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Tracking Point of View in Narrative

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Tracking Point of View in Narrative Tracking Point of View in Narrative Janyce M Wieb e New Mexico State University Thirdperson ctional narrative text is composed not only of passages that objectively narrate events but also of passages that present characters thoughts perceptions and inner states Such passages take a characters psychological p oint of view A language understander must determine the current psychological point of view in order to distin guish the beliefs of the characters from the facts of the story to correctly attribute beliefs and other attitudes to their sources and to understand the discourse relations among sentences Tracking the psychological point of view is not a trivial problem because many sentences are not explicitly marked for point of view and whether the point of view of a sentence is objective or that of a character and if the latter which character it is often depends on the context in which the sentence appears Tracking the psychological point of view is the problem addressed in this work The approach is to seek by exten sive examinations of naturally occurring narrative regularities in the ways that authors manipulate point of view and to develop an algorithm that tracks point of view on the basis of the regularities found This paper presents this algorithm gives demonstrations of an implemented system and describes the results of some preliminary empirical studies which lend support to the algorithm Introduction Imagine that a language understander encounters the following passage while reading a novel 11 12 He Sandy wanted to talk to Dennys How were they going to b e able to get home from this strange desert land into which they had b een cast and which was heaven knew where in all the countless solar systems in all the countless galaxies LEngle Many Waters p cmp-lg/9407019 22 Jul 1994 In this passage the author is not ob jectively narrating events or describing the ctional world but is presenting the thoughts and emotions of a character It is to Sandy that the land is strange and it is Sandys uncertainty that is expressed by the question and the expression heaven knew where Unless the language understander realizes these things it hasnt fully understo o d the passage Passages such as take a characters psychological p oint of view and are com p osed of sub jective sentencessentences that present the thoughts p erceptions and inner states of characters in the story Notice that nothing in explicitly sp ecies that the sentence is Sandys thought In general only a narrative parenthetical such as Dennys thought in serves to explicitly indicate b oth that a sentence is sub jective and who its sub jective character is Certainly Dennys thought anything would b e b etter than this horrible smelling place full of horrible little p eople LEngle Many Waters p c Asso ciation for Computational Linguistics In all other cases one must rely on less direct sources of information to determine the psychological p oint of view This pap er presents an algorithm for recognizing sub jective sentences and identifying their sub jective characters in thirdp erson ctional narrative text The algorithm is based on regularities found by extensive examination of naturally o ccurring text ie published novels and short stories in the ways that authors manipulate p oint of view It has b een implemented and some preliminary empirical studies which lend supp ort to the algorithm have also b een p erformed The algorithm is describ ed in the b o dy of the pap er and is given in full in App endix I Sections give background information and describ e my approach to the problem Sections and present an overview of the algorithm sp ecifying the input and output of the basic comp onents and identifying the comp onents fo cused on in this work Sections present the bulk of the algorithm addressing the problem of identifying sub jective characters b efore the problem of recognizing sub jective sentences Section describ es the algorithms treatment of sentences ab out privatestate actions such as sighing and lo oking Sections conclude the pap er with a summary of tests of the algorithm and discussions of the relationship b etween tracking p oint of view and anaphora resolution and of directions for future research The algorithm is given in app endix I demonstrations of its implementation are given in app endix I I and the results of a test of the algorithm are given in app endix I I I Point of View Introduction In facetoface conversation an utterance is understo o d with resp ect to the situation in which the conversation takes place Barwise and Perry Thus deictic expressions such as now here come go and just ahead derive their meanings from the time and place of the utterance Fillmore Lyons In ctional narrative text however spatial and temp oral deictic terms are clearly not understo o d with resp ect to the time and place of the authors writing nor of the readers reading Rather they are understo o d with resp ect to a here and now within the story Hamburger Kuro da Baneld Bruder et al Rapap ort et al ab Thus the reader must track the spatial and temp oral p oints of view with resp ect to which ob jects and events are describ ed Usp ensky Knowing who the sp eaker is is another situational comp onent needed to understand conversation Most obviously the sp eaker is needed as the referent of rstp erson pro nouns but in addition she is the source of b eliefs emotions evaluations etc expressed by her utterances But in thirdp erson narrative text sentences can express a characters b eliefs emotions etc even when he or she is referred to in the third p erson Thus an additional deictic comp onent corresp onding to the sp eaker in conversation is needed to understand thirdp erson narrative the psychological p oint of view Usp ensky Although various p oints of view often coincide in thirdp erson narrative text they need not For example a passage may take a characters spatial and temp oral p oints of view without taking the psychological p oint of view of any character Usp ensky It is the psychological p oint of view with which we are concerned in this pap er Sub jective Sentences Following Ann Baneld a literary theorist who analyzes p oint of view linguisti cally we shall call sentences that take a characters psychological p oint of view here after simply p oint of view or POV sub jective in contrast to sentences that ob jectively narrate events or describ e the ctional world Sub jective sentences present private states of charactersstates of an exp eriencer holding an attitude optionally toward an ob ject Varieties of private states include intellectual ones such as someone b elieving wondering or knowing something emotive ones such as someone hating some thing or b eing afraid and p erceptual ones such as someone seeing or hearing something Thus private states are states that are not op en to ob jective observation or verication Quirk et al To refer to a private state p and its comp onents we shall write ps p experiencer attitude object where experiencer is the p erson in state p and attitude is know b elieve see or whatever sort of private state p is Notice that attitude is b eing used as a general covering term referring to a class of which the prop ositional attitudes are only a sub class We shall limit our scop e in this pap er mainly to two classes of sub jective sentences one containing those Baneld calls represented thoughts and represented p ercep tions and the other containing those I call privatestate rep orts We will not consider represented sp eech at all Jesp ersen Baneld due to its complexity and only toward the end of the pap er section will we consider a variant of privatestate rep orts sub jective sentences ab out privatestate actions Even restricting ones attention to the two classes mentioned ab ove there are many syntactic semantic and pragmatic features according to which one could characterize sub jective sentences Below I prop ose a view of sub jective sentences that is useful for the sp ecic purp ose of tracking POV For characterizations that include further and alterna tive distinctions see for example the following works in literary theory and linguistics Dolezel Usp ensky Fillmore Cohn Baneld Caenep eel Galbraith and Li A private state is part of the meaning of any kind of sub jective sentence However a represented thought or represented p erception without a narrative parenthetical explicitly mentions only the ob ject of the private state the attitude and exp eriencer are implicit On the other hand a privatestate rep ort explicitly mentions the exp eriencer the attitude and optionally the ob ject of a private state p in addition with the privatestate rep ort p is not the ob ject of some other private state with an implicit exp eriencer and attitude Consider the following sentences 31 32 Zo e was angry at Jo e Where was he Sentence is a represented thought It mentions the ob ject of a private state p whose exp eriencer Zo e and attitude wonder or a similar attitude are implicit Where was he psp experiencer attitude object Sentence mentions the exp eriencer attitude and ob ject of a private state p 1 Zo e was angry at Jo e psp experiencer attitude object 1 1 1 1 Under a privatestate report interpretation of p is not itself the ob ject of some 1 other private state We shall call the character whose psychological p oint of view is taken by a sub jective sentence the sub jective character SC of that sentence The SC is the sub ject of a narrative parenthetical when one is present the implicit exp
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