Nohr.Tyrants of Truth
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London School of Economics and Political Science Tyrants of Truth A genealogy of hyper-real politics Andreas Aagaard Nøhr A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political science (LSE) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Lon- don, UK. September 2017 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provid- ed that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98.678 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by David Cummings. 2 Abstract This thesis challenges the widely accepted discourse of post-truth politics, which finds support in what is in this thesis referred to as ‘antinomy hypothesis’ – the belief that politics and truth are opposites and external to one another, where one exists the other disappear; truth is abstract and absolute, while politics is a theatre of appearances with no room for truth. In contrast, this thesis explores the conditions of possibility for think- ing that we inhabit a world of post-truth politics, by proposing the concept of the ‘politics of truth’ – the struggle at the most general level of society where the true is separated from the false and where what gets to count as truth and reality is decided. If truth only has value in so far as it serves life then the central problem in the politics of truth, the thesis argues, is to establishes the socio-political limits of thought: how and by what practices is it possible for thought to test its own truth in politics? It is by erecting the epistemological space that sets out possible answers to this question that thought became the tyrant of truth, which today has taken form of hyper-real politics of truth. This thesis thus asks the genealogical question: what will or wills have shaped the politics of truth, so that it today has become hyper-real? To answer this question the thesis develops a theory of ‘traditions of thought’ based on the French school of Histor- ical Epistemology. The rest of the thesis explores, in a series of chronological chapters spanning from Archaic Greece until today, how the politics of truth has been problema- tized in thought through the concepts of parrhēsia, exhortation, public critique, and hyper-real politics. In hyper-real politics of truth where the real is in the process of being replaced by its copy, there is no space for the difference of thought, only the positive mode of thought that affirms and produces more truth. 3 Acknowledgements I wish to thank my supervisor Iver B. Neumann for seeing me through this long and enriching intellectual journey. I would like to give a special thanks to Aaron McKeil and Liane Hartnett for our regular discussions and for commenting extensively on several chapters. My thanks also go to Chris Brown, Tomila Lankina and Mark Hoff- man for helping me through my two research panels. For comments on chapter drafts and enlightening conversations elsewhere at the LSE, I would like to thank Kirsten Ainley, Tarak Barkawi, Martin Bayly, Federica Bicchi, George Lawson, Margot Light, and Peter Wilson, as well as my fellow PhD students – Morten Skumsrud Andersen, Scott Hamilton, Marian Feist, Gustav Meibauer, Annissa Haddadi, Emmanuelle Blanc, Maggy Ainley, Joanne Yo, David Brenner, Ilaria Carrozza, Evelin Pauls, Ida Danewid, Bjørnar Svendrup-Thygeson, Adrian Rogstad, Kerry Goettlich, Alireza Shams-Lahijani, and Alvina Hoffmann. I would also like to thank the participants of two workshops in Oslo (2016) and Leiden (2017) for their comments and questions: Halvard Leira, Einar Wigen, Nina Græger, Kristin M. Haugevig, Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, and Cecilie Bas- berg Neumann; and Jorg Kunsterman, Xavier Guillaume, Julia Costa López, Filipe De Rois, and Benjamin de Carvalho. In addition I would like to thank Oliver Kessler, Inan- na Hamati-Ataya, Ole Jacob Sending, Simona Rentea, Lucas van Milders, Tobias Wille, and Freja Schaumburg Pallesen for their conversations and intellectual support. I wish to thank my partner Océane Toffoli for her love and encouragement during these last four years. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, without whose support this thesis would not have been possible. 4 Table of Content Introduction: The Antinomy Hypothesis and the Politics of Truth ....................... 6 Chapter I: Traditions of Thought ............................................................................ 28 Chapter II: Parrhēsia ............................................................................................... 57 Chapter III: Exhortation .......................................................................................... 93 Chapter IV: Public Critique .................................................................................. 137 Chapter V: Hyper-real Politic ................................................................................ 189 Conclusion: The Socio-Political Limits of Thought ............................................. 220 Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 228 5 Tyrants of Truth Introduction: The Antinomy Hypothesis and the Politics of Truth * * * [1] This is a thesis about the politics of truth – that struggle, at the most general level of any society, where the true is separated from the false, where what gets to count as truth and reality is decided; or rather in the light of the present, it is about the emerging hy- per-real politics of truth and what this means for the practice of truth-telling (relative to the relationship between truth and politics). What follows is (I) a clarification of how this study is situated in the present in opposition to what I term the ‘antinomy hypothe- sis’. Then follows (II) an outline of the concept of the politics of truth, drawing extensively on Nietzsche, determining it as the problem of placing a socio-political limit on thought. Lastly (III), after uncovering how the antinomy hypothesis is implicated in what it purports to critique, a sketch of the argument made in the thesis is presented – specifically how the thesis traces the formation of historical social forces that, through their determination of epistemological spaces, have constituted the different socio- political limitations of thought. I [2] In certain parts of the world, contemporary political discourse is plagued by a com- plete disregard for truth and truth-telling. We are told the post-factual society is upon us: post-truth politics that emphasise emotions over evidence have hijacked the institu- tion of democracy; the public sphere is said to be swamped with alternative facts instigated by ‘bullshit artists’ who display a complete cynicism towards truth and reali- ty; and we are also told that thanks to the relentless critiques of rigorous scientific facts by post-modernists in our universities, conspiracy theories have become mainstream in the realm of politics. 6 The Antinomy Hypothesis and the Politics of Truth [3] An imagined Golden Age legitimizes the current discourse of a time before and after the crisis of post-truth politics. It is a discourse that is easily defended, because it is anchored in series of value commitments that find support in three related instances of western civilization, which crucially provide strategies for confronting post-factual society. Principally, this genuine sense of something being lost, or at least denied its rightful place, emanates from a sense of the hard fought struggle of the scientific worldview against ignorance and superstition. All adherences to a post-factual society are regarded as dangerous because they eclipse the scientific worldview, which we are told emancipated us from millennia of mysticism and barbarism. We are only offered simple choices; the truths discerned by science are good because they rest on impartiali- ty, on the collection of and respect for evidence and the value of critical scholarship and clear thinking. The scientific worldview firmly links the progress of man to the progress of science – it civilizes, enlightens, and after having accumulated knowledge in a stead- fast stream, it provides us with the tools for addressing our common challenges. Truth is discovered by science, common sense and scientific realism hold it in place and guaran- tee it. And by now, science has rightfully established itself as the only way to truly know reality, legitimated by scientific method and standards of evidence, it has been the function of the scientific expert to delineate a worldview that overrules all others. Post- factual politics is a catastrophe for the scientific community; in our darkest imagination, it is only a question of time before scientists will be rounded up and disposed of in the most gruesome fashion. Likewise, after the fall of the Berlin Wall it became clear for all to see that liberal democracy had triumphed. History