DOCSLIB.ORG

Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe COVER PHOTO BY ЛОБАНОВ ВЯЧЕСЛАВ/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS JULY 2016 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Undersea Warfare Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org in Northern Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com Europe PROJECT DIRECTOR Kathleen H. Hicks AUTHORS Kathleen H. Hicks Andrew Metrick Lisa Sawyer Samp Kathleen Weinberger A Report of the CSIS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM ISBN 978-1-4422-5967-6 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington,Ë|xHSLEOCy259676z DC 20036v*:+:!:+:! 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Blank hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh JULY 2016 hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Undersea Warfare in Northern Eu rope PROJ ECT DIRECTOR AUTHORS Kathleen H. Hicks Kathleen H. Hicks Andrew Metrick Lisa Sawyer Samp Kathleen Weinberger A REPORT OF THE CSIS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM —-1 Lanham • Boulder • New York • London —0 —+1 594-66143_ch00_3P.indd 1 7/21/16 5:16 PM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh About CSIS hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked hn hk io il sy SY ek eh to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2016 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-5967-6 (pb); 978-1-4422-5968-3 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Ave nue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 -1— 202-887-0200 | www . csis . org 301 - 459 - 3366 | www . rowman . com 0— +1— 594-66143_ch00_3P.indd 2 7/21/16 5:16 PM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Contents hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh iv Acknowl edgments hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh v Executive Summary vii Introduction vii Scope and Objectives 1 CHAPTER 1 | The Rus sian Navy: Undersea Activities and Objectives 3 Recent Rus sian Undersea Activities 5 Rus sian Naval Objectives 8 CHAPTER 2 | Rus sia’s Undersea Capabilities: Today and Tomorrow 8 Rus sia’s Current Capabilities 13 Shipbuilding and Maintenance 14 Rus sia’s Future Capabilities 19 CHAPTER 3 | Meeting the Rus sian Challenge 19 NATO and Partners’ Strategic Priorities 20 NATO and Partners’ Capabilities 29 Working Together 32 CHAPTER 4 | Recommendations for Countering Rus sian Undersea Activity 32 Preparing Orga nizational Structures 35 Upgrading Capabilities 40 Enhancing Posture 41 Appendix A. Key Submarine Technologies: A Primer 45 Appendix B. Capability Recommendation Matrix 48 About the Authors —-1 —0 —+1 III 594-66143_ch00_3P.indd 3 7/21/16 5:16 PM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Acknowl edgments The proj ect director and the authors would like to thank the numerous experts in Finland, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States for sharing their time and insights at vari ous points throughout the study pro cess. In par tic u lar, the CSIS team thanks the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), the National Centre for Strategic Studies (NCSS), and the Royal United Ser vices Institute (RUSI) for helping facilitate a series of productive meetings in Finland, Poland, and the United Kingdom, respectively. This study has been dramatically improved by insights shared at workshops in the countries mentioned as well as in the United States. Fi nally, the study team is grateful to Saab North Amer i ca, which sponsored this work and saw the value in growing a more detailed knowledge of Rus sian undersea activities and improving allied and partner responses. The team is deeply appreciative of Saab’s respect for our intellectual in de- pen dence at each step along the way. The content and recommendations presented— including any errors— remain solely those of the authors. -1— 0— +1— IV 594-66143_ch00_3P.indd 4 7/21/16 5:16 PM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Executive Summary Rus sia is expanding its undersea operations as part of a broader strategy of coercion aimed at its neighbors, the North Atlantic Treaty Or ga ni za tion (NATO), and the United States. Rus sia has a long history of emphasizing its maritime capabilities for the purpose of strategic signaling, including the use of targeted provocations. Suspected territorial incursions in the Baltic Sea and provocative patrols in the North Atlantic have caused alarm among NATO and partner nations, in part because they have underscored the extent to which NATO and regional partner anti- submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities have atrophied since the end of the Cold War. The Rus sian Navy and its submarine force have remained somewhat insulated from the economic and personnel challenges impacting Rus sia’s broader military modernization efforts. Moscow has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the development and maintenance of its submarine- based strategic deterrent and has emphasized nonnuclear submarine capabilities, certain surface warfare capabilities, and long- range anti- ship missiles over carrier battle groups, for example. For this reason, Rus sian submarines are generally believed to be very capable vessels when properly maintained. In Northern Eu rope, the Rus sian Navy’s use of submarines to signal presence, reach, and power achieves an effect that is disproportionate to the resources committed. NATO and partner nations do not currently possess the ability to quickly counter the Rus sian undersea challenge in much of the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea. Declining capabilities are not only to blame, however; equally problematic is the lack of integration among relevant allies and partners. An effective ASW capability will take a federated approach that integrates national and NATO platforms, sensors, and personnel in a coordinated manner. This integrated capability needs to be undergirded by a coherent and cohesive doctrine and regularly exercised to build a true capability at both a national and alliance level. Given competing priorities, tight defense bud gets, and seam issues in the Eu ro pean defense community between NATO members and the vital partner countries of Sweden and Finland, or gan i za tional reforms paired with a federated approach to capability development and small —-1 —0 —+1 V 594-66143_ch00_3P.indd 5 7/21/16 5:16 PM hn hk io il sy SY ek eh posture adjustments are needed to begin rebuilding the U.S. and Eu ro pean ASW capability in hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Northern Eu rope. hn hk io il sy SY ek eh 1. Preparing Organizational Structures: Using exclusively NATO structures may fail to prop- hn hk io il sy SY ek eh erly leverage partner capabilities and expertise. NATO together with the Nordic Defense hn hk io il sy SY ek eh Cooperation (NORDEFCO) may be able to serve a bridging function to drive interoperability and combined operational proficiency. An ASW- focused Center of Excellence could also usefully serve as a hub for research, planning, doctrine development, lessons learned, and rebuilding and integrating undersea warfare capabilities. 2. Upgrading Capabilities: In order to develop a system that is effective against new and emerging technologies, NATO and its partners need to build a multidomain, multiplatform ASW and maritime surveillance complex, ideally within a federated construct, that prioritizes payloads over platforms. The specific recommendations contained in this report bring together dif­fer ent sensors and strike capabilities hosted on large and small, manned and unmanned, space- based, aerial, surface, and subsurface platforms. 3. Enhancing Posture: NATO can optimize its ASW posture to ensure that the right capabilities are in the right places at the right time by reopening Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and encouraging Norway to reclaim and reopen its submarine support fa cil i ty at Olavsvern. The organ izations, relationships, intelligence, and capabilities that once supported a robust ASW network in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea no longer exist.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 2014 Ships and Submarines of the United States Navy
    AIRCRAFT CARRIER DDG 1000 AMPHIBIOUS Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear-Propulsion) THE U.S. NAvy’s next-GENERATION MULTI-MISSION DESTROYER Amphibious Assault Ship Gerald R. Ford Class CVN Tarawa Class LHA Gerald R. Ford CVN-78 USS Peleliu LHA-5 John F. Kennedy CVN-79 Enterprise CVN-80 Nimitz Class CVN Wasp Class LHD USS Wasp LHD-1 USS Bataan LHD-5 USS Nimitz CVN-68 USS Abraham Lincoln CVN-72 USS Harry S. Truman CVN-75 USS Essex LHD-2 USS Bonhomme Richard LHD-6 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CVN-69 USS George Washington CVN-73 USS Ronald Reagan CVN-76 USS Kearsarge LHD-3 USS Iwo Jima LHD-7 USS Carl Vinson CVN-70 USS John C. Stennis CVN-74 USS George H.W. Bush CVN-77 USS Boxer LHD-4 USS Makin Island LHD-8 USS Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71 SUBMARINE Submarine (Nuclear-Powered) America Class LHA America LHA-6 SURFACE COMBATANT Los Angeles Class SSN Tripoli LHA-7 USS Bremerton SSN-698 USS Pittsburgh SSN-720 USS Albany SSN-753 USS Santa Fe SSN-763 Guided Missile Cruiser USS Jacksonville SSN-699 USS Chicago SSN-721 USS Topeka SSN-754 USS Boise SSN-764 USS Dallas SSN-700 USS Key West SSN-722 USS Scranton SSN-756 USS Montpelier SSN-765 USS La Jolla SSN-701 USS Oklahoma City SSN-723 USS Alexandria SSN-757 USS Charlotte SSN-766 Ticonderoga Class CG USS City of Corpus Christi SSN-705 USS Louisville SSN-724 USS Asheville SSN-758 USS Hampton SSN-767 USS Albuquerque SSN-706 USS Helena SSN-725 USS Jefferson City SSN-759 USS Hartford SSN-768 USS Bunker Hill CG-52 USS Princeton CG-59 USS Gettysburg CG-64 USS Lake Erie CG-70 USS San Francisco SSN-711 USS Newport News SSN-750 USS Annapolis SSN-760 USS Toledo SSN-769 USS Mobile Bay CG-53 USS Normandy CG-60 USS Chosin CG-65 USS Cape St.
    [Show full text]
  • Offshore Wind Submarine Cable Spacing Guidance
    Offshore Wind Submarine Cable Spacing Guidance Contract # E14PC00005 United States Department of Interior Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement December 2014, For Public Use Offshore Wind Submarine Cable Spacing Guidance Contract # E14PC00005 United States Department of Interior Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement December 2014, For Public Use The authors gratefully acknowledge permission of the Crown Estate to base parts of this report on their study “Principles of Cable Routing and Spacing (2012)”, Reference ID 8 in this report Document Control Responsible for Job Title Name Date Signature Chris Sturgeon Cables specialist Jim Hodder Cables specialist Colin Poat Cables specialist Content 2014-12-15 Cables specialist Steven Drew Principal Environmental Consultant Rachel McCall EHS Senior Consultant Tanjia Maynard Checked EHS Senior Consultant Tanjia Maynard 2014-12-15 Approval Principal Engineer Jim Doane 2014-12-15 Copyright: PMSS © Document Reference: 734300670/140708 Signatures in this approval box have checked this document in line with the requirements of QP16 This report has been prepared by TÜV SÜD PMSS and Red Penguin Associates with all reasonable skill and care, within the terms of the contract with the Client. The report contains information from sources and data which we believe to be reliable but we have not confirmed that reliability and make no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. The draft report is confidential to the Client and TÜV SÜD PMSS accepts no responsibility to any third party to whom information in this report may be disclosed. No part of this document may be reproduced without the prior written approval of TÜV SÜD PMSS © TÜV SÜD PMSS 2014 Offshore Wind Submarine Cable Spacing Guidance 1 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement Table of Contents Abbreviations 2 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Fellow Submarines by Jan Joel Andersson
    32 2016 AL E X A ND E RZ E ML IA N ic H E NKO/AP/SIPA Fellow submarines by Jan Joel Andersson Ever since the occupation of Crimea in 2014, commercial, and military transport. Moreover, Russian military activity has increased in and the growing importance of secure maritime bor- around Europe. Russian air and land exercises have ders and the protection of vital undersea global also become more assertive and frequent compared communication cables make it both prudent and to previous years. Fighter jets of the Swedish and necessary for Europe to collectively manage, de- Finnish air forces, as well as NATO fighters pro- ter, and counter any undersea provocations. tecting the air space of the three Baltic republics of Countering enemy submarines is, however, very Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are scrambled on a difficult, time consuming and costly as the best regular basis to intercept approaching Russian air- underwater defences are submarines themselves. craft. Similarly, the Russian navy has stepped up its operations and engages in naval exercises and Complex and competitive deployments of increasing scope and scale. Containing more parts than jet airliners and be- Perhaps most worryingly to Western observers is ing more complicated than surface vessels, sub- the increase in underwater activity in the Baltic marines can be compared to space ships in their Sea and North Atlantic: senior NATO naval com- complexity. There are only a handful of companies manders have confirmed that “Russian submarine in the world capable of designing advanced sub- activity is reaching levels unseen since the end of marines and the majority of them are European.
    [Show full text]
  • Development of Submarine MV AC Power Cable With
    B5.2 9th International Conference on Insulated Power Cables B5.2 Development of submarine MV-AC power cable with aluminum conductor Sven MUELLER-SCHUETZE, Heiner OTTERSBERG, Carsten SUHR, Ingo KRUSCHE, Norddeutsche Seekabelwerke GmbH/General Cable, Nordenham, Germany, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Daniel ISUS FEU, General Cable, Manlleu, Spain, [email protected] ABSTRACT cables due to its very good conductivity. However, the high demand of copper material results in a very high A single armored MV-AC submarine power cable with an market value. This was set to above 6000 $/ton at the aluminum conductor was developed for offshore beginning of April 2015. renewable energy, interconnections between offshore platforms, islands and shore. For the cable design Aluminum has lower conductivity compared to copper process an intended installation in water depths up to 300 resulting in the need to select larger conductor cross m and the application of additional cable protection sections. Despite the larger conductor cross section, cost methods such as rock dumping for on-bottom stabilization reduction is achieved due to the lower material price of were considered. aluminum compared to copper. At the beginning of April 2015 the market value for aluminum was oscillating A type test has been successfully performed on 3x 800 around 1770 $/ton. Due to that market value difference mm² 19/33 (36) kV XLPE submarine power cable with an aluminum is a cost-effective replacement for copper as aluminum conductor. The qualification program was conductor material. During the selection conductor performed under consideration of the CIGRE Electra 171, material, both the electrical and mechanical material CIGRE TB 490, IEC 60502-2 and CENELEC HD620-10C properties were reviewed for all aluminum alloy standards.
    [Show full text]
  • Offshore Wind Submarine Cabling Overview Fisheries Technical Working Group
    OFFSHOREoverview WIND SUBMARINE CABLING Fisheries Technical Working Group Final Report | Report Number 21-14 | April 2021 NYSERDA’s Promise to New Yorkers: NYSERDA provides resources, expertise, and objective information so New Yorkers can make confident, informed energy decisions. Our Vision: New York is a global climate leader building a healthier future with thriving communities; homes and businesses powered by clean energy; and economic opportunities accessible to all New Yorkers. Our Mission: Advance clean energy innovation and investments to combat climate change, improving the health, resiliency, and prosperity of New Yorkers and delivering benefits equitably to all. Courtesy, Equinor, Dudgeon Offshore Wind Farm Offshore Wind Submarine Cabling Overview Fisheries Technical Working Group Final Report Prepared for: New York State Energy Research and Development Authority Albany, NY Morgan Brunbauer Offshore Wind Marine Fisheries Manager Prepared by: Tetra Tech, Inc. Boston, MA Brian Dresser Director of Fisheries Programs NYSERDA Report 21-14 NYSERDA Contract 111608A April 2021 Notice This report was prepared by Tetra Tech, Inc. in the course of performing work contracted for and sponsored by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (hereafter “NYSERDA”). The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of NYSERDA or the State of New York, and reference to any specific product, service, process, or method does not constitute an implied or expressed recommendation or endorsement of it. Further, NYSERDA, the State of New York, and the contractor make no warranties or representations, expressed or implied, as to the fitness for particular purpose or merchantability of any product, apparatus, or service, or the usefulness, completeness, or accuracy of any processes, methods, or other information contained, described, disclosed, or referred to in this report.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward an Enhanced Strategic Policy in the Philippines
    Toward an Enhanced Strategic Policy in the Philippines EDITED BY ARIES A. ARUGAY HERMAN JOSEPH S. KRAFT PUBLISHED BY University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies Diliman, Quezon City First Printing, 2020 UP CIDS No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, without written permission from the publishers. Recommended Entry: Towards an enhanced strategic policy in the Philippines / edited by Aries A. Arugay, Herman Joseph S. Kraft. -- Quezon City : University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative Studies,[2020],©2020. pages ; cm ISBN 978-971-742-141-4 1. Philippines -- Economic policy. 2. Philippines -- Foreign economic relations. 2. Philippines -- Foreign policy. 3. International economic relations. 4. National Security -- Philippines. I. Arugay, Aries A. II. Kraft, Herman Joseph S. II. Title. 338.9599 HF1599 P020200166 Editors: Aries A. Arugay and Herman Joseph S. Kraft Copy Editors: Alexander F. Villafania and Edelynne Mae R. Escartin Layout and Cover design: Ericson Caguete Printed in the Philippines UP CIDS has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ______________________________________ i Foreword Stefan Jost ____________________________________________ iii Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem _____________________________v List of Abbreviations ___________________________________ ix About the Contributors ________________________________ xiii Introduction The Strategic Outlook of the Philippines: “Situation Normal, Still Muddling Through” Herman Joseph S. Kraft __________________________________1 Maritime Security The South China Sea and East China Sea Disputes: Juxtapositions and Implications for the Philippines Jaime B.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 30, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33745 SUMMARY RL33745 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) September 30, 2021 Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Specialist in Naval Affairs Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there will be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.” The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts; what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE Office of the Secretary, the Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301–1155 Phone, 703–545–6700
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301–1155 Phone, 703–545–6700. Internet, www.defenselink.mil. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM LYNN III Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, ASHTON B. CARTER Technology, and Logistics Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business PAUL A. BRINKLEY Transformation) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense LOUIS W. ARNY III (Installations and Environment) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy MICHELE FLOURNOY Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense JAMES N. MILLER, JR. for Policy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW Security Affairs) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special MICHAEL VICKERS Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland (VACANCY) Defense and America’s Security) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Strategic JOSEPH BENKERT Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense (Asian and (VACANCY) Pacific Security Affairs) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Plans) JANINE DAVIDSON Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (VACANCY) (Technology Security Policy/Counter Proliferation) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy, KATHLEEN HICKS Plans and Forces) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy PETER VERGA Integration and Chief of Staff) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense WILLIAM J. CARR, Acting for Personnel and Readiness Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) DAVID L. MCGINNIS, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve JENNIFER C. BUCK Affairs) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program JEANNE FITES Integration) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) SAMUEL D. KLEINMAN Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military WILLIAM J. CARR Personnel Policy) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military ARTHUR J. MYERS, Acting Community and Family Policy) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans) GAIL H.
    [Show full text]
  • Deploying Federal Civilians to the Battlefield: Incentives, Benefits, and Medical Care
    Deploying Federal Civilians to the Battlefield: Incentives, Benefits, and Medical Care U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations April 2008 HASC Committee Print No. 9 41-410 On the cover: The Defense of Freedom medal, created after the September 11th attacks, acknowledges civilian employees of the Department of Defense and other civilians in service to the Department of Defense who are killed or injured while on duty. It is the civilian equivalent to the Purple Heart. DEPLOYING FEDERAL CIVILIANS TO THE BATTLEFIELD: Incentives, Benefits, and Medical Care HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS STAFF LORRY M. FENNER, STAFF LEAD STEVE J. DETERESA, PROJECT LEAD THOMAS HAWLEY ANDREW HYDE JOHN E. KRUSE GREGORY A. MARCHAND MICHAEL MCERLEAN SUZANNE MCKENNA MARK PARKER SASHA ROGERS ROGER I. ZAKHEIM DEPLOYING FEDERAL CIVILIANS TO THE BATTLEFIELD 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We want to thank our fellow subcommittee members and the subcommittee staff. We would also like to thank Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member Hunter, and staff members, Erin Conaton, Bob DeGrasse, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Paul Arcangeli, Cathy Garman, Debra Wada, Michael Higgins, David Kildee, Loren Dealy, Lara Battles, Christine Lamb, Josh Holly, Linda Burnette, Nancy Warner, Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, and Derek Scott. Finally, we want to thank our own military legislative assistants (MLAs) and fellows, Dan Madden, James Lively, Justin Johnson, and Caryll Rice, as well as the rest of the subcommittee MLAs for all their assistance on this study. We also want to thank those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, including those from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff, the military services, the Department of State, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense 2020 “Covid-19 and the U.S. Military”
    Center for Strategic and International Studies TRANSCRIPT Defense 2020 “Covid-19 and the U.S. Military” RECORDING DATE Wednesday, April 1, 2020 GUESTS Steve Morrison Senior Vice President, and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS Mark Cancian Senior Advisor, International Security Program, CSIS Christine Wormuth Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation Christine Wormuth Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation HOST Rear Admiral (Ret.) Tom Cullison Former Deputy Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, and Adjunct Fellow, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS Transcript by Rev.com Kathleen Hicks: Hi, I'm Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and this is Defense 2020 a CSIS podcast examining critical defense issues in the United States is 2020 election cycle. We bring in defense experts from across the political spectrum to survey the debates over the US military strategy, missions and funding. This podcast is made possible by contributions from BAE systems, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and the Thales Group. Kathleen Hicks: On this episode of Defense 2020, I hosted discussion with four experts on COVID-19 and the US military. Steve Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director of Global Health Policy at CSIS, Mark Cancian, Senior Advisor in the International Security Program at CSIS, Christine Wormuth, Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation and Rear Admiral (Ret.), Tom Cullison Former Deputy Surgeon General of the US Navy and an Adjunct Fellow in the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 Draft DSCTC Report
    DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (DSC) Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) EVOLVING SECURITY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC Draft Report by Nicholas SOAMES (United Kingdom) Rapporteur 077 DSCTC 19 E | Original: English | 23 April 2019 Until this document has been adopted by the Defence and Security Committee, it only represents the views of the Rapporteur. 077 DSCTC 19 E TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 2 II. IMPORTANCE OF THE ATLANTIC ....................................................................................... 2 III. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE GIUK-N GAP AND NEW RUSSIAN PRESENCE AND CAPABILITIES .............................................................................................................. 3 A. INCREASED RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND PRESENCE........................................... 3 B. RUSSIA IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND ARCTIC ..................................................... 4 C. THE NORTHERN FLEET AND RUSSIAN DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE IN THE ATLANTIC .................................................................................................................... 5 IV. NATO’S NORTH ATLANTIC PRESENCE AND NEW INITIATIVES ....................................... 5 A. NATO MARITIME COMMAND ...................................................................................... 6 B. ICELAND AND RENEWED NATO ANTI-SUBMARINE EFFORTS ............................... 7 V. INTERIM
    [Show full text]
  • From Small Scales to Large Scales –The Gulf of Finland Science Days
    Gulf of Finland Co-operation From small scales to large scales –The Gulf of Finland Science Days 2017 9th-10th October 2017 Estonian Academy of Sciences, Tallinn Photo: Riku Lumiaro Photo: Gulf of Finland Contents Co-operation ORAL PRESENTATIONS V. Andreeva, E. Voyakina* Phytoplankton structure in eastern part of Gulf of Finland A. Antsulevich*, S. Titov Development of the program for combined restoration of European pearl mussel (Margaritifera margaritifera) and salmonid fishes local populations in two rivers inflowing to the Gulf of Finland in nature protected areas of Leningrad Oblast. R. Aps*, M. Fetissov, F. Goerlandt, P. Kujala, A. Piel, J. Thomas Systems approach based maritime traffic safety management in the Gulf of Finland (Baltic Sea) J. Kotta*, R. Aps, M. Futter, K. Herkül Assessing the environmental impacts and nutrient removal potential of mussel farms in the northeastern Baltic Sea J. Björkqvist*, O. Vähä-Piikkiö, L. Tuomi, V. Alari A spatially extensive validation of three different wave models in the Helsinki coastal archipelago A. Ivanchenko, D. Burkov* The state and environmental consequences of pollution air pool of the Gulf of Finland transport emissions K. Rubtsova, T. Mironenko, E. Daev* Preliminary assessment of water and sediment pollutions in littoral zone of the Kotlin Island. P. Ekholm*, M. Ollikainen, E. Punttila, S. Puroila, A. Kosenius Reducing agricultural phosphorus load by gypsum: results from the first year after amendment M. Fetissov*, R. Aps, P. Heinla, J. Kinnunen, O. Korneev, L. Lees, R. Varjopuro Ecosystem-based Maritime Spatial Planning – impact on navigational safety from offshore renewable energy developments V. Fleming-Lehtinen*, H. Parner, J.
    [Show full text]