Conferences, Publications Increase As 300 Anniversaries Begin Berkeley
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Dr. Stephen H. Daniel
DR. STEPHEN H. DANIEL Department of Philosophy email: [email protected] Texas A&M University 979-845-5619/5660 (Office) College Station, Texas 77843-4237 979-324-4199 (Cell) CURRENT POSITION Texas A&M University Presidential Professor for Teaching Excellence (2007; permanent) Thaman University Professor in Undergraduate Teaching Excellence (2019–2022) Professor of Philosophy (1993- ) RECORD OF EMPLOYMENT 1983-present: Professor of Philosophy (1993- ), Associate Department Head (2017-2018, 1986-90), Murray and Celeste Fasken Chair in Distinguished Teaching (2007-2011); Associate Professor (1986-93); Assistant Professor (1983-86), Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. 1978-1983: Assistant Professor of Philosophy; Department Chair (1982-83), Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama. (1979-1980) Visiting Scholar & NEH Fellow, University of Virginia, Department of English; Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Spring Hill College (on academic leave). 1977-1978: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Mount St. Mary’s College, Los Angeles, California. 1973-1977: Graduate Instructor in Philosophy, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri. EDUCATION Ph.D., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 1977; Dissertation: “The Philosophic Methodology of John Toland.” M.A., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 1974; Thesis: “Individuation in Giordano Bruno.” B.A., magna cum laude, Philosophy (major), History (minor), St. Joseph Seminary College, St. Benedict, Louisiana, 1972 PUBLICATIONS (Philosophy) Books (Authored): George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. xii + 340 pp. How Berkeley’s philosophy—especially his novel philosophy of mind—engages views developed by his predecessors and contemporaries. Contemporary Continental Thought. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2005. xiii + 490 pp. A survey with readings in critical theory, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalytic feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism. -
Suomalaisia Tietokirjailijoita
Risto Niku Suomalaisia tietokirjailijoita BTJ Kustannus Kannen kuvat (vasemmalta oikealle ja ylhäältä alas): Kaari Utrio Tammi / Kaj Ewart Lasse Erola Gummerus Timo Airaksinen Otava / Irmeli Jung Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila Otava / Irmeli Jung Kari Uusikylä PS-Kustannus Tommy Hellsten Yksityiskokoelma Jaakko Heinimäki Yrjö Tuunanen Matti Klinge Otava / Irmeli Jung Hannu Mäkelä Otava / Tiina Itkonen Esko Valtaoja Ursa Anto Leikola Tammi / Sakari Majantie Mysi Lahtinen Tammi / Lina Tegman Anna Kortelainen Tammi / Ville Palonen Peter von Bagh Otava / Irmeli Jung Max Jakobson Otava / Irmeli Jung Seppo Zetterberg Pirita Zetterberg. BTJ Finland Oy, Helsinki 2008 Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä 2008 ISBN 978-951-692-694-3 Sisältö Lukijalle ........................................... 7 Suvi Ahola ........................................ 9 Timo Airaksinen ................................15 Peter von Bagh ..................................21 Kari Enqvist .....................................27 Lasse Erola ......................................33 Carl-Fredrik Geust.............................38 Jaakko Heinimäki ..............................43 Tommy Hellsten ................................49 Eero Huovinen ..................................54 Martti Häikiö ...................................60 Kaisa Häkkinen ................................66 Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila .......................72 Max Jakobson ...................................78 Petteri Järvinen ..................................83 Jaakko Kiander .................................89 Matti -
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations Sinan Dogramaci∗ 1 A Puzzle: What Is the Function of Epistemically Evaluative Language? What is the function of words like `irrational' as used in ordinary epistemic evaluations? I'm thinking of simple evaluations: criticism like `Smith's belief that Obama's a Muslim is irrational' or praise like `Green's belief that all humans are mortal is rational'. We don't make such claims just for the sake of it, just for fun, or for no reason at all. So what is the real point or purpose of this epistemically evaluative aspect of our linguistic practice? It must have some utility, but what? What would we lose if epistemically evaluative words suddenly disappeared from our vocabulary?1 The question requires some motivation, since discovering a word's func- tion doesn't necessarily call for armchair philosophy. Some words might serve a hidden psycho-sociological function that only empirical science can uncover. This might be true of words like `hello' and `thanks'. And for many words, their basic function isn't particularly mysterious. For example, we ∗I pronounce it, when speaking English, like this: sin·on dor·uh·mudge·uh. 1The question of this paper thus contrasts with the timeworn questions of how to give necessary and sufficient conditions for this or that philosophically interesting property. There are, however, a few excellent philosophical explorations of the function of this or that philosophically interesting word or concept. In philosophy of logic and language, Quine offered an elegantly simple insight about the utility of the truth predicate which precipitated the contemporary development of deflationism about truth; see Quine (1970), Leeds (1978), Horwich (1990/98), and Field (1994). -
PDF File Issue No 21
Berkeley Studies No. 21 (2010) Editors Stephen H. Daniel, Senior Editor College Station, Texas, USA Marc A. Hight, Coordinating Editor Hampden-Sydney, Virginia, USA Silvia Parigi, Bibliographical Editor Cassino, Italy Laurent Jaffro, Book Review Editor Paris, France Tom Stoneham, News Editor York, UK Contents James Hill The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions 3 Marc Hight New Berkeley Correspondence: A Note 16 Jacopo Agnesina Review: Laurent Jaffro, Geneviève Brykman, Claire Schwartz, eds, Berkeley’s Alciphron: English Text and Essays in Interpretation 22 Bertil Belfrage Review: C. George Caffentzis, Exciting the Industry of Mankind: George Berkeley’s Philosophy of Money 25 Ville Paukkonen Review: Talia Mae Bettcher, Berkeley: A Guide for the Perplexed 28 News and Announcements 32 Recent Works on Berkeley (2008-2010) 33 Berkeley Studies 21 (2010) 2 © Berkeley Studies and Contributors 2010 Berkeley Studies is sponsored by Hampden-Sydney College and the International Berkeley Society Berkeley Studies 21 (2010) 3 The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions James Hill Abstract: This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. -
Internalism Explained* Ralph Wedgwood
Internalism Explained* Ralph Wedgwood 1. The word ‘rational’ is used in many ways. But when the word is used in the way that is most common among philosophers, the following intuition seems compelling. Consider two possible worlds, w1 and w2. In both worlds, you have exactly the same experiences, apparent memories, and intuitions, and in both worlds you go through exactly the same processes of reasoning, and form exactly the same beliefs. In this case, it seems, exactly the same beliefs are rational in both worlds, and exactly the same beliefs are irrational in both worlds. Now suppose that in w1 you are bedevilled by an evil demon who ensures that many of your experiences are misleading, with the result that many of the beliefs that you hold in w1 are false. In w2, on the other hand, almost all your experiences are veridical, with the result that almost all the beliefs that you hold in w2 are true. Intuitively, this makes no difference at all. Exactly the same beliefs are rational and irrational in both worlds.1 This intuition seems to support an “internalist” conception of rational belief. According to this conception, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on “internal facts” about the thinker’s mental states — in this example, on facts that hold in both these two possible worlds w1 and w2, not on facts about the external world that vary between w1 and w2. Moreover, this seems to be a completely general feature of rationality, since a parallel claim seems plausible with respect to rational decisions or choices as well. -
Dr. Stephen H. Daniel
DR. STEPHEN H. DANIEL Department of Philosophy email: [email protected] Texas A&M University 979-845-5619/5660 (Office) College Station, Texas 77843-4237 979-324-4199 (Cell) CURRENT POSITION Texas A&M University Presidential Professor for Teaching Excellence (2007; permanent) Thaman University Professor for Undergraduate Teaching Excellence (2019–2022) Professor of Philosophy (1993- ) RECORD OF EMPLOYMENT 1983-present: Professor of Philosophy (1993- ), Associate Department Head (2017-2018, 1986-90), Murray and Celeste Fasken Chair in Distinguished Teaching (2007-2011); Associate Professor (1986-93); Assistant Professor (1983-86), Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. 1978-1983: Assistant Professor of Philosophy; Department Chair (1982-83), Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama. (1979-1980) Visiting Scholar & NEH Fellow, University of Virginia, Department of English; Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Spring Hill College (on academic leave). 1977-1978: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Mount St. Mary’s College, Los Angeles, California. 1973-1977: Graduate Instructor in Philosophy, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri. EDUCATION Ph.D., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 1977; Dissertation: “The Philosophic Methodology of John Toland.” M.A., Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 1974; Thesis: “Individuation in Giordano Bruno.” B.A., magna cum laude, Philosophy (major), History (minor), St. Joseph Seminary College, St. Benedict, Louisiana, 1972 PUBLICATIONS (Philosophy) Books (Authored): George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. xii + 338 pp. How Berkeley’s philosophy—especially his novel philosophy of mind—engages views developed by his predecessors and contemporaries. Contemporary Continental Thought. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2005. xiii + 490 pp. A survey with readings in critical theory, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalytic feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism. -
Samuel C. Rickless
1 SAMUEL C. RICKLESS Philosophy Department, 0119 University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0119 Employment 2009- : Professor, Philosophy, University of California, San Diego 2003-2009: Associate Professor, Philosophy, University of California, San Diego 2001-2003: Assistant Professor, Philosophy, University of California, San Diego 1996-2001: Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Florida State University 1995-1996: Visiting Lecturer, Philosophy, Florida State University Affiliations 2003- : University of San Diego Institute for Law and Philosophy 2013- : University of San Diego Institute for Law and Religion 2016- : Affiliate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law 2014, 2015: Adjunct Professor, International Summer Campus, Korea University Education Ph.D., Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, 1996 Dissertation: “Sinn Without Guilt: A Theory of Content for Singular Terms” Committee: David Kaplan (chair), Kit Fine, Tim Stowell B.Phil., Philosophy, Oxford University, 1988 B.A., Philosophy, Harvard University, 1986 Areas of Research History of Modern Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Language, History of Ancient Philosophy Books 1. Plato’s Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Reviewed in: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007), Rhizai: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science (2007), Classical Bulletin (2007), Journal of the History of Philosophy (2008), Bryn Mawr Classical Review (2008), Greece and Rome (2008), The Review of Metaphysics (2009), Mnemosyne (2009), Classical World (2010), Gnomon (2010), Etudes Platoniciennes (2010), Universa: Recensioni di Filosofia (2011), The Ancient World (2011). 1 2 2. Berkeley’s Argument for Idealism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Reviewed in: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2013), Philosophical Quarterly (2013), Mind (2014), Philosophy in Review (2014), Journal of the History of Philosophy (2015), European Journal of Philosophy (2016), Hume Studies (forthcoming). -
Berkeley Studies
Berkeley Studies No. 28 (2019) Editors Stephen H. Daniel, Senior Editor College Station, Texas, USA John R. Roberts, Coordinating Editor Tallahassee, Florida, USA Silvia Parigi, Bibliographical Editor Cassino, Italy Tom Stoneham, News Editor York, UK Contents Jessica Gordon-Roth Tracing Reid’s ‘Brave Officer’ Objection Back to Berkeley—And Beyond 3 Daniel E. Flage Rickless and Passive Obedience 23 News and Announcements 47 Recent Works on Berkeley (2017-2019) 48 Berkeley Studies 28 (2019) 2 © Berkeley Studies and Contributors 2019 Berkeley Studies is sponsored by Florida State University and the International Berkeley Society Berkeley Studies 28 (2019) 3 Tracing Reid’s ‘Brave Officer’ Objection Back to Berkeley—And Beyond Jessica Gordon-Roth Abstract: Berkeley’s two most obvious targets in Alciphron are Shaftesbury and Mandeville. However, as numerous commentators have pointed out, there is good reason to think Berkeley additionally targets Anthony Collins in this dialogue. In this paper, I bolster David Berman’s claim that “Collins looms large in the background” of Dialogue VII, and put some meat on the bones of Raymond Martin and John Barresi’s passing suggestion that there is a connection between the Clarke–Collins correspondence, Alciphron, and the objection that Berkeley raises regarding persons and their persistence conditions therein. Specifically, I argue that we have evidence that Berkeley’s objection to consciousness–based views of personal identity, as found in VII.8, is a response to a challenge that Collins raises to Clarke in “An Answer to Mr. Clarke’s Third Defense of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” This is significant not just because this objection is usually—and consistently—taken to be an objection to Locke, but also because Berkeley’s objection works against Collins’s theory of personal identity in a way that it doesn’t against Locke’s. -
Curriculum Vitae 1 M
M. Folescu / Curriculum Vitae 1 M. Folescu Department of Philosophy Phone: (310) 622-2277 University of Missouri Email: [email protected] Columbia, MO 65211-4160 Homepage: http://marifol.net/ Positions Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri,USA || 2019–present Humboldt Research Fellow at the Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany || August, 2022-July 2023 Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, UK || February–July, 2022 American Philosophical Association Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, UK || September–October, 2017 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, USA || 2013–2019 Education Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2013 M.A. Art History, Western University, Canada, 2005 M.A. Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania, 2003 B.A. Art History, National University of Fine Arts, Romania, 2002 Areas of Specialization Historical Philosophy of Language and Mind Areas of Competence Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Action Theory, Aesthetics Publications Journal Articles Folescu, M. “Mary Shepherd on the Role of Proofs in Our Knowledge of First Principles.” Forth- coming in Noûs, DOI:10.1111/nous.12365. (Online early view 2021). Folescu, M. “Perception As A Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.” Journal of Scottish Phi- losophy. 19(1) (2021): 57-74. Folescu, M. “Using Benevolent Affections To Learn Our Duty.” Mind 127(506) (2018): 467-489. Folescu, M. “A Reidean Account of (Episodic) Memory.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re- search. 97(2) (2018): 304-321 (Published online in 2016). M. Folescu / Curriculum Vitae 2 Folescu, M. “Reid’s View of Memorial Conception.” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16(3) (2018): 211–226. -
Timo Airaksinen (University of Helsinki, Finland) - I
Timo Airaksinen (University of Helsinki, Finland) - I. Policy, 2 From Human Education in the 3rd Millennium (For 20 years a member of the state matriculation examination board, the chair of philosophy and non-religious moral education; also responsible for the exam questions with Mr Pekka Elo (+)) I. Policy (Educational reforms: what modern educational policy really means? What educational policy should contain in order to provide what people and their societies need) 2) How should we understand the relationships between education and work? The limitations of neoliberal models and education policy focused on economic production.Tendencies for education to be incorporated into the interests of global and cognitive capitalism and neoliberalism, so that technical skills and capacities (eg for 'entrepreneurialism') are played up and human qualities and human understandings are neglected. There is something wrong with the Finnish school system, although it is widely admired. The teachers are happy and motivated; they think their work is appreciated and their status is ok. But the disturbing symptom is that the students are not motivated; in fact discipli-nary problems are very bad, and the teachers suffer from this. Also, learning results, say, in mathematics are low. The Finnish students' problems are the worst among those studied recently. Also, the parents' attitudes tend to be problematic. What should be done? KEY THEMES The limitations of neoliberal educational models and education policy focused on economic production. Tendencies for education to be incorporated into the interests of global corporations, capitalism, and neoliberalism, so that work related technical skills and capacities are played up. 1) The Finnish school educational system has been successful because (a) the teachers are academically trained, and (b) the nation has always respected learning and knowledge, although this “always” has a very short span. -
Berkeley's Theory of Common Sense
Berkeley Studies 24 (2013) 3 Berkeley’s Theory of Common Sense Matthew Holtzman Abstract: This essay situates Berkeley’s views on common sense within the context of eighteenth- century debates about the nature of common sense. It argues that in his Notebooks, Berkeley develops a theory according to which to possess common sense is to use the faculties of the mind properly, and that Berkeley’s approach to common sense can be understood as a response to John Toland’s epistemology of religion. It concludes with a discussion of consequences of this analysis for our understanding of Berkeley’s later works, his methods, and his overarching philosophical aims. In The Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (DHP), Berkeley argues that matter does not exist (PHK 9),1 that spirit is the only substance (PHK 6), and that physical objects are not causes but signs (PHK 66). If these claims initially shock readers’ philosophical sensibilities, the effort required to come to terms with them will seem familiar enough. One must take pains to work one’s way into a perspective from which they can be seen as not only consistent but mutually supporting or even inevitable. Yet Berkeley seems firmly to deny that effort is required, for he repeatedly insists that his philosophy agrees with common sense: immaterialism is difficult to accept not because it is abstruse, but because readers come to it corrupted by modern philosophy.2 Learning to accept immaterialism is not like an initiation into an esoteric system of thought, but, as Berkeley claims in the preface to the Three Dialogues, like a long journey home (DHP 2:168). -
The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine Of
Berkeley Studies 21 (2010) 3 The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions James Hill Abstract: This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism. In Siris, Berkeley offers us a characteristically succinct reflection on his doctrine of notions: [Aristotle] held that the mind of man was a tabula rasa, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary, held original ideas in the mind; that is, notions which never were or can be in the sense, such as being, beauty, goodness, likeness, parity. Some, perhaps, may think the truth to be this: that there are properly no ideas, or passive objects, in the mind but what were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations; such are notions.