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War in Religious Dimension
War in religious dimension Attacks on religion in Crimea and Donbas region Report submitted under Article 15 for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Kyiv 2019 1 Table of content The Authors..........................................................................................................................................3 Truth Hounds...............................................................................................................................3 International Renaissance Foundation.......................................................................................3 Executive summary...............................................................................................................................3 Legal assessment..................................................................................................................................5 Methodology........................................................................................................................................7 Collecting data.............................................................................................................................7 Analyzing data.............................................................................................................................8 Background...........................................................................................................................................9 Prewar context............................................................................................................................9 -
Humanitarian Snapshot 20171205 EN V2
UKRAINE: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 15 May 2017) OVERVIEWOVERVIEW HRP 2017:PRIORITIES Daily hostilities continued to generate civilian casualties and humanitarian needs despite the ceasefire agreement reached at the end of March, which brought about a brief respite in early April. According to OHCHR, a slight STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES decrease of conflict-related civilian casualties was recorded in April, with 66 casualties (13 deaths and 53 injuries) reported compared to 71 in March. Since the beginning of 2017, the majority of the civilian casualties was caused by shelling (55 per cent), followed by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) at 35 per cent. Of particular concern is a recent sharp rise of civilian casualties as a result of the explosion of landmines and other Protection explosive devices at the start of farming season. Farmers and local population expose themselves to risks of such incidents as agriculture is among some of the limited sources of income. The real number of mine/ERW incidents is thought to be much higher in Non-Government controlled areas (NGCA), where humanitarian access is limited. While the conflict continues raging unabated, a risk of collapse of the inter-connected energy and water supply systems in both GCA and NGCA remains due to the unresolved issue of non-payment of debts despite multiple Access negotiations. The ongoing financial and bureaucratic bottlenecks could, in the immediate run, affect some 400,000 to 600,000 people on both sides of the ‘contact line’ in Luhanska Oblast, with people in Donetsk also at risk, according to the WASH Cluster. In late April, energy supplier Luhansk Energy Association (LEO) cut all electrical power supply to NGCA of Luhanska oblast, forcing the de facto authorities to take power from alternative sources, including Donetska oblast NGCA and the Russian Federation as a humanitarian action. -
WASH Incident Report No.39 Date: 11/03/2017
WASH Incident Report No.39 Date: 11/03/2017 Location: Popasnyanskyi rayon (Luhansk GCA), Prepared by: Volodymyr Kalinin, WASH Cluster IMO CARBONIT SYSTEM SHELLING AND REPAIRS: Near Zolote, in Government Controlled Areas (GCA) of Luhansk oblast, the area around a pumping station and 1200 mm diameter water pipelines of the Catrbonit system was again under night-time shelling from 10 – 11 March 2017. A flexible pipe joint was damaged by soil movement due to the shelling, exacerbating damage incurred on 1st March 2017. As a result, water supply to Non- Government Controlled Areas (NGCA) was significantly reduced overnight from 1200 to 300 cubic meters per hour by PVK so that repair works can be completed. According to PVK, repair work should be finished until the end of today, 11 March 2017, with the volume of water supplied returned to normal levels of 1400 m3 per hour. The main water pipelines ensure water supply to around 400, 000 people in Luhansk NGCA (Pervomaisk, Stakhanov, Brianka, Alchevsk, Kranyi Luch, Antratsyt). There are two pipelines but one of them has not been in operation due to the significantly damages since 2015. The flow in the water pipeline, was reduced from 1400 to 1200 cubic meters per hour due to the last shelling on 1 March 2017. The pumping stations and Western Filter Station continue to operate in normal mode. Officially, Carbonit system supplies safe drinking water to over 460, 000 people from Luhansk GCA and NGCA (Pervomaisk, Stakhanov, Brianka, Alchevsk, Krasnyi Luch, Antratsyt). Since the beginning of the March 2017, the Carbonit system was shelled at least three times. -
Accountability for Killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 Contents
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 Contents Paragraphs Page Executive summary ............................................................................................ 3 I. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1-5 5 II. Legal framework ................................................................................................ 6-18 5 A. Applicable international law ...................................................................... 6-17 5 1. International human rights law ........................................................... 6-13 5 2. International humanitarian law............................................................ 14-15 7 3. International criminal law .................................................................. 16-17 8 B. National legislation .................................................................................... 18 8 III. Killings and violent deaths in the context of assemblies ...................................... 19-28 8 A. Violence of January–February 2014 during the Maidan events .................... 20-24 9 B. Violence of 2 May 2014 in Odesa .............................................................. 25-27 10 C. Other assemblies marked by violent deaths ................................................ 28 10 IV. Killings in the context of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine ................................ 29-57 -
Assessment Report Improving the Health and Safety of Miners in Eastern Ukraine Published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine
ASSESSMENT REPORT IMPROVING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF MINERS IN EASTERN UKRAINE Published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine Kyiv, Ukraine, November 2012 © UNDP, 2012 — All rights reserved All rights reserved. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP or its Member States. The mention of specific companies does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by UNDP in preference to others of a similar nature. UNDP does not warrant that the information contained in this publication is complete and correct and shall not be liable for any damages incurred as a result of its use. United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine 1, Klovsky Uzviz Str. Kyiv, 01021, Ukraine Contents Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 5 KEY FINDINGS . .6 1. INTRODUCTION. 8 1.1 Miners. 8 1.2 Mining Industry. 8 1.3 National Priorities. .8 1.4 Gender Considerations . 9 2. COMMUNITY MEETINGS. 10 2.1 Methodology . .10 2.2 Factors Affecting the Health and Safety of Miners . 10 3. HEALTH DATA ON MINERS. 11 3.1 Key Findings from the Medical Exams of Miners . .11 3.2 Methodology for Conducting and Analysing the Medical Exams. 11 3.3 Health Data on Miners. 11 4. SAFETY DATA ON MINERS . .17 4.1 Key Findings. 17 4.2 Safety Data on Miners. 17 5. OPINION SURVEYS OF MINERS IN ROVENKY AND SVERDLOVSK . .18 5.1 Key Findings from Rovenky and Sverdlovsk . 18 5.2 Miners’ Opinions on Health . .18 5.3 Miners’ Opinions on Safety. -
Human Rights Impact Assessment of the Covid-19 Response on the Territory of Ukraine
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSE ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE July 2020 Cover photo: © Міністерство охорони здоров’я України / CC BY-SA (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0) Table of contents I. Introduction 3 II. Executive Summary 5 III. Methodology 8 IV. Brief Country Information 9 V. Incidence of COVID-19 in Ukraine 12 VI. The Ukrainian Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 and Its Impact on Human Rights 14 VII. The Occupying Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 in Russian-Occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and Its Impact on Human Rights 42 VIII. The so-called DPR/LPR Authorities’ Response to COVID-19 and its Impact on Human Rights 46 IX. Summary of Key Findings 49 X. Recommendations 53 2 I. Introduction In December 2019, a new type of viral respiratory infection was recorded in Wuhan – a city in the eastern Hubei province of China. By the end of January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had confirmed that a new type of coronavirus – named 2019-nCoV or COVID-19 – had emerged and was capable of human-to-human transmission. At the start of February 2020, COVID-19 had already spread to 18 countries, infecting nearly 8000 people, leading the WHO to declare a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’. By 11 March 2020, COVID-19 had infected 118 000 and killed 4 291 people across 114 countries, and was declared a global pandemic. On the same day, the WHO Director General instructed all countries to prepare hospitals and public health infrastructure, clearly explain the risks and mechanics of transmission to the public, protect and train health workers and reduce transmission by effectively testing, tracking, tracing and isolating.1 At the time of writing, nearly 12 million people have tested positive for COVID-19 worldwide, leading to 550 000 deaths.2 Governments around the world have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by imposing restrictions on movement, banning public gatherings, closing educational institutions and imposing varying forms of quarantine or self-isolation. -
Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications
Order Code RL32272 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Updated February 11, 2005 Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Summary Russia’s then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military and civilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin’s rise to power and continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute this conflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and a presidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to the region. Since Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. Such a government will use its own forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawal of most Russian troops from the region. This “Chechenization” of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts, constitute the main elements of the Russian government’s campaign to wind down the fighting. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federal control and include rebuilding assistance and elections. -
Places of Illegal Detention
EASTERN-UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR CIVIC INITIATIVES PLACES OF ILLEGAL DETENTION IN EASTERN UKRAINE DURING THE MILITARY CONFLICT HDIM WARSAW 2016 AUTHORS Volodymyr Shcherbachenko Ganna Ianova Olexandr Pavlichenko "JUSTICE FOR PEACE IN DONBAS" COALITION The Coalition was established in December 2014 and includes 17 NGOs, mainly from the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. The Coalition members are: Alchevsk Human Rights Analytical Centre, Centre for Civil Liberties / Euromaidan SOS, Civic Organization “Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group,” Donbas SOS, Donetsk "Memorial," Eastern-Ukrainian Centre for Civic Initiatives, Ecological and Cultural Centre “Bakhmat,” Human Rights Centre “Postup” / Vostok SOS, Luhansk Regional Human Rights Centre “Alternative,” Luhansk Rights Defence Group, Public Committee for Protection of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of Citizens, Public Movement “Ochyshchennya,” Public Organization “Mirny bereg,” “Social Action” Centre NGO, Starobilsk District Public Human Rights Women’s Organization “Victoria,” Starobilsk Public Organization CONTEXT he armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine led to numerous gross and systemic violations of human rights on the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in particular the establishment of a network of illegal T detention places by Ukrainian army and Russia-backed separatists. International human rights law and international humanitarian law prohibit arbitrary detention.1 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, applicable in both international and non-international armed -
Ukraine SITREP 3-12-15 Approved
Ukraine Crisis Update: March 12, 2015 1 March 7: Multiple roadside IEDs detonated near the 6 March 10: According to the ATO press center, Cossack militants separatist-held city of Alchevsk, injuring the Cossack launched mortar strikes near Stakhanov on other separatists likely commander of the “Prizrak” (Ghost) Brigade, a unit aliated aliated with the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). e ATO with the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) which controls reported the previous day that Cossack commander and the city. A pro-Kyiv group calling itself the “Tini” (Shadows) LNR critic Pavel Dromov was preparing Partisan Detachment claimed responsibility for the attack for clashes with the LNR near Stakha- although their involvement is unconrmed. Increased nov and Antratsyt. Ukrainian military reports of separatist inghting in Luhansk Oblast and analyst Dmytro Tymchuk reported the location of Alchevsk around 40 kilometers within that the Cossacks had been defeated separatist-held territory suggest that the LNR may also LUHANSK by the LNR in Antratsyt and have staged the assassination attempt. OBLAST Krasnyi Luch and at least some units had agreed to join the LNR. 1 2 March 9: A rail bridge was blown up near the village of Orikhove. Representatives of both the Ukrainian 7 March 10: Pro-Russian Anti-Terror Operation (ATO) and the Luhansk separatists launched mortar strikes People’s Republic (LNR) acknowledged the explosion Sievierodonetsk on the villages of Lozove and and the ATO suggested that separatists were to Shchastia Luhanske. blame. Separatist sources said the destroyed rail bridge was the last connecting LNR-held territory to Ukrainian-controlled Luhansk Oblast. -
STATE of the SIVERSKYI DONETS BASIN and RELATED RISKS UNDER MILITARY OPERATIONS Technical Report
STATE OF THE SIVERSKYI DONETS BASIN AND RELATED RISKS UNDER MILITARY OPERATIONS Technical report 3 Contents INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................................................................5 BASIN, WATER USE AND CHANGES OVER THE PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES ...................................................................7 ASSESSMENT OF WATER BODIES IN THE NON-GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREAS .........................................14 SURFACE WATER STATUS AND ITS CHANGES BASED ON THE MONITORING DATA .............................................20 HAZARD AND PREDICTED CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS.......................................................................................33 FURTHER STEPS: SURFACE WATERS ................................................................................................................................39 Dedicating the monitoring system to surface water quality ......................................................................................39 Analysis of sources and consequences of human-made accidents and emergency response measures .....42 GROUNDWATER STATUS .......................................................................................................................................................44 COAL MINE FLOODING AND ITS CAUSES ..........................................................................................................................54 FURTHER STEPS: GROUNDWATERS...................................................................................................................................61 -
I Impact O T of Th Oblasts E Conf S on Th Infr Lict in He
15 September 2014 Kiev IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT IN LUHANSK AND DONETSK OBLASTS ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE SUMMARY This paper presents a summary of the damage assessment in areas affected by the armed conflict of Luhansk and Donets oblasts in the period since the beginning of the conflict until 14 September 2014. As of 14 September 2014, 1,968 facilities (including social infrastructure, residential houses, and enterprises) were reported to receive the damage, amounting to a monetary loss of total UAH 5.958 bn hryvnias, or US$ 440 mln (estimated, without account of unconfirmed damages in the residential sector, disruption of contracts, and lost profits of business enterprises). Among those reported 995 facilities are located in Luhansk oblast (UAH 1.094 million), and 783 facilities are in Donetsk oblast (UAH 3.964 billion). 190 facilities, with an estimated loss of UAH 900 m, belong to railway infrastructure situated in the territory of both oblasts. As can be seen in the consolidated table (page 6 and 7), 1230 housing buildings were damaged (667 in Luhansk and 563 in Donetsk oblasts), and this affected the shelter of 6,618 families (including 1,844 in Luhansk oblast and 4,774 in Donetsk oblast). Due to different limitations in determining the exact number of affected families, the real number of affected families is, most likely, of a greater scale than presented in this report. Indirectly (by worsened access to public services) the conflict in Donbass affected the majority of the 6,6 million population of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. It is worth noting, that the report indicates another 1873 housing buildings damaged during the conflict, however no verification (geographical/address localization) was possible by the team of data collectors, and this number remained outside the main analysis in this paper. -
WASH Cluster Ukraine Alert Bulletin
WASH Cluster Ukraine Alert Bulletin 01 November - 31 December 2017 Issue 12 WASH Cluster Coordinator OVERALL INCIDENTS ANALYSIS FOR 2017: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS Mark Buttle [email protected] In 2017 the WASH Cluster recorded 1351 separate incidents in total, each of which put at risk the water supply or sanitation to 4.8 million people served by centralized systems in conflict-affected Eastern Ukraine, with almost WASH Cluster IMOs: 60% occurring in the first 6 months. Volodymyr Kalinin Donetsk oblast experienced 116 incidents: 14 in Government Controlled Areas (GCA) and 102 in Non-Government [email protected] Controlled Areas (NGCA). In Luhansk oblast there were only 19 incidents: 17 in GCA areas and only 2 in NGCA areas. This is not to say Luhansk was less affected: a single incident near Popasna, in April, cut water for around Stas Dymkovskyy 180,000 people for 27 consecutive days. The WASH Cluster notes that people were almost always affected on [email protected] both sides of the Line of the Contact for most incidents. In the overview, all months were different, however there were three main periods of increased activity, when there was heavy shelling around critical water infrastructure along the Line of Contact: February and March; May KEY FACTS to July; and December (see below). Ceasefires were effective only for relatively short-time periods. 135 is the total number of WASH Incidents and their effect, 2017 Of the 135 incidents, WASH incidents since the start 25 7,000,000 of 2017. water infrastructure was damaged or 6,000,000 Geographical breakdown of stopped due to explo- incidents by oblast and by gov- 20 sive risk 80 times; and ernment controlled versus non- 5,000,000 electricity cuts due to government controlled areas: shelling affected water 15 Donetsk Luhansk Total 4,000,000 supply another 46 times.