construction of ommended to Eisenhower that the telleria “a sort of laboratory to de- naval and air bases was well under Allies first seize Pantelleria. Marshall termine the effect of concentrated way. As many as 100 Axis aircraft AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2002 65 had been kept at Marghana airfield Extensive aerial reconnaissance a concentrated air bombardment. during the Tunisian campaign. proved a critical element throughout Their objective was to shatter the Although the Allied victory in the operation. morale of the troops and civilian North Africa greatly diminished Pan- population. telleria’s value as an Axis staging Daily Coverage For the duration of Corkscrew, point, it still contained an under- Beginning in late May, the North- Eisenhower’s air arm was headed by ground hangar with large repair and west African Photographic Recon- Mediterranean Air Command. This was maintenance shops. naissance Wing made at least one and a small planning headquarters com- As Corkscrew began taking more sometimes two daily swings over the manded by British Air Chief Marshal definite shape, it garnered additional island. Coverage increased during Arthur W. Tedder. MAC oversaw opponents. At least one major player, June. And on June 11, the day ground Northwest African Air Forces headed Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham, forces landed, as many as five photo- by Spaatz and comprising several op- commander of the Northwest African graphic missions were flown. erational units—Northwest African Tactical Air Force, did not share the The reconnaissance film was in- Strategic Air Forces commanded by enthusiasm of Eisenhower and Spaatz terpreted at NAAF headquarters, Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle; North- for the operation. Coningham found where targets were assigned daily. west African Tactical Air Force headed it difficult to take seriously the planned Intelligence experts were assisted by by Coningham; as well as coastal, ser- massive bombardment of the island. Solly Zuckerman, an Oxford scien- vice, and training commands. Also In fact, he made light of it, prompting tist on loan from the British Com- under Tedder were the Royal Air Force Spaatz to recommend bluntly that he bined Operations Staff. They ana- Middle East, with the US Ninth Air correct his attitude. lyzed the aerial photographs for each Force and the RAF Malta. No one doubted that taking Pan- bombing mission for the relation Eisenhower directed Spaatz to telleria by air would be a significant between effort and effect. throw the full resources of the North- challenge. Aerial reconnaissance NAAF intelligence experts relied west African Air Forces into the task. over the rocky 42-square-mile is- almost exclusively on aerial recon- For Corkscrew, a joint command di- land revealed more than 100 gun naissance, working closely with the rectly responsible to Eisenhower emplacements, embedded in rock or reconnaissance units to ensure im- consisted of Spaatz; Rear Adm. R.R. concrete. Additionally, pillboxes mediate delivery of prints, to make McGrigor, Royal Navy; and Maj. were scattered in the mountains and target assignments. “The mainte- Gen. Walter E. Clutterbuck, com- in the sides of cliffs. nance of a constant check through manding the British 1st Infantry Di- The strength of the garrison was aerial reconnaissance of this kind vision. estimated at 10,000. This led Allied constituted an essential part of the The US Twelfth Air Force and a planners to worry that, if these troops operation,” stated the official Army number of groups from Ninth Air were skillful and disciplined, the Air Forces history.

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