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January Meeting Occasion for Elections, Funding Decisions Published by the International Berkeley Society Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4237 USA Summer 2007 January Meeting Occasion for Elections, Funding Decisions The annual meeting of the International Berkeley Currently, the Society has about 125 Society was held on Saturday evening, January 20, active members; another 25 are arrears 2007 at Whitehall, Berkeley’s Rhode Island home in dues payments. Half of our members near Newport. Margot Grosvenor, president of the are involved in teaching and research National Society of Colonial Dames of America in (mostly in philosophy), and half are Rhode Island, welcomed the Society either retired academics or non- to the house, and elections followed Migely academicians interested in Berkeley shortly thereafter. Elected for three- (especially his time in Rhode Island). year terms were President Stephen Two-thirds live in the U.S.; the rest live in England, Daniel (Texas A&M University), Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Germany, Vice-President Timo Airaksinen Finland, México, Sweden, Switzerland, Scotland, Daniel (University of Helsinki), Secretary- Slovenia, Japan, Estonia, Australia, and Venezuela. Treasurer Nancy Kendrick (Wheaton College, MA), Membership Secretary Genevieve Those present at the meeting decided that future Migely (Cornell College, IA), and Recording Secre- membership forms should include a request not only tary Amy Garrison (Naval War College, RI). Other for dues and Whitehall library purchases but also for Executive Committee officers—past donations to support research on Berkeley’s life and President Lou Alfonso, Archivist (and thought. In the past the Society has aided in publishing former secretary-treasurer) Maureen translations of Berkeley’s writings and helped defray Lapan, and Philosophy Associations costs of international conferences. Three such projects Coordinator Margaret Atherton— were approved for funding for 2007: two international were recognized for their service, as Berkeley conferences (one in Helsinki, Finland, another were Joanne Dunlap (former member- Airaksinen in Gaeta, Italy) were each given $400 to host IBS- ship secretary), Dana Magee (former sponsored receptions, and a $500 grant was provided to recording secretary), and Nancy Bredbeck (chair of help with the publication of Reexamining Berkeley’s the Colonial Dames’ Whitehall Committee). The philo- Philosophy, edited by Stephen Daniel (University of sophy departments at Texas A&M University and Toronto Press, 2007). Funding was also approved to Cornell College were also thanked for covering printing install wireless internet service in Whitehall for and mailing costs for the Society. scholars in residence during July and August. In 2006 the Society received $1036.79 By far, the most engaging topic of the evening was the in dues and Whitehall library dona- plan for a Berkeley conference in Newport (now fixed tions, and expenses totaled $1027.55. for June 26-28, 2008). The conference will showcase IBS accounts amounted to $6557.34, both Berkeley’s thought and the New England setting of which $1809.63 are committed to in which he lived. Expecting great things for next year, Kendrick the support of Whitehall and the IBS members ended the meeting with a toast commemo- library there. rating the Berkeleys’ arrival in Rhode Island. Berkeley Sessions at APA Eastern McDonough Wins Turbayne and Central Division Meetings Berkeley Essay Prize After a hiatus of several years, the IBS sponsored a well-attended session on Berkeley at the Eastern The winning essay in this year’s Colin and Ailsa Division meeting of the American Philosophical Turbayne International Berkeley Prize is Association in Washington, D.C. on December 28, “Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine 2006. Forty people showed up, and afterwards Concurrentism” by Jeffrey McDonough many went out to dinner to continue the discussion. (Philosophy, Harvard University). Established by the Turbaynes in conjunction with the This year’s session will be at the Marriott Inner Philosophy Department of the University of Harbor Hotel in Baltimore, Maryland. Tentatively Rochester, the $2000 prize is awarded every two scheduled for Friday, Dec. 28, 2007, 5:15-7:15, it years. The next deadline for submissions is features Sukjae Lee (Ohio State U), who will speak November 1, 2008; the winner will be on “Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits” (comment announced on March 1, 2009. Submitted essays by Jeff McDonough, Harvard U); and Samuel should be unpublished treatments of some aspect Rickless (U California San Diego), who will speak of Berkeley’s philosophy, written in English, on “Berkeley and Abstract Ideas” (comment by and not exceed 5,000 words. All references to Martha Brandt Bolton, Rutgers U). For more Berkeley should be to Luce & Jessop, using the information, contact the session chair, Margaret MLA or a similar format for notes. Submissions Atherton (U of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) at are blind reviewed by a panel selected by the [email protected]. Department of Philosophy of the University of Rochester. Past winners are listed on the IBS CALL FOR PAPERS: The IBS will also sponsor a website. Submissions should be sent on paper session at the Central Division meeting of the APA (not e-mail) to: at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago. It is tentatively scheduled for Thursday, April 17, 2008, Chair, Department of Philosophy 5:15-7:15. If you would like to be considered for the University of Rochester program, please send your paper to Margaret P.O. Box 270078 Atherton (address above) no later than Thursday, Lattimore 532 Rochester, NY 14627-0078 November 1, 2007. Papers should deal with some aspect of Berkeley’s philosophy and be no longer than 3,500 words. Also, please contact Margaret if you would like to be a commentator. Donating Materials to Whitehall Most of the books and articles in the IBS library at PayPal On-line Dues Payment a Whitehall were donated by supporters or authors themselves. Such donations allow us to use our Success limited resources to fill in gaps in the collection. If you have publications that could enhance the After only one year, half of all IBS members now pay collection, please send them to the International their $15 dues and make donations on-line using a Berkeley Society, Honyman Hall, Queen Anne’s credit card or a personal account on PayPal. For Square, Newport, RI 02840, USA. members in the U.S. and abroad, this is often much easier than surface mail. Due to excessive costs, the A list of current holdings at Whitehall can be found at IBS no longer accepts checks from foreign banks. To http://georgeberkeley.tamu.edu/whlibrary.pdf. For use PayPal, simply follow the instructions at our more details, contact Nancy Kendrick at 508-286- website (http://georgeberkeley.tamu.edu/form.html). 3677 or [email protected]. Helsinki Conference on Berkeley, 6-9 August 2007 In anticipation of the 300th anniversaries of the publication of some of Berkeley’s most known works, scholars from around the world will gather for a conference on his philosophy at the University of Helsinki August 6-9, 2007. The conference site is the main university building at Fabianinku 33. Events include a bus tour of Helsinki the night before the conference begins, an audience with the Rector of the University of Helsinki, and a banquet. The conference schedule includes: August 6 09.45 Opening of the Conference. Chair: Bertil Belfrage 10.00 Session One: Berkeley on Perceiving. Chair: Stephen Daniel Bertil Belfrage: “Ideas” in Section One of Berkeley’s Principles Martha Bolton: Berkeley on Perception, Judgment, Suggestion and Inference 13.30 Session Two: Berkeley on Perceiving (cont.). Chair: Howard Robinson Daniel Flage: Analysis in Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision Luc Peterschmitt: The New Theory of Vision: Science or Metaphysics? Mykolas Drunga: Berkeley and the Time-gap Argument August 7 09.30 Session Three: Berkeley’s Ontology. Chair: Richard Brook Geneviève Brykman: Is Immaterialism a Roundabout Way to Faith? Georges Dicker: Another Whack at Berkeley: a Critical Analysis of Principles 1-7 Stephen Daniel: The Pervasiveness of Stoic Elements in Berkeley’s Thought 13.30 Session Four: Berkeley’s Ontology (cont.). Chair: Georges Dicker Howard Robinson: Two Berkelian Arguments about the Nature of Space Wolfgang Breidert: Representation in Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics George Pappas: Berkeley’s Treatment of Scepticism August 8 10.15 Session Five: Berkeley’s Concept of Soul. Chair: George Pappas Kenneth Winkler: “Marvellous Emptiness”: Berkeley on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Richard Brook: Does Berkeley Need a Subconscious? 13.30 Session Six: Berkeley’s Concept of Soul (cont.). Chair: Wolfgang Breidert Ville Paukkonen: Berkeley on Self-Knowledge Marc Hight: Of Brutes and Men: What the Nature of Beasts can tell us about Berkeley’s Conception of the Mind Roomet Jakapi: Berkeley and the Disembodied Soul August 9 09.30 Session Seven: Berkeley in Context. Chair: Geneviève Brykman Timo Airaksinen: Berkeley on Newton in Siris Tom Stoneham: Arthur Collier on Imagination and Inexistence George Caffentzis: Berkeley and Hume on Money, Notions, and Conventions 13.30 Session Eight: Berkeley in Context (cont.). Chair: Timo Airaksinen Talia Bettcher: Abstraction: Berkeley against Locke Jani Hakkarainen: Hume and Berkeley’s Repugnancy Argument against the Primary-Secondary Qualities Distinction For more information contact the conference organizers: Timo Airaksinen Bertil Belfrage Ville Paukkonen Department of Philosophy Villan, S-57162 Department of Philosophy University of Helsinki Bodafors, Sweden University of Helsinki Helsinki, Finland [email protected] Helsinki, Finland [email protected] [email protected] “The Dean of Thin Air” DVD Available for Donation The IBS has received permission from Rhode Island Public Broadcast to make DVD copies of “The Dean of Thin Air” (1983) available to its members for personal and educational use. The hour-long PBS documentary about Berkeley cannot be obtained else- where and is a must-see for those interested in how the good bishop and his ideas are portrayed in film.
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