The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions an International Organization Reader Edited by William T
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T he Political Economy of Monetary Institutions he Political The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions An International Organization Reader edited by William T. Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark Recent analysis by political economists of monetary institution determi- nants in different countries has been limited by the fact that exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions are studied in isolation from each other, without examining how one institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and level of central bank independence together; the articles (originally published in a special issue of International Organization) constitute a second generation of research on the determi- nants of monetary institutions. The contributors consider both economic and political factors to explain a country’s choice of monetary institutions, and examine the effect of political processes in democracies, including interest group pressure, on the balance between economic and distribu- tional policy. William Bernhard is Associate Professor of Political Science at the The Political University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. J. Lawrence Broz is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. William Roberts Clark is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. Economy of Bernhard, Monetary Broz, and Clark, Institutions editors IO International Organization Reader An International Organization Reader edited by William T. Bernhard, The MIT Press 0-262-52414-7 J. Lawrence Broz, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 http://mitpress.mit.edu ,!7IA2G2-fcebei!:t;K;k;K;k William Roberts Clark The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY INSTITUTIONS edited by William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark A special issue of International Organization The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England The contents of this book were first published in International Organization (ISSN 0020-8183), a publication of the MIT Press under the sponsorship of the IO Foundation. Except as otherwise noted, copyright in each article is held jointly by the IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2003 The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The political economy of monetary institutions / edited by William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, William Roberts Clark. p. cm. “A special issue of International organization.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-262-52414-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Financial institutions. I. Bernhard, William (William T.) II. Broz, J. Lawrence. III. Clark, William Roberts. IV. International organization. HG173.P65 2003 332.1—dc21 2003051314 10987654321 International Organization Volume 56, Number 4, Autumn 2002 Preface xiii The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions William 1 Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary 33 Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital William Roberts Clark Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of 59 Monetary Commitments Philip Keefer and David Stasavage Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Mark 83 Hallerberg Political Parties and Monetary Commitments William Bernhard 111 and David Leblang Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and 139 European Monetary Integration Jeffry A. Frieden Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment 169 Regimes J. Lawrence Broz Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the 197 Design of Monetary Institutions John R. Freeman Contributors William Bernhard is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He can be reached at [email protected]. J. Lawrence Broz is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, California. He can be reached at [email protected]. William Roberts Clark is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. He can be reached at [email protected]. John R. Freeman is McKnight University Professor and Chair of the Depart- ment of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He can be reached at [email protected]. Jeffry A. Frieden is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He can be reached at [email protected]. Mark Hallerberg is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He can be reached at [email protected]. Philip Keefer is Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group at the World Bank. He can be reached at [email protected]. David Leblang is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. He can be reached at [email protected]. David Stasavage is Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He can be reached at [email protected]. Abstracts The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions by William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank inde- pendence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives. Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital by William Roberts Clark Central bank independence and pegged exchange rates have each been viewed as solutions to the inflationary bias resulting from the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy. While it is obvious that a benevolent social planner would opt for such an institutional solution, it is less obvious that a real-world incumbent facing short-term partisan or electoral pressures would do so. In this article, I model the choice of monetary institutions from the standpoint of a survival-maximizing incumbent. It turns out that a wide range of survival- maximizing incumbents do best by forfeiting control over monetary policy. While political pressures do not, in general, discourage monetary commitments, they can influence the choice between fixed exchange rates and central bank independence. I highlight the importance of viewing fiscal policy and monetary policy as substitutes and identify the conditions under which survival-maximizing incumbents will view fixed exchange rates and central bank independence as substitutes. In so doing, I provide a framework for integrating other contributions to this volume. Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments by Philip Keefer and David Stasavage In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions and information asymmetries. However, the impact of these two factors differs. We argue that the presence of one institution—multiple political veto players—should be crucial for the effectiveness of central bank independence, but should have no impact on the efficacy of exchange-rate pegs. In contrast, exchange-rate pegs should have a greater anti-inflationary impact when it is difficult for the public to distinguish between inflation generated by policy choice and inflation resulting from exogenous shocks to the economy. Such information asymmetries between the public and the government, however, do not increase the efficacy of central bank independence. Empirical tests using newly developed data on political institutions provide strong support for our hypotheses. Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions by Mark Hallerberg I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player’s ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments