The Limits of Expression: Language, Poetry, Thought
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The Limits of Expression: Language, Poetry, Thought Patricia Kolaiti Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD UCL September 2009 1 I, Patricia Kolaiti, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Signature 2 Acknowledgments I would like to thank my supervisor, Deirdre Wilson, for being the brilliant thinker she is, a constant source of inspiration and support -moral, intellectual and financial- throughout the five years of my PhD and such great fun to work with. Also, many thanks to my second supervisor Robyn Carston for her very constructive input in developing this thesis. I owe many thanks to Billy Clark, Anne Furlong and Paul Simpson for their interesting comments at the presentation of Chapter 8 in the form of a paper at the 26 th PALA conference; to my upgrade examiners Tim Wharton and Robyn Carston for the stimulating discussion at my upgrade interview; to my Phd examiners Alan Durant and Billy Clark for insightful comments and suggestions for development of my arguments; to Dan Sperber and Francois Recanati for their suggestions during the ‘International Workshop on Word Meaning, Concepts and Communication, Cumberland Lodge, London, 2005’; to Anne Furlong, the participants in the ‘International Workshop in Poetic Effects, Paris, 2006’ -and particularly Adrian Pilkington, Elizabeth Camp, Diane Blakemore and Robyn Carston for the long discussion on ‘poetic thoughts’- and my friends Julie Sellier, Calo Giammeta, Virginia Virtu and Valeria Medkova for their feedback and comments while working on Chapters 4 and 5; to Christina Kolaiti for our occasional discussions on visual art and the audience of the ‘Dasein Lectures in Philsophy, Athens, 2008’ for the long challenging discussion after my talk on ‘Art as an Action’. Also, many thanks to my sponsors: The Lilian Voudouri Public Benefit Foundation, the AHRC and the UCL Graduate School for funding my MA and Doctoral studies. Finally, I would like to thank my ex-partner for being a constant source of intellectual, moral and financial support throughout my academic studies. 3 Abstract The following analysis takes as its starting point a divergence in views on what philosophers and linguists call ‘effability’ or ‘expressibility’ (the extent to which it is possible, through the use of a public language, to make one’s thoughts available to others). While philosophers and linguists (Searle, Katz, Recanati) defend stronger or weaker forms of effability, the ‘struggle of the poet to defeat the ineffable’ is a recurring motif in most 20 th century critical thinking. In trying to explain this apparent divergence, I reconsider a wide range of interdisciplinary issues of particular interest to linguists, psychologists, literary theorists and philosophers of art; these include the limits of linguistic expression, the role of perceptual representations in our mental tapestry, the existence or otherwise of a property of literariness or essence of art, the distinctiveness of the poetic/ artistic mind and the nature of aesthetic experience. In due course, my discussion brings to light a novel account of the possible evolutionary origins of art and sketches an empirically tractable model of aesthetic experience that lend us significant insight on the actual mental goings-on behind the poet’s discontent with language. In view of the distinct ways in which, as it will be argued, an artistic mind is creative and the psycho-cognitive particularities of the kind of action art is, the ‘struggle of the poet to defeat the ineffable’ is soon ranked as a problem of an entirely different order than had been previously thought. The thesis takes the thread from the empirical observation that the limitations of speaking out the contents of the mind are so much more intensely felt in the literary mentality, in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this very mentality, of the kind of action art is and the mind that brings it to light. 4 Table of Contents Acknowledgments 3 Abstract 4 Prologue 7 Chapter 1: How much of our mind can we speak out? 12 The question of expressibility Chapter 2: Language, World and Mind 23 Chapter 3: The curse of the phenomenal: a case from Kinaesthesia 40 3.1. Kinaesthesia: a case study 40 3.2. The curse of the phenomenal 44 3.3. More thoughts on the curse 50 3.4. The reach of the phenomenal. How far does the curse go? 55 3.5. The list-poem : proper names as ‘ phenomena ’? 60 Chapter 4: Varieties of essentialism in Art 66 4.1. Essentialism and its ethics 66 4.2. Structural essentialism in literature and the other arts 68 4.3. Relational essentialism: Arthur Danto and Jerry Fodor 72 Chapter 5: The Poetic Mind 83 5.1. From ‘Language’ to ‘Thought’ 83 5.2. Poetic thought states 89 5.3. Art as distinct psycho-cognitive etiology 111 5.4. Implications for linguistic pessimism 120 Chapter 6: Is Art a mistake? (Part 1) On the content of aesthetic experience 122 6.1. Introduction 122 6.2. Aesthetic experience and pleasurable sensory response 124 6.3. Modes of aesthetic experience. A case from attention blindness 146 Chapter 7: Is Art a mistake? (Part 2) On the origins of art 155 7.1. Perceptually driven actions: art and perceptual effect 155 7.2. Perceptual effects and cognition 172 7.3. On distinctive teleology 180 7.4. Is art ostensive inferential communication? 187 5 7.5. Is art a mistake? 190 7.6. Conclusion 193 Chapter 8: Interdisciplinarity: some epistemic concerns on literary and art theory 196 8.1. Influential statements that do not state what they have been taken to state 196 8.2. Interdisciplinarity and Theory in literature and the other arts 202 8.3. Theory vs pre-theory 209 8.4. (Deontic) Epilogue 217 8.5. We talk the talk, but can we walk the walk? (Actual) Epilogue 217 References 225 6 Prologue Don’t be surprised to see that what purports to be an extensive essay on the question of effability or expressibility of thought will along the way grapple with issues as wide and diverse as the essence of literature and art, the nature of the ‘poetic mind’, the content of aesthetic experience, the role of perceptual representations in human mental tapestry and the evolutionary origins of art. One pretty much knows what to expect from an empirical theorist -say, a cognitive scientist, a theoretical linguist or a philosopher of language- dealing with a question like effability. At present, when theoretical specialisation is a methodological necessity in empirical studies, the ‘characteristic mind set of the empirical theorist’ - as I will refer to it in the first chapter- is such that she can only achieve relevance by keeping her subject matter relatively restricted and narrow. Certain types of empirical mind will happily invest an entire theoretical life investigating lines of argument that, to a literary-artistic eye, differ from one another by a hair’s breadth. The present analysis, however, is at least partly the work of a thinker from the humanities. And it will be pursued at least partly in the literary-artistic way. An underlying theme throughout the discussion will be the relation between thinking in the humanities and empirical/scientific theorising of the type produced in the cognitive sciences, linguistics and philosophy of language. From the outset, I have consciously tried to develop this thesis within a broader -and, in a sense, political- framework involving not just the content and import of theorising in the humanities per se, but also its relationship to and possible interaction with theory articulated within the empirical/ scientific world. Towards the end of this analysis (Chapter 8), I will argue that interdisciplinary exchanges in the Humanities in the last 50 years lack genuine reciprocity. Theorising in the humanities has borrowed extensively from 7 disciplines such as cognitive psychology, theoretical linguistics and philosophy of mind, but in turn has had little, if any, retroactive effect on any of these disciplines. The belief that theorising in the humanities is intrinsically incapable of making truth claims 1 -the only way in which it could achieve retroactive effects on other disciplines- has become so deeply entrenched in the post-modern literary-artistic mentality that theorists seem to have entirely given up any ambition of actually forming or pursuing such claims. It goes to show how much theorising in the humanities has alienated itself from straightforward reason-preserving thought processes that post-modernism still holds pride of place in many departments and universities around the world. I take it as self-evident that nothing can be a theory of something unless it can make at least one truth claim about this something. Thus, theorising in the humanities, like theorising in the cognitive sciences, is committed to the pursuit of truth. With these broader issues in mind, the question of effability may be seen as more an ‘excuse’ than a genuine question. Even so, this excuse was not chosen at random. The question of the effability of human thought itself, and the very different perspectives literary and philosophical camps have adopted towards it, seem to offer an excellent vantage point for looking afresh into a diverse range of pervasive literary and art-theoretical questions. How is this theoretical divergence to be explained? Are the different views put forward by literary authors and empirical theorists respectively arbitrary or empirically justified? Could the pessimistic perspectives on language and communication held in the literary world give ground for thinking that the literary 1 The testability of the claim, or the way truth is pursued and arrived at, may vary, but the claim should nevertheless be capable of being both intended and recognised as a claim for truth, for it to be relevant to any adequate notion of theory.