THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

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Authors Conklin, John G., 1939-

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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 76-18,253

CONKLIN, John Gordon, 1939- THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

The University of Arizona, Ph.D., 1976 Political Science, general

! i Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

@ 1976

JOHN GORDON CONKLIN

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

by

John Gordon Conklin

Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of th

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1976

Copyright 1976 John Gordon Conklin THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my

direction by John Gordon Conklin

entitled THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE

be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy

-> *jj*fj £ Dissertation Director Date//

After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:'-''

This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial ful­ fillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The Uni­ versity of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: TO MY

MOTHER AND FATHER TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paige

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xiii

ABSTRACT xv

1. INTRODUCTION 1

Outline 1 Data and Coding 5

2. THE LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL ISM AND POWER 15

Types of Executives in Latin America 17 Monarchs and Life Consuls. . 18 Parliamentary and Collegial 20 Failure of Non-Presidential Systems 24 Informal Influences on Power 30 Cultural Influence 30 Practical Influences 32 Historical Influences 36 Institutional Influence 39 Formal Bases of Power 44 Chapter Summary 50

3. PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REQUIREMENTS 51

Formal-Legal Qualifications 52 Age, Religious, and Other Requirements ... 52 Other Special Qualifications 58 Special Disqualifications 59 Informal Prerequisites 60 Age 60 Birthplace 62 Education 70 Civilian Occupations 76 Chapter Summary 79

4. PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: SOCIAL CLASS AND MILITARY OCCUPATIONS 80

Social Class 80 Social Class: Trend Analysis ... 82

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

Page

Social Class: Theoretical Considerations. 85 Socio-Racial Theory 85 European Countries 87 Mulatto Countries 89 Mestizo Countries 92 Indian Countries 93 The Emergence of the Middle Sectors ... 98 Summary: Social Class and Executive Recruitment 100 Military Occupations 103 Military Occupations: An Overview .... 104 Militarism: Trend Analysis 107 Rise of Militarism: Independence to 1870 107 Decline of Military: 1870-1920 .... 114 Stabilization and Increase of Military: 1920-1970 115 Militarism: Theoretical Considerations. . 116 Socio-Racial Types 117 Militarism: Literacy 121 Militarism: Socio-Economic Complexity. 126 Militarism: Political Parties 132 Militarism: Summary 142

5. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: OVERVIEW AND ELECTIONS. 14 5

Studies of Executive Succession 146 Executive Succession: Overview 147 Executive Successions: Elections 156 Theories of Democracy 156 Democracy in Latin America: Hypotheses. . 162 Socio-Economic Contexts 162 Communications Systems 162 Socio-Political Structures 163 Military and Democracy 163 Independent and Dependent Variables. . 164 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy. 164 Communications and Democracy 168 Socio-Political Structures and Democracy. 171 Military 175 Political Parties 175 Labor 179 Chapter Summary 179 vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

Page

6. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: VIOLENCIAS 182

Theories of Instability 182 Instability in Latin America: Hypotheses . . 187 Cultural Bases 188 Economic Bases . 190 Psychological Urbanization Bases 191 Socio-Structural Bases 192 Executive Succession: Violencias and Instability 192 Culture and Instability 193 Socio-Racial Type and Instability .... 197 Economic Opportunities and Instability. . 200 Alienation, Urbanization and Instability. 203 Socio-Political Structures and Ins tab i 1 i ty 211 Militarism 213 Political Parties 215 Labor 2 22 Chapter Summary. 225

7. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: IMPOSICIONES AND TENURE PATTERNS 229

Imposicion 230 Tenure 236 Tenure Patterns: Overview 238 The Institutionalization of the Chief Executive 242 Occupations and Tenure 248 Party Systems and Tenure 252 Successions and Tenure 2 56 Chapter Summary 2 58

8. CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE 260

Presidential Backgrounds 260 Presidential Successions 267 The Significance of the Study for Under­ standing and Predicting Trends in Latin American Politics 269 Constitutionalism and Executive Power . . 270 Executive Recruitment and Power: Soldiers vs. Civilians 273 Executive Succession and Power 279 vii .

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

Page

APPENDIX I: PRESIDENT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 285

APPENDIX II: PRESIDENTS: TERM OF OFFICE, SUCCESSION, DEPARTURE 328

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 374 LIST OP TABLES

Table Page

1.1 Number of Unknown Data in Appendix I By Country and Category 7

2.1 Types of Executives in Latin America Independence to 1970 (By Country). ... 29

3.1 Constitutional Qualifications for Latin American Presidents 5 3

3.2 Age of Latin American Executives Upon Eirst Achieving Office (By Number and Percentage 61

3.3 Birthplace of Latin American Presidents (By Si ze) 6 3

3.4 Percentage of Urban Dwellers and Urban Born Executives in Latin America .... 64

3.5 Percentage of Latin American Presidents Born in National and State Capitals 66

3.6 Formal Education of tlie Presidents of Latin America (By Number and Percentage) 71

3.7 Civilian Occupations of Latin American Chief Executives (Bv Country) 77

4.1 Class Origins of Presidents of Latin America By Country and Socio- Racial Type (Number and Percentage). . . 88

4.2 Class Origin of Presidents in Revolu­ tionary and Traditional Indian Countries 95

4.3 Class Origin of Presidents in Revolu­ tionary Indian Countries Before and After Revolution 96

4.4 Presidents Born in Middle Class in Middle Sector and Non-Middle Sector Countries 99

v i i i ix

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table Page

4.5 Civilian, Professional Military and Insurgent Military Presidents: By Country (Number and Percent­ age 105

4.6 Rank Order and Percentage of Profes­ sional, Insurgent and Total Military Presidents 106

4.7 Percentage of Military and Civilian Executives Born in the Unper , Middle and Lower Classes Ill

4.8 Percentage of Executives Born in the Upper, Middle and Lower Classes from Military and Civilian Occu­ pations 112

4.9 Civilian, Professional Military and Insurgent Military Presidents: By Socio-Racial Type (Number and Percentage) 118

4.10 Analysis of Variance: Socio-Racial Type and Militarism. 120

4.11 Literacy and Militarism: Tests of Regression and Correlation 125

4.12 Raw Scores for Socio-Economic Com­ plexity Index by Percentage . 129

4.13 Step-Wise Regression: Militarism and Socio-Economic Complexity. 130

4.14 Correlation Coefficient: Militarism and Socio-Economic Complexity. . , . . . 131

4.15 Partial Correlation Coefficients: Socio-Economic Complexity Index. . 133

4.16 Incidence of Military and Civilian Executives in Systems With and Without Modern Parties (By Country) 137

4.17 Analysis of Variance: Militarism and Party Systems 1920-1970 138 X

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table Page

4.18 Civilian and Military Executives in Strong, Moderately Strong, and Weak Traditional Party Systems Be­ tween 1870 and 1920 140

4.19 Analysis of Variance: Militarism and Party Systems 1870-1920 143

5.1 Number of Executive Successions by Violencia, Imposicion, and Election (By Country) 148

5.2 Number of Executive Successions, Pro­ visional and Provisional Violencia (By Country) 149

5.3 Number of Executive Departures by Constitutional and Unconstitutional Means, Death and Health Reasons (By Country) 150

5.4 Rank Order and Percentage of Executives Attaining Office by Violencia, Im- nosiciones, and Elections (Indepen­ dence to 1970) 154

5.5 Percentage of Executive Departures by Constitutional and Unconstitutional Means (Independence to 1970) 155

5.6 Raw Scores for Communications Develop­ ment Index 170

5.7 Elections by Number and Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1920 and 19 70 by Countries With and Without Modern Parties 178

6.1 Percentage of Presidents Attaining Office by Violencia, Inmosicion, Election and Provisionally (By Socio-Racial Type and Country) 198

6.2 Analysis of Variance: Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencias) 199 xi

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table Page

6.3 Ranking of Latin American Countries by Levels of Social Mobilization and Economic Opportunity 204

6.4 Countries Grouped According to Degree of Political Instability and Pre­ dicted Level of Economic Oppor­ tunity 205

6.5 Percentage of Violencia, Imposicion and Election Used by Military and Civilian Executives 214

6.6 Percentage of Military and Civilian Executives Attaining the Presi­ dency by Violencia, Imposicion and Election 216

6.7 Political Parties and Instability: Violencias as a Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1870 and 1920 by Strong, Moderately Strong and Weak Party Systems. 220

6.8 Political Parties and Instability: Violencias as a Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1920 and 1970 by Countries With and Without Modern Parties ..... 221

7.1 Imposiciones by Number and Percentage of all Turnovers Between 1870 and 1920 by Strong, Moderately Strong and Weak Party Systems 233

7.2 Imposiciones by Number and Percentage of all Successions Between 1920 and 197 0 by Countries With and Without Modern Party Systems 234

7.3 Number of: Years Served by Each Latin American Executive (By Country) 239

7.4 Mean and Median Term of Office for Latin American Chief Executive Per Country . 241 xii

LIST OF TABLES--Continued

Table Page

7.5 Average Number of Years Served by Each Executive Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 244

7.6 Percentage of Presidential Terms Minus One Year, One to Two Years, Two to Four Years , Four to Ten Years and Plus Ten Years Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 245

7.7 Latin American Chief Executive Per­ centage of Years Office Held by Civilians and Military 249

7.8 Number and Percentage of Executives, Civilian - Professional Soldier - Military Insurgent, Serving Four to Ten, Ten to Twenty, and Over Twenty Year Terms 251

7.9 Executive Tenure in Strong, Moderately Strong, and Weak Party Systems Be­ tween 1870 and 1920 254

7.10 Number of Presidents Serving Various Terms by Countries With and Without Modern Parties 255

7.11 Executive Tenure by Election, Imposi- cion and Violencia 257 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

3.1 Percentage of Presidents College and Military College Trained Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods 74

4.1 Class Origins of the Presidents of Latin America Over Twenty-Five Year Periods (By Percentage) 83

4.2 Percentage of Civilian and Professional and Insurgent Military Presidents Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods. . . . 108

4.3 Relationships Between Illiteracy and Militarism in Latin America 123

5.1 Percentage of Violencia, Imposiciones and Elections by Twenty-Five Year Periods 153

5.2 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections) 166

5.3 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 167

5.4 Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.) 169

5.5 Communications Development and Democracy (Elections) 172

5.6 Communications Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 173

5.7 Communications Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S .') 174

5.8 Democracy and Militarism in Latin America 176

xiii xiv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS--Continued

Figure Page

5.9 Democracy and Labor Organization in Latin America 180

6.1 Cultural Homogeneity and Political Instability 194

6.2 Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencia) 201

6.3 Political Instability and Psychological Alienation in Latin America 207

6.4 Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Levels of Urbani­ zation) 209

6.5 Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Rate of Urbani­ zation) . . , . , 212

6.6 Percentage of Military Presidents and Violencias over Six Twenty- Five Year Periods 217

6.7 Political Instability and Labor in Latin America 226

7.1 Educational Development and Imposi- ciones in Latin America. 237 ABSTRACT

This dissertation concerns executive recruitment and succession among the twenty Latin American republics from the Wars of Independence to 1970. The purposes of the study are two-fold: First, to describe the background and succession and tenure patterns of the Latin American chief executive and, second, to analyze this descriptive data within the context of other societal and political phenomena. The maior question under consideration concerns the influence of recruitment and succession upon the ef­ fective exercise of executive power.

The data for this dissertation is based upon the backgrounds of the 978 men who served as a Latin American chief executive between the Wars of Independence and 1920, and the modes of succession utilized for the 1,331 turn­ overs that occurred over this time period. Five background variables -- birthplace, social origins, education, occu­ pation, and age -- are used to describe the Latin American presidents. Successions are coded according to three major categories: violencias (violent turnovers), imposiclones

(electoral charades), and elections.

The "typical" Latin American chief executive was born to a middle or upper class family .in an urban area, likely a state or national capital. Historically, most

xv xv i executives came from the upper class but, since the turn of the century, an increasing number have emerged from the middle sectors. He likely attended college and pursued a career in one of the professions or the military and as­ sumed office in his forties or fifties. The imposicio'n was the most frequently utilized mode of succession, fol­ lowed by violencias and elections. However, since 1920, the incidence of impos iciones has declined, while elections have likeivise increased. The incidence of violencias has remained relatively consistent over the past 50 years

(1920-1970).

Besides utilizing this data for describing execu­ tive backgrounds and successions, social origins, military- civilian occupations, violencias . and elections are used as measures of politically significant features of Latin

American society. Namely, social origins is related to differences and changes among the Latin American repub­ lics in class structure; military occupations is used to measure militarism, and violencias and elections to gauge instability and democracy, respectively.

The most "open" class structure in Latin America occurs among so-called Mulatto and Revolutionary Indian states. Changes in the social class background of Latin

American presidents relate to the size of a country's middle sector and to political revolution. Namely, where xvii

middle sectors are large and where revolutions occur,

greater numbers of presidents from the middle class emerge.

The indices of violencia for each country were re­

lated to five independent variables: 1) cultural character­

istics, 2) socio-racial type, 3) economic opportunity, 4)

psychological alienation due to urbanizations, and 5) three

socio-political structures -- militarism, political parties

and labor organization. Statistically significant rela­

tionships occurred between violencias and cultural context,

level of concerbation, and militarism.

Indices of elective presidential successions were

tested against five independent variables: 1) socio­

economic development, 2) communications development, 3)

militarism, political parties, and labor organization.

Statistically significant positive relationships were found

between elections and socio-economic and communications

development. A significant negative relationship exists

between elections and militarism.

It is the thesis of this dissertation that the so­

cial and economic progress of Latin America will be most

propitious in those societies which evolve effective elec­

toral succession systems. Such systems are essentially

civilian and the so-called "modernizing military" is un­

likely to emerge as an effective agent of social and eco­ nomic growth. CHAPTER X

INTRODUCTION

The political significance and power of the Latin

American chief executive is routinely noted in the litera­ ture on Latin American politics. Indeed, the thesis of overwhelming executive power is unquestioningly restated by scholars concerned with Latin America. It is curious, then, that no general study exists either describing or 1 analyzing the Latin American chief executive. The purpose of this dissertation is to undertake just such a study by examining the office and office-holders of the chief exe­ cutive in Latin America and placing them into context with other political and societal phenomena. Three main topics are considered: (1) what men come to power, (2) how they come to power, and (3) once in power, how long they keep it.

Outline

The dissertation is divided into eight chapters.

The first chapter is an introduction, the second chapter descirbes the character and scope of the office of the chief

-^See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the literature on the Latin American chief executive.

1 2 executive, the third and fourth chapters deal with presiden­ tial recruitment, the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters discuss presidential succession, and the eighth and final chapter summarizes recruitment and succession and relates them to presidential power and its effective use.

Chapter 1 states the purpose of the paper and briefly outlines the other chapters. It also summarizes major aspects of data and explains methods of coding uti­ lized in the study. Chapter 2 is a descriptive treatment of the office of the Latin American chief executive. Types of executives who have held office, failure of non- presidential systems, and formal bases of power are the main subiects.

Chapter 3 is also descriptive. It concerns the formal-legal and informal requisites in presidential re­ cruitment, The formal-legal requirements are written into the individual constitutions. In addition to these formal requirements, certain socio-economic characteristics greatly influence the real opportunity for attaining office. This chapter focuses on age, birthplace, education, and civilian occupation as they pertain to executive recruitment.

Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the impact of informal background characteristics upon presidential re­ cruitment. The characteristics considered here are social origins and military occupations. Besides describing their influence in the recruitment process, they are also used as 3 measures of two politically significant features of Latin

American society. Social origins is utilized to gauge the rigidity or openness of class systems, and military occupa­ tions -- the incidence of soldier-presidents -- is used to measure militarism. Using these measures to differentiate among the Latin American countries, Chapter 4 focuses upon explaining why class structure and militarism vary from country to country. To find out about class openness and rigidity, two independent variables are tested: (1) socio- racial type, and (2) the strength of middle sector elements in each of the Latin American countries. Regarding mili­ tarism in Latin America, the incidence of soldier-presidents will be measured against four independent variables: (1) socio-racial type, (2) literacy, (3) socio-economic complex­ ity, and (4) political parties.

Chapters 5, 6 , and 7 concern executive succession in Latin America, Three modes of succession -- violencias, imposiciones, and elections are discussed. In addition to their descriptive purposes, violencias and elections are used as indices to gauge levels of political instability and political democracy, respectively.

In Chapter 5, elective presidential successions are identified and utilized as an index of Latin American politi­ cal democracy. The purpose of this chapter is to relate to electoral turnovers those environmental elements which seem conducive to political democracy. These elements are: (1) 4 level of socio-economic development, (2) the extensiveness and effectiveness of communications systems, and (3) the impact of socio-political structures -- again, militarism, political parties, and labor organization..

Chapter 6 treats succession from the standpoint of stability and instability. Its maior purnose is to identify those societal conditions which give rise to unstable suc­ cessions; i.e., political instability. Violent, unstable turnovers are considered a dependent variable and is tested against five independent variables: (1) cultural character­ istics, (2) socio-racial type, (3) economic opportunity,

(4) psychological alienation as a result of urbanization, and (5) three socio-political structures -- militarism, political parties, and labor organization.

The final aspect of executive succession in Latin

America, imposlciones and tenure patterns, is dealt with in

Chapter 7. The impos icion, a maior mode of Latin American succession, refers to those turnovers which are not either electoral contests or violent overthrows, but are electoral charades. The imposicion is discussed and analyzed as re­ gards its relationship with military-civilian occupations, political parties, and levels of educational development.

Tenure, the second maior consideration in Chapter 7 , is used in this study as a measure of individual success of the executive and of the institutionalization of the office of the Latin American chief executive. It is assumed that the 5 longer the tenure, the more successful is the executive, and the shorter, the less successful. Regarding institutionali­ zation, the closer tenure patterns conform to constitutional provisions, the higher is the level of institutionalization, and the farther the tenure pattern deviates from constitu­ tion, the lower the level. Tenure, used as a measure of in­ stitutionalization, is related to three variables -- military- civilian occupations, political parties, and modes of suc­ cession.

In Chapter 8 ? executive recruitment and succession are considered as influences upon executive power. The thesis of this study is that historical analysis reveals recruitment and succession characteristics that relate di­ rectly to the effective exercise of presidential power. Of particular importance is the relationship among tenure, suc­ cession, civilian and military occupational groups, and the varying environmental contexts found in the twenty Latin

American republics. Using tenure patterns as estimates of effectiveness, Chapter 8 analyzes those elements that are either positively or negatively related to effective execu­ tive power.

Data and Coding

The data for this dissertation is summarized in Ap­ pendices I and II. Appendix I is a listing of the presi­ dents of the twenty republics of Latin America from the Wars of Independence to 1970. This list includes 991 men and is

7 believed to be complete." Five background variables -- age upon assuming office, occupation, social class origins, edu­ cation, and birthplace -- are listed for each president ex­ cept in those cases where the information is unknown. This data is the basis for the discussion in Chapter 3 and 4 of social background characteristics and their relationship to presidential recruitment.

Unfortunately, information is not available for all of the 991 men. Consequently, the data presented in Chapters

3 and 4 are based on samples. As shown in Table 1.1, these range from 88% in the case of occupation to 50% in the case of class origins. In some instances, a sample is skewed to­ ward a group of presidents from countries for which data was more available. Generally, information on the presidents of

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Cuba, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay is more ac­ cessible and more complete than is the case for the presidents of Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,

Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. It is also

^In point of fact, only 978 different men have served as a Latin American chief executive. Seven have served as chief executive in more than a single country and, therefore, are counted more than once. These individuals are Simon Bolivar, who was president in five countries, Francisco Morazan in four, Dionisio de Herrera in three, Juan Lindo in two, Diego Vigil in two, Andres de Sanata Cruz in two, and Carlos Salazar in two. 7

TABLE 1.1

NUMBER OF UNKNOWN DATA IN APPENDIX I BY COUNTRY AND CATEGORY

aa o c e b Total

Argentina 0 0 9 0 1 30 Bolivia 1 3 24 15 2 51 Brazil 0 0 6 2 5 28 Chile 3 0 15 9 4 49 Colombia 0 0 14 4 0 67 Costa Rica 7 6 34 25 6 60 Cuba 0 0 0 0 1 16 Dom Rep 8 1 18 12 15 37 Ecuador 12 2 16 7 9 55 El Salvador 44 26 58 43 51 71 Guatemala 22 11 36 28 36 53 Haiti 23 7 26 21 6 40 Honduras 40 27 50 42 44 65 Mexico 1 1 27 6 0 59 Nicaragua 45 27 45 44 40 72 Panama 0 0 10 1 0 37 Paraguay- 15 5 26 20 25 42 Peru 5 0 35 22 9 73 Uruguay- 0 0 19 12 2 39 Venezuela 20 7 30 21 22 47

Total 246 123 498 334 278 991 ^Unknown 24% 12% 50% 33% 29% % Known 76% 88% 50% 67% 71%

aThe column represents the following: a = age, o = occupation, c = class, e = education, b = birthplace. 8

likely that some samples are distorted within some of the

countries. No doubt, more data exists on twentieth century

rather than on nineteenth century executives , and on the

better known men of both eras. While these problems of rep­ resentativeness are present, the descriptions and analyses

presented herein are based upon relatively large samples.

Appendix II lists the successions of Latin American

presidents from the Wars of Independence to 1970. Each

president is listed along with the date he took office, years-months-days in office, the mode used for attaining

office, and the nature of departure from office. Except for

a gap in the first twenty-odd years of Honduran independence,

the codings are virtually complete.

The modes for attaining office utilized in this study

are adapted from William Stokes' classic article proposing

a typology of Latin American executive succession.^ Stokes

divides executive transfers into two basic types -- violent successions and peaceful ones. Violent takeovers include machetismo, cuartelazo, golpe de estado, and revolution.

Peaceful procedures are imposicion, candidato unico, contin- uismo, and competitive election.

The first kind of violent takeover, machetismo, is a

method which relies upon the use of raw physical power to

7. 'William S. Stokes, "Violence As a Power Factor m Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly (September, 1952), pp. 445-69. 9 achieve political office and is frequently associated with the concept of caudillismo.

The cuartelazo is a "barracks revolt", which involves an internal takeover of a military post, a cuartel, and the issuance of a manifesto "deposing" the existing government.

Successful cuartelazos requiring extensive planning and considerable skill in execution are characterized by minimal loss of life or property. A golpe de estado differs from the cuartelazo in that it bypasses the cuartel for a direct as­ sault upon the government. Revolution is characterized by mass participation and fundamental changes in public policy.

The imposicion is an electoral charade, a "staged election" wherein the government oversees the complete electoral process to a predetermined conclusion. The candidato unico occurs when there is but one candidate run­ ning. Continuismo involves engineering the constitution in order to permit an incumbent to extend his tenure beyond the legally proscribed term of office. Elections refer to competitive contests wherein reasonably honest vote counts determine the winners and losers.

For the purposes of this study, Stokes' typology is collapsed into three basic categories -- violencia, imposi- cion, and election. Violencia refers to any case in which a presidential aspirant uses armed force directly to achieve office. The violence can take many forms, from a bloodless golpe de estado or cuartelazo to a violent revolution. In 10 every case, however, armed action is employed to gain power.

Elections refer to a contest between two or more candidates, each of whom must have a "reasonable chance" of winning."^

Three types of elections are used in Latin America: (1) popular elections in which the winner simply receives a major­ ity or plurality of the votes, (2) elections in which a leg­ islative or constituent assembly chooses an executive, and

(3) elections where legislative bodies select a president when none of the candidates wins a sufficiently large major­ ity of the popular vote.

Imposiciones are all-power turnovers that fall be­ tween violencias and elections. Normally, they are elec­ toral charades in which there is a single candidate or only one candidate with a chance to win. For the purposes of this study, a legislative ratification of a golpe de estado or another violent form of taking office is not an imposi- cion. i'his tactic is frequently used by presidential aspi­ rants who successfully stage a coup d'etat. If the president gained office violently and stages a popular election after­ ward to ratify his taking office, then an imposicion is con­ sidered to have, occurred.

A "reasonable chance" of winning means that more than one candidate must be a serious contender. No formal criteria are used in this study to distinguish elections from impos iciones. Rather, the author has relied upon historical and journalistic accounts and his own judgment to determine when competitive elections occur. The reader can refer to Appendix II to see those 131 cases judged to be elections in this study. 11

Latin American turnovers frequently involve tempo­ rary or interim arrangements. To accommodate such successions, the category "provisional" has been added. Provisional presidents are frequently appointed by a junta or a legisla­ tive body when presidential succession is interrupted. At other times, they replace a vacationing or ailing president.

Hence, it is useful to distinguish between those provisional executives who come to power legally and peacefully and those who talce office in unconstitutional or violent cir­ cumstances. As used here, the category "provisional presi­ dent" includes those individuals who might legally be labelled acting or interim chief executives.

Each transfer of the executive office of the twenty

Latin American republics is coded according to the following formula:

v = violent, forcible, unconstitutional change i = imposicion e = election by popular vote ec = election by legislative body of constituent assembly e/ec = popular election followed by election in legis­ lature p = provisional succession pv = provisional succession under forcible conditions

Presidents who continue in office without interruption are coded only for their initial assumption of office unless subsequent extensions of their term involve a different mode than that initially employed. The conditions under which individuals leave the presidency is coded according to one of the following seven categories: 12

c = constitutionally and voluntarily u = unconstitutionally and under duress r = voluntary resignation or withdrawal h = for reasons of health d = death ds = death by suicide da = death by assassination

Coded data and its use for indices raise questions of reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the accuracy of the codings. Validity concerns the indicators and whether they actually indicate what they are claimed to indicate. The accuracy of the codings in Appendices I and

II hinges upon the accuracy of the historical and journalis­ tic accounts from which they derive, and, in most cases, the codings are mechanical. Personal judgments are required, however, for coding some of the categories. For instance, distinguishing among class backgrounds is, at times, judg­ mental. The line between middle and upper class origins is not always clear. Too, distinguishing an election from an imposicion presents difficulties.

Validity is, perhaps, a more serious issue. In this study, four categories are used to measure political phenom­ ena. Executive class background is used to measure the characteristics of class structure, the incidence of soldier-presidents measures militarism, violent successions measure instability, and electoral successions measure polite ical democracy.

It is logical that where relatively large numbers of people from the lower and middle classes fill elite positions, the class system could be considered less strati­ fied and closed than where such offices are monopolized by members of the upper class.

The question of whether the incidence of soldier- presidents is indicative of militarism hinges upon a defi­ nition of militarism. In the social sciences, militarism is frequently associated with notions such as authoritarian personality, fascism, and a general militarization of society. In Latin America, militarism has generally had a more limited meaning. There, as in this study, it refers specifically to military establishments and to their rela­ tionships with the state. For example, Robert Gilmore de­ fines militarism as follows:

The military is concerned with the management and use of controlled violence in the service of the state according to terms laid down by the state. When the military institution veers from this role to participate in or to influence other, non- military agencies and functions of the state, in­ cluding its leadership, then militarism exists in greater or lesser degree.5

In light of this definition, soldier-presidents which repre­ sent military participation in non-military institutions, seem a valid measure of militarism.

Domestic political instability is usually said to consist of events such as demonstrations, riots, pronouncia- mientos , golpes de estado, guerrilla actions, and civil

^Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910, (AthensV Ohio University Press',' 1964), pp\ 4-5'." wars. Significantly, the target of these events is gener­ ally the existing government; hence, the measure of insta­ bility used in this study, violent successions, strictly speaking, gauges "successful" destabilizing actions.

Majority rule is a keystone of political democracy and elections provide the institution for determining ma­ jorities. Although political democracy involves more than competitive elections, such elections are, at least, a neces­ sary condition for democracy. Hence, the measure used here, though somewhat limited, is adequate as it is a fundamental aspect of democracy.

All the background and succession data used in this study will attempt to provide a better understanding of the office of chief executive in relation to political power and the larger societies in Latin America, But, before pre­ senting and analyzing this data, it is useful to review the evolution of the Latin American chief executive, along with the informal and formal influences conducing to the emer­ gence and solidification of presidential systems. This is the subject of Chapter 2. CHAPTER 2

Tllf: LATIN AMERICA?,' CHIEF EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIALISM AND POWER

Executive predominance is the salient feature of

Latin American government. Indeed, "the most widely pro­

fessed fact in the field of Latin American politics is un-

I questionably the dominant role of the president." Yet, curiously, there are few studies of the Latin American chief executive. Only a handful deal with presidency in a general sense. By far, the best of these is Rosendo Gomez's article,

"Latin American Executives: Essence and Variation." G^mez discusses the Latin American executive and his relationship

to executive power more generally conceived. He distin­ guishes between New and Old World authoritarianism and out­ lines a five-fold typology for cataloguing chief executives.

Other general studies are in almost all textbooks on Latin

American government and politics. Two of the better efforts

are by Frank Brandenburg and Alexander Edelmann.

•^Rosendo Gomez, "Latin American Executives: Essence and Variation," Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (June, 1961) , p. 81.

^Gomez, pp. 81-96.

7 Frank Brandenburg, "The Presidency," in Harold E. Davis (ed), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press , 19 5 8) , pp. 2 52 - 89 ; Alexander T. Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics, revised edition (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 19 69), pp. 406-41.

15 16

Both authors cover the formal-legal aspects of presi­

dential power and presidential succession. Brandenburg in­

cludes an excellent discussion of the cultural and histori­

cal bases of presidential power, and Edelmann presents a

useful catalogue of the types of executives found in Latin

America.

The remaining literature on the Latin American exec­

utive consists of chapters in country studies and a few

articles that concern a single country. These works tend to

be descriptive and historical in approach. Some do not go beyond formal-legal arrangements, although most include some

discussion of variables, either political, cultural, socio­

logical, or historical, that have influenced the office of

the chief executive.^ a number of studies are thinly dis­

guised polemics designed to publicize some perceived "evil"

^For historical treatments almost wholly limited to formal-legal questions see: N. Andrew N. eleven, The Politi­ cal Organization of Bolivia (Washington: Carnegie Institu- tion, 1940) , pp. 114-67; Herman G. James, The Constitutional System of Brazil (Washington: Carnegie Ins titution, 1923), pp. 82- 10 5 ; Graham II. Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru, (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 19 2 5) , pp. 36-50 ; and Wil­ liam S. Stokes, Honduras: An Area Study in Government (Madi­ son: University of Wisconsin Press , 19 50) . Broader interpre- tations of the executive are found in: Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), pp. 92-106; Alexander T. Edelmann, "The Rise and Demise of Uruguay's Second Plural Executive," Journal of Politics XXXI (February, 1969), pp. 119-39; Russell IH Fitzgibbon, "Execu­ tive Power in Central America," Journal of Politics, III (August, 1941), pp. 297-307. For three studies that emphasize the political bases of executive power see: Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964) ; Leo B. Lott, "Executive Power in Venezuela," American 17 in executive behavior.5 George Blanksten's book on Ecuador is an interpretation of Ecuadorean politics from the per­ spective of the presidency.^ Three recent articles concern­ ing presidential recruitment and succession in Chile, Costa

Rica, and Ecuador get away from the approaches and methods

7 that have always dominated this literature. There are em­ pirically based studies utilizing quantifiable data to indi­ cate patterns of executive selection and tenure.

Types of Executives in Latin America

Presidential government has not always been the sole executive system in Latin America. Indeed, considerable experimentation with varying types of executives has occurred among the twenty republics. These consist of five main types

Political Science Review L (June, 1956), pp. 422-41; and Martin Needier, "Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System: The Case of Peru."- Parliamentary Affairs. XVIII (Spring, 1965), pp. 156-61.

^Ernest Hamblock, His Majesty the President of Bra­ zil (New York: E. P. Duttori^ 1936), and Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," Foreign Affairs XXVII (October, 1948), pp. 44-57.

^George I. B1 anks ten ,N Ecuador: N^Cons t^rtu t i oris^ and Caudi 1 los (Berkeley: University of California 'Press , 1'9 51), Blanksten develops the thesis that the national political life of Ecuador has been greatly affected by the caudillo- pres ident.

^Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin, "Presiden­ tial Succession in Chile: 1817 to 1966 ," Journal of Inter- American Studies , XI (Jan., 1969), pp. 144-59 ; James ET Busey, "The Presidents of Costa Rica." The Americas. XVIII (July, 1961), pp. 55-70 18

-- moriarchial, life consular, parliamentary, collegial, and

g presidential. Experiments with monarchs and life consuls were largely limited to the post-Independence era and can be dealt with summarily. Parliamentary and collegial systems, which represent a more viable alternative to presidential- ism, require more discussion.

Monarchs and Life Consuls

Monarchial systems were adopted in the immediate post-Independence period in Mexico, Haiti, and Brazil. In

Mexico, the reign of Emperor Agustin Iturbide proved tempo­ rary lasting less than a year. Some Mexicans believed that a monarchy would provide a more stable polity than would a democratic system. But, on the whole, pro-monarchist senti­ ment was limited, and the adoption of this particular system reflected the desire of Iturbide for personal aggrandizement rather than a desire of society for monarchy. Three Haitian monarchs were somewhat more successful. Emperor Jacques I ruled for two years, Henri I, fourteen years, and Faustin I, twelve years.^ None of these men, however, passed his title

^Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics, pp. 406-09.

^The Mexican Agustin I, Agustin Iturbide, governed from 1822 to 1823. The Haitians were Jacques Dessalines, 1804-1806, Henri Christophe, 1806-1820, and Faustin Soulouque, 1847-1859. 19 of emperor to a successor. The Haitian monarchies reflected the personal inclinations of the rulers themselves who had a curious infatuation with traditional European governmental forms.

The Brazilian monarchy was the most durable, lasting from 1822 to 1889, a period of sixty-seven years, during which time two men, Pedro I and Pedro II, served as emperors.

The Brazilian monarchy was unique in Latin America because

Pedro I was a leader of the movement to free Brazil from

Portugal. Hence, independence was achieved by a monarchial government rather than because of a monarchial government.

In Spanish Latin America, independence forces fought against a monarchial system.

Life consul systems were also adopted during and -J immediately following the Wars of Independence. Simdn

Bolivar (1825) and Antonio Jose'' de Sucre (1826) were desig­ nated lifelong dictators of Bolivia, and Andres de Santa Cruz assumed the position of "Protector for Life" over the short­ lived Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1837). The same position was accorded the Haitian Alexander Petion (1816-1818) and his successor, Jean Piere Boyer (1818-1843), who ruled for twenty-five years. A third Haitian, Sylvain Salnave, took this title and ruled for two years (1867-1869) but then was deposed and shot by a revolutionary tribunal. More recently,

Francois Duvalier of Haiti provided a variation on this theme when he took the title of Life President, serving from 1964 until 1971. Parliamentary and Collegial

A third type of executive, the parliamentary-prime minister system, has also been utilized in Latin America.

Most countries have required the president to collaborate with the legislature to some degree in the performance of his official duties. Carried to an extreme, such "collabo­ ration" results in a parliamentary system wherein the presi- 10 dent is nothing but a figurehead. In Latin America, every republic except Paraguay and Nicaragua has attempted to force the president to "collaborate," Operating parliamen­ tary and semi-parliamentary systems have been used in Mexico,

Chile, Honduras, and Brazil, These experiments grew out of a desire to bring an end to the overwhelmingly predominant position of the president in the governmental system.

The Mexican Constitution of 1857 created a parlia­ mentary system, but it did not become effective until 1861,

At that time, the legislature and cabinet began to dominate and did so until 1863 when President Benito Juarez reasserted the president's control over executive power. During its two years of predominance, the legislature was "aggressive and independent," but cabinet instability caused by the lack

•^For a review of parliamentarianism in Latin Ameri­ ca, see: William S. Stokes, "Parliamentary Government in Latin America," American Political Science Review, XXXIX (June, 1945), pp~ 522-36. 11 of a stable majority led to its loss of leadership. The more successful Chilean experiment with parliamentary govern rnent spanned thirty-four years from 1891 to 1925. This ven­ ture, also marred by cabinet instability, was finally ended when the military intervened to disband Congress and to in­ stitute a presidential system.

Parliamentary government in Honduras lasted six years, from 1925 to 1931, during which time Congress chal­ lenged the President on policy question, executive appoint­ ments, and various administration matters through a formal 1 2 parliamentary appartus. In 1932, however, President

Tiburcio Carias Andino restored the traditionally powerful role of the presidency.

In Brazil, a parliamentary system was created by the military in order to force President JOao Goulart to share power with a Prime Minister. As a result, lines of author­ ity were obfuscated and immobilismo plagued the government.

The choice between a parliamentarian system and a rcresidenti system was later given to the people in the form of a refer­ endum and the parliamentary system was rejected. The experi ment, begun in 1961, had lasted only sixteen months. The

"^Frank D. Knapn, Jr., "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857: A Forgotten Phase of Mexi­ can Political History," Hispanic American Historical Review XXXIII (February, 1953), p. 84.

-^Stokes, "Parliamentary Government in Latin America p. 5 2 8, 22 current executive system in Cuba might be considered a vari­ ation of parliamentarianism. President Osvaldo Do'rticos is a figurehead, while real power lies in th e hands of Prime

Minister Fidel Castro.

A few countries in Latin America have attempted to operate plural executive systems. The first Venezuelan

Republic had such an executive, but it fe 11 quickly because of the indecision and weakness that chara cterized the govern- ing committee. For just over five months , in 1822 and 1823, the Peruvians had a multiple executive de signated the junta gubernativa. It never elicited substanti al popular support, however, because two of the three members were non-Peruvians,

Moreover, the junta gubernativa became a scapegoat when many people began to blame it for the reverses suffered by the rebels in the fight against Spain. In th e end, the multiple executive was overthrown by the military.

Undoubtedly, the Uruguayans have undertaken the most innovative experiments with the multiple executive. They originated the collegial system whereby executive power was shared by a nine-man colegiado. The initiator of this execu­ tive form, Jose'' Batlle y Ordo'nez, believed that it would pro­ mote democracy and lessen the likelihood of dictator presi­ dents gaining power. In this sense, the colegiado proved successful. Uruguay acquired an international reputation for its adherence to the tenets of liberal democracy and its avoidance of dictatorial executives. Otherwise, however, 23 the system proved not so successful. In practice, the members of the colegiado were often sharply divided into three or four factions operating much like a parliamentary system without a stable majority. The nine men needed a majority vote for policymaking and as the group became more and more divided by intra-party strife, the "majority" became a shifting coalition. In some instances, decisions made one day were reversed the next. At times, the members of the executive acted irresponsibly, particularly after elections when they fought over "dividing up the spoils." These squabbles fre­ quently continued for weeks leaving the government paralyzed 1 7 and the populace aghast.

The plural executive was tried twice in Uruguay from

1919 to 1933 and from 1952 to 1967. Under the first system, power was shared by the president and the colegiado. Each was independently elected and given separate areas of juris­ diction. Under the second experiment, the colegiado had all executive power and the president was simply one of the colegiado members selected for a one year term. All policy questions were determined by the whole body. The initial colegiado system was eliminated by the Dictator Gabriel

Terra as part of a move to consolidate power in his own

13 For critical assessments of the colegiado, see: Edelmann, "The Rise and Demise of Uruguay's Second Plural Executive," pp. 119-39; and Russe Fi'tzgibbon, "Uruguay: A Model for Freedom and Reform in Latin America," Freedom and Reform in Latin America, Frederick B. Pike, ed" (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 231-55, 24 hands. The second colegiado was done away \\rith by the voters in a referendum.

Failure of Non-Presidential Systems

Non-presidential experiments have been sufficiently varied and extensive to provide a useful gauge of their success and practicality in the Latin American context. By and large, they have not proven successful. Authoritarian­ ism exists and has sometimes provided effective government in Latin America, but its formal-legal counterparts, monarchy and life consul, have not proved sustaining. While some in­ dividuals have succeeded in assuring a lifelong term of of­ fice, in a systemic sense this governmental arrangement has not evidenced longterm viability or stability, therefore, not succeeding as an ongoing institution.

Parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, or collegial systems have been attempted almost universally in Latin

America and have succeeded beyond the term of a single in­ dividual, but they have resulted in ineffectual government.

One reason might be that such systems are not related to the realities of the Latin American political environment. In most countries where parliamentarianism has been written into the constitution, it has not been implemented."^ And,

14pnr an interesting account of the Cuban attempt to engineer a functioning parliamentary system, see: William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowe 11, 1954], pp. 437-54 . 25 where it has been implemented, the results have been nega­ tive. Collegial systems have proven no more successful. In essence, parliamentary and collegial executive systems have severely limited the ability of government to respond to pressing public problems. Their dismal records point this out.

In Mexico, two years of parliamentary government greatly complicated the problem of establishing effective governmental control outside of Mexico City. Continuous cabinet crises and challenges from an aggressive legislature caused President Benito Juarez to concentrate upon maintain­ ing the government rather than solving the problems that 15 faced Mexico. In addition, the Congress lacked party dis­ cipline and the resultant "fluctuating maiority" left govern­ ment without direction. In 1867, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, the first minister in Juarez's cabinet, sought to increase the executive's power arguing that under a parliamentary system, the orderly administration of government was impos-

-| r sible. Eventually, the position of Lerdo prevailed and the legislature was brought under presidential control.

•^For summaries of Juarez's problems during these two years, see: Walter V. Scholes , Mexican Politics During The Juarez Regime 1855-1877 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 19 5 7), pp. 56-91; and Knapp, "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857," pp. 65-87.

Frank D. Knapp, Jr., The Life of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1951) , pp. 126 - 28. 26

The Chilean parliamentary system ushered an unprece­ dented era of instability and moral decay in Chilean poli­ tics. During the thirty-three years of legislative rule,

121 different cabinets, an average of almost four annually, governed the country.^ Due to the system of legislative apportionment, the traditional rural-based oligarchy was able to retain its control of the political system. Vote- 1 ft buying and bribery became common and accepted practices.

In the words of the historian Hubert Herring, "Easy money corrupted the politicians. . . . the selling of votes was a 19 general practice." According to Federico Gil, "the govern­ ment of Chile reached its lowest ebb during the period of parliamentary rule."i ..20

The pariiamentary-presidential government in Brazil was never more than a political expedient, a compromise ar­ rangement between the anti-Goulartistas and the proponents of a legal solution to the succession crisis. Their exper­ iment with parliamentary government was never given an oppor­ tunity to work, as President J&ao Goulart, often in concert

l^Gil, The Political System of Chile, p. 50.

l^For poorer families, the sale of the vote became an important additional source of income; see: Alfred Bar- naby Thomas, Latin America: A History (New York: Macmillan § Co., 1956), p. 400.

•^Hubert H. Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960J , p. 558.

^Gil, The Political System of Chile, p. 49. with the Prime Minister, worked to sabotage the system and

to regain the full powers of the presidency. Apparently, most Brazilians backed the return of the presidential sys­

tem and regarded the parliamentary arrangement as a largely discordant system.21

In Uruguay, the colegiado was twice introduced under

propitious circumstances; that is, with substantial popular support and a desire on the part of the government to make

the system work. Under the first plural executive (1919 to

1933) power was divided between a president and a nine-man

National Council, Despite continuous conflict over juris- dictional questions, the system functioned fairly well. ? ?

When the plural executive was reintroduced (1952 to 1967),

the independent president was eliminated and all executive

power was placed in the nine-man Council. Evidently, the

Council was overly responsive to group and individual de­

mands and as a result, fiscal and productivity problems 2 3 reached catastrophic proportions. At the outset, a colle-

gial system seemed to be an efficacious arrangement within

the Uruguayan context. The country did avoid dictators,

•^Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press , 1967) , p. 221.

? ? Philip B. Taylor, Jr., "Interests and Institutional Disfunction in Uruguay," American Political Science Review (March, 1963), p. 71.

^Taylor, p, 72. 28 considerable stability was achieved, personal liberties were protected, but the productivity of the economy declined and, in the end, the colegiado proved incapable of solving public problems.

The most supportive evidence of the viability of presidential systems is the failure of non-presidential ex­ periments. Overtly authoritarian institutions do not last.

Colegiados and prime ministers are disasters. From a formal- legal point of view, the problem is one of establishing ef­ fective government within a non-authoritarian structure.

Presidential government provides such a framework.

The Latin American experience has been largely with presidential systems. Table 2.1 summarizes the types of executives found in Latin America and the number of years

that they have ruled in each of the countries since Independ­ ence. Measured in terms of the number of men who have served within presidential systems as against those who have served

in other executive forms, 971 of all chief executives have been presidents. Using total years served by presidents and by other types of executives, presidents held office 91% of the time. Clearly, presidential government seems effica­ cious for Latin America, Clues to the reasons for this lie

in the relationship between presidential systems and histor­

ical and societal factors present in Latin America. 29

TABLE 2.1

TYPES OF EXECUTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA INDEPENDENCE TO 1970 (BY COUNTRY)

All Executives Presidents Othera number years number years number years

Argentina 30 108 30 108 0 0 Bolivia 51 145 48 142 3 3 Brazil 28 148 25 80 3 68 Chile 49 153 40 119 9 34 Colombia 67 151 67 151 0 0 Costa Rica 60 146 60 146 0 0 Cuba 16 65 15 54 1 11 Dom Rep 37 120 37 120 0 0 Ecuador 56 140 56 140 0 0 El Salvador 63 149 63 149 0 0 Guatemala 53 149 53 149 0 0 Haiti"3 40 179 34 121 6 58 Honduras 66 146 64 140 2 6 Mexico0 59 148 58 145 2 3 Nicaragua 72 145 72 145 0 0 Panama 37 66 37 66 0 0 Paraguay 42 159 41 135 1 24 Peru 73 147 72 146 1 1 Uruguay 39 140 36 111 3 29 Venezuela 47 140 47 140 0 0

Total Number 985 2744 955 2507 31 237 Percentage 100% 100% 97% 91 % 3% 9

aOther refers to monarchial, life consul, functioning parliamentary, and collegial executives.

'-'The total number of years for Haiti includes the period from 180 7 to 1820 when the country had two chief exec­ utives. Chronologically Haiti has been independent only 166 years.

cThe total number of other executives includes Benito Juarez who was president during the experiment with parlia­ mentary government from 1861 to 1863.

^The number of executives does not include those who served from 1952 to 1967 when the colegiado was tried for the second time. Informal Influences on Power

Latin America's extensive experience with presiden­

tial government is not simply a reflection of the failure of

alternative executive systems. Rather, presidential govern­

ment is entwined with the Latin American political culture,

the kinds of problems confronting Latin American governments,

historical factors, and the particular evolution of its po­

litical institutions.

Cultural Influence

The political culture of Latin America has been par­

ticularly hospitable to a strong executive. The colonial

governments established a 300-year tradition of authoritar­ ian government. Throughout that epoch, the relationship

between the government and the governed was rather simple,

The government expected and received obedience from the

governed.^ Moreover, not only were the king and his repre­ sentatives in the New World accorded complete fealty, their

intentions were considered above reproach and their actions beyond public criticism.

The major religious and socio-economic ^nst^tutious reinforced this relationship between the masses and the

This is not to say that disobedience and rebellion were absent throughout the colonial period. Some signifi­ cant Indian revolts occurred and a number of conquistadors bridled under the decrees of the monarchs. But, overall, the era was marked by remarkable mass obedience. political elite. The Catholic church was also founded upon an authoritarian hierarchy that required unquestioning de­ votion and submission to its dogma and life style, encour­ aging the individual to "accept his lot." Another pillar of society, the hacendado, was an autocrat on a local scale.

From his hacienda he controlled the economic, social, and political life of the area. Like the monarch and the clergy, he insisted upon compliance with his orders. His words often carried the power of life and death. Little wonder that the hacendado became the patro"n in the eyes of the villagers.

From the perspective of the commoner, the political officials, religious leaders, and hacendados bestowed all of life's rewards and penalties, and even the afterlife was controlled by the Church. They were all powerful men to be obeyed without question. This indoctrination to submission to authority has carried over to the present time. Latin

Americans tend to assume deferential attitudes toward those in control, particularly political officeholders, and more particularly, the president. Hence, he becomes something of a "national hacendado," regarded by many as omnipotent and omniscient. His position is reinforced by a cultural environment laden with institutions historically based upon authoritarian relationships that have created and continu­ ally reinforce habits of deference and obedience. Practical Influences

Another influence upon the evolution of the Latin

American executive office relates to the momentous political and economic problems confronting the area. Initially, the governments were troubled by serious separatist movements, continuous rebellion, and periodic anarchical conditions.

A major problem was simply to establish a government that could last long enough to be effective. Cyclical economic conditions of depression and prosperity .also greatly compli­ cated the task of governing. More recently, significant groups such as labor and middle sector elements have de­ manded a greater voice in the political system, as well as redistribution of material wealth. This, coupled with the drive for industrialization and economic development, has increased the problems of governing in Latin America.

Throughout history, Latin America has encountered a range of nationbuilding, statebuilding, participation, and distribution crises, which have required an energetic, vigorous government. It is frequently argued that execu­ tives are best able to provide such government. In his classic argument, Alexander Hamilton identified the strong executive with "good government," national security, effi­ cient administration, the protection of property, and se- 2 S curity from anarchical assaults upon liberty.

? ^ Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers: Number 70 (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 42 3-31. 33

Hamilton's assessment of the necessity for a strong executive strikes a responsive cord among Latin American po­ litical leaders. In a message to the Congress of Bolivia in

1826, Simo'n Bolivar spoke of the crucial role of the chief executive, even advocating a lifetime term.

The President of the Republic, in our Constitution, becomes the sun which, fixed in its orbit, imparts life to the universe. This supreme authority must be perpetual, for in hierarchical systems, more than in others , a fixed point is needed about which lead­ ers and citizens, man of affairs, can revolve. "Give me a point where I may stand," said an ancient sage, "and I will move the earth." For Bolivia this point is the life-term President.26

Two years later, speaking to the Congress of Ocana in Bogota'",

Bolivar restated his belief in and commitment to a strong executive government, pointing up its congruence with the social structure of Latin America.

Our many branches of government are not organized in keeping with our social structure and the needs of our citizens. We have made the legislative branch the sovereign body, whereas it should have only limited sovereignty. We have made the execu­ tive branch subordinate to the legislature to which we have given a far greater part in the general ad­ ministration of the government than the nation's true interest demands. ?

In the early 1900's, a group of Venezuelan intellec­

tuals articulated a theory of "democratic caesarism" that continued Bolivarian thought by arguing for caudillo

^Simo'n Bolivar, Selected Writings of Bolivar, Harold A. Bierck, Jr., ed. [New York: The Colonial Press , 1951), p. 598.

Bolivar, Selected Writings of Bolivar, p. 676. presidents whose authority was founded upon the "unconscious suggestion of the majority." Since Venezuelan society

lacked the elements needed for a representative democracy,

such democratic caesars were necessary as only they could

harmonize society and bring about growth and progress. In

the words of one disciple of this school, "The mystic doc­

trine of democracy is being replaced by love of one's coun­

try and the desire to make it great by utilizing all its

forces, organized to function harmoniously through the con- 2 8 trol which can be exerted only by a Supreme Director."

More recently, Jose^F, Estigarribia, the former

President of Paraguay and architect of its current Consti­

tution, reissued the Bolivarian argument for the necessity

of a strong president.

The organization of contemporary society demands a strong, expeditious executive power that can imme­ diately resolve many of the questions which daily arise in social life,..,As regards the executive and legislative powers, the specialization of func­ tions made it desireable to give the executive power a wide range, which would cover all that re­ lated to the administration of the country, the regulation of the economy, the intervention of governmental direction in conflicts of private in­ terests; and to give Congress the function of pro­ viding general standards.

2 8pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gomez Regime in Venezuela and its Background (Washington, D.C.,: 1936)/ p. 59.

2^Jose^ F. Estigarribia, "Comments on the Constitu­ tion of Paraguay," Constitutions of Nations „ revised edi­ tion, Amos J. Peas lee, ed. [The Hague: Mart inus Nijhoff, 19 56) , p. 129. 35

Others have argued that the pressing public problems to be overcome in Latin America require a powerful executive.

One exponent of this position, the former president of Chile,

Eduardo Frei Montalva, insists that the president must have

"wide powers" in order to meet the "complex conditions of our times which demand authority, very rapid measures, total responsibility, and, therefore, considerable freedom 30 of action." In.1969, Frei introduced a reform bill into

Congress which would have increased the power of the chief executive. This legislation provided for the use of the plebiscite to determine public policy when the executive and the Congress reached an impasse, gave the president the power to dissolve Congress and call new elections once dur­ ing his six year term, and granted the president exclusive power to table appropriations bills and legislation dealing with social welfare and wage levels. In addition, this bill allowed the chief executive to introduce legislation as

"emergency laws." Such bills would require a Congressional decision within thirty days, which, if Congress failed to 31 act, would automatically became laws.

^Cited in: Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967), p. TO9.

•7 "I "Chile: Constitutional Reform -- For Whose Benefit," Latin America, January 24, 1969, p. 28. 36

Similar notions are stated and defended in the writ­ ings of the Argentine Fernando Cuevillas who, defending the

administration of Juan Peron, wrote, "Nevertheless, when a

caudillo emerges to clean up an anarchic social and politi­

cal state, he may feel it does not suit his purpose to co­

exist with representatives in a national congress and that

he must transform his government temporarily into a dictator­ ship."^

The exigencies of government, then, have reinforced

the position of the Latin American chief executive. Faced with a bewildering array of problems, the typical republic

has required a firm hand at the helm simply to maintain

order. Perhaps the tremendous problems of governing Latin

America were best put by the former President of Ecuador,

Otto Arosemena. Aslced if he planned to run for the presi­

dency, he understated, "Latin America is more difficult to

•z 3 govern than is generally thought."

Historical Influences

From the outset, the executive was the important

center of political power in Latin America. In the colonial

32Fernando N. A. Cuevillas, "El Re"gimen del Caudillaie en Hispanoamerica," Dictatorship in Latin America, Hugh H. Hamill, Jr., ed. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 205.

•^"Ecuador," Latin American Digest (Tempe: Arizona State University, September, 1968), p. 4^ 37 period, a strong executive was instituted and has persisted throughout the evolution of Latin American political history.

Institutions that might have operated as countervailing powers to the emergence and solidification of presidential systems, failed to mature. The audencias had the potential for growing into a powerful body, and did possess judicial, legislative, and administrative functions. But, in the words of Hubert Herring, "The audiencia early proved inade­ quate. The conquerors and their heirs were difficult to handle, and the disputes which multiplied among them and the clergy and the civil authorities required a sterner disci­ pline than any court could impose. Some of the audiencias were corrupt, more were inefficient.""^ Similarly, the cabildo, or city council, might have grown into an important countervailing institution. In the early phase of the Inde­ pendence movement, they were, in many colonies, centers of revolutionary activity and provided leaders. But, they re­ mained essentially a local body, and when the opportunity to govern came during the Wars of Independence, the cabildos proved inadequate to the task.

During and immediately following the Wars of Inde­ pendence, numerous republics attempted to concentrate power in the hands of the legislature. These attempts failed and

•Z A Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 160. soon most of the newly-independent Spanish American repub­ lics cast about for governmental systems that would replace the king-viceregal system in form, but not in fact. For example, the first Bolivian Constitution designated the president a life term. Similarly, Simo'n Bolivar argued for a lifelong mandate to govern Gran Colombia. In Argentina, the men who overthrew the Spanish authorities in 1810 even­ tually sought a king or queen to replace Ferdinand VII. In many Latin American countries, an office of Supreme Director was created. Almost inevitably these Supreme Directors were given dictatorial powers by the legislatures so that the exec­ utive might impose order.

The monarch, then, was succeeded by the caudillo.

Indeed, the 19th century has been aptly labelled the "age of the caudillos." During that period various local and re­ gional caudillos competed for control of the national govern­ ment. From this competition there emerged national caudillos who dominated individual countries over extended periods of time. The outstanding characteristic of the caudillo is the personal nature of his power:

35Gran Colombia was a confederation made up of present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Panama', and Ecuador. It split in 1830. Bolrvar advocated life-term executives for all of Latin America. 39

in a political sense I would use 'caudillismo' to apply to that regime which consists of the per­ sonification or incarnation of authority, where he who governs acts with an extraordinary charismatic moral ascendancy over his people: advising them, guiding them, leading them paternally. The power of the caudillo is inspired authority before it is iuridical authority.^6

The caudillo is very much the "natural leader" to whom others look for guidance. His "inspired authority" is widely accepted. "He is the personification of the people, the state, the ideals of society, and his authority transcends ?7 law, constitution, party, flag, and political principle."

The 20th century president is heir to this monarchial and caudillo tradition. In every country, these traditions bolster the office of the chief executive and increase the potential fqr individuals to dominate or control "counter­ vailing institutions."

Institutional Influence

The history of Latin America has also been charac­ terized by the failure of countervailing institutions to develop. Latin American judiciaries, legislatures, and bureaucracies are largely subservient to the executive.

Too, effective pressure groups which constitute countervailing

7 /• Cuevillas, "El Regimen del Caudillaie en Hispano- america," Dictatorship in Latin America, p. 205.

3?Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 303. 40 powers elsewhere, have emerged only recently in Latin

America.

The iudiciaries of Latin America have generally been dominated by the chief executive. The iudiciaries of some countries during certain periods have manifested consider­ able independence but such instances are rare. For the most part, court systems are inexorably tied to the execu­ tive since they usually rely upon a sympathetic chief execu­ tive for their autonomous status. Hence, in an ultimate sense, any independent actions by a Latin American judiciary reflect the benign attitudes of a president rather than the

7 O strength of a court system.

The Latin American legislature has generally proven even less autonomous than the judiciary. "In most of the nations, the legislative body is greatly overshadowed by the president and does not even enjoy as much independence 39 or influence as the judiciary." Most Latin American legislatures simply process executive initiatives, frequently accepting the president's policy proposals en toto. In part, this is due to a lack of funding for legislative pur­ poses and a dearth of staff assistance. With very limited

38 An outstanding exception is the Costa Rican judi­ ciary . 7Q Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics, p. 443. Exceptions to this generalization are found in Costa Rica and Venezuela. Formerly, Chile and Uruguay had somewhat powerful legislative branches. 41

resources, congresses find it difficult to compete with the

comparatively well-endowed executive branch. Legislators

are also hindered by the comparatively short duration of

congressional sessions. Typically, they run from sixty to

ninety days annually.

In many countries, the electoral process works

against the emergence of an aggressive, independent legisla­

ture. The president and the congress are frequently elected

simultaneously with the presidential contest capturing the

voter's interest and dominating the direction in which

votes are cast. Hence, many presidents come into office

along with a large delegation of loyal supporters. In some

cases, the president can rig the elections in order to en­

sure a legislative majority. Then, again, the lack of

party discipline characteristic of most Latin American leg­

islative systems results in a fragmented and fluid congres­ sional body that finds it difficult to do anything, let

alone challenge the power of the chief executive. Finally,

the president is popularly elected and only he has a national

constituency. Each congressman necessarily represents only

a small sector of society. The president's national man­

date increases the inclination of the legislative branches

to give the chief executive considerable latitude.

It is also true that the legislators themselves have done little to increase the role of the congressional branch

in Latin American politics. Evidently, many Latin American 42 legislators seek office in order to achieve status rather than to advance programs.^ Oftentimes, the deputy or senator takes a seat traditionally held by his family and his legislative responsibility ends after he has gained an appropriate share of the spoils. Since the chief executive controls the spoils system, the congressman is careful not to court presidential displeasure. In this context, the chief executive's administrative powers are particularly important for influencing opposition and independent legis­ lators. In sum, a variety of legal and practical factors discourage legislative autonomy and assertiveness.

Similarly, the Latin American bureaucracy is less of a check upon executive power than are its counterparts else­ where. Students of the United States government have fre­ quently observed that the bureaucracy constitutes a check upon executive power.^ There is increasing evidence that the bureaucracy in Latin America might constitute a

^This is the thesis of a recent book on the Colum­ bian Congress. See: James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 196 8). Frank Brandenburg reaches much the same conclusion in his analysis of Mexican legislators; see: The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 153.

41-Of course, the same phenomenon has been found elsewhere. formidable countervailing force.^2 But, to date, this poten

tial remains only partially realized. Civil service examina

tions are not widely used in Latin America, hence, most bu­

reaucratic positions are filled by presidential appointment.

Lach new president causes a virtually complete turnover in

personnel as the chief executive rewards his supporters.

The result is a comparatively loyal bureaucracy that the

president can rely upon to implement executive policy.

Pressure groups are not notably effective as counter

vailing institutions in Latin America. Firstly, they are

few in numbers.^3 Secondly, Latin American groups tend to

operate "defensively," i.e., to protect members from onerous

government decisions rather than to press their policy pre­

ferences upon government. Interest groups, then, do not

complete with or balance executive power. To the contrary,

^2xhis is a conclusion of my study of Mexico: John Conklin, An Analysis of the Impact of Interest Groups Upon Mexican Development (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, 1968). See also: Martin C. Needier, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change. (New York: Random House, 1968), p~! 31

^Kalman Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America in Herbert L. Matthews, ed., The United States and Latin America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-lJall, 1959), p.

44por example, see the Mexican Case: Robert Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Develop­ ment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) , p~] 363. 44 they seek to ally themselves with that power in order to gain favorable governmental treatment.

Latin America's political evolution, culture, insti­ tutional development, and practical problems are all support tive of presidential systems. Modelled after the United

States' presidential system, the Latin American executive has characteristically been a single individual elected directly or indirectly by the people with substantial powers derived from a constitution, which renders it substantially independent of legislative control. In fact, the constitu­ tions provide further evidence of the need for strong execu­ tive leadership in Latin America.

Formal Bases of Power

The constitutions of Latin America provide a formal- legal milieu which adds even more to the primacy of the president. They confer upon him powers typically entrusted to presidents in other countries. But, more importantly, most Latin American constitutions go considerably beyond these "usual" delegations of authority. In addition, the constitutions are filled with ambiguities and vagueness of language which provides an avenue for further expanding exec­ utive power. His "usual" duties include being head of the armed forces, chief of state, administrative head of the executive branch, charged with conducting foreign relations, empowered to initiate and veto legislation, and authorized 45 to fill a large number of appointive positions in the execu­ tive and judicial branches,.^

Concerning the "unusual" constitutional provisions, the typical Latin American president is constitutionally entrusted with opening and closing the first and last ses­ sions of Congress. A president can use this power to render the legislature impotent by refusing to convoke its first meeting. Such a move is not without precedence in Latin

America. Conversely, he can keep Congress in session inde£*- initely. Some executives also have considerable constitu­ tional authority over budgetary matters. In Haiti and Para­ guay, only the president can introduce revenue and appropria­ tions bills. In Haiti, the legislature cannot increase the president's budget. The Paraguayan executive has a signify icant power concerning all bills introduced by him. Specif* ically, such bills automatically become law if the legisla­ ture fails to dispose of them during the session at hand.

Finally, all of the Latin American presidents can veto leg­ islative acts, but the Haitian, Chilean, and Mexican execu­ tives have the power of item veto. This, of course, greatly

45xhis review of the constitutional powers of the Latin American presidents is based upon the following con­ stitutions: Argentina, 1857; Bolivia, 1967; Brazil, 1967; Chile, 1925; Colombia, 1886; Costa Rica, 1949; Cuba, 1940; Dominican Republic, 1966; Ecuador, 1967; El Salvador, 1962; Guatemala, 1965; Haiti, 1964; Honduras, 1965; Mexico, 1917; Nicaragua, 1950; Panama, 1946; Paraguay, 1967; Peru, 1933; Uruguay, 1967; and Venezuela, 1961. 46 strengthens the hand of a president in his relationship with the legislature.

While the constitutional powers of the president un­ der normal conditions are considerable, during periods of

"emergency," they are sweeping. Fifteen Latin American con­ stitutions include an estado de sitio or state of seige pro­ vision.1^ While formal rules for its implementation vary a little from country-to-country, the estado de sitio gives the president the power to declare martial law, suspend con­ stitutional guarantees, and assume dictatorial powers during periods of foreign threats or domestic crisis. In most cases, if congress is in session, the executive must ask the legislature to declare an estado de sitio. However, leg­ islative bodies in Latin America are frequently closed and when congress is adjourned, the president can declare a state of seige. When in session, congressional compliance 47 is the norm.

Vagueness characterizes the conditions under which an estado de sitio is declared. Consider Article 197 of the

Nicaraguan Constitution. According to it, the president can declare an estado de sitio when either a civil or international

The Mexican, Peruvian, Panamanian, Costa Rican, and Ecuadorean Constitutions do not include an estado de sitio c1ause. 47 For two recent examples, consider the behavior of the Chilean and Uruguayan legislatures in 1973, 47 war occurs, whenever there is a danger of either occurring, during times of public disaster, or "whenever due to any other circumstance it is required for the protection, peace, or security of the Nation or of its institutions or forms of government." Similarly, Article 52 of the Paraguayan Con­ stitution reads in part: "if any grave threat occurs ....the

President of the Republic will declare....a state of seige,"

Every Latin American constitution empowers the presi­ dent to suspend constitutional guarantees and to exercise decree powers. Although the suspension and decree provisions are technically distinct from an estado de sitio, they have much the same effect. Again, there is some variation from country-to-country, but the basic process is for the legis­ lature to declare an "extraordinary situation" and to author­ ize the president to govern by decree. When the legislature is adiourned, the president himself can declare the extra­ ordinary situation, and issue decrees having the force of law, although decrees having the force of law must usually be ratified later by the legislature. Most constitutions do not mention the substantive areas in which decree law may be used, other than to specify that decrees might be employed to suspend constitutional guarantees.

Perhaps the most innovative constitutional treatment of extraordinary situations is found in the Guatemalan Con­ stitution. It allows the president to take certain extra­ ordinary powers depending upon the gradation of disorder. 48

According to Article 153, "the Law on Public Order shall es­

tablish the measures to be taken, in accordance with the fol­

lowing gradation:

1. state of prevention 2. state of alarm 3. state of public disorder 4. state of seige 5. state of war

Hence, the Guatemalan President can assume sufficient power

to deal with the problem at hand. Other Latin American con­

stitutions simply distinguish between a president having

limited extraordinary power and complete extraordinary power.

The Constitutions of Latin America contribute sub­

stantially to the power of the presidency. This conclusion

is contrary to the frequent assertion that Latin American

constitutions are more aspirational than practical; i.e.,

that the democratic forms outlined in them reflect euphoric

rather than practical goals. Scholars refer to the provision

for separating power between three branches of government,

universal in Latin America, as a long range goal instead of A O a fact of governmental process. But, a review of the

See: J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitu­ tions: Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics, XXI (May, 1959), pp. 258-75. Concerning the executive, Mecham says, "Because of the well-founded belief that it is the executive which will be most prone to irresponsibility and be acquisi­ tive of power, the most numerous constitutional limitations are those imposed on the presidents. Despite all this... the executive overshadows the other two powers." The posi­ tion taken here is that the typical Latin American constitu­ tion increases the president's power vis-a-vis the legisla­ ture. executive's powers does not confirm this interpretation.

Clearly, the constitutions currently in force in Latin

America call for strong executives. True, they also call

for a separation of power among executive, legislative, and

iudicial branches; however, nothing like an equivalent divi­ sion of power is envisioned in the terms of the constitu­

tions. Every constitution in Latin America makes it possible

during times of legislative recess for a president to take, upon his own word, dictatorial powers. Constitutionally,

then, all Latin American systems are strong presidential sys­

tems. In fact, all are at a minimum strong presidential sys­

tems. In the Latin American context, the real issue concerns

iust how strong the president is in relation to the other

branches of government. In 1970, the executive was in con­

trol in thirteen countries, dominant in four, and strong in

three. Of course, there is some shifting within these cate­

gories. In the mid-1960's, Peru's executive system was strong

and Panama's was dominant. Some might regard the current

Venezuelan president as strong rather than dominant. Today

(1974) , Chile and Uruguay would be considered under Executive

Contro1.

Executive Control Executive Dominant Executive Strong

Mexico Venezuela Costa Rica

Ecuador Guatemala Chile

Honduras El Salvador Uruguay

Nicaragua Colombia 50

Executive Control Executive Dominant Executive Strong

Panama

Bolivia

Peru

Paraguay"

Argentina

Brazil

Chapter Summary

The focal point of Latin American government and politics is the office of the chief executive. In Latin

America, this translates into presidential government.

Generally speaking, no other governmental institution ri­ vals the president's power. It is not unusual for the president to dominate the rule-making and rule - adiudieating processes in addition to carrying out his traditional func­ tion of rule-application. The primacy of the presidency results from the tradition of omnipotent executive govern­ ment, the arrested development of other governmental insti­ tutions, the presence of urgent practical problems demand­ ing action or remedy, and a cultural context conducive to the growth of presidencialismo. His extensive formal-legal power is a reflection of these historical, political, and cu11ura 1 variab1es . CHAPTER 3

PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REQUIREMENTS

Studies of elite backgrounds provide another per­

spective for describing and analyzing political recruitment

patterns."'" Such data indicates trends in recruitment, mak­

ing it possible to retrace the sequence of change. More­

over, changes in recruitment patterns are likely to reflect

changes in the polity itself. For instance, the emergence

of new social classes or occupational groups as recruitment

founts may signal changes in the locus of political power.

Also, the social backgrounds of political leaders reflect

basic values in society. In most cases, persons with com­

paratively highly-valued characteristics tend to achieve 2 high political offices.

•^For examples of background studies, see: Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds. , World Revolutionary Elites : Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cam­ bridge : The MIT Press, 196 5); Donald Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New YorlTi Random House, 1954) ; Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage, 1960); Frederick W. Frey, Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965); and Frank Bonilla, The Failure of Elites (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1970). ~~ ' 2 Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, pp. 44-45.

51 52

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe formal- legal and so-called "informal" qualifications of the office of chief executive in Latin America. These "informal re­ quisites" in this chapter are the age, birthplace, education, 3 and civilian occupation. The formal-legal qualifications, those written into the Constitutions, will be described first.

Formal-Legal Qualifications

Executive recruitment in Latin America is subject to various constitutional qualifications. Some of the most outstanding ones, as seen in Table 3.1, are age qualifica­ tions, religious qualifications, special qualifications, and special disqualifications. Also, some qualifications not in the Table but mentioned in the text concern citizenship, res­ idency and property.

Age, Religious, and Other Requirements

All countries have minimum age requirements. But, there is a good deal of variation which will be discussed more fully later in the chapter. A number of constitutions have special religious qualifications. In ten countries, the president must be a layman. Argentina and Paraguay re­ quire that he profess a belief in or belong to the Roman

^Two other "informal requisites", social origins and military occupations, are described and analyzed in Chapter IV. 53

TABLE 3.1

CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis- Qualifications

Argentina 30 member annual income incumbent Roman 2,000 pesos or Catholic equivalent Church

Bolivia 35 layman fulfill mili­ incumbent and tary duties relatives and nominee of vice president a party minister of state active military personnel

Brazil 35

Chile 30 incumbent

Colombia 30 ex-president incumbent pres designate member of congress cabinet minis­ ter minister plen­ ipotentiary governor of department magistrate of superior court councilor of state attorney gen­ eral of nation 54

TABLE 3.1--Continued

CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis- Qualifications

Comptroller general of nation university professor (5 years) practitioner of a lib­ eral pro­ fession with a univers ity degree

Costa Rica 30 layman Literate incumbent and own property relatives worth vice president 500 colones or cabinet minister income of magistrate of 200 colones supreme court director of civil register director of an autonomous in­ stitution comptroller gen­ eral assistant comp­ troller general

Cuba 35 incumbent active military personnel

Dom Rep 30 active military personnel 55

Table 3.1 --Continued

CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis- Oua1if i c at ions

Ecuador 40 layman incumbent and relatives vice president minister of state state contractors or concession­ aires

El Salvador 30 layman honest and incumbent and learned relatives minister of state Active military personnel administrators of public funds until audit per­ sons in debt to state

Guatemala 35 layman incumbent and relatives vice president and relatives minister of state active military personnel head of coup d'etat

Haiti 40

Honduras 30 layman incumbent and relatives president of congres s cabinet members head of armed forces 56

TABLE 3.1--Continued

CONSTITUTIONAL OUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis- Qualifications

Honduras members of national (con'd) election council (all relatives of above)

Mexico 35 layman incumbent secretary of state cabinet member attorney general governor

Nicaragua 25 layman incumbent and relatives minister of state magistrate of court head of coup d'etat or mem- ber of an ille­ gal administra­ tion

Paraguay 40 profess possess moral two term incum­ Roman and intel­ bents Catholic lectual re­ faith quirements needed for office

Panama 35 incumbent

Peru 35 layman incumbent and relatives minister of state members of judi­ cial power active military personnel 57

TABLE 3.1--Continued

CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

Age Religious Special Special Qualifications Dis- Qualifications

Uruguay 35 incumbent

Venezuela 30 layman incumbent and relatives cabinet member governor secretary to pres ident Catholic Church. Concerning citizenship, all the nations require that the president be a native born citizen, or if born abroad, the offspring of native born parents. The

Nicaraguan Constitution specifies, however, that the presi­ dent be born in Nicaragua of a Nicaraguan mother or father.

In Mexico, to be President, an individual must be the "son of Mexican parents by birth." By implication, then, women are constitutionally barred from becoming president of the country. All twenty republics have a residency requirement.

In Mexico, the president must have resided in the country for a full year prior to election. According to the Peru­ vian Constitution, the president must have resided ten years continuously in the republic. In Nicaragua, the president must have had over five years residency in the country. In the remaining countries, residency is defined for the pres­ idents the same as for qualified voters. Argentina, along with Costa Rica, has a property and minimum income require­ ment.

Other Special Qualifications

The Salvadorean and Paraguayan Constitutions include moral and intellectual standards. In the same vein, the

President of Costa Rica must be able to read and write.

Only persons who have fulfilled their military duties and who have been nominated by a party or a coalition of parties can become president in Bolivia. The Colombian Constitution specifies that the president must have held one of several specific occupations.

Special Disqualifications

Some potential presidential aspirants are barred from office because of disqualifications. Incumbents and their relatives are disqualified in seventeen and nine countries, respectively. Ten constitutions have provisions barring some government officials from executive office un­ less they have resigned their post six to twelve months be­ fore the impending presidential election. In El Salvador, persons who have handled or administered public funds are disqualified until their accounts have been audited. De­ linquent debtors to the public treasure are also legally ex eluded from the presidency. Similarly, the Ecuadorean Con­ stitution disqualifies those who have contracts or conces­ sions with the State for the exploitation of the National wealth or the operation of public utilities. Not surpris­ ingly, nine countries have constitutional provisions affect ing military personnel.^ These disqualify anyone who has served actively in the armed forces for a year or six months prior to the next election. The constitutions of

Guatemala and Nicaragua disqualify leaders of coup d1etats,

The number is ten if the qualifications to become the president of Colombia are considered to exclude mili­ tary personnel. 60 revolutions, or other armed movements, from the chief execu­ tive office. In Nicaragua, this provision is extended to anyone who serves as minister of state or in a high ranking military position for a de facto government that interrupted a constitutional regime.

Informal Prerequisites

The social background characteristics treated in this section are age, birthplace, education, and civilian occupations. The ages of the presidents are simply de­ scribed by country. But birthplace, education, and civilian occupations are described and analyzed as being indicative of societal values and to show trends over time.

Age

As stated earlier, all countries have a minimum age requirement. They range from twenty-five years (one coun­ try) , to thirty years (eight countries), to thirty-five years (eight countries), to forty years (three countries).

Although there are slightly varied minimum ages at which a man might become president, none of the Latin American coun­ tries bars anyone forty years of age or over and there is no maximum or retirement age specified. On the whole, Table

3.2 indicates that the presidents of Latin America have come to power with some years to spare. Eighty-three percent of all presidents were at least forty when they first assumed the presidency, with the greatest number occurring from fo^ty* 61

TABLE 3.2

AGE OF LATIN AMERICAN EXECUTIVES UPON FIRST ACHIEVING OFFICE (BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Argentina 0 2 5 15 6 2 0 Bolivia 0 11 20 9 9 1 0 Brazi1 0 0 5 12 6 0 0 Chi le 0 3 14 20 7 1 0 Colombia 0 12 25 18 9 2 1 Costa Rica 1 12 22 11 5 2 0 Cuba 0 3 4 2 6 1 0 Dom Rep 0 7 8 6 2 0 0 Ecuador 0 4 10 7 3 0 0 El Salvador 0 1 10 5 1 0 0 Guatemala 0 3 8 6 8 0 0 Haiti 0 2 7 4 0 0 1 Honduras 1 6 5 3 2 0 0 Mexico 2 8 30 15 4 0 0 Nicaragua 0 3 8 5 3 1 0 Panama 0 2 11 14 5 2 0 Paraguay- 0 2 7 3 1 0 0 Peru 2 10 23 22 6 4 0 Uruguay 0 8 12 8 10 1 0 Venezuela 0 3 8 4 2 1 _0

Total 6 102 242 189 95 18 2 Percentage .9% 15,6% 37.0% 28.9% 14.5% 2.8% .3 62 years (37%) to fifty years (29%),' Another 16% and 15% were in their thirties and sixties, respectively. Only a handful of men in their twenties have achieved the chief executive office. The same is true for individuals in their seventies and eighties.

Birthplace

A great majority of the presidents of Latin America were born in urban settings. Table 3.3 shows that 70% were born in towns and cities of over 10,000 population, and 36% of these in cities of over 50,000. In addition, 11% and 8% of the executives were born in towns of 5,000 to 10,000 and

2,000 to 5,000, respectively. Hence, almost 90% of all

Latin American presidents originated in what are usually de­ fined as urban settings.^ In two countries, Argentina and

Chile, all of the presidents have begun life as urban dwellers (See Table 3.3). Of the twenty republics, only

Guatemala and Haiti have had as many as one-fourth of their executives born in rural areas. Table 3.4 shows the percent age of presidents born in urban settings as compared to the percentage of population living in urban areas. The

^There is no universally accepted criteria for dis­ tinguishing between rural and urban populations. However, many countries use a figure of around 2,000 for such pur­ poses. Cuba and Mexico, for example, use 2,000 populations while the United States and Argentina use 2,500, Colombia counts all administrative centers with more than 1,500 inhabitants as urban. 63

TABLE 3.3

BIRTHPLACE OF LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS (BY SIZE)a

under^ 2,000 5 ,000 10 ,000 over 2,000 to to to 50 ,000 5,000 10 ,000 50 ,000 # % tt 0,0 It '0 tt "00. It 0.0

Argentina 0 0 3 11 2 1 10 36 13 46 Bolivia 4 8 2 4 3 6 22 46 17 36 Brazil 3 14 1 5 8 36 4 18 6 27 Chile 0 0 6 13 0 0 11 25 28 62 Colombia 11 17 12 18 5 7 20 30 19 28 Costa Rica 1 2 • 1 2 13 24 38 72 0 0 Cuba 1 7 3 13 3 20 4 27 5 33 Dom Rep 4 17 2 13 3 13 8 35 5 22 Ecuador 2 4 3 4 5 11 8 17 29 64 El Salvador 3 15 5 25 1 5 6 30 5 25 Guatemala 7 35 2 10 0 0 3 15 8 40 Haiti 9 26 1 3 2 6 17 50 5 15 Honduras 3 14 2 10 4 19 12 57 0 0 Mexi co 6 10 9 15 9 15 19 33 16 27 N i caragua 3 9 2 6 4 12 10 30 14 43 Panama 2 6 0 0 3 9 8 23 21 62 Paraguay 2 11 1 6 0 0 7 39 8 44 Peru 9 15 7 12 4 7 17 28 23 38 Uruguay 1 3 2 6 3 8 9 26 20 57 Venezuela 4 17 1 4 5 21 4 17 10 41

Total 75 11% 66 8% 77 11% 237 34% 252 36%

aThe size of the town in which the presidents were born was taken from: American Geographical Society of New York, Map of Hispanic America: Complete Set for South America and Central America (New York: American Geographical Society of New York, 19 20) ; except for Mexico which is based upon the census of 1900; Ministerio de Fomento, Censo General de la Republica Mexicana (Mexico: Secretaria de Fomento, 1901- 1906).

^The number of presidents born in towns with the population under 2,000, etc., is in the column headed by the symbol //. The number translated into percentage is in the column headed by the symbol %. 64

TABLE 3.4

PERCENTAGE OF URBAN DWELLERS AND URBAN BORN EXECUTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

population8 presidents urban urban

Argentina 62 100 Bolivia 34 92 Brazil 36 86 Chile 60 100 Colombia 36 84 Costa Rica 33 98 Cub a 55 93 Dom Rep 24 83 Ecuador 28 96 El Salvador 36 85 Guatemala 25 65 Haiti 12 74 Honduras 29 86 Mexico 43 90 Nicaragua 35 91 Panama 36 94 Paraguay 35 89 Peru 36 85 Uruguay 82 100 Venezuela 54 78

Mean 401 89

aThe percentage of urban population for all the countries is around 1950, except for Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay which is taken from 1960. Sources: Harold E. Davis, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press" 19 5 8J , p. 40. difference between the means (49%) reflects the "over- representation" o L" urban dwellers in executive recruitment.

A high proportion of presidents are born in national

and state capitals. Table 3.5 shows that at least half of the presidents in four countries (Chile, Honduras, Panama,

and Uruguay) were born in national capitals. A comparison of columns one and two in Table 3.5 shows the extent to which national capitals have produced executives disproportionate to their percentage of the population. Every national capi­ tal except Havana, Cuba, has produced a greater percent of presidents than its population size would warrant given ran­ dom chance. The average capital produced 34% of its country's executives while the average capital's population is only 8% of its country's population. State capitals have been even more fecund. The mean for the state capitals of a country producing presidents is 36%. Such capitals produced over half of the executives in three countries (Dominican Repub­

lic, Ecuador, and Nicaragua). Together, national and state capitals have supplied 70% of Latin America's executives.

In eighteen countries, they have produced at least half of the presidents.^

The upper and middle classes which have spawned most

7 of Latin America's executives are basically urban peoples.

^Brazil and Guatemala are the only exceptions. n See Chapter III for a discussion of class and execu­ tive recruitment. 66

TABLE 3.5

PERCENTAGE OF LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS BORN IN NATIONAL AND STATE CAPITALS

Population ina Presidents in Presidents in Nat'l Capital Nat'l Capital State Capital Total

Argent ina 20 20 41 70 Bolivia 4 33 46 79 Brazil 5 14 14 28 Chile 10 51 36 87 Colomb ia 3 21 31 52 Costa Rica 8 47 42 89 Cuba 13 13 40 53 Dom Rer>k 9 21 58 79 Ecuador 6 27 58 85 El Salvador 5 25 44 69 Guatemala 4 31 15 46 Haiti0 4 15 44 59 Honduras 6 50 29 79 Mexico 5 19 32 51 Nicaragua 6 18 61 79 Panama 16 62 24 86 Paraguay- 10 3 3 22 55 . Peru 4 25 45 70 Uruguay 27 57 11 68 Vene zuela 3 33 23 56

Mean 81 31 % 36% 67%

aThe percentage of the total population living in a national capital around 1920 is taken from: W. II. Koebel, ed., Anglo-South American Handbook Including Central America, Mexico" and Cuba for 1922 (London: Federation of British In- dustries, 1922}.

^The percentage of the Dominican population living in the national capital is for 1950.

cThe percentage of the Haitian population living in the national capital is for 1950. The upper class consists of the old landed aristocracy and the new urban moneyed class -- industrialists, bankers, and entrepreneurs. Of course, this latter group is by defini­ tion urban, but the old landed aristocracy is also very urban in its life style. Although it was historically sus­ tained by the hacienda, the hacendado and his progeny often were, and are, urban dwellers. They spend much of their time living in the capital cities of Latin America and Europe.

Frequently, they take advantage of certain economic oppor­ tunities and serve as bank president or as director of a railroad or as member of a corporation board. Sometimes, members of the landed aristocracy become internationally known experts on law, philosophy, or literature. As a group, they move in cultured circles. Of course, all of these activi­ ties are based upon living in urban areas where the econom­ ic, cultural, and intellectual outlets are present. Per­ haps the most telling evidence of the basic orientation of the landed aristocracy is the phenomenon of the absentee owner which has longstanding and widespread application in

Latin America. This, of course, is the owner who operates his estate from Buenos Aires or Mexico City or Paris or

London through the reports of an overseer. In the words of two students of agrarian structure in Latin America: "Char­ acteristically the larger farm owners have financial and commercial activities in the large cities, political re­ sponsibilities in the capital, and professional or cultural 68 interests far removed from the land. Agriculture, as such, is often only of secondary interest to them. Typically, O they maintain residence in the city or even abroad,"

The Latin American middle class is also basically an urban group. Occupationally, many of its members are doc­ tors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, merchants, government officials, small industrialists, army officers, and techni­ cians, but only in a few scattered places does it include rural occupational groups such as small landowners. Indeed, the rural areas of Latin America are, for the most part, without a middle class. Since the colonization almost all rural dwellers have been slaves, farm laborers, or mini - fundistas living day-to-day on the margin of life. In ad­ dition, the high educational level associated with executive recruitment also works against rural dwellers.^ Even today, educational facilities in rural areas are very limited, but in the years prior to 1930 (when the presidents of Latin

America were of school age), they were practically unknown.

The high incidence of urban born executives also re­ flects a long-standing value put upon the city and city life.

When the European conquistadores arrived in the New World,

O Solon L. Barraclough and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries" Agrarian Prob­ lems and Peasant Movements in Latin America,ed.', p.ondolfo Stavenhagen'(New York':' Doubleday Co.", Inc.) , p. 5 2. g See below for more extensive discussion. they immediately set about mapping great cities with enor­ mous public buildings and expansive boulevards. They created replicas of upper class urban life in Europe with its leisure, cultural milieu, material comforts, and social swirl. On the other hand, they denigrated manual labor such as tilling the soil. This point of view is clearly depicted in Domingo Sarmiento's classic study of the gaucho, Facundo.

Sarmiento contrasts the brutal, barbaric, and authoritarian rural life with that of the urban dweller who is cultured, educated, cosmopolitan, and democratic. As president,

Sarmiento emphasized the importance of rural education as its only road to salvation. More recently, the determination of the ruling elite of Mexico to make Mexico City, "the most beautiful capital in the world," reflects the same tradi­ tion. Too, the high land values and desirability of living at the center of the city is indicative of this norm.

Locale of birth is strongly related to executive re­ cruitment. That is, a disproportionate percentage of Latin

American executives were born in urban settings. Evidently, this is, in part, due to the fact that the cluster of char­ acteristics in class, education, and employment that charac­ terize most Latin American executives are foreign to the rural areas of Latin America. Moreover, the traditional value placed on the city and the city way-of-life also works against the recruitment of rural dwellers. In part, the backgrounds of individuals in high political positions 70 reflect the basic values of a society. In Latin America, there has always been high value placed upon the city as compared to the countryside.

Education

Historically, the presidents have been among the most highly educated occupational groups in Latin America. One- half have been university graduates, (See bottom row of

Table 3.6) Another 8% studied under tutors or attended col­ lege, 12% graduated from military college, and 28% have had a secondary or primary education. Only 2% of the Latin

American chief executives have had no formal education. A single country, Haiti, accounts for over half of this last group. These figures are particularly significant in the

Latin American context where educational opportunities have been, and are, severely limited.

Although educational data for the period prior to

1930 (the period when the men under consideration here were of school age) is very incomplete, it does suggest the exclusive nature of Latin American educational systems. For instance, in Chile in 1842, only fifty primary schools existed and the primary school enrollment of 3,000 was drawn 10 from a primary school-age pool of over 200,000. Roughly, l9d of all Chilean children had a chance to receive a primary

10 Luis Galdames,- History of-Chile (Austin: Univer­ sity of Texas Press, 1941) ,' pV '277.' 71

TABLE 3.6

FORMAL EDUCATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF LATIN AMERICA (BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

ca ct ca cu s P mc n

Argentina 17 0 1 0 2 0 11 0 Bolivia 17 1 2 0 2 1 8 1 Brazi1 16 2 0 0 1 1 6 0 Chile 31 0 1 0 1 1 6 0 Colombia 42 1 8 1 8 3 2 0 Costa Rica 26 1 5 19 0 0 0 0 Cuba 12 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 Dom Rep 5 0 7 8 2 3 0 0 Ecuador 19 1 3 5 2 0 3 1 El Salvador 16 0 0 4 6 0 6 0 Guatemala 17 0 1 2 1 0 7 0 II a i t i 6 0 1 0 0 1 4 8 Honduras 16 0 1 4 1 2 3 0 Mexico 21 1 2 8 10 2 8 i Nicaragua 21 0 3 7 3 1 1 0 Panama 19 1 2 1 8 1 1 0 Paraguay 16 0 0 11 1 1 3 0 Peru 16 3 0 22 18 5 8 1 Uruguay 11 0 3 4 6 2 4 0 Venezuela 9 0 1 0 2 0 4 2

Total Number 353 11 42 96 80 24 85 14 Percentage 50 % 2% 6% 14% 11% 3% 12% V

Explanation: the number in each column indicates the total number of presidents in each category from Inde­ pendence to 1970. The letter symbols at the head of each column refer to: c = college graduate, ct = tutorial educa­ tion (equivalent to college), ca = attended college, cu = some formal education but level unknown, s = secondary edu­ cation, p = primary education, mc = military college, and n = no formal education. The percentages in the bottom row refer only to those executives whose educational level is known. 72 education. As late as 1872 in Brazil, only 6% of the pri­ mary school age population attended school, and by 1890, their relative numbers had increased to only 7%,^ In

Mexico at the turn of the nineteenth century, roughly 101 1 2 of the children of primary school age were in school.

Assuming that these early statistics are illustrative of prevailing conditions throughout the continent, it is clear that a primary school education was available to compara­ tively few individuals. More recent data indicates that at­ tendance in primary school remains the preserve of a minor­ ity. As late as 1950, only 44% of all Latin American chil- 13 dren of primary school age entered school. More impor­ tantly, only 8% of those entering completed school at this 14 level. By contrast, Table 3.6 shows that almost all presidents (98%) have had at least primary training.

Of course, attendance in a secondary school is a sign of even much greater exclusivity. Again, data for the years prior to World War II are sketchy. A survey in Mexico,

^UNESCO, World Illiteracy at Mid-Century (Switzer­ land: UNESCO, 1957) , p. 170. ~ 1 ? Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum Press , 1965), p . 198. 13' 'Oscar Vera, "The Educational Situation and Re­ quirements in Latin America," in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pT 96.

^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 96. however, revealed that only about 5% of the school age popu­ lation between the years 1900 and 1930 had had formal edu- 1 ^ cational training beyond the primary level. 0 This figure would seem to reflect a hemispheric pattern. As late as

1955, only 10% of the secondary school age population of 16 Latin America was attending classes. Clearly, even today access to a secondary education is available to only a few.

In 1950, II of the population between the ages of fifteen 17 and nineteen was engaged in higher education. Assuming a normal attrition rate, considerably less than 1% could be expected to earn a college degree. On the other hand, at least 50% of all presidents since the Wars of Independence have had a college degree. Figure 3.1 shows the incidence of college and military college trained presidents from Inde­ pendence to 1970. It shows that a college education has always been an important characteristic of executives and that the percentage of such presidents slowly increased from

-^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 202. The survey cited by Cline was talcen In 1950 and included only those Mexicans over twenty-five years of age.

•^Aldo Solari, "Secondary Education and the Develop­ ment of Elites," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press , 1967J , p. 459. ~~

l^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 97. 74

I nd. - 184 S- ]8 5 5 - 1945- 1845 1870 1920 1970

COLLEGn

MILITARY COLLEGE

College includes college graduates, those who at­ tended college, and individuals who had the equiva­ lent of a college education with tutors.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Presidents College and Military College Trained Over Six Twenty-Five Year Periods Independence to 1945. For the period 1945-1970, their rela­ tive numbers declined slightly. Until the period 1920-1945, the percentage o£ executives trained in military schools fluctuated between 3%and 10%. However, since 1920, they have become an increasingly important institution in the training

and socialization of future presidents. For the period

1895-1920, only 3% of them were educated in a military academy. This figure rose to 17% for the period 1920-1945, and to 26% in the twenty-five years since World War II.

This increase is a result of either increased enrollments in

Latin American military schools or an increase in the inci­ dence of soldier-presidents. Probably both factors help ex­ plain it. More military personnel probably attend military

academies in the contemporary era than was the case pre­ viously. Too, the incidence of professional soldier- 1 ft presidents has increased since 1945.

The comparatively high levels of formal education achieved by Latin American presidents point to the highly selective nature of the recruitment process. Statisticallyf a secondary education can be viewed as an "informal" quali­ fication for becoming president. Yet, as late as 1950, only 2% of the appropriate age group had completed this level 19 of schooling. In a country such as Honduras, this means

18Discussed more fully later in the chapter.

•^Vera, "The Educational Situation and Requirements in Latin America," p. 97. that 2,450,000 of some 2,500,000 citizens are effectively excluded from any reasonable chance of sitting in the presi­ dential office. Hence, even today, individuals with this

"informal" requisite are unusual. Given the post-World

War II emphasis upon education that has been almost uni­ versal in Latin America, it is reasonable to assume that educational opportunities were even more limited between

1790 and 1930, the years in which the presidents of Latin

America were of school age.

Civilian Occupations

About half of the Latin American executives come from civilian occupations and half from the military. This section describes those from the civilian group. Persons with civilian occupational backgrounds account for 52% of

Latin America's chief executives. In Table 3.7, the occu­ pations of the civilian presidents are listed by country.

A majority of these executives (65%) were public men, that is, leaders of parties or holders of an elective office.

Considerable numbers (34%) had careers as government offi­ cials, particularly as jurists and diplomats. Lawyers

constituted the largest "private" occupational category (38%) followed by educators (20%), businessmen (14%), journalists

(10%), physicians (8%), landowners (6%), authors (5%), en­ gineers (3%), and architects and clergymen (less than 1%).

Most of the civilian presidents, then, have risen from pro­ fessional occupations. 77

TABLE 3.7

CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES (BY COUNTRY)

la pin g j e a p b h i z x

Argent ina 74 84 21 16 21 11 5 5 0 0 0 0 Bolivia 52 5 7 43 0 30 0 5 24 0 0 0 0 Bra zi1 58 89 21 11 5 0 5 0 10 0 0 0 Ch i 1 e 54 84 54 5 27 3 5 11 5 5 0 0 Colombia 51 78 4 0 32 15 20 29 9 5 2 0 0 Costa Rica 39 91 15 4 19 0 10 19 11 2 0 0 Cuba 40 46 33 13 0 13 13 13 0 13 0 0 Dom Rep 21 42 21 11 11 21 0 25 5 0 0 11 Ecuador 58 85 10 5 20 5 8 13 10 3 0 0 El Salvador 27 65 19 0 8 0 15 8 15 4 0 4 Guatemala 44 49 28 0 16 11 0 11 0 0 0 0 Haiti 44 78 56 11 33 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 Honduras 27 86 27 5 9 9 14 9 0 0 0 0 Mexico 55 23 61 3 23 0 3 3 6 3 0 0 Nicaragua 21 58 26 37 11 0 18 18 13 0 0 0 Panama 21 24 50 6 21 0 15 35 3 10 0 0 Paraguay 40 69 35 16 32 4 8 0 0 0 4 0 Peru 33 56 30 15 33 0 4 3 3 11 4 4 4 Uruguay 12 56 33 21 15 0 3 9 0 3 0 0 Vene zuela 40 66 56 11 22 15 11 6 0 0 0 0

Total 40% 6 5% 33% 10% 20% 5% 8% 14% 6% 3% .4% .8

aThe letters heading the colomns represent the fol­ lowing occupations: 1 = lawyer, pm = public man, g = government official, j = journalist, e = educator, a = author, p = physician, b = businessman, h = landowner, i = engineer, z = architect, and x = clergyman. 78

This finding generally concurs with occupational

background studies of political elites elsewhere in the

world. In his study of the occupations of the United States

presidents, vice-presidents, and cabinet members between

1877 and 1934, Donald Matthews found that fully 70% were ? f) trained as lawyers. Similarly, he found that 44% of

those British Cabinet members between 1918 and 1935 were 21 professionals. Maxwell Knight's study of backgrounds of

the members of the German executive shows that over half of

those serving in Germany's cabinets between 1890 and 1945 2 2 were from the professions. Political elites elsewhere

frequently have extensive experience with political and/or

governmental occupations. For example, in Germany, 53% of

the members of the German cabinets between 1890 and 1945 2 3 rose to power through the civil service. Studies of the

United States Senate reveal that the "average" Senator had devoted about ten years to governmental and political office- 2 4 holding prior to arriving in the Senate.

^Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Poli­ tical Decision-Makers, p. 30. ? 1 Matthews, The Social Background of Political Deci s ion-Makers , p. 44. " ~~

2 2 Maxwell Knight, The German Executive (Stanford: Stanford University Press) , 1937 , p~^ 2 3 Knight, The German Executive,p. 33,

^Donald R. Matthews, United States Senators and Their World, p. 52. 79

The occupational backgrounds of Latin American execu­ tives seem to be distinctive in at least two ways. First, the high incidence of individuals with military backgrounds ? s would seem to be peculiar to Latin America. While this

"pattern" seems to be prevalent .in other Third World areas , it generally has not occurred in countries that have been politically independent for an extensive period of time.

Secondly, Latin America is notable for the variety of pro­ fessional occupations characteristic of its chief executives.

Along with a preponderance of lawyers, the Latin American executives include sizeable numbers of educators, journal­ ists, physicians, and even authors.

Chapter Summary

The background characteristics of the Latin American presidents considered in this chapter suggest the highly selective nature of the executive recruitment process. Most were born in an urban area. Almost all of them went to school and had considerable formal training. A sizeable majority became professional men. Finally, between the ages of 40 and 60, the "average" executive became president.

The "typical" president, then, differs greatly from the

"typical" Latin American citizen. Indeed, the impact of

"informal" requisites is even greater if social origins and military occupations are also considered.

2^See Chapter 4 for a discussion of executives with military backgrounds. CHAPTER 4

PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT: SOCIAL CLASS AND MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

Chapter 4 concerns the class origins of the Latin

American presidents and the influence of soldier-presidents upon executive recruitment. The class origins and military occupations of Latin American executives take on particular significance because class stratification and militarism have long been salient features of Latin American political life. The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to describe and analyze changing patterns in the class backgrounds of the Latin American presidents and to place such change pat­ terns in societal context, and (2) to describe and explain the high incidence of soldier-presidents in Latin America and to place militarism in political context.

Social Class

The Latin American republics are typically charac­ terized as always having had stratified social structures with very little opportunity for upward mobility. The colonizers of Latin America instituted a kighly stratified societies which still exist to some degree to this day.

Logically, this stratification would be found in other areas as well, particularly in the political and executive recruit­ ment system. This would certainly be the case in those

80 81 societies acutely aware of class standings and emphasizing the value of upper class status. They would be likely to exhibit a preference for upper class individuals to fill the highest political office in the land. In the words of Asher

N. Christensen:

The colonizers of Latin America developed a highly stratified society having some feudal aspects de­ rived from the homelands ....The Wars of Independ­ ence did little to change this basic social pattern, and it changed very little during the nineteenth century. Even in the mid-twentieth century its remnants are visible to some degree in all the na­ tions.... Furthermore , the system has fed upon itself. Wealth, prestige, and political power have been con­ centrated in a small ruling class, which has either opposed basic social and economic changes, or grud­ gingly assented to them under pressure. Class structure is breaking down in Latin America today and social mobility is increasing.. ..but the old structure persists with enough strength to retard these transformations and in some countries vir­ tually to prevent them.^

To discover how class structure in Latin America has evolved, it shall be viewed over time. Latin America was a highly stratified colony at the outset with the upper classes enioying special priviledge and control in every respect.

Whether or not this has changed significantly can be seen in a trend analysis drawn from Independence to the present.

1-Asher N. Christensen, "A Changing Society and Economy," in Harold E. Davis, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press , 19 5 8), pp. 53- 54. Social Class: Trend Analysis

Just as there are differences among countries and socio-racial categories, it is reasonable to assume that there are differences in class origin over time. It is commonly argued, as in the quote cited previously, that throughout the nineteenth century, all aspects of life, social economic, political, religious, were dominated by the so-called "oligarchy" headed by the upper classes. This oligarchy is alleged to have monopolized the political sys­ tem and to have resisted any changes in the social struc­ ture including measures that might generate socio-political mobility. In the twentieth century, the political position of the upper class is said to have declined while that of the middle class has risen to a point of dominance. If these assertions are correct, they should be reflected in executive recruitment. Specifically, there should be a preponderence of upper class executives throughout the nineteenth century and increasingly greater numbers of middle class born presi­ dents in the twentieth. Concerning the middle class by it­ self, we would expect to find the greater number of them in the twentieth rather than the nineteenth century.

The class origins of the executives of Latin America over six twenty-five year periods is diagrammed .in Figure

4.1. By and large, it confirms the line of analysis outlined above. It shows that in the period from Independence to

1845, almost 70% of all the presidents were from the upper 83

1945- Ind. - 1 845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945 1970 1845 1870 1895 1920

701 UPPER CLASS

604

504

401 MIDDLE CLASS

>04

204

LOWER CLASS 104

04

Figure 4.1: Class Origins of£ the Presidents ofor Latin Ainerica Over Twenty-Five Year Periods (By Percentage) classes. Their relative numbers declined to about half of

all executives over the following fifty years, and then rose

to over 60% for the period from 1895 to 1920. The current

decline of individuals born in the upper class began in the

period 1920-1945 when their relative numbers dropped to 51%.

Their numbers have fallen even more precipitously to 34% of

all presidents since 1945. The recruitment of individuals

originating in the middle class follows a pattern almost juxtaposed from that of the upper class. The recruitment

pattern for executives born in the lower classes is remark­

ably consistent. Their relative numbers hovered around 10% from Independence to the late 1800's. Since that time,

they have declined slowly until the period 1945-1970, when

only 5% of the executives originated in this class.

The incidence of executives from the upper classes

has declined continuously since Independence, with the ex­

ception of the period 1895-1920, when their relative numbers

increased considerably. Similarly, executive recruitment

from among the middle sectors has consistently increased

except for the years 1895-1920, which, from this perspective,

might be regarded as a "deviant" historical period. What­

ever, since that time, the increase of executives from the

middle class has been notable with a sizeable majority of

all presidents emanating from that sector since 1945. 85

The decline of the upper class presidents occurring concurrently with, and exactly opposite to, the increase in the middle class presidents is shown in Figure 4.1. To ex­ plain this phenomenon, social class structure relating to political life will be examined in more detail.

Social Class: Theoretical Considerations

Recently, Martin Needier and John Johnson have pro­ posed two theories relating class structure to political life in the Latin American republics. Martin Needier has argued that class structure influenced by socio-racial char­ acteristics relates to political life. John Johnson main­ tains that the "emergence of the middle sectors" has had the most profound effect upon class structure which, in turn, affects political life and executive recruitment. In the following section, the Needier and Johnson theories are utilized as organizational and theoretical underpinnings for the discussion of the impact of class variables on executive recruitment.

Socio-Racial Theory

Needier makes no explicit ranking of countries in terms of class stratification as such, but rather, in terms

? Martin C. Needier, Political Development in Latin Amerlca (New York: Random House, 1968) , pp. 98-105; and John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford Uni­ versity Press , ITF58J . of socio-racial types, four categories in number:

European Mulatto Mestizo Indian

Argentina Brazil Chile Bolivia Costa Rica Cuba Colombia Ecuador Uruguay Dom Rep El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Panama Nicaragua Peru Venezuela Paraguay

He argues that the socio-racial type of a country can serve as an independent variable "explaining" the distinctive polit' ical characteristics found among the countries.

The socio-racial type that has the least amount of stratification would be the most "open" and would have the largest amount of diversity in the social backgrounds of the executives. The socio-racial type that has the largest amount of stratification would be the least "open" and would evidence lesser diversity in executive social back­ ground, Using this premise, the four types would fall into this order going from most to least "open": (1) European,

(2) Mulatto, (3) Mestizo, and (4) Indian.

Interpreting data concerning social class origins of the presidents and socio-racial groups that is shown in

Table 4.1, it is found that Needler's theory is neither en­ tirely borne out nor repudiated. Table 4.2, summarized be­ low, shows the total percentage of presidents from each of the socio-racial categories. 87

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

European 2% 42% 561 Mulatto 122% 50% 38% Mesti zo 5% 32% 63% Indi an 9 % 36% 5 5%

Total 39% 54%

European Countries. Needier notes that European

countries do not have a large culturally distinct group that must be integrated into the political system and, therefore,

they are not stratified along ethnic lines. They are, in­ stead, oriented toward egalitarianism and mass participa­

tion. Me suggests that since class lines are less rigid, the people "possess the basic skills requisite for partici- 3 pation in democratic politics." Social deference and hier­

archy do not involve the deep divisions found in other types of Latin American countries. Looking at the percentages for

the European countries, which should show the greatest amount of diversity, it is interesting to note that 56% of the presidents come from the upper class, 42% from the middle,

and only 2% from the lower class. This suggests less "open­ ness" in the European countries than anticipated. One rea­ son for the relatively high incidence of upper class presi­ dents might be the ability of this class to almost completely

dominate their respective political systems throughout most of the nineteenth century. Moreover, in Argentina and Costa

•^Needier, Political Development in Latin America, p. 99. 88

TABLE 4.1

CLASS ORIGINS OF PRESIDENTS OF LATIN AMERICA BY COUNTRY AND SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE (NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Cla: 0, 0, 0, It 0 # "0 It "0

European Argentina 0 0 9 4 5 11 55 Costa Rica 0 0 12 46 14 54 Uruguay 1 5 7 35 12 60

Total 1 2 28 42 37 56

Mulatto Brazil 0 0 14 64 8 36 Cuba 1 6 11 61 6 33 Dom Pep 4 21 10 53 5 26 Haiti 5 36 5 36 4 28 Panama 0 0 10 37 17 63 Venezuela 4 24 8 47 5 29

Total 14 12 58 50 45 38

Mestizo Chi le 0 0 15 44 19 56 Colomb ia 6 11 11 21 36 68 El Salvador 1 8 5 38 7 54 Honduras 1 7 5 33 9 60 Nicaragua 0 0 7 26 20 74 Paraguay- 0 0 7 44 9 56

Total 8 5 50 32 100 63

Indian Bolivia 5 18 9 32 14 50 Ecuador 2 5 9 23 28 72 Guatemala 1 6 9 53 7 41 Mexico 4 13 20 63 8 24 Peru 2 5 8 21 28 74

Total 14 9 55 36 85 55

Total 37 7 191 39 267 54 Rica, the upper class was able to maintain and transfer power along relatively peaceful and constitutional lines.

The fluidity in the European context has tended to favor middle class elements also, which produced a high per­ centage of presidents. A reason for this might be the changes that occurred around World War I when political rights, particularly suffrage, were extended to the masses.

Middle class groups led the movement for these reforms and were quick to capitalize upon them. The Europeans have been the least hospitable to lower class individuals achieving the executive office. One possible explanation is that the unstable conditions that seem to be related to the incidence of presidents of lower class origins in other Latin American countries were not present in the European countries, except for one instance in Uruguay. Prior to the turn of the cen­ tury, Uruguay was characterized by instability and militar­ ism and that is when a lower class executive was in office.

Mulatto Countries. Politics in Mulatto countries tend to be "more turbulent, personalist, and violent than in the other Latin American countries..." but the political systems are relatively "open" because the upper class is less entrenched, the social structure less rigid, class divisions are less deep, and there is greater opportunity for verti­ cal mobility. The office of the chief executive in Mulatto countries has clearly been more open to individuals born in lower and middle class surroundings than it has in European, Mestizo, or Indian countries. The Mulatto republics rank first in the incidence of middle and lower class presidents, and last in the incidence of upper class executives. The class patterns of presidential recruitment in Mulatto coun­ tries depart sharply from those of the rest of Latin America, as the distance between this group and the three other groups under consideration is comparatively wide. This relative diversity would seem to be explained by the factors outlined by Needier; i.e., the absence of an entrenched upper class, a flexible social structure, and the opportunity for verti­ cal mobility. Moreover, the violence and turbulence charac­ teristic of Mulatto politics implies an inability of elites to institutionalize succession patterns. As a result, norms favoring adherence to constitutional practice, which were successfully utilized by the upper classes of many European,

Mestizo, and Indian countries to maintain control, never flourished in Mulatto contexts. Freed of these restraints, the opportunities for individuals of any class outside the governing elite to seize power increased. This helps ex­ plain the high incidence of lower class presidents in Mulatto countries. Significantly, such presidents have risen to power in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Cuba, the Mulatto countries which have had turbulent, violent histories. On the other hand, Brazil and Panama, the two comparatively stable Mulatto countries have had no presi­ dents of lower class origin. Within the Mulatto groups Brazil and Panama are, to varying degrees, special cases.

Over the long history of the Brazilian Empire, an entrenched political elite did develop. However, by the time of the passing of the Empire, incipient middle class forces were already integrated into the political system and a move to­ ward middle class control was underway.^ The high percentage of Brazilian presidents of middle class origin reflects this integration. In Panama, political events have been greatly influenced by the overwhelming presence of the

United States in its internal affairs. Generally, the United

States has interceded to the advantage of the status quo which has strengthened the political position of the Pana­ manian socio-economic elite. Hence, Panama has a strikingly higher incidence of executives of upper class origins than is the case for the remaining Mulatto states.

Where lower class Mulattos have assumed the presi­ dency, it has usually been through the military. Of the fourteen lower class presidents , only one xvas a civilian.

Hence, the military would seem to provide a particularly influential institution for mobility from the lower classes in Mulatto states.

In terms of middle class access to the executive, the Mulatto and European groups are similar; i.e., both are

^On this point see: Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative Political Study .(New York: The Macmillan Company , 1971) , pp. 96-98. 92 relatively "open" in the Latin American context. However, their respective recruitment patterns are very different when measured by the incidence of upper and lower class presidents. In Mulatto countries, the number of lower and middle class presidents is considerable, while the number of upper class presidents is relatively small. in European countries, the reverse is true. In a word, executive re­ cruitment in the Mulatto states is quantitatively and quali­ tatively more eclectic while any opportunity for political mobility among the European countries has been largely limited to middle class elements. The lack of an ongoing political elite in Mulatto states and the presence of such an elite in European states helps explain these different recruitment patterns.

Mestizo Countries. Political life in Mestizo coun­ tries is dominated by traditional Liberal and Conservative parties and characterized by limited popular participation.^

The political organization and the rules of the game are defined to the advantage of the upper classes who, his­ torically, have been able to dominate executive recruitment patterns. Through the two-party mechanism, socio-economic elites were able to generate a tradition of political

•'Needier cites the Chilean and Salvadorean party systems as exceptional among the Mestizo countries. Chile's two-party system broke down under the pressure of twentieth century forces and El Salvador never developed a strong party system. Needier, Political Development in Latin America, p. 48. 93 leadership and inculcate norms supportive of such a tradi­ tion. Indeed, in Colombia, such norms have been formalized in the Constitution of 1886 which disqualifies from the pres idential office anyone who has not held an important politi­ cal post or earned a university degree. Of course, in 1886, this effectively disqualified almost everyone outside of the upper class from achieving the chief executive. Over three-fifths of the presidents of these countries were born in the upper class and a few in the lower class. The rela­ tive prevalence of upper class individuals in the executive recruitment process would seem to be related to the two- party systems that currently operate in Colombia, Honduras,

Nicaragua, and Paraguay, and which operated in Chile through out most of the nineteenth century. Historically, through the party apparatus, the upper classes in these countries were able to maintain their position of political dominance.

This was accomplished by monopolizing party leadership roles and by the incorporation of the masses into the folds of the party system. As such, the parties became multi-class asso­ ciations dominated by the upper class. Within this system, political conflict was defined in non-class terms and poten­ tial class antagonisms muted. Politics, then, rarely pitted class against class .

Indian Countries. The Indian Countries would seem to manifest considerably more diversity in their recruitment 94 than suggested by Needier. They rank second in the inci­ dence of lower class presidents, and third in the incidence of middle class presidents. Moreover, fewer upper class executives are found in the Indian states than in either the Mestizo or European countries. This relatively high diversity in the social origins of executives seems to be explained when the Traditional and Revolutionary Indian countries are treated as distinct groups.^ The different class origins of the executives in Traditional and Revolu­ tionary Indian countries is summarized in Table 4.2. This shows the strikingly different recruitment patterns found in these two Indian groups. The Traditional countries have had over twice the percentage of upper class executives.

Where no social revolution has occurred, the upper class has been able to more effectively monopolize the presidency than where such revolutions have occurred. In Table 4.3, the class origins of the presidents of the three Revolution­ ary countries are compared before and after their individual revolutions. This shows that between the two periods the percentage of presidents born in the upper class declined from 481 to 16% while executives of middle class origins in­ creased from 37% to 66%. As shown in Table 4.1, it is

^As noted above, Needier does distinguish between traditional and revolutionary Indian countries. He does not include Guatemala in the revolutionary category. 95

TABLE 4.2

CLASS ORIGIN OF PRESIDENTS IN REVOLUTIONARY AND TRADITIONAL INDIAN COUNTRIES

Lower Middle Upper

Revolutionary Indian 13% 49% 38%

Traditional Indian 5% 22% 13% 96

TABLE 4.3

CLASS ORIGIN OF PRESIDENTS IN REVOLUTIONARY INDIAN COUNTRIES BEFORE AND AFTER REVOLUTION

Pre-Revolution Post-Revolution Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper

Bolivia 4 7 12 1 2 2

Guatemala 1 4 6 0 5 1

Mexico 3 8 7 1 12 1

Total Number 8 19 25 2 19 4

Total Percentage 15% 37% 48% 8% 76% 16% apparent that most presidents of middle class origins in

Indian countries are from Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico.

On the other hand, comparatively few middle class presidents are found in Ecuador and Peru.

The incidence of presidents of lower class origins in Indian countries falls above the mean and is number two

in the rank order. Indeed, lower class recruitment in the

Indian group is very similar to the recruitment pattern in the Mulatto countries. However, unlike the Mulatto states, the Indian republics have an entrenched political elite, an ossified social structure, and comparatively little opportu­ nity for vertical mobility. In this societal context, it is surprising that relatively large numbers of individuals born in the lower class would achieve the presidence. Table

4.2 indicates that Revolutionary Indian countries account for more lower class executives than do Traditional Indian

countries. However Table 4.3 shows that the incidence of such presidents declined in the post-Revolutionary era. Rev­ olution, then, does not explain the high incidence of lower

class presidents.

The basis for the comparatively high incidence of

executives of lower class origin in Indian countries re­

mains an open question. It might be that Indian societies

are more politically open than the literature suggests. As­ suming accurate samples, the data here indicates that almost

half of the executives, sixty-nine men, in Indian republics were born in lower or middle class homes. While further background data is needed, this recruitment pattern is hardly suggestive o£ a rigid social structure with a closed politi­ cal system.

The Emergence of the Middle Sectors

John Johnson argues that, since the late nineteenth century, momentous changes have begun to occur in the class structure of the Latin American countries. He describes this phenomenon as the "emergence of the middle sectors."

He states that:

In the late nineteenth century a number of the repub­ lics of Latin America began to undergo technological transformations. By 1920 the impact of those trans­ formations was widely felt. One of the most profound developments to come from them was the emergence of the urban middle sectors of society as an aggressive political force. Today these groups hold a prominent position in the socio-political amalgams that control Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.'7

The data on the class backgrounds of the Latin American pres­ idents support Johnson's contention that the twentieth cen­ tury has been characterized by the "emergence of the middle sectors." Table 4.4 shows the remarkable increase in execu­ tives from middle class origins since World War I. Of all the presidents from the middle class since independence, 40% served in the 100-odd years prior to 1920 and 60% in the 50 years between 1920 and 1970.

^Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, p. 97. 99

TABLE 4.4

PRESIDENTS BORN IN MIDDLE CLASS IN MIDDLE SECTOR AND NON-MIDDLE SECTOR COUNTRIES

1870-1895 1895-1920 1920-1945 1945-1970

Middle Sector 28% 32% 68% 861

Non-Middle Sector 361 33% 35% 56% 100

Beyond this, executive recruitment patterns in coun­ tries specified by Johnson is those where the middle sectors took power -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay

-- further verifies the Johnson thesis. In the period 1870 to 1920, middle sector countries had a smaller percentage of executives born in the middle class than did the non-middle sector countries. However, between 1920 and 1945, the in­ cidence of middle class presidents increased by more than

100% in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, while their relative numbers remained almost constant in non-middle sector states. Only in the post-World War IT era did the non-middle sector countries show an increase in the percent­ age of middle class born presidents. In this period, in both mi.ddl e . sector and non-middle sector countries, the increase amounted to about 20 percentage points. Hence, changes in the class structures of Latin American countries cited by Johnson as occurring in the late 1900's and which have greatly affected executive recruitment after 1920 may now be occurring in the rest of Latin America.

Summary: Social Class and Executive Recruitment

Class origins affect executive recruitment consider­ ably. Roughly equal numbers were born in the middle and upper classes, while only a handful originated in the lower class. Lower class born presidents are found largely in the Indian, and particularly the Revolutionary Indian, and

Mulatto republics. This is seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 ttfhich are summarized below. 101

Percentage of Presidents Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

Mulatto 12% 50% 38% Revolutionary Indian 13% 49% 38% European 2% 42% 56% Mestizo 5% 32% 63% Traditional Indian 5% 22% 73% Latin America 7% 39% 54%

Their relative numbers have been fairly consistent over time with a slight decline beginning in the third quarter of the nineteenth century and continuing to today. Almost all exec­

utives originating in the lower classes were soldiers. In­ deed, 89% of the executives born in the lower classes were g soldiers. Of the military presidents from the lower classes,

58% rose through the regular army and 42% through the ranks of insurgent movements. This finding confirms the observa­

tion frequently made that the military in Latin America has 9 played an important role as an agency for vertical mobility.

That is, in Latin America, ambitious individuals from the

lower and lower-middle classes rising up the socio-economic

ladder frequently find civilian institutions closed to them

and, hence, utilize the armed forces to realize their ambi­

tions. Executives from the lower classes seem to achieve

power in turbulent, violent political environments. Their

"Twenty-four of the twenty-seven executives original ing in the lower classes were soldiers.

^John J. Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 106-07. 102 success in Mulatto countries would also seem to be a reflec­ tion of the relatively fluid social structure in these states.

Executives originating in the middle class are found mainly in Mulatto, Revolutionary Indian and European coun­ tries. Their prevalence in these types of republics seems to be explained by the comparatively "open" quality of Mulatto and European societies and by the revolutions in Revolutionary

Indian societies. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between the incidence of executives born in the middle class and fundamental socio-economic transformations. Transforma­ tions that generate a growing middle class ultimately cause a basic transformation in executive recruitment, specifically, a growing proportion of presidents of middle class origin.

Hence, the incidence of middle class born executives is greatest where such middle groups initially flourished.

Over time, the incidence of presidents born in the middle class became pronounced after the turn of the century.

Presidents born in the upper class predominate in

Traditional Indian and Mestizo societies, and comparatively large numbers are also present in European countries. They seem to flourish where an entrenched elite is able to main­ tain its position either through a strong two-party system or through "upper class democracy." In Mestizo republics, the two-party apparatus seems to have been the key mechanism underlying the comparative success of the upper class in monopolizing the executive. In Traditional Indian countries, 103 it is related to "upper class democracy." In the European states, such "democracy" gave way to demands for extended participation and, since that time, the executives of these 10 countries have been predominantly middle class in origin.

Executives born in the upper class declined, but flourished throughout the nineteenth century and into the initial years of the twentieth century. However, since World War II, their fortunes have declined precipitously.

Military Occupations

Militarism has long been a prominent feature of

Latin American politics. The actual and/or proper role of the military in Latin America is the subject of numerous 11 books and articles. Indeed, it is probable that more is known about the armed forces than any other Latin American institution. This section deals with the impact of the Latin

American military upon executive recruitment, and, particu­ larly, with where, when, and why military executive flour­ ished, and where, when and why they did not.

1 0 Prior to 1920 the mean for upper class executives in European countries was 79% and after 1920, 27%. The mean for middle class presidents before 1920 was 20%, and after 1920, the mean was 73%.

Upor recent reviews of the literature on the Latin American military see: L.N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin American Research Review (Fall, 1966), pp. 5-33; and Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces," Political Science Quarterly (September, 1972), pp. 401-18. 104

To discover when and, in part, why military presi­ dents flourished, a trend analysis was done of incidence of military -- professional and insurgent -- and civilian pres­ idents over time. It began with Independence and continues up to the present. The executive patterns in six twenty-five year time periods are described and examined in some detail.

Military Occupations: An Overview

The significance of the soldier-president in execu­ tive recruitment in Latin America is shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Since the Wars of Independence, soldiers have ac­ counted for 45% of all Latin American chief executives. In nine countries, over half of all the executives have been military men, and in fifteen states, over a third. Of the soldier-presidents , 71% have been professional military men

and 29% military insurgents. Military insurgents refer to individuals who began their military careers as guerrilla soldiers or with irregular forces, referred to sometimes as

"civilian-soldiers." Professional soldiers are those who have usually begun early training at a military cadet school and have spent adulthood in one of the regular stand­ ing military services.

Table 4.6 lists the incidence of professional and insurgent military presidents by country in rank order.

This Table shows considerable variation from country-to- country in both the professional and insurgent categories.

The incidence of professional soldiers ranges from 67% in 105

TABLE 4.5

CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY, AND INSURGENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS: BY COUNTRY (NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

Civilian Professional Insurgent Military Military if % ii % ii %

Argentina 18 60 12 40 0 0 Bolivia 21 44 25 52 2 4 Brazil 19 73 7 27 0 0 Chile 37 76 11 22 1 2 Colombia 39 58 8 12 20 30 Costa Rica 46 85 7 13 1 2 Cuba 7 41 1 6 9 53 Dom Rep 17 47 12 33 7 20 Ecuador 38 69 14 25 3 6 El Salvador 22 49 21 47 2 4 Guatemala 17 40 23 53 3 7 Haiti 7 21 22 67 4 12 Honduras 21 54 15 38 3 8 Mexico 23 40 18 31 17 29 Nicaragua 27 60 6 13 12 27 Panama 34 92 3 8 0 0 Paraguay 24 65 12 32 1 3 Peru 27 40 32 44 14 16 Uruguay 18 46 9 23 12 31 Venezuela 15 37 15 37 10 26

Total 477 55% 273 32% 112 13 106

TABLE 4.6

RANK ORDER AND PERCENTAGE OF PROFESSIONAL, INSURGENT AND TOTAL MILITARY PRESIDENTS

Profess ional Insurgent Total Military Military Military Ra % R % R %

1 Haiti 67 1 Cuba 53 1 Haiti 79 2 Guatemala 54 2 Uruguay 31 2 Venezuela 63 3 Bolivia 52 3 Colombia 30 3 Peru 63 4 El Salvador 47 4 Mexico 29 4 Guatemala 60 5 Peru 44 5 Nicaragua 27 5 Cuba 59 6 Argentina 40 6 Venezuela 26 6 Mexico 58 7 Honduras 38 7 Dom Rep 20 7 Bolivia 56 8 Vene zuela 37 8 Peru 19 8 Uruguay 54 9 Dom Rep 33 9 Haiti 12 9 Dom Rep 53 10 Paraguay 32 10 Honduras 8 10 El Salvador 49 11 Mexico 31 11 Guatemala 6 11 Honduras 46 12 Brazil 27 11 Ecuador 6 12 Colombia 42 13 Ecuador 25 13 Bolivia 4 13 Argentina 40 14 Uruguay 23 13 El Salvador 4 13 Nicaragua 40 15 Chile 22 15 Paraguay 3 15 Paraguay 35 16 Nicaragua 13 16 Chi le 2 16 Ecuador 31 17 Costa Rica 13 17 Costa Rica 2 17 Brazi1 27 18 Colomb ia 12 18 Argentina 0 18 Chile 24 19 Panama 8 18 Brazi1 0 19 Costa Rica 15 20 Cuba 8 18 Panama 0 20 Panama 8

aR = rank order and % = percentage of professional, insurgent, and total military presidents. 107

Haiti to 8% in Panama. Insurgent military presidents range from 53% in Cuba to 0% in three countries -- Argentina, Bra­ zil, and Panama. Total military executives range from 79% in Haiti to 8% in Panama. In the following sections of this chapter, these ranks and percentages are utilized as mea­ sures of Latin American militarism.

Militarism: Trend Analysis

The recruitment of military and civilian executives over time is shown in Figure 4.2. The military was the most important avenue to the presidency over the first fifty-odd years of Independence. The incidence of military executives declined rapidly after 1870, however, and sometime between

1870 and 1895, their relative numbers were surpassed by exe

with civilian backgrounds , whose numbers increased dramatically between 1870 and 1920. Since 1920, the per­ centage of military presidents, as with civilians, has levelled off. The change in their relative numbers between

1920 and 1970 is only 2%. The incidence of insurgent mili­ tary executives has, with minor fluctuations, declined con­ tinually since the period of Independence. In the period from Independence to 1845, they accounted for 29% of all executives. By the period 1845 to 1970, they had declined to only 21.

Rise of Militarism: Independence to 1870. The com­ paratively high incidence of military presidents in this 108

Ind. - 1845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945- 1845 1870 1895 1920 194 S 1970

701

60? CIVILIAN

50%

40 $

30 \ PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

201

MILITARY INSURGENT

101

01

Figure 4.2: Percentage of Civilian and Professional and Insurgent Military Presidents Over Six Twenty- Five Year Periods 109 period was due to a number of factors. First, the Wars of

Independence had extended for some fifteen years and, as a result, the new states were left with large standing armies

and large numbers of army officers. Simultaneously, a situation of institutional flux prevailed. The established

Spanish institutions had been cast aside and replaced by newly-created legislative, executive, and judicial structures which were filled by civilians who attempted to establish

the rule of law and bring order to the new political communi­

ties. They were not able to do this and the rule of law gave way to the rule of force with the military gaining control.

The early institutionalization of the military plus the fragility of governmental structures left the government prey to the armed forces.

Secondly, some authors have pointed out that much of 12 the officer corps consisted of "civilian amateurs." Edwin

Lieuwen notes that such men possessed neither a professional

tradition nor a professional esprit de corps. Independence

achieved, these men,

...moved easily and naturally into the political vacuum created by the disappearance of royal authority. Thus at the very beginning of nationhood the armed forces assumed extramilitary (that is, political) functions. And as their military mission, that of defending the new nations against reconquest from Europe, became

12see, for example, Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 18-19. Figure 4.2 shows that the percentage of "civilian amateur" or "military insurgent" executives was 29% in the period 1820-1845, and 20% in the period 1845-1870. 110

less meaningful and real, the military rulers, de­ termined to preserve their vested institutional in­ terests, placed more and more emphasis upon poli­ tics .13

In time, the military became a vehicle for ambitious young

men from the lower and middle classes who wanted "a share

in the power, wealth, and social prestige enjoyed by the

landed oligarchy and the church hierarchy. The presi­

dency became the central position around which opportunistic

military officers flocked for a share of the booty. This

relationship between class, occupation, and executive re­

cruitment is quantitatively tested in Table 4.7, which shows

that there was a lower percentage of military presidents

(54%) than of civilian presidents (81%) from the upper

class. But, the middle and lower classes produced more

military presidents (46%) than civilian presidents (19%),

which shows that for middle and lower class persons a mili­

tary occupation was a better route to the executive office

than was a non-military occupation. In Table 4.8, the same

question is examined from another perspective; that is, the

percentage of executives originating in the upper, middle,

and lower classes who achieved the presidency from a military

or non-military background. This indicates that whatever the

class, the military did supply a, majority of the executives

•^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 19.

•^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 20. Ill

TABLE 4.7

PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES BORN IN THE UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES

Military Civilian Total

Upper Class 54 81 65

Middle Class 31 17 25

Lower Class 15 2 10

Total 100 100 100 112

TABLE 4.8

PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES BORN IN THE UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES FROM MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS

Upper Class Middle Class Lower Class

Military 53 75 93

Civilian 47 25 7

Total 100 100 100 113 between Independence and 1870. In the upper class, the military provided 6% more executives than did civilians, in the middle class they produced 50% more, and in the lower class they far outdistanced the civilians with an 86% dif­ ference. Taken together, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 confirm

Lieuwen's argument that the armed forces served the lower

and middle classes as a vehicle to political power in the post-Independence era.

A third factor underlying the high incidence of military executives in this period was the incompetence of the civilian leaders and governments and their failure to adequately distribute material rewards to the armies of

Independence, which engendered bitterness within the ranks of the military. John Johnson writes:

...the 'largesse' of the new nations was distributed according to who knew whom, not according to a con­ ception of legal justice....There is no question that some other officers, and some civilians as well, came out of the Wars better off financially than when they entered them. But it is not less true that the new states failed to meet their obligations and re- 1 r sponsibilities to most officers and most civilians. D

The widening gulf between military and civilian leaders was reflected in the words of Bolivar who spoke of "legislators, more ignorant than evil, more presumptuous than ambitious, are leading us to anarchy. Those men think that the will of the people is their opinion, without perceiving that in

1 ^ John J. Johnson, The Military and Society m Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1964), p~! 31. 114

Colombia the people are the army.""^ The military had come to regard itself as more representative of the public will, than the institutions created and designed for that purpose.

This antipathy toward civilians grew until in the end "the 1 7 liberators turned on the liberated."

The soldier-presidents had an additional advantage in that they were the heroes of Independence, the men who had tossed off the Spanish yoke. It was a fortuitous time for soldier-politicians and little wonder that large numbers of them held the office of the chief executive.

Decline of Military: 1870-1920. The decline in the number of military executives from 1870 to 1920 is less eas­ ily explained. Lieuwen notes that militarism, "partly con- 18 sumed itself through its own outrageous excesses..." In many countries, strong leaders, often military men, had risen to power and, therefore, had strengthened the national government while consolidating their own position. Armies were coming increasingly under national control. Too, the public had grown tired of the rapacious nature of Latin

American militarism. Johnson states that by the mid 1800's

•^Quoted in Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 24.

-^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 25.

-^Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 28. 115 the armies of Latin America were in "near-total disgrace" and forced to recruit officers from the lower sectors of so- 1 Q ciety.

Another reason for the relative decrease of soldier- presidents was the almost universal desire among publics for economic development and industrialization, which do not flourish in politically anarchical situations. 2 0 Agrarian resources can be replenished with comparative ease. But, industrial facilities are not so easily reconstituted. The process is costly and consuming. In Latin America, the problems of economic growth were multiplied by the key role played by foreign entrepreneurs who supplied capital and ex­ pertise until domestic armies began engaging continually in internal struggles. The unrealized desire for industry and economic progress encouraged civilian and professional mili­ tary leaders to bring order out of chaos which had been brought on by the military insurgents.

Stabilization and Increase of Military: 1920-1970.

The steady decline of the professional soldier-presidents, which had begun in 1845, levelled off then in 1920, and re­ mained constant until 1945, at which time it began to increase and continued to do so until 1970. But, the decline of

•^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 106. 20 Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, pp. 6 2-66. military insurgent presidents, which had also begun in 1845, continued to decline until the present time when it has reached an all time low. This was an extremely complex era, both internationally and domestically, characterized by depression, a world war, emergence of mass-based politi­ cal parties, and the development of industrial-scale labor unions. The real significance from the point of view of executive recruitment was the stabilization of, and subse­ quent increase in, professional military presidents, which was the first in 100 years. Moreover, the rate of increase

(from 24% to 33%) which was roughly 40% was considerable, and if it continues, the incidence of professional military presidents will easily surpass the highest point reached in the 1845-1870 period. In sum, the professional-soldier has now become institutionalized in the recruitment process.

The underlying causes of the increasingly promi­ nent role of soldier-presidents are treated in the follow­ ing section where Latin American militarism is measured against four specific theories.

Militarism: Theoretical Considerations

A number of theories have been advanced to explain militarism in Latin America which focus upon race, cultural propensities, economic deprivation, ignorance, and the in­ adequacy of countervailing socio-political institutions.

This section considers four specific theories: 117

(1) socio-racial type, (2) literacy, (3) socio-economic complexity, and (4) political parties.

Socio-racial type refers, again, to Needler's argu­ ment that the socio-racial characteristics of a country are related to or "explain" its political characteristics. The countries divided into four socio-racial types are tested against levels of militarism. Based upon Needler's general description, it is hypothesized that levels of militarism will be highest in Mulatto countries, followed by Mestizo,

Indian, and European states.

With illiteracy, the basic argument revolves around an inferred relationship between educational levels and overt political behavior by the military. Presumeably, such behavior is facilitated by mass ignorance; i.e., a polity largely unable to read or write.

Theories relating militarism and socio-economic complexity point to the difficulties of taking and re­ taining power that soldiers encounter where socio-economic complexity is high. Finally, political parties are fre­ quently cited as discouraging military intervention as they provide the institutional framework for civilian con­ trol of government.

Socio-Racial Types. Table 4.9 lists the incidence of civilian, professional soldier, insurgent soldier, and total military presidents by the four socio-racial 118

TABLE 4.9

CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND INSURGENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS: BY SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE (NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

Professional Military Civilian Military Insurgent

European 28 2 31 13 10% 82 67%

Mulatto 60 32 % 30 16% 99 52%

Mestizo 73 26% 39 14% 170 60%

Indian 112 4 2% 30 11% 126 47%

Total 273 32% 112 13% 477 55% types: (1) European, (2) Mulatto, (3) Mestizo, and (4) In­ dian. Looking at total military presidents, the variance among the four categories is only 20%. Within this range, the Indian and Mulatto countries manifest the highest in­ dices of militarism with 53% and 48%, respectively, followed by Mestizo and European countries with 40% and 33% militar­ ism, respectively. The hypothesized ranking, then, is not confirmed. Regarding just professional soldier-presidents, the countries rank in the same order with total military presidents; i.e., Indian, Mulatto, Mestizo, and European.

But, the Indian countries stand clearly ahead of the other groups, contributing 42%, while the Mulatto countries con­ tribute 32%, the Mestizos contribute 26%, and the Europeans wind up last with 23%.

To verify this finding of no relationship between socio-racial type and military presidents, another test was done in the form of a statistical Analysis of Variance.

The Analysis of Variance, summarized in Table 4.10, indicates that the relationship betiveen socio-racial type and militar­ ism is not significant. The Analysis of Variance is de­ signed to show whether there is greater variance in a given sample between groups or within groups. In this case, the variance is the incidence of civilian, professional military, and insurgent military presidents (the dependent variables).

The test determines whether or not the observed variance is explained between or within the socio-racial categories 120

TABLE 4.10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND MILITARISM

Source of Variance df Sum of Squares Mean Squares F-ratio

Civilian Presidents Between groups 3 985. 40 328. 47 Within groups 16_ 17169.09 1073.07 .31 -ns

Total 19 18154.49

Military Insurgent Pres idents Between groups 3 233. 57 77. 86 Within groups 1_6_ 1848.62 115. 54 .55 -ns

Total 19 2082. 19

Professional Military Presidents Between groups 3 825.42 275. 14 Within groups 16_ 4327.99 270. 50 1.01 -ns

Total 19 5153. 41 121

(the independent variables). If the differences between the socio-racial categories are significant, the mean square be­ tween will be significantly larger than the mean square within. Table 4.10 shows that the mean square between is smaller than the mean square within for civilian and insur­ gent military presidents. On the other hand, the mean square between is larger than the mean square within for profes­ sional military presidents. However, the F-ratio from the data (1.02) is smaller than the tabled F (3.24) so that the ? 1 mean squares difference is not significant. In other words, the Analysis of Variance shows that the greater vari­ ance in each category -- civilian, professional military, and insurgent military presidents -- occurs within the socio- racial categories rather than between them. Hence, from a statistical perspective, socio-racial type does not explain militarism in Latin America.

Militarism: Literacy. The relationship between il­ literacy and militarism has been suggested by a number of authors. Johnson writes that "In those republics histori­ cally dominated by the military, literacy rates are lower than in republics where civilians have had a greater role in

T abled F refers to the Table of F-scores showing the significance o f any F-score according to the degrees of freedom allowed. 122 government." 2 2 Wycoff, speaking of the Latin American states in which the military is never an overt factor in politics, points out that, "the bulk of the population lias at least a primary school education; the overall literacy rate is 2 3 high." Alexander Edelmann also notes a relationship be­ tween military intervention in politics and illiteracy.

Speaking of the masses, he notes that, "unable to read, they knew little if anything about the civil rights established in the new constitutions, and had not the least conception of civic responsibilities, so essential if democratic govern- ment is to be effectual." ? 4- These theoretical arguments, then, hypothesize a positive relationship between militarism and illiteracy.

The correlation between militarism and illiteracy is plotted in Figure 4.3. The observations tend to cluster in the top right and bottom left quadrants, thereby seeming to indicate some correlation between militarism and illit­ eracy, But more rigorous tools are required to measure the strength of the relationship and to determine its significance.

^Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 135.

"^Theodore Wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (September, 1960), p. 755.

^Alexander Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood: Dorsey^ 1969) , p. 165. — 123

901 Ilaiti

804

Guatemala •Bolivi a

Honduras

Nicaragua 604 •El Salvador epublic

504 Brazil Venezuela

Peru

Ecuador Mexico 404 Colombia

4 arapuay Panama Cuba

4 Cos ta. ica

Ch i le U ruguay

Argentina 104

0 30 4 704 PERCENT MILITARY PRESIDENTS

Figure 4.3: Relationships Between Illiteracy and Militarism in. Latin America 124

By utilizing statistical techniques greater precision

can be brought to this visual impression. For the purpose

o£ this study, .05 will be the point for distinguishing be­

tween significant and insignificant findings. That is,

the .95 level will serve as the confidence level, the point

at which a significant relationship is assumed to exist.

This means that the chance of any finding occurring if the

variables were not correlated is no more than five in one

hundred.

A further glance at the scattergram suggests that

estimates of the correlation coefficient and the regression

line may well establish the veracity of the hypothesis. A

simple linear regression and Pearson's correlation coeffi­

cient are particularly appropriate statistical tests as

both are designed to assess the strength of linear relation­

ships and both accommodate data sets characterized by a

limited number of observations. These tests were calculated 2 5 with the results indicating that the hypothesis is valid.

If there were no correlation, the slope "b" would be zero.

(See Table 4.11) The size of "b", relative to the standard

error, leads to the conclusion that a correlation exists.

The t-test, which measures differences in means and confi­

dence levels, further supports this conclusion. The

^All computational analysis in this study was done on the Hewlett Packard Calculator - Computer 9830A and the Hewlett Packard 3867B Mass Memory. 125

TABLE 4.11

LITERACY AND MILITARISM: TESTS OF REGRESSION AND CORRELATION

Regression

a b standard error df t-test significance

14.99 .68 .22 19 3.02 .01

Correlation

Coefficient R coefficient of df significance determination R

.58 .34 19 .005 126 calculated t-ratio (3.02) is larger than the tabled t-ratio

(2.101 at the .05 level). Moreover, the calculated t-ratio considerably exceeds the stipulated significance level of

.05 reaching the .01 level.

The Pearson's correlation coefficient also exceeds the stipulated confidence level of .95. Probably, the most useful application of the correlation coefficient is achieved by squaring it (R^). This coefficient, also referred to as the coefficient of determination, specifies the proportion of the variance of one measure (militarism) which is ac­ counted for by another measure (illiteracy). With a coef­ ficient of determination of .34, we can conclude that il­ literacy "explains" 34% of the variance in militarism found among the countries of Latin America. However, this does not establish the direction of the relationship. It does not indicate whether illiteracy gives rise to militarism or. militarism gives rise to illiteracy. Of course, both arguments can be made. It might be that military presidents curb government investments in education and, hence, cause illiteracy. On the other hand, illiteracy might be indic­ ative of a socio-economic environment that is particularly susceptible to militarism.

Militarism: Socio-Economic Complexity.. Samuel *7 A Huntington argues that this is, indeed, the case. He

•^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 220-50. 127 claims that socio-economic complexity makes it more diffi­ cult for military officers to either seize power or to wield it effectively.

As society becomes more complex it becomes more dif­ ficult for military officers, first, to exercise power effectively and then to seize power success­ fully... As the praetorian society becomes more com­ plex and differentiated, the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordina­ tion and interest aggregation become increasingly complex. In the absence of effective central politi­ cal institutions for the resoltuion of social con­ flicts, the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce coop­ eration declines. In addition, of course, military officers are not necessarily skilled in the esoteric arts of negotiation, compromise, and mass appeal which are required for political action in a complex society. '

According to this theory, then, the level of socio-economic complexity is an independent variable discouraging mili­ tarism where complexity is "high" and encouraging militarism where it is "low".

For the purpose of this test, eight variables -- literacy, per capita Gross National Product, non-agricultural workers, labor force in manufacturing and construction, school-age children 7-14 attending school, school-age chil­ dren 15-19 attending school, labor unionization, and urban­ ization -- have been combined to develop an index of

^^Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 229. 128 socio-economic complexity. The underlying assumption of this index is that the higher the incidence o£ a variable the more complex a given socio-economic system. The indicators and their dollar and percentile values are listed in Table 4.12.

These figures, along with the measure of militarism -- percentage of military executives -- were converted to Z- scores and submitted to a multiple linear correlation test with the following results: correlation coefficient coefficient df significance of de termination

.821 .67 11 .01

The correlation coefficient (significant at the .01 level) and the coefficient of determination indicate a sig­ nificant relationship exists with 671 of the variance in militarism "explained." But, a step-wise regression and the partial correlations listed in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 suggest an alternative conclusion. Table 4.13 shows that only two independent variables, literacy and percentage of students

15-19 attending school, are correlated with militarism at the specified significance level (.05). Similarly, in Table

4.14, these are the only two variables attaining this confi­ dence level. The multiple correlation coefficient of .82 would seem to reflect a relationship between educational systems and militarism rather than socio-economic complexity and militarism. 129

TABU! 4.12

RAW SCORES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY INDEX BY PERCENTAGE

la 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Argent i na 87 562 81 29 90 3 5 12.2 68 Bolivia 31 134 37 13 59 14 5.4 30 Brazil 49 300 48 17 56 18 3.8 39 Ch i 1 e 81 324 72 24 76 31 6.5 63 Colombia 61 309 53 17 5 4 19 2 . 2 46 Costa Rica 79 370 51 15 9 4 32 2 . 1 38 Cuba 7 3 517 58 18 113 18 22. 0 55 Dom Rep 43 288 39 11 85 7 6.6 29 Ec it a d o r 56 186 44 25 71 16 2.0 35 El Salvador 41 247 40 14 57 14 1 . 5 33 Guatemala 30 287 35 10 37 7 0.4 31 I!a i t i 11 79 17 7 30 4 0 . 3 13 Honduras 34 203 3 3 9 52 8 0.9 22 Mex i co 57 386 46 15 65 14 6.1 54 Nicaragua 37 • 303 40 13 58 7 1 . 1 34 Panama 82 466 54 10 78 38 1 . 4 41 Paraguay 68 199 45 17 94 17 1.2 34 Peru 51 236 50 17 • 70 20 5.1 36 U ruguay 81 520 82 28 89 4 2 7.1 82 Venezuela 49 768 68 11 72_ 21 21.6 62_ Total 1100% $6684 993% 324% 1400% 3 82% 109.5% 845' Mean 55 334. 2 50 16. 2 70 19 5.575 42 S.D. 18 165 16 6 21 11 6.3 171

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963), 3 = percent non-agricultural work­ ers (cl960), 4' = percent of labor force engaged in manufac­ turing and construction (c'1960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960), 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960), 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960) , 8 = percent urban (cl960).

^All of the original data was taken from: J. Gomez- QuLnones, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1964 (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, TTCUfT, 196 5) ; Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America, p. 96; and Jorge V. Arevalo, Population Growth and Education," in J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, ed., Population Dilemma in Latin America (Menasha: George Banta Co. , 1966) , pp~ 131-33. 130

TABLE 4.13

STEP-WISE REGRESSION: MILITARISM AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY

regression a b standard error df t-test significance

la .053 .68 .22 19 3.01 .01

2 - .020 .07 .23 19 0. 31 ns

3 - .015 .28 .22 19 1. 27 ns

4 - .037 .24 .23 19 1.03 ns

5 - .024 .34 .22 19 1.51 .20

6 .045 .48 .21 19 2.34 .05

7 - .020 .28 .22 19 1. 24 ns

8 - .020 .11 .24 19 0.45 ns

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963), 3 = percent non-agricultural work­ ers (cl960), 4 = percent of labor force engaged in manufac­ turing and construction (cl960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960), 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960), 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960), 8 = percent urban (cl960). 131

TABLE 4.14

CORRELATION COEFFICIENT: MILITARISM AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY

correlation coefficient-R coefficient of df significance determination-R^

la .580 .34 19 .01

2 .072 .005 19 ns

3 .286 .08 19 ns

4 .236 .06 19 ns

5 .334 .11 19 ns

6 .483 .23 19 .05

7 -.283 .08 19 ns

8 .105 .01 19 ns

al = percent literate (cl960), 2 = per capita Gross National Product (cl963), 3 = percent non-agricultural work­ ers (cl960), 4 = percent of labor force engaged in manufac­ turing and construction (cl960), 5 = percent of children 7-14 in school (cl960), 6 = percent of children 15-19 in school (cl960), 7 = percent of labor force unionized (cl960), 8 = percent urban (cl960). Table 4.15, however, shows that literacy and school age children age 15-19 attending school are strongly related to the other five variables used in the socio-economic com­ plexity index. Again, the correlation between literacy and the other variables is particularly high. Socio-economic complexity, then, is a complex index best measured by liter­ acy in the first instance, and children age 15-19 attending school in the second instance.

In a word, the hypothesis is accepted. Theories postulating a relationship between socio-economic complex­ ity and militarism are verified by the data. Too, the hy­ pothesized direction of the relationship is confirmed. The greater the level of socio-economic complexity, the lower is the level of militarism.

Militarism: Political Parties. It is frequently argued that the high incidence of militarism in Latin Amer­ ica is due to structural weakness within the civilian sectors of society. According to this argument, the military repre­ sents one of the few well-organized groups in Latin America and, naturally, fills the political vacuum resulting from institutional desarray characteristic of the civilian sphere. In the words of Theodore Wycoff:

The political role of the military is not a 'polit­ ical disease1; rather it is but a symptom of a condition of political immaturity...it would ap­ pear that where democracy flourishes -- and even where it flourishes with occasional military 133

TABLE 4.15

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY INDEX

la 2 34 56 78 9

1D .832 .968 .749 . 743 .536 .701 .935 .580

2 .779 . 351 .505 .371 .760 .788 .072

3 .782 .618 .567 . 563 .945 .286

4 .492 .304 .311 .743 .236

5 .423 .542 .537 .334

6 .077 . 533 .483

*^3 .603 .283

00 .105

9

a The horizontal and vertical numbers 1 through 9 re­ present the following: 1 = literacy, 2 = per capita GNP, 3 = non-agricultural workers, 4 = labor in manufacturing and construction, 5 = children age 7-14 attending school, 6 = children age 15-19 attending school, 7 = unionization, 8 = urbanization, and 9 = militarism.

^Number 1 correlates all data more than the original dependent variable. 134

intervention -- there also is to be found the con­ ditions of powerful countervailing forces.^

On the other hand, military intervention in politics is most frequent where there "also is to be found an absence ? Q of countervailing forces." Wycoff goes on to cite the

Blanco and Colorado parties of Uruguay as examples of such countervailing forces. If this argument is valid, the ma­ turation of civilian institutions such as the modern par­ ties should reduce the incidence of military presidents.

Modern political parties began to emerge in Latin

America in the post-World War I era. In Uruguay, for ex­ ample, "it was not until the close of the century that the two political parties began to take fast form, and it was first in 1919 that permanent parties appeared."

Similarly, the Argentine and Chilean Radicals first be­ came broadly based organizations only around the turn of the century. The development of a modern party in Peru and Mexico occurred in the 1920's. Finally, the emer­ gence of the Christian Democrats in the 1930's and their growth in the post-World War II period illustrates the increasing maturity of party systems in Latin America. This

28wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin Amer­ ican Politics, p. 762.

^^Wycoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin Amer­ ican Politics, p. 762.

•^Goran G. Lindahl, Uruguay's New Path: A Study in Politics During the First Coleglndo, 1919-33 (Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1962), p. 13. 135 position, that modern party systems began to appear in Latin

America around 1920, is echoed by Robert Alexander. He ar­ gues that:

The kind of political party that has evolved in Latin America since World War I differs funda­ mentally from the parties of the first century of independence. It is an organization with reason­ ably well-defined programs and ideologies. The various parties represent the widest spectrum of political philosophy... It is upon the basis of their appeals to special interest groups , rather than on the grounds of allegiance to a particular political leader, that they recruit their membership... The new political party in Latin America also has a much more intensive internal life than did the older kind ...These parties involve relatively large numbers of citizens drawn from various classes.

If the countervailing powers hypothesis is valid, the incidence of military presidents should decline in the period after World War I. Figure 4.2 shows that this is not the case. Instead, the incidence of professional soldier-presidents remained constant after World War I and even increased after World War II. The number of civilian presidents has remained fairly consistent since 1920.

Hence, the evidence seems to indicate that the emergence of modern party organizations in Latin America coincided with an increase in professional-soldier executives. This could be interpreted to mean that modern parties have contributed to an increase in professional military presidents, while having had little impact upon civilian presidents.

•^Robert J. Alexander, "The Emergence of Modern Political Parties in Latin Ame rica," in Peter G. Snow, ed., Government and Politics in Lat in America: A Reader (New York: Holt', Rinehard and Winston, Inc. , 1'96 7)",~ pp. 387-88. 136

The data in Figure 4.2, however, conceals consider­

able diversity among the twenty republics of Latin America.

Obviously, not all of them have modern party systems, and

in some, their development did not occur until the 1940 's.

Nor have the numbers of professional military presidents in­

creased in all twenty countries. It might be that the rising

incidence of professional military executives occurred in

systems that lacked such parties and their countervailing

effect.

In Table 4.16, the countries of Latin America are

categorized as being with or without modern parties between

1920 and 1970. This Table indicates that the development

of modern parties does not decrease the incidence of mili­

tary executives. To the contrary, such parties seem related

to an increase in the number of soldier-presidents, as was

the case in Figure 4.2. Where modern parties were present,

60% of the executives were civilians whereas 70% were civil­

ians where these parties were not present. The distinction

is almost nil when the civilian and military insurgent cate­

gories are considered as a single group. Then, the gap be­

tween systems with and without modern parties declines to

IS. However, the incidence of professional soldier presi­ dents still remains greater in systems with modern parties.

An Analysis of Variance, summarized in Table 4.17,

shows that the mean squares within groups are larger than

the mean squares between groups. This indicates that more of 137

TABLE 4.16

INCIDENCE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES IN SYSTEMS WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES (BY COUNTRY)

Civilian Total Professional Insurgent Military Military Military

With Modern Parties Argentina l9"20-7"0" 7 10 10 0 Bolivia 1945-70 7 5 5 0 Brazi1 1945-70 9 4 4 0 Chile 1920-70 17 5 5 0 Colombia 1920-70 15 3 3 0 Costa Rica 1945-70 7 0 0 0 Cuba 1920-70 6 8 1 7 Guatemala 1945-70 3 7 7 0 Honduras 1945-70 3 2 1 1 Mexico 1920-70 6 6 0 6 Paraguay 1920-70 11 6 5 1 Peru 1920-70 8 7 7 0 Uruguay 1920-70 10 3 3 0 Venezuela 1945-70 5 _3 _3 _0

Total 114 79 54 15 Percentage 601 40% 28% 12%

Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-45 5 6 6 0 Brazi1 1920-45 4 0 0 0 Costa Rica 1920-45 10 0 0 0 Dom Rep 1920-70 10 3 3 0 Ecuador 1920-70 21 4 4 0 El Salvador 1920-70 4 11 11 0 Guatemala 1920-45 1 5 5 0 Haiti 1920-70 6 4 4 0 Honduras 1920-45 2 3 2 1 Nicaragua 1920-70 10 3 1 2 Panama 1920-70 25 3 3 0 Venezuela 1920-45 _0 _3 __2 1

Total 98 45 41 4 Percentage 701 30% 27% 3% 138

TABLE 4.17

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: MILITARISM AND PARTY SYSTEMS 1920 - 1970

Source of Variance df Sum of Squares Mean Squares F-ratio

Countries With Modern Parties" Between groups 13 8892.71 684,05 Within groups 1 4224.43 714.28 95 ns

Total 14 13117.14

Countries Without Modern Parties' Between groups 11 484.18 37. 24 Within groups 1 270.32 53.32 1.45 ns

Total 12 754.50 the variance occurs between the countries with and without modern parties than within these categories. However, each of the calculated F-ratios is smaller than the tabled F- ratios and the mean squares differences are not statisti­ cally significant.

Although modern parties seem to contribute nothing toward decreasing the incidence of militarism, it is curi­ ous that the great decline in military executives between

1870 and 1920 coincides with the presence of more tradi­ tional parties in Latin America. Where they existed, these party systems usually took the form of elitist Conservative and Liberal parties vying for power. Too, in some countries reformist movements such as the Radicals in Chile were be­ coming prominent. Of course, it is very difficult to ac­ curately assess the strength of these partisan organizations and their impact upon the political life of Latin America.

Be that as it may, in Table 4.18, the countries of Latin

America are divided into three groups according to whether the traditional parties were relatively strong, moderately strong, or weak.

If the traditional party systems did affect mili­ tarism in the manner suggested by the countervailing powers theory, then the incidence of military presidents should be greatest in the countries with weak party systems and least in the countries with strong party systems. The data in

Table 4.18 supports the argument. The incidence of civilian 140

TABLE 4.18

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXECUTIVES IN STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK TRADITIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS BETWEEN 1870 AND 19 20a

Civilian Total Professional Insurgent Military Military Military

Strong Argentina 11 2 2 0 Chile 12 2 2 0 Colombia 14 11 1 10 Ecuador 10 4 2 2 Nicaragua 6 9 3 6 Paraguay 11 6 6 0 Uruguay _9 _JL _£ JL Total 73 39 20 19 Percentage 65% 35% 18% 17:

Moderately Strong Bolivia 8 6 6 0 Costa Rica 18 5 5 0 Guatemala 3 5 3 2 Honduras 6 6 6 0 Peru II _9 __8 _1 Total 46 31 28 3 Percentage 60% 40% 36% 41

Weak Dom Rep 8 11 6 5 El Salvador 6 6 5 1 Haiti 1 11 10 1 Mexico 8 7 4 3 Venezuela _1_ n _5 __6

Total 30 46 30 16 Percentage 39% 61% 39% 23-

aBrazil, Panama, and Cuba are not included in the Table because Brazil was under a monarchial system until 1889 and Cuba and Panama were not independent until after 1900. executives is 65% in countries with strong party systems,

60% in those with moderately strong party systems, and 39% in the groups with weak party systems. If professional and insurgent military presidents are considered as separate groups, the relationship remains strong. When the civil­ ians are combined with the military insurgents, the distance between the countries with strong party systems and those with moderately strong and weak systems is wider, 821, 64%, and 62%, respectively. Hence, the impact of traditional parties upon militarism would seem to be significant. While they seem organizationally primitive by today's standards, they may well have provided the institutional basis for civilian organization and for civilians to more successfully compete for the office of the chief executive than was the case in earlier years. The evidence here indicates that the growth of parties as countervailing powers do not, of them­ selves, curb militarism. In fact, it seems that such powers can either generate overt military intervention into the political system as has been the case since 1920, or curb it, as was the case between 1870 and 1920. Hence, the argu­ ment that countervailing powers in the form of political parties constitute a check upon militarism is not verified or falsified by the data. Parties might either increase or curb military interventions.

The essential element in the relationship between militarism and parties may have to do with the policy orientation of such institutions rather than their simple presence or absence. It is frequently argued that the policy ends of militarism are predominately oriented toward preserving the status quo. Our findings can be interpreted as being supportive of this argument. That is, in the peri­ od 1870-1920, existing parties were basically committed to preserving the existing socio-economic order. On the other hand, the mass-based parties that arose in the post World

War I era were fundamentally committed to socio-economic reform. As it relates to political parties, policies rather than institutions may well be the basis of Latin American militarism.

However, Table 4.19 shows that the differences among party systems outlined in Table 4.18 are not statistically significant. The mean squares between groups are all larger than the mean squares within groups. Hence, more of the variance in military executives is explained within each group than between them. But, this finding is not statisti­ cally significant as the calculated F-ratios are smaller than the tabled F-ratios.

Militarism: Summary. Historically, the incidence of military executives has declined. However, this decline has become almost imperceptible in the twentieth century, and professional-soldier presidents have increased considerably since 1945. Quantitatively, the incidence of military presi­ dents is greater in Indian and Mulatto countries than in 143

TABLE 4.19

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: MILITARISM AND PARTY SYSTEMS 1870 - 1920

Source of Variance df Sum of Squares Mean Squares F-ratio

Strong Between groups 6 1775.00 487.50 Within groups 1 1377.17 266,67 1.83 ns

Total 7 3152.17

Moderately Strong Between groups 4 5479.00 826.33 Within groups 1 2918.50 486.42 1.59 ns

Total 5 8397.50

Weak Between groups 4 5352.67 676.34 Within groups 1 1553.33 438.72 1.54 ns

Total 5 6906.00 144

European and Mestizo countries. This is true for both pro­ fessional and insurgent military executives. Statistically, however, the socio-racial type of a given country does not explain the variance found in militarism among the countries of Latin America. There is a relationship between militar­ ism and illiteracy. A relationship between militarism and socio-economic complexity exists. In quantitative terms, party does have an effect upon executive recruitment. That effect might be either toward greater or lesser numbers of military executives, depending upon the era under observa­ tion. Statistical tests, however, indicate that the rela­ tionship between political parties and militarism is not significant. CHAPTER 5

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: OVERVIEW AND ELECTIONS

The transfer of political power from one ruler, or group of rules, to the next is a focal aspect of political processes. Few political acts so capture the national at­ tention nor the intense concern of political elites. This would seem to be particularly true in the Latin American context where the transfer of political authority is often

"irregular" in that executive successions frequently occur without regard to formal-legal parameters. Specifically, judged against constitutional norms, Latin American succes­ sion tends to be erratic as regards both timing and mode.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal with executive succes­ sion in Latin America. Chapter 5 concerns electoral, demo­ cratic turnovers, Chapter 6 violent, unstable successions, and Chapter 7 imposiciones and tenure patterns. The main purpose in each of these chapters is to systematically de­ scribe the pattern of transfer and place these succession patterns in the framework of existing succession theories.

Pursuant of this, these three chapters examine how the Latin

American presidents achieve office, their length of time in office, and the conditions surrounding their departure.

145 146

Studies of Executive Succession

Executive succession is the subject, albeit indi­ rectly, of numerous books and articles. Most of this liter­ ature focuses upon the extreme modal poles of succession -- competitive elections and overtly unconstitutional transfers.

Too, the bulk of this material consists of descriptive case studies which trr.ee the participant elements of an electoral i battle or a polpe de estado to their respective conclusions.

The maior purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze patterns of electoral succession, but first it is useful to outline the basic features of Latin American succession.

The Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems has now been publishing case studies of elections and coups in Latin America for many years. A number of these appear with other case studies in: Richard E. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs", N.J . : Prent ice -Hal 1 , 1970) , Part s I and I~I . For additional ex­ amples of the case study of golpe de estado literature see: Martin C. Needier, "Ecuador,'196 3 ," Wi11iam G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan, eds., The Politics of the Coup d'Etat (New York: Van Nostrand Re i.nhold, 1969) ~ pp. 5-42; Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Mi1itarIsm in hatin America TNew York: Praeger, 1964) ; and Martin CT. \T e e dTer^ "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review (September, 1966), pp. 616- 626. Othe r case studies of the electoral process include: William S. Stokes, Latin Americnn Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1959), Chapters 14 niict 15; Leo B. Lott , "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections: A Lesson for 1957," Western Political Quarterly, X (September, 19 57), pp. 541 - 581 Peter Ranis, "Pe ron nTm Without Peron: Ten Years After the Pall," Journal of Inter-American Studies (January, 1966), pp. 112-28; and_ Phi 1ip B. Taylor, Jr. , "The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism?" Western Political Quarterly, XI11 (September, 1960), pp. 722-44. 147

lixecutive Succession: Overview

Since Independence, the twenty executive offices of

Latin America have changed hands well over 1,300 times. The raw scores listed in Appendix II, and summarized in Tables

5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 shows that of 1,331 coded turnovers, 754

(56%) involved "regular" successions and 577 (44%) were of a provis ional nature. Mos t "regular" successions were imposi- ciones (52%), followed by violencias (31%), and elections

(17%). A sizeable majority (70%) of the provisional changes occurred without violence. Just over a tenth of the depar­ tures were due to death or poor health (12%), with the re­ mainder divided between constitutional and unconstitutional separations (44% each).

The Latin American chief executive is hardly a

"safe" occupation. Almost half are forcibly eiected. Con­ siderable numbers die in office, particularly in Haiti. One quarter (10 of 40) of the presidents of that country died while holding office. Indeed, only four (10%) of the Haitian executives left their office under constitutional conditions.

Three of these occurred between 1915 and 1934, years when

Haiti was occupied by the United States Marines and indirectly governed by representatives of the United States government.

The direct influence of the United States government upon succession patterns is also apparent in four other

Caribbean states. Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican

Republic have had a total of fourteen popular elections, of 148

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSIONS BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, AND ELECTION (BY COUNTRY)

va i e ec e/ec

Argentina 9 11 5 0 0 Bolivia 20 21 5 0 0 Brazil 3 12 4 0 0 Chi le 9 11 16 1 0 Colombia 6 26 8 3 4 Costa Rica 10 20 8 4 2 Cuba 5 8 3 0 0 Dom Rep 18 17 5 0 0 Ecuador 14 21 7 2 0 El Salvador 14 36 0 1 0 Guatemala 14 21 5 1 0 Haiti 14 19 2 0 0 Honduras 15 28 3 2 0 Mexico 15 27 3 1 0 N icaragua 10 24 2 4 0 Panama 3 6 10 1 0 Paraguay 5 24 0 0 0 Peru 26 21 3 3 1 Uruguay 9 18 10 0 0 Venezuela 11 19_ _3 _0 _0 Total 233 390 101 23 7 Percentage 311 52% 13% 3% r

aThe headings represent the following: v = violencia; i = imposicicfn; e = election; ec = election by a legislature or assembly; and, e/ec = popular election followed by a legis­ lative election. 149

TABLE 5.2

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSIONS, PROVISIONAL AND PROVISIONAL VIOLENCIA (BY COUNTRY)

Pa Pv

Argentina 5 3 Bolivia 13 9 Brazil 6 5 Chile 22 3 Colombia 31 7 Costa Rica 32 5 Cuba 3 1 Dom Rep 7 10 Ecuador 14 8 El Salvador 44 15 Guatemala 25 9 Haiti 1 6 Honduras 50 12 Mexico 20 22 Nicaragua 38 14 Panama 20 7 Paraguay 12 11 Peru 31 19 Uruguay 16 9 Venezuela _8 _4

Total 398 179 Percentage 681 32'

aThe headings of the columns represent the follow- ing : p = provisional, acting, or interim successions and pv = provisional succession under forcible conditions. TABLE 5.3

NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTURES BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, DEATH, AND HEALTH REASONS (BY COUNTRY)

ca u d 4a ds h

Argentina 17 10 1 0 0 3 Bolivia 16 24 1 3 1 1 Brazil 12 5 1 0 1 3 Chile 22 13 2 0 0 4 Colombia 39 11 1 0 0 1 Costa Rica 26 18 1 0 0 1 Cub a 7 5 0 0 0 0 Dom Rep 8 25 1 2 0 0 Ecuador 21 29 2 1 0 0 El Salvador 27 26 1 1 0 2 Guatemala 8 22 3 3 0 1 Hai t i 4 19 5 4 1 0 Honduras 15 25 2 1 0 4 Mexico 16 26 2 0 0 0 Nicaragua 21 16 6 3 0 1 Panama 15 8 3 1 0 2 Paraguay 20 19 5 1 0 0 Peru 19 35 3 4 0 0 Uruguay 27 13 2 1 0 1 Vene zuela 19 17 3 1 0 0

Total 359 366 45 26 3, 24 Percentage 44% 441 6% 3% n 3!

aThe column headings represent the following: c = constitutional, u = unconstitutional, d = death, da = death by assassination, ds = death by suicide, and h = health reasons, which represent types of executive departures.

^The number of deaths by suicide, three, was so small that the percentage was negligible, n. which eight have been under direct United States tutelage.

Two of the three Cuban elections that have occurred over the past seventy-odd years took place under United States supervision (1909 and 1913), The United States conducted two elections in Panama (1908 and 1920), two in the Domini­ can Republic (1914 and 1924), and two in Nicaragua (1929 and 1933). In Nicaragua, these have been the only free elections in the history of the country.

Provisional successions are common throughout most of Latin America, but the six Central American republics have the greatest propensity for provisional executive ar­ rangements. Forty-six percent of all provisional succes­ sions occur in this area. They were particularly prevalent during the nineteenth century when invasions among the states of Central America were common. Such incursions frequently resulted in the placing of a provisional executive in office either by a victorious invader or a president rushing off at the head of an army to defend the patria against invaders.

Too, in these early years, it was not uncommon for presidents to seek health and/or recreation away from the capital, leav­ ing a brother, father, uncle, or comrade to manage the af­ fairs of state. But, of course, such actions were not limited to the Central American area. In a number of countries,

Panama and Colombia for example, the incidence of provisional turnovers is enlarged by constitutional articles requiring 152 that a provisional president be appointed whenever the "regu­ lar" executive might be out of the country.

The incidence of violencias, impos iciones, and elec­ tions over twenty-five year time periods is summarized in

Figure 5.1. This shows that in the early years of indepen­ dence (Independence to 1845), violencias and impos iciones were used at the same rate. Then the rate of imposiciones increased sharply, levelled off, and has declined since the period from 1895 to 1920. Violencias declined sharply after the period from 1845 to 1870, but since 1895, they have con­ sistently accounted for about twenty-five percent of all successions. Elections occurred at an almost constant rate for the first one hundred odd years of independence, but have increased greatly since 1920.

The percentage of violencias. impos iciones . and elec­ tions by country is listed in Table 5.4. This shows that the incidence of violencias range from 48% in Peru to 131 in

Colombia. The greatest incidence of imposiciones occurs in

Paraguay (831) and the least in Chile and Panama (30% each).

Elections are most frequently utilized in Panama (55%) and least used in Paraguay (0%). Beyond describing successions in each country, these percentages and rankings will serve as indices of stability-instability and democracy-non-democracy.

Similarly, the percentage of constitutional and non- constitutional turnovers is listed in Table 5,5. This, too, will serve as an index of a dependent variable, democracy. 153

Ind.- 1845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945- 1845 1870 1895 1920 1945 1970

704

IMPOSICIONES

60*

504

40*

304

\VIOLENCIAS

204

ELECTIONS

10*

Figure 5.1; Percentage of Violencia,, Inmosiciones and Elec­ tions by Twenty-Five Year Periods 154

TABLE 5.4

RANK ORDER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES ATTAINING OFFICE BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICIONES, AND ELECTIONS (INDEPENDENCE TO 1970)

Violencia Impos icion Election a O. O. R Q R 0 R %

1 Peru 48 1 Paraguay 83 1 Panama 55 2 Dom Rep 45 2 El Salvador 71 2 Chi le 47 3 Bolivia 43 3 Brazil 63 3 Colombia 32 4 Mai ti 40 4 Mexico 60 3 Costa Rica 32 5 Venezuela 39 4 Nicaragua 60 5 Uruguay 28 6 Argentina 36 6 Honduras 59 6 Brazil 21 7 Guatemala 35 7 Colombia 55 7 Argentina 20 8 Mexico 33 8 Haiti 54 7 Cub a 20 9 Ecuador 32 9 Guatemala 53 7 Ecuador 20 10 Cuba 31 10 Venezuela 52 10 Nicaragua 15 10 Honduras 31 11 Cub a 50 11 Dom Rep 13 12 El Salvador 27 11 Uruguay 50 12 Guatemala 12 13 Nicaragua 25 13 Ecuador 48 12 Peru 12 14 Chile 23 14 Bolivia 46 14 Bolivia 11 14 Costa Rica 23 15 Costa Rica 45 15 Honduras 10 16 Uruguay- 22 16 Argentina 44 16 Venezuela 9 17 Paraguay 17 17 Dom Rep 42 17 Mexico 7 18 Brazil 16 18 Peru 40 18 Haiti 6 19 Panama 15 19 Panama 30 19 El Salvador 2 20 Colombia 13 20 Chi le 30 20 Paraguay 0

aR = rank order and % = percentage of executives at­ taining office by violencia, imposicion, and election. 155

TABLE 5.5

PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTURES BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS (INDEPENDENCE TO 1970)

ca u

Argentina 63 37 Bolivia 36 64 Brazil 67 33 Chile 63 37 Colombia 79 21 Costa Rica 59 41 Cuba 59 41 Dom Rep 23 77 Ecuador 41 59 El Salvador 50 50 Guatemala 24 76 Haiti 14 86 Honduras 36 64 Mexico 38 62 Nicaragua 5 3 47 Panama 63 37 Paraguay 50 50 Peru 33 67 Uruguay 66 34 Venezuela 51 49

aThe letter "c" represents constitutional and the letter "u" represents unconstitutional executive departures. 156

Executive Successions: Elections

This section considers electoral turnovers, those

successions deemed democratic. Electoral successions will

be employed as a measure of political democracy. Beyond describing such successions, the purpose of this section is to explain why electoral democracy occurs where it does in

Latin America.

Theories of Democracy

Presidential succession goes right to the heart of political democracy. Indeed, distrinction between democratic

and non-democratic systems inevitably hinge upon the manner

in which transfers of the executive office occur. Politi­

cal democracies are characterized by competitive elections, where all political oppositions are unfettered and the votes

are counted with reasonable accuracy. A continuing question

in the social sciences concerns the relationship between elec­

toral democracy and other aspects of the political community.

This question has resulted in a number of theories that pur­ port to describe those environments or processes related to

democratic systems.

Undoubtedly, the most influential theory, in terms of the academic response it has engendered, is S. M. Lipset's theory that a relationship between political democracy and 157 2 socio-economic development exists. To test this theory,

Lipset devised a study wherein dependent variables -- coun­ tries -- are measured against independent variables -- indi­ cators of socio-economic development. The countries were divided into two major categories with each of these two subdivided into two more categories: (1) European and

English-speaking Nations, a) Stable Democracies, b) Unstable

Democracies and Dictatorships; and (2) Latin-American Na­ tions, a) Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships, b) Stable

Dictatorships. The indicators of socio-economic development were: (1) Wealth, (2) Industrialization, (3) Education, and

(4) Urbanization. The results of his study were that a posi­ tive relationship does exist between political democracy and the wealthier, more industrial, urban and educated polities.

Daniel Lerner's theory of democracy centers upon the concept of empathy. He argues that democratic man is char­ acterized by his ability to empathize with others, "to put himself in the shoes of another person." To do this, man must have an "open ego"; that is, the socio-psychological state of mind most conducive or "open" to individual be­ havior as a democrat. Traditional man, the villager living in a centuries-old life style, lacks an open ego. He is a

^Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday § Co., 1959), chapter T~, ~

7. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press^ 1958). 158 captive o£ the village and its life style, not incapable of being anything but what he is, probably n conservative, re­ ligious farmer. Traditional man cannot visualize or is not interested in a life beyond his personal universe. Lerner poses the questions: How does man become "modern", and how is it that man's vision might look beyond the confines of the village?

Using data from Middle Eastern countries, Lerner says that the shift from tradition to modernity involves a fourfold process, which begins with urbanization and ends with political participation. It is worthwhile quoting

Lerner at some length on this proposal:

The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urban­ ization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban ma­ trix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases -- literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to per­ form the varied tasks required in the modernizing so­ ciety. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of par­ ticipation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.^

^Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 60. 159

This progression, then, involves urbanization giving rise to education, which leads to the growth of mass communication, which causes demands for political participation.

Either Lipset and/or Lerner is the point of departure for much of the literature dealing with empirical democratic theory.*' Following Lerner's lead, Phillips Cutwright has elaborated a communication's theory of political democracy.

He hypothesizes that:

...political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, economic development, commun­ ications systems, urbanization, and labor force distribution. A nation's economic system can de­ velop only if its educational system keeps pace, if people concentrate in urban areas, if communication and transportation systems emerge and if changes oc­ cur in family and social life that induce people to fit into the demands of the unfolding system.

Cutwright developed four indices -- measuring levels of com­ munication, urbanization, education, and employment in agri­ culture -- as independent variables and computed the Pearson

^These and other empirical theories of democracy are available in a single volume: Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, ed., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969j^ pp ~ 14 3-327.

^Phillips Cutwright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review (April, 1963), pp. 253-64. Cutwright avoids the term demo- cracy in his study, preferring to term his index of political democracy, political development. Yet, the criteria he uses for determining levels of national political development -- i.e., the size of parliamentary oppositions, the conditions surrounding executive elections, and subseauent executive be­ havior -- would seem to be indices of characteristics widely assumed to be descriptive liberal democracy. 7 Cutwright, "National Political Development: Mea­ surement and Analysis," p. 255. 160

Product Moment correlation coefficient for each with the de­ pendent variable -- political democracy. He found that the strongest of his independent variables was the communica­ tions index. The correlation coefficient between level of democracy and level of communications was .81, accounting for 65% of the variance in levels of political democracy. A regression test further strengthens his argument establish­ ing the linear nature of the relationship between communica­ tions development and democracy, and specifying the residual error of prediction for each observation. Cutwright recog­ nizes a strong relationship among communication development, economic development, urbanization, and education, but shows that none of these variables predict political democracy levels as well as communications systems.

Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde provide a fuller test of Lerner's progress-toward-democracy communications O model. Using Cutwright's data and employing causal model­ ing techniques, they test six theoretical models postulating a relationship among urbanization, education, communications and democracy. By calculating the correlation coefficient for each potential relationship among the variables, the authors show the correlational strength between each of the

^Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political Science Revie\\r (March, 1967], pp. 72-79." ' ' ' ' 161 variables. But, to establish the impact of each independent variable upon one another and upon the dependent variable -- political democracy -- they employ path correlations. The advantage of the path correlation technique lies in the fact that it measures "changes in the dependent.variable produced 9 by standardized changes in the independent variable."

The results confirm the validity of Lerner's original model.That is, they found significant causal links in the evolution toward political democracy. The developmental se­ quence involves a direct relationship between the development of mass media and democracy. Media growth is conditioned by educational development which tends to occur in urban en­ vironments. Expressed figuratively, the McCrone and Cnudde study posits the following model.

^ E

C

Finally, numerous democratic theorists relate demo­ cracy to groups. Groups, it is argued, provide the institu­ tional base for popular participation in political life.

Too, individual participation in a number of groups is said

^McCrone and Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," p. 73.

-^The authors refer to the "remarkable correspon­ dence" between their finding and Lerner's theory. See: McCrone and Cnudde, p. 78. 162 to encourage a "democratic outlook," one which is "moderate" and accommodative of alternative views. Multiple group mem­ bership generates cross-pressures and enables an individual to view an issue from all sides, thereby facilitating com­ promise, an essential element in democratic political life.

Democracy in Latin America: Hypotheses

Democratic theory indicates that some environments are more conducive to democratic government than are others, and that the effective elements which produce these environ­ ments are mainly socio-economic, communications, and socio­ political.

Socio-Economic Contexts. Socio-economic theories of democracy focus upon levels of "development and underdevelop­ ment" as determinents of democratic and non-democratic sys­ tems. Generally speaking, democratic regimes are found in highly developed socio-economic societies. Conversely, non- democratic systems tend to occur where underdeveloped socio­ economic conditions exist. The countries of Latin America offer a wide variety of socio-economic levels of development, and the hypothesis here is that a positive relationship exists between democratic successions and highly developed socio­ economic areas.

Communications Systems. Democracy involves citizen participation in public issues. Participation requires a 163

communications system through which the government and

governed can interact. Communication, then, is necessary

if there is to be effective participation, which is essen­

tial for democratic societies. It is anticipated that the

more developed the communications system, the greater the

likelihood for political democracy.

Socio-Political Structures.(Participatory Groups.)

A necessary condition for democracy seems to be a large number of participatory groups such as labor and management,

consumer and producer, conservative and liberal political

parties, and civilian and military. These groups provide a

"check and balance" system which is a necessity for politics

of the large nation-states. Where an extensive group struc­

ture exists, individuals are subject to the moderating influ­

ence of cross pressures, which many observers feel broadens

an individual's perspective, raises his tolerance level, and

increases his capacity to compromise and settle disputes

amicably. The prevailing hypothesis states a positive rela­

tionship between the presence of participatory-group struc­

tures and democracy. The groups considered in this section

are political parties and labor organizations.

Military and Democracy. One group, the military, is

frequently cited as being inimical to democratic politics.

The military is cast as a danger to democracy. Hence, it is 164 anticipated that a negative relationship exists between militarism; i.e., incidence of soldier-nresidents, and democracy; i.e., incidence of elections.

Independent and Dependent Variables. Empirical stud­ ies of democracy identify certain elements in a society which makes it more susceptible to democratic or to non-democratic government. Briefly, these elements are: (1) Socio-economic development, (2) Communications systems, and (3) Socio­ political structures, and they are the independent variables.

It is hypothesized that relationships exist between these independent variables and elections and constitutional de­ partures, the dependent variables.

Socio-Economic Development and Democracy

The level of socio-economic development runs the gamut in Latin America from very highly developed areas to areas so underdeveloped as to be thought primitive by modern standards. The hypothesis being tested is that a positive relationship exists between the levels of socio-economic development and the succession patterns -- the higher the level, the greater the chance of democratic successions, elections and constitutional departures. To test this hy­ pothesis, it is necessary to determine the level of socio- development in each country. The index of Latin American socio-economic development is taken from an earlier section 165 of this study. This index uses eight variables, all of which relate to those elements identified by Lipset as 1 causes of democracy. ? Using the index, each country is ranked according to its level of socio-economic development and compared it with a rank order of the incidence of elec- tions and constitutional departures in Latin America.

The results are summarized in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

Spearman's rank order correlation test provides a technique for calculating the strength and direction of the relation­ ship in these Figures. A perfect positive or negative cor­ relation exists when the calculated coefficient is either

+1.0 or -1.0, respectively. A coefficient of zero means that the variables are not related. The coefficients for

Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are .44 and .60, respectively, both of which are significant. Hence, the findings verify the theory relating democracy to levels of socio-economic development.

11See Chapter IV, Table 4.12. 1 ? Lipset cites wealth, industrialization, urbaniza­ tion, and education as correlates of democracy. The eight variables in the index used here are: (1) Percent literate, (2) Per Capita Gross National Product, (3) Percent non- agricultural workers, (4) Percent of labor force engaged in manufacturing and construction, (5) Percent of children age 7-14 in school, (6) Percent of children age 15-19 in school, (7) Percent of labor force unionized, and (8) Percent urban.

l^For the ranking of Latin American countries ac­ cording to percentage of election, see Table 5.4, and for the ranking of countries by constitutional departures, see Table 5.5. 166

20 xParaguay

xEl Salvador

xllaiti xMexico

xVenezuela

15

x!!ondiiras

xBoliv ia xPeru xGua temala >- xDom Ren OS< 2 10 xNicarapua QW

xArgentina xCuba xEcuador

xBrazil

xUruguay xPanana

xColopibia

xCosta Rica

xChile

10 15 20

Socio-Econonic Deve lopn>ent

n significance s ,44 20 .05

Figure 5.2: Socio-Economic Development and Democracy (Elections) 167

xHaiti xDon Rep xGuatemala

xPeru Bolivia x x Honduras

xMexico xEcuador

xVenezuela x x Paraguay El Salvador

xNicaragua

x x Costa Rica Cuba

x x xPanama Argentina Chile

xtJ ruguav

xBrazil xColombia

10 15 20

Socio-Econonic Development

n s igni f icance s .60 20 .01

Figure 5.3: Socio-Econonic Development and Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 168

As rioted earlier, the United States has directly

controlled elections in Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, and

the Dominican Republic. To test the impact of the United

States, Figure 5.4 compares levels of socio-economic develop­

ment and incidence of elections from each country excepting

the above-mentioned ones controlled by the United States.

The calculated Spearman's coefficient, .38, is still signif­

icant, but not as significant as the coefficient of .44 in

Figure 5.4. This indicates that United States control over

elections in Latin America does increase their effectiveness.

But, even without that assistance, there is a positive cor­

relation between higher levels of socio-economic development

and democratic successions.

j Communications and Democracy

A number of studies of democracy have established

| that a relationship exists between communication systems

j and democracy. The relationship found is positive; that is,

the higher the level of communications development in a so­

ciety, the greater is the likelihood for democracy. To test

this theory, an index was devised using four indicators to

measure the communication system: (1) Newspapers delivered

per 1,000 persons, (2) Radio receivers per 1,000 persons,

(3) Television sets per 1,000 persons, and (4) Percentage of

literacy. The numbers of these indicators for each country

which is listed in Table 5.6 were converted into Z-scores 169

20 xParaeuav

xEl Salvador

xllaiti

xNicaragua

xCuba

15

xMex ico xDon Rep

>,u xVenezuela xHonduras ay* xBolivia <->10 c oE O xPeru xGua tercala

xArpentina xEcuadnr

xBrazil xUruguay

xCosta Rica xColombia

xPanaina

xChile

10 IS 20

Socio-Econonuc Development

s n s ipni f icarice . 38 20 .05

Figure 5.4: Socio-•Economic Development anc! Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.) 170

TAB LI:! 5.6

RAW SCORES FOR COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Newspapers Radio Television Percent Delivered3 Receivers Sets Literacy

Argentina 146 282 68 95 Bolivia 26 137 0 40 Brazil 54 95 29 71 Chile 118 187 7 90 Colombia 52 183 17 73 Costa Rica 77 89 25 84 Cubab 88 181 74 96 Dom Rep 27 40 6 53 Ecuador 52 104 2 70 El Salvador 47 140 11 49 Guatemala 18 54 12 38 Haiti 6 13 1 22 Honduras 19 58 3 45 Mexico 112 184 33 84 Nicaragua 49 63 6 50 Panama 75 198 41 82 Paraguay 12 86 0 68 Peru 47 169 15 68 Uruguay 314 309 65 91 Venezuela 78 196 70 74

Total 1417 2769 485 1343 Mean 71 139 24 67 S. D. 66 78 21 21

aNewspapers, radios, and televisions are all mea­ sured per 1,000 persons.

'•'All Cuban data is taken J'rom: Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 197 2) , pp. 244 - 245. The data for all of the other countries is taken from: For Columns 1, 2, 3: Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Sta­ bility in Latin America," p. 1134; for Column 4: inter-American Development Bank, Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, 1970 (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 19713. 171 and totaled to establish a ranking of Latin American coun­ tries' level of communications development. The first three indicators -- newspapers delivered, radios owned, and tele­ vision sets owned -- measure the extensiveness of the system and are the same as those used by Cutwright in his study of communication and political development. The fourth indi­ cator -- literacy -- is included to measure the "effective­ ness" of the system, the assumption being that literacy is a measure of the "effective audience" available for a media system, particularly printed media.

The ranking of each country's communications level is plotted against three dependent variables: (1) Percentage of electoral successions, (2) Percentage of constitutional departures, and (3) Percentage of elections controlling for

United States. The results, seen in Figures 5.5, 5.6, and

5.7, show that the relationship between constitutional de­ partures and communications development is significant at the ,01 level, total elections and communications relate significantly at the .05 level, and elections controlling for

United States are not significant.

Socio-Political Structures and Democracy

This section concerns three groups, the military, political parties, and labor, and their impact, if any, on democratic successions; i.e., elections. It is anticipated that the military will not contribute to Latin American 172

20 xParaguay

xEl Salvador xllaiti

xMexico

xVenezuela 15 xllondur as

xBolivia

xGuatemala

xDnm Rep u CO uio xNicaragua c e pCD

x xCuba xEcuador Argentina

xBrazil xUruguay

x xColombia Costa Rica

xChile

xPanama

10 15 20

Communications Development

s n significance ,41 20 .05

Figure 5.5: Communications Development and Democracy (Elections) 173

xllaiti

XDOIT ReD

xGuntemala xPeru

x xHonduras Bolivia xMexi co xEcundor

El Salvador x xParaguay

xVenezuela

xN.icaragua

xCuba xCosta Rica

xArgentina x xPanama Chile

xBrazil xUruguay xColombia

5 10 IS 20

Communications Develonpicnt

n significance

.65 20 .01

Fipure 5.6: Communications Development an^ Democracy (Constitutional Departure) 174

xParaguay

xEl Salvador xHaiti xCuba

5

xMexico xDom Rop

xVcnezuela

xNicarapua xHonduras

xBolivia .0 xPeru xGuatemala

xArgentina xEcuador

xBrazil

xllruguay

x xColombia Costa Rica

XPanama xChile 1 I 10 15 20

Communications Development

n significance s .35 20 ns

gure 5.7: Communications Development and Democracy (Elections Controlling for U.S.) 175 democratic succession. On the other hand, mass participatory- organization -- represented here by political parties and unionization -- are expected to relate positively to democ­ racy.

Military. Since Independence, a total of 131 elec­ toral turnovers have occurred in Latin America, Of these, twenty-one (16%) involve professional soldiers and seven

(5%) military insurgents. Moreover, of the military presi­ dents, only 17% utilized elections to gain power. In a word, military presidents, whether insurgent or profes­ sional, have come to power through elections infrequently.

To estimate the relationship between elections and militarism on a societal level, the incidence of elections

(controlling for those conducted by the United States) and militarism (percentage of years served by military presidents) are plotted in Figure 5.8. If the correlation between mili­ tarism and elections runs in the direction of the hypothe­ sized relationship, the Figure would show an inverted matrix and a negative coefficient. Snearman's rank order correla­ tion coefficient, -.91, strongly confirms the presence of a negative relationship between militarism and electoral democ­ racy. .

Political Parties. Figure 5.1 shows a sharp rise in elections after 1920. This year was also a benchmark in the 176

20 xParaguay

xUruguay xEl Salvador

xNicar.ip.ua

xCuba 15 xDom Rep xMexico

xVenezuela

xllonduras

u xBolivia CT? tio c • 4JE n xGuatemala xPeru

x xArgentina Ecuador

xBrazil

xUruguay

xColombia xCosta Ric

Panamax

xChile

10 15 20

Militarism (Years Military Presidents)

n significance s -.91 20 .01

Fipure 5.8: Democracy and. Militarisin in Latin America 177 evolution of party systems in Latin America.Specifically, modern party organization has occurred since that time. The question here is whether this signifies a relationship be­ tween the evolution of parties and elections or a coinci­ dence.

In Table 5.7, the countries of Latin America are categorized according to whether or not they have modern 1 S parties. This Table shows that the incidence of elections is higher in those countries with modern parties, but the margin of difference is only 9%. When those elections di­ rectly organized and implemented by the United States are removed from the sample, the margin of difference increases to 12%, but this range hardly constitutes a basis for as­ serting that a significant relationship exists. The t-test, which calculates the difference of means for two independent samples, shows that the finding in Table 5.7 is not statis- 1 A tically significant. The data moves in the hypothesized direction but not to any significant degree.

•^See above, Chapter 6, for a full discussion of political parties and 1920 as a pivotal year.

"^The placement of Latin American parties into modern and non-modern categories is based upon the author's judgment.

-^Results of difference of means test for Table 5.7: t-test df significance 1.15 13 n.s. 178

TABLE 5.7

ELECTIONS BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 19 20 AND 19 70 BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

Elections Total Turnovers

Countries With Modern Parties Argentina 1920-1970 3 16 Bolivia 1945-1970 3 10 Brazil 1945-1970 4 7 Chile 1920-1970 11 16 Colombia 1920-1970 2 13 Costa Rica 1945-1970 6 7 Cub a 1920-1970 1 13 Guatemala 1945-1970 3 8 Honduras 1945-1970 1 5 Mexico 1920-1970 0 11 Paraguay 1920-1970 0 15 Peru 1920-1970 3 12 Uruguay- 1920-1970 8 9 Venezuela 1945-1970 _3 _J_ Total 48 149 Percentage 32% 100%

Countries Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 0 9 Brazil 1920-1945 0 4 Costa Rica 1920-1945 4 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 3 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 5 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 0 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 0 8 Haiti 1920-1970 2 9 Honduras 1920-1945 2 4 Nicaragua 1920-1970 2 14 Panama 1920-1970 9 15 Vene zuela 1920-1945 _£ _3 Total 27 113 Percentage 23% 1001 Labor. The organization of labor is the second par­ ticipatory structure to be measured against electoral democ­ racy in Latin America. Again, as in the case with parties, it is anticipated that a positive relationship exists between labor organization and elections. To gauge the correlation between them, compared levels of unionization by percentage of workers organized into unions, and incidence of elections by rank order, is seen in Figure 5.9. The results do not verify the hypothesis. Indeed, the data in Figure 5.9 in­ dicates that if a relationship exists, it is a very weak negative one.

The findings here do not support the hypothesis that democracy is related to the presence of mass participatory groups in society. Neither political parties nor labor or­ ganizations contribute significantly, if at all, to elections.

On the other hand, militarism is related, negatively, to elec­ toral democracy. By two tests -- the behavior of soldiers and the correlation between militarism and elections -- the data supports the contention that the military does not contribute to democracy in Latin America.

Chapter Summary

Imposiciones are the most frequently utilized mode of succession in Latin America, followed by violencias and elec­ tions. Electoral turnovers, however, have occurred with in­ creasing frequency since 1920 , while impos iciones have 180

20 xParaguay

x xBolivia Mexico 15

xVenezuela xPeru xEl Salvador

xDom Rep xHaiti

x Guatemala >, xNicaragua CC y 10 xArpentina c xEcuador § xBrazil o

xHonduras

xUruguay xColombia

xCosta Rica

xCuba

xChile

xPanama

10 15 20

Labor Unionized

n significance -.07 20 ns

Figure 5.9: Democracy and Labor Organization in Latin America 181 declined since that date. The incidence of violencia has remained almost constant since the period 1870-1895,

A positive relationship exists between elections and socio-economic development even when those elections conducted by the United States in Latin America are controlled for. A positive relationship also exists between elections and com­ munications development. But, when those elections conducted by the United States are controlled for, the relationship is not significant.

A strong, negative relationship exists between mili­ tarism and electoral democracy. The data shows no relation­ ship between elections and the two mass , participatory or­ ganizations considered in this study -- political parties and labor organizations.

These findings suggest a propitious future for elec­ toral democracy in Latin America. The trend toward electoral turnovers has continued for fifty years. If comparable in­ creases in the rate of elective successions continue, elec­ tions will account for about 67% of all turnovers between

1970 and 1995.

Significantly, elections occur with greater frequency where communications systems are most extensive and effective and in the more socially and economically developed Latin Ameri­ can societies. Given the commitment of Latin American govern­ ments to development, it is likely that the area will become more developed in the future. This bodes well for electoral democracy in Latin America. CHAPTER 6

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: VIOLENCIAS

Chapter 6 deals with violent successions in Latin

America. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why

violent, unstable successions occur with great frequency in

some Latin American countries and less often in others. In

order to pursue this question, incidences of vlolencias are

used as a measure of political instability. The concept of

instability is central to a number of general theories of

Latin American executive succession. Indeed, much of the

theoretically significant literature of Latin American poli­

tics maintains that executive instability is the salient fea­

ture of Latin American political life.

Theories of Instability

Perhaps the most significant general theory of exe­

cutive succession is contained in Charles Anderson's group

theory of Latin American politics. Anderson describes Latin

American politics as "tentative." In tentative systems,

"government is based on a flexible coalition among diverse

power contenders which is subject to revision at any time if

^Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 196 7), pp. 87- TTT.

182 183 the terms under which the original government was formed are 2 deemed violated." Anderson likens the coalition to a "liv­ ing museum", in which feudal landlords, medieval churchmen, and civilian and military caudillos interact with leaders of mass-based parties, trained economists, government techno­ crats, labor leaders, professional soldiers, industrialists, and representatives of various middle sector occupational organizations.

The basic terms of the "coalition contract" is that no power contenders be denied a voice in the policymaking process. Presumably, the coalition shifts according to the policy area under consideration. Some groups intensely con­ cerned about one public question might be mildly interested in another and completely oblivious to yet a third. However, any attempt to change the basic composition of the coalition by eliminating a contender or denying hiin access on perti nent policy questions violates th.e contract a,nd leaves the government liable to deposition. The peculiar characteristic of Latin American politics is that no member is ever fully purged from the coalition. His status within the coalition

O Anderson, Politics and Economic Change m Latin America, p. 103.

3When exceptions to this rule occur, Anderson refers to them as valid revolutions. As do most observers, he points to Cuba (1960), Mexico (1911) , and Bolivia (1952) as cases of revolutionary change in Latin America. 184 might decline, but he is never eliminated. Coalitional change occurs when status realignments take place or when new members are added. Membership expansion is due to the rise of a power contender who is able to organize a power capa­ bility sufficient to threaten the stability of the coali­

tion. The system is tentative in that no single power ca­ pability is held to be universally valid. Hence, no govern­ ment has a guaranteed term of office. An election, for example, is not universally binding upon all power contenders.

Maintaining this coalition or bolstering it with other ele­ ments in the face of these conditions is a iob of consider­ able magnitude. Anderson points up the leadership problem inherent in such a system.

In the classic or evolutionary styles of Latin Ameri­ can statesmanship, politics is supremely the art of the possible, the art of combining heterogeneous and incompatible power contenders and power capabilities together in some type of tentative coalition, one in which the various members feel no obligation to main­ tain the combination intact for any prescribed term of office.^

Latin American political instability's connection with the difficulties the chief executives face in maintain­ ing control of presidential office is also argued by Merle

Kling. He theorizes that this executive inability to main­ tain control in Latin America is related to the absence of

^Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, p. 113. 185 economic bases for vertical mobility.^ According to this theory, the economic resources of Latin America are con­ trolled by a small number of domestic and foreign monopolists whose control over the economies of Latin America precludes any significant opportunity for individual mobility through economic modes and efforts.

Since ownership of land or mines does not pass read­ ily from the hands of one group to another, control of conventional bases of power cannot be secured by the ambitious mestizo, mulatto or Indian without a maior social upheaval. The systems of land tenure dooms to frustration amibitious individuals in search of a new agrarian base of power. Foreign exploita­ tion of mineral resources effectively blocks the pos­ sibilities of shifts in the possession of mineral bases of power. And at its current pace of develop­ ment, industrialization had failed to expand into a broad, substantial base of power.^

Unlike the economic system, the apparatus of government and its formal and informal sources of gain provide a viable avenue for the ambitious. Coupled with a basically colonial economy is an "independent" political system with consider­ able opportunity for public power and personal enrichment.

With the number of available public posts limited, competi­ tion is understandably keen, giving rise to the chronic in­ stability characteristic of executive politics in Latin

America. As Kling notes, "In the distinctive power structure

5Merle K1 ing, "Toward a Theory of Power and Politi­ cal Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quar­ terly', TX (Mapch., 195.6) ? pp. 21-35,—

^Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political In­ stability in Latin America," p. 33. 186 of Latin America, government serves as a special transformer through which pass the currents of economic ambition."

Kenneth Johnson's treatment of Latin American polit­ ical instability emphasizes the destabilizing impact of socio-psychological variables.^ Namely, instability results from a psychological state of alienation which, in turn, re­ sults from three general factors: (1) entrepreneurial de­ ficiencies, (2) high degrees of role substitutability, and

(3) urbanization. Johnson is particularly intrigued by ur­ banization which in Latin America could be approaching "a

'threshold of criticality' as far as urbanization as an in- g dicator of political instability is concerned."

Other writers focus on the significance of cultural variables in Latin American political instability. Charles

Cumberland, for example, feels that cultural heterogeneity 1 0 gives rise to instability. Latin America, he notes, in­ cludes two major cultural patterns, the Iberian and Indian,

^Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political In­ stability in Latin America," p. 33. O Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin Ameri­ can Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 432-65^ ~~

^Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Politi­ cal Instability," p. 445.

-'-^Charles C. Cumberland, "Political Implications of Cultural Heterogeneity in Latin America," Frederick B. Pike, ed., Freedom and Reform in Latin America (Notre Dame: Uni- versity of Notre Dame Press, 19 59) , pp. 59-80. 187 plus elements of the Northern European and North American cultural traditions. The Iberian culture emphasizes indi­ vidualism, a trait which reaches its fullest expression in the concept of personalising. On the other hand, indigenous cultures stress the importance of the collectivity and the need for individuals to recognize their place in the social whole. Politically, the Iberian tradition is authoritarian and absolutist, and public office is undertaken in the spirit of the Conquest; i.e., to acquire booty. Gerontocracy is the Indian mode of government. Holding public office has strong religious overtones and is undertaken as a solemn duty to the community.

Martin Needler's concept of socio-racial type would seem to be a variant of cultural theories.-'--'- Needier speci­ fies four types of socio-racial societies in Latin America, arguing that each is characterized by a distinctive political life. With regard to instability, Needler's discussion sug­ gests that political instability is most pronounced in the

Mulatto states, followed by the Mestizo, Indian, and European countries.

Instability in Latin America: Hypotheses

Broadly speaking, four factors seem to affect politi­ cal stability -- cultural, economic, psychological, and socio-structural.

^Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America (New York: Random House,"1968), pp. 9 8-116, 188

Cultural Bases

Cultural theories argue that such qualities contrib­

ute substantially to stabilizing or destabilizing environ­

ments. The direction of the relationship is determined by

patterns of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Cultural homo­

geneity encourages stable politics while heterogeneity gives

rise to instability. We can, then, hypothesize the follow­

ing relationship:

cultural v political ^ political homogeneity ^ compromise stability

cultural cultural political heterogeneity clash ^ instability

Socio-racial theories are a variant of the cultural

environment argument. However, the emphasis here is upon

type rather than variation.

Martin Needier!s descriptions of political life in

these four socio-racial groups -- European, Mestizo, Mulatto,

and Indian -- includes some discussion of patterns of stabil­

ity and instability. Mulatto politics, which Needier cites

as being the most "turbulent and violent" in Latin America, would logically have the greatest incidence of unstable changes in office. Violence in Mestizo countries centers upon the partisan divisions that characterize politics in most Mestizo states. These divisions polarize the populace

into two warring camps armed for combat rather than one that 189 is engaged in peaceful competition,^-^ Their violence level is comparable to that of the Mulatto group. In the Indian republics, politics often operate peacefully, controlled by the upper classes. Indeed, Indian societies "tend to exhib­ it greater constitutional stability than those of predomi­ nately Mestizo or Mulatto character."-^ However, the potential for violence is ever-present with the large, unintegrated, oppressed Indian masses, needing only a catalytic leader or event to marshal an attack upon the "white government."

The brutal fury of the occasional revolts of desper­ ate Indians, however, serve to remind the upper class Peruvian or Ecuadorean from time to time of the fra­ gility of his political order and of the limited value of its guarantee of the safety of his life and prop­ erty. The specter of Indian revolt is raised anew by threats to expand political participation, which raise the possibility of political changes in unknown direc­ tions that may possibly get out of hand and lead even­ tually to 'stirring up' the Indians.

According to Needier, it is difficult to generalize about 15 political life in the European countries. But, an impli­ cation of his claim that these countries have participant publics is the notion of relatively effective institution­ alized civilian politics operating constitutionally with

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p. 111. 1 Needier, Political Development in Latin America p • 106.

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p • 106.

^^Needier, Political Development in Latin America p . 115. 190 peaceful changes in office rather than violent, unconstitu­ tional turnovers. Presumably, the potential for violence is considerably greater where the masses lack a participa­ tion tradition and are politically apathetic and docile. As the European states have the most politically astute popula­ tions, logically violence levels would be comparatively low.

Employing Needler's four socio-racial categories, it is an­ ticipated that each socio-racial type will fall along a 1 A stability-instability spectrum in the following manner:

Stable Unstable Politics European Indian Mestizo Mulatto Politics

= >

Economic Bases

Economic theories of instability argue that a rela­ tionship between economic deprivation and political insta­ bility exists. This relationship hinges upon the availabil­ ity of economic avenues for mobility. Where such avenues are not available for the amibitious, the political system becomes an alternative route for upward mobility. On a societal level, this involves levels of congruity between so­ cial mobilization and economic opportunity. Where social mobilization levels exceed economic opportunity levels, we hypothesize highly unstable politics. Where economic oppor­ tunity is greater than social mobilization, we anticipate

•^Needier, Political Development in Latin America, pp . 9 8-116. 191 stable politics. These hypothetical relationships can be expressed in terms of the following formulae:

minimal economic maximum social _ political opportunity + mobilization instability

maximum economic minimal social _ political opportunity mobilization ~ stability

Psychological Urbanization Bases

A continuing theme of the literature of our own epoch concerns frustration and alienation. According to this argument, contemporary society is marked by the breakdown of traditional structures and mores leaving individuals rootless and bewildered. This is particularly pronounced in so-called

"transitional societies" where the processes of change seem to be much accelerated in comparison with similar processes that occurred earlier in the Northern European and North

American areas. Central to this process has been a quicken­ ing urbanization which seems to be at the heart of the frus­ tration/alienation thesis. The political ramifications are very significant. As Kenneth Johnson says:

As Latin American overpopulation continues, pressure mounts upon the already inadequate rural land forcing more and more persons into the great cities where entrepreneurial deficiencies make it doubtful that their wants will be gratified. Growing popular frus­ tration and alienation are manifest in popular sup­ port for aggressive radical movements which voice mistrust of government and hatred for the dominant classes. At this point, opportunities for usurpation of government roles may be seized upon by armies, 192

bureaucracies, or other power groupings and politi­ cal instability moves across the continuum from la­ tent to overt.

This hypothesis can be formulated in the following terms:

urbanization > Frustration/alienation -> instability

Socio-Structural Bases

The structure of groups and group behavior are fre­ quently cited as causal variables in Latin American politics.

The most explicit discussion of the impact of groups in Latin

America is contained in Charles Anderson's theory of Latin

American politics. He implicitly argues that the group con­ stitutes the most salient aspect of the political system.

However, he treats groups as a singular phenomenon and does not specify the political consequences of variation among group structures and behaviors. While a relationship be­ tween group structures and instability exists, the direction of that relationship remains an open question. This study is particularly concerned with three groups in Latin American politics -- the military, political parties, and labor organ­ izations -- and patterns of stability and instability.

Executive Succession: Violencias and Instability

Culture is a very nebulous concept, which does not lend itself to rankings, categories, and precise measurement.

•^Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Politi­ cal Instability," pp. 440-41. Yet, to systematically test ideas regarding the impact of cultural variance upon political life, it is necessary to specify some basis for distinguishing among societies ac­ cording to cultural criteria.

Culture and Instability

In Latin America, cultural variation can be asso­ ciated with ethnicity. Numerous socio-anthropological 18 studies point to this relationship. Consider the respec­ tive world-views of an isolated Andean Indian, a black favela resident, and a member of El Salvador's "fourteen families."

It is widely acknowledged that cultural heterogeneity varies from country to country in Latin America. In the columns of Figure 6.1, the countries of Latin America are categorized in three groups distinguishing among culturally homogeneous, transitional, and heterogeneous societies. The rows in the Figure catalogue the measurement of instability, violencias into three groups -- high, moderate, and low -- - indicating the number of violent turnovers in the countries.

A perfect relationship would find all of the observations

(countries) in the upper left, lower right, and center cells

•'• For a comparison of the cultures or world-views of Mexican Indians, Mestizos, and Europeans see: Ricardo Pozas, Juan, the Chamula (Berkeley: University of Califor­ nia Press , 1956) ; Oscar Lewis , Five Families (New York: Basic Books, 1959); and Flavia DeRossi, The~Mexican Entre­ preneur (Paris: OECD, 1971). 194

Cultural Dimension Homogeneous Transisitional Heterogeneous

Chile Costa Rica Brazil Colombia Paraguay Panama

Low Uruguay-

i

e o • H c O l-H r3 Mexico c £ Nicaragua > Political i i

Bolivi a Dam Ren i Argen tina Venezuela Guatemala j High Haiti I ! Peru j

Fi.gurq 6,1; Cu^tura.J, llornogqrXQ.it/ qn4 Political instability 195 of the matrix (Figure). This is not the case; the correla­ tion is not perfect. Kendall's Tau statistic is a useful tool to calculate the significance of these groupings. This test provides a basis for determining whether or not placement of the observations in the Figure occur randomly. A perfect relationship for Kendall's Tau would result in a +1.0 or -1.0.

The further the calculated Tau is from these figures, the less significant the relationship. The calculated Tau for Figure

6.1 is .61, indicating that cultural homogeneity and violencia are related.

Frankly, this finding is rather surprising. The foundations of the "culture clash-leading - to-political in­ stability" theories are not supported by logic. This argu­ ment assumes that members of culturally antagonistic com­ munities compete for power within and control of the politi­ cal system. Yet, patterns of cultural dominance rather than competition would seem to characterize Latin America. His­ torically, the Indian and black elements in Latin America have been inert, rarely engaging in politically relevant behavior. Mestizos and Mulattos have typically existed on the margins of society. Only occasionally have members of those communities achieved positions or engaged in behavior of political consequence. Rather, such positions tend to be monopolized by individuals predominently European in appear­ ance and culture. 196

There are exceptions, however. Some Indians, Blacks,

Mestizos and Mulattos have been and are politically interested and active. But, their existence is not a result of open cultural clash. Take the cases of Benito Juarez and Porfirio

Diaz of Mexico, Iloracio Vasquez of the Dominican Republic, and Luis Sanchez Cerro of Peru are examples of political leaders rising out of the ranks of the Indian, Black, Mes­ tizo, and Mulatto groups. These men achieved power only after having adopted the perspective of the dominant European- based culture. They reflect a comparatively casual attitude toward race. Certainly, they are not manifestations of a cultural clash. In fact, political battles in Latin America tend to involve members of the same culture. It would be difficult, then, to support the contention that political in­ stability relates directly to a clash among cultures.

Perhaps the findings in Figure 6.1 reflect the indi­ rect impact of cultural diversity. That is, cultural hetero­ geneity might provide an environmental context that encour­ ages political instability. If an atmosphere of fear and mistrust destabilize political life, the presence of large numbers of socially, economically, and politically suppressed people who also possess distinctive racial and cultural characteristics may well engender a climate of fear mis­ trust, thereby contributing to instability. Whatever, the findings at the very least leave the issue open. 197

Socio-Racial Type and Instability-

Utilizing Martin Needler's theory of socio-racial type, the hypothesis is that the incidence of violencias, and political instability will be greatest in Mulatto coun­ tries, followed by the Mestizo, Indian, and European states.

The data in Table 6.1 does not confirm the hypothesis. The incidence of violencia as a means for attaining office occurs most frequently in Indian countries, followed by Mulatto, •

European, and Mestizo countries.

When the Indian countries are divided into Traditional and Revolutionary categories, and the Mulatto states that achieved independence late -- Brazil, Cuba and Panama -- are controlled for, the rankings do not change.

By comparing the variance in total violencias, impo- s iciones , and elections among the socio-racial categories, it can be shown where the most variance occurs, within or between the categories."^ The Analysis of Variance, summarized in

Table 6.2, shows that the mean square between columns is greater than within columns indicating that much of the vari­ ance in Table 6.1 occurs between rather than within socio- racial categories. Moreover, the F-ratio for the data within the categories is not significant.

^This test gives a general indication of variance occurrence (whether within or between) in the categories, as the test measures the variance among all three succession categories and the concern here is, specifically, with vio­ lencias . 198

TABLE 6.1

PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTS ATTAINING OFFICE BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, ELECTION AND PROVISIONALLY (BY SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND COUNTRY)

Violencia Imposicion/ Election 3.

European Argentina 36 44 20 Costa Rica 23 45 32 Uruguay 22 50 28

Total 27 46 27

Mulatto Brazil 16 63 21 Cuba 31 50 20 Dom Rep 45 42 13 Haiti 40 54 6 Panama 15 30 55 Venezuela 39 52 9

Total 34 49 17

Mestizo Chile 23 30 47 Colombia 13 55 32 El Salvador 27 71 2 Honduras 31 59 10 Nicaragua 25 60 15 Paraguay 17 83 0

Total 23 60 17

Indi an Bolivia 43 46 11 Ecuador 32 48 20 Guatemala 35 53 12 Mexico 33 60 7 Peru 48 40 12

Total 40 47 13

aElections includes popular, legislative, and con- stituent assembly votes. 199

TABLE 6.2

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SOCIO-RACIAL TYPE AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY (VIOLENCIAS)

Source of Variance df Sum of Squares Mean Squares F-ratio

Socio-Racial Type

Between groups 3 302.50 108.83

Within groups __2_ 621. 16 246. 5 8 .43 ns

Total 5 923.66 200

The findings here do not verify the general observa­ tions made by Needier in his discussion of the political characteristics of different socio-racial societies. Needier connected that these societies rank from most-to-least stable in the following manner: (1) European, (2) Indian, (3) Mes­ tizo, and (4) Mulatto. Actually, the data indicates that the ranking would be as follows: (1) Mestizo, (2) European, (3)

Mulatto, and (4) Indian.

Further, the validity, as well as the accuracy, of the theory remains open to question. The four categories are not clearly related to instability. To the extent that a relationship might exist, it seems limited to combinations of the socio-racial categories. By casting the four socio- racial groups against the index of instability on a four-by- four matrix, the countries tend to cluster in the upper left half and the lower right half cells, as shown in Figure 6.2.

Were the relationship between instability and socio-racial type perfect, all of the countries would be in the four cells going diagonally from the upper left to the lower right.

The calculated Kendall's Tau for Figure 3.4 is +.58, indica­ ting a relationship exists.

Economic Opportunities and Instability

Theories of political instability and economic depri-V'

ation focus upon the lack of economic opportunity for those personally ambitious. Logically, this is a very persuasive 201

Socio-Rncial Type

Mestizo European Mulatto Indian

Paraguay Uruguay Brazil Colombia Panama

Honduras El Salvador Costa Rica

Nicaragua i Chi le 1

1 i i

Mexico ' 1 Argent ina Cuba Guatemala j

Ecuador j

i i i i »

Haiti Peru | • Venezuela Bolivia Don Rep

Figure 6.2: Socio-Racial Type and Political Instability (Violencia) 202 argument, but difficult to test on a societal level. One technique for assessing the extent to which economic avenues for vertical mobility exist is to develop a scale measuring economic opportunities and compare this with an estimate of the numbers of economically ambitious persons in each coun­ try .

This raises the question of what stimulates desires for money and power. Some scholars argue that such desires result from social mobilization. For example, Duff and

McCamant assert in their study of Latin American instability

"with economic growth and the passing of traditional society both the objective needs and the population's consciousness of these needs increase. The process that brings this in­ crease in the level of political demands is called social 20 mobilization." The authors of the study iust cited have developed indices of both social mobilization and economic 9 1 opportunity in Latin America. By comparing the ranking of each country in these indices, the gap between mobilization and opportunity provide a basis for predicting which coun­ tries will be stable and unstable.

20Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1133.

^Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," pp. 1138- 39. 203

In Table 6.3, the first column lists the ranking of each country according to social mobilization levels. Column two shows each country's rank on the economic opportunity scale. Wherever mobilization is greater than economic oppor­ tunity, the predicted outcome is political instability. Where economic opportunity outstrips mobilization level, the pre­ dicted outcome is political stability. If the differential between the two rankings is three or more, the anticipated result is either a very stable or a very unstable situation.

The results are shown in Table 6.4. Disregarding the category "unstable" as only one country falls into it, the results generally support the hypothesized relationship between economic opportunity and political instability. The incidence of violencias is greatest in those countries pre­ dicted to be very unstable, and least in those countries predicted to be very stable. The difference among the cate­ gories, however, is not too great, at least not great enough to show a strong relationship exists between economic develop­ ment and stability. In order to test the hypothesis conclu­ sively, much more refined and specific data is required.

Alienation, Urbanization and Instability

Any test of the urbanization-alienation-political in­ stability hypothesis necessitates an estimate of the relative number of rural-to-urban migrants in each Latin American coun­ try. This is a problem, as comparable data on population 204

TABLE 6.3

RANKING OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY LEVELS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY3

Social Economic Stability Mobilization Opportunity Prediction

Argentina 3 14 vu Bolivia 11 11 s Brazil 8 7 s Chile 4 3 s Colombia 9 15 vu Costa Rica 12 10 s Cuba0 nm nm nm Dom Rep 15 16 u Ecuador 13 13 s El Salvador 10 4 vs Guatemala 16 9 vs Haiti 19 19 s Honduras 18 12 vs Mexico 5 2 vs Nicaragua 14 6 vs Panama 7 1 vs Paraguay 17 17 s Peru 6 5 s Uruguay 2 18 vu Venezuela 1 8 vu

aSource for rankings: Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," pp. 1134-35.

bin this column, stability is represented by the following: vu = very unstable, u = unstable, s = stable, and vs = very stable. The one exception is Cuba where nm = not measured.

cDuff and McCamant do not include Cuba in their study; therefore, "nm" has been placed in each column, mean­ ing "not measured". 205 TABLE 6.4

COUNTRIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND PREDICTED LEVEL OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Degree of Level of Political Instability Economic Opportunity

Group 1 - 31% Violencias3- Argentina vu° vlc Colombia vu vl Uruguay vu vl Venezuela vu vl

Group 2-0% Violencias Dom Rep u 1

Group 3 - 22% Violencias Brazil ~~ s h Chile s h Costa Rica s h Ecuador s h Haiti s h Paraguay s h Peru s h

Group 4 - 16% ViolenciaSi El Salvador ' vs vh Guatemala vs vh Honduras vs vh Mexico vs vh Nicaragua vs vh Panama vs vh

aThe violencias here are listed as percentages of all successions^

^Degree of political stability-instability is indi­ cated by the following: vu = very unstable, u » unstable, s = stable, and vs = very stable.

The level of economic opportunity is indicated by the following: vl = very low, 1 = low, h = high, and vh = very high. 206 movement in the Latin American republics is not available.

Lacking such precise information, this study will use two measures of urbanization -- the level of urbanization in each country (c 1960) and rates of urbanization between 1950 and 1970.

By ranking urbanization levels and violencia levels in Latin America, the relationship between the two can be 2 2 assessed. The correlation between the rankings is plotted in Figure 6.3. Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient provides a test for calculating the strength and direction of the relationship.^ a perfect positive or negative correla­ tion exists when the calculated coefficient is either +1.0 or -1.0, respectively, A coefficient of zero means that the variables are not related. The Spearman's correlation co­ efficient for Figure 6.3, -.369, shows that a negative rela­ tionship exists, although not at the established significance level, .05.

However, this finding might result from the widely disparate time frames represented in the dependent and inde­ pendent variables. The measure of political instability involves observations from Independence to the present era.

The measure of urbanization is a "snapshot" of the percentage

2^See Chapter 4, Table 4.12, column 8, for the urbanization data used in the index in Figure 3.6.

^See: John T. Roscoe, Fundamental Research Statis- tics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 196 9) , p~! 81". 207

xColombia xPanama

xBrazil

xParaguay xUruguav

xChile xCosta Rica

xNicaragua

xEl Salvador 0 xCuba xEcuador

xMexico xGuatenala

xArgentina

xVenezuela

xHaiti

xBolivia

xDom Rep

xPeru

10 15 20

Psychological Alienation (Urbani zat ion)

n significance * s ns -.369 20

ure 6,3: Political Insta.bil.lty and Psychological Aliena­ tion in Latin America 208 of Latin American urban dwellers circa 1960. It might be more realistic, then, to measure the incidence of violencias since 1945 against the level of urbanization, particularly since the shift toward urbanization in Latin America has been a largely twentieth century and, even more, post-World War 2 4 II phenomenon. By calculating the incidence of violencias in Latin America since World War II, the index of instability coincides with the most intensive period of rural-to-urban movement, 1945-1970. This relationship is plotted in Figure

6.4. Again, the calculated Spearman's correlation coeffi­ cient is negative; however, in this case, the relationship is significant. Only the Venezuelan, Cuban, and Argentine cases are "outliers" in what is clearly an inverted correlation.

When these three countries are controlled for, the coeffi­ cient rises to -.94.

The data, then, refutes the urbanization-alienation- political instability hypothesis. This conclusion is sup­ portive of at least two other studies that consider urbaniza- tion and alienation in Latin America. In his case study of

Numerous studies of Latin American urbanization malce this point. Only Argentina and Uruguay had consequential ur­ banization in the 19th century. But, this was due to migra­ tions from Europe rather than from the rural areas of Argentina and Uruguay. See, for example: Walter D. Harris, Jr., The Growth of Latin American Cities (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1971), pp. 39-5T:

^The Feierabend's reach the same conclusion in their study of political violence within politics. See: Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind C. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962, A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution (September, 1966), pp. 249-271. 209

xChile xllruguay xMsxico

xColomb ia

xBrazi1

xPanama

xParaguav

xCosta Rica

x xHonduras El Salvador Guatemala

xNicaragua

xVene zuela xPeru xDom Rep

xEcuador

xCuba xBolivia xArgent ina xHaiti

10 15 20

Psychological Alienation (Urbanization)

s n significance •.534 20 .01

Figure 6,4: Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Levels of Urbanization) 210 a barrio in Mexico City, Oscar Lewis argued against the "root- lessness" hypothesis that is the pumice for much of the urban­ ization-alienation-instability literature.^ He found that rural-to-urban migrants re-established village institutions and relationships upon arrival in the city. He designated this phenomenon "urbanization without breakdown." The find­ ings of Joseph Kahl in his survey of the attitudes of work­ ing class people in Brazil and Mexico are also contrary to 2 7 the urbanization-alienation hypothesis. He found that rural-to-urban migrants were generally satisfied and content with their lives. As a group, they responded that their lives had improved since moving to the city and that they had posi­ tive expectations for their children's futures, particularly in the areas of education and subsequent opportunities for socio-economic mobility. Moreover, when the responses of migrants were compared with those of life-long city dwellers and persons living in the provinces, Kahl stated that "we detect no major differences between metropolitans, provin- cials , andJ migrants..."- M 28

The findings here also support an alternative propo­ sal; to wit, the lower the level of urbanization, the greater

^Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown," Scientific Monthly (April, 1948), pp. 327-334. 2 7 Joseph Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism (Austin: University of Texas PreslTJ 1968J , p~! 94. ' ~

2 8 Kahl, The Measurement of Modernism, p. 145. 211 the probability for political instability. This relation­ ship can be pursued further by assessing the correlation between rates of urbanization and violencias since World War

II. Rates of urbanization were calculated by comparing lev­ els of urbanization between 1950 and 1970 for each country.

The proportion of urban dwellers in every Latin American country increased during this period. The countries were ranked according to the magnitude of the increase and com­ pared with levels of violencia between 1945 and 1970. The results are plotted in Figure 6.5. Once again, the variables are negatively correlated. Although the strength of the re­ lationship is not as strong as in Figure 6.4, the correla­ tion is significant at the .05 level.

However the dependent and independent variables are designed, the urbanization-alientation-ins tabi1ity hypothesis is not verified by the data. Moreover, two of the three tests used here support the conclusion that a negative corre­ lation exists between levels of urbanization or rates of ur­ banization and political instability.

Socio-Political Structures and Instability

It is assumed here that a relationship exists between

group structures and instability. Further, certain socio­ political groups seem to have more effect upon the stability

or instability of the society, than do other groups. In Latin 212

20 xMexico xChile xUruguay

IS xBrazil

xPanama

x?aragua;.

xColonbia xCosta Rica 10

xHonduras xEl Salvador

c Oh xNicaragua

xVenezuela xPeru xDom Rep

xEcuador

xCuba xBolivia

xArgentina

xHaiti

10 15 20

Psychological Alienation CRate of Urbanization)

n significance s -.411 20 .05

Figure 6.5: Political Instability in Post-1945 Latin America and Psychological Alienation (By Rate of Urbanization) 213

America, the military, political parties, and labor organi­ zation would be likely to have an impact upon executive suc­ cession.

Militarism. The military is frequently cited as a causal factor in executive turnovers, particularly violent, unstable ones in Latin America. It is logical .that chief executives with military backgrounds , those who directly con­ trol the tools of violence, will utilize violencias more fre- ? Q quently than will executives with civilian backgrounds.

Certainly, it is anticipated that military insurgents will, since they are, by definition, engaged in politically vio­ lent and unstable activities, thus contributing to political ins tab i1i ty.

Table 6.5 lists the percentage of all violencias, im- pos iciones, and elections involving military, insurgent mili­ tary, and civilian presidents. It shows that professional soldiers are responsible for 611 of all violent turnovers, while comprising only 37% of the executives. But, military insurgents account for 15% of all violent changes which ap­ proximates their percentage of all executives. Finally, civilians, who constitute 48% of all presidents, contribute

29rrhe concern in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 is to des­ cribe and analyze the modes of succession through which, military men gain office. In fact, most studies show that violent successions involve both civilian and military ele­ ments . 214

TABLE 6.5

PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENCIA, IMPOS1CION, AND ELECTION USED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES

Total Violencia Imposicion Election Presidents3

Military Professional 37% 61% 31% 16

Military Insurgent 15% 16% 17% 5

Civilian 48% 23% 52% 79

Total 100% 100% 100% 100

aThese percentages do not include provisional presi­ dents. Therefore, they do not coincide with those totals presented in Chapter 2. 215 only 23% of the violencias. Military presidents are account­ able for 77% of all violencias or unstable turnovers which, by the measure employed here, indicates a positive relation­ ship does exist between militarism and instability. This relationship might further be shown by using another criteri­ on; namely, usage frequency. Table 6.6 shows that profes­ sional soldiers attain the presidency through violencias half of the time and the military insurgents, a third.

Another indication of the positive relationship be­ tween the Latin American military and violencias is seen in a comparison of Figure 4.2 and Figure 5.1, which show the incidence of military executives and violencias over time.

If a relationship between the two exists, logically their in­ cidence over time would be similar. A comparison of Figures

4.2 and 5.1 is presented in Figure 6.6. Their patterns are, indeed, very similar, the only point of difference occurring between Independence-1845 and 1945-1870 when military presi­ dents rose slightly while violencias declined, also, slightly

The data, then, warrants the conclusion that a strong rela­ tionship exists between military executives and violencias; i.e., unstable turnovers, i.e., instability.

Political Parties. Political parties are the second of the three groups chosen to measure the effect of socio­ political structure on the stability or instability of a society in Latin America and executive succession. The 216

TABLE 6.6

PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EXECUTIVES ATTAINING THE PRESIDENCY BY VIOLENCIA, IMPOSICION, AND ELECTION

Total Military Military Civilian Successions Professional Insurgent

Violencia 31% 501 34% 14%

Imposicion 52% 42% 57% 53%

Election 17% 8% 9% 33%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 217

1945- Ind. - 1 84 5- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1970 1845 18 70 1895 1920 1945

60%

50*

MILITARY

PRESIDENTS

404 'A

VIOLENCIAS

30 *

201

10%

Figure 6,6: Percentage of Military Presidents and Violencias over Six Twenty^Five Year Periods

n 218

literature on Latin American political parties is unclear re­

garding this relationship between parties and succession.

Some studies argue that political parties contribute to po- 7 n litical violence and instability. Others conclude that

parties constitute a basis for stability and constitutional 31 government. The concern here is whether mature parties in

Latin America operate as a countervailing element providing

opportunity for political participation and the orderly

transfer of political office. The hypothesis here is that

the strong party systems in Latin America do provide the

means of orderly power transfer for the politically active

segments of society, thereby stabilizing the polity and dis­

couraging unstable successions -- violencias.

Following this train of thought, it would be logical

to assume that those countries with strong party systems

would not be characterized by a high incidence of violencia.

Similarly, those countries with weak party systems would use

A number of authors relate Colombian parties with patterns of violence found in Colombia, e.g., Richard S. Weinert, "Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia," American Political Science Review (June, 1966), pp. 340-47. And see: Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pitts­ burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press , 19 57).

31-This argument is frequently made both implicitly and explicitly. For example, see Fitzgibbon's concluding statement in his article: Russell II. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly (March, 1957), pp. 3-22. 219

violencias more frequently. And, the countries with moder­

ately strong party systems might lie anywhere between these

extremes.

In this section, the impact of parties upon stability

is tested for two time periods -- 1870 to 1920 and 1920 to

1970. In Table 6.7y each country is put into one of the three

abovementioned groups: (1) Strong party systems, (2) Moder­

ately strong party systems, and (3) Weak party systems. The number of violent turnovers -- violencias -- is given for

each country individually, the percentage of violencias is

given per group, and the total number of successions is given

per country and per group, from 1870 to 1920, The results

are mixed. The percentage of violencias in strong party sys­

tems (14%) is considerably lower than that occurring in

moderately strong (30%) and weak (31%) party systems, But,

there is not sufficient evidence to either verify or refute

the hypothesis.

For the period from 1920 to 1970, the strength of

any party system is determined by the presence or absence of

modern parties. In Table 6.8, the countries of Latin America

are divided into two groups: (1) Countries with modern poli­

tical parties, and (2) Countries without modern political

parties. According to the hypothesis, the level of violencias

should be greater among those countries without modern part­

ies. The results show that this is not the case. In fact,

the percentage of violencias is higher in those countries with 220

TABLE 6.7

POLITICAL PARTIES AND INSTABILITY: VIOLIiNCIAS AS A PERCENTAGE OP ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 1870 and 1920 BY STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS

Violencias Total Successions

Strong Parties Argentina 0 9 Chile 2 12 Colombia 0 16 Ecuador 3 15 Nicaragua 1 10 Paraguay 3 15 Uruguay 4 1_7

Total 13 94 Percentage 14%

Moderately Strong Parties Bolivia 4 14 Brazi1 1 8 Costa Rica 4 15 Guatemala 2 9 Honduras 9 23 Peru J5 19_

Total 26 88 Percentage 30%

Weak Parties Cuba 0 5 Dom Rep 11 21 El Salvador 4 17 Haiti 8 16 Mexico 3 18 Panama 1 6 Vene zuela 11 Total 30 98 Percentage 31% 221

TABLE 6.8

POLITICAL PARTIES AND INSTABILITY: VIOLENCIAS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1970 BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

Violenci as Total Successions

With Modern Parties Argentina F97IP'1970 15 Bolivia 1945-1970 10 Brazil 1945-1970 1 7 Chile 1920-1970 4 16 Colomb i a 1920-1970 1 13 Costa Rica 1945-1970 1 7 Cuba 1920-1970 5 13 Guatemala 1945-1970 2 8 Honduras 1945-1970 2 5 Mexico 1920-1970 0 11 Paraguay 1920-1970 1 15 Peru 1920-1970 5 12 Uruguay 1920-1970 1 9 Venezuela 1945-1970 3 7

Total 38 148 Percentage 26%

Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 5 9 Brazil 1920-1945 1 5 Costa Rica 1920-1945 1 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 1 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 5 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 2 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 3 10 Haiti 1920-1970 1 9 Honduras 1920-1945 1 7 Nicaragua 1920-1970 2 14 Panama 1920-1970 2 14 Venezuela 1920-1945 _0 _3

Total 24 119 Percentage 2 01 222 modern parties (26%) than in those without modern parties

(20%). Even more importantly, the distance between the two groups (6%) is not sufficiently large to support the hypoth­

esis that a relationship exists between political parties and violencias. A test of the difference of means shows that the variance between the two columns is not statistically 3 2 significant.

Taken together, these tests suggest that the "strength" of a party system has little to do with patterns of executive succession instability. Although, the finding for the 1870-

1920 period does leave the question somewhat open, as the strong party systems had half the amount of violenci as that the moderately strong and weak party systems had (14% -- 30%,

31%).

Labor. Worker organizations have long been a feature of Latin American society. These organizations of labor were largely limited to skilled trade unions, members of which banded together into "mutual assistance" leagues. However, since the twentieth century, movements have emerged with po- 3 3 litical overtones with mass-industrial-workers at the core.

Results of the difference of means test for Table 6.7: T-test df Significance 1.22 13 ns

•^^Almost all studies of Latin American labor point this out; e.g., Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America (Stanford: University of Stanford Press', 196 8) , p. 2 7". Slba argues that industrial unions as a polit­ ical force did not emerge until after the world-wide depres­ sion of 1929. 223

The political force of organized industrial labor in Latin

America was first felt in Argentina where, during the first

decade of the twentieth century, workers fought for the es­

tablishment of a radically reformed society along anarcho-

syndicalist lines. Subsequently, workers' movements became

politically significant in many countries in Latin America.

But, labor as a strong political force did not develop until

after World War I. Therefore, to establish the existence of

a relationship between labor and unstable successions -- vio -

lencias -- this discussion is confined to the period from

1920 to 1970.

While there is some controversy over labor and its

political influence, the prevailing interpretation definitely

casts labor as an agent of change in Latin America. The best- known proponent of this position, Robert Alexander, argues

that the labor movement in Latin America constitutes a revo­

lutionary force seeking fundamental social, economic, and po­

litical change. He states that, "Organized labor in Latin

America has had an essentially revolutionary role...Labor is

^Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965). For a somewhat contrasting view see: Henry A. Landsberger, "The Labor Llite: Is It Revolutionary," in Seymour Martin Lip- set and Aldo Solari, ed., Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 2 56-300. Landsberger1s thesis is that Latin American labor is not ideologically oriented. He disclaims himself, however, from "differing at all categorically or fundamentally from Alexander," and con­ cludes that "many sectors of labor seem to have more politi­ cal than economic power... partly because of labor's rapid political involvement, through the ballot box or by violence, between 1920 and I960." 224 part of the movement for basic economic, social, and politi­ cal change, and has represented a group which was seeking a 7 C larger role in the general life of the community." In

Alexander's view, such changes focus upon achieving social equality, freedom from economic want, and political democracy.

Given the social, economic and political milieu found in Latin

America, it is little wonder that Alexander concludes that organized labor is a revolutionary force, and as such, could be considered a destabilizing element, a contributor to polit­ ical instability.

Just such a theory has been postulated by James L.

Payne in his study of Peruvian labor, According to Payne, systemic market forces lead to inevitable and violent labor demands which focus on the presidency, causing political in­ stability. Payne argues that labor surpluses make labor's conventional weapon -- the strike -- relatively ineffective.

No strike can successfully force management to compromise with workers or accede to their demands when huge labor sup­ plies provide a bottomless labor pool. Therefore, labor's strategy is to press for government intervention in labor- management disputes. To gain the attention of the govern­ ment, workers resort to physical demonstrations and disruption

^Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, p. 12.

36james l. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). 225 of the system, thereby forcing confrontation with the state.

The "target" of these demonstrations and riots is the presi­ dent. Physically controlling the situation is, at best, un­ pleasant and, at the worst, dangerous. The military, in charge of this task, constitutes an additional threat with the possibility of golpe de estado. All this encourages the president to arbitrate in favor of the workers so that order can be restored as soon as possible.

The hypothesized relationship posits a positive cor­ relation between labor organization and violent successions.

In Figure 6.7, the ranking for each country of the percentage of workers unionized is correlated with the ranking of each country's violencia level between 1920 and 1970.^ The cal­ culated Spearman's correlation coefficient, .08, is not sig­ nificant, thereby, not verifying the hypothesized relation­ ship between labor and instability.

Chapter Summary

Violencias and political instability were treated as dependent variables and tested against seven independent

number of studies of Latin American labor use the percentage•of workers organized into unions as a measure of worker's strength. See: Martin Needier, Political Develop­ ment in Latin America, p. 96; Duff and McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," p. 1134; and Irving Louis Horowitz, "Elec­ toral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," Urban Affairs Quarterly, I (March, 1967), p. 18. The ranking used in this section is taken from the Horowitz art icle. 226

20 xMexico xParaguay xColombia

xDom Ren

xUruguay xlla i t i

xCostn Rica IS

xPanama Nicaragua .Oes xEl Salvador -10 xBrazil

xChile xHonduras o p-

xEcuador xbuate:naia

xVenezuela xCuba

xPeru

xBolivia

^ xArgentina

10 15

Labor Unionization

n significance * s .08 20 ns

Figure 6.7: Political Instability and Labor in Latin America 227 variables -- cultural context, socio-racial type, economic opportunities, urbanization, militarism, political parties, and labor organizations. Theories postulating a positive relationship between cultural heterogeneity and violencias, instability, are supported by the findings. While varia­ tion in succession and instability occurs among countries of differing socio-racial type, the range of variance is not extensive and the socio-racial characteristics themselves do not seem to be related to violencia, instability. Rather, violencias occur more frequently in both Mulatto and Indian countries and less often in Mestizo and European countries.

Theories focusing upon the lack of economic oppor­ tunity as a source of violencia - instability are not veri­ fied by our findings, A relationship exists between urbani­ zation and violencias- instability, but not in the hypothe­ sized direction. Theories of psychological alienation point to large numbers of rural-to-urban migrants as a dissatisfied, anomic mass prone to political violence and giving rise to political instability. Whatever the measure of urbanization, the relationship between these variables remained negative.

In two of three tests , the negative relationship is statisti­ cally significant.

Not surprisingly, a positive relationship exists be­ tween the behavior of soldiers and the incidence of violencia-

instability. The impact of parties upon violencia is mixed.

During the period 1870-1920, violencia-instability occurred 228 more often in countries with weak or moderately strong party systems than in countries with strong party systems. Between

1920 and 1970, the proportion of violencias was greater in countries with modern parties than in those countries with­ out such parties. In the first period, 1870-1920, strong parties seem to have encouraged violencia-instability, while in the second period, 1920-1970, the opposite occurred. In both cases, however, and particularly from 1920-1970, the impact of parties was not considerable. Labor organization is not related to violencia-instability.

Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, vio­ lent successions have consistently accounted for about 25% of all turnovers. Violencias , however, occur most frequently in the more rural Latin American societies. Simultaneously,

Latin America is engulfed in an urban explosion as rural-to- urban migrants and high birthrates enlarge the proportional size of urban populations. If conurbation does directly in­ fluence violencia, violent successions should decrease in the future. CHAPTER 7

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: IMPOSICIONES AND TENURE PATTERNS

Chapter 7 considers the imposicion and tenure pat­

terns in Latin America. The impos icidn and its variants,

continuismo and the candidato unico, constitute a peculiarly

Latin American contribution to systems of executive succes­ sion. Nowhere else has such a succession mode become an in­

stitutionalized feature of executive politics. No systematic

descriptions of this phenomenon exist, let alone any theo­

retical explanations. This treatment is limited to describ­

ing and analyzing the relationship between impos iciones and

occupation, political parties, and educational development.

Tenure patterns relate to the successes and failures

of individual chief executives and, in the long run, to the successes and failures of political systems. Briefly,

longer tenures mark individual success and shorter terms, in­

dividual failure. From the perspective of the political sys­

tem, however, successful tenures relate to constitutional

parameters. Extremely short tenure patterns indicate a lack

continuity in the executive office, suggesting little op­

portunity for ongoing policy formulation and implementation.

Latin America's experience is mixed with regard to extremely

lengthy tenures.

229 230

Extremely lengthy tenures bring continuity to the ex­ ecutive office and, at time, effective policy implementation for some social and economic growth. But, such patterns are also frequently associated with large scale personal corrup­ tion and harsh political repression, even to the point of government-sponsored terrorism.

The implications of tenure patterns roughly corre­ sponding to constitutional terms are two-fold. First, they indicate that a chief executive will have time to gain con­ trol of government and effectively implement policies. Sec­ ond, such tenures signify the absense of long-term dictators

The section on tenure in this chapter treats tenure of four to ten years as optimal, designating the absense of problems that attend extremely short and long tenure pat­ terns. This time span allows for both the six-year terms and those instances where re-election is constitutionally sanctioned. Constitutional terms have varied widely through­ out Latin American history. Today, however, the minimum single legal term is four years and the maximum six years.

The purpose of the discussion of optimal tenure patterns is to describe where they occur and to determine the conditions conducing their occurrence.

Impos i cion

Table 5.1 shows that the imposicion is the most fre­ quent kind of Latin American succession, accounting for 52% 231 of all turnovers. Figure 5.1 shows that the incidence of imposiciones has varied considerably over time. It shows that, basically, impos iciones were most prevalent between

1870 and 1920. Since 1920, they have continually declined.

Table 6.4 indicates that the imposicion occurs, roughly, in proportion to the number of civilian, professional soldier, and military insurgent executives. Civilians, constituting

48% of the executives , account for 52% of all impos iciones.

Professional military men who make up 37% of the presidents were involved in 31% of the impos iciones. Military insur­ gents, with 15% of the executives, account for 17% of the impos iciones. Table 6.5 lists the percentage of civilians, professional and insurgent soldiers attaining the presi­ dency by way of impos icion. Military insurgents utilize impos icion most frequently (57%), followed by civilians (53%) and professional soldiers (42%).

Table 5.4 ranks the countries of Latin America ac­ cording to incidence of impos icion. The variance among countries is considerable, ranging from 83% in Paraguay to

30% in Panama and Chile. The incidence of impos icion, then, varies both over time and among countries. To explain the variation in use of imposicion over time, the following anal­ ysis examines the impact of political parties from 1870 to 1970. To analyze the variation of impos icion from coun­ try to country, the influences of occupation and educational development are considered. It is anticipated here that the imposicion is posi­ tively related to strong party systems in the period 1870-

1920. Jose" Medina Echeverria has pointed out that beginning in the 1880's and 1890's, many Latin American countries em­ barked on eras of stability that, in some cases, extended for several decades.''" Perhaps the impos icion became the vehicle for stable succession in those countries with rela­ tively stronger party systems. Too, the decline in imposi- ciones following World War I may be related to the political instability that, Edwin Lieuwen argues, resulted from the 2 emergence of new, disruptive social groups and institutions.

Here, modern political parties are assumed to represent such disruptive forces and to contribute to the decline in impo- sicion in the period from 1920 to 1970 ,

In Table 7.1, the countries of Latin America are listed according to the strength (strong, moderately strong, and weak) of party systems between 1870 and 1920. The inci­ dence of impos icion is roughly the same for all three cate­ gories, indicating that party systems have no impact upon the use of imposicion. In a word, the hypothesis is not verified.

Table 7.2 deals with the period 1920 to 1970 and the impact parties upon impos icion, using as a measure countries with

"'"Jose'' Medina Echeverria, "Relationship Between So­ cial and Economic Institutions: A Theoretical Model Appli­ cable to Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America (March, 1961), p. 30.

^Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 4 2 -58. 233

TABLE 7.1

IMPOSICIONES BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL TURNOVERS BETWEEN 1870 AND 19 20 BY STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS

Imposiciones Total Turnovers

Strong Parties Argentina 7 9 Chile 5 12 Colombia 13 16 Ecuador 9 15 Nicaragua 8 10 Paraguay 12 15 Uruguay 11_ 1_7_

Total 65 94 Percentage 69% 100%

Moderately Strong Parties Bolivia 8 14 Brazil 7 8 Costa Rica 8 15 Guatemala 6 9 Honduras 13 23 Peru 1_2 19

Total 54 88 Percentage 61% 100%

Weak Parties Cub a 3 5 Dom Rep 8 21 El Salvador 13 17 Haiti 8 16 Mexico 15 18 Panama 3 6 Venezuela 1_2_ '15_

Total 62 98 Percentage 63% 100% 234

TABLE 7.2

IMPOSICIONES BY NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL SUCCESSIONS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1970 BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTY SYSTEMS

Imposicion Total Successions

Countries With Modern Parties Argentina 1920-1970 4 15 Bolivia 1945-1970 3 10 Brazil 1945-1970 2 7 Chile 1920-1970 1 16 Colombia 1920-1970 10 13 Costa Rica 1945-1970 0 7 Cuba 1920-1970 7 13 Guatemala 1945-1970 3 8 Honduras 1945-1970 2 5 Mexico 1920-1970 11 11 Paraguay 1920-1970 14 15 Peru 1920-1970 4 12 Uruguay 1920-1970 0 9 Vene zuela 1945-1970 JL JL Total 62 148 Percentage 41%

Countries Without Modern Parties Bolivia 1920-1945 4 9 Brazil 1920-1945 4 5 Costa Rica 1920-1945 3 8 Dom Rep 1920-1970 7 11 Ecuador 1920-1970 8 18 El Salvador 1920-1970 9 11 Guatemala 1920-1945 7 10 Haiti 1920-1970 6 9 Honduras 1920-1945 4 7 Nicaragua 1920-1970 10 14 Panama 1920-1970 3 14 Venezuela 1920-1945 JL _3 Total 68 119 Percentage 57% 235 and countries without modern party systems. These findings weakly support the argument that modern party systems are negatively related to imposicion. In countries without mod­ ern parties, imposiciones account for 571 of all succes­ sions, whereas in countries with modern party systems, the comparable figure is 41%. A test of the difference of means shows that these differences are not statistically signifi­ cant. ^

Variations in the incidence of imposiciones from country to country may also be related to levels of develop­ ment. The impos icion is an elaborate charade designed to dupe the polity, or, at best, to provide the polity with some 4 sense of, though no real, political participation. Presum­ ably, such a charade is most effective where the polity is least sophisticated. To test this hypothesis, it is neces­ sary to gauge sophistication levels in the Latin American polities. Political sophistication is understood to mean the degree to which the voting public is aware of and understands the electoral systems. This is linked to education, so levels

•^Results of the difference of means for Table 7.2: t-test df significance 1.34 13 ns

^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), p. 108, report that 34 % of the Mexican respondents in their study "feel satisfaction when going to the polls." This percentage is similar to the response from citizens in the U. K. (43%), Germany (35%), and Italy (30%). This is a rather remarkable finding, as British, German, and Italian elections are competitive, while those in Mexico are not. 236 of educational development will be used as the independent variable against which imposicioli will be tested.^ If the educational levels do affect impos icion usage in the manner indicated above, the decline of imposicion following World

War I should occur most noticeably in countries with high levels of educational development and least noticeable in countries with lower levels. This relationship is tested in Figure 7.1, which shows that a positive relationship ex­ ists between education and imposicio'n. The Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient, .50, is significant at the

.05 level, verifying the proposed hypothesis.

Tenure

Tenure is a good indicator of the potential success of a chief executive and the political system. The longer the tenure, the more successful is the executive control, the shorter the tenure, the less successful. From a sys­ temic viewpoint, successful tenures relate to constitutional terms of office. At the outset of this discussion, tenure patterns are described and used to measure the institution­ alization of the Latin American chief executive. Then, the influence on tenure of occupation, party systems, and modes of succession is described and analyzed.

^To develop an index of educational development, the scores for literacy and the percentage of school age chil­ dren 6-14 and 14-19 were taken from Table 4.12 in Chapter 4 converted to Z-scores and totalled. 237

20 xUruguay xChile

xCosta Rica

xPanama

xArp.entina

xPeru 15

xBolivia

xVenezuela

xEcuador

xHonduras xCuba 10 xGuatemala xBrazil

xDoro Rep

xHaiti

xNicaragua

xColombia

xEl Salvador

xParaguay

xMexico

10 15 20

Level of Educational Development

n significance .50 20 .05

Figure 7.1; Educational Development and Iinpos iciones in Latin America 238

Tenure Patterns: Overview

The tenure of the chief executives of Latin America

has varied widely. Twelve presidents served only a single

day, while one man had a term of office which lasted 26 years. Table 7.3 shows that, of the 980 Latin American ex­

ecutives, 412 or 42% served a total of less than one year.

An addition 102, 10%, served less than two years, and 181,

19%, did not total four years in office,^ Of the Latin Amer­

ican presidents, 694, 72%, served fewer than four years.

At the other extreme, six men served for total peri"

ods of over twenty years. The Mexican Porfirio Diaz holds

the record for the longest total years in office -- thirty years, three months, nine days -- and the longest continuous

term of office -- twenty-six years, five months, and twenty- 7 five days. Another 37 men held office for ten or more years, but less than twenty years. Finally, 226, 23%, Latin

American presidents held office for a total of four years to

nine years, eleven months, and thirty days.

^The data in Table 7.3 reflects the total number of years served by each Latin American executive. In effect, it treats the years in office of each executive as having occurred continuously.

''The other five men with plus twenty are Jose'' Gaspar Rodriquez de Francia of Paraguay, 25 years, 10 months, 20 days; Juan Vicente Gomez of Venezuela, 25 years, 6 months, 17 days; Jean Pierre Boyer of Haiti, 24 years, 11 months, 13 days; Manuel Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala, 22 years, 2 months, 6 days; and Carlos Antonio Lopez of Paraguay, 21 years, 5 months , 28 days. 239

TABLE 7.3

NUMBER OF YEARS SERVED BY EACH LATIN AMERICAN EXECUTIVE (BY COUNTRY)

-la 1-2 2-4 4-10 10-20 +20

Argentina 4 3 13 9 1 0 Bolivia 13 4 19 15 0 0 Brazil 7 2 10 8 1 0 Chi 1 e 24 2 3 14 6 0 Colombia 31 9 7 20 0 0 Costa Rica 31 3 8 17 1 0 Cuba 5 1 2 6 2 0 Dom Rep 14 8 7 5 3 0 Ecuador 22 3 9 11 3 0 El Salvador 28 6 12 16 1 0 Guatemala 31 3 7 10 3 • 1 Haiti 19 1 5 9 5 1 Honduras 34 6 10 15 1 0 Mexico 33 7 3 14 1 1 Nicaragua 33 12 15 10 2 0 Panama 15 6 7 6 0 0 Paraguay 16 7 8 8 1 2 Peru 35 4 23 8 3 0 Uruguay 11 5 6 16 1 0 9 Venezuela 6 10 7 9 (-! 1

Total 412 102 181 226 37 6 Percentage 43% 10% 19% 2 3% 4% -1

aThe term of office goes up to but does not include the last number in each category. For example, in column two the data includes executives who served between 1 year and 1 year, 11 months, and 30 days. 240

Most Latin American presidents served for a period less than the constitutional term of office. In Latin Amer­ ica, formal constitutional terms have varied greatly, from one year to life. But, in the main, the constitutions of

Latin America have specified the term of chief executive at two, four, five, or six years. Two year terms were quite common in the nineteenth century in the Central American re­ publics and in Colombia, but most countries have always had at least a four year constitutional term. Table 7.4 shows that all of the Latin American constitutions presently call for at least four year terms, and the "average" legal term in Latin America is four years, eight months. Table 7.3 in­ dicates that 53% of all executives served a total of less than two years. Beyond this, the Table shows that 12% of all executives served a total of less than four years.

Since the constitutions stipulating a five or six year term probably more than balance those calling for a two year term, it is reasonable to speculate that at least 75% of all Latin

American presidents did not complete a full constitutional term. But, even this figure probably underestimates the ex­ tent to which actual terms have fallen short of constitu­ tional terms.

Table 7.4 outlines the mean and median terms in of­ fice in each country. The mean term was computed by dividing the number of years each country has been independently se­ lecting its chief executive by the total number of presidents 241

TABLE 7.4

Ml;AN AND MEDIAN TERM OP OFFICE FOR LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES PER COUNTRY

Constitutional Mean Term Med i an Term Terma Years 5 Months Years § Months

Argentina 6 3 6 2 $ 11 Bolivia 4 2 8 2 f. 1 Brazil 4 2 $ 8 2 $ 6 Chile 6 3 1 0 § 6 Colomb ia 4 2 § 2 1 $ 0 Costa Rica 4 2 § 4 0 5 7 Cuba 4 4 $ 0 3 a 9 Dom Rep 4 3 § 2 1 § 0 Ecuador 4 2 $ 9 0 $ 11 El Salvador 5 2 $ 3 0 § 9 Guatemala 4 2 $ 7 0 6 Haiti 4 4 § 1 0 § 8 Honduras 6 2 2 0 § 5 Mexico 6 2 5 0 $ 9 Nicaragua 5 2 $ 0 0 § 7 Panama 4 1 S 9 0 9 Paraguay 5 3 § 7 1 $ 5 Peru 6 2 0 0 § 6 Uruguay 4 3 5 1 § 0 Venezuela 5 4 § 0 2 $ 0 * O 3 * Total O 2 $ 8 1 § 2

aIn this column are the constitutional terms of office (number of years) per country as of 1970. The average constitutional term of office for Latin America is 4.8 years. 242 in each country. The results indicate that the "average" president served a total of two years, eight months, which is two years less than the current "average" constitutional term. However, like the data in Table 7.3, the mean term does not accurately reflect the length of time of each term because it does not account for individuals who have served more than once. That is, it treats all the time spent in of­ fice by a given individual as a single term when in reality some presidents have served more than one term. The median term was computed for each country by locating the mid-point in the terms of office listed in Appendix II. Hence, it ac­ counts for instances when a president's time in office is interrupted and another individual takes the presidency. It shows that half of the presidents of Latin America served less than one year, two months. Moreover, in twelve of the twenty republics, half of the presidents completed less than one year. Most Latin American chief executives, then, serve terms of about one year and only twenty to 251 serve a term at least equal to that specified in the constitution.

The Institutionalization of the Chief Executive

Tenure patterns measure institutionalization. Logi­ cally tenure patterns from Independence to 1970 should show a shift toward longer terms; that is, they should indicate a trend toward the institutionalization of the Latin American chief executive. Since Independence, the various countries of Latin America have confronted the primary problem of build ing effective national governments, With the establishment of such governments, the rapid turnover in executive person­ nel should diminish. The problems of extending effective state control and inculcating national loyalties were most pronounced in the early phases of independent Latin America.

During most of the nineteenth century, national governments remained weak vis-a-vis other institutions and systems and national executive tenures would logically be comparatively short. Changes would occur with the subsequent institution­ alization of national systems and the redirection of mass loyalties toward national entities. The national chief ex­ ecutive should be a major beneficiary of these changes and his ability to remain in office should be greater.

One way to test this theory is to calculate the aver­ age number of years each executive served in various time periods. This has been done in Table 7.5, and the results confirm a movement toward longer terms. The average tenure of each president within six twenty-five year periods has increased from 1.1 years for the period Independence-1845 to

3.7 years for the period 1945-1970. More evidence from another perspective is provided in Table 7.6. This Table catalogues the term of each Latin American executive in one of five time spans over six twenty-five year periods. It shows that the greatest percentage of presidents in any time period have served for less than one year. The incidence of 244

TABLE 7.5

AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS SERVED BY EACH EXECUTIVE OVER SIX TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERIODS

Indep 1845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945- -1845 1870 1895 1920 1945 1970

Total Years 348 400 433 485 500 505

Total Executives 306 250 229 192 206 186

Average Term 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.4 3.7 245

TABLE 7.6

PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL TERMS MINUS ONE YEAR, ONE TO TWO YEARS, TWO TO FOUR YEARS, FOUR TO TEN YEARS AND PLUS TEN YEARS OVER SIX TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PERIODS

Years Indep 1845- 1870- 1895- 1920- 1945- -1845 1870 1895 1920 1945 1970

-1 68% 54% 41% 381 45% 36%

1-2 13% 15% 12% 12% 9% 14%

2-4 11% 16% 24% 16% 16% 17%

4-10 6% 12% 21% 32% 28% 31%

+10 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 2%

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 10 0% 246 presidents serving less than one year, however, has consis- tently declined with the excepti on of the period 1920-1945.

The relative number of executive s holding office from one to two years has remained compar atively constant from Inde- pendence to 1970. The differenc e between the periods Inde- pendence to 1845 and 1945 to 197 0 is only 1% . While many executives serving short terms d id so under strictly consti-

tutional conditions, the inciden ce of executives in the two

categories -- less than one year and one to two years -- is a fairly accurate indication of institutional underdevelop- ment. At the very least, the pr evalence of short terms of office suggest that many nationa 1 executives had little time to provide policy continuity and direction. It might also be taken as evidence of an inabi lity on the part of elites to agree upon the rules to govern executive succession. As the incidence of presidents serving such short terms had de­ clined from 81% in the period Independence -1845 to 50% in the period 1945-1970, the conclusion is that institutional devel­ opment has occurred.

The number of presidents serving terms of two to four years rose until the period 1895-1920, but declined and lev­ elled off after that point. This incline until the period

1895-1920 probably reflects the comparatively extensive use of two-year terms from the mid-1800's to the late - 1800's.

Moreover, during this era, many executives serving longer terms left the presidency in the hands of a designate while 247 vacationing or retreating to healthier climates. As a re­ sult, some executives who might have served out four-year terms did not do so. Presidents in this category were not always removed prior to the end of their constitutional term. This category does not, then, necessarily reflect institutional fragility.

The number of executives whose tenure falls between four and ten years has increased from 6% in the post-

Independence era to 311 in the contemporary period. This strongly suggests evolving institutional maturity. Greater staying power provides a basis for policy continuity and in­ dicates, then, a general strengthening of the national gov­ ernment and the executive office particularly.

The incidence of executives who have served contin­ uous terms of ten years or more has been remarkably consis­ tent throughout the history of Latin America. Their relative numbers equal two or three percent in each of the time peri­ ods under consideration. Such lengthy terms probably do not reflect institutional development; rather, they suggest personal strength, the rise of the overwhelmingly powerful individual able to dominate over a remarkably long time. The continuity of this tenure pattern suggests neither institu­ tional development nor underdevelopment. The findings in

Tables 7.5 and 7.6 indicate a long term move in the direc­ tion of greater executive stability and institutionalization.

They suggest that this process has been continuous except for 248 the period 1920-1945 when the consistent shift toward longer tenures was interrupted. This interruption supports the fre­ quently heard argument that the twin problems of economic depression and political mobilization which occurred together in the post-1920 period, destabilized the Latin American area.

Occupations and Tenure

Occupation and tenure considers the impact, if any, of soldier and civilian presidents upon tenure patterns.

Logically, it is anticipated that soldiers have advantages over civilians in a political milieu characterized by vio­ lence. They, of course, possess the "tools of the trade"; i.e., arms, that are frequently determinative in violent

Latin American political life and power turnovers.

To ascertain a rough estimate of the comparative tenures of civilians and soldiers, it is necessary to estab­ lish their respective indices. In Table 7.7, the percentage of years the executive office was held by civilians, pro­ fessional soldiers, and military insurgents is listed by country. A comparison of the total percentage of years these occupational groups held office with their relative numbers will indicate the "success" of each group in main­ taining office. Table 7.7 shows that civilians have held the presidency of Latin America 52% of the time, followed by professional soldiers with 32% and military insurgents 249

TABLE 7.7

LATIN AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERCENTAGE OF YEARS OFFICE HELD BY CIVILIANS AND MILITARY

Civilian Professional Insurgent Military Military

Argentina 65 35 0 Bolivia 41 56 3 Brazil 70 30 0 Chile 71 25 4 Colombia 59 11 30 Costa Rica 92 8 0 Cuba 35 16 49 Dom Rep 29 47 24 Ecuador 64 27 9 El Salvador 47 53 0 Guatemala 38 40 22 Haiti 28 59 13 Honduras 41 40 19 Mexico 36 40 24 Nicaragua 52 8 40 Panama 95 5 0 Paraguay 59 41 0 Peru 45 47 9 Uruguay 69 11 20 Venezuela 16 24 60

Latin America 52 32 16 250 with 16%. Correspondingly, the percentage of civilian

Latin American executives is 55%, followed by professional soldiers with 32% and military insurgents with 13%. On a hemispheric basis, then, soldiers do not exhibit greater staying power than civilians. Indeed, civilians have been slightly more successful in these terms, although the margin of difference is too small to warrant the conclusion that occupation affects tenure patterns.

By talcing only those individuals who have managed to serve comparatively lengthy tenures, it can be ascertained whether soldiers or civilians have greater success, by Latin

American standards, at staying in office. Table 7.8 shows the percentage of civilian and military presidents that have served terms of over four years. The total incidence of ci­ vilian executives is 3% greater than the incidence of civil­ ian presidents serving over four years. The total incidence of professional soldier presidents is 2% greater than the in­ cidence of soldiers serving over four years, and the insur­ gents serving over four years show an increase of 5% over the total insurgents. Of the three occupational groups, only the insurgents manifest tenure lengths proportionately larger than their numbers, though the margin, 5%, is small.

Insurgents show their greatest staying power in tenures of ten to twenty years, where they account for 30% of all exec­ utives in the category. Beyond this, the sub-categories 251

TABLE 7.8

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTIVES, CIVILIAN, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, MILITARY INSURGENT, SERVING FOUR TO TEN, TEN TO TWENTY, AND OVER TWENTY YEAR TERMS

4-10 10-20 +20 Total

Civilian Number 126 13 3 142 Percentage 56 % 3 5% 50% 52%

Professional Soldier Number 65 13 2 80 Percentage 29% 35% 33% 30%

Military Insurgent Number 35 11 1 47 Percentage 15% 30% 17% 18% 252 in Table 7.8 show very little variance. Occupation does not seem to affect tenure patterns. While there is some vari­ ance in tenure patterns among the three occupational groups being considered, the variance is so minimal as to be insig­ nificant.

Party Systems and Tenure

Political parties should contribute to lengthening tenures to, at least, constitutional maximums. They provide the institutional basis for sustaining mass support for an incumbent and serve as a counterweight to any threat of de­ position by civilian or military opponents. To assess the impact of Latin American parties upon tenure, this section will consider two historical periods -- 1870-1920 and 1920-

1970 -- and use them as times to test the relationship be­ tween tenure lengths and the strength of party systems.

Tenures ranging between four and ten years are of particular concern, as they are defined here as being most significant from the standpoint of institutional development. Also, tenures of less than a year are of special interest as they evidence institutional underdevelopment.

As in previous sections of this study, the countries of Latin America are catalogued according to party system characteristics of strength -- strong, moderately strong, and weak -- and to the presence or absence of a modern party system. The first category, the strength of party systems, is used in Table 7.9. The findings are partially supportive of the hypothesis. They show that 33% of the tenures in strong party systerns were between four and ten years. In systems with moderately strong parties, the figure drops to

181. In countries with weak party systems, however, 27% of all tenures are between four and ten years. Table 7.9 also indicates that tenures of less than one year are least fre­ quent in countries with strong parties (31%), most frequent in countries with moderately strong parties (49$), while the countries with weak parties fall in between (42%). These findings suggest that while the presence of strong parties in the years from 1870 to 1920 did contribute to lengthening executive tenure, the presence of weak parties was also con­ tributory. Weak parties are, perhaps, indicative of a hos­ pitable political climate for the well-known Latin American caudillo-president who reigns supreme over considerable time periods. The argument is supported, albeit weakly, by the last row in Table 7.9, which shows that tenures of over ten years are most often found in countries with weak party systems.

In Table 7.10, the categories for the division of countries is the presence or absence of modern party systems.

The data in this Table is, also, somewhat supportive of the theory that parties contribute to tenure length. In coun­ tries with modern parties, 33% of all tenures fall into the 254

TABLE 7.9

EXECUTIVE TENURE IN STRONG, MODERATELY STRONG, AND WEAK PARTY SYSTEMS BETWEEN 1870 AND 19 20

YEARS SERVED

minus 1 1 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 10 over 10

Strong Parties

Argentina 0 1 7 7 Chi le 5 0 1 9 Colomb ia 13 5 5 6 Ecuador 4 0 3 7 Nicaragua 8 3 4 4 1 Paraguay 9 5 7 4

Total 43 17 31 41 1 Percentage 31% 12% 23% 33% 1%

Moderately Strong Parties

Bolivia 2 1 6 6 Costa Rica 17 2 5 6 Guatemala 2 0 0 2 2 Honduras 26 4 9 2 Peru 11 4 6 5

Total 58 11 26 21 2 Percentage 49% 9% 22% 181 2%

Weak Parties

Dom Rep 11 5 6 1 El Salvador 6 1 1 9 Haiti 8 1 2 6 Mexico 9 2 1 3 1 Venezuela 4 3 3 5 1

Total 33 12 13 24 Percentage 42% 131 14% 27% 4% TABLE 7.10 255

NUMBER OF PRESIDENTS SERVING VARIOUS TERMS BY COUNTRIES WITH AND WITHOUT MODERN PARTIES

YEARS SERVED

minus 1 1 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 10 over 10

Countries With Modern Party or Parties

Argentina 1920-1970 4 3 7 3 Bolivia 1945-1970 7 2 3 3 Brazil 1945-1970 6 1 4 2 Chi le 1920-1970 16 1 0 7 Colombia 1920-1970 3 3 2 9 Costa Rica 1945-1970 1 1 0 5 Cuba 1920-1970 6 1 2 5 1 Guatemala 1945-1970 5 0 3 3 Honduras 1945-1970 0 1 0 3 Mexico 1920-1970 1 1 2 8 Paraguay 1920-1970 9 3 3 3 1 Peru 1920-1970 9 3 1 5 1 Uruguay 1920-1970 5 2 1 5 Venezuela 1945-1970 1 2 2 3

Total 73 24 30 64 3 Percentage 38% 12% 15% 33% 2%

Countries Without Modern Party or Parties

Bolivia 1920-1945 4 2 4 2 Brazil 1920-1945 1 0 1 1 1 Costa Rica 1920-1945 4 0 2 5 Dom Rep 1920-1970 5 6 1 5 1 Ecuador 1920-1970 18 3 6 4 El Salvador 1920-1970 6 0 2 7 1 Guatemala 1920-1945 5 0 0 2 1 Haiti 1920-1970 7 0 0 4 2 Honduras 1920-1945 2 0 0 3 1 Nicaragua 1920-1970 6 2 4 4 1 Panama 1920-1970 15 4 7 4 Venezuela 1920-1945 0 0 2 2 1

Total 73 17 29 43 9 Percentage 43% 101 17% 2 5% 5% 256 four to ten year range, while only 251 of the tenures in countries without modern parties fall into this range.

Similarly, "countries with" have fewer tenures of less than a year (38%) than do "countries without" (45%). In both cases, however, the margins are small and do not allow any clear conclusion. Rather, the data suggests that the direc­ tion of the hypothesis that political parties relate posi­ tively to long tenure may be valid but not in any definitive sense .

Successions and Tenure

This section concerns the relationship between tenure patterns and modes of succession. It is hypothesized here that electoral democracy is significant in Latin America.

Furthermore, a manifestation of this is that presidents at­ taining office through election will serve longer terms than those executives using violencias or imposiciones. To test this argument, a calculation was made of the relationship between tenure and type of executive succession. The number and percentage of each type of succession was given for the periods of tenure used previously and the results are seen in Table 7.11. It shows that 58% of the men elected and 47% of those using imposi'cirfh served, four years or more, while only 18% of those coming to power by way of violencia served such a term. 257

TABLE 7.11

EXECUTIVE TENURE BY ELECTION, IMPOSICION AND VIOLENCIA

YEARS SERVED8

minus 1 1 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 10 over 10

Election number 10 12 33 12 percentage 9% 25% 55% 3%

Impos icion number 52 40 85 139 16 percentage 12% 25% 42% 5%

Violencia number 78 30 48 30 percentage 411 16% 2 5% 16% 2%

Violencia/ Imposicion number 2 5 19 4 percentage 7% 17% 63% 13%

Total number 140 84 171 260 28 percentage 211 2 5% 38% 3%

aThe column categories are to, but do not include, the written number. In column two, for example, the data includes executives who served between 1 year and 1 year, 11 months, and 30 days. 258

This data suggests that the tenure of any non- provisional executive is related to electoral democracy. The closer an executive comes to approximating the democratic ideal to attain office, the greater his chances for a longer term. Interestingly, those who came to power through vio­ lent change and then conducted an imposjcion to legitimize their position, fared better than the men in any of the other categories. Whatever the situation, the hypothesis relating succession mode and tenure positively is valid.

Chapter Summary

Historically, the imposicion occurs with greater frequency than either elections or violencias in Latin

America. In the twentieth century, however, it has de­ clined sharply. The phenomenon of imposiciori is only weakly related, if at all, to party systems. It does relate posi­ tively to educational development; the greater the level of educational development, the less propitious and educational is the environment for impos icion. Both historical trends, then, indicate that the impos icion will become less signify icant mode of succession.

Using tenure as a measure of institutionalization, the evidence indicates that the Latin American executive office is become more institutionalized. Mean terms are moving toward congruence with constitutional terms. Occu­ pation has almost no affect upon tenure. The relationship 259

between political parties and tenure is unclear. Con­ sidering parties and tenure in the period 1870-1920,

longer term patterns occurred in both the strongest and weakest party systems, while moderately strong party sys­

tems had the shortest tenures. Perhaps the relationship

between parties and tenure is not linear. If this is the

case, it would explain the fact that the tests showed par­

ties in the period 1920-1970 had no impact UDon tenure.

The relationship between tenure and modes of succession

is very clear. The longer tenures occur with elections

and the shorter with violencias. Imnos iciones fall in

between, closer to electoral levels than violencia levels. CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE

The purposes of this study are two-fold; first, to describe the backgrounds of Latin American chief exec^ utives and their patterns of succession; and second, to utilize this descriptive data to quantitatively measure and statistically test causal relationships frequently ascribed to Latin American political life. This chapter reviews the basic findings of the study and analyzes the significance of the findings for understanding and pre­ dicting trends in Latin American politics.

Presidential Backgrounds

The backgrounds of persons achieving the office of the chief executive in Latin America indicate that

"informal requisites" constitute rigorous parameters for determining effective access to the presidency. This is not unusual. Studies of elite backgrounds inevitably find that individuals with certain characteristics are consistently favored in the process of elite selection.

While individuals without the "preferred" characteristics do achieve office, quantitatively speaking, their real opportunities are extremely limited. Again, this is true of political elites everywhere. In Latin America, however,

260 261

elite recruitment occurs in a highly stratified context,

and the findings here suggest that the "necessary cluster

of informal requisites" encourage an orientation toward

predominantly upper class values and preferences. That

is, individuals who pass through the institutional ma­

trix common to the experience of most chief executives

are likely members of the upper classes. For those who

are not, the institutions themselves purvey values con­

gruent with upper class orthodoxy. Taken as a whole, the

backgrounds of the Latin American chief executives point

toward stratified socialization processes likely to re­ sult in a particular outlook.

Presidential recruitment is influenced by age,

place of birth, education, class origin, and occupation.

The process favors individuals who are older, urban-born,

educated, upper and middle class, with professional oc­

cupational careers. The data in Chapter III shows that a sizeable majority of Latin American presidents achieve office between the ages of forty and sixty. This is

hardly surprising. Political elites everywhere tend to reach positions of national prominence during these years.

The high incidence of urban-born presidents is a

more distinguishing feature of executive recruitment in

Latin America. Historically, Latin American demography was overwhelmingly rural. Yet, since the period of polit­

ical independence, fully 89% of all presidents were born 262 in towns and cities. Even more striking is the high in­ cidence (67%) of executives born in capital cities, both national and state. This finding indirectly supports the argument that in Latin America national governments have

"governed the cities" leaving the governance of the coun­ tryside to the power machinations of regional hacendados and caudillos. This is particularly likely in light of the traditional disdain with which Latin American urban elites view rural life and rural peoples, especially im­ poverished rural dwellers. This pattern likely reflects and/or contributes to the megacephalic quality that char­ acterizes national government in Latin America.

The high educational levels achieved by Latin

American chief executives is not unusual among political elites. Background studies inevitably find that such elites are drawn from the better educated sectors of so­ ciety. However, in Latin America, the implications are more manifold because access to quality education has been and is very limited. As detailed in Chapter III, roughly half of all primary school age children enter school, and only eight percent of those entering complete school at this level. By contrast, fully 98% of all Latin

American chief executives completed primary school.

Stated alternatively, 96% of the primary school age chil­ dren receive either no education or such limited educations 263 that their opportunities for achieving a presiden­ tial office are practically nil. The influence of edu­ cation upon executive recruitment is further seen in the high proportion of college trained presidents. Roughly

70% of all Latin American presidents received some col­ lege education or training in a military college. Of course, opportunities for a university education in Latin

America are extremely limited and include strong class preferences. Particularly, in the nineteenth century college was available for members of the upper class and a handful of persons from the "middle sectors."

Given this relationship between educational op­ portunity and class structure, it is hardly surprising that 93% of all Latin American chief executives come from the upper and middle classes, with a maiority (54%) from the former. Over time, individuals from the upper classes predominated in the nineteenth century, while persons from the middle class predominate in the twentieth century.

When class and recruitment are considered by country ac­ cording to socio-racial type, upper class presidents tend to occur most frequently in Traditional Indian, Mestizo, and European countries. Middle and lower class chief executives are found in greater numbers in Mulatto and

Revolutionary Indian states. The incidence of presidents of middle class origin in Revolutionary Indian countries increases dramatically in the post-Revolutionary period. 264

Similarly, countries where the middle sectors have most fully evolved -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and

Uruguay -- draw a greater proportion of chief executives from that sector than is the case in the rest of Latin

America.

These findings indicate that executive recruit­ ment is affected by both revolutionary occurrences and evolutionary changes in class structure. In the area as a whole, a middle class "revolution" in recruitment appears to have occurred since 1920. Most Latin American chief executives now come from the middle class. But, the emergence of middle class presidents is most strik­ ing in contexts characterized by significant change.

The influence of abrupt change upon recruitment is seen in Guatemala, Bolivia, and Mexico. In all three countries, the incidence of presidents of middle class origin in­ creased dramatically following revolution. Of course,

Mexico is also one of the countries designated by Johnson as having a "mature" middle sector. However, the social structures of Bolivia and Guatemala remain largely tradi­ tional and undifferentiated. They are basically two-class societies consisting of large numbers of lower class pea^ ants and laborers and a miniscule upper class. No mid­ dle sector of any size has emerged in either Bolivia or

Guatemala. Hence, the revolutionary experience would seem to be a basis for changes in executive recruitment. 265

Elsewhere, fundamental socio-economic transformations are reflected in changes in executive recruitment.

Occupationally, about half of the presidents in

Latin America come from civilian careers and half from the military. Most civilians are from the professions, particularly law, education, journalism, and medicine.

Too, most had previous experience in public life as legislators, party leaders, or government officials.

Historically, the incidence of civilian executives has increased, although this increase has become almost im­ perceptible in the twentieth century. By the same token, the incidence of soldier-presidents has decreased slightly since the turn of the century. However, when professional and insurgent soldier-presidents are considered separately, the incidence of professional soldier-presidents has in­ creased noticeably in the post World War II period. Mili­ tary presidents occur with greatest frequency in countries with high illiteracy rates and undifferentiated socio­ economic contexts.

The particular cluster of background characteris­ tics found among the presidents of the twenty Latin Amer­ ican republics are markedly homogeneous and persistently reflective of upper class values. The similarity in presidential backgrounds suggests that Latin American chief executives arise out of very similar institutional contexts. Most, as we have seen, are born in middle or 266

upper class circumstances, live in towns and cities, had

lengthy formal educations, and pursued professional ca­

reers, Executive recruitment systems in Latin America

are basically alike in the sense that people exposed to

similar socializing institutions achieve executive office.

Whatever the country, recruitment processes involve a

common institutional network. Access to this network is

largely limited to those who are socially and economi­

cally powerful or to those who have been exposed to in­

stitutions traditionally supportive of powerful societal

elements.

The Latin American militaries provide alternative

recruitment systems. Soldier-presidents need only achieve

success within the military and, hence, are not exposed

to the same institutions as civilians. This is reflected

in the findings on educational and class backgrounds out­

lined in Chapters III and IV. All of the presidents with no formal education achieved the office of the chief exec-:

utive following insurgent or professional military ca­

reers. Moreover, soldier-presidents account for 891 of

the Latin American chief executives born in the lower

class.

Latin American presidential recruitment, then,

involves two separate systems, civilian and military.

Access to the civilian recruitment system is limited

largely to upper and middle class citizens who are also 267

city dwellers and professionals. In the nineteenth cen­

tury, this system was highly elitist in that access to

the institutions through which presidents emerged was

available to very few other than the socially and eco-

nomically powerful. In the twentieth century, the oppor­

tunities for political mobility have expanded to incor­

porate a larger portion of society; i.e., middle class

elements. On the other hand, the other background vari­

ables common to civilian presidents have persisted. Ac­

cess to the presidency through the military provides op­

portunities for those who would otherwise likely be ex­

cluded from any chance to achieve executive office.

Presidential Successions

Executive succession in Latin America involves

three modes -- elections, violencias , and imposiciones.

The imposicion has been the most frequently utilized

mode, although its usage has declined markedly since

1920. Historically, violencias have occurred with less

frequency than impos iciones and greater frequency than

elections. However, while the impos icion has declined

in the twentieth century, violencias have consistently

accounted for about 25% of all turnovers. Elections have been the least utilized mode, but their incidence has

increased since 1920 at a rate roughly paralleling the decline in irrmosi clones. 268

The relationship between elections and four inde­ pendent variables -- socio-economic development, communi­ cations development, militarism, and participatory groups

(political parties and labor organization) -- was consid­

ered in Chapter V. The tests show a positive correlation

between elections and socio-economic and communications

development, a negative correlation with militarism, and no correlation with participatory groups. That is, elec­

tions occur more frequently where social, economic, and communications systems are more developed, and less fre­ quently where militarism occurs. The presence of partic­

ipatory groups has no impact upon the incidence of elec­

tions .

In Chapter VI, violencias were treated as a de­ pendent variable and tested against seven independent variables -- cultural context, socio-racial type, econom­

ic opportunities, urbanization, militarism, and partic­

ipatory groups. A positive relationship between the in­ cidence of violencia and militarism exists. The rela­

tionship between violencia and urbanization is negative.

Violencias, then, occur with greater frequency in the more rural societies of Latin America and where militarism

is more prevalent. Otherwise, no statistically signifi­ cant correlations were found.

Chapter VII concerned imposiciones and tenure patterns. Impos iciones are positively related to levels 269 of educational development; i.e., the higher the level of educational development, the less likely imposiciones will occur. Executive tenures are lengthening in Latin Ameri­ ca, moving closer to constitutional norms. Longer tenures are positively related to elections and negatively related to violericias ; that is , tenures are longer where elections are more frequent and shorter where violencias are more frequent.

The Significance of the Study for Understanding and Predicting Trends i-n Latin American Politics

In recent years a growing body of theoretical literature has argued that politically-relevant behavior is the proper focus of political inquiry. Proponents of a behavioral approach argue that analytically it is im­ practical to cast politics in a formal-legal framework because constitutionalism is not the modal pattern for political interaction, From a methodological point of view, this argument is persuasive. Unfortunately, how­ ever, a behavioral focus tends to treat formal-legal variables summarily, if at all. This is particularly true where polities are characterized by continued vio­ lation of constitutional\£f rules. Of course,' Latin Ameri- ca is characterized by precisely such violations and con­ temporary interpretations of politics there usually yiew repeated abuses of constitutional provisions as accepted 270 features of the political system which operate indepen­ dently of formal rules. The problem with a behavioral focus is that it includes a strong tendency to dismiss formal-legal rules as irrelevant to the operation of the

"real system" and to ignore the influences of either con­ stitutional compliance or violation upon behavior.

Constitutionalism and Executive Power

It is likely, however, that constitutionalism does make a difference. Although no studies of the in­ fluence of constitutionalism upon behavior exist, it is logically a major influence. This is especially true for the Latin American chief executive. The institutionali­ zation of recruitment and succession patterns that are unconstitutional seriously impairs the effective exer­ cise of executive power because it implies a highly ten­ tative nature of tenure in Latin America. In the con­ temporary nation-state with its varied interests and ex­ tensive bureaucratic apparatus policy formulation and implementation are difficult enough. Tentative tenure systems contribute to these difficulties by introducing the element of the unknown with all its attendant practi­ cal and psychological implications.

Consider the implications of the theories by

Charles Anderson and James Payne which were discussed earlier and are suggestive of the consequences of the 271

tentative tenure systems upon the effective power of

Latin American presidents. Having described the linkages

between groups, power capabilities, and the threat of im­

minent deposition, Anderson concludes:

Revolution requires exceptional leadership of a certain style to succeed, and those who have possessed it, the Maderos, Zapatas, Castros , and Bolivars and San Martins , have entered the ranks of the vivid personal heroes of Latin American history. But there is another style of leadership relevant to the conduct of Latin American government, and there is no reason to believe that it is less available in this cul­ ture than that represented by the revolutionary politician in arms. The skills at the craft of politics, of working within the system to the end by transcending it, have been exemplified by men like Betancourt, Frondizi, Figueres, Lleras Camargo, Lopez Mateos , and many others. They had their historic predecessors in such figures as Sarmiento -and Juarez. Their skills and capabilities are not to be despised. In fact, set within the context of the system in which "they have operated, and against the background of man's efforts to govern himself, they often appear as little short of incredible.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from Payne's study of the political system of Peru. lie notes that ex­ ecutive behavior is strongly conditioned by the continu­

ing threat of military intervention. The chief executive,

Payne argues, is all-responsible but by no means all- powerful. "He is situated between a ravenous opposition on the one side and an ambivalent military on the other.

As the political temperature rises -- strikes, solidarity

•'-Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, p. 114, emphasis addecH 272 strikes, demonstrations, clashes, deaths, protest demon­ strations --the tenure of the chief executive becomes in­ creasingly uncertain.

Although the policy consequences of tentative tenure is a highly speculative topic, it is logical that they are negative. This negative influence is at least two-fold. First, all decisions must be made within the context nf potential deposition. This likely limits the options available to the president. Second, tentative tenure likely influences the policy levels and areas ad­ dressed by the chief executive. Payne notes that the president, acting as arbiter, becomes deeply involved in

Peruvian labor-management negotiations. That is, his attention is consumed by tactical questions rather tha,n general policy considerations.

This has important consequences for Latin America because the social and economic evolution of the area is linked to the performance of the state which is led by the president. The extensive role of the state in economy ic matters is widely acknowledged. Evidently, Latin

America's financial and economic relations with the economically developed areas are perennially disadvanta­ geous to the Latin Americans. Market mechanisms, allowed

2Payne, Politics and Labor in Peru, p, 163, 273 to operate freely, results in undevelopment., or, in the severest of cases, virtual retrogression. Whether or not this observation can be empirically verified is moot.

Latin American elites accept this thesis and the economic role of the state will likely increase throughout the continent. An effective state, able to implement poli­ cies consistently and effectively, is crucial to the overall evolution of the region.

Effective government in Latin Ame rica will ema- ' nate from the presidency. Chapter 2 of this study de- tails experiments with alternative execu tive systems.

Monarchies and life consuls have not thr ived. Parlia- mentary and collegial systems have been ineffectual. More- over, cultural, historical, and institut ional factors along with formal-legal provisions are support ive of presidential government.

Executive Recruitment and Power: Soldiers vs. Civilians

A striking aspect of executive recruitment in Latin

America is the prominent role of the mil itary. Throughout history, the military has served as a ma ior fount of future presidents. Students of Latin America have long noted the capacity of the military to make use of its power as perhaps the single most organized institution pr esent in the societies under consideration. The military as an institution is in an 274 enviable position in Latin America. It can command obedi­ ence through the threat and use of force as well as through organizational competence. But the future impace of the military in executive recruitment is unclear.

Trend analysis shows that the incidence of soldier- presidents has increased sharply in the twenty-five year period since 1945. Military presidents, however, occur most frequently in environments characterized by illiter­ acy and undifferentiated socio-economic systems. Cur­ rently, a trend exists in Latin America toward higher educational and literacy levels and greater social and economic complexity. If the historical trend observed since 1945 continues, the incidence of military presidents will increase. If societal changes prevail as causal variables, they will decrease with the socio-economic development of the region.

Countervailing civilian political institutions are another dimension of socio-economic differentiation.

Presumably, as persons organize on a socio-economic basis political institutionalization also occurs. Chapter 4 shows that the presence of countervailing civilian in­ stitutions, i.e., political parties, affects the influ­ ence of the military in executive recruitment. Around the turn of the century, such civilian organizations lessened the significance of the military. Contrarily, the emergence of more modern, mass-based parties since 275

1920 had no such impact, and may even have contributed to the military's prominent role in recruitment.

This suggests that countervailing civilian in­ stitutions, in and of themselves, do not have a direct bearing upon the incidence of military presidents. An alternative explanation focuses upon the values and poli­ cies such institutions represent. Accordingly, the in­ cidence of soldier-presidents would be more directly re­ lated to matters of policy than organizational structure.

The political parties that existed in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were extremely elitist.

Programmatically, they were supportive of the existing social structure. With the appearance of these parties,

Latin American militarism declined.

The political parties that emerged after World

War I were reform movements that sought to.incorporate the masses into national political life and which rhetor­ ically threatened to redistribute the wealth of the upper classes among the masses. Typical of such movements were the various Aprista parties, Mexico's PRI, and the Argen­ tine Radicals. They were dominated largely by middle sector elements. The emergence of these parties with their threat to the status quo coincides with increasing militarism. It seems likely, then, that during this peri­ od the military intervened in response to the destabiliz­ ing impact of mass political movements and their 276 programmatic implications. Hence, countervailing civilian institutions relate to militarism, but the direction of the relationship results from matters of policy. Indeed, policy issues are the maior factor underlying the increas­ ing incidence of soldier-presidents since 1945.

This seems a propitious era for the Latin Ameri­ can military. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, a rash of military governments took power. The United

States, a maior influence in Latin America, placed its seal of approval on the military alternative in the

Rockefeller Report. But, more than anything else, the alluring notion of a "modernizing military" provided a much more impressive rationale for military rule than those traditionally offered. Indeed, this modernizing role is most likely crucial to the future impact of the

Latin American military upon executive recruitment.

No longer is military intervention seen as merely a stop-gap measure to prepare the way for a return to civilian government. As the contemporary Brazilian and

Peruvian cases most vividly point out, the military has achieved a new level of competence in its understanding of political, social, and economic problems. The phenom,-,- ena of the "cientificos" of another era has been reborn under the guise of a "modernizing military", -justifying long term military rule as the path to social and economy ic progress. 277

Over the short run, the military may well be an

effective modernizer, especially in commanding the econ­

omy. On the other hand are the long term social and po­

litical consequences certain to arise under conditions of protracted military dominance of society. Military

governments face the very serious problem of legitimizing

the new order. The legitimacy of such regimes rest upon

a successful modernization program or, in a more ultimate sense, the threat or use of armed force. These are very shaky underpinnings for any regime. Modernization pro­

grams are perceived chiefly in economic terms , and the

Latin American economies are notoriously volatile. In­

deed, Latin America illustrates the fact that the paths

of development are not necessarily always toward growth or linear in nature. Since the Wars of Independence, the economies have fluctuated from periods of heady expansion

to periods of stagnation to periods of retrogression.

Sustained growth lias proven an elusive goal.

In the absence of strong economic performance,

the military applies force to reduce the possibility of challenge to its regime and, in doing so, reduces com­ munication and participation among the groups of society.

To further its own survival, military government follows a calculated program of "militarizing" society. Such a context is hardly propitious for modernization. Moderni­

zation involves expanding the opportunity to participate. 278

While military regimes may well expand the opportunities

for economic participation, they greatly restrict the

opportunities for political participation. Socially,

military regimes seem to represent middle sector ele­

ments. They have demonstrated little responsiveness to

the entire spectrum of class needs. The chances that the

military in Latin America will prove successful as a

modernizer are remote, at best. Over the long run,

modernization involves changing society by expanding the

opportunities for participation. Just as change is a

requisite for Latin America's modernization, so too is a

flexible social, economic, and political environment necessary to promote conditions conducive to change.

It is likely, then, that the phenomenon of the soldier-president will decline. The Latin American mili­

taries will become less significant in executive recruit­

ment. In Chapter IV, it was shown that the incidence of military regimes relates to levels of social, economic,

and communications development. It is in precisely the more developed socio-economic environments that civilians flourish. Logically, successful modernizing military re­

gimes sow the seeds of their own passing. Unsuccessful regimes lack the political base for lengthy existence.

Over a protracted period, effective government,

even one committed to change and modernization, requires

levels of support that transcend the vagaries of the 279 economy. The notion of the military as a modernizer has contributed to a surge of military presidence in the peri­ od 1945-1970. But this should prove a transitional phase. The key is political legitimacy which is precisely what military regimes lack.

Executive Succession and Power

As noted above, Latin America lacks effective government. The experience of the region seems to verify

Samuel Huntington's argument that a precondition of socio-economic growth is effective government, and, specifically, the building of effective nolitical insti- tutions. Unfortunately, the most effective political institution, in Latin America, the presidency, is akin to a "revolving door." A maiority of all Latin American presidents serve less than two years. Tncleed, 43% serve terms of less than a single year. The whole of Latin

American history, however, indicates a gradual shifting toward longer presidential terms. This is a very hope­ ful sign.

At a minimum, effective government requires some prospect for continuity in office. Without time to es­ tablish control and "oress policy alternatives with con­ sistency, government is largely immobilized and subsequently

^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press" 1968). 280 rendered ineffective. In Latin America, lengthier tenure patterns are strongly related to non-coercive turnovers, and particularly, to elections. Ironosiciones also relate to longer tenures, but this is largely due to its use during lengthy dictatorial regimes. Violencias, on the other hand, are characterized by short tenures.

Fully 5 7% of all violencias end in tenures of less than two years. By far, the greatest user of vio- lencia is the military which accounts for 84% of all violencias. Moreover, the incidence of soldier-presidents, as seen in Chapter IV, is related to illiteracy and less complex socio-economic environments. The finding here, then, is that violencias result in short terms and occur in environments that are socially and economically "under­ developed." If such phenomena are related to absolute levels of development, violencias should decrease in the future. On the other hand, if they are "pathological" to the area and their frequency is a relative matter, the violencia is here to stay. If this is so, violencias will continue as a maior mode of succession, and frequent turnovers will, also, likely occur along with ineffective government.

The fact that ijiyposicjones are related to length­ ier tenures must not be misconstrued, Host long-term dictators in Latin America have utilized the i mp os i cion or one of its variants to clothe dictatorship in the 281 fabric of democracy. Pnrfirio Diaz, dictator of Mexico, used the iirposicion seven times over a span of twenty- five years. More recently, Alfredo Stroessner, dictator of Paraguay since 1954 , has used the i nm o s i c i on five times. Finally, the evidence in Chanter VII shows that the imposicirin is related to low educational levels.

Presumably, with the large amount of government spending now going into education in Latin America, the incidence of the imposicion will decline.

The election is the efficacious succession mode for the evolution and development of Latin America. It is strongly related to longer tenure patterns. Chapter

V shows that elections tend to occur in precisely those environments which Latin Americans are attempting to de­ velop; i.e., environments that are socially and economi­ cally developed with extensive communications networks.

Too, history seems supportive of the electoral process.

Throughout the nineteenth century, it remains a "token" mode of succession, but in the twentieth century, its use has increased markedly.

The evidence here supports Martin Needier's con­ tention that Latin America suffers a "legitimacy gap."

According to Needier, democratic ideology is present in

Latin America, but historical circumstances around the period of the IVars of Independence gave rise to authori­ tarian ideologies which continue to compete with 282

democracy. As a result:

Stability on the basis of a nondemocratic offi­ cial ideology is not possible. Attempts to achieve such stability are made from time to time but today they are bound to fail. Short of a totally democratic stability, there can only be either a state of permanent instabil­ ity or an unstable state steadily modified in the direction of greater fidelity to democrat­ ic norms. It has been repeatedly made evident that politically conscious Latin Americans ac­ cept without question the norms of the complex of democratic public ideas, at least as_ norms /

The comparatively successful performance of elec­

ted executives in terms of tenure supports the statement

that democratic elections are the most legitimate mode

of succession in Latin America. As democratic elections

are based upon a constellation of democratic norms, it

is likely that additional democratic tenets are prevalent

in Latin America. Democracy may well be the prevailing

Latin American ideology.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to systematically explore the question of ideology in Latin America and the place of electoral democracy in the hierarchy of values.

Consider, however, Teodoro Petkoff's analysis of the

]963 Venezuelan elections. Petkoff, a Marxist who was

a member of the Venezuelan Communist Party until 1971

and who fought as a guerrilla against the Betancourt and

^Martin Needier, Political Development in Latin America (New York: Random House, 196 8), p~^ 2 7. 283

Leoni governments, argues:

The 1963 elections took place in the period when the armed struggle reached its climax and, nevertheless, the electoral process became the most important political phenomenon in the coun­ try, absorbing the interest and passion of the masses. We did not understand that under the conditions of the time, in a country shaken by the armed struggle, with a democracy still un­ stable, with the army restless, these elections could have aggravated the contradictions in Venezuelan society and our movement could have emerged much stronger by participating in them.0

More evidence is needed, but the tentative conclu­ sion here is that electoral democracy is very salient to the evolution of Latin America. In practical terms, this means that effective government is related to the electoral process. In recent years, formal-legal mecha­ nisms, and elections in particular, have been treated as

"irrelevancies" in the literature on Third World countries.

The thrust of this literature has maintained that democ­ racy is fine where economic abundance and a modicum of social welfare are present, but that such political nice­ ties are irrelevant where masses of people live in econom­ ic want and soci al despair. This same developmental literature focus es upon the utility of a tutelary elite leading the unwa shed toward the cornucopia of economic abundance. Curr ently, it is widely argued that the

^Norman G all, "Teodoro Petkoff: The Crisis of the Professional Revolutionary," (American Universities Field Staff Repo rt, August, 1973), p. 4. 284 institution of the military possesses characteristics which make it efficacious for undertaking iust such a tutelary role. The findings here contradict such a view.

Effective government in an institutional sense requires some consideration of prevailing political values. In

Latin America, elections seem to make a difference. In the long run, they may well be the most utilitarian in­ strument for establishing effective government and address­ ing social and economic problems. APPENDIX I

PRESIDENT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

aThe occupations are designated by the following: a = author, b = businessman, e = educator, g = government official, h = landowner, i = engineer, i = iournalist, 1 = lawyer, m = military, mi = military insurgent, p = physician, pm = public man, uk = unknown, x = clergyman, and z = architect.

^The class is designated by the following: u = upper class, m = middle class, and 1 = lower class,

cThe education is designated by the following: c = college graduate, ct = tutorial education (equivalent to college), ca = attended college, cu = some formal education but level unknown, s = secondary education, p = primary education, mc = military college, u = no formal education, and uk = unknown.

Argentina

Age Occu.a Class^ Ed.° Birthplace

Mitre, Bartolome 40 m/i/a/pm u mc Buenos Aires Paz, Marcos 52 l/pm uk c Tucuman, Tucuman Sarmiento, Domingo F. 57 e/a/j/pm m s San Juan,Cordoba Avellaneda, 37 m u c Tucuman, Tucuman Nicolas Roca, Julio Argentine 37 m u s Tucuman, Tucuman Juarez Celman, 42 l/pm u c Cordoba, Corboda Miguel Pellegrini , 44 l/pm u c Buenos Aires Carlos Pena, Luis Saenz 70 l/pm u c Buenos Aires Uriburu, Jose 63 1/pm/gd u c Salta, Salta Evaristo Quintana, Manuel 68 l/pm uk c Buenos Aires Figueroa Alcorta 45 l/pm u c Cordoba, Cordoba Jose Saenz Pena, Roque 59 1/gd u c Buenos Aires de la Plaza, 73 1/g uk c Salta, Salta Victorino Irigoyen, 66 m u mc Buenos Aires Hipolito

285 286

Argentina--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Torcuato, Marcelo 54 1/pm u c Buenos Aires Uruburi, Jose F. 62 m u 111C Salta, Salta Justo, Agustin P. 55 m uk mcc Concepcion de Uruguay, Entre Rios Ortiz, Roberto M. 51 1/b/pm uk c Buenos Aires Castillo, Ramon S. 69 g.i/e uk c Catamarca, Raws on, Arturo 58 m uk mc Santiago del Es tero, Santiago del Estero Ramirez, Pedro P. 59 m m mc LaPaz, Entre Rios Farrell, Eldemiro 57 m uk mc Avellaneda, B. A. Peron, Juan Domingo 50 m m mc Lobos , Buenos Aries Lonardi , Eduardo 59 m m m.c uk Aramburu, Pedro 52 m uk mc Rio Cuarto, Cordoba Frondizi, Arturo 49 1/e/pm m c Paso de los Libres , Corrientes Guido, Jose Maria 51 1/pm uk c uk Illia, Arturo 63 p/pm m c Pergamino, B.. Ongania, Juan Carlos 52 m m mc Marcos Paz, B. A. Levingston, Roberto 50 m m mc uk M. 287

Bolivia

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Bolivar, Simon 42 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela de Sucre, Antonio 30 m u s Cumana, Jose Vene zuela de Urdininea, Jose"' 44 uk uk uk LaPaz M. Perez de Velasco, Jose'' 33 m uk uk Santa Cruz, Miguel Santa Cruz Blanco, Pedro 33 uk uk uk Cochabamb a, Cochabamba Santa Cruz, Andre's 35 m u s Huarina, LaPaz Serrano, Jose" 51 uk uk uk Sucre, Mariano Chuquisaca Ballivian, Jose 37 mi u - ca LaPaz Guillarte, Eusebio 48 m uk uk LaPa z Belzu, Manuel Isidoro 39 m 1 P LaPaz Cordova, Jorge 33 m uk uk LaPaz Linares , Jose" Maria 47 1/gd u c Potosi, Potosi de Acha, Jose" Maria 51 m uk uk Cochabamba, Cochabamba Melgarejo, Mariano 44 m 1 n Tarata , Cochabamba Frias, Tomas 68 pm/g uk c Potosf, Potosi Morales , Agustin 63 m uk uk LaPaz Ballivian, Adolfo 41 m u mc LaPaz Daza, Hilaron 36 m 1 P Sucre, Chuquisaca Campero, Narciso 67 m u c Toio, Tarija Pacheco, Gregorio 61 b m uk Potosi, Potosi Area, Aniceto 64 b m uk Tariia, Tarija Baptista, Mariano 60 b/pm uk c Cochabamba, Cochabamba Fernaxtdez Alonso, 47 1/gd m c Sucre, Servo Chuquisaca Reyes Ortiz, Serapio 76 pm uk uk LaPaz Pando, Jose" Manuel 50 m uk uk Araca, LaPaz Montes, Ismael 42 m/l/g m c LaPaz Villazon, Eliodoro 61 1/pm uk c Sacaba, Cochabamba Gutierrez Guerra, 47 b u - ca Sucre, Jose" Chuquis aca Saavedre, Bautista 49 1/e/pm uk c LaPaz Guzman, Felipe 46 e uk uk LaPaz Siles , Hernando 44 1/e/gd u c Sucre, Chuquisaca Blanco Galindo, 48 m uk uk Cochabamba, Carlos Cochabamba 288

Bolivia--Continued

Age Occu. C]ass Ed. Birthplace

Salamanca, Daniel 68 e/pm u c Cochabamba, Cochabamba Teiada Sorzano, Jose 52 b m c LaPaz Toro Ruilova, David 37 m m mc Sucre, Chuquisaca Busch, German 33 m m mc San Javiar de Chiquitos , Santa Cruz Quintanilla, Carlos 51 m uk mc Cochabamba, Cochabamba Penaranda, Enrique 47 m 1 mc Sorata, LaPaz Villarroel, Gualberto 34 m uk mc Villa Rivero, Cochabamba Arenas , Damaso uk m uk uk uk Guillen, Nestor 56 1/gi/pm uk c. uk Monje Gutierrez, 61 1/gi/pm uk c Coroico Tomas Hertzog, Jose Enrique 49 p/e/pm u c LaPaz Urriolagoitia, 54 g/pm/gd u c Sucre , Mamerto Chuquisaca Ballivian, Hugo 50 m uk uk LaPaz Siles Zuazo, Hernan 42 1/pm u c LaPaz Paz Estenssoro, 44 1/e/pm m c Tariia, Tarija Victor Barrientos Ortuno, 44 m m • mc Tarata, Rene" Cochabamba Siles Salines, Luis 44 1/e u c LaPaz Ovando Candia, 51 m uk mc Cobij a Alfredo ^ Torres , Juan Jose"' 49 m 1 mc Cochabamba, Cochabamba 289

Brazil

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Dom Pedro I 24 uk u ct Lisbon, Portugal Dom Pedro 11 16 uk u ct Rio de Janeiro Foriseca, M. 62 m m mc Alagoas, Alagoas Deodoro da Peixoto, Floriano 52 m m mc hacienda near Maceio Morais, Prudente de 53 1/pm u c Itu , Sao Paulo Campos Salles, 57 1/prn uk c Campinas, Manuel de Sao Paulo Rodrigues Alves, 54 1/pm/g u c Guaratingueta, Francisco Sao Paulo Penna, Alfonso 59 1/pm/j u c uk Pecanha, Nilo 42 1/pm m s Rio de Janeiro Fonseca, Hermes da 55 m uk uk uk / Braz, Wenceslau 46 pm uk c Itajuba, Minas Gerais Moreira, Delphim 50 1 m c uk Silva Pessoa, 54 1/pm/gi uk c uk Epitacio da Silva Bernardes, 47 1/pm m c Vicosa, Minas Arturo Gerais Luis, Washington 50 1/pm m c Rio de Janeiro Vargas, Getulio 47 1/pm u c Sao Boria, Rio Grande do Sul Linhares 59 1/gi uk c Baturite, Ceara Dutra, Eurico 60 m m mc Guiaba, Mato Gaspar Grosso Cafe Filho, Joao 55 i /pm m P Natal, Rio Grande do Norte Luz, Carlos 59 h/pin u uk Tres Corac'oes , Minas Gerais Ramos, Nereu 67 1/pm uk c Lagos, Santa Catarina Kubitschek, 53 p/pm m c Diamantina, Juscelino Minas Gerais Quadros, Janio 44 e/pm m c Campo Grande, Mato Grosso Mazzilli, Raniere 51 g/pm m c Caconde , S3o Paulo Goulart, Joao 43 h/pm u c Sao Borja, Rio Grande do Sul Castello Branco, 64 m m mc Fortaleza, Ceara Humberto Costa e Silva, 64 m m mc Taquari, Rio Arthur da Grande do Sul Garrastazu Meclici, 63 m m mc uk Emi1io 290 Chile

Ape Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

0'Higgins , 38 mi' u - ca Chilian, Nuble Bernardo Freire Serrano, 37 m uk mc Santi ago Ramon Blanco Encalada, 36 m uk mc Buenos Aires, Manuel Argentina Eyzaguirre, Agustin 58 b/pm u uk Santiago Pinto Diaz, 52 1/pm/e u c Santi ago Francis co VicuHa Larrain, 51 pm uk uk Santiago Francis co Errazuri z, 54 pm u uk Santiago Fernando de Ruiz Tagle , uk b/pm u uk uk Francisco Ovalle, Jose' Tomas 42 1 uk uk Santiago Prieto Vial, 44 m uk uk Concepcion, Joaquin Concepcion Bulnes Prieto, 41 m uk P Concepcion, Manuel Concepcion Montt Torres, 41 e/l/g/pm m c Pe torca, Manuel Aconcagua Pe'rez Mascayano, 60 gd/pm u c Santiago Jose" Errazuriz Zanartu, 46 1/e/g/pm u c Santiago Federico Pinto Garmendia, 51 e/g/pm u c Santiago An lb a1 Santa Maria G., 56 e/g/pm u c Santiago Domingo Balmaceda, Jose'' 46 .i/g/pm u s Santiago Manuel Baquedano Gonzales, 65 m uk uk Santiago Manue1 Montt Alvarez, 45 m m mc Cas ablanca, Jorge Valparaiso Errazuriz, Federico 46 h/pm u c Santiago Fernandez Albano, 55 1/g uk c Santiago El ias Zanartu Zanartu, 54 1/pm uk c Concepcion, Anibal Concepcion Riesco Errazuriz, 47 1/g i/pm u c Rancagua, German 0'Higgins Montt Montt, Pedro 60 1/g/pm u c Santiago Figueroa Larrain, 44 1/gd/pm uk c Santiago Emi1i ano Barros Luco, Ramon 75 1/g/pm uk c Santiago 291

Chile- - Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Sanfuentes, Juan 56 1/b/g/pm u c Santiago Luis Alessandri, Arturo 52 1/g/pm m c Linares, Linares Altamirano Talavera uk m m uk uk Luis Bello Codesido, 55 1/pm u c Santiago Emilio Barros Borgono, 69 1/g u c Santiago Luis Ibaffez del Campo, 49 m/pm m mc Linares, Carlos Linares Opaso Letelier, 55 b/h/g/pm u c Talca, Talca Pedro Montero Rodriquez, 52 1/e/pm uk c Santiago Juan Trucco Franzani, 57 i/e/gd/pm m c Cauquenas, Manuel Maule Puga Vega, Arturo uk m m uk uk Grove Valleio, 53 m m mc Copiapo, Marmaduke Atacama Davila Espinosa, 45 j/fid m c Los Angeles, Carlos Bio Bio Blanche Espejo, 53 m m mc La Serena, Bartoloine Coquimbo Ovanedel Urrutia, 58 1/gi uk c Copiapo, Abraham Atacama Aguirre Cerda, 59 1/e/pm u c Los Andes, Pedro Aconcagua Mendez Arancibia, 57 p/pm uk c uk Jeronimo Rios Morales, Juan 53 1/pm uk c Canete, Arauco Antonio Duhalde Vazquez, 47 h/pm u c Rio Bueno, Alfredo Valdavia Iribarren Cabezas, 62 e/g m c Vicuna, Juan Coquimbo Gonzales Videla, 47 1/gd/pm m c La Serena, Gabrie1 Coquimbo Alessandri, Jorge 62 i/b m c Santiago Frei Montalva, 53 1/e/a/pm m c Santiago Eduardo Allende, Salvador 62 p/pm m c Valparaiso, Valparaiso 292

Colombia

Age Occu. Class Ed.. Birthplace

Bolivar, Simdn 36 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela Santander, 30 mi u s Rosario de Francisco de P. Cucuta, Norte de Santander Caicedo, Domingo 46 mi/pm u c Bogota Mosquera, Joaquin 42 mi/1/e/a u c Popayan, Cauca Urdaneta, Rafael 41 m 1 s Maracaibo, Venezuela Obando, Jose" Maria 35 m 1 s Guengue, Cauca Marquez, Jose" 38 1/gj/pm u c Ramiriqui, Boyaca Ignacio de Alcantara Herran, 40 mi/pm u P Bogota'' Pedro Dios Aranzazu, 43 1/i/pm u c LaCeia, Antioquia Juan de Mosquera, Tomans 46 m/pm u p Popayan, Cauca Cipriano de Cuervo, Rufino 46 g/gd/j u c Tunia, Boyaca Lo'pez, Jose'' Hilario 51 mi/pm 1 p Popayan, Cauca Melo, Jose" Maria 53 mi m uk Chaparrel, Tolima Herrera, Tomas 53 mi/pm 1 uk Panama" City Obaldia, Jose" de 45 1/pm u c Panama City Mallarino, Manuel 46 1/e/g/pm u c Cali, Valle Maria Ospina Rodriquez, 51 1/j/pm u c Guasca, Mariano Cundinamarca Calvo, Bartolome 45 1/a/g uk c Cartagena, Bolivar Largacha, Froila'n 39 e/i/gi uk c Popayan, Cauca Uricoechea, Juan 39 1/gi u c Bogota' Agustin Murillo Toro, Manuel 41 1/pm uk c Agrado, Huila Riascos, Joaquin 33 m/pm uk uk Chorrera, Panama Acosta, Santos 38 p/mi/pm uk c Miraflores , Boyaca Gutierrez, Santos 47 1/mi/pm uk c El Cocuv , ^ Boyaca Camacho Roldan, 41 1/i/e/pm u c Nunchia, Boyaca" Salvador Salgar, Eustorgio 38 l/g/pm uk c Bogota Perez, Santiago 43 l/.i/g.i uk c Zipaquira, Cundinamarca Parra, Aquileo 49 b/pm 1 s Barichara, Santander Truiillo, Julia"n 50 1/mi uk c Popayan, Cauca Ramirez, Manuel 60 1/e/pm m c Llaneros, Mar fa Santander Norte 293 Colombia--Continued

A^e Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Camargo, Sergio 43 1/pd/mi ulc c Iza, Boyaca" Nunez, Rafael 54 1/h/mi/pm u c Cartagena, Bolivar Zaldua, Francisco 70 1/gi/pm u c Bogota" Javier Calderon, Climaco 30 e/j/ g.i /h/pm uk c Santa Rosa de Vi terbo, Boyaca Otalora, Jose' 54 e/g/mi/pm u c Fomeque, Euseb io Cundinamarca Hurtado, Ezequiel 58 1/mi/pm m c Silvia, Cauca Campo Serrano, Jose" 54 g/mi/nm u s Santa Marta, Mar fa Magdalena Pay an, Eliseo 61 1/g/mi uk c Buga, Valle Holguin, Carlos 56 1/gd/i/a/pm u c Novita, Choco Caro, Miguel Antonio 48 e/i/a/pm m c Bogota" Quintero, Guillermo 64 mi/pm uk s Gamarra, Magdalena Marroquin, Jose" 71 h/a/pm u ca Bogota" Manuel Sanclemente, 84 1/gi/pm u c Buga, Valle Manuel A. Reyes, Rafael 54 b/a/ini/pm m s Santa Rosa de Viterbo, BoyacEf Angulo, Euclides de 66 mi/pm u ca Popayan, Cauca Holguin, Jorge 60 i/b/pm m s Cali, Valle Gonzalez Valencia, 58 m uk c Chitaga, Ramo"n Santander Restrepo, Carlos E. 42 j/a/pm u ca Medellfn, Antioquia Concha, Jose" Vincente 47 1/i/gd/pm u c Bogota" Suarez, Marco Fidel 63 a/pm 1 ca Bello, Antioquia Nel Ospina, Pedro 63 m/gd/pm u ca Bogota'' Abadia Mendez, Miguel 58 1/pm u c Piedras, Tolima Olaya Herrera, 50 1/i/gd/pm m c Guateque, Enrique Boyaca'' Lopez Pumarejo, 48 i/b/a/pm u ca Honda, Tolima A1fonso Santos , Eduardo 49 j/a/pm u c Bogota" Echandia, Dario 46 1/pm u c Chaparral, Tolima Lozano y Lozano, 38 1/gd/pm u c Fusagasuga", Carlos Cundinamarca Lleras Camargo, 39 i/g/pm m ca Bogota' Alberto 294

Colombia--Continued

Age Occu. Clas s Ed. Birthplace

Ospina Pe~rez, 54 e/i/pm u c Medellin, Mariano Antioquia Gomez, Laureano 61 i/a/pm u c Bogota'' Urdaneta, Roberto 61 1/g/pm u c Bogota'* Roias Pinilla, 53 m m mcc Tunja, Boyaca Gustavo Parf*s , Gabriel 45 m m mc Ibague, Tolima Leon Valencia, 57 pm u ca Popayan, Cauca Guillermo Lleras Restrepo, 58 b/j/pm m uk Bogota Carlos Pastrana Borrero, 46 1/pm u c Neiva, Huila Misael 295

Costa Rica

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Mora Fernandez, 40 b/pm u • ca San Jose'' Juan Gallegos, Jose' 48 e/h/pm u s Cartago Rafael de Gutierrez L. , uk 1/pm uk c uk Agustfn Lara Arias, uk uk uk uk Ala juela Juan Jose' Fernandez Chacon, uk h/pm u uk Cartago Manuel Carrillo Colima, 35 g/pm u • ca Cartago Braulio Mora Fernandez, uk uk u uk San Jose Joaquin Aguilar Chaco'n, 39 1/g/pm uk c San Jose Manuel Bonilla Nava, 36 pm uk uk uk Manuel Morazan, Francisco 50 mi m s Tegucigalpa, Honduras Pinto Suarez, 62 m uk uk Oporto, Antonio. Portugal Alfaro Zamora, 43 uk uk uk Alajuela Jose'' Maria Oreamuno, Francisco 43 g/pm u ct Cartago Moya Murillo, 44 pm uk uk San Antonio_ Raf ae1 de Bele"n, Heredia Castro Madriz, 29 g/pm m c San Jose"' Jose' M. Carazo, Manuel J. 40 pm uk uk Cartago Mora Porras, Miguel 33 uk uk uk San Jose'' Mora Porras, Juan 35 b uk uk San Jose"' Rafael Escalante Nava, uk m uk uk Cartago Rafael Montealegre, 44 P u c San Jose" Jose'" Maria Jime'nez Zamora, 39 p/pm u c Cartago Jesus Figueron Oreamuno, 42 1/e/pm u c Cartago Euseb io Carranza Ramirez, 47 1/e/i/pm uk c San Jose' Bruno Uuardia Gutierrez, 37 m uk uk Bagaces, Tomas Guam 296 Costa Rica--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Pinto Castro, uk 1/gj/pm uk c San Jose" Jose A. Gonzales Ramirez, 42 uk uk uk uk Salvador Barroeta Baca, 60 b u s Cartago Rafae1 Lizano Gutierrez, 45 e/pm uk uk Heredia Joaquin Esquivel Saenz, 52 1/pm uk c Cartago Aniceto Herrera Zeledon, 55 e/pm uk c San Jose Vicente Lara Zamora, 41 pm uk uk uk Salvador Lizano Gutierrez, 55 pm uk uk uk Saturnino Fernandez 0., 47 m uk - ca San Jose Prospero Soto Alfaro, 31 1/pm m c San Jose Bernardo Soto Quesada, 59 m/h/b/pm m uk Alajuela

Apo1inar / Duran Cartin, 36 p/pm u c San Jose Carlos Rodriquez , Jose 52 1/pm uk c San Jose Joaquin Iglesias Castro, 33 pm uk uk San Jose Rafael Iglesias Llorente, uk 1 uk c uk Demetrio Esquivel Ibarra, 41 1/pm uk c Rivas, As cens ion Nicaragua Gonzales Viquez, 48 1/g/pm uk c Barba, Heredia Cleto Jime"nez Oreamuno, 51 1/h/pm u c Cartago Ricardo Gonzales Flores, 36 1/b uk c Heredia A1fredo Tinoco Granados, 46 m uk uk San Jose Federico Quiros, Juan 66 m uk uk San Juan de Bautista Tibas , San Jose' Aguilar Barquero, 62 1/pm uk c Cartago Francisco Acosta Garcia, 47 g/pm uk uk San Ramon, Julio Alaiuela Costa Rica--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Corte's Castro, 53 1/e/pm m c Alaiuela Leon Caldero"n Cuardia, 40 p/pm m c San Jose Rafael Calderon Guardia, 35 b/pm m uk San Jose' Francisco CaldercSn Munoz, 73 P m c San Jose' Rafael Mine Saborio, 64 b uk uk San Jose' Jorge Picado Michalski, 44 1/e/pm m c San Jos^ Teodoro Picado Michalski, 42 uk m uk San Jose' Rene'' Herrera, Santos 73 i/e/pm m c San Jose Leon Figuere's , Jose 41 h/b/pm m -ca San Ramon, Alaiuela Ulate Blanco, 58 j/pm uk s Ala juela Otilio Echandi Jimenez, 42 1/pm u c San Jose' Mario Orlich, Francisco 55 b/pm u -ca San Ramdn, J. Alajuela Treios Fernandez, 50 e uk c San Jose" Jose"" 298 Cub a

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Estrada Palma, 67 1/pm m c Bayamo, Oriente Tomas Gomez, Jose Miguel 50 mi u s Sancti Spiritus, Santa Clara Menocal, Mario G. 46 mi/i u c Hanabana, Matanzas Zayas v Alfonso, 60 mi/l/g m c Havana Alfredo Machado Morales, 54 mi/b m s uk Gerardo Cespedes , Carlos 62 gd/a/mi u c New York, New York Manuel de San Martin, Ramo'n 45 p/pm m c Pinar del Rio Grau Hevia, Carlos 33 i/b/mi/pm m c Havana Marquez Sterling, 62 i/gd/a u -ca Lima, Peru Manuel Mendieta Montefur, 60 mi/p/pm m c San Antonia de Carlos las Vuelt.as Barnet y Vinageras , 71 gd m c Barcelona, Spain Jose'' A. Gomez, Miguel 46 1/pm u c Sancti Spiritus, Manuel Santa Clara Laredo Bru, 61 1/g/mi m c Remedios, Las Federico Villas Batista, Fulgencio 39 m/pm 1 s Banes, Oriente Prio Socarras , 45 l/j/pm m c Bahia Honda, Carlos Pinar del Rio Castro, Fidel 31 1/pm/mi m c Mayari, Oriente 299

Doininican Republic

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Santana, Pedro 42 m uk - cu Hincha. Jimenez, Manuel 37 m m - cu uk ^ Baez, Buenaventura 39 pm/g m - cu Azua, Azua Regla Mota, Manuel uk m uk uk uk de Valverde, Jose uk uk uk uk uk Des iderio Pimentel, Pedro 51 mi m - cu Las Matas de Antonio Santa Cruz, Monte Cristi Cabral, Jose'' Maria 48 mi uk - cu Santo Domingo Gonzales, Ignacio 34 m ) uk uk uk Mar 1 a Espaillat, Ulises 53 i/a/pm uk uk Santiago F. Guilermo, Cesareo 31 m m - cu Ilato Mayor Luperon, Gregorio 37 mi 1 p Puerto Plata, P.P. Merino, Fernando 47 X uk c Antonci, Distrito A. de Nacional Ileureaux, Ulises 36 mi 1 p Puerto Plata, P.P. Billini, Francisco 40 m i/ j/ a uk - cu Santo Domingo G. Woss y Gil, uk mi/pm m s Santa Cruz de Alejandro Seibo Figuereo, Wencesla(i uk m uk uk uk Vasquez, Horacio 39 m m uk uk Jime"nez, Juan 53 h/b u uk uk Is idro Morales, Carlos F. 36 m uk uk Puerto Plata, P.P. Caceres, Ramon 39 mi uk -cu Moca, Espaillat Victoria, Eladio uk pm uk uk uk Nouel , Adolfo A. 50 X uk c . uk Bordas , Jose uk m uk uk uk Baez , Ramon uk p/e/pm u c uk llenriques , Francisco56:o 56 P uk c uk Burgos, Vicini uk b u uk uk Estrella, Urena 41 1/e/pm m ca Santiago Rafael Truiillo, Rafael 38 m 1 P San Cristobal Leonidas Peynado, Jacinto 60 1/pm uk c uk B. Troncoso, Manuel 61 1/e/g uk c Santo Domingo 300

Dominican Republic--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Truiillo, Hector 42 m 1 ca. San Cristobal Balaguer, Joaquin 52 gd/e/a m c Villa Bisono, Santiago Bonnelly, Rafael 58 1/e/pm uk c Santiago de los Caballeros Bosch, Juan 53 a/pm m ca La Vega Reid Cabral, Donald 41 b m uk Santo Domingo Imbert Barrera, 44 b u s uk Antonio Garcia Godov, 44 gd/b u c Moca, Espaillat Hector 301 Ecuador

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Flores , Juan Jose' 30 m 1 n Puerto Cabello Venezuela Bolivar, Simon 47 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela Valdivisso, Felix uk uk uk uk uk Rocafuerte, 51 e/a/pm u c Guayaquil Vicente Roca, Vicente 53 pm u ct Guayaqui1 Ascazubi, Manuel de 45 m u uk Quito Noboa, Diego 61 pm uk s Quayaquil Urvina, Jose Maria 40 m u mc Ouito Elizalde, Antonio uk m uk uk uk Robles , Francisco 45 m uk mc Guayaquil Franco, Guillermo uk m uk uk uk Garcia Moreno, 38 1/e/pm u -ca Guayaquil Gabriel Havier Leon, uk l/pm uk c uk Francisco Carrio"n, Jero'nimo 61 pm uk uk Loj a Arteta, Pedro 70 1/e/pm uk c Quito Jose" de Espinosa, Javier 53 l/pm u c Quito Borrero, Antonio 55 1/pm u c Cuenca Veintemilla, 46 m m mc Cuenca Ignacio de Placido Caamano, 46 m/l/pm u c Guayaquil Jose Flores Jijon, 55 1/gd m c Qui to Antonio Cordero, Luis 59 l/pm u c Cuenca Salazar, Vicente 62 l/pm uk c Quito Lucio Alfaro, Eloy 53 mi/pm m s Montecristi, Manab i Plaza Gutierrez, 37 mi m uk Charapoto, Leonidas Manabi Garcia, Lizardo 63 b u s Guayaquil Estrada, Emilio uk b/pm u s Quito Freile Zaldumbide, uk h uk uk uk Carlos Andrade Marin, uk l/pm uk c uk Francisco Baquerizo Moreno, 56 1/a/pm u c Guayaquil Alfredo Tamayo, Jose Luis 61 l/pm uk c Guayaquil Cordova, Gonzalo S. 61 1/gd/pm m c Cuenca Ayora, Isidro 46 p/e/pm 1 c Lo i a 302

Ecuador--Continued

Age Occu, Class Ed. Birthplace

Larrea Alba, Luis 35 m u mc Guayaquil Guerrero Martinez, uk 1/pm uk c Guayaquil Alberto Martinez, Juan de 57 1/pm uk -ca Guayaquil Dios Montalvo, Abelardo uk 1/pm m c uk Velasco Ibarra, 41 1/e/pm u c Quito Jose' Maria Pons, Antonio uk P u c uk Paez, Federico 58 i/e/pm u c Quito Gallo, Alberto 43 m u mc Tanicuchi, Leon Enriquez Borrero, Manuel uk 1/pm u c Cuenca Maria Mosquera Narvaez, 54 p/e/pm u c Quito Aurelio Arroyo del Rio, 46 1/e/pm u c Guayaquil Carlos Cordova, Andres F, 41 1/pm m c Canar Moreno, Julio E. 51 1/pm uk -ca Quito Mancheno Caj.as , 45 m u mc Riobamba Carlos Suarez Veintemilla, 50 j/1/pm m c Otavalo, Mariano Imbabura Arosemena Tola, 53 b/pm u c Guayaquil Carlos Julio Plaza Lasso, Galo 42 h/gd u c Quito Ponce Enriquez, 44 h/l/pm u c Quito Camilo Castro Jijon, Ramon 47 m m mc Esmeraldas Arosemena Monroy, 42 1/pm u c Guayaquil Carlos Julio Yerovi Indaburu, 63 h/b/gd u s Barcelona, Clemente Spain Arosemena Gomez, 41 b/pm u c Guayaquil Otto 30

El Salvador

Age Occu. Clas s Ed. Birthplace

Barriere, Pedro ulc 1 uk : c Delgado, Matias 54 X uk c San Salvador Rodriquez, Juan M. uk uk uk uk uk Villacorta, Juan 61 b m s Zacatecoluca Vicente Cornejo, Jose Maria ulc uk uk uk uk Morazan, Francisco 46 mi m s Tegucigalpa, Honduras San Martin y uk uk uk uk uk Ulloa, Joaquin Salazar, Carlos uk m uk uk uk Prado, Mariano uk pm uk c uk Salazar, Gregorio 41 uk uk uk uk Escalon, Joaquin uk uk uk uk uk Silva, Jose" Maria uk uk uk ulc uk Herrera, Dionisio S3 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca, Honduras Espinosa, Nicolas uk uk uk uk uk Gomez, Francisco uk uk uk uk ulc Vigil, Diego 36 uk uk uk uk Menendez, Timoteo uk uk uk uk uk Canas, Antonio J. uk uk uk uk uk Morazah, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Ramirez, Norberto uk 1 uk c uk Lindo y Zelaya, 51 g m c Tegucigalpa, Juan Honduras Arce, Pedro uk uk uk uk uk Marin, Escolastico uk uk uk uk uk Guzman, Juan Jose"' uk pm uk c uk Villacorta, uk uk uk ulc uk Dionis io Malespfn, Francisco uk m uk uk uk Guzman, Joaquin uk m uk uk uk Eufras io Palacios , Fermm uk pm uk uk uk Aguilar, Eugenio uk P uk c uk Medina, Tomas uk uk uk uk uk Vasconcelos, uk ulc uk uk ulc Doroteo Rodriquez, Ramon uk uk uk uk uk Duenas, Francisco uk 1/pm uk c uk Quiroz, J, Felix uk 1/pm uk c uk San Martin, Jose" uk uk uk uk uk Maria Campo, Rafael 42 b uk s Sonsonate 304

El Salvador--Continued

Age Occu, Class Ed. Birthplace

Gomez, Vicente uk uk uk uk uk Hernandez, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Zededa, Lorenzo uk uk uk uk uk Santin, Miguel uk uk uk uk uk Barrios, Gerardo 49 m uk uk uk Peralta, Jose' Maria uk uk uk uk uk Gonzales, Santiago uk m uk uk uk Mendez, Manuel uk uk uk uk uk Valle, Andres uk pm uk uk uk Zaldivar, Rafael 41 p/pm u c San Alejo, La Union Guirola, Angel uk 1/pm uk c uk Figueroa, Fernando 35 m uk uk uk Rosales , Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk Menendez, Francisco uk m uk uk uk Ezeta, Carlos 35 M uk uk uk Gutierrez, Rafael 45 M uk uk uk AA • Regalado, Tomas 34 m uk uk uk Escalon, Pedro Jose'"' 42 mi/pm uk uk uk Araujo, Manuel 45 p/h/pm u c Juayua Enrique Melendez, Carlos 51 h/pm u s San Salvador Quinonez Molina, 41 p/h/e/pm u c Suchitoto Alfonso Melendez, Jorge 47 h/pm u s San Salvador Romero Bosque, Pio 35 1/gj/pm uk c Zacatecoluca, LaPaz Araujo, Arturo uk i/h/pm u c Suchitoto Hernandez 49 m/pm m mcc San Salvador Martinez, M. Menendez, Andre's 46 m m s Santa Ana, Ignacio Santa Ana Aguirre Salines, uk m/g uk uk uk Osmin Castaneda Castro, 56 m/g uk mc Cojutepeque, Salvador Cuscatlan Cordova, Manuel uk m uk uk uk de J Osorio, Oscar 37 m 1 mc Sonsonate Bolanos, Oscar uk m uk uk uk Lemus, Jesus Maria 45 m uk mc Puerto Oriental La Union Rodolfo Cordo'n, uk m uk uk uk Eusebio 305

El Salvador--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. ' Birthplace

Rivera Carballo, 41 m uk mc Zacatecoluca, Julio A. ^ LaPaz Sanchez Hernandez, 49 m uk mc El Divisadero, Fidel Morazan 306

Guatemala

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Rivera Paz, Mariano 34 pm uk uk uk Gainza, Gabino 53 m m uk uk Filisola, Vicente 33 m uk uk Naples, Italy Codallos, Felipe uk m uk uk uk Cabeza de Vaca, uk m uk uk uk A. Diaz Barrundia, Juan uk pm uk c uk Flores, Cirilo 51 uk uk c uk Area, Manuel Jose" 48 mi uk uk San Salvador, Salvador Estrada, Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk Domingo Aycinena, Mariano de 37 b u c uk Zenteno, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Barrundia, Jose" 45 a/pm uk c Guatemala City Francisco Molina Flores, Pedro 51 p/a/pm uk c Guatemala City Rivera Cabezas, uk m u uk uk Antonio Marquez, Gregorio uk uk uk uk uk Flores, Francisco X. uk uk uk uk uk Galvez, Mariano 37 1/e/pm m c uk Vasconcelos, Simon uk uk uk uk uk Valenzuela, Pedro J. 34 uk uk uk uk Martinez, Juan uk b u uk uk Antonio Sanchez de Leon, uk uk uk uk uk Mariano Salazar, Carlos uk m uk uk uk Lo'pez, Venancio un gj uk c uk Carrera, Rafael 30 mi 1 n Guatemala City Escobar, Jose'' uk 1/a/pm uk uk uk Bernardo Paredes, Mariano 49 m uk uk uk Aycinena, Pedro de uk 1/g u c uk Cerna, Vicente uk m uk uk uk Garcia Granados, 62 m uk uk uk Miguel Barrios, Justo 36 mi m -ca San Lorenzo Rufino Orantes, Jose"'Maria uk m uk uk uk Sinibaldi, Alejandro uk 1 uk c uk Barillas, Manuel 41 1 uk c uk Lisandro Reyna Barrios , Jose'' 36 m u uk uk Maria 307

Guatemala--Continued

Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Estrada Cabrera, 41 1/g m c Quetzaltenango Manuel Herrera, Carlos 64 uk uk uk uk Orellana, Jose Maria 47 m uk mc Jicaro Chacon, Lazaro 53 m uk s Teculutan Palma, Baudilio 46 1 uk c uk Orellana, Manuel uk m uk uk uk Reyna Andrade, uk uk uk uk uk Jose' Maria Ubico, Jorge 58 m u mc Guatemala City Ponce Vaide"s , 55 m/g uk uk uk Federico Arevalo, Juan Jose" 41 e/a/pm m c Taxisco Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo 37 in m mc Quetzaltenango Diaz de L. , Carlos uk m uk uk uk Enrique Castillo Armas, 39 m m mc Santa Lucia Carlos Cotzumalguap; Gonzalez Solis, uk 1 uk c uk Luis A. Flores Avendano, 59 m uk uk uk Guillermo Ydigoras Fuentes, 62 m/gd u mcc Retalhuleu Manue1 Peralta Azurdia, 54 m uk mc Guatemala City Enrique Mendez Montenegro, 50 e m c Guatemala City Julio Cesar Arana Osorio, 51 m m mc Barberena Carlos Manuel i 308

Haiti

Age Occu. C1 a s s Ed. Birthplace

Dessalines, Jean uk mi 1 n Cormiers Jacques Christophe, Henri 39 mi 1 n uk Petion, Alexandre 36 m m mc Port -au-Prince Boyer, Jean Pierre 42 m m mc Port-au-Prince Ilerard, Charles uk m uk P Port Salut Guerrier, Philippe 87 mi 1 n Marmelade Pierrot, Jean Louis 84 m uk n Cap Haitien Riche, Jean Baptiste 60 m uk n Grande Riviere Soulouque, Faustin 62 m ; ;uk n Petit-Goave Geffrard, Fabre uk m uk uk Anse-a-Veau Salnave, Sylvain uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Nissage-Saget uk m uk uk St. Marc Domingue, Michel uk m uk n Aux Cayes Boisronde-Canal uk m uk uk Aux Cayes Felicite Salomon, uk pm u uk Aux Cayes Etienne Legitime , F. Deus uk uk uk uk Jeremie Florvil Hippolyte, uk m uk uk Cap Haitien F.M. Simon Sam, P.A. uk m 1 n Grande Riviere Tiresias Alexis, Nord uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Simo'n, F. Antoine uk m uk uk Aux Cayes Leconte, Michel uk uk uk uk Cap Haitien Cincinnatus Auguste, Tancrede uk uk uk uk Cap Haitien Oreste, Michel 43 mi/pm/1 uk c Jacmel Zamor, Oreste uk m uk uk Gonaives Theodora, Joseph uk m/pm uk uk Fort Liberte Davilmore Sam, J. Vilbrun uk m uk uk Cap Haitien Guillaume Dartiguenave, P. uk uk u uk Anse-a-Vesu Sudre Borno, Joseph Louis 56 1/gd/pm u c Port-au-Prince Roy, Eugene uk uk uk uk uk Vincent, Stenio 56 1/i/e/g/pm uk c Port-au-Prince Lescot, Elie 57 g/gd u s le Cap Lavaud, Frank uk m uk uk uk Estime, Dumarsais 46 1/e/pm m c Verrettes Magloire, Paul 43 m uk c Cap Haitien Memours Pierre-Louis uk uk uk uk uk J . Cantave, Leon 46 m m mc Mirebalais Sylvain, Franck uk uk uk uk uk 309

Haiti-- Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Fignole, Daniel 44 e/pm 1 - ca Pestel Kebreau, Antonio Th. 45 m uk mc uk Duvalier , Francois 50 p/g m c Port-au-Prince 310

Honduras

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplaci

Ilerrera, Dionisio 42 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca Justo Milla, Jose'' uk m uk uk uk Bendena, Cleto uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Jose' J . uk uk uk uk uk Bustamante, Miguel uk uk uk uk uk n"P . Morazan, Francisco 35 mi m s Tegucigalpa Vigil, Diego 29 uk uk uk uk Arias, Juan A. uk "uk uk uk uk Santos deleValle, uk uk uk uk uk Jose' MzCrquez, Jose uk m uk uk uk Antonio Milla, Francisco uk pm uk uk uk Rivera, Joaquin 37 b/pm u - ca Tegucigalpa Ferrera, Francisco 39 mi m P San Juan de Flores Bustillo, Jose Maria uk uk uk uk uk Martinez, Jose' Maria uk uk uk uk uk Ilerrera, Jose' J. uk uk uk uk uk Matute, Lino uk uk uk uk uk Molina, Juan F. de uk uk uk uk uk Medina, Felipe N. uk uk uk uk uk Alvarado , Jose'' uk pm uk uk uk Guerro, Jose''Maria uk uk uk uk uk Garriga, Mariano uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Chavez, Coronado 38 pm uk uk uk Lindo, Juan 56 g/pm m c Tegucigalpa Bustillo, Felipe uk uk uk uk uk Gomez, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Cabanas, Trinidad 46 m uk mc Tegucigalpa Bueso J., Santiago uk uk uk uk uk Aguilar, Francisco uk pm uk uk uk Guardiola, Santos 39 m 1 mc Tegucigalpa Montes, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Medina , Jose' Maria 35 m uk p Sensenti, Gracias Cas tellano, uk uk uk uk uk Victoriano Inestroza, Francisco uk uk uk uk uk Go'mez, Cresencio 32 1/pm uk uk Tegucigalpa Lo'pez, Juan uk m uk uk uk Cruz, Francisco uk a/gd uk uk Comayagua Rodriguez, Inocente uk uk uk uk uk Xatruch, Florencio uk uk uk uk uk 311

Honduras --Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Arias , Celeo 37 1/pm uk c Goas coran Leiva, Ponciano uk m uk uk uk Zelada, Jose'' Maria uk uk uk uk uk Mejia, Marcelino uk uk uk uk uk Soto, Marcos 27 1/pm u c Tegucigalpa Aurelio Bogran, Luis uk m uk uk uk Aguero, Rosendo uk pm uk uk uk Vabsque z, Domingo uk m uk uk uk Bonilla, Policarpo 35 1/gd/pm u c uk Sierra, Terencio 59 m u c Comayagua Arias, Juan A. uk uk uk c uk Bonilla, Manuel 53 m uk uk Juticalpa Davila, Miguel R. uk m uk uk uk Bertrand, Francisco 41 pm uk c uk Membreno, Alberto 54 a/gd/pm uk c uk Bogran, Francisco uk uk uk c uk Lopez Gutierrez, 65 m uk uk uk Raf ae1 Tosta, Vicente uk m uk uk uk Paz Barahona, 61 p/pm u c Santa Barbara Miguel Mejia Colindres, uk p/pm/g/i uk c La Esperanza Vicente Carias Andino, 56 mi/e/pm u c Tegucigalpa Tiburcio Galve'z, Juan Manuel 62 1/pm u c Tegucigalpa Lozano Diaz, Julio 69 b/pm m c Tegucigalpa Villeda Morales, 49 p/pm u c Ocotepeque Ramon Lopez Arellano, 42 m m mc Danbi Oswaldo 312

Mexico

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Iturbide, Agustin 38 m m s Morelia, Michoacan Victoria, 38 mi m c Tamazula, Durango Guadalupe Guerrero, Vicente 45 mi In Tixtla, Guerrero Bocanegra, Jose'' 42 1 u c Troie, Aguascalientes Maria" Velez, Pedro 42 1 uk c Zacatecas, Zacatecas Bustamante, 49 mi/pm m s Jiquilpan, Michoacan Anastasio Muzquiz, Melchor 42 mi uk uk Ciudad Mozquiz, Coahuila Gomez Pedraza, 42 m uk p Queretaro, Queretaro Manuel Gomez Farias, 52 p/pm u c Guadalaiara,Jalisco Valentin Santa Anna, A. 38 m u mc Jalapa, Veracruz Lopez de Barragan, Miguel 45 mi uk uk Valle de Maiz, San Luis Potosi Justo Corro, Jose"' 42 1 uk c Guadalajara, Jalisco Bravo, Nicolas 52 mi m uk Chilpancingo, Guerrero Echeverria, 44 b/g/pm u -cu Jalapa, Veracruz Francisco J. Canalizo, Valentin 49 m uk uk Monterrey, Nuevo Leon Herrera, Jose*' 52 m uk mc Jalapa, Veracruz Joaquin de Paredes y A, 48 m uk mc Mexico City Mariano Salas , Jose'' Maria 49 m uk -cu Mexico City Anaya, Pedro Maria uk uk uk - cu Iluichapan, Hidalgo Pena y Pena, 58 1/e/gi uk c Tacuba, Mexico Manuel de la Arista, Mariano 48 m uk mc San Luis Potosi, San Luis Potosi Ceballos , Juan 41 1/gi uk c Durango, Durango Bautista Lombardini, Manuel 51 mi m -cu Mexico City Maria Carrera, Martin 48 m uk mc Mexico City Diaz de la Vega, 54 m uk mc Mexico City z Romulo A1varez, Juan 6 5 mi m p Atoyac, Guerrero Comonfort, Ignacio 43 m/1 m c Puebla, Puebla 313

Mexico--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

/ Zuloaga, Felix 54 m ulc uk Alamos, Sonora Robles Pezuela, 41 m uk - cu Guanaj uato, Manuel Guanaj uato Miramo'n, Miguel 26 m u mc Mexico City Pavon, Jose'' 69 1/gi uk c Veracruz, Veracruz Ignacio Lerdo de Teiada, 49 1/e/gi/pm uk c Veracruz, Veracruz Sebastia'n Iglesias , Jose'' 53 l/j/g/pm uk c Mexico City Maria Juarez, Benito 51 1/g/pm 1 c San Pablo Guetatao Oaxaca Diaz, Porfirio 46 m 1 s Oaxaca, Oaxaca Mendez, Juan N. 5 2 m uk uk Ocampo, Puebla Gonzalez, Manuel 47 m uk s Matamoros, Tamaulipas Leo'n de la Barra, 47 gd u -ca Queretaro, Francisco Queretaro Madero, Francisco 38 h u -ca Parras, Coahuila 1T . Lascuram, Pedro 54 1/e uk c Mexico City Muerta, Victoriano 6 7 m m mc Colotlan, Jalisco Carvai al , 43 1 uk c Campeche, Campeche Franci s co Carran za, 54 h/pm u s Cuatro Cienegas, Venustiano Coahuila Gutierrez , 34 mi m - cu Santo Domingo, Eulalio Coahuila Gonzales..Garza, 29 mi uk - cu Saltillo, Coahuila Roque / Lagos Chazaro, 36 1/gi uk c Tlacotalpan, Francisco Veracruz Muerta, Adolfo 39 mi/g m s Hermosillo, Sonora de la Obrego'n, Alvaro 40 mi m n Siquisiva, Sonora Calles, Plutarco 47 mi/e m s Guaymas, Sonora Elias Portes Gil, 38 1/g m c Ciudad Victoria, Emi1io Tamaulipas Ortiz Rubio, 53 mi/i/g uk c Morelia, Miehoacan Pascual Rodrique z, 44 mi/g m s Guaymas, Sonora Abelardo L. Cardenas , Lazaro 40 mi/g 1 p Jiguilpan de Juare z, Michoacan 314

Mexico--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Avila Camacho, 43 mi/g m s Tezuitlan, Puebla Manuel Alemah, Miguel 44 1/g m c Sayula, Veracruz Ruiz Cortines, 60 g m s Veracruz, Veracruz Adolfo L6pez Mateos, 48 1/e/g/pm m c Atisapan de Adolfo Zaragoza, Mexico Diaz Ordaz, 54 1/e/gi/g m c Ciudad Cerdan, Gus tavo _ Puebla Echeverria Alvarez, Luis 48 1/e/g m c Mexico City 315

Nicaragua

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Cerda, Manuel A. 45 h/pm u uk Granada de la Arguello, Juan uk uk m uk uk Espinosa, Juan uk uk uk uk uk Herrera, Dionisio 48 1/e/g/pm u c Choluteca, Honduras Ruiz y Bolanos, uk uk uk uk uk Carlos Morales, Benito uk uk uk uk uk Nunez, Jose'' uk P u c Leon Zepeda, Jose"' uk m uk uk uk Juarez, Gregorio uk uk uk uk uk Rubio, F. X. uk uk uk uk uk Rocha, Evaristo uk uk uk uk uk Cosio, Joaquin uk pm uk uk uk Rivas, Patricio uk pm uk uk uk Ullo'a, Hilario uk uk uk uk uk Valladares, Tomas uk uk uk uk uk Orozco, Juan de uk uk uk uk uk Dios Buitrago, Pablo 34 1/e/gi u c Leon Pe'rez, Manuel uk uk uk uk San Jorge, Rivas Madriz, Emiliano uk uk uk uk uk Saenz, Bla"s uk uk uk uk uk Antonio Sandoval, Jose' Leo^n 36 h/b/mi u uk Granada Morales, Miguel R. uk uk uk uk uk Guerrero, Jose" uk 1 uk c uk Teran, Toribio uk uk uk uk uk Rosales, Benito uk uk uk uk uk Ramirez, Norberto uk 1/pm uk c uk Torcuato, Jose'' uk uk uk uk uk Abaunza, Justo uk uk uk uk uk Pineda, Laureano 49 1/pm uk c Rivas Montenegro, uk uk uk uk uk Francisco del Alfaro, Jesus uk uk uk uk uk Vega, Fulgencio uk uk uk uk uk • Chamorro, Fruto 47 l/b/mi u c Granada Estrada, Jose'' Mar ia uk m uk uk uk Escoto, Nazario uk pm uk c uk Castello'n, Francisco uk 1 uk c uk Martinez, Tomas uk b/mi m P uk Solorzano, Federico uk ulc uk uk Managua Guzmali, Fernando uk b/mi uk uk Granada Silva, Antonio uk g uk uk uk 316

Nicaragua--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. • Birthplace

Chamorro, Pedro 51 h/pm/mi u uk Granada Joaquin Cuadra, Vicente uk b uk uk Granada Balladares , Pedro uk uk uk uk uk Zavala, Joaquin uk m uk uk Managua Cardenas, Adan 47 p/mi/gd/pm u c Rivas Carazo, Evaristo 64 mi/pm uk uk Rivas Osorno, David uk g ulc c uk Sacasa, Roberto 49 p/pm u c El Viej o , Chinandega Chavez, Ignacio uk m uk uk uk Machado, Salvador uk uk uk uk uk Zelaya, Jose"" Santos 39 mi/pm m uk Managua Madriz, Jose'' uk 1/g m c Leon Estrada, Jose Dolores uk m uk uk Managua Estrada, Juan Jose" uk mi/g uk uk Managua Diaz, Adolfo 36 pm uk uk uk Chamorro, Emiliano 45 mi/i/pm u s Acoyapa', Chontales Chamorro, Diego 59 mi/g/pm u -ca Nandaime, Manuel Granada Chamorro, Rosendo uk uk u c uk Martinez, Bartolome 63 h/b u s Jinotega Solorzano, Carlos 64 h/b u - ca Managua Sacasa, Juan 51 p/e/pm u c Leon Bautis ta Moncada, Jose" Maria 58 mi/e/j/h/pm u s Masatepe, Masaya Irias , Julian uk uk uk c uk Brenes Jarquin, 51 p/pm uk c Masaya Carlos A. Somoza, Anastasio 40 g m -ca San Marcos, Carazo Argiiello, Leonardo 72 P/Pm uk c Leon Lacava Sacasa, 59 b/pm u uk uk Beni amin Roman y Reyes, Victor 70 iik m uk uk Somoza Debayle, Luis 34 pm u c Leon Schick, Rene"" 53 pm m uk uk Guerrero Gutierrez, 66 p/gd/pm u c Granada Lorenzo Somoza Debayle, 41 m u mc Leon Anastasio Panama

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Amador Guerrero, 71 p/pm uk c Turbaco, Bolivar, Manuel Colombia Obaldia, Jose"' 63 b/gd u c David, Chiriqui Domingo de Mendoza, Carlos A. 54 1/pm u c Panama'' City Boyd, Federico 62 b/gd u s Panama"' City Arosemena, Pablo 74 1/pm uk c Panama' City Chiari , Rodolfo 42 h/b/g u ct Aguadulce, Cocle Porras , Belisario 55 1/e/j/gd u c Las Tables, Los Santos Valdes,Ramon M. 48 1/e/gd uk c Penonome', Cocle Urriola, Ciro L. 55 P uk c Panama'' City Diaz, Pedro A. 63 b/pm uk s Panama City Lefevre, Ernesto 44 b/pm u s Panama City T1 • Duque, Tomas 39 b/j/g u s Panama' City Gabriel Arosemena, 57 i u c Panama City Florencio H. Arias , Harmondio 45 1/e/gd u c Penonome"', Cocle Alfaro, Ricardo J. 48 1/e/gd uk c Panama City Arosemena, Juan 57 1/e/gi uk c Panama City Demons tenes Fernandez Jaen, 53 gi m p Penonome'', Cocle Ezequie'l Boyd, Augusto 60 P/gd u c Panama City Samuel Arias Madrid, 39 p/pm u c Penonome', Cocle Arnulfo Ja'en Guardia, 50 i/e/gd uk c Penonome'', Cocle Ernes to Guardia, Ricardo 41 g m uk Panama City A. de la Jimenez, Enrique 57 gd m s Panama City ^ Adolfo Diaz Arosemena, 58 b/pm m - ca Panama City Domingo Chanis , Danie1 57 p/e u c Panama City Chiari, Roberto F. 44 b/pm u c Panama' City Arosemena, 67 b/gd uk s Los Santos, Los Alcibiades Santos Remon, Jose'' 44 m m mc Panama City Antonio Guizado, Jose 55 i u c Panama City Ramon 318

Panama--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Arias Espinosa, 42 b u -ca Panama' City Ricardo M. Guardia, Ernesto 52 b/gd m c Panama City de la Gonzalez Ruiz, 59 p/a/pm u c Las Tables, Los Sergio Santos Bazan, Jose 44 pm m s Colon Dominador Gonzalez Ruiz, 52 p/pm u c Las Tables, Los Bernardino Santos Robles, Marcos 58 g uk s Aguadulce, Cocle Aurelio Pinilia, Jose M. 49 m m s Panama City Urrutia, Bolivar 50 m m s La Palma, Los Santos Takas Bahas, 44 b m c Colon Demetrio

i ! 319

Paraguay

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Francia, Jose' G. 48 1/e u c Asunci o'h Rodrique z Lopez, Carlos 50 1/e m. c Asuncion Antonio Lopez, Francisco 34 m u P Asuncion Solano Rivarola, Cirilo uk uk uk uk uk Antonio Jovellanos, Salvador 38 uk uk uk Asunci on Gil, Juan Bautista uk g uk uk uk Uriarte, Higinio uk uk uk uk uk Barreiro, Candido uk pm/gd uk uk uk Caballero, Bernardino 32 in uk uk Ibiqui Escobar, Patricio uk m uk uk Asuncion Gonzales, Juan uk pm uk uk uk Gualberto Morinigo, Marcos uk pm uk uk uk Eguzquiza, Juan 39 m uk s uk Bautista Aceval, Emilio 44 pm uk -ca uk Carballo, Hector uk pm uk uk uk Escurra, Juan uk m uk uk uk Gaona, Juan Bautista 58 uk uk uk uk Baez , Cecilio 43 i/e/a uk c Asuncion Ferreira, Benigno 61 m uk uk uk Jara, Albino 32 m uk uk uk Roi as , Liberato uk uk uk uk uk Pena, Pedro 44 p/e uk c uk Schaerer, Eduardo 39 pm m c Caazapa Franco, Manuel 41 1/e/pm uk c uk Montero, Jose uk pm/gd uk c uk Gonzalez Navero, 46 pm/1 uk c uk Emiliano Gondra, Manuel 38 mi/e/gd/pm u c Asuncion Alaya, Eusebio 46 1/e/g/pm m c Barrero Grande Ayala, Eligio 42 a/g/pm uk c Mbuyapey Riart, Luis Alberto uk j/l/pm u c uk Guggiari, Jose P. 44 j/1/pm u c Asuncion Franco, Rafael uk m uk uk uk Paiva, Felix 62 1/e/gj/pm uk c Caazapa Estigarribia, Jose^ 51 m u mc Caraguatay Felix Morinigo, Higinio 43 m m mc Paraguari' Frutos, Juan Manuel uk '/gi m uk uk Gonzalez, Juan 50 i/gd u uk Villa Rica Natalicio 320

Paraguay--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Rolo'n, Raimundo 45 m m uk uk Molas Lopez, Felipe 48 p/pm uk c uk Chaves , Federico 71 I/pm u uk uk Romero Pereira, Tomas uk z/pm u c uk / Stroessner, Alfredo 41 m m mc Encarnacion 321

Peru

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Riva Aguero, Jose'' 39 m u ct Lima de la San Martin, Jose^de 43 m u P Yapeya, Argentina Tagle, Jose'' 44 m u s Lima Bernardo de Bolivar, Simon 40 mi u ct Caracas, Venezuela Santa Cruz, Andre's de 32 m u s Huarina, LaPaz Bolivia Nieto, Domingo 23 mi u uk Moquegua, Moquegua Sanchez Carrio"n, 39 1/pm uk c Iluamachuco , Jose' F. Trui illo Unanue, Hipolito 71 p/i/e/pm uk ct Arica, Huanuco Salazar, Manuel 59 g uk uk Lima Gutierrez, Antonio 32 mi uk uk Huantaj aya, Tarapaca, Chile LaMar y Cortazar, 48 m u s Cuenca, Ecuado Jose'' de Gamarra, Agustin 44 m u s Cuzco, Cuzco Reyes , Andres 49 mi/h uk uk Chancay Telleria, Manuel 43 pm uk uk uk Braulio Del C, Jose^ 50 pm uk uk uk Orbegoso, Luis Jose 36 mi/b u uk Chuquisongok Huanachuco Bermudez, Pedro 40 m uk P Tarma, Junin Salaverry, Felipe 28 mi u s Lima Santiago Bujanda, Juan Angel 42 mi uk uk Cuzco, Cuzco Salas, Juan Jose"" uk mi uk uk uk LaValle, Juan 56 mi u uk uk Bautista de Tristan, P10^ 64 m uk uk uk Herrera, Ramon uk mi uk uk uk Galdeano, Jose Maria uk g uk uk uk Menendez, Manuel 48 m uk uk Lima Torrico, Juan 34 m uk s Lima Crisostomo Vidal Laos , Juan 42 mi uk s Supe, Lima Francisco Figuerola y Estrada, 72 1/e/pm uk c Lambayeque, Justo Lambayeque Vivanco, Manuel 37 m u uk Lima Ignacio de 322

Peru-- Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Elias , Domingo 37 b/h/gd u s Ica, Ica Castilia, Ramon 48 m m s Tarapaca', Chile Echenique, Jose'' 42 mi u p Puno, Puno Ruf ino San Roman, Miguel 60 mi m p Puno, Puno Medina, Miguel 54 m uk p Huancabamba Raygada, Jose'' Maria 62 m uk s Piura, Piura Mar, Juan Manuel del 54 1/pm uk c Cuzco, Cuzco Canseco, Pedro Diez 48 m u uk Arequipa, Arequipa Pezet, Juan Antonio 52 m u s Lima Prado, Mariano 38 m u s Huanuco, Ignacio Huanuco Puerta, Luis de la 56 m uk s Cuzco, Cuzco Balta v Montero, Jose'' 54 m m mc Lima Gutierrez, Toma"s uk mi uk n uk Zevallos, Mariano 52 m uk uk Cuzco, Cuzco Ilerencia Pardo y Lavalle, 37 j/b/pm u c Lima Manuel Costas, Manuel uk b/pm uk uk uk Pierola, Nicola's de 40 1/b/pm m s Arequipa, Arequipa Garcia Calderon, 46 1/e uk c Arequipa, Francisco Arequipa Montero, Lizardo 49 m u c Ayabaca Iglesias y Pino, 53 m u uk Cai amarca, Miguel Caj amarca Arenas Merino, 77 1/e/g uk c Lima Antonio Caceres , Andre's 53 m uk s Ayacucho, Ave lino Ayacucho Morales Bermudez, 53 m uk s Pica, Tarapaca, Remigio Chile Borgono, Justiniano 57 m m uk Lima Candamo, Manuel 53 b/i/gd u uk Lima Lopez de Romana, 52 i u c Arequipa, Eduardo Arequipa Calderon, Serapio 60 1/e/pm uk c Cuzco, Cuzco Pardo y Barreda, Jose 40 1/e/pm u c Lima Leguia, Augusto B. 45 b/g m s Lambayeque, Lambayeque Billinghurst, 61 b/.i/pm m s Arica, Huanuco Guillermo E. Benavides, O'scar R. 37 m u mc Lima 323

Peru--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Ponce, Manuel Maria 56 m uk mc Arequipa, Arequipa Holguin, Mariano 70 X uk c Arequipa, Arequipa Arias, Ricardo Elias 56 g.i uk c Pisco, lea Jimenez, Gustavo A. 44 m uk mc Cerro de Pasco, Junin Sanchez Ocampo, David 44 h/pm u uk Hu amb o , Apurimac Sanchez Cerro, Luis 41 m 1 mc Piura, Piura Matias Manzanilla, 63 e/pm uk c I ca, Ica Jose'' Prado y Ugarteche, 50 b/e/pm u c Lima Manuel Bustamante, Jose"' Luis 51 1/e/gd uk c Arequipa, Arequipa Noriega Aguero, Zenon 48 m u mc Villa Jesus, Cai amarca Odris, Manuel A. 50 m m mc Tarma, Junin Belaunde Terry, 50 z/pm u c Lima Fernando Velasco Alvarado, 58 m 1 mc Piura, Piura Juan 324

Uruguay

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Rivera, Fructuoso 42 mi u s PeTlarol, Montevideo Pereira, Gabriel 39 mi/pm u s Montevideo Antonio Anaya, Carlos 56 mi/b/pm uk s San Pedro, Buenos Aires Oribe, Manuel 42 m m uk Montevideo Suarez, Joaquin 57 mi/pm u uk Villa de Canelones, Canelones Berro, Bernardo 48 mi/j/pm u s Montevideo Prudencia Giro, Juan Francisco 61 mi/pm u - ca Montevideo Flores , Venancio 45 mi u s Trinidad, Flores Varela, Pedro 30 b/pm m s Villa de la Florida, Florida Bustamante, Manuel B. 69 mi/pm uk uk San Carlos, Maldonado Lamas, Luis 61 mi/b uk uk Montevideo Aguirre, Anastasio de 62 mi/pm uk uk Montevideo la Cruz Villalba, Tomas 59 mi/g m uk Dolores, Soriano Vidal, Francisco 38 p/pm u c San Carlos, Antonio Maldonado Batlle, Lorenzo 57 m u mc Montevideo Gomensoro, Tomas 62 mi/pm uk uk Dolores , Soriano Ellauri, Jose'' Eugenio 38 1/g uk c Montevideo Latorre, Lorenzo 35 m 1 p Montevideo Santos , Ma'ximo Benito 34 m m P Canelones, Canelones Tales, Maximo 34 m uk mc Montevideo Herrera y Obes, Julio 49 i /g u c Montevideo Borda, Juan Idiarte 49 pm m uk Mercedes, Sori ano Cuestas , Juan Lindolfo 60 g uk uk Paysandu, Paysandu Batlle y Ordonez, Jose 46 i /pm u - ca Montevideo Williman, CIaudio 43 e/pm uk c Montevideo Viera, Feliciano 42 g/pm uk c Salto, Artigas Brum, Baltasar 35 1/g u c Salto, Artigas Serrato , Jose'' 54 i/g/pm uk c Montevideo Camisteguy, Juan 67 e/i/pm uk c Montevideo Uruguay --Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Terra, Gabriel 58 e/i/gd uk c Montevideo Baldomir, Alfredo 5 3 m uk mc Montevideo Charlone, Cesar 42 1/e/a uk c Montevideo Amezaga, Juan Jose 61 1/e/gd uk c Montevideo Berreta, Tomas 71 m/g/pm m uk Arroyo MiguiL Montev Batlle Berres, Luis 49 i /pm u -ca Montevideo Martinez Trueba, Andrews 66 urn uk uk uk Gestido, Oscar Daniel 65 m/g m mc Montevideo Pacheco Areco, Jorge 47 1 uk - ca Montevideo 326 Venezuela

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Pa"ez, Jose" Antonio 40 mi 1 n Acarigua, Barinas Vargas, Jose' Maria 48 p/e/gi/pm u c Caracas Narvarte, Andre's uk pm uk c uk Soublette, Carlos 48 mi m uk Caracas Monagas , Jose'' Tadeo 63 mi m n Maturin, Cumana Monagas , Jose" 56 mi m uk Maturin, Cumana Gregorio Castro, Julian uk m uk uk uk Carreno, Jose" Maria uk m uk uk uk Gual, Pedro 76 pm/gd uk c Caracas Tovar, Manuel Felipe 56 uk uk uk Caracas de Falcon, Juan 43 m uk uk Paraguana, Falcon Bruzual, Manuel E. uk m uk uk uk Monagas , Jose" uk m m uk uk Ruperto Tell Villegas, uk 1/pm uk c uk Guillermo Palacios, Esteban uk uk uk uk uk Pulgar, Venancio uk mi uk uk uk Arvelo, Rafael uk g/a uk uk uk Gil, jyiiguel uk uk uk uk uk Guznutn Blanco, 41 mi/j/g u c Caracas Antonio Linares Alcantara, 50 m uk uk uk Francis co Gutierrez Coll, 42 a uk uk uk Jacinto Urbaneia, Diego uk uk uk c uk Bautista Diez, Manuel uk uk uk c uk Antonio Valera, Jose'" uk mi uk uk uk Gregorio Crespo, Joaquin uk m uk uk uk Villanueva, Laureano 37 p/.i/pm uk c Caracas Lopez y Guzman, uk m uk uk uk Hermo''genes Rojas Paul, Juan 59 g/gi/pm/1 uk c Caracas P ab 1 o Andueza Palacio, 47 1/pm/g uk c Guanare Raimundo Villegas Pulido, 38 1/gi/pm u c BariTias G. Tell 327

Venezuela--Continued

Age Occu. Class Ed. Birthplace

Andrade, Ignacio 47 mi 1 uk Cucuta Castro, Cipriano uk 1/mi 1 n Capacho, Tachira Guzman Alvarez, uk m uk uk uk Manuel Rodriquez, Victor uk m uk uk uk Go'mez, Juan Vicente 49 b/g/mi 1 n San Antonio, Tachira Perez, Juan Bautista uk uk uk uk uk Marquez Bustillo, V, uk uk uk c uk Lopez Contreras, 52 m uk s Queniquea, Eleazar Tachira Medina Angarita, 43 m uk mc San Cristobal, I s afas Tachira Betancourt, Romulo 37 pm m - ca Guatire, Mirand Gallegos, Romulo 63 e/a uk c Caracas Delgado Chalbaud, 39 m u mc Caracas Carlos Suarez Flamerich, 43 1/e/gd/pm uk c Caracas German Pe'rez Jimenez, 38 m m mc T achira Marcos Larrazabal, Wolfgang 46 m u mc uk Leoni, Raul 58 pm m c Upata, Bolivar Caldera, Rafael 53 1/e/pm m c San Felipe, Y aracay APPENDIX II

PRESIDENTS: TERM OF OFFICE, SUCCESSION, DEPARTURE aThe tenure is designated by the following: y = year, m = month, and d = day.

^Succession (In) is designated by the following: v = violent, forcible, unconstitutional change, i = imposicion, e = elec­ tion by popular vote, ec = election by legislative body or constituent assembly, e/ec = popular election followed by election in legislature, p = provisional succession, pv = provisional succession under forcible conditions. cDeparture (Out) is designated by the following: c = constitu­ tionally and voluntarily, u = unconstitutionally and under duress, r = voluntary resignation or withdrawal, h = for rea­ sons of health, d = death, ds = death by suicide, and da = death by assassination.

Argentina

President Date Took Office Tenurea In Outc

Mitre, Bartolome 4-12-1862 3y 2m Od V Paz, Marcos 6-12-1865 2y 6m 20d P r Mitre, Bartolome 1- 2-1868 0y 10m 1 Od c Sarmiento, Domingo 10-12-1868 6y 0m Od e c Avellaneda, Nicolas 10-12-1874 6y 0m Od i c Roca, Julio A. 10-12-1880 6y 0m Od i c Juarez Celman, Miguel 10-12-1886 3y 9m 26d i u Pellegrini, Carlos 8- 8-1890 2y 2m 4d pv c Pena, Saenz 10-12-1892 2y 3m lOd i h Uriburu, Jose Evarista 1- 22-1895 3y 8m 20d P c Roca, Julio A. 10-12-1898 6y 0m Od i c Quintana, Manuel 10-12-1904 ly 5m Od i d Alcorta, Jose Figueroa 3- 12-1906 4y 7m Od P c Saenz Pena, Roque 10-12-1910 2v 11m 24d i h Plaza, Victorino de la 10- 6-1913 3y 0m 6d P c Irigoyen, Hipolito 10-12-1916 6y 0m Od e c Alvear, Marcelo T. de 10-12-1922 6y 0m Od i c Irigoyen, Hipolito 10-12-1928 lv 10m 2 4d e u Uriburu, Jose F. 9- 6-1930 iy 5m 14d V c Justo, Agustin P. 2-20-1932 6y 0m Od i c Ortiz, Roberto M. 2-20-1938 2y 4m 13d i h Castillo, Ramon S. 7- 3-1940 2y 11m Id P u Raws on, Arturo 6- 4-1943 Ov 0m 3d V r

328 329

Argentina--Continued

Pres iclent Date Took Off ice Tenure In Out

Ramirez, Pedro P. 6- 7-1943 Oy 9m, 2d V u Farrell, Edelmiro 3- 9-1944 2v 2m,2 5d V c Peron, Juan 6- 4-1946 9y 3m,15d i u Lonardi, Eduardo 9-23-1955 Oy 1 m, 20 d V u Aramburu, Pedro E. 11-13-1955 2y 5m,17d V c Frondizi, Arturo 5- 1-1958 3y 11m, Od e u Guido, Jose Maria 3-30-1962 ly 7m,12d pv c Illia, Arturo 10-12-1963 2y 8m,lOd e u Ongania, Juan Carlos 6-28-1966 • 3y 11m,lOd V u Military Junta 6- 8- 1970 Oy 0m,lOd pv c Levingston, Roberto M. 6-18-1970 Oy 9m, 4d V u 330

Bolivia

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Bolivar, Simon 8-11-1825 3y 2m Od V r Sucre, A. Jos£" de 1- 1-1826 2v 7m Od p/i u Urdininea, J.M. Perez 8- 1-1828 Oy 0m 12d PV r de Velasco, Jose' Miguel 8-12-1828 Oy 4m 12d P r de Blanco, Pedro 12-25-1828 4y Oin 6d P da Velasco, Jose'Miguel 1- 1-1829 Oy 5m 2 Id P u de Santa Cruz, Andre's 5-24-1829 9y 9m 26d i u Velasco, Jose Miguel 2-22-1839 Oy 2m Od P r de ^ Serrano, Jose Mariano 4- 1839 Oy lm Od V u Ballivan, Jose' 9-22-1841 6y 3m Id i u Guillarte, Eusebio 12-23-1847 Oy 0m lOd v/i u Velasco, Jose' Miguel 1- 2-1848 Oy 11m 4d pv r de Belzu, Manuel Isidoro 12- 6-1848 6y 8m 27d i u Co'rdova, Jorge 8-15-1855 2y 0m 2 4d V c Linares , Jose" Maria 9- 9-1857 3y 4m 4d i u Acha, Jose" Maria de 5- 6-1861 3y 7m 23d V u Melgarejo, Mariano 12-28-1864 6y 0m 17d v/i u Morales, Agustin 1-15-1871 ly 10m 12d V u Frias , Tomas 11-28-1872 Oy 5m lid V da Ballivian, Adolfo 5- 9-1873 Oy 8 m 3d p c Frias , Toma"s 1-31-1874 2y 3 m 5d e h Daza, Hilaron 5- 4-1876 3v 7m id P u Campero, Narciso 1-19-1880 4y 4m 15d V u Pacheco, Gregorio 9- 4-18 84 3y 11m lid V c Arce, Aniceto 8-15-1888 3y 11m 2 8d e c Baptista, Mariano 8-11-1892 4y 0m 8d i c Fernandez Alonso, 8-19-1896 2y 7m 23d i c Severo Pando, Jose' Manuel 12-12-1898 0y 10m 7d i u Reyes Ortiz^, Serapio 4-12-1899 Oy 6m 13d v/ i Pando, Jose Manuel 10- 25-1899 4y 10m 17d p r Montes, Ismael 8-14-1904 4y 11m 2 8d c Villazon, Eliodoro 8-12-1909 4y 0m Od i c Montes, Ismael 8-14-1913 4y 0m Od i c Gutierrez Guerra, 8-15-1917 2y 10m 27d i c Jose' Saavedra, Bautista 7-12-1920 5y 2m 2 Id i u Guzman, Felipe 9- 3-1925 0y 4m 7d pv c Siles , Hernando 1-10-1926 4y 4m 18d i u Blanco Galindo, Carlos 6-28-1930 0y 8m 7d V r 331

Bolivia--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Salamanca, Daniel 5- 5-1931 Ov 4m 20d i u Teiada Sorzano, Jose'' L. 11-28-19 34 ly 5m 19d pv u Toro Ruilova, Jose' David 5-17-1936 ly 1m 26d v u Busch, German 7-13-1937 2y lm lOd V ds Quintanilla, Carlos 8-23-1939 Oy 7m 2 2d P c Penaranda, Entrique 4-15-1940 3y 8m 5d i u Villarroel, Gualberto 12-20-1943 2v 7m Id V da Arenas , Damaso 7-21-1946 Oy 0m Id pv r Guillen, Nestor 7-21-1946 Oy 0m 26d pv r Monje Gutierrez, Tomas 8-17-1946 Oy 6m 23d pv c Hertzog, Jose Enriquez 3-10-1947 2y lm 2 7d e r Urriolagoitia, Mamerto 5- 7-1949 2y Oin 9d P r Ballivian, Hugo 5-15-1951 0y 11m Od V u Siles Zuazo, Hernan 4- 9-1952 Oy 0 m 6d PV r Paz Estenssoro, Victor 4-16-1952 4y 3m 2 Od e/v c Siles Zuazo, Hernan 8- 6-1956 4y 0m Od i c Paz Estenssoro, Victor 8- 6-1960 4y 2m 2 8d i u Ovando Candia, Alfredo 11- 3-1964 0y 0m 3d pv r Barrientos Ortuno, Rene 11- 6-1964 ly lm 2 4d P r Ovando Candia, Alfredo 1- 1-1966 Oy 7m 5d P c Barrientos Ortuno, Rene 8- 6-1966 2y 8m 2 Id e d Siles Salines, Luis A. 4-27-1969 0y 5m Od P u Ovando Candia, Alfredo 9-26-1969 ly 0m lOd V u Torres , Juan Jose' 10- 7-1970 Oy 9m 2 Od V u 332

Brazil

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Fonseca, Manuel 11-15-1889 2y , Om, 8d V u Deodoro da Peixoto, Floria.no 11-23-1891 2y 11m 2 2d PV c Morais Barros, 11-15-1894 4y 0m Od i c Prudente de Campos Salles, Manuel 11-15-1898 4y Om Od i c F. de Rodrigues Alves, F. de 11-15-1902 4y Om Od i c Morelra Penna, Affonso 11-15-1906 2y 7m Od i d Pecanha, Nilo 6-14-1909 iy 5m Od P c Fonseca, Hermes da 11-15-1910 4y Om Od i c Persira Gomes, 11-15-1914 4y Om Od i c Wenceslau Bras Moreira, Delfim 11-15-1918 0y 8m 13d P h Pessoa, Epitacio 7-28-1919 3y 3m 17d i c Silva Bernardes, 11-15-1922 4y Om Od i c Artur da Sousa, Washington 11-15-1926 3y 11m 9d i u Luis P. de Junta 10-24-1930 Oy Om 9d pv r Vargas, Getulio 11- 3-1930 14v 11m 26d v/i u Linhares , Jose'' 10-29-1945 Oy 3m 2d pv r Dutra, Eurico Gaspar 1-31-1946 5y Om Od e c Vargas, Getulio 1-31-1951 3y 6m 2 4d e ds Filho, J'oao Cafe' 8-24-1954 lv 2m 14d P h Luz, Carlos Soimbra da 11- 8-1955 Oy Om 3d P u Ramos , Nereu 11-11-1955 Oy 2m 19d pv c Oliveira, Juscelino 1-31-1956 5y Om Od e c Kubitschek de Silva Quadros, 1-31-1961 Oy 6m 25d e r Janio da Mazzilli, Raniere 8-25-1961 Oy Om 13d P r Goulart, Joao 9- 8-1961 2y 6m 23d P u Branco, Humberto 3-31-1964 2y 11m 15d V c Castelo Silva, Artur Costa e 3-15-1967 2y 5m 16d i h Junta 3-31-1969 Oy 2m Od P r Medici, Emilio 10-30-1969 i Garras tazu 333

Chile

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

O'Higgins, Bernardo 2-14-1817 5y,llm, 14d v/i u Military Junta 1-28-1823 Freire Serrano, Ramon 5-31-1823 2y, lm 6d V Vicuna Larrain, 5- 5-1825 oy, 0m lOd P r Francis co , Freire Serrano, Ramtm 5-16-1825 iy, lm 23d r Blanco Encalada, 7- 9-1826 oy, 2m Od P r Manuel Eyzaguirre, Agustin 9- 9-1826 oy, 4m 17d P u Freire Serrano, Ramon 1-27-1827 oy, 3m 8d ec r Pinto Diaz, Francisco 5-25-1827 2y, lm 19d P .Vicuna Larrain, 7-16-1829 oy, 3m 3d P r Francisco Pinto Diaz, Francisco 10-19-1829 oy, 0m 13d u Vicuna Larrain, 11- 2-1829 oy, lm 12d P u Francisco Junta 12-24-1829 Errazuriz, Fernando de 2- - 1830 oy, 0m lOd PV r Ruiz Tagle, Francisco 2-17-1830 oy, 2m Od P T Ovalle, Jose Tomas 4- - 1830 oy, llm Od P h Errazuriz, Fernando de 3-21-1831 oy, 5m 27d P r Prieto Vial, Joachim 9-18-1831 10y, 0m Od v/i c Bulnes Prieto, Manuel 9-18-1841 lOy, 0m Od i c Montt Torres, Manuel 9-18-1851 lOy, 0m Od i c Pe'rez Mascavano, Jose'' 9-18-1861 lOv, 0m Od i c Errazuriz Zanartu', 9-18-1871 5y, 0m Od i c Federico Pinto Garmendia, Anibal 9-18-1875 5y, 0m Od i c Santa Mar fa G., Domingo 9-18-1881 sy, 0m Od i c Balmaceda, Jose'' Manuel 9-18-1886 4y,llm 12d i u Baquedano Gonzales, 8-29-1891 oy, 0m 2d V u Manuel Montt Alvarez, Jorge 8-31-1891 5y, 0m 16d v/e c Errazuriz Echaurren, 9-18-1896 3y, 8m 23d e Federico Fernandez Albano, Elias 6-11-1900 0y, 4m Od P r Errazuriz, Federico 10-11-1900 oy, 6m 2 Od h Zanartu Zanartu, Anibal 5- 1-1901 oy, 4m 17d P c Riesco Errazuriz, German 9-18-1901 5y, 0m Od e c Montt Montt, Pedro 9-18-1906 3y, 8m 20d e h Fernandez Albano, Elias 7- 8-1910 0y, lm 28d n d Figueroa Larrain, 9-16-1910 oy, 3m 17d P c Emiliano Barros Luco, Ramon 12-23-1910 5y, 0m Od i c Sanfuentes , Juan Luis 12-2 3-1915 5y, 0m Od e c 334

Chile--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Alessandri, Arturo 12-23-1920 3y 8m 15d e u Altamirano Talavera, 9 - 8-1924 Oy 4m 15d pv u Luis Bello Codesido, Ernilio 1-23-1925 Oy 2m 7d pv u Alessandri, Arturo 3-21-1925 0y 6m lOd r Barros Borgono, Luis 10- 1-1925 Ov 2m 2 2d P c Figueroa, Emiliano 12-23-1925 iy 4m lid e u Ibanez del Campo, 5- 4-1927 4y 2m 2 2d v/i u Carlos Opazo Letelier, Pedro 7-26-1931 Oy 0m 2d pv r Montero Rodriquez, 7-27-1931 Oy 0m 29d P r Juan " Trucco Franzani, Manuel 8-22-1931 Oy 3m 12d P r Montero Rodriquez, 12- 4-1931 Oy 6m Od e u Juan Puga Vega, Arturo 6- 4-1932 Oy 0m 8d V r Grove Valleio, Marmaduke 6-12-1932 0y 0m 4d V u Espinoza, Carlos Davila 6-17-1932 Oy 2m 26d V u Blanche Espejo, Bartolome 9-13-1932 Oy 0m 19d pv r Oyanedel Urrutia, Abraham 10- 2-1932 Oy 2m 2 2d P c Alessandri, Arturo 12-24-1932 6y 0 m Od e c Aguirre Cerda, Pedro 12-24-1938 2y 10m 16d e h Mendez Arancibia, 11-10-1941 Oy 4m 2 2d P c Geronimo Rios Morales, Juan 4- 2-1942 4y 2m 2 5d e d Antonio Duhalde ^Vazquez, Alfredo 6-27-1946 0y 3m 20 d p r Irabarren, Juan Antonio 10-17-1946 Oy 0m 16d P c Gonzalez Videla, Gabriel 11- 3-1946 6y 0m Od e c Ibanez del Campo, Carlos 11- 3-1952 6y 0m Od e c Alessandri Rodriquez, 11- 3-1958 6y 0m Od e c Jorge Frei Montalva, Eduardo 11- 3-1964 6y 0m Od e c Allende, Salvador 11- 3-1970 2y 9m 21d e da 335

Colomb ia

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Bolivar, Simon 8-10-1819 3y 0m Od V r Santander, Francisco 1822 5y 0m Od P r Bolivar, Simon 9-10-1827 2y 5m 20d r Caicedo, Domingo 3- 1-1830 0y lm 13d P r Mosquera, Joaquin 6-13-1830 Oy 2m 2 2d ec u Urdaneta, Rafael 9- 5-1830 Oy 7m 27d V u Caicedo, Domingo 4-14-1831 Oy 7m 9d pv r Obando, Jose' Maria 11-23-1831 Oy 3m 17d P r Ma'rquez, Jose" 3-10-1832 Oy 6m 23d p c Ignacio de Santander, Francisco 10- 7-1832 4y 5m 2 3d ec/e c Ma'rquez, Jose" 4- 1-1837 4v 0m Od e/ec c Ignacio de Caicedo, Domingo 4- 1-1841 Oy lm Id P r Alcantara Herra'h, 5- 2-1841 Oy 2m Od e/ec Pedro Dios Aranzaztf, Juan de 7- 2-1841 Oy 10m 17d P r ^ Alca'ntara Herran, 5-19-1842 2y 10m lid c Pedro Mosquera, Tomas 4- 1-1845 2y 4m Od e/ec Cipriano de Cuervo, Rufino 8- - 1847 Oy 4m Od P r Mosquera, Tomas 12- - 1847 iy 4m Od c Cipriano de Lopez, Jose" Hilario 4- 1-1849 2y 6m Od i Obaldia, Jose" de 10- - 1851 0y 3m Od P r Lopez, Jose' Hilario 1- - 1852 iy 3m Od c Obando, Jose" Maria 4- 1-1853 iy 0m 16d i u Me 1 o , J os e" Marfa 4-17-1854 0v 7m 17d V u Herrera, Tomas 4-21-1854 0y 3m 14d pv r Obaldia, Jose" de 8- 5-1854 Oy 7m 26d pv c Mallarino, Manuel 4- 1-1855 2y 0m Od e c Maria Ospina, Mariano 4- 1-1857 4y 0m Od e c Calvo, Bartolome 4- 1-1861 0y 3m 18d P u Mosquera, Tomas 7-18-1861 ly 6m 13d V r Cipriano de Largacha, Froilan 2- 1-1863 Oy 4m Od P c Mosquera, Tomas 5-31-1863 Oy 7m 2 8d i Cipriano de Uricoechea, Juan A. 1-29-1864 Oy lm Od P r Mosquera, Tomas 2-29-1864 Oy 2m Od c Cipriano de Murillo Toro, Manuel 4- 1-1864 2y 0m Od i c Roias Garrido, Jose" 4- 1-1866 Oy lm 19d P r Mosquera, Tomas"" 5-19-1866 iy 0m 4d i u Cipriano de 336

Colombia--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Riascos, Joaquin 5-12-1867 Oy 2m 16d pv r Acosta, Santos 5-23-1867 Oy 10m 7d V c Gutierrez, Santos 4- 1-1868 Oy 8m 20d i Camacho Rolda"h, 12-21-1868 Oy Oin lid P r Salvador Gutierrez, Santos 1- 2-1869 iy 4m Od c Salgar, Eustorgio 4- 1-1870 Oy 5 m Od i Trujillo, Julian 9- 1-1870 Oy 0m 8d P r Salgar, Eustorgio 9- 8-1870 iy 6m 2 2d c Murillo, Manuel 4- 1-1872 2y 0m Od i c Perez, Santiago 4- 1-1874 2y 0m Od i c Parra, Aquileo 4- 1-1876 iy lm 19d ec Camargo, Sergio 5-19-1877 0y 2m 24d P r Parra, Aquileo 8-13-1877 Oy 4m 9d Ramirez, Manuel Maria 12-22-1877 Oy 0m 3d P r Parra, Aquileo 12-24-1877 Oy 3m 6d c Trujillo, Julian 4- 1-1878 2y 0m Od i c Nunez, Rafael 4- 1-1880 2y 0m Od i c Zaldua, Francisco 4- 1-1882 Oy 8m 20d i d J avier Caldero'n, Climaco 12-21-1882 Oy 0m 2d P r Otalora, Jose"Eusebio 12-22-1882 ly 3m 9d P c Hurtado, Ezequiel 4- 1-1884 Oy 4m lOd P r Nunez, Rafael 8-11-1884 ly 7m 20d i c Campo Serrano, Jose" 4- 1-1886 Oy 9m 5d P r Payan, Eliseo 1- 6-1887 Oy 4m 28d P r Nufiez, Rafael 6- 4-1887 Oy 5m 8d i P ay an, Eliseo 12-13-1887 Oy lm 24d P r Nunez, Rafael 2- 8-1888 Oy 5m 2 8d r Holguin, Carlos 8- 7-1888 4y 0m Od i c Caro, Miguel A. 8- 7-1892 3y 7m 5d i Quintero, Guillermo 3-12-1896 0y 0m 5d P r Caro, Miguel A. 3-17-1896 2y 4m 2 Od c Marroquin, Jose" Manuel 8- 7- 1898 0y 2m 26d P r Sanclemente, Manual A. 11- 3-1898 lv 8m 2 8d i u Marroquin, Jose" Manuel 7-31-1900 4y 0m 7d pv c Reyes, Rafael 8- 7-1904 3y 7m 9d i Angulo, Euclides de 3-16-1908 Oy lm Od P r Reyes, Rafael 4-16-1908 iy lm 2 Id u Ifolguin, Jorge 6- 7-1909 Oy lm 26d pv r Gonzalez Valencia, Ramon 8- 3-1909 ly 0m 4d P c Restrepo, Carlos E. 8- 7-1910 4y 0m Od ec e Concha, Jose Vicente 8- 7-1914 4 v Oin Od i c Sua'rez, Marco Fidel 8- 7-1918 3V 3m 5D e u Holguin, Jorge 11-12-1921 Oy 8m 26d P c Ospina, Pedro Nels 8- 7-1922 4y 0m Od i c 337

Colombi a-- Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Mendez, Miguel Abadia 8- 7-1926 4y 0m Od i c Olaya Herrera, Enrique 8- 7-1930 4y 0M Od e c Lopez Pumarejo, Alfonso 8 - 7-1934 4v 0M Od i c Santos, Eduardo 8- 7-1938 4v 0M Od i c Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 8- 7-1942 Oy 2M 2d i Lozano v Lozano, Carlos 10 - 9-1942 0Y 0m lOd P r Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 10 -19-1942 ly lm Od Echandia, Dario 11 -19-1943 0v 7m 2 Id P r Lopez Pumareio, Alfonso 7 -10-1944 ly 0M 2 7d r Lleras Camargo, Alberto 8- 7-1945 iy 0M Od P c Ospina Perez, Mariano 8- 7-1946 4y 0M Od e c Gomez, Laureano 8- 7-1950 iy 2m 24d i h Urdaneta Arbelaez, 10-31, 1951 iy 7m 13d P u Roberto Roias Pinilla, Gustavo 6-13- 1953 3v 1 lm 3d V u Paris , Gabrie1 5 -10-1958 0v 2m 2 7d pv r Lleras Camargo, Alberto 8- 7-1958 4y 0m Od i c Leon Valencia, 8- 7-1962 4y 0m Od i c Gui1lermo Lleras Restrepo, Carlos 8- 7-1966 4y 0m Od i c Pastrana Bor.rero, Misael 8- 7-1970 4y 0m Od i c 338

Costa Rica

Pres ident Date Toolc Office Tenure In Out

Fernandez, Juan Mora 9 - 8-1824 8y 6m Id i c Gallegos , Jose'' 3- 9-1833 iy 3m 18d i Rafael de Gutierrez, Agustfn 6 -27-1834 0y lm 21d P r Gallegos , Jose'' 8-18 -1834 Oy 6 m 16d u Rafael de Lara Arias, Juan Jose" 3 - 4 -1935 Oy 0m 13d P r Fernandez Chacon, 3-17 -1835 Oy lm 18d P r Manuel Carrillo Colima, 5 - 5 -1835 iy 9m 26d i c Braulio Fernandez, Joaquin 3 - 1 -1837 Oy lm 17d P r Mora Aguilar Chacon, 4-17 -1837 iy lm lOd ec u Manue1 Carrillo Colima, 5-27 -1838 3y 10m lid V r Braulio Bonilla Nava, Manuel 4- 8 -1842 Oy 0m 4d P u Antonio Morazan, Francisco 4-12 -1842 Oy 5m Od V u Pinto Suarez, Antonio 9-11 -1842 Oy 0m 6d pv r Alfaro Zarnora, Jose"" 9-17 -1842 2y 2m 12d i c Maria Oreamuno Bonilla, 11-29 -1844 Oy 0m 18d i u Francisco Murillo, Rafael Moya 12-17 -1844 Oy 4m 13d P r Gallegos , Jose'' 4-30 -1845 iy lm 7d P u Rafael de Alfaro Zamora, Jose'" 6 - 7 -1846 Oy 11m Od i u Maria Castro Madriz, Jos£" 5 - 8-1847 ly 10m 5d i Maria Carazo Bonilla, 3-13 -1849 Oy 0m 21d P r Manuel Jose Castro Madriz, Jose 4- 4-1849 Oy 7m lid u Maria Mora Porras, Miguel 11-15 -1849 Oy 0m lid PV r Mora Porras, Juan 11-26 -1849 Oy 3m 26d V Rafael Mora Porras, Miguel 3-22-1850 Oy 0m 14d P r Mora Porras, Juan 4- 6-1850 8y 0m lid i Rafael Escalante Nava, Rafael 4-17-1858 Oy 2m 13d P r Mora Porras, Juan 6-30-1858 Oy 9m 13d u Rafael Escalante Nava, Rafael 4-13-1859 Ov 0m 21d P u Montealegre, Jose''Maria 5- 4-1859 4y 0m 4d V c 339

Costa Rica--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 5- 8-1863 3y 0m Od i c Castro, Jose''Maria 5- 8-1866 2y 5 m 2 2d i u Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 11- 1-1868 0y 6 m 20d V Figuero'n Oreamuno, 5-21-1869 Oy 0m 2d P r Eusebio Jimenez Zamora, Jesus 5-22-1869 Oy 11m 5d u Carranza Ramirez, 4-27-1870 Oy 3m lid V u Bruno Gutie'rrez, Tom as 8- 9-1870 iy 10m 16d V Guardi a Castro, Jose' Antonio 6-27-1872 Oy 7m Id p r Pinto Gutierrez, Tama's 1-26-1873 Oy 9m 26d c Guardia Gonzales Ramirez, 11-21-1873 Oy 0 m lOd p r Salvador Barroeta Baca, Rafael 12- 2-1873 Oy 2m 26d P r Gutie'rrez, Tomas 2-28-1874 iy 2 m 2 Id i Guardi a Lizano Gutierrez, 5-21-1875 Oy 5m 14d P r Joaquin Gutierrez, Tomas 11- 5-1875 Oy 6m 3d c Guardia Saenz, Aniceto 5- 8-1876 Oy 2m 2 2d i u Esquive1 1 O Herrera Zeledon, 7- C a I 1876 iy lm lid pv u Vicente Gutie'rrez, Tomans 9-11-1877 3y 8m Od V Guardia Lara Zamora, Salvador 5-10-1881 Oy 7m 13d P r Gutierrez, Tomas 1-23-1882 Oy 4m 2 4d h Guardia Lizano Gutierrez, 6-17-1882 Oy lm 3d P r Saturnino Fernandez, Pro"spero 7- 7-1882 2y 8m 5d p/i d Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 3-12-1885 iy 7m 2 4d P/i Soto Quesada, Apolinar 11- 6 -1886 Oy 0m 2 8d P r Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 12- 4-1886 Oy 7m 3d Soto Quesada, Apolinar 7- 7-1887 Oy lm 6d P r Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 8-13-1887 iy 2m 19d n _ Soto Quesada, Apolinar 11- i-< 1888 Oy 4m 13d P r Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 3-15-1889 Oy lm 15d Esquivel Ibarra, 5- 1-1889 Oy 3 m. 1 Od P r As cencion Soto Alfaro, Bernardo 8-10-1889 Oy, 2m 2 7d c 340

Costa Rica--Continued

Pres ident D; e Took Office Tenure In. Out

Duran Cartin, Carlos 11- 7-1889 Oy 6m Id P r Rodriquez, Jose' Joaquin 5- 8-1890 4y 0m Od ec c Iglesias Castro, Rafael 5- 8-1894 4y 6m Od i Iglesias Llorente, 11- 8-1898 0y 7m 13d P r Demetrio Iglesias Castro, Rafael 6-21-1889 2y 6pi 17d Iglesias Llorente, 1- 8-1902 Oy 2m 7d P r Demetrio Iglesias Castro, Rafael 3-15-1902 Oy lm 23d c Esquivel Ibarra, 5- 8-1902 4y 0m Od i c Ascencion Gonzalez Viquez, Cleto 5- 8-1906 4y 0m Od i c Jimenez Oreamuno, 5- 8-1910 4y 0m Od ec c Ricardo Gonzalez Flores, Alfredo 5- 8-1914 2y 10m 19d e/ec u Tinoco Granados, 1-27-1917 2y 6m 1 5d V u Federico Quiros, Juan Bautista 8-12-1919 0y 0m 2 Od pv r Aguilar Barquero, 9- 2-1919 0y 8m 6d P c Francisco Acosta Garcia, Julio 5- 8-1920 4y 0m Od v/i c Jimenez Oreamuno, 5- 8-1924 4y 0m Od e/ec c Ricardo Gonzalez Viquez, Cleto 5- 8-1928 4y 0m Od e c Jimenez Oreamuno, 5- 8-1932 4y 0m Od ec c Ricardo Corte's Castro, Leon 5- 8-1936 4v 0m Od e c Calderon Guardia, Rafael 5- 8-1940 iy 6m 23d i Caldero'n Guardia, 12- 1-1941 0y 0m 6d P r Francisco Caldero'n Guardia, Rafael 12- 6-1941 iy lm 19d Calderon Munoz, Rafael 1-25-1943 0y 0m 9d P r Caldero'n Guardia, Rafael 2- 4-1943 Oy lm Od Mine Saborio, Jorge 3- 4-1943 Oy 0m lid P r Calderon Guardia, Rafael 3-15-1943 lv lm 23d c Picado Michalski, 5- 8-1944 Oy 4m lOd i Teodoro Picado Michalski, Rene 9-18-1944 0Y 0m 2d P r Picado Michalski, 9-19-1944 3y 7m Od u Teodoro Ilerrera, Santos Leon 4-19-1948 Oy 0m 19d pv c Figuere's , Jose 5- 8-1948 iy 6m Od V T. Od Ulate Blanco,7 /Otilio 11- 8-1949 4y 0m e C Figueres, Jose 11- 8-1953 4y 6m Od e c Echandi Jimenez, Mario 5- 8-1958 4Y 0m Od e c Orlich, Francisco J. 5- 8-1962 4y 0m Od e c 341

Costa Rica--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Tre i os ^Fernandez, Jose' 5- 8-1966 4y, Om, Od e c Figuere's , Jose'' 5- 8- 19 70 4y, 0m, Od e c 342

Cuba

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Estrada Palma, Tama's 5- 20-1902 4y 4m 8d i u Gomez, Jose' Miguel 1- 28-1909 4y 3m 2 2d e c Garcia Menocal, Mario 5- 20-1913 8y Orn Od e/i c Zayas y Alfonso, 5- 20-1921 4y 0m Od i c Alfredo Machado y Morales, 5- 20-1925 8y 2m 2 2d i u Gerardo Cespedes, Carlos 8-12-1933 0y 0m 23d pv u Manuel de / Grau San Martin, Ramon 9-10-1933 Oy 4m 5d V r Hevia, Carlos 1-15-1934 Oy 0m 3d V r Marquez Sterling, 1-18-1934 Oy 0m Id p r Manuel I 1 I— Mendieta Montefur, 1- CO 1934 iy 10m 23d V r Carlos Barnet y Vinageras, 12-11-1935 Oy 5m 9d p c Jose A. Gomez y Arias, Miguel 5- 20-1936 Oy 7m 4d i r Mariano Laredo Bru, Federico 12-24= 1936 3y 9m 16d P c Batista y Za.ldivar, 10-10-1940 4y 0m Od i c Fulgencio Grau San Martin, Ramon 10-10-1944 4y 0m Od e c Prio Socarras, Carlos 10-10-1948 3y 5m Od i u Batista y Zaldivar, 3-10-1952 6y 9m 20d v/i u Fulgencio Castro Ruz, Fidel 1- 1-1959 14y , 0m, Od V 343

Dominican Republic

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Santana, Pedro 11-13-1844 3v 8m 21d V u Jimenez, Manuel 9- 8-194 8 Oy 8m 2 Id V u Baez, Buenaventura 9-24-1849 3y 4m 2 Id i u Santana, Pedro 2-15-1853 3y 3m lid V r Regla Mota, Manuel de 5-26-1856 Oy 4 ?!; 12d P r Baez, Buenaventura 10- 8-1856 Oy 9m Od i u Valverde, Jose" 7- 7-1856 iy 3m Id pv Des iderio Santana, Pedro 1-31-1859 2y lm 18d V r Pimentel, Pedro 3-25-1865 0y 4m 18d pv Antonio Cabral, Jose' Maria 8-13-1865 Oy 3m 2 5d Baez, Buenaventura 12- 8-1865 Oy 5m 2 Od i u Cabral , Jose" Maria 8- 22-1866 iy 5m 9d V u Baez, Buenaventura 5- 2-1868 5y 7m 29d V u Gonzalez, Ignacio 1- 2-1874 2y lm 19d V u Mar 1 a Espaillat, Ulises 5-29-1876 Oy 4m 6d i u Francis co Gonzalez, Ignacio 10- 5-1876 Oy 2m 22d V u Maria Baez, Buenaventura 12-27-1876 lv 2m 5d V u Gonzales, Ignacio 7- - 1878 Oy lm Od V u Mar la Guillermo, Cesareo 2- 27-1879 Oy 9 m 8d V u Lupero'n, Gregorio 12- 6-1879 3y 8m 25d pv r Merino, Fernando 9- 1-1880 2y 0m Od e c Arturo de rieureaux, Ulises 9- 1-1882 2y 0m Od i c Billini, Francisco 9- 1-1884 Oy 8m 15d i r Gregorio Woss y Gil, Alejandro 5-16-1885 lv 7m 2 2d P r Heureaux, Ulises 1- 6-1887 12v 6m 2 Od i da Figuereo, Wenceslao 5- 26-1899 Ov lm 4d P r Vasquez, Horacio 8-30-1899 Oy 2m 15d pv . r Jimenez, Juan Isidro 11-15-1899 2y 5m 15d v/i u Vasquez, Horacio 5- 1-1902 0y 11m 18d V u Woss y Gil, Alejandro 4-18-1903 Oy 6m 16d V u Morales, Carlos F. 11- 4-1903 2y 2m 9d v/i u Ca'ceres , Ramon 1-13-1906 5y 10m 6d V/i da Victoria, Eladio 11-19-1911 iy 0m 7d p r Nouel, Adolfo A. 12- 2-1912 0y 3m 29d i r Bordas , Jose" 4-14-1912 lv 4m 13d V u Baez, Ramon 8-27-1914 Ov 3m 8d PV r Jimenez, Juan Isidro 12- 5-1914 iy 5m 2d e u Ilenriquez, Francisco 7-26-1916 0y , 4m 13d P u 344

Dominican Republ ic--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Burgos, Juan Vicini 10- 1-1922 ly, 5m,15d P c Vasquez, Horacio 3-15-1924 5y,11m,18d e u Estrella, Rafael Urena 3- 3-1930 Oy, 2m,13d pv r Truiillo, Rafael 5-16-19 30 8y , 3m, Od v/i c Leonidas Peynado, Jacinto B. 8-16-1938 ly, 6m,21d i d Troncoso de la Concha, 2-27-1940 2y, 2m,24d P c Manuel Trujillo, Rafael 5-16-1942 lOy, 3m, 2d i c Leonidas Truiillo, He'ctor 8-16-1952 7y,11m ,16d i c Balaguer, Joaquin 8- 4-1960 ly, 5m,12d i u Bonnelly, Rafael 1-18-1962 ly, lm,lld pv r Bosch, Juan 2-27-1963 Oy, 7m, Od e u Cabral, Donald Reid 9-27-1963 ly, 7m, Od PV u Imbert Barrera, 4-25-1965 Oy, 4m,•8d pv u Antonio Garcia Godoy, Hector 9- 3-1965 Oy, 9m,28d pv c Balaguer, Joaquin 7- 1- 1966 e/i 345

Ecuador

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Flores, Juan Jose' 5-13-1830 Oy 6m,15d v/i u Bolivar, Simon 11-28-1830 Oy 0m, 9d V u Flores , Juan Jose-' 12- 7-1830 3y 6m, 5d V u Valdivieso, Felix 6-12-1834 0y 2 m,2 8d pv r Rocafuerte, Vicente 9-10-1834 4y 4m,2 Id V/i c Flores , Juan Jose' 1-31-1839 3y 11m,2 2d i Provisional Junta 1- 22-1843 0y 2m, 9d Flores , Juan Jose"' 4- 1-1843 iy 11m, 6d u Provisional Junta 3- 6-1845 0v 9m, 2d Boca, Vicente Ramo'n 12- 8-1845 4y 0m, 1d ec c Ascazubi", Manuel de 12-15-1849 Oy 2m,17d P r Noboa, Diego 3- 2-1850 0y 3m,13d v Elizalde, Antonio 6-15-1850 Oy 8m,lid P r Noboa, Diego 2-26-1851 Oy 4m,2 8d u Urvina, Jose'' Maria 7- 24-1851 4y 4m,2 Id v/i c Robles , Francisco 12-16-1856 2y 4m,15d i u Provisional Junta 5- 1-1859 Oy 4m,17d Franco, Guillermo 9-17-1859 iy 0m, 7d pv u Garcia Moreno, Gabriel 9- 24-1860 4y 11m,13d v/i c Carrion, Jeronimo 9- 7-1865 2y 4m,13d i u Artete, Pedro Jose"" de 1- 1868 pu r Espinosa, Javier 1- 20-1868 0y 11m,27d pv u Garcia Morena, Gabriel 1-17-1869 5y 10m,2 2d i da Javier Leon, Francisco 12- 9-1875 P r Ascazubf, Manuel de 1876 P c Borrero, Antonio 1876 e u Veintimilla, Ignacio 9- 8-1876 6Y, 4m, 6d v/i u (J " Provisional Junta 1-14-1883 iy 0m,26d Pla'cido Caamano, Jose'' 2-10-1884 4y 4m,2 3d ec c Maria Cevallos, Pedro Jose"' 7- 1-1888 0y lm,13d P r Flores Jiion, Antonio 8-17-1888 3y 10m,17d e c Cordero , Luis 7- 1-1892 i u Salazar, Vicente Lucio 1893 pv u Alfaro, Eloy 6- 5-1895 6y 2m,26d v/i c Plaza Gutierrez, 9- 1-1901 4y 0m, Od i c Leonidas Garcia, Lizardo 9- 1-1905 Oy 4m,15d i u Alfaro, Eloy 1-16-1906 5y 0m, Od v/i u Freile Zaldumbide, Carlos 1911 PV c Estrada, Victor Emilio 9- 1-1911 Oy 3m,2 3d i d Freile Zaldumbide, Carlos 12-25-1911 Oy 0m 3d P u Andrade Marin, Francisco 12-28-1911 0y 8m 2d pv c Plaza Gutierrez, 9- 1-1912 4y 0m, Od i c Leonidas 346

Ecuador-- Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Baquerizo Moreno, 9- 1-1916 4y , 0m, Od i c Alfredo ^ Tamayo, Jose Luis 9- 1-1920 4y 0m Od i c Cordova, Gonzalo S. 9- 1-1924 Oy 10m 9d i u Provisional Junta 7-10-1925 Oy 8m 20d Ayora, Isidro 4- 1-1926 5y 4m 2 4d v/i u Larrea Alba, Luis 8- 24-1931 0y lm 2 Id pv u Baquerizo Moreno, 10-15-1931 Oy 10m 17d p u Alfredo Guerrero Martinez, 9- 2-1932 Oy 3 m 3d p u Alberto Martinez, Juan de 12- 5-1932 Oy 10m 15d i i Dios Montalvo, Abelardo 10-20-1933 Oy 10m lOd P c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1934 Oy 11m 21d i u Maria Pons , Antonio 8- 21-1935 Oy 0m 5d pv r Paaz, Federico 9- 26-1935 2y 0m 2 7d P r Gallo, Alberto 10-23-1937 0y 9m 17d P r Enriquez Borrero, Manuel Maria 8-10-1938 Oy 3m 2 2d P c Mosquera Harvaez, 12- 2-1938 Oy 11m 14d i d Aurelio Arroyo, Carlos Alberto 11-16-1939 Oy 0m 2 5d P r Cordova, Andres F. 12-11-1939 Oy 8m 6d P r Moreno, Julio E, 8- - 1940 Oy 0m 2 Od p c Arroyo, Carlos Alberto 9- 1-1940 3y 9m Od i u Junta 5-28-1944 0y 0m 3d Velasco Ibarra, Jose 6- 1-1944 3y 2m 23d v/i u Maria Mancheno Can as, Carlos 8- 23-1947 Oy 0m 9d V u Suarez Veintimilla, 9- 2-1947 Oy 0m 15d pv r Mari ano Arosemena Tola, Carlos 9-17-1947 Oy 11m 13d p c Jul io Plaza Lasso, Galo 9- 1-1948 4y 0m Od e c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1952 4y 0m Od e c Maria Ponce Enriquez, Camilo 9- 1-1956 4y 0m Od e c Velasco Ibarra, Jose 9- 1-1960 iy 2m 8d e u Maria Arosemena Tola, Carlos 11- 9-1961 iy 8m 2d PV u Julio Castro Jiion, Ramon 7-11-1963 2y 8m 18d V u Yerovi Indaburo, Clemente 3-29-1966 0y 7m 17d PV r 347

Ecuador--Continued

Pres ident Date Toole Office Tenure In Out

Arosemena Gomez, Otto 11-16-1966 ly, 9m,16d p c Velasco Ibarra, Jose'' 9- 1-1968 3y, 5m,15d e/v u Maria 348

El Salvador

Pres ident e Took Office Tenure In Out

Barriere, Pedro 9-22-1821 oy, 2m Od V u Delgado, Jos^ Matias 11- -1821 2y, 5m Od V Rodriquez, Juan 3- -1824 oy, 6m Od P r Manue1 Prado, Mariano 9- -1824 oy, 3in Od P c Villacorta, Juan 12-13-1824 2y, 0m Od ec h Vicente Prado, Mariano 12- -1826 2y, lin Od P u Cornelo, Jose' Marfa 1-15-1829 3y, 4m Od i u Morazan, Francisco 4- -1832 oy, lm Od V c Prado, Mariano 5-13-1832 oy, lm 17d i Villacorta, Dionisio 6-30-1832 0v, 0m 19d P r Prado, Mariano 7-19-1832 lv, 0m 6d u San Martin, Joaquin 2- -1833 iy, 4m Od pv u Salazar, Carlos 6-23-1834 oy, 0m 2 Od V r Salazar, Gregorio 7-13-1834 oy, 2m Od V u Escalon, Joaquin 9-13-1834 0v, lm Id pv r Silva, Jose Maria 10-14-1834 oy, 5m 26d p r Ilerrera, Dionisio de 4- -1835 0v, 0m 5d p r Espinosa, Nicolas 4-15-1835 oy, 6m 2 7d p u Gomez, Francisco 11-13-1835 oy, 4m 17d p c Vigil, Diego 4- 1-1836 iy, lm 2 3d i Menendez, Timoteo 5-23-1837 oy, 0m 14d P r Vigil, Diego 6- 7-1837 Ov, 7m Od c Menendez, Timoteo 1- 6-1838 oy, 4m 17d P r Canas , Antonio Jose 5-23-1839 oy, lm 18d p r Morazan, Francisco 7-11-1839 0v, 7m 5d i r Silva, Jose' Maria 2-16-1840 oy, lm 19d P r Canas, Antonio Jose 4- 5-1840 Oy, 5m 15d P u Ramirez, Norberto 9-20-1840 oy, 3m 17d pv u Lindo y Zelaya, Juan 2- 1-1841 iy, 0m Od v/i u Marin, Escolastico 2- 1-1842 oy, 2m lid pv c Guzman, Juan Jose 4-12-1842 oy, 2m 18d i Villacorta, Dionisio 6-30-1842 oy, 0m 19d P r Marin, Escolastico 7-19-1842 oy, 2m 7d P r Guzman, Juan Jose' 9-26-1842 oy, 4m Od Arce, Pedro 1-26-1843 oy, lm 12d P r Guzman, Juan Jose"' 3- 8-1843 oy,10m 23d u Palacios, Fermin 1-31-1844 oy, 0m Id pv r Malespin, Francisco 2- 1-1844 oy, 3m 8d i Guzman, Joaquin 5-19-1844 oy, lm 7d P r Eufrasio Malespin, Francisco 6-16-1844 oy, 4m 9d Guzman, Joaquin 10-25-1844 oy, 3m 2 Id P r Eufrasio Palacios, Fermin 2-16-1845 oy, 2m 9d P r 349

El Salvador--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Guzman, Joaquin 4-25-1845 oy, 9m 5d p/v c Eufras io Pal acios, Fermm 2- 1-1846 oy, 0m 2 Id P r Aguilar, Eugenio 2- 21-1846 0y, 4m. 2 Id i Palacios , Fermin 7-12-1846 oy, 0m 9d P r Aguilar, Eugenio 7- 21-1S46 iy, 6m 9d c Medina, Tomans 2- 1-1848 oy, 0m 2d P r Quiroz, Felix 2- 3-1848 Oy, 0m 4d P r Vasconcelos, Doroteo 2- 7-1848 iy,11m 19d i r Rodriguez , Ramo"n 1- 26-1850 oy, 0m 4d P c Santin del Castillo, 2- 1-1850 oy, 0 m 3d P r Miguel Vasconcelos, Doroteo 2- 4-1850 oy,11m 8d i u Duenas, Francisco 1-12-1851 oy, lm 18d pv r Quiroz, Felix 3- 1-1851 oy, 2m 13d P r Duenas, Francisco 5-13-1851 2y, 8in 17d P/i c Gomez, Vicente 2- 1-1854 oy, 0m 12d P r San Martin, Jose'' Maria 2-12-1854 oy, 7m 14d i Hernandez, Mariano 9- 26-1854 oy, lm 17d P r San Martin, Jose" Maria 11-13-1854 iy, 2m 17d c Duenas, Francisco 2- 1-1856 oy, 0m 12d P r Campo, Rafael 2-12-1856 oy, 3 m 4d i Duenas, Francisco 5-16-1856 oy, 2m 2d P r Campo, Rafael 7-18-1856 iy, 6m 12d c Zepeda, Lorenzo 2- 1-1858 oy, 0m 6d P r Santin del Castillo, 2- 7-1858 oy, 4m 17d i Miguel Barrios , Gerardo 6-24-1858 oy, 2 m 26d P r Santin del Castillo, 9-20-1858 oy, 4m Od u Miguel Guzman, Joaquin 1-19-1859 oy, 0m 26d pv r Eufrasio Peralta , Jose"'Maria. 2-15-1859 oy, 0m 24d p r Barrios Espinosa, 3- 9-1859 iy, 9m 6d v/i Gerardo Peralta, Jose''Mar fa 12-15-1860 0v, lm 24d p r Barrios Espinosa, 2- 9-1861 2y, 8m 17d u Gerardo Duenas , Francisco 10- 26-1863 sy, 5m 19d pv/i u Gonzales , Santiago 4-15-1871 iy, 0m 15d pv/i Mendez, Manuel 5- 1-1872 oy, 2m 8d P r Gonzalez, Santiago 7- 9-1872 3v, 6m 2 Id c Valle, Andres 2- 1-1876 oy, 3m Od i u Zaldivar, Rafael 4-30-1876 7y,11m 6d pv/i (2i) Guirola, Angel 4- 6-1884 oy, 4m,15d P r 350

El Salvador--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out Zaldivar, Rafael 8- 21-1884 Oy 8m. 24d u Figueroa, Fernando 5-15-1885 Oy lm 3d pv u Rosales , Jose^ 6-18-1885 Ov 0m 4d P r Menendez, Francisco 6- 22-1885 5y 0m Od v/i d Ezeta, Carlos 6- 22-1890 3y 11m 2 4d v/i u Gutierrez, Rafael 6- 9-1894 5y 4m 27d v/i u Antonio Regalado, Tomas 11-13-1898 4y 3m 15d v/i c Escalon, Pedro Jose 2-28-1903 4v 0m Od i c Figueroa, Fernando 2-28-1907 4y 0 m Od i c Arauio, Manuel 2-28-1911 ly 11m 9d i da Enrique Melendez, Carlos 2- 8-1913 ly 6m 2 Id P r Quinonez Molina, 8- 28-1914 0y 6m Od P c Alfonso Melendez, Carlos 2-28-1915 3y 9m 2 Id i h Quinonez Molina, 12-21-1918 Oy 2m 7d P c Alfonso Melendez, Jorge 2- 28-1919 4y 0m Od i c Quinonez Molina, 2- 28-1923 4y 0m Od i c A1fonso Bosque, Pio Romero 2-28-1927 ^ y 0m Od i c Arauio, Arturo 2- 28-1931 0y 9m 2d i u Hernandez Martinez, 12- 2-1931 2y 8m 26d V r Maxmi1i ano Menendez, Andres I. 8-28-1934 0v 6 m Od P c Hernandez Martinez, 2-28-1935 9y 2m 8d i(3)u Maxmi1i ano Menendez, Andres I. 5- 8-1944 0y 5m 13d pv u Aguirre y Salinas, 10-21-1944 Oy 4m lOd pv c Osmin Castaneda Castro, 2- 28-1945 3y 9m 14d i u Salvador Cordova, Manuel de 12-15-1948 0y Oirv 19d V u Jesus/ Osorio, Oscar 1- 4-1949 Oy 9m 18d pv r Bolanos , ,0scar 10- 22-1949 Oy 10m 2 2d P c Osorio, Oscar 9-14-1950 6y 0m Od i c Lemus , Jose' Maria 1-25-1956 4y lm 12d i u Rodolfo Cor doll, 1-25-1962 0y 5m 5d pv c Eusebio Rivera Carballo, 7- 1-1962 5y 0m Od i c Julio Sanchez Hernandez, 7- 1-1967 5y 0 m Od i c Fidel 351

Guatemala

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Gainza, Gabino 9-15-1821 Oy 9m 7d V u Filisola, Vicente 6- 22-1822 Oy 5m Od i r Codallos, Felipe 11- - 1822 iy 10m Od P Diaz, Alejandro 9-15-1824 Oy 0m 2 Sd P r Barrundia Jose"' 10-12-1824 ly 10m 24d ec u Francisco, Juan Flores , Cirilo 9- 6-1826 Oy lm 7d pv da Arce, Manuel 10-13-1826 Oy 3m Od P r Estrada, Jose 1- - 1827 Oy 3 m Od P r Aycinena, Mariano de 3- 1-1827 2y lm 13d i u Zenteno, Mariano 2-11-1829 0y lm Od pv u Barrundia, Jose 4-13-1829 Oy 4m Od pv r Juan Molina Flores, Pedro 8- - 1829 Oy 7m Od i u Rivera Cabezas, 3- 9-1830 Oy 9m Od PV r Antonio Marque'z, Gregorio 2- - 1831 0y lm Od P r Martinez, Juan Antonio 2- - 1831 Oy 0m 5d P r Vasconcelos, Simo'n 2- - 1831 Oy 0m 5d P ' r Valenzuela, Pedro J. 2- - 1831 0y 0m 5d P r Marquez, Gregorio 3- - 1831 Oy 5m Od P r Flores, Francisco X. 8- - 1831 Oy lm Od P r Galvez, Mariano 8- - 1831 4y 8m Od i c Sanchez de Leon, 5- - 1836 0y 0m 5d P r Mari ano

Galvez, Mariano 5- - 1836 iy 10m Od i u Valenzuela, Pedro J. 2- 2-1838 0y 5m 20d V u Rivera Paz, Mariano 7-22-1838 Oy 6m 8d v/i u Salazar, Carlos 1-30-1839 Oy 2m 13d V u Rivera Paz, Mariano 4-13-1839 2y 8m Od V u Lopez, Venancio 12-14-1841 Oy 5m Od pv r Rivera Pas, Mariano 5-14-1842 2y 6m 27d i u Carrera,/ ' Jose Rafael 12-11-1844 3v 8m 4d v/i u Martinez, Juan 8-15-1848 Oy 3m 13d P r Antonio Escobar, Jose Bernardo 11-28-1848 Oy 0m 3d p r Paredes, Mariano 1- 1-1849 2y 9m 2 Id i u Carrera, Jose Rafael 10- 22-1851 13y 5m 22d V d Aucinena, Pedro de 4-14-1865 Oy lm Od P r Cerna, Vicente 5-14-1865 6y lm 16d p/i u Garcia Granados, Miguel 6-30-1871 Oy 10m 8d V Barrios, Justo Rufino 5- 8-1872 Oy lm 2d P r Garcia Granados, Miguel 6-10-1872 0y 11m 24d c Barrios, Justo Rufino 6-14-1873 9y lm Od i(2) Orantes , Jose'' Maria 7- - 1882 0y 5 m Od P r Barrios, Justo Rufino 12- - 1882 ly 5 m Od d 352

Guatemala--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Sinibaldi, Alejandro 4- 3-1885 Oy 0m 5d P r Barillas, Manuel 4- 8-1885 4y 1 lm 23d P/i c Lis andro Reyna Barrios, Jose 3-15-1892 5y 10m 23d e/v da Maria Estrada Cabrera, 2- 8-1898 2 2y 2 m 6d P/i(3) u Manue1 Herrera, Carlos 4-14-1920 Oy 7m 21d pv/ i u / S Orellana, Jose Maria 12- 5-1920 5y 9m 16d v/i d Chacon, Lazaro 9- 26-1926 4y 2m 16d p/i h Palma, Baudilio 12-12-1930 Oy 0m 5d P u Orellana, Manuel 12-17-1930 Oy 0m 15d V r Reyna Andrade, Jose 1- 2-1931 Oy lm 12d p u Maria" Ubico, Jorge 2-14-1931 13y 4m 17d v/i u Ponce Vaides, Federico 7- 1-1944 0y 3m 19d i u Military Junta 10-20-1944 Oy 4m 2 5d pv c Arevalo, Juan Jose 3-15-1945 6y 0m Od i c Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo 3-15-1951 3y 3m 12d i u Military Junta 6-27-1954 0y 0m 6d pv r Castillo Armas, Carlos 7- 3-1954 3y 0m 23d v/i da Gonzales Solis, Luis 7-26-1957 Ov 2m 28d P r Military Junta 10-24-1957 Oy 0m 2d pv r Flores Avendano, 10-26-1957 Oy 4m 6d P c Guillermo Ydigoras Fuentes , 3- 2-1958 5y 0m 29d e u Miguel Peralta Azurdia, 3-31-1963 3y 3m Od v c Enrique Mendez Montenegro, 7- 1-1966 4y 0m Od e c Julio Arana Osorio, Carlos 7- 1-1970 e 353

Haiti

President Date Took 0f f :i. ce Tenure In Out

Dessalines, Jean Jacques 1- 1-1804 2y 9m 1 7d V da Christophe, Henri 10-17-1806 13y 11m 2 Id i ds Petion, Alexandre 3- 9-1807 lly 0m 20d i d Bover , Jean Pierre 3-30-1818 24v 11m 13d i u Ilerard, Charles 12-30-1843 Oy 4m 3d V u Guerrier, Philippe 5- 3-1844 Ov 11m 12d V d Pierrot, Jean Louis 4-16-1845 Ov 10m 12d i r Riche, Jean Baptiste 3- 1-1846 0y 11m 26d i d Soulouque, Faustin 3- 1-1847 lly 10m 15d i u Geffrarc1 . Fabre 12-23-1858 8y 2m 2 Od V u Salnave, Sylvain 6-14-1867 2v 6m 4d' V u Nissape-Saget 3-19-1870 4y lm 2 4 d V r Domingue, Michel 6-11-1874 lv 10m 4d i u Bo is ronde- Canal 7-17-1876 3y 0m Od i u Felicite Salomon, 10- 23-1879 8y 9m 18d i u Etienne Boisronde-Canal 8-10-1888 Oy 4m 4d pv r Legitime, F. Deus 12-16-1888 Oy 8m 7d V u Florvil Ilippolyte, F.M. 10- 9-1889 6y 5m 14d V d Simon Sam, P.A. Tiresias 3-31,1896 6y lm 15d i r Alexis , Nord 12-21-1902 5y 11m 12d i u Simon, F. Antoine 12-17-1908 2v 7m 16d V u Leconte, Michel 8-14-1911 Oy 11m 24d V da Cincinnatus Auguste, Tancrede 8- 8-1912 Oy 8m 2 4d i da Oreste, Michel 5- 4-1913 Ov 8m 2 3d i u Zamor, Oreste 2- 8-1914 0y 8m 20d V u Theodore, Joseph 11- 7-1914 Oy 3m 15d V u Davilmar Sam, Jean Vilbrun 3- 4-1915 Oy 4m '2 3d V da Gu i1laume Dartiguenave, Philippe 8-12-1915 6y 9 m 4d i c Sudre Borno, Joseph Louis 5-15-1922 8y 0m Od i(2) c Roy, Eugene 5-15-1930 Oy 6m 3d P r Vincent, Stenio 11-18-1930 lOy 5m 2 7d ec/i c Lescot, Elie : 5- 15-1941 4y 7m 26d i u Junta 1-11-1946 Ov 7m 5d Estime, Dumersais 8-16-1946 3y 8m 24d i u Magloire, Paul 5-10-1950 6v 7m 2d v/ i u Memours Pierre- 12-12-1956 Uy lm 2 2d pv u Louis , Joseph Cantave, Ledin 2- 4-1957 0y 0m 3d pv r Sylvain, Franck 2- 7-1957 Oy lm 2 4d PV r Fignole, Daniel 5- 25-1957 Oy 0m 19d pv _.u Kebreau, Antonio T. 6-14-1957 Oy 4m 8d pv c Duvalier, Franqois 10-22-1957 13y 6m Od e d 354

Honduras

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Herrera, Dionisio 9-16-1824 2y 5m 24d v/ec u Mills , Jose" Justo 3-10-1827 0y 6m Od V u Bendena, Cleto 9- - 1827 Oy lm Od P Zelaya, Jose J. 10- - 1827 Ov lm Od P Bustamante, Miguel 11- 5-1827 Oy 0m 2 2d P Morazan, Francisco 11-27-1827 0y 6m 2Id x> Zelaya, Jose J. 6-18-1828 Ov 0m 12d P Vigil f/ Diego 6-30-1828 lv 5m 2d p Morazan, Francisco 12- 2-1829 Oy 0m 2 2d p Arias , Juan Angel 12-24-1829 0y 3m 2 8d p Morazan, Francisco 4- 22-1830 Oy 3m 6d p Valle, Jose Santos del 7-28-1830 Ov 7m 12d p Marquez, Jose Antonio 3-10-1831 iy 0m lid p Mills, Francisco 3-22-1832 0y 9m 15d p Rivera, Joaquin 1- 7-1833 Oy 8m 17d i Ferrera,* Francisco/ 9- 2.4- 1833 Oy 4m Od P r Rivera, Joaquin 1- - 1834 Oy 8m Od Ferrera, Francisco 9- 20-1834 Oy 2 m Od P r Rivera, Joaquin 11- - 1834 Oy 10m Od Bustillo, Jose Maria 9-10-1835 Oy lm Od P r Rivera, Joaquin 10- - 1835 iy 2m Od u Martinez, Jose' Maria 12-31-1836 Oy 4m 2 8d pv Herrera, Jose' J. 5- 28-1837 ly 3m 5d P Martinez, Jose Maria 9- 3-1838 Oy 2m 9d P Matute, Lino 11-12-1838 Oy lm 2 7d P Molina, Juan F. de 1- 9-1839 Oy 3m 4d P Medina, Felipe N. 4-13-1839 0y 0m 2d P Alvarado, Jose 4-15-1839 0y 0m 13d P Guerro , Jose Maria 4-28-1839 Oy 3m 12d P Garriga, Mariano 8-10-1839 Oy 0m lOd P Bustillo, Jose Maria 8-20-1839 Oy Oin 7d P Ministros, Consejo de 8- 27-1839 Oy 0m 4d Zelaya y Reyes, 9- 21-1839 iy 3m 10 d Francisco Ferrera, Francisco 1- 1-1841 2y 0m Od i c Ministros, Consejo de 1- 1-1843 0y lm 2 8d P c Ferrera, Francisco 2-28-1843 ly 8m Od i Ministros, Conseio de 10- - 1844 Oy lm Od P r Ferrera, Francisco 11- - 1844 Oy 2m Od c Chavez, Coronado 1- 1-1845 2y 0m Od i c Ministros, Consejo de 1- 1-1847 Oy lm 12 d p r Lindo, Juan 2-12-1847 0y 7m 9 a i r Bustillo, Felipe 9- 21-1847 lv 2m 16d P c Lindo, Juan 12- 8-1848 3y lm 2 2d i h Go'mez, Francisco 2- 1-1852 Oy lm Od P c Cabanas , Trinidad 3- 1-1852 ly 2m 8d i u 355

Honduras --Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Gomez, Francisco 5- 9-1853 Oy 7m 22d pv r CabafTas , Trinidad 12-31-1853 iy 9m 18d i u Bueso J., Santiago 10-18-1855 0v 0m 16d pv h Aguilar, Francisco 11- 8-1855 Ov 3m lid pv u Guardiola, Santos 2-19-1856 5y 10m 2 2d v/i da (2i) Montes , Francisco, 1-11-1862 0y 0m 24d P r Medina, Jos

Honduras --Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Leiva/} Ponciano 4-15-1886 Oy 4m 13d P r Bogran, Luis 8-28-1886 5y 3m 2d c Leiva, Ponciano 11-30-1891 lv 2m 9d i r Aguero, Rosendo 2- 9-1893 Oy 2m 9d P u Vasquez, Domingo 4-18-1893 Oy 10m 2d V u Bonilla, Policarpo 2-22-1894 4y 11m 9d V/i c Sierra, Terencio 2- 1-1899 3v 11m Od i u Ministros, Consejo de 12-30-1902 Oy lm 18d Arias , Juan A. 2-18-1903 Oy lm 2 5d i u Bonilla, Manuel 4-13-1903 3y 10m 12d V u Ministros, Consejo de 2- 25-1907 0y lm 23d Davila, Miguel R. 4-18-1907 3v 11m lOd v/i u Bertrand, Francisco 3-28-1911 Oy 11m Od pv r Bonilla, Manuel 2- 1-1912 ly lm 2 Od i d Bertrand,Francis co 3- 21-1913 Oy 4m 7d P r Membreno, Alberto 7-28-1913 2y 5m 2d P c Bertrand, Francisco 2- 1-1916 3y 7m 8d i u Ministros, Consejo de 9- 9-1919 Oy 0m 26d Bogran, Francisco 10- 5-1919 Oy 5m 26d PV r Lo'pez Gutierrez, Rafael 2- 1-1920 4y lm lOd v/i u Ministros, Consejo de 3-10-1924 0y lm 2 Od Tosta, Vicente 4-30-1924 Oy 9m Od P r Paz Baraona, Miguel 2- 1-1925 4y 0m Od i c Meiis Colindres, Vicente 2- 1-1929 4y 0m Od e c Carias Andino, Tiburcio 2- 1-1933 15y 11m Od e/i Galvez, Manuel 1- 1-1949 5y 11m 16d i u Lozano Dias, Julio 11-16-1954 iy 11m 5d P h Military Junta" 10-21-1956 iy 2m Od u Villeda Morales, Ramon 12-21-1957 5y 9m 12d v/e Lopez Arellano, 10- 3-1963 7y 8m 3d v/i u Oswaldo 357 Mexico

Pres ident D; e Took Office Tenure In Out

Iturbide, Agustin de 5-21-1822 Oy 9m 2 8d V u Vivanco, Marquis de 3-19-1823 Oy 0m 13d pv r Junta 4- 2-1823 Victoria, Guadalupe 10-10-1824 4y 6 m lOd e c Guerrero, Vicente 4-11-1829 0y 8m 17d i u Bocanegra, Jose Maria 12-18-1829 Ov 0m 5d pv u Velez, Pedro 12- 23-1829 Ov 0 m 8d pv r Bustamante, Anastasio 1- 1-1830 2y 8m 13d V u Muzquiz, Melchor 8-14-1832 Ov 4m lOd Pv r Gomez Pedraza, Manuel 12- 24-1832 Ov 4 m 6d p c Santa Anna, A. Lopez 4- 1-1833 Oy 0 m lOd i • c1"e ^ Gomez Farias, Valentin 4-10-1833 Oy lm 5d P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 5-16-1833 Oy 0m 14d • c^e ^ Gomez Farias, Valentfn 6- 2-1833 Oy 0m 1 5d P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 6-18-1833 Oy 0m 17d ^ de ^ Gomez Farias, Valentin 7- 6-1833 Oy 3m 2 Id P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 10-28-1833 Oy lm 6d ^ d e ^ Gomez Farias, Valentin 12- 5-1833 Oy 4m 18d P r Santa Anna, A. Lo'pez 4- 24-1834 Oy 9m Id r de ^ Barragan, Miguel 1- 28-1835 iy lm 2d P d . Corro , Jose' Justo 3- 2-1836 Oy lm 16d P r Bustamante, Anastasio 4-19-1837 iy 11m 2 8d i u Santa Anna, A. Lo'pez 3- 18- 1839 Oy 3m 21d V u de Bravo, Nicolas 7-10-1839 Oy 0m 7d pv r Bustamante, Anastasio 7-17-1839 2y 2m 4d • i u Echeverria, Francisco 9- 22-1841 Oy 0m 17d pv r Javier Santa Anna, A. Lopez 10- 9-1841 Jy 0m 16d V de / Bravo, Nicolas 10-26-1842 Oy 4m 9d P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 3- 5-1843 Oy 6 m 2 8d de Canalizo, Valentin 10- 4-1843 Oy 8m Od P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 6 - 4-1844 Oy 3m 7d r de ^ ^ Herrera, Jose' Joaquin de 9-12-1844 Oy 0m 9d P r Canalizo, Valentin 9-21-1844 Oy 2m 14d P u Herrera, Jose'' Joaquin de 12- 6-1844 iy 0m 24d pv u Paredes y Arrillaga, 1- 3-1846 Oy 6m 2 5d V u Mari ano 358

Mexico--Continued

Pres ident e Took Off ice Tenure In_ Out

Bravo, Nicolas 7- 28-1846 Ov 0m 6d pv r Salas, Jose Mariano 8- 5-1846 Oy 4m 17d v r Gomez Farias, Valentin 12-24-1846 Oy 2m 26d P r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 3-21-1847 Oy 0m lOd v de ^ Anaya, Pedro Maria 4- 1-1847 Oy lm 2 Od p r Santa Anna, A. Lopez 5- 20-1847 Oy 3m 2 Sd u de Pena y Pena, Manuel 9-16-1847 Oy lm 28d pv de la Anaya, Pedro Maria 11-14-1847 Oy lm 23d p r Pena v Pena, Manuel 1- 8-1848 Oy 4m 28d c de la Merrera, Jose Joaquin de 6- 2-1848 2y 7m 12d e c Arista, Mariano 1- 15-1851 iy 11m 19d i u Ceballos, Juan Bautista 1- 5-1853 Ov lm 2d pv r Lombardini, Manuel Maria 2- 7-1853 0y 2m 13d P r Santa Anna, A. LcTpez 4-20-1853 2y 3m 2Id i r de Carrera, Martin 8-14-18 55 Oy 0m 28d P r Diaz de la Vega, Romulo 9-12-1855 Oy 0m 2 Id P r Alvarez, Juan 10- 4-1855 Oy 2m 6d pv u Comonfort, Ignacio 12-11-1855 2y lm 9d V u Zuloaga, Felix 1- 21-1858 Oy 11m 3d V u Robles Pezuela, Manuel 12-23-1858 Oy 0m 2 8d V u Zuloaga, Felix 1-24-1859 Oy 0m 6d pv r Miramon, Miguel 2- 2-1859 iy 6m 2d V Pavon, Jose Ignacio 8-13-1860 Oy 0m 2d p r Miramon, Miguel 8-15-1860 Oy 4m 9d u Juarez, Benito 1-21-1858 14y 6m 2 7d p/v/e i (3) d Lerdo de Teiada, 7- 8-1872 4y 3m 1 Od P/i u Sebastian Iglesias, Jose'' Maria 10- 28-1876 Ov 2m 19d p/i r Diaz, Forfirio 11- 28-1876 Ov 0m 8d pv r Mendez, Juan N. 12- 6-1876 Oy 2 m lid P r Diaz, Forfirio 2-16-1877 3y 9m 14d P/i c Gonzales, Manuel 12- 1-1880 4y 0m Od i c Diaz, Forfirio 12- 1-1884 26y 5m 2 5d i(7)u Leon de la Barra, 5- 25-1911 Oy 5m lid pv r Francisco Madero, Francisco 11- 6-1911 iy 3m 12d v/i u Lascurain, Pedro 2-18-1913 Ov 0m Id pv r Huerta, Victoriano 2-18-1913 lv 4m 2 8d V u Carvaial, Francisco 7-15-1914 Oy 0m 28d pv r Gutie'rrez, Eulalio 11- 6-1914 Ov 2m lOd i u 359

Mexico--Continued

Pres ident Date TooV. Office Tenure In Out

Gonzalez Garza, Roque 1-16-1915 Oy 4m,24d i u Lagos Chazaro, 6-10-1915 Oy 6m, Od i u Francis co Carranza, Vemistiano 7-15-1914 5y 10m, 6d v/i u Huerta, AdoIfo de la 6- 1-1920 Oy 6m, Od pv r Obregon, Alvaro 12- 1-1920 4y 0m, Od i c Calles , Plutarco 12- 1-1924 4y 0m, Od i c Elias Portes Gil, Emilio 12- 1-1928 iy 0m,2 8d i c Ortiz Rubio, Pascual 12-21-1929 2y Sm,lid i u Rodriquez, Abelardo 9- 4-1932 2y 2m, 4d pv c Cardenas, Lazaro 12- 1-1934 6y 0m,:0d i c Avila Camacho, Manuel 12- 1-1940 6y 0m, Od i c Aleman, Miguel 12- 1-1946 6y 0m, Od i c Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo 12- 1-1952 6y 0m, Od i c Lopez Mateos, Adolfo 12- 1-1958 6y 0m, Od i c Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 12- 1-1964 6y 0m, Od i c Echeverria yClvarez, 12- 1-1970 i Luis 360

Nicaragua

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Cerda, Manuel de la 4-20-1825 3y 6m 18d V u Argiiello, Juan 4- 8-1826 3v 6m 2 3d V c Espinosa, Juan 11- 1-1829 Oy 6 m 12d P u Herrera, Dionisio 5-12-1830 iy 3m Od v/i Ruiz y Bolance, Carlos 8- -1831 0v lm Od P r Herrera, Dionisio 9- -1831 iy 5m Od Morales, Benito 3- 1-1833 0y 0m 4d p r Herrera, Dionisio 3- 4-1833 0y lm 26d u Morales, Benito 5- 1-1833 Oy 10m 1 Od pv r Nunez, Jose'' 3-10-1834 ly lm 13d P r Zepeda, Jose'' 4-23-1835 Ov lm Od i Juarez, Gregorio 5- -1835 Ov lm Od P r Zepeda, Jose"' 6- -1835 ly 7m Od da Nunez, Jose^ 1-25-1837 ly 0m Od P F. X. Rub io 1- -1838 Oy lm Od P Nunez, Jose' 2- -1838 Oy 3m Od P Rocha, Evaristo 5- -1838 Oy 2m Od P Cosio, Joaquin 6- -1838 lv 0m Od P Rivas, Patricio 6- -1839 Oy lm Od P Cosio, Joaquin 7- -1839 Oy 3m Od P Ulloa, Hilario 10- -1839 Oy 2m Od P Valladares, Tomas 11- -1839 Ov 10m Od P Rivas, Patricio 9- -1-8 40 Oy 5m Od P Buitrago, Pablo 3- 4-1841 2y 0m 26d ec c Orozco, Juan de Dios 4- 1-1843 Oy lm Od P r Perez, Manuel 5- -1843 iy 8m Od i u Madriz, Emiliano 1-25-1845 Oy 0m 5d pv da Saenz, Bla's Antonici 1-20-1845 0v 2m 14d pv r Sandoval, Jose'' Leon 4- 4-1845 iy 2m 21d i Triunvo ^ Sandoval, Jose'' Leon 9- 2-1846 0y 6m 10d' c Morales, Miguel R. 3-12-1847 Oy 0m 24d P r Guerrero, Jose'' 4- 6-1847 ly lm 2 5d ec c Teran, Toribio 4- 1-1849 Ov 0m Id P r Rosales, Benito 4- 1-1849 Oy 0 m Id P r Ramirez, Norberto 4- 1-1849 ly 0m 2d Torcuato, Jose 4- 3-1850 Oy 2m 4d P r Ramirez, Norberto 6- 7-1850 Ov 9m 24d c Abaunza, Jus to 4- 1-1851 Oy lm 5d P r Pineda, Jose'Laureano 5- 5-1851 Oy 3m Od ec u Abaunza, Jus to 8- 5-1851 0v 2m 2 7d pv u Montenegro, Francisco del 8- 5-1851 Oy 0m 14d pv d Alfaro, Jesds 8-19-1851 Oy lm 13d p r Pineda, Jos£ Laureano 11- 2-1851 Ov lm 18d V Vega, Fulgencio 12-20-1851 Ov lm 23d p r Pineda, Jose'' Laureano 2-13-1852 lv lm 18d c 361

Nicaragua--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Chamorro, Fruto 4- 1-1853 iy 11m 13d i d Castellon, Francisco 6-11-1854 iy 2m 2 Id v d Estrada, Jose' Marfa 3-12-1855 0y 7 m lid P u Escoto, Nazario 9- 2-1855 0y lm 2 Id pv u Rivas , Patricio 10-13-1855 ly 9 m lid pv u Martinez, Tomas 11-15-1857 9y 3m Od v/i C3i) h Solorzano, Federico 2- - 1867 0y 0m lOd P r Silva, Antonio 2- - 1867 Oy 0 m 5d P r Guzman, Fernando 3- 1-1867 2y 6 m lid i Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin 9-12-1869 Ov 2m 13d P r Guzmali, Fernando 11-25,1869 iy 3m 6d c Cuadra, Jose" Vicente 3- 1-1871 4v 0m Od i c • y Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin 3- 1-1875 iy 0m Od i Balladares,7 Pedro 1876 0y 3 m Od P r Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin 1876 2y 9m Od c Zavala, Joaquin 3- 1-1879 4v 0m Od ec c Cardenas , Adan 3- 1-1883 2y 0m Od i Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin 3- - 1885 0y 2m Od P r Ca'rdenas , Ad an 4- - 1885 ly 10m Od c Carazo, Evaristo 3- 1-1887 2y 5m Od i d Osorno, David 8- 1-1889 0y 0m Id P r Sacasa, Roberto 8- 1-1889 ly 4m 2 4d P r Chavez, Ignacio 12- 25-1890 0y 2m 6d P c Sacasa, Roberto 3- 1-1891 2y 3 m 5d i u Machado, Salvador 6- 6 -1893 Oy 3m 9d pv u Zelaya, Jose"Santos 9-15-1893 16y 3m 12d v/i u Madriz , Jose"" 12-27-1909 Oy 7m 23d pv u Estrada, Jose Dolores 8-20-1910 Ov 4m lid pv r Estrada, Juan Jose" 1- 1-1911 Oy 4m lOd V r Diaz, Adolfo 5-11-1911 5y 7m 2 Od P/i c Chamorro, Emiliano 1- 1-1917 4y 0m Od i c Chamorro, Diego Manuel 1- 1-1921 2y 9m lid i d Martinez, Bartolome 10-12-1923 iy 2m 19d P c Solorzano, Carlos 1- 1-1925 IV 0m 15d i u Sacasa, Juan Bautista 1-16-1926 0y 0m Id PV r Chamorro, Emiliano 1-16-1926 Oy 10m. Od V r Uriza, Sebastian 10- - 1926 Oy lm Od P r Diaz, Adolfo 2- - 1927 2y 11m Od P c Moncada, Jose Maria 1- 1-1929 4y 0m Od e c Sacasa, Juan Bautista 1- 1-1933 3y 5m Od e u Brenes Jarquin, Carlos A. 6- 9-1936 0y 6m 2 Od pv c Somoza, Anastasio 1- 1-1937 lOy 4m Od v/i (2i) c Argdello, Leonardo 5- 1-1947 Oy 0m 2 5d i u Sacasa, Benjamin Lacaya 5- 26-1947 Oy 2 m 19d pv r 362

Nicaragua--Continued

Pres ident Date Toole Office Tenure In Out

Roman y Reyes, Victor 8-14-1947 2y, 8m,22d i d Somoza, Anastasio 5- 7-1950 6y, 4m,22d p/i da Somoza Debayle, Luis 9- 29-1956 6y, 7m, 2d p/i c Schick, Rene"' 5- 1-1963 3y, 3m, 2d i d Guerrero Gutierrez, 8- 3-1966 Oy, 3m,28d p c Lorenzo Somoza Debayle, .• 5- 1-1967 6y, 2m, 7d i c Anas tas io 363

Panama

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Amador Guerrero, Manuel 2-20-1904 3y 3m 13d v/e Obaldia, Jose'" Domingo 6- 24-1907 Oy 6m 5d P r de Amador Guerrero, Manuel 12-30-1907 Oy 9m Od c Obaldia, Jose''Domingo 10- 1-1908 iy 5 m Od i d de Mendoza, Carlos A. 3- 1-1910 Oy 7m Od P r Boyd, Federico 10- 1-1910 Oy 0m 4d P r Arosemena, Pablo 10- 5-1910 ly 3m 27d P r Chiari, Rodolfo 2- 2-1912 Oy lm 4d p r Arosemena, Pablo 3- 7-1912 Oy 6in 23d p c Porras, Belisario 10- 1-1912 4v 0m Od e c Valde's , Ramon M. 10- 1-1916 iy 8m 2d i d Urriola, Ciro L. 6- 3-1918 0y 3m 2 7d P u Diaz, Pedro A. 10- 1-1918 Oy 0m lid PV r Porras, Belisario 10-12-1918 ly 3m 17d i r Lefevre, Ernesto T. 1-30-1920 Oy 8m Od P c Porras, Belisario 10- 1-1920 2y 8m 5d e Chiari, Rodolfo 6- 6-1923 Oy 0m 6d P r Porras, Belisario 6-12-1923 ly 3m 18d c Chiari, Rodolfo 10- 1-1924 3y 11m 7d e Duque, Tomcfs Gabriel . 9- uO 1928 0y 0m 17d P r Chiari, Rodolfo 9- 25-1928 0y 0m 6d c Arosemena, Florencio 10- 1-1928 2y 3m 2d e u Harmodio Arias , Ilarmondio 1- 2-1931 Oy 0m 14d pv r Alfaro, Ricardo 1-16-1931 ly 8m 14d P c Arias, Ilarmondio 10- 1-1932 4y 0m Od e c Arosemena, Juan 10- 1-1936 3y 2m 15d V d Demos tenes Fernandez Jaen, 12-16-1939 0y 0m 2d P r Ezequiel Boyd, Augusto Samuel 12-18-1939 Oy 9m 13d p c Arias , Arnulfo 10- 1-1940 ly 0m 8d i u Pezet, Jose'' 7-14-1941 Oy 0m 5d P r Jaen Guardia, Ernesto 10- 9-1941 0y 0m Id PV r Guardia, Ricardo 10- 9-1941 3y :8m 6d ec u Adolfo de la Jimenez, Enrique Adolfo 6-15-1945 3y 3m 15d P c Diaz Arosemena, Domingo 10- 1-1948 Oy 9m 27d i h Chanis, Daniel 7- 28-1949 Oy 3m 2 2d p u Chiari, Roberto F. 11-20-1949 Oy 0m 5d PV r Arias, Arnulfo 11-25-1949 ly 5m 15d V u Arosemena, Alcibiades 5-10-1951 ly 4m 2Id pv c Remon Cantera, Jose"' 10- 1-1952 2y 3m Id i da Guizado, Jose"Ramon 2- 3-1955 oy 0m 12d P i 364

Panama--Continued

Pres ident e Took Office Tenure In Out

Arias Espinosa, Ricardo 1-15,1955 iy 8m 16d P c Guardi a, Ernesto de la 10- 1-1956 4y 0m Od e c Chi ari , Roberto F. 10- 1-1960 0y 9m 19d e Ru i z , Se'rgio Gonzales 7-19-1961 Oy 0m 5d P r Chiari , Roberto F. 7-24-1961 Oy 8m 16d Bazan, Jose'' Dominador 4-10-1962 0v 0m 4d P r Chiari , Roberto F. 4-14-1962 Oy lm 2 7d Gonzal ez Ruiz, Sergio 6-11-1962 Ov 0m 6d P r

Chiari ) Roberto F. 6-17-1962 Oy 9m Od Gonzal ez Ru l z 3-17-1963 Oy 0m 6d P r Be rnardino Chiari , Roberto F. 3-23-1963 lv 6m 7d c Robles , Marco Aurelio 10- 1-1964 4y 0m Od e c Arias , Arnulfp 10- 1-1968 0v 0m lid e u Pini.ll a, Jose M. 10-12-1968 Ov 8m Id pv h Urruti a, Bolivar 6-13-1969 Oy 3 m Od P r Pini11 a, Jose M. 9- -1969 0y 3m Od P u Takas Bahas, Demetrio 12-18-1969 pv/i 365

Paraguay

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Francia, Jose'' G.R. de 10-30-1814 2 5y 10m 20d V d Lo'pez, Carlos Antonio 3-12-1841 2 ly 5m 28d p/i d Lopez, Francisco Solano 9-10-1862 6v 11m 2 5d i u Rivarola, Cirilo 9- 1-1870 iy 3m 17d i u Antonio Jovellanos, Salvador 12-18-1871 2y 11m 23d P c Gill, Juan Bautiste 11-25-1874 2y 4m 17d i da Uriarte, Higinio 4-12-1877 lv 7m 13d P c Berreiro, Candido 11-25-1878 ly 9m 9d i d Caballero, Bernardino 9- 4-1880 6y 2 m 2 Id P/i c Escobar, Patricio 11-25-1886 4y 0m Od i c Gonzales, Juan 11-25-1890 3y 6 m 14d i u Gualberto Moringo, Marcos 6- 9-1894 0y 5m 16d pv c Eguzquiza, Juan 11-25-1894 4y 0m Od i c Bautista Aceval, Emilio 11-25-1898 3y lm 14d i u Carballo, He'ctor 1- 9-1902 0v 10m 16d pv c Escurra, Juan A. 11-25-1902 2v 0m 24d i u Gaona, Juan Bautista 12-19-1904 Oy 11m 20d PV u Baez, Cecilio 12- 9-1905 Oy 11m 16d V u Ferreira, Benigno 11-25-1906 iy 7m 7d V u Gonzalez Navero, 7- 2-1908 2y 4m 23d pv c Emiliano Gondra, Manuel 11-25-1910 0y lm 2 2d i u Jara, Albino 1-17-1911 Oy 5m 12d V r Roias, Liberato 7- 5-1911 Oy 7m 26d P u Pena, Pedro 3- 1-1912 Oy 0m 15d PV u Gonzalez Navaro, 3-15-1912 Oy 5m Od pv c Emi1iano Schaerer, Eduardo 8-15-1912 4y 0m Od i c Franco, Manuel 8-15-1916 2y 9m 2 Od i d Montero, Josex 6- 5-1919 iy 2m 10 d P c Gondra, Manuel 8-15-1920 0y 2m 2 2d i u Alaya, Eusebio 11- 7-1921 iy 5m 4d pv r Avala, Eligio 4-11-1923 0y 11m 6d P r Riart, Luis A. 3-17-1924 Oy 4m 2 8d p c Ay a1a, Eligio 8-15-1924 4y 0m Od i c Guggiari , Jose P. 8-15-1928 3y 2m lid i Navaro, Emiliano Gonzales 10-26-1931 Oy 3m 2d P r Guggiari, Jose'" P. 1-28-1932 0y 6m 17d c Alaya, Eusebio 8-15-1932 3y 6m 2d i u Franco, Rafael 2-18-1936 ly 5m 17d V u Paiva, Felix 8-15-1937 2v 0m Od pv c Estigarribia, Jose''Felix 8-15-1939 iy 1 lm 2 2d i d Morinigo, Higinio 9- 7-1940 7y 11m 8d P/i u 366

Paraguay--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Frutos , Juan Manuel 6- 4-1948 Oy, 2m,lid PV c Gonzales, Juan 8-15-1948 Oy, 5m,15d i u Natalicio Rolon, Raimundo 1-30-1949 Oy , 0m,26d pv u Molas Lopez, Felipe 2-26-1949 Oy, 6m,14d P/i u Chaves, Federico ^ 9-11-1949 4y, 7m,26d p/i u Romero Pereira, Tomas 5- 6-1954 Oy, 3m, 9d pv c Stroessner, Alfredo 8-15-1954 i(5) 367

Peru

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out / / San Martin, Jose de 7- 6-1821 Oy 4m 13d V Tagle, Jose'' Bernardo 1-19-1822 Oy 7m Od P r de ^ San Martin, Jose 8-19-1822 Ov lm Id r LaMar, Jose^de 9-20-1822 Oy 5m 7d P u Aguero, Jose Riva 2-28-1823 Oy 8m 2 5d V u Tagle, Jose Bernardo 7-17-1823 Oy 7m Od pv r „de • Bolivar, Simon 9- 1-1823 iy 5 m 2 3d V LaMar, Jose de 2-24-1825 0y 11m 16d p r Nieto, Domingo 1826 Oy 0m 24d p u Sanchez Carrion, Jose" 1826 Oy 0m Id pv r Unanue, Hipo'lito ^ 9- 3-1826 Oy 0m Id. p r Santa Cruz, Andres 9- 3-1826 Ov 11m 2Id p r LaMar, Jose de 8-24-1827 iy 9m 13d ec u Salazar, Manuel 1828 Pv u Gutierrez, Antonio 7- 5-1829 Oy lm 2 5d pv Reyes , Andre's 8-31-1829 Oy lm Od P Gutierrez, Antonio 9-30-1829 Oy 2m 2 Od r Gamarra, Agustin 12-20-1829 0y 8m 14d i r Gutierrez, Antonio 9- 4-1830 Oy 7m lid p Reyes , Andre's 4-15-1831 Oy lm 2 2d pv u Gamarra, Agustin 6- 7-1831 Ov 0m 2 2d u Reyes, Andres 8-31-1831 Oy 10m Od P Gamarra, Agustin 6-31-1832 Ov 2m 2 5d r Telleria, Manuel 9-27-1832 Oy lm 4d P Gamarra, Agustin 10-31rl832 Oy 9m Od r Braulio del C, Jose'' 7-30-1833 Oy 3m 23d P Gamarra, Agustin 11-23-1833 Oy 0m 2 7d r Orbegoso, Luis Jose' 12-20-1833 Oy 0m 14d ec c Bermu'.1 c z , Pedro 1- 4-1834 Oy 0m 24d V u Orbegoso, Luis Jose 1-28-1834 Ov 2m Od u Salazar, Manuel 3- -1834 0v 2m Od P Orbegoso, Luis Jose 5- 3-1834 Oy 9m 2 2d r Salaverry, Felipe 2-25-1835 Ov lm lid V u Buianda, Juan Angel 4- 6-1835 Oy lm Od p Salaverry, Felipe 5- 6-1835 Ov 4m 2 2d r Salas , Junn Jose'' 9-28-1835 Oy 0 m 16d p LaValle, Juan 10-14-1835 Oy 2m 14d p r Bautista de i1U Salaverry, Felipe, 12-28-1835 Oy lm 20d da Santa Cruz. Andres de 2-18-1836 Oy 11m 2Id V u Tristan, Pio 2- 9-1837 Oy 3 m Id ec u Herrera, Ramon, 9-12-1837 0y lm Od PV r Galdeano, Jose Maria 1- 4-1838 Oy lm 16d P r Gamarra, Agustin 2-24-1838 2v 0m 24d V 36 8

Peru--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Of£ice Tenure In Out

Menendez, Manuel 3-18-1841 iy 5m Od P u Torrico, Juan 8-18-1842 0y 0m 2d V Crisos tomo LaValle, Juan 8-20-1842 Oy 0m 5d P r Bautista de Torrico, Juan 8-25-1842 Oy lm 2 2d u Crisostomo Vidal , Juan 10-20-1842 Oy 4m 20d V u Franci s co Figuerola, Justo 3'15- 1843 Oy 0m 5d pv r Vivanco , Manuel 3-20-1843 Oy 8m 1 Od V u Elias , Domingo 11-30-1843 Ov 8m lOd V r Figuerola, Justo 8-10-1844 Oy lm 2 7d p r Menendez, Manuel 10- 7-1844 Oy 6m 13d V r Castilla, Ramon 4- 20-1845 6v 0m Od v/i c Echenique, Rufino 4-20-1851 3y 4m 1 7d i u Medina, Miguel 9- 7-1854 Oy 3m 2 8d pv r Castilla, Ramon 1- 5-18 5 5 2y 2m 2 7d V Raygada, Jose Maria 4- 2-1857 lv 3m 26d P r Castilla, Ramon 7-28-1858 lv 2m 24d Mar, Juan Manuel del 10-24-1859 0y 4m 2 7d P r Castilla, Ramon 3-21-1860 2y 7m Id c San Roman, Miguel 10-22-1862 0y 8m 8d i d Canseco, Pedro Diaz 4- 3-1863 Ov 4m 2d P r Pezet, Juan Antonio 8- 5-1863 2y 2 m 26d P u Canseco, Pedro Diaz 10-31-1865 Oy 0m 27d pv u Prado, Mariano 11-28-1865 iy 10m 14d v Ignacio Puerta, Luis de la 10-12-1867 0y 2m 23d p r Prado, Mariano 1- 6-1868 Oy 0m 2d u Ignacio Canseco, Pedro Diaz 1- 7-1868 Oy 6m 2 5d pv r Balta, Jose' 8- u1 _ 1868 3v 11m 2 Od i da Gutierrez, Tomas 7-22-1872 Oy 0m 4d pv da Zevallos, Mariano 7-26-1872 Oy 0m 7d pv c Ilerencia Pardo, Manuel 8- 2-1872 2y 3m 16d e Costas, Manuel 11-18-1874 Oy 2m Id p r Pardo, Manuel 1-19-1875 iy 6m 13d c Prado, Mariano 8- 2-1876 3y 4m 15d i u Ignacio Puerta, Luis de la 12-18-1879 Oy 0m 5d pv u Pierola, Nicola's de 12- 23-1879 lv 11m 5d V u Garcia Caldero"n, 3-12-1881 Oy 6m 16d pv u Francisco Montero, Lizardo 9-28-1881 2y , 0m ,27d V u 369

Peru--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Iglesias, Miguel 10-23-1883 2y lm lOd V u Arenas Merino, Antonio 12- 3-1885 Oy 6m Od pv r Caceres , Andre's 6- 3-1886 4y lm 7d v/i c Avelino Morales Bermudez, 8-10-1890 3y 7m 2 Id i d Remug io Borgono, Justiniano 4- 1-1894 0y 4m lOd p c Cacers, Andres 8-10-1894 Oy 7m lOd i u Ave 1ino Candamo , Manuel 3-20-1895 Oy 5m 18d pv r Pierola, Nicolas de 9- 8-1895 4y 0m Od i c Lopez de Romana, 9- 8-1899 4y 0m Od i c Eduardo Candamo, Manuel 9- 8-1903 Oy 7m lOd i d Calderon, Serapio 4-18-1904 Oy 5m 6d P c Paro, Jose 9-24-1904 4y 0m Od i c Leguia, Augusto B. 9-24-1908 4y 0m Od i c Billinghurst, 9-24-1912 ly 4m lOd i u Guillermo E. Benavides," /Oscar 2- 4-1914 ly 6m 14d V c Pardo, Jose 8-18-1915 3y 10m 16d i u Leguia, Augusto B. 7- 4-1919 llv lm 2 Id i/v u Ponce, Manuel Maria 8-25-1930 Oy 0m 3d pv r Cerro, Luis M. Sanchez 8- 28-1930 Ov 6m 3d V r Ilolguin, Mariano 3- 1-1931 Oy 0m Id p r Arias, Ricardo Leoncio 3- 1-1931 Oy 0m 5d p r El ias Jimenez, Gustavo A. 3- 6-1931 Oy 0m 2d V u Sanchez Ocampo, David 3-10-1931 Oy 8m 2 8d V c Sanchez Cerro, Luis M. 12- 8-1931 lv 4m 22d e da Matias Manzajiilla, Jose 4-30-1933 Oy 0m Id P r Benavides, Oscar 4-30-1933 5y 7m 8d i c Prado, Manuel 12- 8-1939 5y 7m 30 d i c Bustamante, Jose 8- 1-1945 3y 2m Od i u Noriega Aguero, Zenon 10-29-1948 0y 0m 2d pv r Odris, Manuel A. 10-31-1948 ly 7m Od V r Noriega Aguero, Zenon 6- 1-1950 0y lm 2 8d p c Odris, Manuel A. 7-28-1956 6y 0m Od i c Prado, Manuel 7-28-1956 5v 11m 2 Id e u Military Junta 7-19-1962 iy 0m 9d pv c Belaunde Terry, Fernando 7-28-1963 5y 2m 5d e u Velasco Alvarado, Juan 10- 3-1968 V 370 Uruguay

Pres ident Date Took 0£fice Tenure In Out

Rivera, Fructuoso 11- 6-1830 2v 4m Id V Pereira, Gabriel A. 3- 7-1833 0y 6 m 2 2d P r Rivera, Fructuoso 9-28-1833 Oy 5m 8d Anaya, Carlos 3- 6-1834 0y 11m 2 5d P c Oribe, Manuel 3- 1-1835 iy 11m 24d i Anaya, Carlos 2-24-1837 Oy 11m 2 5d P h Oribe, Manuel 2-19-1838 Oy 8m 5d u Pereira, Gabriel A. 10-24-1838 Oy 0m 17d PV r Rivera, Fructuoso 11-11-1838 oy 3m 4d V Suarez, Joaquin 2-15-1839 ly 0m Od P r Luis M.

Rivera, Fructuoso 2- - 1840 3y 0m Od c Suare;: , Joaquin 2-16-1843 9y 0m Od i u Luis M. Berro , Bernardo 2-15-1852 0y 0m 15d P c Prudencio Giro, Juan Francisco 3- 1-1852 0y 7m 27d i Berro , 'Bernardo 10-28-1852 Oy 2 m 14d P r Prudencio Giro, Juan Francisco 1-12-1853 Oy 8m 13d u Flores , Venancio 1-13-1854 iy lm 24d V Bustamante, Manuel B. 3- 7-1855 Oy 0m 2Id P r Flores , Venancio 3- 28-1855 Oy 4m 12d u Bustamante, Manuel B. 8-10-1855 Oy 0m 18d pv u Lamas, Luis 8-28-1855 Ov 0m 13d PV r Bustamante, Manuel B. 9-11-1855 Oy 5m 20d P c Pereira, Gabriel A. 3- 1-1856 4v 0m Od i c Berro, Bernardo 3- 1-1860 4y 0m Od i c Prudencio Cruz Aguirre, 3- 1-1864 0y 11m 15d i u Atanasio de la Vi11 alb a, Tomas 2-15-1865 Oy 0m 6d PV r Flores , Venancio 2-21-1865 0y 3m 14d V Vidal, Francisco A. 6- 5-1865 iy 3m Od P r Flores , Venancio 9- - 1866 iy 5m Od u Varela, Pedro 2-19-1868 0y 0m 12d pv c Batlle, Lorenzo 3- 1-1868 4y 0m Od i c Gomensoro, Tomas 3- 1-1872 0y 11m 15d pv c Ellauri, Jose' Eugenio 2-15-1873 ly 11m 7d i u Varela, Pedro 1-22-1875 iy 2m 18d v/i u Latorre, Lorenzo 3-10-1876 2y 10m 5d V c Vidal, Francisco A. 2-15-1879 0y 0m 15d p c Latorre, Lorenzo 3- 1-1879 ly 0m 13d i u Vidal, Francisco A. 3-13-1880 iy 11m 17d pv u 371

Uruguay--Continued

Pres ident Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Santos, Maximo B. 3- 1-1882 4y, 0m Od i c Vidal, Francisco A. 3~ 1-1886 oy, 2m 24d i u Santos, Maximo B. 5-24-1886 0v , 5 m 24d V u Taies, Maximo 11-18-1886 3y, 3m 12d V c Ilerrera y Obes , Julio 3- 1-1890 4y, 0m Od e c Idiarte Borda, Juan 3-21-1894 3y, 5m 4d e da Cuestas , Juan Lindolfo 8-25-1897 sy, 6m 5d p/i c ^ / Batlle y Ordonez, Jose 3- 1-1903 4y, 0m Od i c Williman, Claudio 3- 1-1907 4y, 0m Od i c Batlle y Ordonez, Jose 3- 1-1911 4y, 0m Od i c Viera, Feliciano 3- 1-1915 4y, 0m Od i c Brum, Baltasar 3- 1-1919 4y, 0m Od i c Serrato, Jose 3- 1-1923 4y, 0m Od e c Campisteguy, Juan 3- 1-1927 4y, 0m Od e c Terra, Gabriel 3- 1-1931 7y, 3m 18d e/v r Baldomir, Alfredo 6-19-1938 0v, lm 2 Od P r Charlone, Cesar 8- 9-1938 0v, 0m 6d P c Baldomir, Aldredo 8-15-1938 4y, 6 m 15d e c Amezaga, Juan Jose 3- 1-1943 4y, 0m Od e c Berreta, Toinas 3- 1-1947 Oy, 5m Id e d Batlle Berres, Luis 8- 2-1947 iy, 0m 29d P Mayo Gutierrez, Cesar 8-31-1948 oy, 0m 14d P r Batlle Berres, Luis 9-14-1948 2y, 5m 16d c Martinez T^rueba, Andres 3- 1-1951 iy, 0m Od e c Gestido, Oscar Daniel 3- 1-1967 oy, 9m 5d e d Pacheco Areco, Jorge 12- 6-1967 P 372

Venezuela

Pres ident e Took Office Tenure In Out

Paez, Jose Antonio 1-13-1830 5y 0m 26d v/i c Vargas, Jose Maria 2- 9-1835 lv 2m 15d i r Navarte, Andres 4-24-1836 Ov 8m 26d P c Soublette, Carlos 1-20-1837 2y 0m Od i c Paez, Jose Antonio 1-20-1839 4y 0m Od i c Soublette, Carlos 1-20-1843 4y 0m Od i u Monagas, Jose'' Tadeo 1-20-1847 4y 1m Od V c Monagas, Jose' Gregorio 2- 5-1851 3y 11m 15d i c Monagas, Jose Tadeo 2- 5-1855 3y lm lOd i u Cas tro Julian 3-15-1858 iy 4m 17d V u Gual , Pedro 8- 2-1859 0y lm 2 7d V u Tovar, Manuel Felipe 9-29-1859 iy 7m 9d pv u de Gual, Pedro 5- 8-1861 0y 3m 19d V u Paez, Jose' Antonio 8-27-1861 iy 10m Od V u Falcon, Juan 6-26-1863 ly 4m lOd y Guzman Blanco, Antonio 11- 6-1864 Ov 8m Od P r Falcon, Juan 7- 6-1865 2y 11m 2 2d u Monagas, Jose/ Tadeo 6-28-1868 0y 4m 2 Od V d Monagas, Jose' Ruperto 11-18-1868 ly lm Od P u Pulsar, Venancio 12- -1869 0y 5m Od pv u Guzman Blanco, Antonio 4-27-1870 6y 10m 5d V c Linares Alcantara, 3- 2-1877 ly 8m 2 8d i d Francis co Valera, Jose Gregorio 11-30-1878 0y 2m 26d P c Guzman Blanco, Antonio 2-26 ,1879 5y 2m Id i c Crespo, Joaquin 4-27-1884 2y 4m 18d i c Guzman Blanco, Antonio 9-17-1886 0y 10m 2Id i r Lopez, Hermogenes 8- 8-1887 Oy 10m 24d P c Rojas Paul, Juan Pablo 7- 2-1888 ly 8m 5d i c Andueza Palacio, 3- 7-1890 2y 7m Od i u Raimundo Crespo, Joaquin 10- 7-1892 5y 6m 9d V c Andrade, Ignacio 4-16-1898 iy 6m 5d i u / S Rodriquez, Victor 10-21-1899 0y 0m Id PV r Ca,stro, Cipriano 10-22-1899 9y lm Od V u Gomez, Juan Vicente 12-19-1908 6y 0m Od i(5) Marquez Bustillos, V. 1914 iy 0m Od P r Gomez, Juan Vicente 1915 14y 0m Od c Perez, Juan Bautista 1929 2y 6m Od i r Gomez, Juan Vicente 6- 1-1931 4y 6m 17d i d Lopez Contreras, Eleazar 12-18-1935 5y 4m 17d P c Medina Angarita, Isaias 5- 5-1941 3y 9m 8d i u Betancourt, Romulo 10- 8-1945 2y 4m 7d V c Gallegos, Romulo 2-15-1948 0y 9m 9d i u Delgado Chalbaud, Carlos 11-24-1948 iy 11m 19d V da 373

Venezuela--Continued

President Date Took Office Tenure In Out

Sua'rez Flamerich, 11-13-1950 2y, 0m,2 Od P u German P/rez Jimenez, Marcos 12- 3-1952 5y, lm,20d V u Larrazabal, Wolfgang 1-23-1958 ly, 0m,20d pv c Betancourt, Romulo 2-13-1959 5y, 0m,19d e c Leoni, Raoul 3- 2-1964 5y, 0m, Od e c Caldera, Rafael 3- 2-1969 e

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Thesis and Miscellaneous

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