Summer I99Z

fwM ill i V* : )f $*<•• W& '• •<%> MflkS■ >*vr* Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Ervin C. Sharpe, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor M a r v i n VV. B a s s e t t , Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong. Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1992, Vol. VI, No. 2 AFRP 50-2

Editorial . 2

Roots and Wings: A Perspective on Reorganization Gen Russell E. Dougherty, USAF, Retired 4

In the Loop: Superiority in Command and Control 1st Lt Gary A. Vincent, USAF 15

Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, USAF, Retired 26

Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in the Korean War Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF 37

Assured Access to Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and Launch-on-Demand Capt Lawrence A. Cooper, USAF 47

Jointness: The Fundamental Problem A Review of Joint Pub 1 Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF 58

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 71 Notams Notices of Interest 93 Contributors 95 We make business decisions with our EDITORIAL heads; logic, thought, and pros and cons are involved in the process. But there are other, less tangible factors involved. What makes this decision so difficult for many A Terrible Choice of us is not the loss of benefits such as the Big BX or the 20-year retirement package. That’s not why we joined and stayed all of VER THE PAST couple of months, these years. Culturally, the Air Force has thousands of us bluesuiters have had been just too damn neat for some of us to toO make what for many amounts to a ter- want to voluntarily jump from what seems rible choice. We must either accept an to be a perfectly good airplane. Many of us attractive separation bonus and leave the will prefer to wait it out and hope that a Air Force for good, or stay in, leave the KC-135 appears before the gas runs out. separation decision to a possible reduction As of this writing, there is still time for in force (RIF) board, and—if RIFed— us to ponder the choice between leaving accept a smaller severance payment. now or taking a pretty big (expensive) From a business standpoint, it may chance on the results of a RIF board. For make sense to accept the separation bonus those of you who, like me, are extremely and leave the service. Think rationally vulnerable to forced separation and hap- about it, and ask yourself some important pen to enjoy the Air Force, D day questions. How good are my records (not approaches. In mid-March, I’m reminded me, but my records)? How valuable is my of the words of a gruff colonel who, after AFSC to the Air Force? How many years listening to an exasperated lieutenant do I have invested? Perhaps most impor- describe his hectic schedule, replied, tantly, How many of my peers have taken “Good! Helps build character!” I’ve had the separation package? and. How do the my dose of character the past couple of numbers look? months. Only after all the facts are in, after By the time this is printed, the choices you’ve talked with your supervisor, will have been made and the die cast. The coworkers, and family, and the options are larger issue, then, is the excruciating deci- clearly before you, do you go to the per- sions that must be made by both the indi- sonnel office and ask for the paperwork. vidual and the institution as we draw Yes, you can rationalize the decision from down for the first time in the truly all- a business standpoint. After all. the num- volunteer force. Perhaps these decisions bers just ain’t there. Ninety-five percent of are just the first pains in the process of your year group may get whacked by a RIF birthing an Air Force for the new world we board. The choice is clear. live in. JJD

HOW ARE WE DOING? We need to know how you feel about the Airpower Journal. We are genuinely interested in providing you. the reader, as well as the Air Force, the best possible professional journal, it is, after all, your journal. In that spirit, we have provided a tear-out readership survey ju st inside the back cover. Please take a few minutes to complete it and return it to us. (We’ll pay the postage.) It will help us further define the focus and scope of the Journal. and it will help us determine how well we are reaching our target audience. Thanks for your help. The Editor

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre­ It was my privilege to serve on a special spondence should be addressed to the Editor, study group looking at our doctrine while I was Airpovver Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, a student at Air War College (AWC). Inter- Maxwell AFB AL 36112—5532. We r es er ve the estingly enough, the team I was on concluded right to edit the material for overall length. that our "old” doctrine was actually pretty good. Indeed, the now-famous air campaign of Operation Desert Storm appeared to follow’ the AIR POWER VINDICATED tenets of chapter 2 very well! Specifically, para- graph 2-7's ‘‘Broad Plan of Employment” The article by Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt explains how' to conduct simultaneous strategic Col Charles M. Westenhoff ("Air Power Think and tactical actions after gaining air superiority. ing: Request Unrestricted Climb' ”) in your Under "Attack an Enemy's Warfighting Poten- Fall 1991 issue was excellent. High-tech air tial,” we find, inter alia, explanations of the power was certainly vindicated in the Gulf war, "how” and “why" of relentlessly attacking an as were the many hard battles in the Pentagon enemy in depth, planning/coordinating inter- and on the Hill to get the equipment and the diction with surface forces, and constantly weapons the Air Force needed to fulfill its assessing the battlefield situation (pages 2-13 promise. through 2-15). There is also a now-obvious The authors quote Alfred the Great on good reminder that "close support can create oppor- fortune, but he also noted that success breeds tunities, protect maneuver, and defend land arrogance; we learn by our failures. In our pres- forces." Additionally, the “old 1-1" emphasizes ent euphoria, we should remember that many seizing the initiative w’ith a flexibly structured of the key systems which vindicated them- force to compel the enemy to react. That is just selves in the Gulf overcame hard times—from what we did in Iraq. Congress, the administration, and the operators While not meaning to offend the rated themselves—before they could be fielded. I force—and General Boyd in particular—1 hope refer to the E-3, A-10, F-16, and joint sur- the first volume of the draft AFM 1-1 is not, as veillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) he characterized it, a "summation of Air Force inter alia. Among weapons, the Paveway series thinking” (page 4). It certainly is "bare bones” is a great example. Paveway I was unwelcome and the format is definitely easy to read, but it in Vietnam until it showed its prowess. Pave- neglects any significant mention of the role of way III was cancelled by Secretary of the Air leadership. In fairness, chapters 3 and 4 do talk Force Verne Orr in the eighties. Now it’s back about several important things commanders do. in production. Fortunately, even though we How'ever, the 1984 version at least explains that have been late and overpriced, we seem to be "command is the exercise of leadership and the best in the world anyway. power of decision” (page 1-4), w'hile mention- Maj Gen J. C. Toomay, USAF. Retired ing leadership another 15 times in the text and Carlsbad, California two more times in annex A. The draft, on the other hand, uses the term only four times, and three of those deal with the enemy! Nonethe- less, both the old and new versions lack the LEADERSHIP AND DOCTRINE punch of AFM 1-10, Combat Support Doctrine, I want to thank Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt when defining and explaining leadership. Col Charles M. Westenhoff for bringing our Our curriculum at AWC provided the oppor- attention back to basics in their Fall 1991 arti- tunity to read AFM 1-10. In my opinion, that cle, ‘‘Air Power Thinking: Request Unre- short document contains some of the best offi- stricted Climb’.” At the same time, I would like cial comments on leadership that I have to offer some observations about the draft of the encountered in over 21 years. Unfortunately, first of the two volumes scheduled to replace many of my rated classmates admitted they the 1984 version of AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. continued on page 63

3 ROOTS AND WINGS A PERSPECTIVE ON REORGANIZATION

G en Russel l E. Dougherty, USAF, Ret ired

Adapted from remarks to the Tactical Air Command Commanders Conference, 8 October 1991.

IR FORCE people are standing on the threshold of another great period of readjustment that will better serve the nation and make A this one of the most exciting times to serve. Readjustment, retrenchment, and reorganization are the order of the day, and Air Force people are in on the begin- ning of the development of new ways to put together the capabilities of the Air Force to make them even more effective. I am an advocate of the Air Force, but I’m not a blind advocate of any particular organization within the Air Force. I do not think internal Air Force organizations are institutions in their own right. Organiza- tions must be designed to serve a purpose ROOTS AND WINGS 5

or address a need. The Air Force is the ing circumstances, why it is important to overarching institution; how it is or- not resist provisions of command structure ganized internally depends on the circum- and internal organization, and what histor- stances and objectives of our nation. It ical events led to the shape of today’s Air depends on what we have to do and the Force. framework in which we must do it. It has The Air Force is a creation of this cen- always been that way. tury. By and large, aviation technology is The restructure of Strategic Air Com- only 75 or 80 years old, with the modern mand (SAC), Tactical Air Command Air Force less than 50 years old. Some of (TAC), and Military Airlift Command those early years in the Air Force were (MAC) is an example of reorganization to taken up with learning to fly, trying to serve the requirements of the time. I keep alive, and discovering the pos- served in SAC many years. Its passing is sibilities of military aviation. intensely nostalgic. It was a truly great The service is still so young we can see organization of people, spirit, and mission. our traditions aborning. We can reach out I am proud of every day I spent there and and touch our roots. I and my contempo- of the people of the command. Adm raries know Gen James H. Doolittle and Thomas H. Moorer, former chairman of the Gen Elwood R. (“Pete”) Quesada. We Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was right when knew generals like H. H. (“Hap”) Arnold, he told an international military audience Curtis E. LeMay, Lauris Norstad, Ira C. in 1971, “SAC enjoys worldwide the repu- Eaker, Haywood S. (“Possum”) Hansell, tation of being the ultimate in profession- and many others who formed the roots of alism and in readiness, and it has set the the Air Force. Unlike the other services, standard for all the military organizations we could reach out and touch our “roots,” of the world.”1 have first-person, face-to-face experiences But I am not going to wail and wring my with them, know what they did, and how hands because of SAC’s disestablishment. they thought. SAC has served us well; it did something From my conversations with him, I can that had to be done. We conducted a cold still hear General Eaker say, war for 40 years and won it. It is necessary now to reorganize to take advantage of vic- tory and handle the future objectives of the Beware of permitting the “corps concept” to nation. So SAC, TAC, and MAC are being get into the Air Force. Don’t let that happen to us—resist it at every turn! The “corps” phased into a more relevant command begins to develop its own raison d’etre. It structure. builds resistance to change. It exists to pro- Since this is a time of great change for tect and preserve "the corps.’’ Yet the corps our nation’s military, it is useful to reflect is only an organization, not an institution. It on why organizations must adapt to chang- should be flexible.2 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

I think General Eaker was adamantly some global instincts, though not yet opposed to our losing flexibility and global capabilities. Global power projec- becoming committed to any particular tion was emerging, but we could not yet organization. get there except through leapfrogging. To me. the “ roots” we have are Air Our nation’s political perceptions were Force roots—not organizational roots. The beginning to change. We had expanding important heritage of our short Air Force national horizons. We had begun to see existence is the ability to change and to that our security and future prosperity adapt to circumstances. We have adapt- were going to lie in international ability with our equipment, with our train- involvement. ing, and with our tactics and our or- Threat changes were paralleled by ganizations. Our service should not permit changes in our industrial base for produc- its internal organizational structure to tion of the instruments of the aerospace become so institutionalized that these age. We had come from being a stop- organizations take on inviolable lives of making- plows-and-start-making-tanks their own. We must not let those who country to one with a defense industry. would resist change cause us to abdicate We could no longer get by with industries the Air Force traditions of adaptability and that stopped making firecrackers and bak- flexibility. ing powder to start making gun powder The chief of staff and the secretary of the and explosives. We were developing an Air Force have set the stage for our inter- aerospace industry. Finally, and of great nal Air Force reorganization. Secretary of significance, was an awakening of the con- the Air Force Donald B. Rice has noted ceptual changes that air power had made that the Air Force is a service born of in the ability of a nation to attack, to pro- change, and he is exactly right. We were ject power, to deter attack, and to make born of change, of controversy, of endless obsolete many of the early forms of de- vigilance by prescient forefathers to pre- fense. That was the environment in which vent our new technology—the technology our fledgling air forces were born. And it of aerospace—from becoming subsumed in was in my lifetime and that of many others the existing “institutions” of other times alive today! and other technologies. When Lew Allen was leaving as chief of The National Security Act of 1947 staff, I was running the Air Force Associa- brought a major change in the structure of tion staff and I asked him, “Chief, do you our nation’s military. The Air Force was have any parting advice for your Air Force created because brave people recognized Association?” He said, “Make sure our the need for change; they recognized the people understand the unique aspect of air tremendous potential of our new technol- power.” ogy. That recognition, that milieu, that I said, “Yes, sir. Chief, you can bet that’s controversy, is worth considering since what we’ll do.” On the way back to the stewardship in the future can hinge on office I asked myself, scratching my head, how well we understand the past. “What in the hell is the unique aspect of We were spawned by dramatic political air power?” I felt just like George Brown change. Our nation was coming out of an when he went over to the Senate for con- isolationist period. We had reluctantly firmation as the chief of staff for the Air gone into Europe for the second time in Force. On that occasion, we worked for two decades. Only after a sneak attack did three or four days giving George all sorts of we reluctantly focus on the necessity to “skull sessions” and all sorts of data col- destroy Japan’s military elite. lections. He had books all tabbed and Technological change was coming along filled with figures and facts. Lo and be- so fast we had to organize to handle and hold, the first question he got from the channel it. We were beginning to have committee was, “General, why do we need HOOTS AND WINGS 7

an Air Force?” George said to us later, ‘‘I As slated by the author, the Air Force s relative youth has was completely unprepared to answer that allowed many o f today's flag officers to “reach out and touch their roots" by interacting with the likes o f generals question!” Hansell. Quesada. and LeMay. Here. General LeMay talks What is the unique aspect of aerospace to students during a break at the Joint Flag Officer power? My answer: “Access.” Aerospace Warfighting Course at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1988. A power provides unlimited access to this regular guest o f the course, his final visit occurred the week world and, to an increasing degree, access before his passing in October 1990. out of this world. Access for whatever purpose—for offense or defense, for infor- In 1945 President Harry S Truman sent a mation and intelligence, for political pur- message to Congress outlining his ideas poses, for psychological purposes, for about the post-World War II military. He exploration, for whatever is in our nation’s suggested a separate air force and advised interests. Access. Congress to start now legislating for a com- What we can offer the president, the bined War and Navy Department, with National Security Council, or our combat- unified direction of land, sea, and air ant commanders is the ability to “access.” forces; a “comparatively small regular We can demonstrate how those com- Army, Navy and Marine Corps—a cadre- manders can best use that access and what type regular service,” with a separate air it can accomplish: Global Reach and force. Then he wanted to have a greatly Global Power—the strategic vision estab- strengthened and enlarged National Guard lished for the Air Force by Secretary Don and organized Reserve. He recommended Rice. the creation of a large general reserve of As for the question, Why do we need an trained men who have completed a course Air Force? go back to the environment of in universal military training (UMT).3 change in which this Air Force was born. UMT was a hot potato that sent Congress Just as the recent focus has been on organi- into a real spin. It became a rallying cry for zation, so the Congress was focused on everybody who wanted to defuse any ini- military reorganization at the end of World tiatives to create an air force. In effect, they War II. advocated focusing on UMT and forgoing 8 AJRPOIVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Secretary o f Defense Janies Forrestal liosted the Newport atomic bomb, many felt that airpower was Conference, where the services formulated a compromise to destined to become the decisive weapon of the contentious Key West Agreement on roles and missions. the future. Since 1919 most Army airmen had Participants included, left to right. Lt Gen Lauris Norstad. championed the cause of a totally separate air USAF; Gen Hoyt S. Vandenherg. USAF: Lt Gen Albert C. department, co-equal with the Army/Navy, as Wedemeyer. USA: Gen Omar N. Bradley. USA: Forrestal. the best means for exploiting the full Adm Louis E. Denfield. USN; Vice Adm Arthur W. Radford. potential.'4 USN: and Maj Gen Alfred M. Gruenther. USA. Noteworthy is the fact that Congress had the military reorganization to create an air considered over 50 bills between 1919 and force. But the proponents of a separate air 1945, all designed to reorganize the mili- force prevailed, so Congress delayed tary and most to provide the Air Force action on the proposed UMT and reserve some breathing room.5 forces, supporting the ground swell for About this time, the Army came out broader reorganization, fanned and fueled with a philosophical position paper on by the champions of a separate air force. how it would develop the defense es- The military history of this period, as tablishment into one department, a single recorded in the history of the Office of the civilian secretary, a single military com- Secretary of Defense, helps us know how mander (or chief of staff), a single military we got here: high command, and unified service branches for air, sea. and ground warfare. Although many factors militated in favor of The Navy took exception to this. Finding post-war Service reorganization, none cap- the plan to be a challenge to its existence, tured the public imagination quite so the Navy created an immediate buffer. The strongly as the coming of age of airpower. buffer recommended working defense mat- From the beginning of the war, the aircraft ters through agencies and cooperative ven- carrier replaced the battleship as the Navy's tures. The services and military depart- primary offensive weapon while the enor- mously expanded Army Air Forces became a ments would remain separate, but would near autonomous service overshadowing “cooperate” with each other on a range of both the Army ground forces and the Army tasks. service forces. And with the advent of the This significant “exchange of service HOOTS AND WINGS 9 views” started the battle that culminated refused the job, and the president turned with the National Security Act of 1947, to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, who popularly called the Unification Act, that was confirmed that day by voice vote in created the United States Air Force. The the Senate.8 act was signed on 26 July 1947, and the Forrestal very rapidly changed his Navy- Air Force’s birthday came on 18 Septem- oriented views and, to a great degree, ber 1947, when the act became effective. began to support the actions needed for But things did not end there. unification. He had no luck with his Navy. Other things were happening that would Norstad was again brought back in and affect the Air Force’s future. The principal teamed this time with Adm Forrest Sher- service-level controversy was the one over man. Again these great men tackled roles the roles and missions of the service chiefs and missions. At the time, the president’s and service forces. The decisions on roles disputed executive order (EO 9877) on and missions gave metes and bounds to roles and missions was still on the books, the new Air Force and serious heartburn to with the Navy openly irritated and ada- the other services, particularly the Navy. mantly opposed to the Air Force role in Seeing this confrontation coming, two very certain naval aviation matters.9 important men took on the job of sorting The debate got so heated that President out the thorns and stickers: Maj Gen Lauris Truman rescinded Executive Order 9877 Norstad of the Air Force and Vice Adm and told Secretary Forrestal to issue the Arthur W. Radford of the Navy. They tried “Functions” directive himself.10 Secretary to work out an arrangement that could be Forrestal took all the joint chiefs down to agreed to, but without success. Key West, Florida, for a four-day retreat. President Truman himself then took a This produced the famous Key West agree- hand in the matter, and lit right into one of ment on roles and missions. But, in fact, the big arguments: whether the Navy could out of the Key West agreement came possess land-based air for naval reconnais- another heated debate. So a second retreat sance, antisubmarine warfare, and protec- was set up in Newport, Rhode Island, tion of shipping. In a letter to Secretary of where a shaky compromise was worked the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of out. War John Patterson, the president said that While all this legislative maneuvering such planes “should be manned by Air was under way, the Air Force groundwork Force personnel!”6 That presidential posi- being laid, and the roles and missions fight tion sent the Navy through the overhead. placed on the table, several commands had After the president sent this letter, he been established in 1946 as internal orga- sent a similar letter to the Senate and nizations of the Army Air Forces: Strategic House committees on Military and Naval Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air Affairs. This letter reiterated his version of Defense Command (ADC), and Air Trans- the roles and missions of the services, port Command (ATC). including his view that land-based planes Importantly, when the Air Force was for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine created, the chief of staff of the Air Force warfare, and protection of shipping “can was designated by law as the commander and should be manned by Air Force of all Air Force forces. In a couple of years, personnel.”7 specific language in legislation, using com- After the unification legislation was mand names, placed SAC, TAC, ATC, and passed, Forrestal was made the first secre- the other major operational organizations tary of defense. As a footnote, Forrestal of the Air Force under his overall com- was the president's second choice for sec- mand, with other Air Force organizations retary of defense. His first choice was Pat- under his “supervision.” The chief of staff terson, then secretary of war, a jurist with was the commander of all Air Force com- the Silver Star with oak leaf cluster,and a batant forces; he was the Air Force’s opera- thoroughly respected man. Patterson tional force commander. 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

On 18 November 1952, Secretary of operations— This separation is clearly Defense Robert A. Lovett wrote the presi- incompatible with unified commands whose dent a letter. His key thoughts were as missions and weapon systems go far beyond the concepts and traditions of individual follows: Services__ The organizations of the Army, the Navy, and I recommend, therefore, that present law, the Air Force are all different. The respon- including certain restrictions relating to com- sibilities and authorities of the Chiefs of Staff batant functions, be so amended as to remove of the three services differ. Their present any possible obstacles to the full unity of our organizations follow a preunification pattern Commands and the full command over them and some parts are fixed by law while others by unified commanders.12 are not.11 President Eisenhower then forwarded a He concluded that this was an unsatisfac- draft bill to do what he recommended. It tory and unworkable situation. Lovett rec- was no surprise that once the Congress ommended a thorough functional and took the command relationship bit in its organizational study of the Department of teeth, the fire and fury raged. Only the role Defense. and stature of Eisenhower as commander President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who in chief and president kept the debate lim- well knew how things were, echoed Secre- ited to a few months. Most of his recom- tary Lovett’s dissatisfaction and, with his mendations became law in the Defense impeccable credentials in the defense area, Reorganization Act of 1958. dealt a personal hand. He convened the This legislation modified and repealed Rockefeller Commission and in early 1958 the overall command authorities of the sent Congress a most important message. chiefs of the services over their combatant In part, he said, forces. The chief of staff of the Air Force no longer had command of Air Force oper- We must organize our fighting forces into ational forces. His new role was extensive operational commands that are truly unified, and vital, but generally one of supervision each assigned a mission in full accord with over the preparation and equipping of Air our overall military objectives of the United Force forces to conduct their missions States__ under the various combatant commanders I intend that, subject only to exceptions per- in chief (CINC). sonally approved by the Commander in The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 Chief, all of our operational forces be said the Air Force shall be divided into organized into truly unified commands. Such such organizations as the secretary may commands will be established at my prescribe to carry out his responsibilities, direction__ including aviation forces, both combat and Each unified commander must have unques- service. The command of all the opera- tioned authority over all units of his com- tional forces, however, was to be assigned mand. Forces must be assigned to the com- mand and removed only by central to the CINCs. This was to be done an- direction—by the Secretary of Defense or the nually through the JCS Force Assignments Commander in Chief—and not by orders of Paper, which was to be approved by the individual military departments. secretary of defense. But things were not Commands of this kind we do not have as “clean” as they sounded. today. To the extent that we are unable to DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the organize them under present law, to that Department of Defense and Its Major Com- extent we cannot fully marshal our armed ponents, of 31 December 1958 was the strength. “mother” of all DOD reorganization plans. We must recognize that by law our military It revised and articulated the functions, organization still reflects the traditional con- roles, and missions of the services and the cepts of separate forces for land, sea, and air department. It is in this significant direc- ROOTS AND WINGS 11

tive that the service tasks to “organize, train, and equip” are found. So here we were, in the never-never land of 1959, where the chief had many of the residual trappings of command and almost all the real sinews of command but was no longer the force commander of the operational Air Force forces. We had a rudimentary unified and specified command structure, but nobody paid much attention to it in practice. The service chiefs still ran their forces through the service component commands without much, if any, CINC involvement. It was my observation that, by and large, we lived with some fragments of this arrangement for the next 17-plus years, until 1986. A lot of things that we did did not work very well, in part because the law' said, "This is the way it’s supposed to be,” and we were just not doing it that way. At times some practices had to ignore the legal command arrangements. It just did not work well. I recall that one day Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. McConnell, who had just returned from Southeast Asia, tacked a Many in the service were slow to fully appreciate or sign up on the door of his office. I think he understand the changes in command relationships dictated picked up the sign from one of the squad- by the Defense Reorganization Act o f 1958. While catchy, rons in Thailand—the 388th or “Triple the legendary “fly and fight" slogan misrepresented the real mission o f the A irforce, which, per DOD Directive 5100.1, Nickel,” or some such. It said, “The mis- was to organize, train, and equip the airforces assigned to sion of this outfit is to fly and fight—and the CINCs. don’t you forget it!” Over the sign the chief wrote, “The mission of the Air Force is to fly and fight—and don’t you forget it!” I said one day, in a not very discreet units of the CINCs and fly and fight and do environment I suppose, “I don’t think that it better than anyone else. is the primary mission of the Air Force. I You can imagine that this irreverent think it used to be the mission of the Air observation of mine started a big brouha- Force, but it was changed in 1958, and ha, but it also caused some people to think we haven’t yet recognized that it has about what had changed. The command changed." role of the chief of staff had changed dra- The “fly and fight” imperative was the matically. The Defense Reorganization Act mission of that combat squadron and all of 1958 had made major differences in the its people. Also, I think “fly and fight” command lines of combatant forces. was included in the combatant mission of Shortly thereafter we changed the name of Pacific Command (PACOM) and Pacific the place in the basement of the Pentagon Air Forces (PACAF), but it was not our from the Air Force “Command Post” to the service mission in the Air Force. The Air Air Force “Operations Center.” We were Force mission was to organize, procure, beginning to see the light. train, equip, motivate, and support those There’s a lot more light now. In fact, a forces to go out there in the combatant brilliant congressional spotlight was 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

turned on this command relationship by • Forward presence in the Pacific areas, the Department of Defense Reorganization with primarily maritime and mobile forces Act of 1986, or the Goldwater-Nichols Act. deployed over vast areas. To a great degree, this legislation put those • Contingency forces for crisis response, legislated command relationships in con- formed from service forces postured and text and demanded we get with it. In this equipped in the continental United States, act, Congress beefed up the responsi- and from reconstituted forces, to support bilities and authority of the chairman of the area commands, or to conduct con- the JCS and the CINCs to a degree they tingency operations in their own right, at never had before. The CINCs were given any time and place required, with what- authority to fire and hire, and even to ever forces are required to prevail. require their component commanders to • Strategic forces, consolidated under report “through” them if they chose. They the operational command and control of could even require info copies of all the the new CINC, US Strategic Command, correspondence between the services and with assigned Navy and Air Force nuclear- the components, if they chose. The CINCs capable forces.13 were given the ability and authority to direct and influence some unit training, To a great degree, we are at the point inspection, disposition, and equipping of that Napoleon’s maxims would advise, the service forces under their operational “He who hazards nothing, gains nothing,” command. Goldwater-Nichols goes far or as some of our pilots say, “No guts, no toward combining combatant command glory.” We have an opportunity to get out authority with mission responsibility, but in front and organize the Air Force so that the understanding of our law is still we fit into the forthcoming unified com- incomplete and unenthusiastic. mand organizations. If I could offer some We must do better. These legislative dic- advice from over the years, it would be to tates are a fact of life. If we don’t live with “make sure we get all of our operational them, we are going to be out of tune with forces tucked in under the proper unified Congress and at odds with the way Con- or specified command structure and train gress has directed the forces of the United together as we plan to fight together.” I States to be deployed and commanded in hope the commander of Air Combat Com- combat. mand can become a CINC in the unified We must organize as we are going to command structure—possibly of a unified fight. We need to develop first-rate, re- US Combat Command, or the CINC of the sponsible Air Force organizations that air component of a unified US Combat work with and support the combatant Command. commanders of the United States with the Joint force employment is a hallmark of best we can'give them. And we must start our times. It is a dictate of our Congress, it now to train our top people to function makes sense, and it is the right thing to do. well as the CINCs and senior staff officers This nation is not an island: it lives in the of such commands. world. Our services cannot survive alone, Though we still cannot see the entire and certainly they cannot fight alone in all construct that is emerging, the president’s the circumstances we may face. We must most recent national military strategy do a better job of putting them together. By (1991) is divided conceptually into four the same token, our nation cannot fight force packages: alone in all the circumstances we must envision. International involvement is a • Forward presence in the Atlantic sine qua non of our times, and this will areas, including a European forward pres- continue. ence, not as heavy as it is now but with Joint military employment is an absolute staying power. requirement of successful military opera- HOOTS AND WINGS 13 tions. Be good at it. If we are to be best qualified for the key responsibilities in joint operations, our best people need to be trained and prepared in our own equip- ment. They need to move through the experience wickets and qualify for the jobs with international military organizations, for the top joint jobs, for the CINCs’ jobs. That way we make sure air power is effec- tively employed. Show me some joint commanders or senior joint staff officers who don’t understand well their own ser- vice equipment and employment doc- trine, and I’ll show you some “losers." The Air Force Times had an editorial in the Fall 1991 issue concerning Air Force reorganization. The editorial postulated. What would LeMay think about all this? Well, we don’t know—he’s not with us— Ay part of SAC's stand-down from alert, a weapons load but I worked for the revered "old man" team chief downloads air-launched cruise missiles from a long enough to venture a guess as to what B-52 at Fairchild AFB's 92d Bombardment Wing. General LeMay might say about the recent reorganization. He’d say. What took you so long? Great Captains for more on what was hap- He’d say, We’ve been down a road like pening in our formative years; and The this before; don’t hesitate to get started and Warlords; Military Commanders of the don’t be grit in the chief’s machinery. 1 Twentieth Century for insights into an think he would be sure to say. Minimize essential aspect of World War II air the number of higher headquarters, be- power—flexibility to adapt.14 cause I hate all higher headquarters. That All of us are products of our own times disdain for paper-pushing headquarters and our own experiences. Too often we was a principle he often shared. accept as truth only those wisdoms that He would say, Organize to ensure unity our experience validates as being true. 1 of command in peace and in war, under would encourage Air Force people, as they whatever command structure makes sense. put together different people and things in Make sure you have unity of command, new organizational structures, to recognize and make sure you practice it. Finally, that they will not have had an opportunity General LeMay would say. Train like to experience all the things their col- you're gonna fight. leagues have. They will not be able to vali- We have been down this road before. date by their own experience all of the For instance, at Langley Field, Virginia, in truths others have validated by theirs, so the mid-1930s, there was a "General Head- listen and share. quarters Air Force," which was, in effect, These new colleagues must learn to an Air Force combat command. At one work together, to respect each other’s time, it was under Gen Frank M. Andrews, truths. They’ll have to grow in the ability with headquarters at Langley, and it was to plan, to conceive tactics, to apply air the centrally controlled combat command power, to ensure unity of air power, and to of the Army Air Forces during that time. make sure air power is not fractured or Incidentally, Curtis LeMay, as a first lieu- misunderstood. Let’s trust each other- tenant. was the lead navigator/bombardier let’s don’t have a rivalry within the Air of this command! I suggest the book A Few Force like the one between Auburn and 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Alabama. It’s too important to be torn I thought about that advice all night. But you apart by schisms. If we can interact in know Dad, you were a bomber and tanker good spirit, with honest motives, Air Com- pilot all your life ... so you’ve got an awful bat Command and Air Mobility Command lot to be modest about! will be vital forces for ensuring the proper Then he added, use of air power under every situation, with rapid application. We already have But, Dad, sitting here where I am, surrounded the very best, balanced, and experienced by all of these gurus of the profession, at the people that the world has ever seen. Let’s top rung of the fighter pilot ladder ... Hat in the Ring ... 27th Fighter, oldest squadron in make them better. the Air Force ... Langley ... gad, Dad, it’s As we become smaller (and we must), hard to be modest when you’re at the top of let’s make sure those left are the best—and the world! that they are the best-equipped, best- motivated, and best-led warriors in the Share your expertise, your good will, world. and capability with all your new col- A light note of personal counsel—and a leagues—but be modest in the doing. The wonderful memory—in closing. When my guy down at Seymour Johnson who runs son Bryant was promoted to lieutenant those KC-lOs, that bomb squadron com- colonel. I went to the 1st Tactical Fighter mander at Grand Forks, or that Security Wing for the pinning. When it came time Police commander at Loring is damn for Bryant to talk, he looked over at me proud of his or her outfit, too. And those and said, missile crews are proud of their skills and their mission—justifiably proud—and so it Dad called me last night and said, “Son, goes all the way through our Air Force. you're going to be promoted tomorrow to In fact, none of us are going anywhere if lieutenant colonel. I've got some advice for the airmen assigned to pull our chocks you." I asked him, “What is it, Dad?” and don’t do their job! Be proud of the entire Dad said, “Son, it’s time for you to become more modest.” Air Force; treat it with loving respect as you go about putting it together in a new Bryant continued, package—and have fun doing it! □

Notes 1. Closing remarks by Adm Thomas H. Moorer at the Air 9. Executive Order 9877. Functions of the Armed Services, Force Association/SAC Symposium. Orlando. Florida, 16 26 July 1947, was signed by President Truman on the same December 1971. date, and at the same time he signed the National Security 2. Gen Ira C. Eaker, USAF, Retired, personal conversation Act of 1947. with author, c. 1976. 10. Richard I. Wolf, The United States Air Force: Basic 3. Alice C. Cole et al.. The Department of Defense: Docu- Documents on Roles and Missions (Washington, D.C.: Office ments on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 of Air Force History. 1987), 154. (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense History 11. Cole, 124. Office. 1978). 7; Steven L. Rearden. History of the Office of 12. ibid.. 179-80. the Secretary of Defense, vol. 1. The Formative Years, 1947- 13. President George Bush. National Security Strategy of 1950 (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense the United States (Washington, D.C.: The W^hite House. History Office, 1984), 14. August 1991). 4. Rearden. 18. 14. Dewitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and 5. Ibid.. 17. Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power 6. Cole. 26-28. (Garden City. N. Y.: Doubleday, 1980): Field Marshal Sir 7. Ibid.. 30. Michael Carver, ed.. The War Lords: Military Commanders of 8. Rearden. 29—30. the Twentieth Century (Boston: Little, Brown. 1976). IN THE LOOP SUPERIORITY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL

1 st Lt Gary A. Vin c en t , USAF

N THE coming years of military draw- downs, there will be much talk of “doing more with less” and "fighting smarter.” If the quantity of our fire- I power is to shrink, then the quality of its application assumes paramount impor- tance. Applying firepower against an enemy in the proper place in space and time is the function of command, control, and communications (C3). As the war against Iraq graphically demonstrated, the side that cannot properly wield its forces will succumb to the side that can, and the results will be the same regardless of the numbers involved. It may well be in the future that we speak of C3 superiority in the same way we now speak of air superi- ority, as something mandatory for success in other areas. As we shall see, the two concepts are closely related. What we seek is an outline for command and control (C2) superiority because communications is 16 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 simply the technical means for command culation and the nerves of an army. In the and control. Basically, the C2 structure days of “classical” C2 (before telegraphs or “provides commanders with the status and radios), the two systems were one and the capabilities of both friendly and enemy same, hence the virtually synonymous use forces and allows a commander to direct of the terms line of supply and line of an air effort knowledgeably and effi- communication.3 Success against these ciently.’’1 We look for a program of assail- lines was quicker although somewhat ing enemy C2 from all sides while reversible. Modern technology, however, protecting our own, a doctrine that com- has placed an interesting limitation on bines the ideas of electronic combat, cam- maneuver. When the radio replaced the ouflage, deception, stealth, and mobility. telegraph, it became possible for units to We shall examine in better detail how C2 be logistically cut off but still able to com- fits into the overall scheme of military municate with the main body. Until those operations and then move on to examine units ran out of supplies, they could still C2 and its components. By studying the be effectively controlled by the overall pieces and how they best fit, we can inte- commander. The lines of communication grate them in a way to best ensure success now ran through the radio waves instead over an opponent. of along the ground with supplies. Thus, classic maneuver became an attack mainly upon logistics. If the enemy nervous system can no Where It Fits longer be attacked through maneuver, then Like most things, this goal is easier it can be attacked separately and directly stated than achieved, and getting to the by two newer weapons—the aircraft and essence of C2 is easier done if we can see electronic combat (EC). An attack directly its place in the larger military whole. To upon the C2 system produces the quickest do this, we will use a biological analogy and most short-lived effect—paralysis. It is implicit in much of our military thinking important to note that the effect is transi- but seldom explicitly stated. Carl von tory. If an attack is not sustained, the Clausewitz tells us that “war is no activity enemy will soon regain control of his of the will, which exerts itself upon inani- forces, be a little wiser for his troubles, mate matter ... but against a living and and be harder to knock off balance later. reacting force.”2 Let’s take this idea a step Therefore, if we have temporarily para- further; let’s say the enemy is not simply lyzed our enemy, we have three choices: living and reacting but his armed forces (1) continue to attack his C2, (2) shift our are also structured like a biological organ- efforts to attack combat units, or (3) attack ism. Combat units, logistics, and C2 are the his logistics. Often, all three are combined. labels we will use instead of muscular, cir- Air Force doctrine separates attacks on culatory, and nervous systems. combat units (close air support) from With this biological analogy in mind, we attacks on targets in the rear (air interdic- can compare the two traditional models of tion). However, targets in the rear are not warfare—attrition and maneuver—to separated into those supporting logistics attacks on separate systems of the organ- and those supporting C2. According to Air ism. Attrition is an attack on the muscular Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, system, a battering of enemy flesh. Its Air interdiction attacks are usually executed effects can be the most lasting because it against enemy surface forces, movement net- entails the physical destruction of the works (including lines of communication). opponent, but its success is the slowest command, control, and communications net- and most difficult to produce. Maneuver works, and combat supplies.-1 traditionally was a method to concentrate force against particular units of an army In this sense, the doctrine does not recog- and later to attack and sever both the cir- nize the divergence of the logistics (cir- IN THE LOOP 17

dilatory) and C2 (nervous) systems. The danger here is that we will attack half of one and half of the other while destroying neither. Normally, initial attacks should concentrate on command and control as the doorway to the other systems. In the air campaign against Iraq, all types of targets were attacked early on, but there was a shift from an emphasis on C2 (headquarters units, radar units) to logis- tics (bridges, trucks, supply dumps) to combat units (tanks and troops).5 The greatest contribution by EC was in the opening attacks, where it “shut down the Iraqi air defense completely in the first 24 hr. of the air war.”*’ Compass Call EC-130Hs jammed radio communications, “severing Baghdad’s ability to communi- cate with its radars, missiles and artillery batteries.’’7 EF-lllA s and EA-6Bs provided radar-jamming escort for strike The greatest contribution by electronic combat during packages, and F-4G Wild Weasels and Desert Storm was offered in the opening attacks, when it other aircraft attacked radar sites directly. crippled Iraqi air defense systems. Compass Call EC-130s (above) played a key role in jamming Iraqi radio As a result, “allied aircraft achieved tacti- communications while EF-I11 Ravens (below ) provided cal surprise and delivered a paralyzing radar-jamming escort fo r strike packages. blow that Iraq never recovered from. Air strikes crippled Iraq’s highly centralized A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Boyd air defense system and devastated its com- asserts that mand and control network.’’8 Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak in order to win, we should operate at a faster observed, “In essence, the issue was tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or decided in the first few hours of the better yet, get inside (the) adversary’s engagement.’’9 The initial attack on C2 Observation—Orientation—Decision—Ac­ opened the way for follow-on attacks, and tion time cycle or loop.10 while the enemy was in temporary disar- This cycle or loop, abbreviated by Boyd as ray, our initial success was parlayed into a the O-O-D-A cycle, suggests warfare is a lasting one. constant process of evaluation and action, As we will see, air power and EC are the and the side that passes through each tools best suited for destroying the cycle faster will be in better consonance enemy’s C2, and thereby unhinging his ability to counter other attacks on his forces. We can examine C2 in detail, dis- sect it for its various parts, and see how air power and EC, woven together, can be used to attack each part.

The Model Perhaps the best model of command and control is that offered by John R. Boyd in 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 with reality. (AFM 1-1 has a similar loop Observation diagram, although the specific components are somewhat different.)11 The goal, con- When we speak of observation, we define tends Boyd, is to “collapse [the] adver- it as the sum of possible information sary’s system into confusion and disorder sources available to a commander. Pre- by causing him to over and under react to viously, those sources were limited mostly activity that appears simultaneously men- to what could be optically observed. Tech- acing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or nology has produced a whole gamut of misleading.”u The idea of fast-tempo sensors exploiting many, if not all, bands operations aimed at creating confusion of the electromagnetic spectrum (and in and disorder has found its latest expres- the case of sonar, the sonic spectrum). sion in the concept of “hyperwar.” As the Here is where EC first enters the picture. name implies, this concept hinges on By definition, “electronic combat involves “high tempo round-the-clock opera- actions to protect friendly electromagnetic tions.”13 Upon reflection, we can see that capabilities and actions to neutralize or this is nothing more than maximum rate destroy the enemy’s electromagnetic O-O-D-A cycle attack. capabilities.”16 EC is unique in the mili- Of course, none of these ideas are tary arsenal on two counts. First, no other entirely new. Sun Tzu, a heavy influence type of combat uses so many “soft-kill” on Boyd, counseled that (nondestructive) methods. Jammers, for all warfare is based on deception. Therefore, example, presently produce no lasting when capable, feign incapacity; when active, damage to their victim (although this may inactivity. When near, make it appear that change in the future).17 Second, EC is the you are tar away; when far away, that you are only weapon targeted almost exclusively near ... anger his general and confuse him.14 at command and control. A laser-guided bomb destroys a radar site or a supply Even Clausewitz, with his emphasis on truck equally well, but a radar jammer has direct battle, concedes that surprise “lies only one potential victim. more or less at the foundation of all under- Traditionally, observation is an area ripe takings, for without it the preponderance for creating friction in an opponent’s O-O- at the decisive point is not properly D-A cycle. Jamming, stealth, camouflage, conceivable.”15 decoys, and other deceptions are all efforts Achieving surprise and operating at a to deny good observation to the enemy. faster tempo than the enemy are the results Stealth, lately the most celebrated of these of several interactions. The main factors techniques, is important because it can are the natural tempos of each opponent’s deceive the enemy as to the level of C2 system—how quickly a system can activity as well as its direction. An operate without interference, its inherent increase in jamming will clue the enemy “friction” as Clausewitz would say—and that something is happening even if he how much it can interfere with the sys- does not know what. Stealth can let you tems of others. “when near, make it appear that you are Inherent friction is determined by the far away.” Of course, stealth is only one of structure of the C2 system, and as such is a many techniques. As many as possible topic that demands a lot more space than should be used, since often a combination we have here. Furthermore, we have no of methods will work where any single control over the natural tempo of the one fails. enemy. We must analyze how to create Other means are available to deny infor- friction in an opponent’s O-O-D-A cycle mation to the enemy. Less flamboyant, but and how to prevent its creation in ours. just as important, are security measures We will elaborate on this by considering such as emissions control (EMCON) and each part of the O-O-D-A cycle in turn. communications security (COMSEC). IN THE LOOP 19

These and other mundane measures help using the separate radar and infrared to ensure the success of active deceptions. bands.) Diversity lets us cross-reference Highly mobile forces, and the use of information from different sources to them in an unpredictable manner, are also develop a truer picture of the battlefield. important. Commanders piece together The principle remains the same whether ‘•snapshots” of the combat situation as in reference to sensors or communications. information comes to them through the Diversity can be achieved in one of two loop. The more dynamic the battle is, the ways. One way is to build separate sys- more their picture will be out of sync with tems operating in different frequency reality as time goes on. Herein lies the bands. In this case, physical diversity is inherent advantage of maneuver over attri- also achieved, creating more targets for an tion. Since attrition battles are often static adversary to attack. Unfortunately, this slugging matches, a given picture remains method can grow prohibitively expensive. accurate for a longer time. Even if the pic- An alternate method is to produce a single ture is old. simple extrapolation can be piece of equipment capable of operating at used to figure out the course of battle. different frequencies, otherwise known as Using mobility, we make it difficult for an frequency agility. This allows frequency enemy to keep up with reality by rapidly diversity, though not physical diversity. reshaping reality itself. Maneuver also Also, most of these systems confine them- exacerbates the inherent tendency for selves to relatively few frequency bands. erroneous information to enter the However, the development of ultra- enemy’s system in an environment charac- wideband (UWB) radars may herald sen- terized by fear, fatigue, and uncertainty. sors using many frequency bands at In addition to deception and mobility, once.18 we can use physical attack against enemy Of course, guarding against electromag- observation. Here air power, with its netic attack is only part of the equation. inherent mobility and concentrated fire- The more traditional worry has been attack power. is often the weapon of choice. from the air. The need for air superiority is Communication nodes and certain sensors well argued and well documented.19 It pro- like airborne and ground surveillance tects our forces, including our C2, from radars are particularly vulnerable to aerial attack. It allows us cover for freedom destruction. Other sensors, like battlefield of mobility and deception. Conversely, it radars and night vision devices, have pro- denies all these things to the enemy. As liferated so greatly that it is not practical to with many things, it is easier to desire attack them all. In this case, soft kill is the than to achieve it, but the attainment of air preferred route. superiority and the attainment of C2 supe- The flip side of all this is how to prevent riority are inextricably woven together. an intelligent adversary from doing the Just as achieving air superiority requires same things to us. A guiding principle of much more than the best aircraft and the EC should be frequency diversity. In best pilots, all the elements of stealth, essence, diversity is a form of electromag- deception, EC, unified C2, and aircrews netic mobility. If an opponent wants to and aircraft must be combined to achieve deny our use of the spectrum, he should C2 superiority. Arguably, the quality of have to chase us across many bands to pre- Iraqi pilots or the MiG-29 was largely irrel- vent it. The more bands used, the more evant to the success of the coalition air jammers must dissipate their energy to campaign. If the Iraqis had possessed Top cover them. Furthermore, deceptions Gun graduates and the F-22, the results of aimed at one part of the spectrum seldom the air war would have varied only work against other parts. (An obvious slightly. To paraphrase an old saying, example is the need of aircraft to carry “Fighters can patrol some of the air all of chaff and flares in order to defeat missiles the time, or all of the air some of the time, 20 AJRPOIVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

but not all of the air all of the time.” They the way we observe, the way we decide, must know when to sortie and what parts the way we act.”20 of the sky to search for the enemy. No one In orientation, experience—and indeed system can do it alone. With no proper prejudice—shapes how we or the enemy command and control, any aircraft would decides what is important. It takes place in simply have ended up as a bomb magnet. the minds of all those who observe or assimilate information. As such, there is no physical attack against orientation; the Orientation attack against orientation is psychological. Orientation is the part of the O-O-D-A We can program our deceptions and cycle where information gathered during actions to take advantage of the inherent observation is filtered and organized. It is prejudices of our enemy. This, of course, where we decide what is important and can be difficult as it requires an extensive attempt to answer the question, What does knowledge of our enemy, his culture, and it all mean? Boyd considers it the most his training. On the other hand, if we do important part of the cycle. Says Boyd, “It have this knowledge, we can see a large shapes the way we interact with the return for not a lot of effort. The decep- environment—hence orientation shapes tions can range from the tactical to the grand strategic. The German preoccupa- tion with Lt Gen George S. Patton was The airplane and radio, the latter classically represented here hy an infantry radioman, have taken movement and C2 played for effect in the days before the to a new dimension— the aircraft into the sky and the radio Normandy invasion. His phantom army, into the electromagnetic spectrum. made of wooden tanks and jeeps, pinned IN THE LOOP 21

down numerous German divisions across ones. Sun Tzu said that ‘‘what is of the Pas de Calais, despite the fact that the supreme importance in war is to attack the Germans were 90 percent convinced the enemy’s strategy ... next best is to disrupt attack would fall in the Normandy area. his alliances ... the next best is to attack False radio networks and numerous air his army__ The worst policy is to attack raids in the area reinforced the cities.”24 Attacking cities in those days deception.21 meant siege warfare, the most predictable As a protection against being manipu- form of attrition. We should not be meet- lated ourselves, we should be aware of our ing strength with strength. Perhaps it is own prejudices. As members of the mili- better to let the enemy strive for and tary, as Americans, and as Westerners, we achieve invalid objectives than to forestall possess tendencies and biases we may be his achieving valid ones. only partially aware of, if at all. The North In these last stages, protecting our ability Vietnamese were skillfully able to play to act is a function of many of the steps in upon the American public’s impatience previous stages. Proper electronic diversity and aversion to civilian casualties to their ensures we will be able to communicate own advantage. Compare this to Saddam our orders to tasked units. Air superiority Hussein’s total misunderstanding of West- safeguards our freedom to act, and mobil- erners, and how he only managed to ity means our forces will be on the way to increase American resolve with his ploys accomplishing their objectives before the (e.g., his televised interviews with hos- enemy can stop them. With the cover of air tages). The difference in the results was power, Operation Desert Storm ground partly because of the skills of the practi- units were able to safely and secretly mass tioner but also because of the American to the west prior to their encirclement military’s renewed understanding of the maneuver. Once the ground phase began, importance of public opinion. All this lies these highly mobile units were able to at the heart of Sun Tzu’s admonition to close the trap even after their objective “know the enemy and know yourself.”22 became apparent. Lacking air cover and proper mobility, Iraqi units simply could not move out fast enough to escape. Decision and Action Decision is one aspect of the O-O-D-A cycle that we really cannot influence except by influencing the steps previous to it. Physical destruction is possible but dif- Assessments ficult since top leaders are often hunkered Having examined the individual parts of down in deep bunkers or constantly mov- the O-O-D-A loop model, we can now reas- ing.23 However, we can try to prevent the semble them to examine their interaction commander’s orders from reaching the and to see what cycle times are common units that are to carry them out. Jamming and possible. Remember, we seek to out- and physical destruction of his communi- pace the enemy; we need not measure our cation system are again the tools used speed against some absolute reference. here. First, we should understand that O-O- The last place we may attack the enemy D-A loops are found at every level of a mil- cycle is to preemptively attack the units itary structure. Observations and actions that are to execute the orders. This is less made by commanders at the tactical level than optimum since it may be difficult to feed into those of the operational com- divine just which units are to act. Even if mander and then the strategic commander. we know this, such an attack is really Loops feed into and overlap each other. nothing more than informed attrition. We Unnecessarily complex C2 creates too should attempt to attack the enemy cycle many feeders and overlaps, creating inher- in its early stages as opposed to its later ent friction. 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

speed of message and made possible wide- ranging campaigns like the American Civil War. The airplane and the radio have taken movement and C2 into literally new dimensions—the aircraft into the sky and the radio into the electromagnetic spec- trum. The combination of the two allows cycle times on a faster level than ever before. As a rough guide, we can assume that cycle times are the amount of time it takes for new targets to be selected and then attacked—the amount of time it takes to assess the situation and then react to it. During the Korean War, hnmh targets were selected about twice a week. Count- ing the time to observe new targets and the time to attack them, the cycle times were probably on the order of one to two weeks. In the early years of Vietnam, targets were actually selected only once a week, at a Tuesday White House luncheon.25 Adding observation and attack times, the cycle probably lasted two weeks—no better than Korea. These times could be even longer if bad weather delayed the observation or the attack. In the Gulf war, the air tasking order (the document that specifies all sorties and Attacking the enemy's nervous system at the onset of their objectives) was published on a daily hostilities by neutralizing his radar and command structure is likened to throwing dirt in your opponent's eyes prior to a basis. However, according to Aviation fistfight. Above, remains o f an Iraqi radar system, and Week Er Space Technology, “It took days, opposite, a destroyed Iraqi headquarters building in Kuwait. not hours, to develop the daily tasking orders that went out to individual allied air units, although last-minute changes could be made.”26 So at least we have now Even though there is no absolute stan- progressed to the point where the process dard, let us examine what have been the of evaluation and reaction takes a couple natural cycle times through the years. In of days. What is the theoretical minimum the times of classical command and con- O-O-D-A loop time, and how much faster trol, message speed was essentially the than our current cycle time can we expect same as transportation speed. A single to operate? messenger was faster than a body of The theoretical minimum would be troops, but only a little faster. A messenger instantly—a “reflex” action—and even on a ship moved no faster than a body of though this is of course unattainable, it is troops on a ship. Cycle times on a strategic possible that cycle times could approach level could therefore approach many hours instead of days. Aircraft could be weeks or even months. On a tactical level, tasked on a broad mission-oriented basis, flags, bugles, and drums limited communi- with real-time intelligence providing target cation to a series of simple messages. As selection. The search for Scud launchers the locomotive changed the speed of in the Gulf war resulted in F-15Es being movement, the telegraph changed the placed under the direction of joint sur- IN THE LOOP 23

veillance target attack radar system (J- electronic struggle. According to one STARS) aircraft. After a suspect vehicle analyst, was found, the J-STARS would vector the The Soviet development of REB marked a Eagles to the target just as the airborne great leap forward over the traditional West- warning and control system (AWACS) vec- ern idea of electronic warfare because the tors their air-to-air counterparts.27 Here we Soviets combined the tactics of electronic see a case where aircrews used real-time warfare, surprise, deception and firepower to intelligence to fulfill a broad mission- create a unique doctrine__ The author con- oriented objective instead of simply flying tinues, REB includes actions to disrupt to a point on a map and dropping bombs enemy use of the spectrum and actions to there. protect friendly use of the spectrum. It incor- porates razvedkci (reconnaissance and intel- It is more difficult to judge what the ligence) and maskirovka, a term without any loop times of our potential enemies might satisfactory English translation, but one that be. The very successful paralysis of the combines concealment and deception.28 Iraqis makes it difficult to judge how they would have fared if they had been better The comprehensiveness and aggressive- prepared or had attacked first. If, however, ness in REB is, however, contrasted by a the Iran-Iraq war is any indication, the limited and somewhat defensive view of answer is not too well. air superiority. The Soviets saw command Thankfully, few potential adversaries of the air as difficult if not impossible to are able to act and react as quickly as our achieve and sought instead only local, forces. With the proliferation of high- temporary supremacy.29 Their division of technology weapons, this may continue to forces reflected this view. There was the be our only advantage. Luckily for us, Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), an entire many nations are unable to resist the temptation to purchase prestige weapons (jet fighters, main battle tanks) at the expense of the command and control equipment and training needed to use them properly. Of course, this is not to say that we are immune to this disease ourselves. Another way to look at the issue is to ask, How well would our C2 system cope if it sustained the same sort of initial attack we inflicted on the Iraqis? In other words, we can dish it out. but can we take it? Undoubtedly, our air defense system is very formidable when fully up and operat- ing. But what if we were surprised on a strategic level? What of a high-tech Pearl Harbor? Whether our C2 system could easily and quickly reconstitute itself is another matter. Before its recent demise, the Soviet Union (or one of its former client states) was our greatest threat in most scenarios. It is interesting to note that in some respects Soviet doctrine on EC had become more advanced than ours. The Soviet counterpart to EC was radioelektronnaya bor ba (REB). which translates as radio- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

"command” devoted to protecting Soviet tory system will ensure the muscles have airspace. Long-Range Aviation’s mission the nourishment they need, and their ner- was analogous to the bomber component vous system will give the orders directing of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Of their muscles to act. greatest interest was Frontal Aviation. If we accept this basic analogy, we can Speaking of this component at the zenith choose to employ military force in one of of Soviet strength, one expert on the Soviet several ways. We can go the brawling military said that route and simply trade blows with our frontal aviation has matured into the largest opponent. If we are sufficiently strong, we branch of the Soviet Air Force. It is an will eventually prevail, but we should operational-tactical asset with a multi-role remember that in war every blow struck mission of providing air support, air defense, can cost countless lives. and tactical airlift for the ground forces. We can go the smarter route and strike at Ground support has become the principal pressure points while attempting to dodge role.30 the blows. Or we can go the smartest route and throw dirt in their eyes before we Another expert concluded, "Thus Soviet strike the first blow, then circle around air supremacy is largely tactical, and and strike without warning from any directly related to combined-arms direction. Of course, in a bar fight this activities even when described as ‘inde- would be considered dirty fighting, but pendent air operation’.”31 Nowhere was when lives and national interests are at there an independent force whose mission stake, we might excuse a certain lack of was to wrest control of the skies from the chivalry. enemy. With no true direction in air supe- In any case, attacking the enemy’s ner- riority doctrine, it seems unlikely that the vous system through employment of aero- Soviets would have had the opportunity to space power is the key to success. After we carry out their REB doctrine. have stunned the enemy, we can more More important, the Soviet C2 system easily attack those systems that further our was highly vulnerable to the aerial/ objectives. No two armed forces are the electronic warfare we have been discuss- same, and particular systems that may be ing. At this writing, it is impossible to pre- robust in one army or air force may be dict what form of government will replace weak in another. In small, low-tech armies the Soviet Union or what will become of with small supply needs, combat units its military. It is likely, however, that the may be the best target. For opponents with military forces will remain a highly cen- midsized, medium-tech forces, logistics tralized, top-down structure. may afford the best route to success. As Of course, we should not be so arrogant observed before, these nations have proba- to assume.no one will ever pose a threat to bly bought the weapons before buying the our C2. Our C2 system is still basically support and supplies to operate them. A hierarchical, even if it is less centralized large, high-tech army poses the greatest than others. threat, of course, but in this case the pri- ority should not change. A shifting attack that at first emphasizes C2, then logistics, and finally combat units offers the best chance of success. Of course, this will never be popular with the platoon leader Conclusion at the front, who would rather have an If we view warfare as a match between F-16 attacking the enemy in front of him two single combatants, we see the relation- than a headquarters unit many miles back. ship of each of their biological systems to Also, in this last case we must hope our C2 their overall effort. Their muscles will system is resilient enough to withstand provide the striking power, their circula- whatever blows the enemy can inflict. IN THE LOOP 25

A few final words. The coming years mand and control. If, as we have done will produce a smaller expeditionary force here, we liken armed forces to living bio- geared toward meeting varied threats. If logical organisms, then we must under- this force is to succeed, it must be able to stand that whenever they meet, there will adapt, cope, and reorganize faster than its be a form of military Darwinism at work.32 potential foes. This can only be achieved The best C2, effectively used, ensures sur- by flexible, mobile, and survivable com- vival and prosperity. □

Notes 1. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 18. William B. Scott. “UWB Radar Has Potential to Detect Air Force, 16 March 1984. 2-20. Stealth Aircraft,” Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 4 2. Carl von Clausevvitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Mid- December 1989, 38. dlesex. England: Penguin Books. 1968). 203. 19. For a detailed argument, see John A. Warden III, The 3. C. Kenneth Allard, Command. Control, and the Common Air Campaign (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 37. chap. 1. 4. AFM 1-1. 3-3. 20. Boyd. 212. 5. John D. Morrocco. “War Will Reshape Doctrine, but 21. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: The Story Lessons Are Limited," Aviation Week 6• Space Technology', of World War II (Middlesex. England: Penguin Books. 1972), 22 April 1991. 42. 513. 6. Bruce D. Nordwall, "Electronic Warfare Played Greater 22. Sun Tzu. 84. Role in Desert Storm Than Any Conflict." Aviation Week & 23. Warden. 45. Space Technology'. 22 April 1991. 68. 24. Sun Tzu. 77-78. 7. Ibid. 25. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: 8. Morrocco. 43. Free Press. 1989), 21, 85. 9. Ibid. 26. Morrocco. 42. 10. John R. Boyd. A Discourse on Winning and Losing 27. John D. Morrocco, "Flexibility of Attack Aircraft Cru- (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University. 1987). 5. cial to Crushing Iraq’s Military Machine.” Aviation Week Sr 11. AFM 1-1, 2-19. Space Technology. 22 April 1991, 46. 12. Boyd. 7. 28. Munro, 123-24. 13. Bill Sweetman. "Catching Up with Doctrine." Jane’s 29. R. A. Mason and John W. R. Taylor. Aircraft, Strategy Defence Weekly. 29 June 1991. 1174. and Operations of the Soviet Air Force (London: Jane's Pub- 14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War. trans. Samuel G. Griffith lishing Limited. 1986), 23. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). 66-67. 30. William P. Baxter. Soviet Airland Battle Tactics 15 Clausewitz. 269. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 200. 16. AFM 1-1. 3-6. 31. Mason and Tavlor, 26. 17 For an in-depth discussion, see Neil Munro, The Quick 32. Boyd, 11. and the Dead (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991), chap. 3.

How Are We Doing? We need to know how you feel about the Airpower Journal. We are genuinely interested in providing you, the reader, as well as the Air Force, the best possible professional journal. It is. after all. your journal. In that spirit, we have provided a tear-out readership survey Just inside the back cover. Please take a few minutes to complete it and return it to us. (Well pay the postage.) It will help us further define the focus and scope of the Journal and it will help us determine how well we are reaching our target audience. Thanks for your help, The Editor OF MACHINE GUNS, YELLOW BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE

Lt Col L. Parker Tem pl e III, USAF, Ret ir ed

For the last thirty or forty years there has been going on a gradual stabilisation on the battlefield caused by the machine gun__ That experience began in South Africa, but we did not see whither we were tending. If we had studied the Russo-Japanese War more carefully, we should have seen whither things were leading. Then we had the Great War, which came as a surprise to many of us, though had we only studied history properly it should have been no sur- prise whatever. —Field Marshal Sir George Milne (1927)

26 YELLOW BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE 27

Air Force needs adequate doctrine. Why don’t we have a doctrine that serves us?

Amongst the Munchkins Doctrine should not be considered as strictly precise rules but as “officially approved prescriptions of the best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should be, the product of experience. Doctrine is what experience has shown usually works best.”2 Doctrine plays an essential role in the selection and acquisition of weapon systems.3 It depends on learning history’s lessons and generalizing from accumu- lated experience to form guides to future action.4 As Carl von Clausewitz demon- strated, doctrine should use historical vignettes illustrating normative and value- laden conclusions.5 Based on the idea that T THE beginning of World War I, we learn from individual experience, we the British army had 24 machine ought to benefit from the experience of guns per division and two per others. battalion—the same ratio as in Something seems wrong here. If this A 1899. By the end of the war in 1918. theresummary of the definition and utility of were 500 per division. British observers of doctrine is accurate, why don’t we think of the Russo-Japanese War had reported the AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the great effect of machine guns in 1905, but United States Air Force, as performing their reports went unheeded.1 Field Mar- these functions for us? When was the last shal Milne later disputed some historians time anyone referred to AFM 1-1 in pre- who believed that changes brought about paring a budget, justifying a new aircraft, by the machine gun could not have been or planning the next flight? This descrip- understood beforehand. Clearly he was tion of doctrine is definitely not Kansas, correct. He went further to say that the Toto. changes in warfare should have been Air Force doctrine has been notably obvious before they occurred. The use of unsuccessful in influencing behavior and history as described by Milne is known as weapon system acquisition. It has been the doctrine. critical target of authors who exhort us to The Air Force is facing the most dra- get serious about doctrine, tell us what matic changes since the end of World War doctrine should contain, and describe 1 caused many to declare the military as an what doctrine would do for us if only we expensive and unnecessary luxury in the had one. brave new world of peace. The Air Force is Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United struggling to allocate required cuts, but it States Air Force is not really doctrine as has no viable means of judging how to described above. Robert F. Futrell retain the flexibility it will need to meet lamented that doctrine has languished the unknown challenges of the future. We since the 1950s.6 Our leadership’s lack of a must use history to derive doctrine that stronger push for doctrine is not surpris- tells both how warfare is changing and ing. No active duty personnel have ever how to prepare for and succeed in the next served in an Air Force where fundamental war. More than at any time in the past, the doctrine had a vital role or demonstrated 28 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 its ability to achieve its potential. Conse- 4. Social inquiry must adopt the features quently, there is a predominating opinion of the scientific method that make it self- that we have done just fine without it. correcting and consensus-generating to Dr I. B. Holley, professor emeritus at have genuine knowledge about society. Duke University and a retired Air Force 5. Three features make the scientific Reserve major general, has explained the method self-correcting and consensus- “what” and “why” of doctrine, described generating: a bit of the general content and method, a. The scientific method compels all and suggested the model for who should hypotheses to confront data not liable to do it.7 We won’t go into these concepts conflicting interpretations or subject to here. The missing brick in the yellow brick dispute. road to an adequate doctrine is the b. The scientific method ensures that methodology—the “how to do it” of doc- confrontation with the data will make trine. To produce a useful, viable doctrine, indisputable the confirmation or disconfir- we must have a philosophically valid mation of hypotheses by the data. methodology. In the past, great minds have focused on how to get “there” but were c. The scientific method system- frustrated in convincing the leadership atically and impartially seeks out indisput- that "there” was worth getting to. able data with which to test claims to Doctrine is a form of social inquiry, for knowledge. which there are two contending meth- odological schools. The scientific method The scientific method does have its lim- versus other methods, which we summa- itations, however, in developing an ade- rize as “art,” has been debated for most of quate doctrine. Science can reveal the this century.8 This article is really about wonders of the atom but not the meaning why the scientific method does not work of atomic behavior. Science does not judge for developing doctrine, and it describes a the objects it studies. Physicists criticize more productive method. To understand the standard atomic model or the laws of the proposal for doctrine development, we gravitation on the basis of how accurately need a brief background of the opposing they reflect the truth of the real world, not camps. whether they are pretty, pleasing, good, or bad. For scientists, nature is what it is and not subject to criticism. Newton, Einstein, The scientific method derives universal and Doctrine laws that describe the way nature works but does not establish norms for nature to The scientific method, which has been follow. Isaac Newton did not establish so highly successful in discovering the norms with F = ma any more than Albert universe, is the jewel of Western logical Einstein did with E = me2. Doctrine, on the thought that overshadows other logical other hand, is concerned with establishing methods. It comprises five main ideas:9 norms and making judgments. 1. The scientific method is a self- Sadly, there are no scientifically derived correcting enterprise generating consensus rules which, if followed, will inevitably within the community of inquirers over lead to success in war.10 The principles of the long run. war are abstractions distilled to their 2. Any form of inquiry must be self- essence.11 Their fallacy stems from the correcting and must generate a consensus superficial similarity of wars across time. if it is to form a genuine body of scientific Such similarities do not mean that inviola- knowledge. ble principles exist. A biological analogy is 3. The scientific method is the only that birds, bats, and bees all have wings method that makes gaining knowledge and fly but have little else in common. self-correcting and consensus-generating. Their similarity of form hides fundamen- Y E L L O W BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE 29

tally different structures. Similarity of wars overlooks incompatible underlying structures; every war is different. Not that there is no commonality. The misleading part is that some common elements cause the naive to think that the same is true of other elements. The scientific method loses its useful- ness in developing doctrine because war has no natural laws reducible to fixed equations. If it did. the winner would always be the one who complies best with those equations. If both sides follow the principles of war in precisely the same manner, the winner will be the lucky one. While I would rather be lucky than skillful any day when luck is involved, the situa- tion defies use of rote principles. The prin- ciples of wrar are interesting intellectual usefulness is determined by its method contructs that have outlived their useful- and its validity. History’s contextual set of ness except for informing and educating. dates, places, and events has no more Clausewitz thought he would eventually meaning than the functioning of atoms. To be able to use rational thought to distill have meaning, these facts must be inter- war to its essential elements. He was nota- preted, which is a function of social bly more successful than anyone before inquiry. him in providing a logical structure to his The scientific method describes without work. Serious students of warfare cannot giving meaning. To be useful, doctrine consider themselves complete until they needs meaning that science cannot have read and understood Clausewitz. But provide. Valid alternatives to the scientific something about warfare has changed, and method must be rigorously applied to find only portions of Clausewitz have specific meaning. use in modern war. Few readers of Clause- Doctrine extracts guides for action by witz find much use in his “Attack on Cor- interpreting relevant and meaningful dons,” for example, because modern experience, a procedure that involves warfare is no longer like Napoleonic con- value judgments and standards. Deter- flict. Furthermore, as we saw in Operation mining whether a battle was won or lost Desert Storm, the information available on can be a value judgment. For example, at today’s battlefield is far more voluminous, the Battle of Asculum in 279 B.C., the vic- accurate, and timely than Clausewitz torious Macedonian commander, Pyrrhus could have conceived. An aviator who of Epirus, took heavy losses without understands Clausewitz will not be totally removing the opposing Roman armies prepared to meet the challenges of modern from the field. After the battle, he gave us warfare. the term Pyrrhic victory when he exclaimed, “One more victory like that over the Romans will destroy us completely!”12 Pyrrhus, Leonardo, and Clausewitz sought an essential core of Doctrine principles but stopped short of establish- ing a set of them for rote application. He History as the source of doctrine and sensed that science could be used to help useful information has been a subject of his analysis but that war remained an art.1:1 philosophical debate for over 200 years. Its Clausewitz used the term coup d’oeil to 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 mean “quick recognition of a truth that the If none of these methods are individu- mind would ordinarily miss or would per- ally suited to social inquiry, then what ceive only after long study and reflec- about some sort of synthesis of the various tion.”14 Doctrine helps prepare the mind to approaches to inquiry? There may be a recognize when conditions have changed valid methodology following the thoughts and to improve the chances of success of Brazilian philosopher Roberto Unger.16 when this occurs.15 Providing the study and reflection to aid later battlefield deci- sions is the task and art of doctrine. The essence of art is precisely why the The Yellow Brick Factory scientific method fails: art has meaning relative to the observer, thus defying scien- A way to think of Unger’s method is tific method. This does not mean art can- through a coarse analogy to the classic not be learned but that the Mitchells, dichotomy in flight training methods, such Spaatzes, and Arnolds excelled at their as teaching a cloverleaf maneuver to a craft just as artists do. There have been no T-37 student pilot. Some instructors teach duplicates of any of these great air power by describing the number of degrees to be pioneers, and to assume anyone could turned, the airspeed at various points in iearn to be one of them degrades their the maneuver, and so on. Others teach genius. Studying Pablo Picasso or “feeling” the aircraft to gain the proper Leonardo da Vinci does not make one Pi- performance. The two valid approaches casso or Leonardo. Likewise, studying doc- have individual merit and produce similar trine cannot by itself make military people maneuvers with differing precision and martial geniuses. However, Clausewitz’s understanding of what is happening. Syn- coup d’oeil implies that whatever native thesizing the two classic methods might ability exists can be improved upon. allow a pilot to perform a maneuver with Developing doctrine through the scien- both precise structure (through facts about tific method is the wrong path. If that logi- its parameters) and meaningful under- cal thinking method is wrong, then what standing of the range of handling through about the methods used in the social sci- different attitudes and airspeeds (through ences, which we have referred to as art? subjective “feel”). These approaches (objectivism, relativism, Instead of using the classic battle lines historicism, and many others) are too of choosing between the scientific method numerous to discuss here. While we can or art as the better approach. Unger recog- coherently discuss the scientific method nized that key features of both sides of the (considered by many to be the best way to argument have merit. He proposed the approach learning), no such coherence ties synthesized concept of frameworks together the methods of sociology, describing both the boundaries and the economics, history, and the other social internal structure of social entities. sciences. Whereas the scientific method is For military doctrine, frameworks would a relatively well-defined way to digest be used to describe conditions of impor- facts and gain knowledge, the art we refer tance both on the boundaries and inter- to as the alternative is an amalgamation of nally to the war being examined. numerous disparate approaches. None of Boundary conditions are such things as these different art approaches, used to try the technology available (not necessarily to understand the meaning of historical applied), geography, politics, economics, events, have produced an adequate doc- morality (such as decisions about employ- trine. None have achieved the same degree ing weapons of mass destruction), and of meaningful explanation of human other factors that determine the latitude of activity as the scientific method has had in the actions of either member in a conflict. describing the workings of physics, for Within these boundaries, there are internal example. factors—tactics: training: command, con- YELLOW BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE 31

trol, and communications: intelligence: the some hierarchical frameworks are more technology actually in the field; and simi- open and flexible than others. lar factors—that govern how much of the 5. Once established, frameworks resist maximum latitude any given actor uses. change but all can be changed or Discerning which boundary and internal destroyed. elements determine the meaning of the 6. No framework can fully encompass events described is part of the art of writ- the individuals that live in it in two ing doctrine. senses: Sir George Milne asserted that the a. Humans are context-dependent Russo-Japanese War should have provided beings needing stable and settled frame- evidence of the importance of machine works to find satisfaction in life. guns. But the First World War was fought b. Humans can go beyond context. in a different framework: the degree of Frameworks are never fully satisfying, and armament on both sides was different, the there is always some ability to transcend a political and economic boundary condi- present framework and create new ones. tions were different, the weapons overall were different (despite the commonality of Next we will examine the important the machine gun). For these same reasons, implications of these to developing a doc- Clausewitz is not totally applicable to all trine meaningful to the Air Force. wars; some things are the same, others are different, and the differences become sig- nificant. Judging which differences are sig- “Though This Be Madness, nificant is another part of the art of doctrine. Yet There Is Method In’t.”* The scientific method contributes the The behavior we call war is wholly a idea that when humans settle down within creation of humans complying with the the confines of some framework, there will first attribute of frameworks. Discussions be laws which are valid within that frame- about the savagery of human nature aside, work. Art, as the opposition to scientific decisions about going to war, the means of method, contributes the idea that humans conducting it, and the nature of that war create their own social world, which is are determined by humans. There is neither governed nor limited by universal nothing especially profound in this other laws. Both are key to understanding his- than the conclusion that war is not some tory, deriving its lessons, and being able instinctive behavior over which we are to fashion a doctrine with future powerless. applicability. It should be clear that such a The second attribute means that any war doctrine cannot be static and that it represents some basic agreement by the requires continual examination in light of combatants over the rules to be used. new situations, technologies, and other Whenever war is engaged, the societies on factors which change the face of war. The each side have some set of rules that they key attributes of frameworks are17 deem acceptable or unacceptable for the conduct of that war. Although they don’t 1. People create all social interaction: formally decide on rules beforehand, this there is nothing inbred and unchangeable is not far from the mark. The rules are about society. bound by treaties, weaponry, technology 2. Societies have frameworks of rules availability, habits, and practices rooted in that set the basic tenor of interactions. assumptions about what is feasible and 3. Frameworks arise when people stop what is rational, and even implied rules arguing over terms of social life and agree about what is or is not allowed. Hitler to form some regular patterns. could have used gas and chemical 4. Frameworks have some internal struc- ture involving hierarchies of some sort; *Hamlet, act 2. sc. 2. 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

State, Justice, and others; within the DOD, the Air Force’s contributory framework is different from those of the Army and Navy; within the Air Force, the Strategic Air Command’s framework differs to some degree from that of the Tactical Air Com- mand. The societal hierarchy and its reso- lution of the common issues reflect the differences in the ability of the society to cope with the rest of the world. This, in turn, is reflected in the conduct of war and is an essential element of the differences between wars. The fifth key attribute means that once a society agrees to a basic set of common interests and the hierarchical institutions necessary for that society’s functioning, the society resists further change. Because frameworks are created entities, we have the power to alter and even tear down part or all of any framework we establish. weapons in World War II but did not. The Although the military is reputed to be United States could have used tactical resistant to change, this is probably nuclear weapons in Vietnam but did not. unjustified in recent frameworks. This For the distinctions drawn here, it is not century has seen tremendous changes in so important to understand these rules as the nature and conduct of war, largely as a being driven by policy, treaty, law, or reflection of the more flexible frameworks moral beliefs. What matters is that each of the military institutions evolved in the war has rules that are not violated. These latter part of the century. Some military rules, however, defy generalization across institutions have been veritably dynamic all wars and history. in changing and adapting. The advance of The rules are formed well ahead of time military-related technology has not and reflect the third key attribute, since allowed stability since development of the they evolve as people settle down and machine gun. This century’s warfare testi- agree that they have enough common fies to society’s ability to change frame- interests for them to consider their futures works despite resistance to change. mutually intertwined. They have more in Dynamic military frameworks preclude common than they have to disagree about, development of doctrine that remains sta- and these common items form the core of ble for years. Doctrine must be as vital and the framework’s rules for that society. dynamic as the framework it describes. The fourth attribute reflects the forma- The sixth key attribute covers the tion of the society’s ability to deal with the dynamics of framework evolution and the common issues of security and defense. changing nature of the people within the Just as every society will be different, so military. People depend on context to will their rules regarding warfare. The derive meaning, understanding, and com- issues are resolved with some sense of the fort within their framework. Even with relative priority, prestige, and control of uncertainty, danger, deprivation, and the organization that will provide these vagaries in military life, context plays an services. The Department of Defense important role for every military member (DOD) provides security and defense for in coping. The frameworks for military our society within a hierarchy of other organizations allow a certain number of frameworks alongside the departments of people to do more than simply cope; they YELLOW BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE 33

actually excel and thrive. Such people The more flexible a framework is, the learn to exist and exploit to the fullest the harder it will be for doctrine to remain val- opportunities available within the frame- uable over time. A framework that evolves work. Such people eventually become the easily and adapts to changing conditions leadership. may undermine the pertinent experience Not all people are satisfied with the base from which doctrine is derived. Thus existing framework. Some are dissatisfied some doctrinal thoughts about aerial com- with the framework and merely cope with bat in the Korean conflict may not apply to it, while a small number may play a role in the advanced tactical fighter, while others changing and evolving the framework. Gen may. Again, judgment is required. An William (‘‘Billy”) Mitchell can be consid- unquestioning acceptance of experience as ered in the latter group, since he con- relevant to the present would lead to tinually battled with his Army superiors trouble. over the role of air power. Of those who Luckily, frameworks resist change. This excel within the framework, there are argues for the ability to extract usable some who can go beyond their present lessons learned from experience (judg- context. Gen H. H. (“Hap”) Arnold ment) and the relative longevity of such exemplifies those who created the new doctrine. In this sense, doctrine is critical framework of the Air Force. for helping people cope within the mili- When applied to the military, each of tary. The embodiment of experience in these attributes explains something about doctrine is an ideal way to explain the the military and contributes to the general framework to people entering into the mil- inability to derive consistent and general itary without prior background. Doctrine rules about all warfare. The six attributes would be an important aspect of helping of frameworks all affect the nature and assure survival in the military in times of conduct of war, some so severely that the war when the regular force is augmented. actual concept of universal law's (or scien- Furthermore, people who not only cope tific investigation) becomes ludicrous. within the military framework but who thrive in it may be the best sources of understanding what it takes to succeed (an essential element of writing doctrine). The Yellow Brick Road No two wars are the same at the level of Doctrine does not imply universality detail where doctrine is derived. Since and must be developed only after relevant doctrine is based on history, this seems a experience allows us to extract lessons prescription to fight each war as the pre- learned. Lessons learned within a frame- vious one. Indeed it is if we assume that work may or may not be valid across the the individuals within any framework are boundary to subsequent frameworks. If a only subject to it, unaware of its evolution, new framework is initiated, past and incapable of changing it. Thucydides experience may be irrelevant and dan- wrote his history of the Peloponnesian gerously misleading. Determining when a War because he believed that circum- framework has changed and judging which stances keep recurring, and people who are the proper lessons to be learned from are prepared can prevent the errors of the history’s experience is part of the art of past (by applying what we call doctrine).18 doctrine. Unger’s frameworks allow locally appli- cable laws within stable frameworks. Doc- trine comprises locally applicable laws— not universal principles of war. So long as Oz on the Horizon the framework remains relatively stable We now have the end objective in sight. and experience within it grows, doctrine The incorporation of frameworks as can be usefully and productively pursued. described here will both help us write bet- 34 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

ter doctrine and, just as importantly, help little hope for recognizing the areas where us interpret whatever history we read to doctrine would help exploit weaknesses in determine its usefulness for ourselves. the adversary and where the adversary Unfortunately, we do not now have a doc- might exploit our own weaknesses. trine that is developed according to the Doctrine must be at once historical and framework approach. The current draft of futuristic. It must be historical to under- AFM 1-1 has taken a giant step forward by stand how the framework came to be what incorporating historical examples and it is. Once we understand why it has vignettes, as many of us have encouraged become what it is, we will be able to in the past.19 understand what elements of the frame- Frameworks offer the only valid method work will need to be changed in order for for doctrine development. Each new war us to meet the future, to stay ahead of tech- does not necessarily improve our ability to nology, or to change aspects of the present wage war successfully. Korea and Vietnam framework that we do not like. were not improvements on our success in Suppose we object to the size and World War II. Whether they could have weight of present military satellites and been is moot; they were not because doc- believe we should spend resources to trine had not adequately accounted for the develop lightsats instead. Before rushing increased political dimension of the latter ahead, we should be able to find in an ade- wars. Lessons learned in wars do not move quate space doctrine just how we came to inexorably toward perfect understanding. have such large satellites—and we should Methodologies that cause us to believe we do this in terms clear enough to under- will eventually achieve perfect principles stand what is required to reduce their size of war are dangerous. Each war has ele- and what is lost in downsizing without ments from previous wars but in an essen- adversely affecting other aspects of the Air tially new framework. Unless doctrine is Force’s space business. An adequate doc- dynamic enough to recognize changes in trine would also allow us to judge if frameworks, it will not enhance our smaller satellites are even a good idea once chances of success. we understand the subject. Writing successful doctrine requires rec- Operation Desert Storm provides an ognizing, judging, and describing how the excellent example for doctrinal framework Air Force operates in such a way that we evaluation. The doctrinal frameworks we can observe and assess the changes as might compare it to are the Vietnam War frameworks evolve and come into contact and the North African campaign in World with other frameworks. The Air Force's War II. Both have common elements to frameworks were modified by the develop- carry forward into the framework for Des- ment and fielding of stealth technology in ert Storm. Some of the same problems both Tactical Air Command (TAC) and faced Field Marshals Erwin Rommel and Strategic Air Command (SAC); it also Bernard Montgomery (heat, water short- necessitated modification of the frame- ages, and sand). But I submit that what we work of anyone who might be an enemy, actually saw was the crossing of a signifi- since he would have to try to counter cant framework boundary. Although it will stealth. In this case, we are forcing the rest take more serious thinking, judgment indi- of the world to react to a revolutionary cates the new framework must be built on new technology. the basis of the three key elements of pre- As we force others to adapt to our new cision guided munitions, the vast flow of framework, we cannot wait and adapt to information (public, private, and military), their changing frameworks. We must stay and the tight integration of all US and intensely aware of the status of the frame- allied forces. works of potential enemies as an impor- Precision guided munitions were not tant aspect of professional military new to Desert Storm; however, never education. Without this, there would be before had they been used in such num- YELLOW BRICK ROADS AND DOCTRINE 35 bers (many times the total number used in trine incorporating lessons learned from the entire Vietnam War), with such inten- Desert Storm to select where to take cuts sity (a few months versus years for the and perhaps to justify budget increases to Vietnam War), and with such devastating meet the challenges of peace. As Unger’s effects. Precision guided munitions hold approach makes clear, we need both sci- the potential to be Sir George Milne’s ence and art together, as provided by the machine guns of the latter half of the twen- concept of frameworks. tieth century in terms of doctrinal impact. No war in history ever had so much information flowing. It will take some time to comprehend the impact of the vast amount of information from mass media, The Balloon Home from command, control, communications, There are some straightforward steps to and intelligence (C3I) systems in the mili- develop the doctrine which we need to tary, and from other sources and to fold meet the dynamics of the changes we see them into doctrine. However, the informa- every day. tion revolution of Desert Storm is just as First, we must recognize that AFM 1-1 important doctrinally as the precision must be changed. If we remain tied to its guided munitions within the new 1984 structure, we will have a doctrine framework. manual but no doctrine with which to The integration of forces was also a key meet the challenges ahead. Second, we to success. It was truly a showpiece for must pick a starting point in a dynamic aerial warfare, but it took the synergism of world (today would be good), describing land, sea, air, and space forces to pros- the framework of the Air Force as it has ecute the war with such overwhelming come to be. This includes the operation of effect on the enemy. the Air Force’s frameworks, the underlying The use of frameworks would also cause structures of these frameworks, and why us to examine other aspects of the war. the Air Force is structured the way it is for Before we claim the decisiveness of air the various political, military, and power, we ought to realize that the sym- economic reasons that actually underlie its metry of numbers was not evident in the present form. Simply describing the four- tactics, resources used, technology, train- star commands is inadequate. We must tie ing, and in virtually every metric we could the evolution of the Air Force to its history apply. The coalition fought a lopsided war and judge what is good or bad about that because it took advantage of the three key legacy. Explicit historical reference cou- elements enumerated and because the ples meaning to doctrine and understand- Iraqis could not. The use of precision ing when changes occur. Third, we must guided munitions and the information to give insight into the role of weapon sys- employ them being readily available were tems as they apply either within the exist- a major asymmetry in Desert Storm. Judg- ing framework or as they change the ment indicates that before we derive a doc- existing framework. Stealth or the Strate- trine that asserts the ascendancy of air gic Defense Initiative is an instance in power (as Billy Mitchell and Giulio Dou- which the existing framework will cease to het would have had us do 60 years ago), apply, and frameworks explain why this is we must understand Desert Storm in terms so. of its framework. Largely because of the strength and Frameworks will allow us to build doc- vision of its leaders, the Air Force has not trine that helps us anticipate the changes drifted aimlessly since its inception. But in war before they occur by interpreting we cannot always count on being so lucky. our enemy's altering frameworks rather We must be able to bring people on board than waiting and adapting afterwards. In a quickly in the case of a national time of decreasing budgets, we need a doc- emergency. The lessons of World War I’s 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

“Peace for All Time’’ aftermath must not and most experienced minds to the be forgotten. Nor can we continue to fool development of an adequate doctrine ourselves that our people understand the before we make mistakes more devastating Air Force’s frameworks well enough to than the British in regard to the machine avoid unwise or frivolous resource expen- gun in 1914. □ ditures. Now is the time to devote our best

Notes 1 I. B. Holley. Jr.. Ideas and Weapons (Washington, D.C.: tion of the positivist philosophical school of social inquiry, Office of Air Force History. 1983). 16. in a course entitled The Philosophy of Social Science, pre- 2. 1. B. Holley. |r.. "Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and sented by Dr Andrew Altman at George Washington Univer- Spacecraft: The Search for Doctrine," Air University Review sity, Fall 1990, and used here with his kind permission. 34. no. 6 (September-October 1983): 4. 10. L. Parker Temple III, "The Principles of War” (Unpub- 3. Holley, ideas and Weapons. 39. lished paper. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., April 1978). 4. Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 11. I. B. Holley. "Concepts. Doctrines. Principles: Are You United States Air Force, 16 March 1984, v. Sure You Understand These Terms?” Air University Review 5. Carl von Clausewitz. On War, trans. Peter Paret and 35. no. 5 ()uly-August 1984): 92. Michael Howard (Princeton. N.).: Princeton University Press. 12. Plutarch. The Age of Alexander, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert 1976). Clausewitz describes the idea of value-laden moral (New York: Penquin Books, 1979), 409. An alternative trans- issues on page 137 of this translation. The need for (and cau- lation was, "If we are victorious in one more such battle with tions about the use of) historical vignettes is covered in two the Romans we shall be utterly ruined.” places, pages 156-65 and 170-74. 13. Clausewitz. 127-32 and 148-50. 6. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas, Concepts. Doctrine: A His- 14. Ibid., 102-3. tory' of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907- 15. Holley, “Concepts, Doctrines, Principles." 92; and "Of 1964 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University. 1971), 6. Sabre Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft." 4. 7 Holley. Ideas and Weapons. 19; idem, “The Doctrinal 16. Roberto M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Structure and Its Process: Some Suggested Steps," Military Review 59 (April Task (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987). 165-70. 1979): 2-13; and Clausewitz. 156-57. Clausewitz outlines 17. The interpretation of Unger’s supertheorv approach to here the same sort of critical process as described by Pro- social inquiry again owes much to the interpretive lectures of fessor Holley. Holley, "An Enduring Challenge: The Problem Professor Altman, cited earlier. of Air Force Doctrine," in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in 18. Thucydides. The Complete Writings of Thucydides: M ilitary History, no. 16 (Colorado Springs. Colo.: US Air The Peloponnesian War. trans. John H. Finley. )r. (New York: Force Academy. 1974). 10-11. Modern Library. 1954). 14. In the best ancient description of 8. The debate is actually between two schools of philoso- doctrine, he wrote that if his work “be judged useful by those phy: the "positivist," which believes that the methods of nat- inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid ural science are the only way to understand reality; and the to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of “antipositivist," which has failed to arrive at any consensus human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be about method other than to agree that the methods of natural content.” science are inappropriate for understanding human activity. 19. L. Parker Temple III. "How Dare They Tamper with the For the sake of simplicity in this paper, we use the term sci- Sacred Functions of the Horse Cavalry?” Air University entific method to describe the positivist method and the term Review 37. no. 3 (March-April 1986): 24-30; and "Of Auto- art to cover the antipositivist method. gyros and Dinosaurs.” Airpower Journal 2, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 9. This section owes much to class lecture and interpreta- 38- 51.

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Lt Col Mic h a el A. Kir t l a n d , USAF

FTEN THE lessons we learn still relevant today. Effective air operations best from combat come not come from understanding one’s doctrine, from our victories but from our knowing one’s limitations, and most of all, failures. Such a case is the Rail from thoroughly planning the campaign InterdictionO Program, better known as from beginning to end. Operation Strangle, conducted in Korea The Korean War began with a surprise from the summer of 1951 to early 1952. North Korean attack against the South on Enthusiasm for air power and the desire to 25 June 1950. The woefully unprepared show that air power was enough to win a and battered South Korean army rapidly war were not enough to make up for defi- retreated. US military forces were intro- ciencies in planning, command structure, duced almost immediately from Japan. or resources that plagued this operation. Unfortunately, they had served since the The lessons those airmen learned so pain- end of World War II as an army of occupa- fully, and at such a cost, 40 years ago are tion in Japan and were not ready for the 38 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

hostilities.3 Air Force action quickly destroyed much of the North Korean air force, reestablishing air superiority. FEAF’s Bomber Command began bombing missions over North Korea. Fifth Air Force fighters supported land forces by attacking enemy formations on the ground. Between Bomber Command raids, close air support by Fifth Air Force, and a truly heroic stand by US Marines and Army units around Pusan, the enemy assault was finally slowed long enough for United Nations (UN) forces and US military reinforce- ments to arrive. Relief from the pressure on Pusan came in September when Gen Douglas Mac- Arthur launched a daring invasion at Inchon. Within a week, US forces had bro- ken the enemy lines around Pusan and linked up with units of X Corps that had landed at Inchon. It was now the North Koreans’ turn to head into full retreat. By late October, UN forces had driven the enemy back into North Korea, decimated his air and ground forces, and occupied the North Korean capital at Pyongyang. By mid-November UN forces were approach- ing the Chinese border along the Yalu Gen Otto P. Weyland. commander o f the Far East Air River.4 Forces (FEAF), was charged with implementing Operation UN forces were again surprised on 26 Strangle. November when 300,000 Communist Chi- nese forces entered the war. UN forces difficult combat they faced in Korea. By began a continuous withdrawal and retreat late summer of 1950, the 100.000-man that lasted for the rest of 1950, finally halt- Republic of Korea (ROK) army had lost ing some 70 miles south of Seoul.5 Once over half its strength. US forces brought again it was American air power that over piecemeal from Japan were sent slowed the advance of Communist forces. directly in.to the fight and did not fare The enemy attack bogged down under the much better. North Korean forces had constant assault by air interdiction mis- reduced the ROK/US control over the sions as well as close air support by Fifth Korean Peninsula to a small area around Air Force, Navy, and Marine forces. UN the port of Pusan—the now famous Pusan forces went on the offensive in late winter perimeter.1 and early spring of 1951, recapturing American air power, in the form of Far Seoul and advancing northward.6 Finally, East Air Forces (FEAF) and Fifth Air Force in the summer of 1951, armistice negotia- stationed in Korea, was not much better tions began. prepared for war. FEAF planning for Korea With the coming of the truce negotia- consisted of assistance in the evacuation of tions, UN forces, under US Army general Americans in the event of war.2 But air Matthew B. Ridgway, wanted to keep pres- power recovered much more quickly than sure on the Communists in order to did the land forces, scoring its first aerial encourage the negotiations process. How- victories just two days after the opening of ever, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff PLANNING AIH OPERATIONS 39

(JCS) wanted no operations that would Fifth Air Force vice-commander and later either appear to be offensive in nature or acting commander, suggested a road/truck result in high casualties. This attitude was interdiction effort, which was supported reflected in a JCS message sent to Ridgway by FEAF headquarters with a goal of para- on 11 August 1951 that said, “If Armistice lyzing the Communist transportation sys- discussions fail, it is of greatest impor- tem between the 39th parallel and the tance that clear responsibility for failure front lines.8 The official objective of Oper- rest upon the Communists.’’7 ation Strangle, according to FEAF, was to Air Force leaders, still wanting to show “interfere with and disrupt the enemy’s just what air power could achieve in war, lines of communications to such an extent were quick to offer interdiction as the that he will be unable to contain a deter- solution. Brig Gen Edward J. Timberlake, mined offensive by friendly forces or be THE NAME GAME VERLORD, Saturate, Linebacker, Just name simply followed it. No effort was made to OCause, Desert Storm—sometimes it seems name this rail interdiction effort. Both FEAF and the choosing of a name for military operations is Fifth Air Force press releases continued to refer as critical a part of the operation as the military to Operation Strangle. The capstone to attaching planning itself. Operation Strangle has become Strangle to rail interdiction operations came in a perhaps the classic example of how not to 21 November press conference in Washington choose a name for a military campaign. To un- in which Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force derstand how and why the name Strangle was chief of staff, referred to the effort as Operation chosen, we need to know something about Air Strangle. Force history. To understand why the name be- As it became more evident that the interdic- came a thorn in the side of its planners, we need tion effort could not achieve the objective of to understand bureaucratic politics. pressuring the enemy to conclude truce negotia- Since the inception of air power, air advocates tions, critics, especially in the other services, have sought to prove that air power was the equal began to attack Operation Strangle for its ineffec- of land and naval power and that it could be tiveness in “strangling" the enemy. The dynamic decisive in warfare. Airmen were stung at the end name began to haunt the less than dynamic of World War II by criticism that air power still had results. By 12 December, the Fifth Air Force not truly proved itself. When the opportunity commander, in an article in the Pacific Stars and came during the Korean War to conduct an inter- Stripes, said the correct name was not Strangle diction campaign, Air Force leaders were eager but simply the Rail Interdiction Program. By this to seize the opportunity to show what air power time, no one was admitting who came up with the could do. name Strangle or why the Rail Interdiction Pro- Gen Otto P. Weyland, FEAF commander gram was “erroneously" being referred to as during the Korean War. claims that the source of Operation Strangle. Nonetheless, some Fifth Air the name Strangle is unknown. But the official Force Public Information Office releases con- history of Fifth Air Force attributes the origination tinued to refer to it by that name. of the name to Brig Gen Edward J. Timberlake, Strong criticism of the “failure" of Operation who was Fifth Air Force vice-commander at that Strangle from the other services caused Air time. The history goes on to say that the name Force leaders to come to the defense of Opera- was chosen “in order to avoid the use of the term tion Strangle/Rail Interdiction Program by 'interdiction' to describe an aerial campaign.’’ Air recounting the damage it had done to the enemy power advocates were seeking a strong name and by carefully defining and redefining its pur- that would capture the imagination. Unfortunate- pose. The Air Force maintained throughout the ly, they probably captured too much imagination. war and afterward that Operation Strangle was a The name Strangle was to apply to the road success. Others remained unconvinced. and truck interdiction effort during the summer of Naming an operation carries with it an impor- 1951. As that program faded in favor of the rail tance far out of proportion to whether or not the interdiction effort, which began on 18 August, the operation is successful. 40 AJRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

unable to mount a sustained major offen- completed until more than a month after sive himself.”9 According to noted air the program began. Unfortunately, another power historian Robert F. Futrell, both the important lesson flowed from failure. The Air Force chief of staff, Gen Hoyt S. Van- development of a joint survey was the cor- denberg, and FEAF commander, Gen Otto rect action to take in planning an air cam- P. Weyland, had misgivings about the paign to support Operation Strangle’s operation under the conditions imposed perceived objectives. But surveys should by the JCS and the truce negotiations.10 be completed and the right questions However, there is no indication that they asked before the campaign begins. The expressed those doubts at the time. joint study focused on the logistics needs General Weyland said the goal was to of the Communist field armies and deter- isolate the enemy, making him unable to mined that the enemy required 2,400 tons sustain his frontline forces, but then he of supplies daily to support his combat waffled in this by adding that a parallel forces. Further analysis indicated that objective was to ‘‘punish the enemy to the while it would take approximately 6,000 maximum extent possible.”11 Choosing the trucks to support this effort, 120 railcars name Strangle for the initial road/truck could carry the same load, making rail interdiction operation further confused the transport a more reasonable target for UN issue of just what the objective was air forces to attack. Three alternative solu- intended to be. Air Force leaders were tions were postulated as potential methods looking for a strong name for the operation for attacking the rail transport system. and wanted to avoid using the term inter- Bridges could be destroyed, rolling stock diction in favor of terms that clearly indi- could be attacked, or the rail lines them- cated that this was an air campaign.12 selves could be destroyed. Headquarters Ground commanders seem to have chosen FEAF and Fifth Air Force decided by pro- to interpret the term Strangle to indicate cess of elimination to attack the rail lines that air interdiction would "strangle” the as the primary target, reinforced by sec- enemy by choking off his supplies and ondary attacks on the bridges, as well as preventing him from maintaining an army preplanned and target-of-opportunity in the field. The choice of the name Stran- attacks on rolling stock.14 Here again, gle itself has become a classic lesson in the failure to follow through with proper anal- dangers of picking names for military ysis diluted the effective planning that had operations (see sidebar). The ultimate previously been done. result was an unclear objective, loosely The major effort to analyze the enemy interpreted to suit the goals and needs of logistical system was a textbook example various organizations, with no common of how to determine a center of gravity for understanding of what it was supposed to enemy activity. Rail transport was indeed achieve. The principle of the objective was essential to the enemy effort in the field. In clearly violated. Because of this violation, fact, Lt Gen Nam II, the chief Communist only mixed results came from the effort. delegate to the peace negotiations, speak- The road/truck interdiction program was ing of the overall air effort during the short-lived and not very successful; it Korean War, attributed the success of the killed trucks without really achieving any UN forces to their bombing campaigns.15 s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s . 13 B e c a u s e o f t h e p r o b - But at the same time, the analysis failed to lems with the road/truck interdiction consider just how successful interdiction effort, Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force could be in defeating the North Korean rail began a joint survey in July 1951 to con- supply effort. Little consideration was sider potential weaknesses in the enemy given to the notion that interdiction is logistical system. This survey was to be most effective when combined with a the basis of planning for the Rail Interdic- ground campaign which causes the enemy tion Program, also known as Operation to exhaust his supplies at a rate that can- Strangle, even though the survey was not not be sustained. PLANNING AIR OPERATIONS 41

The most successful period for Opera- “ have the capacity of destroying the tion Strangle was the first three months of enemy’s rail system in North Korea and of the campaign, when Eighth Army was still hindering his highway transportation sys- conducting ground operations to consoli- tem to such an extent that he will not be date and secure its positions. By the capable of opposing the US Eighth Army autumn of 1951, when ground activity effectively.”16 In November, when General decreased, so did the effectiveness of the Vandenberg received an update briefing at interdiction effort. While the study had Fifth Air Force headquarters, the assump- determined the level of supply effort tion that rail traffic could be reduced to needed by the enemy when engaged in near zero was still held: “Our plan is to battle, little consideration had been given reduce the lines to such a state of unser- to what level of supply was required to viceability that we can keep them blocked sustain the enemy in static defensive posi- w'ith a minimum of effort.”17 This estimate tions when neither side was conducting was given despite the fact that at the time offensive operations. Still less effort was a maximum effort was not achieving the given to considering if the rail interdiction same objective. efforts of Operation Strangle could reduce The difficulty of cutting rail traffic was the enemy supplies reaching the front to a not fully considered. Planners simply level below that needed to sustain a static asserted that air attacks could make suffi- defense. Air planners and air commanders cient cuts in rail lines to stem the flow of had simply assumed through their beliefs supplies. This assumption ignored the in air power that they could interdict the recent experiences of IX Tactical Air Com- enemy supply levels to the point where mand (TAC) rail interdiction efforts in the enemy would be forced to negotiate a World War II, which showed that cutting settlement rapidly and in good faith. rail lines was extremely difficult and that, In its official pre-Rail Interdiction Pro- until a new munition was developed, this gram estimate of 14 August 1951, Fifth Air was not a particularly effective technique Force stated that it, FEAF Bomber Com- when compared with the effort involved in mand, and naval Task Force 77 together achieving those cuts.18 The failure to fol- low through with the analysis process to determine if effective means of interdict- 4 Fifth Air Force B-26 light homher returns to its base in ing the rail supply effort below acceptable southern Japan after an early Operation Strangle mission levels for the enemy was a major defect in over Korea in June 1951. The effectiveness o f the interdiction effort would decline in relation to a decrease in the planning effort. Planners asked the US Eighth Army operations. right questions when they determined rail A B-26 strike cripples a supply depot near a rail line (lower not cutting the rail lines. In addition, by right) in North Korea. Despite a sustained effort by UN air this time Communist forces had begun to forces, interdiction alone could not meet the objective o f react to UN air attacks, decreasing the Operation Strangle. effect of successful bombing missions and increasing the danger to UN flyers. transport as a center of gravity. But they Not accounting for enemy reaction to neglected to ask the logical follow-up Operation Strangle was another key lapse questions to determine if the center of in the planning proccess. Initially, the gravity could successfully be defeated interdiction effort had been successful, with the means at hand. During its most destroying enemy supplies faster than they successful period, Operation Strangle could be replaced. Combined with Eighth decreased enemy rail transport to between Army ground activity, the rail interdiction 4 or 5 percent of its prewar levels. How- effort was hurting the enemy. There were ever, that 4 or 5 percent, combined with even reports of food shortages in some other methods of transport, was sufficient areas. Realizing the need to maintain their to support the needs of the Communist supply lines, the Communists can- forces in a static defensive position.19 nibalized existing double-track rail lines in In fact, making cuts in rail lines was order to assure that at least a single-track extremely difficult. Only one out of every rail line would remain open. In many four sorties flown actually produced a rail cases, trains were shuttled the short dis- cut. With a typical sortie carrying two 500- tances between rail cuts and the cargo pound bombs, the statistical results unloaded and transferred to another exist- showed only 12.9 percent of the ordnance ing rail line in order to complete the jour- dropped had any effect on the rail sys- ney to the front. By October 1951, it tem.20 As Operation Strangle entered the seemed as if the rail interdiction effort Korean winter, the results were even would prove successful. But the enemy worse. Bombs often simply skipped off the was beginning to overcome the difficulties frozen ground and exploded harmlessly, created by the interdiction effort, and littering the countryside with shrapnel but FEAF proved slow to react to enemy tacti-

42 PLANNING AIR OPERATIONS 43

cal changes, signaling the eventual down- enemy. This same lack of understanding of fall of Operation Strangle. what reliance on human labor and simple The first enemy reaction was to increase tools could accomplish would haunt US the air defense pressure on FEAF Bomber forces again during the Vietnam War. Command attacks on the bridge system. Being technologically oriented, the US The slow-moving B-29s were extremely military—and perhaps especially the Air vulnerable to MiG activity, and with only Force—gave short shrift to nontechnical a limited number of B-29s available, high solutions to military problems. loss rates could not be tolerated. Commu- Another way Communist forces used nist air attacks against Bomber Command their vast manpower resources to good formations intensified until restrictions advantage was the simple expedient of were placed on how far north they could human transportation. An April 1952 operate. study of enemy reactions to the Rail Inter- The enemy proved extremely capable as diction Program showed, for example, that well in the area of deception techniques, 100 men transporting mortar shells on creating the impression of destroyed their backs could meet the enemy’s daily bridges and rail lines when, in fact, the requirement for mortar shells for an indefi- bridges or rail sections were in good work- nite length of time. By combining those ing order. Bypass bridges were rapidly supplies reaching the front by rail, truck, constructed, in some cases even before the and foot. Communist forces were not only original bridge was destroyed. In addition, meeting their needs, they were actually some bridges had removable sections so able to stockpile some supplies for future that they appeared to be destroyed by day use.23 In spite of a maximum, sustained but were fully functional for nightly rail effort by air forces, interdiction alone traffic.21 A poor understanding of decep- could not meet the objectives set for Oper- tion techniques was a serious weakness in ation Strangle. Lack of analysis combined FEAF intelligence and photo analysis with enemy ingenuity and perseverance to efforts. It resulted in a failure to strike stifle the air interdiction effort. The enemy numerous targets that should have been understood his logistical problems far bet- hit and allowed the enemy to successfully ter than UN analysts did. By using the move his supplies while the UN forces blinders of Western thinking to view pos- believed they had stemmed that sible solutions to the problems of logistical movement. support while under air attack, UN forces The enemy proved to be willing to com- ignored the possibility of simple, but mit a vast amount of human resources to labor-intensive, alternatives. the effort of keeping rail lines open. Man- The most critical enemy reaction to the power, in the form of enforced Korean and interdiction effort was the movement of Chinese labor, was a virtually unlimited antiaircraft assets to protect the rail net- resource that could be stationed at close work. FEAF viewed this as proof that the intervals along the rail lines. When rail Communists needed the rail system and cuts were made, they could be repaired in that the air attacks were hurting them. In very short periods of time, often in no this assessment they may have been cor- more than six to eight hours and some- rect. But the enemy’s ability to sustain times less.22 The tools and supplies attacks was significantly greater than required were simple, plentiful, and inex- FEAF’s ability to sustain the increasingly pensive. The end result was that, typically, greater losses of aircraft and personnel in a rail line that was cut by air attacks was making those attacks. Fifth Air Force units back in operation by the next day and had were assigned specific sections of rail lines to be continually restruck to keep it shut to attack. Because the same sections of down. The cost to the UN forces in mate- railway were attacked day after day, often riel resources was far greater than to the in the same sequence of sections and at the 44 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

same time of day, the Communists could Obviously, this kind of negative exchange concentrate automatic weapons fire and rate could not be sustained. The cost was antiaircraft artillery (AAA) along the rail simply too great, especially when com- line to provide the best air defense.24 pared to the damage being inflicted on the Because of the concentrated AAA fire, enemy. bombs had to be dropped from higher alti- Failure to account for enemy reaction to tudes, decreasing their accuracy. In addi- air attacks and failure to adequately adjust tion, a larger percentage of the sorties had tactics to deal with enemy reactions to be devoted to suppression of enemy air proved to be another costly error for Oper- defenses, further decreasing the effective- ation Strangle. Originally designed to last ness of attempts to cut the rail network. 45 days, the campaign was continuously In the end. the cost became prohibitive extended as it struggled to meet its ill- for UN air resources. In the seven-month defined objectives. UN military planners period from the start of the Rail Interdic- saw no obvious alternative course of tion Program until mid-March 1952, 243 action to achieve the objectives either of aircraft were lost on interdiction missions, “strangling” enemy logistics or of pres- and another 290 suffered major damage. suring the enemy to negotiate in good The cost in human terms was 245 airmen faith. So the Rail Interdiction Program was killed or missing and 34 wounded. The simply extended. Continuing the cam- loss rate was double the replacement rate paign long beyond its intended length for aircraft, four times the rate when without careful consideration of the costs seriously damaged aircraft are included.25 only further separated Operation Strangle from its originally envisioned objectives, no matter which definition of the objec- FEAF Bomber Command B-29s undergo routine tives was used. By December 1951, Fifth maintenance prior to a mission o\’er Korea. The Superfort's Air Force had concluded that Operation vulnerability to North Korean MiGs eventually com pelled FEAF to place restrictions on how fa r north they could Strangle was not working, but General operate. Ridgway insisted it should be continued.26

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/ \ PLANNING AIH OPERATIONS 45

That General Ridgway should insist on supply operations, diverted thousands of continuing an air operation that his air troops, and destroyed thousands of trucks component considered futile further and rail cars.28 The Air Force proudly points out a problem in the air campaign cited the statistics showing the destruction planning process used in Korea. General it had wrought. But the FEAF staff study Ridgway inherited the Korean command that would end the Rail Interdiction Pro- structure from General MacArthur. albeit gram concluded that interdiction of rail with some modifications. It remained lines was not worth the effort and that— throughout the war an Army command given the restrictions placed upon them in structure masquerading as a unified com- terms of unclear objectives, lack of effec- mand system. But it was never a truly tive munitions, and geographical restric- unified command structure with tions along the northern border of Korea— equivalent-level component commanders air power could not be decisive in Korea.29 representing and controlling their own Failure to clearly state objectives after area of expertise. This was especially true considering accepted doctrine and to thor- for air activity. Even within the Air Force, oughly analyze enemy centers of gravity no single commander or staff organization and the available means of attacking those had control over all air assets. Fifth Air centers had doomed Operation Strangle Force controlled fighter-bomber and light before the first sortie ever left the ground. bomber assets, and FEAF Bomber Com- Lack of thorough planning and lack of a mand controlled B-29 attacks. Meanwhile, unified command structure with control naval Task Force 77 controlled naval air over all air assets had further weakened assets, and the 1st Marine Air Wing the efforts of Operation Strangle. worked independently as well. Eventually Attempting to simply extend a short-term a geographical area of responsibility agree- operation into a full aerial campaign ment was worked out giving Marine, Navy, would not suffice in achieving the objec- and Air Force units separate areas of oper- tives. Slow reaction to enemy efforts to ations.27 The beginnings of the route pack defeat Operation Strangle depleted system used in Vietnam can be seen in resources until it was finally admitted that these service-oriented geographical the effort was insufficient. arrangements. There was no air compo- Air interdiction had been successful in nent commander and little or no coordina- limited roles earlier in the Korean War. tion between the services, significantly But it must be remembered that those diminishing the overall effectiveness of air efforts were for a period of limited dura- operations. tion and in coordinated effort with ground In the end, interdiction failed to achieve operations to achieve maximum pressure the results its early planners had envi- on enemy resources. Planners of military sioned, and it became a matter of putting operations, especially air planners, should the best face on an unsuccessful operation. consider the legacy of Operation Strangle General Ridgway told the JCS that air before planning future air campaigns. □ interdiction had seriously affected enemy

Notes 1 Larry H Addington. The Patterns of War since the Eigh- 5. Ibid., 257. teenth Century I Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana University Press, 6. Ibid., 258. 1984). 253-56 7. Message. 98713. Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCFE, 11 2 Secretary of the Air Force. Office of Public Affairs. August 1951. Korea. The Suspended War (Kelly AFB. Tex.; Office of 8. Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea, Public Affairs. 1990). 1. 1950-1953 (New York: Uuell. Sloan and Pearce. 1961). 296. 3. Ibid.. 2. USAF fighters downed seven North Korean air- 9. Robert F. Futrell. Air Operations in the Korean War, craft that day. including the first kills by USAF jet aircraft. 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Research 4 Addington. 256-57. Division Liaison Office, March 1961). 25. 46 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1992

10. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 403. 17. Ibid.. 10. 11 Otto P Weyland, "The Air Campaign in Korea." Air 18. RSI study, 138. University Quarterly Review 6. no. 3 (Fall 1953): 21. 19. Futrell. USAF in Korea, 436. 12. History. Fifth Air Force, |uly-December 1951, appen- 20. Ibid.. 409. dix. "Notes on the Use of the Term Operation Strangle’." 2. 21 Maj Felix Kozaczka, "Enemy Bridging Techniques in 13. Col R. L. Randolph and Lt Col B. I. Mayo. The Applica- Korea.” Air University Quarterly Review 5. no. 4 (Winter tion of FEAF Effort in Korea. FEAF Deputy Commander for 1952-1953): 59. Operations, staff study. 12 April 1952, 5. 22. RSI study, 150. 14 Futrell, USAF in Korea, 403-5. 23. Randolph and Mayo, 5. 15. Research Studies Institute, United States Air Force 24. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 408. Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30/une 25. Randolph and Mayo, 3. 1952 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University. 1955), 138 (hereaf- 26. Futrell, Air Operations in Korea, 26. ter cited as RSI study). 27. Futrell. USAF in Korea, 296. 16 “The Story of 'Operation Strangle'," Air Intelligence 28. RSI study. 152. Digest, January 1952, 7. 29. Randolph and Mayo, 14.

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you've got something to say. send it to us. We ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war. that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don't let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor. Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE THE DILEMMA OF RECONSTITUTION AND LAUNCH-ON-DEMAND

Capt Lawrence A. Cooper, USAF

AUNCH-ON-DEMAND is the ability to put a satellite payload into orbit shortly after making the decision to launch. It includes the ability to Lreplace failed satellites quickly, to attempt a l aunch after an aborted try, and to respond to operational requirements to sat- isfy national security interests. Launch-on- demand provides the means for assured access to space. For years, the United States has sought to protect its interests and space assets by developing antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to deter the Soviet Union from using its ASATs. But we have overlooked assured access to space as an equally important method for safeguarding our assets.

*' j 1 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Although this aspect of space control has Launch-on-demand would also support been discussed in the recent past, its bene- the services’ desire to develop small satel- fits and pitfalls remain relatively obscure.1 lites as tactical aids. Although the Air Before the US implements assured-access Force, Army, and Navy have talked about programs, it must recognize that these pro- launch-on-demand in one form or another grams will need the support of specific for years, one does not simply deploy into plans and policies. These include the the wilderness or steam onto the high seas development of launch systems and sites and launch a satellite. We currently have capable of fulfilling launch-on-demand no procedures for creating satellite designs needs, new satellite designs, and a force and establishing operational methods to structure to perform a launch-on-demand launch satellites during a battlefield situa- mission. tion and then quickly bring them on-line The US should be able to replace or to support a tactical commander’s needs. launch new space assets on short notice. A When the military services call for TAC- launchpad mishap could incapacitate the SATs to provide communications and launch site, or a postlaunch abort could reconnaissance for commanders in battle, diminish mission capability. Further, ter- they are really calling for launch-on- rorist or preemptive strikes against our demand. When critics chastised the US for launch assets could disrupt the deploy- almost crippling its space program after ment of strategic and tactical satellite the Challenger disaster, they too were (TACSAT) assets. One of the best counters really calling for launch-on-demand. to such accidents or threats is the ability to replace satellites quickly and efficiently. Unfortunately, this is currently beyond our means. Air Force Doctrinal Basis for Launch-On-Demand

The US operates major launch sites at Cape Canaveral. The principles of war discussed by Florida, and Vandenherg AFB. California (pictured). Clausewitz and adapted for Air Force Shitting down these sites due to accident or hostile action Manual (AFM) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doc- would he less disruptive if the services had mobile launch systems and "small" satellites that would continue to assure trine of the United States Air Force, sup- access to space. port the concept of launch-on-demand and ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE 49 reconstitution. Specifically, the principles Control of Space of security and logistics as defined by AFM 1-1 apply directly to justifying such a As an operational medium, space has need: been compared to the sea in terms of allowing maneuverability and freedom of Security protects friendly military operations passage.6 Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan rec- from enemy activities which could hamper or ognized the importance of the sea as a defeat aerospace forces— Security in aero- highway, of oceanic trade routes for ease space operations is achieved through a com- of travel and access, and of securing ports bination of factors such as ... the defense and and protecting ships at sea.7 He also hardening of forces.2 emphasized the utility of choke points, Security derives not only from denying an which enable a nation to control access to enemy knowledge of one’s forces and the sea and its trade routes. Many of operations, but also from increasing the Mahan’s observations are relevant to the survivability of these forces. The latter control of space. For instance, nations pre- secures the forces against attacks and thus fer certain locations from which to launch insures their use in offensive and defen- their spacecraft and take pains to protect sive operations. Reconstitution can be an these sites. This enables them to put integral part of survivable space systems spacecraft into orbit when they so desire. and can assure the performance of critical Additional technical and logistical issues space missions immediately prior to. dur- (e.g., weather patterns, access to the site, ing, and after hostilities.3 For example, the proximity to population centers, waste dis- launching of spares augments degraded or posal, etc.) influence the selection of interdicted space systems and provides for launch sites but are beyond the scope of their continued use in strategic and tacti- this article. cal missions. Sun Tzu also touched on an underlying AFM 1-1 also notes that principle of space control when he stressed the importance of focal ground, logistics is the principle of sustaining both man and machi ne in combat by obtai ni ng, observing that “he who gets control of it moving, and maintaining warfighting poten- will gain the support of surrounding tial. . . . states.’’8 Thus, Sun Tzu correctly recog- Effective logistics also requires a flexible sys- nized over 2,400 years ago that the occupa- tem that can function in all combat environ- tion or control of certain areas will provide ments and that can respond to abrupt and a nation security against potential sudden change.4 enemies. Whether called choke points or focal ground, launch sites and ranges will In his book on space power doctrine, Lt play a significant role in space control Col David Lupton recognizes the impor- because all satellites are launched and tance of logistics to space systems. Of pri- controlled from these areas. mary importance is his observation that a Two facts illustrate the value of good nation's ability to access space determines locations for launch sites. First, the closer its pecking order among the space the site to the equator, the easier it is to powers.5 Indeed, the Soviet Union’s launch a spacecraft into geosynchronous inability to put cosmonauts on the moon orbit (i.e.. one in which the satellite travels and the apparent impotency of the US above the equator at the same speed as the immediately following the Challenger earth rotates so that the satellite appears accident diminished the image of these stationary).9 The math of orbital nations as space powers. The Soviet Union mechanics does not allow the launching of shifted its space program’s focus to near- vehicles directly into an orbit inclination earth operations, while the US shifted lower than the site’s latitude. Furthermore, emphasis from the space shuttle to the use the closer the site to the equator, the of expendable launch vehicles. smaller the booster needed to put a 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

payload into a geosynchronous orbit (or launch vehicle is vulnerable while on the the larger the payload put into orbit). Sec- pad and while accelerating downrange and ond. if a fixed site is easily accessible, has into orbit. Just as bombs can destroy proper facilities, and abuts uninhabited launch facilities, so can hand-held ground- areas or is on the ocean, it assures logisti- to-air missiles destroy rocket boosters. cal support and safe operations. Although a launch vehicle’s delicate The manpower, materiel, and money systems, flammable fuels, and slow speed required to build launch complexes would at low altitudes render it vulnerable to normally restrict the number of sites a attack, it does not enjoy even a modicum nation can afford. Most countries have one of the security that is provided to mission- major launch site. The US has two: Ken- control facilities and communications nedy Space Center, Florida (used to nodes. Generally, mission-control facilities launch satellites into equatorial and are protected by security forces on military inclined orbits—fig. 1), and Vandenberg installations, where most mission-control AFB, California (used to launch satellites facilities are located. Because communica- into polar orbits—fig. 2). The Soviets have tions nodes—satellite-control facilities, three (fig. 3). These sites and the ranges communications dishes, radio-frequency through which launch vehicles travel to links, and so forth—are already recognized orbit constitute choke points which must as linchpins or choke points for communi- be protected if the nation is to access cations systems, we have taken extensive space. The launch site’s facilities and per- measures to secure them from jamming sonnel are vulnerable to attack, and the and harden them against the effects of

Figure 1. Launch azimuths from Kennedy Space Center are constrained due to geographical, safety, environmental, and political considerations. (From class notes in Operations Research 592, Air Force Institute of Technology. Winter 1991.) ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE 51

Figure 2 Available launch azimuths from Vandenberg AFB are also constrained due to geographical, safety, environ- mental. and political considerations. (From dass notes in Operations Research 592, Air Force Institute of Technology, Winter 1991 )

nuclear attack.10 Otherwise, an enemy could easily cripple a nation’s ability to use its satellites. Even though we are capable of establish- ing alternate locations from which to con- trol satellites, the fact that there are so few of these sites makes them high-value tar- gets. Well-timed attacks on the few mis- sion- and satellite-control facilities in this country could conceivably cripple the ability of the US to command and control its satellites for a brief time. Nevertheless, control facilities are infinitely more sur-

Figure 3. Soviet Union launch sites and ranges. The northeast arrows for Plesetsk and Tyuratam delineate a range of azimuths. (Adapted from Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space, 1990 (Colorado Springs. Colo.: Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1991], 8.) 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

vivable than launch sites and vehicles sim- Although the use of spares greatly ply because we have taken at least some reduces the time required to replace satel- steps to protect them. But control facilities lites, it does not eliminate the need for are useless if there are no satellites to launch-on-demand. For instance, no control. spares are available for constellations ini- tially placed into orbit. Further, TACSATs—which will augment recon- naissance and communications satellites On-Orbit Spares and provide battlefield commanders enhanced wartime capabilities—are short- The ability of the US to launch space lived assets placed in special orbits. In this assets and to support national security pol- case, the use of spares is impractical icy was considerably degraded after the because we cannot anticipate when we Challenger disaster and the abortive will need TACSATs. Although satellite launches of three other vehicles carrying spares may at first glance seem to solve communications and reconnaissance satel- our problem, we must remember that mov- lites." The Air Force’s communications, ing from high orbits into low ones (and at early-warning, and reconnaissance satel- different orbital inclinations) requires con- lites worked overtime due to the lack of siderable fuel; furthermore, such a maneu- replacements and spares; constellations ver could easily require more time than a had to work with fewer satellites than short-notice launch. More likely, spares were actually needed; and payload sched- would be of much greater use to high- ules were backed up for years. As an orbiting communications satellites— interim solution, the Air Force procured witness the Air Force’s repositioning of expendable launch vehicles (e.g., Delta II, communications satellites during Opera- Titan IV, and Atlas II launchers) to place tion Desert Storm. military and national security assets into Since the prepositioning of spares is an orbit. Thus, the US became reliant on a expensive operation, only a small number mixture of different launchers to comple- of them (if any) are normally orbited. ment and supplement the launch Spares are more feasible as replacements capabilities of the space shuttle. for anticipated losses (e.g., if several satel- But this policy addresses only long-term lites in one or more constellations failed access to space. A so-called short-notice due to natural causes or through human launch would take over three months to intervention, valuable systems would be check out, package, and prepare the satel- degraded until replacements were readied lite.12 If, by some accident, a vital satellite and launched—clearly an undesirable sit- were lost on orbit, or if a global crisis uation). On-orbit spares are appealing, but required a special reconnaissance satellite, they do not eliminate the need for launch- or if a nation with ballistic missiles on-demand; rather, we should strive destroyed one of our satellites, the US toward a balanced use of the two systems. could not quickly launch a replacement. An alternative to launching replacement satellites into space is the use of on-orbit The Soviet Unions spares. This concept involves placing sat- Launch-On-Demand ellites in high storage orbits, where they Capability are left for long periods of time. When it is needed, a spare is activated and moved The Soviet Union launches many more into position to take over the duties of a satellites than does the US. The Soviets failed satellite. We have used on-orbit compensate for the fact that their satellites spares in the past and are considering are less sophisticated and have shorter life them for much more extensive use in spans than US satellites by launching future constellations.13 more of them. But their launch rates have ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE 53

decreased in recent years because Flight controllers in the mission control center at the improved technology has extended the life Johnson Space Center in Houston. Texas, monitor the chores span of their satellites.14 Despite this of a space shuttle crew. decrease, the USSR remains able to launch closely approximate US capabilities. In within a day or two of making such a deci- peacetime, the Soviets have to expend sion. Indeed, the Soviets have launched more resources to match the performance one satellite every 48 hours for several of US satellites, but in a crisis or time of weeks at a time in support of military war, their quick-launch capability gives exercises and space operations. During the them more flexibility. If in some crisis the Falklands War, they launched 29 boosters Soviets lose part or all of their space over 69 days.15 Thus, the people who pre- assets, they have enough stockpiled pare the satellites and launchers and those boosters and satellites to quickly replace who operate the mission-control centers those assets. The US, however, would gain valuable experience. need weeks or months to reconstitute its The Soviet Union not only launches space forces. many rockets on short notice to showcase The loss of one or more of the Soviet its prowess and to carry out its military Union’s three launch sites could easily space strategy, but also to support national cripple its launch capability, forcing the security interests on a day-to-day basis. country to rely on short-lived assets When the need arises, the Soviets launch already in orbit. Of course, the Soviet reconnaissance or other special-purpose Union’s increasing use of long-lived satel- satellites, as they did to monitor the 1973 lites will reduce this vulnerability.17 Yom Kippur War, the Falklands War, and Despite these facts, the Soviets’ launch the war in Afghanistan.16 In each of these sites and boosters are less vulnerable than cases, the Soviets made one or more their American counterparts for two main launches within 48 hours of the onset of reasons: access to the sites is limited, and the crisis, enabling them to closely follow they are well within the boundaries of the events without having to divert their exist- Soviet Union. ing orbiters. The Soviets’ assembly-line approach to satellite production does not imply a less High Payoff for capable space force. Although their satel­ lites are not as sophisticated or as long- Launch-On-Demand lived as ours, by keeping about the same Many benefits await the US if it number in orbit as we do, the Soviets can develops launch-on-demand. We could 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 dedicate special satellites for monitoring vehicles.1:0 Although we have emphasized and providing communications to our the development of technology that will forces in remote locations (e.g., the Persian give the US assured access to space and Gulf) and could replace satellites lost to launch-on-demand, we have not taken accidents or interference. If. for example, a pains to establish the procedures that country such as Iraq or Libya, having would make launch-on-demand feasible. developed long-range missiles or space- One cannot simply drive a mobile launch vehicles, used them to deliver a launcher to a location and shoot a satellite warhead on a high-priority US satellite, we into orbit. Quick launches from fixed sites might respond in several ways. We could will not differ greatly from normal opera- protest and impose sanctions. Or—if we tions, but the same cannot be said of oper- had our own ASATs—we could respond ations from a mobile launcher. in kind, assuming that verification and Many questions and problems present assignation of blame were possible. As an themselves. For quick launches in support alternative or complementary measure, the of battlefield and fleet commanders, who US could replace that asset in less than a will have launch authority? Where will the week. Thus, we would gain prestige and launchers be located? Dust, rain, mud, demonstrate our leadership through our and salt water do not mix readily with ability to respond to adversity, showing the technology of today’s—or even that the loss does not affect our ability to tomorrow’s—launchers and payloads. It continue operations. would probably be best to establish vast, In time of war or heightened tensions, special launch areas in the continental an Army commander might need special United States and on the high seas where reconnaissance capabilities for supporting mobile launch complexes would operate. troops, keeping track of enemy troop Crews could quickly and secretly move movements, and providing other intel- payloads to a remote location within these ligence. A fleet commander might want to areas and quietly launch them into space. launch a special reconnaissance satellite to Additionally, dedicated and secure watch enemy fleets over the horizon, track mission-control complexes and teams hostile forces, or perform surveillance of must coordinate with the organization that an area to aid in battle planning. Since sat- requests and performs the launch. We ellites already in orbit might not be avail- must also establish procedures for quick able to support the mission, we could checkout and transition to operational sta- launch special TACSATs on a moment’s tus. Currently, it takes several days or notice and quickly maneuver them into weeks to check out a satellite, stabilize it, position. and move it into its proper orbit, thus assuring a smooth, efficient operation. Last, we need new satellite designs and Missing Link for Effective operational procedures if those satellites are to perform their missions immediately Launch-On-Demand after launch. The Pegasus air-launched booster is cur- rently being tested. Taurus—its ground- launched, mobile derivative which can deliver bigger payloads—is also under Implications for US development.1” The Air Force, Army, and Space Forces Navy are all developing small, inexpensive satellites for a variety of missions.19 The The US learned its lesson in the after- Air Force is also developing new satellite math of the Challenger disaster and has technology to make modular satellites developed expendable launch vehicles with common buses and standard inter- and other technologies to assure access to faces to facilitate the connection to launch space. But these technologies give the US ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE 55 access to space only at intervals of several months. If we continue to develop small satellites and small, versatile launchers, we must be able to launch these satellites into orbit days after the need arises, not months. The US has the means to do this but not the method. The US must fill the gap between pos- sibility and capability by developing oper- ational procedures and policies to decide to replace or launch a satellite on day one; pull the satellite from inventory, check it out, and mate it to a booster on day two; and launch the satellite and put it to work in space on day three. This capability relieves the pressure of losing a satellite and sends a message to the world that the US is in space to stay and that nothing can stop it from conducting operations in sup- port of its national policies. This position of strength is particularly important in light of Operation Desert Storm. The performance of US sur- veillance, reconnaissance, meteorological, and navigation satellites in the war with Iraq demonstrated the contribution of space forces to national security.21 Had Iraq possessed a credible ASAT capability, though, it could have eliminated or crip- pled our ability to gather valuable intel- ligence that contributed to victory. Because of the protracted buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf. US communica- The second stage o f a Della rocket is hoisted up the gantry tions were sorely taxed. Despite the fact for attachment to the rocket's first stage in preparation for a that the US had more than five months to future satellite launch. Even short-notice launches require prepare for hostilities, however, no sup- over three months o f preparation time. plemental communications satellites were forthcoming. Regardless of whether this cost of such adapted technology indicates need was unforeseen or whether no satel- that a great deal of money has already been lites were available, the situation reveals a spent on the development of launch-on- glaring weakness in our space capabilities. demand. Plans and programs designed to Even in these days of force reductions implement the technology and fit it into and cutbacks in the military budget, we the military’s force structure have not cannot neglect the cost of implementing received the same attention, however. launch-on-demand. It costs money to Such planning, programming, and train- develop launch vehicles and train launch ing of launch crews will compete with crews. Pegasus and Taurus are under other military programs for scarce funds. development and will allow short-notice Deciding how much money to allocate to launching of small payloads. Further, the launch-on-demand depends on the answer technology that underlies weapons such as to the question. In a crisis, what is it worth the small intercontinental ballistic missile to retain space systems as a force multi- (SICBM) can be adapted to provide alter- plier? Desert Storm revealed to the world nate platforms for small launchers. The some of the benefits of space-based naviga- 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 tion, communications, and reconnais- Small, single-purpose light satellites sance. If we are to rely on this technology, (LIGHTSAT) and TACSATs are under we must be sure that it is available during development. New types of launchers, wartime. such as Pegasus and Taurus, will provide the Air Force much greater flexibility in putting payloads into orbit. Although orbi- Conclusion tal inclinations are restricted by the lati- tude of launch, Pegasus could conceivably In order to make launch-on-demand a launch all of its payloads from the equator, reality, US Space Command and Air Force thus maximizing the available orbit Space Command (AFSPACECOM) need to inclinations. The mobile Taurus could be address a number of matters, several of dispersed in times of heightened tensions which are currently under development. to provide reconstitution or local launch AFSPACECOM, which has already taken services to a tactical unit. An unusual over normal launch operations from Air option might include equipping ships or Force Systems Command, must develop submarines with a Taurus derivative to the procedures and technology to rou- launch small satellites into orbit. tinely launch satellites in much the same When these technologies become opera- way that the Air Force generates aircraft tional, technicians will have to begin prac- sorties. At present, the Air Force custom ticing many short-notice launches per year designs each satellite and booster. How- to establish their proficiency. Furthermore, ever, the service is developing an we will need to integrate launch-on- assembly-line approach featuring stan- demand into joint operations for US and dardized boosters for easy mating of NATO troops and practice it during mili- payloads, as well as common buses and tary exercises. This way, the US will have components to facilitate the switching of the technology and the ability to adapt its components to change satellite function. space forces to meet any crisis. □

Notes 1. Capt |ohn W. Power. "Space Control in the Post-Cold change or dogleg maneuver to reach that orbit. This requires War Era." Airpower Journal 4. no. 4 (Winter 1990): 30. more fuel (thus, a larger booster) or a smaller pavload. 2. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 10. Ibid., 35-37. Air Force. 16 March 1984. 2-6 through 2-7. 11. James W. Canan, "Coming Back in Space,” Air Force 3. Col Robert B. Giffen. US Space System Survivability: Magazine 70, no. 2 (February 1987): 45. Strategic Alternatives for the 1990s (Washington. D.C.: 12. Gen John L. Piotrowski. "Military Space Launch: The National Defense University Press. 1982), 42. Path to a More Responsive System (Part I)," Aerospace & 4. AFM 1-1, 2-9. Defense Science 9. no. 7 (July 1990): 43. 5. Lt Col David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space 13. Ibid. Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 14. Craig Covault, "Soviet Military Space Operations June 1988), 127- Colonel Lupton emphasizes five pillars of a Developing Longer Life Satellites," Aviation Week Sr Space space-control doctrine (logistics, humans, space surveillance, Technology 132. no. 15 (9 April 1990): 44. weapons, and organization). Placing logistics first seems to 15. Piotrowski, 46. imply its preeminence, but placing systems and weapons 16. Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space first seems more logical. Otherwise, the tail is wagging the (London: Jane's Publishing Co.. Ltd.. 1987). 93. dog. Logistics supports the systems which perform space 17. Nicholas L. Johnson. The Soviet Year in Space, 1990 control. (Colorado Springs. Colo.: Teledyne Brown Engineering. 6. Power, 26. 1991), 45. 7. A. T. Mahan. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 18. Craig Covault, "Desert Storm Reinforces Military Space 1660-1783 (Boston: Little. Brown and Co.. 1945). 25. Directions," Aviation Week S- Space Technology 134, no. 14 8. Gen Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, trans. Yuan (8 April 1991): 45. Shibing (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1987). 67. 19. Vincent Kieman, "Military Services Moving to Wider 9. Giffen. 12. In order for a launch vehicle to boost directly Role for Lightsats,” Space News 1. no. 30 (6-12 August into orbit, at some time the launch site must be directly 1990): 9. under the orbital path. Boosters launched from latitudes 20. Covault, "Desert Storm," 44. above the inclination of a particular orbit require a plane 21. "The Advantage of Space Power," Space News 2. no. 2 (21 January-3 February 1991): 22. Spring 1992 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

LT COL PHILLIP S. MEILINGER, USAF for his article The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine

Congratulations to Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger If you would like to compete for the Ira C. on his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award win- Eaker Award, submit an article of feature length ner for the best eligible article from the Spring to the Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell 1992 issue of the Airpower Journal. Colonel AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for the best Meilinger receives a $500 cash award for his eligible article in each issue and is open to all contribution to the Air Force’s professional US military personnel below the rank of colo- dialogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker nel or equivalent and all US government civil- and is made possible through the support of the ian employees below GS-15 or equivalent. Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winchester. Massachusetts.

57 JOINTNESS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

A REVIEW OF JOINT PUB 1

Col Den n is M. Drew, USAF

HE PROBLEM is straightforward. legislation has complex and far-reaching Airmen, soldiers, sailors, and provisions. Among other attributes, it marines look at the world through strengthens the role of the chairman of the their own lenses. Their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, modifies both the Tmissions, operating environments,requirements and prospects for officers experiences, and training all lead to very serving in joint billets, and mandates the different perspectives. These divergent production of joint doctrine—for example, perspectives fuel service parochialism and Joint Publication] 1, Joint Warfare of the foster interservice rivalries. US Armed Forces (11 November 1991), the Some degree of service parochialism and subject of this review. interservice rivalry is inevitable and, Whether or not in the long run the legis- within limits, can be healthy. We should lation will have its intended effects with- be suspicious of any service that is not out debilitating side effects remains to be extremely proud of its mission, seen. Many people argue that the stunning capabilities, and accomplishments. In the success of Operation Desert Storm demon- same light, friendly rivalries can keep strated that Goldwater-Nichols achieved institutional capabilities razor-sharp and positive results. One must be cautious in reduce complacency. Unfortunately, both making this judgment, however, because parochialism and rivalry have demon- there may or may not be a direct cause- strated a propensity to get out of hand, and-effect relationship between the legisla- much to the detriment of US national tion and success in the Gulf war. The jury security. is still out. Fed up with perceived service paro- chialism, worried by the failures in Viet- nam and at Desert One, concerned with problems in Operation Urgent Fury (Gre- The Root of the Problem nada), and spurred on by the military reform group, Congress enacted legislation Parochialism and rivalry among the in 1986 (known by the shorthand name, services are certainly not new phenomena. “Goldwater-Nichols”). Designed to Their foundation lies in the nature of the strengthen a sense of “jointness” within services themselves, whose very different the entire US military establishment, the worldviews are based on different operat-

58 ing environments.1 Ground forces, for creation of naval forces from the keel up example, have a relatively narrow world- requires an extremely long lead time. view, which is a natural outgrowth of the Third, naval assets tend to stay in service ways in which ground forces fight. To much longer than air and land force assets. ground forces, every hill, river, forest, and The recent decommissioning of the aircraft so forth, is an obstacle which they must carrier USS Lexington, which was overcome and a serious hindrance to launched midway through World War II, is maneuverability. Further, their “problem” just one recent example. is immediate—it is the “bad guys” right in Airmen have the least constrained front of them who are shooting at them. worldview, which is totally in consonance The result is a constricted worldview and with their operating environment. The all- a heavy emphasis on shorter-term prob- enveloping aerospace environment puts no lems.2 Both of these tendencies have tradi- bounds on the operations of airmen except tionally been reflected in Army doctrine those imposed by technology or human although the most recent versions have endurance. The advance of aeronautical displayed an expanded perspective.3 technology during the twentieth century The traditional naval viewpoint (to has made it possible for airmen to mass include the Marine Corps) is much dif- great power quickly over any spot on the ferent. The naval worldview conforms to globe. The airman’s worldview is also the nature of its operating environment— influenced by the speed at which one can global in scope, constrained only by the operate in the aerospace environment. shorelines of the world’s oceans. Even Closing speeds measured in thousands of these limitations have been loosened by miles per hour provide a sense of imme- the advent of naval air power, which can diacy to a global worldview.4 project power far inland. The broad naval These differing worldviews have led to viewpoint also has a long-range perspec- differing operational concerns. At the risk tive for at least three reasons. First, the pri- of oversimplifying, one may say that mary combat problem is often not ground forces place great emphasis on the immediate. The fact that contending immediate problem—winning the battle— navies are often widely separated has tra- and less emphasis on campaigns and the ditionally made the hunt for the enemy total war effort. At the other end of the fleet a principal problem. Second, the scale, airmen place relatively greater

59 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

JOINT PUB I The Fears of Airmen For airmen, the fears have a significant basis in fact. Most airmen are well aware of the bitter struggles between the Army and the Army Air Corps (later, the Army Air Forces) during the 1920s and 1930s. They also know about the stiff resistance JOINT WARFARE of the Navy during much of that same OF THE period to the expansion of land-based air power in defense of the American coast- US ARMED FORCES iine.5 After World War II, the so-called revolt of the admirals—a controversy over the B-36 bomber and a new supercarrier— demonstrated to airmen just how far another service would go to protect its “turf.”6 Acrimony spilled onto the battlefield in Korea when, for a time, coordinating naval and Air Force air power became all but impossible.7 In Vietnam, service jealousies and bickering resulted in about six dif- ferent air wars being waged simul- taneously, for the most part without centralized control.8 II NOVEMBER IW1 Soldiers, sailors, and marines can recite instances which, from their perspectives, give rise to their own fears. For example, airmen tend to forget the enormous emphasis on actions that can “win” the emphasis on air power during the 1950s entire war. less emphasis on campaigns, when so-called atomic air power became and the least emphasis of all on individual the centerpiece of US national defense pol- battles. Naval forces fall someplace in icy at the direct expense of the Army, between, a situation muddled somewhat Navy, and Marine Corps. The situation because American naval forces have their became so lopsided and intolerable that own “army” (the Marine Corps) and their Gen Maxwell Taylor of the US Army was own “air force.” driven to produce a book openly critical of The upshot of all this is that airmen, sol- US defense policy, warning that all future diers. sailors, and marines have very dif- wars could not be settled by nuclear ferent views about how wars should be weapons.9 A few short years later, our fought and how the nation’s armed forces deep involvement in Southeast Asia should be structured and equipped. This, provided the proof of that pudding. in turn, has led over the years to bitter The point of all this is that soldiers, struggles over the military budget during sailors, airmen, and marines have had— peacetime and struggles over military and probably do have—misgivings about strategy during times of strife. In the latter one another. The problem is real and of instance, all the services fear that their long standing. forces will be misused by the “unwashed” from another service, who do not under- stand how their forces should be used and Enter Goldwater-Nichols do not appreciate the contribution their particular kind of military force can make Into this simmering stew of worldviews, to the larger struggle. parochialism, rivalry, and misgivings came JOINTNESS 61

the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which mandated jointness from the top down. It would be nice if things were so simple and the problem could be so easily solved. As pointed out above, however, the problems are real, they are long-standing, and they are based on fundamentally different worldviews. The situation cannot be changed by a simple wave of the congres- sional pen. One of the most interesting and contro- versial portions of Goldwater-Nichols is the requirement to produce joint doctrine. This requirement has spawned a vast effort that has yielded some significant results. It has also revealed some of the intractable problems caused by differing worldviews The meat of the text attempts to discuss and theories of victory. The production of the nature of modern warfare, the personal joint doctrine—which truly melds the war- values required for successful joint war- fighting viewpoints of land, sea, and air fare, the fundamentals of joint warfare, forces into a coherent war-fighting and the nature of joint campaigns. There is package—is still far from a total success little to argue with here. It is ‘“middle-of- and will require much more effort and the-road” or mainstream military thought. soul-searching. This reviewer also found that throughout the text one could change the word joint to (take your pick) land, sea. or air and still have an accurate and coherent document. The Unveiling of But, perhaps that is the point. Warfare in joint Pub 1 the modern world is joint warfare—not something distinct and apart from that Into the middle of this joint doctrine with which we are familiar. This is a muddle comes Joint Pub 1. intended to be lesson well worth relearning from time to a capstone document which “'guides the time. joint action of the Armed Forces of the One can quibble with the text here and United States, presenting concepts mold- there. For example, the preface states that ing those Armed Forces into the most “‘joint force commanders choose the effective joint fighting force” (page iii). capabilities they need from the air, land, Considering what has been said above, one sea, space, and special operations forces at requires little imagination to realize the their disposal” (page iii, emphasis added). difficulty of fulfilling the publication’s Aside from the arbitrary division of aero- intended purpose. space into air and space, the inclusion of The document is a slick, colorful booklet special operations forces seems somewhat laced with appropriate pictures. Included akin to mixing apples and oranges, in that are vignettes of people who have been it mixes operating environments with awarded the Medal of Honor in joint oper- capabilities. The fact that this odd mixture ations. as well as portraits of famous com- is repeated again (see pages 38-39) indi- manders of joint and combined forces (Gen cates that it is no accident. Another quib- Douglas MacArthur. Gen Alexander Van- ble comes in chapter 4, “The Joint degrift, and Gen Dwight Eisenhower). Campaign.” Section B of that chapter Although informative and illustrative, (‘‘Supporting Capabilities”) defies any these vignettes and portraits tend to dis- observable logic in its construction, mix- rupt the flow of the text throughout the ing capabilities and operations in a care- publication. less fashion. 62 AIRPOXVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

The author or authors have gone out of useful purpose and does so with consider- their way to ensure that this document able style. will offend no one. All of the services are The downside is that the fundamentally given equal billing throughout. Even the different worldviews of soldiers, sailors, Medal of Honor awardees and the pictures airmen, and marines cannot be papered accompanying the vignettes of MacArthur over. They will not just disappear. Nor and Eisenhower have been carefully should these divergent worldviews and chosen and balanced. Here is a picture of theories of victory be sacrificed on the Eisenhower talking to two airmen. Here is altar of jointness. Rather, we must find a Eisenhower aboard ship talking to several way to meld them. We must find a way to admirals. Finally comes a photo of Ike channel parochial interests and interser- talking to several soldiers. The pictures vice rivalries and harness them to create accompanying the MacArthur story are more effective war-fighting capabilities chosen with equal care. across the spectrum of conflict. Joint Pub 1 In this reviewer’s opinion, Joint Pub 1 is does not do this nor, in my opinion, was it not intended for the “military intellectual” intended to accomplish such a feat. If any- community. It is a “cheerleading” docu- thing, Joint Pub 1 is an opening salvo in ment most appropriate for wide public what will be a long-term battle to meld the consumption and for use in precommis- diverse views and capabilities of the ser- sioning education programs. It emphasizes vices in a synergistic fashion. the need for jointness and the reality of Unquestionably, the effort to create joint three-dimensional warfare in the modern synergies will be both long and difficult. It world. It provides positive examples of will be made even more difficult because success in joint operations. At the same of the downsizing of the US military. If time, it ignores the peacetime and wartime history is any guide, parochialism and problems in achieving jointness discussed interservice rivalry reach their zenith earlier and provides little that is new or when the budget gets tight and service challenging to people who have studied institutions and capabilities are threat- warfare. On the positive side, as a docu- ened. A formidable task faces the chair- ment intended for wide public consump- man and the joint chiefs. In fact, a tion. Joint Pub 1 serves an effective and formidable task faces us all.

Notes 1. For a more complete exposition of this concept, see my I960, and vol. 2. 1961-1984 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Univer- article “Joint Operations: The World Looks Different from sity Press. 1989). 10,000 Feet," Airpoiver Journal 2. no. 3 (Fall 1988): 4—Ifi. 5. Again, the best reference is volume 1 of Futrell's Ideas. 2. See Russell Weigley's discussion of this tendency as it Concepts. Doctrine. related to theHnvasion of Northwest Europe in 1944 in 6. An excellent recent article on this incident is Lt Col Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana Uni- Phillip S. Meilinger's "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons versity Press, 1981). 35. for Today." Parameters. September 1989, 81-96. 3. For example, the US Army's Field Manual (FM| 100-5. 7. See Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Operations. 1 |uly 1976. had for its overriding theme the Korea. 1950-1953. rev. ed. (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air notion of "winning the first battle." The version of FM 100-5 Force History. 1983), 48-55. written in the 1980s featured the "AirLand Battle” concept, 8. Two of the best and most authoritative recent books on which incorporates a refreshingly broader perspective. the air wars in Southeast Asia are Mark Clodfelter's The 4. This worldview and the conceptual capabilities of air Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Viet- power were the basis for the strategic bombing doctrine that nam (New York: Free Press, 1989): and Earl H. Tilford. Jr.’s dominated Army Air Corps. Army Air Forces, and Air Force Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Max- thinking from the 1920s well into the 1960s. The most well AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 1991). authoritative treatment of this subject is found in Robert 9. Gen Maxwell D. Taylor. The Uncertain 7’rumpet (New Frank Futrell's massive study Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: York: Harper and Brothers, 1960). Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1. 1907- RICOCHETS 63

Ricochets in their commitment to make the Air Force more continued from page 3 combat capable, (page 3-2) didn't bother to read it because of the title. Happily, the new draft AFM 1-1 captures They felt it didn’t apply to them! Funny, I still many of these ideas in chapter 4 when talking feel that the following observation transcends about training our forces. Perhaps 1 am being all specialties: petty, but we seem to have substituted liberal references to “commanders” for any substan- The maturation of people is an ongoing process tive description of leadership responsibilities. [that is] meant to instill the will—the warfighting Have we really become such an egalitarian out- spirit—and the skills of a warrior as people are fit that it is unfashionable even to talk about trained, educated, and indoctrinated to perform at the unit, theater, and global levels.... Therefore, leadership? Even Total Quality Management self-preparation, coupled with a formal and profes- acknowledges the importance of “vision” and sional education, is needed to compensate for a active, quality-oriented leaders. lack of combat experience, (page 2-3) At a minimum, 1 recommend that these ideas from AFM 1-10 be rolled into the new AFM 1-1 General Boyd and Colonel YVestenhoff admit- to ensure that everyone understands the dif- ted in their article that "airmen have not been ference leadership can have on mission results. famous for reading history” (page 4). Based on If our present and future leaders do not gain a many so-called lessons learned from Desert healthy appreciation for the impact of leaders Shield Storm, it is pretty clear that more atten- at all levels and do not actively strive to “push” tion should be given to such things as Project the doctrinal envelope, then they will indeed Warrior, exercise after-action reports, input be overlooking an “indispensable ingredient in from the unit level (shades of Total Quality understanding warfare’’ ("new” AFM 1-1, Management!), and leadership. I hope that the 1:4-2). So please justify the confidence voiced confidence of General Boyd and Colonel West- by General Boyd and Colonel Westenhoff, and enhoff is rewarded and that "most Air Force get yourself, your peers, and your subordinates professionals not only will read our new doc- involved now! trine with care, but will devote themselves to making it better in the future” (page 5). Unfor- Lt Col C. J. Bohn III, USAF tunately, my experience at AWC leaves me Goodfellow A F B , Texas skeptical. Nonetheless, I am confident that most profes- sionals agree with the following words found in General Boyd's Response: AFM 1-10: Colonel Bohn’s letter raises important issues You [emphasis added] are the single most impor- about basic aerospace doctrine and how it is tant factor in achieving military victory.. Peace- written. A good way to approach these issues time organizations can only remain dynamic and is, I believe, to first address some broader con- viable through personal leadership; groups are less siderations: YVhat is USAF doctrine? What does capable of managing organizational change because group action demands consensus and avoids risk- it do? Why is it important? taking. Thus, the imagination and creativity of the Our basic doctrine is a summation of Air individual leader can bring vision to an organiza- Force thinking in the broadest, most com- tion and motivate people to accomplish extraordi- prehensive sense. It defines what aerospace nary deeds. power is, and it states our belief on how best to Leaders are recognized and judged by their actions, exploit this unique facet of military power. In not by their grade or position. Leaders are people the words of the new AFM 1-1, "Doctrine is who first choose to do "the right thing” and then what we have learned about aerospace power ensure “things are done right." They are loyal [and] and its application since the dawn of powered accept the responsibility for all their decisions, flight. [It is] what we hold true about aerospace especially when they go wrong, without offering power and the best way to do the job in the Air any excuse for their mistakes. They have ... cour- Force." It is thus the sine qua non for formulat- age. integrity, and candor. .. They encourage initia- ing strategy at any of war’s levels—strategic, tive and innovation— They demand realistic operational, or tactical. A solid, comprehensive combat training from and for their subordinates.... They appreciate the relationship between morale, grasp of USAF doctrine—of what aerospace health, physical fitness, cohesion, and combat power is and how it can be fully exploited—is effectiveness. They know how to reward and dis- therefore essential to fulfilling our respon- cipline the troops and when "to keep them out of sibilities to the country and to maintaining the noon-day sun." Finally, leaders are relentless national security. This is why we have an AFM 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

1-1 ; this is why every officer (commissioned key doctrinal manuals) than try to incorporate and noncommissioned) must know what is in everything everyone needs to know into one it. manual. That said, let me address more directly the Military leadership undergoes its greatest test issues raised by Colonel Bohn. First, why did in war. The new AFM 1-1 emphasizes the cha- we revise AFM 1-1’s 1984 version—particularly otic nature of the wartime environment and the when it served us well in Operation Desert decisiveness of the human factor in it. For Shield/Desert Storm? Why mess with a good example, volume 1, chapter 1, thus stresses that thing? “war is a human enterprise" characterized by As Colonel Bohn points out, we did well in “fog, friction, and change," while chapter 4 the Gulf war. We planned and executed an emphasizes that "people are the decisive ele- excellent air campaign—not a perfect one. With ment in war.” Volume 2 contains an entire a little better doctrine and a little better under- essay on human factors in war, and the glossary standing of it, we would have been a little bet- contains three definitions of leadership. In con- ter. As the introduction to the new 1-1 says, trast, the 1984 manual never mentions the dan- “Doctrine should be alive—growing, evolving, ger, exertion, and chance that make wartime and maturing." We should continually improve leadership so demanding. In short, the current and refine 1-1 as we learn more. Hence, the real 1-1 treats leadership in a more realistic and question is not. Why did we revise AFM 1-1? comprehensive manner than did earlier doctri- but, What took us so long to begin doing so? nal manuals. Even more, Shouldn’t we have a doctrinal Third, let me address the notion of doctrinal review process which solicits and incorporates education which Colonel Bohn raised. This the insights of USAF personnel like Colonel issue highlights a distinctive USAF cultural Bohn earlier on? (I will address this particular trait and a leadership challenge of the first issue below.) Doctrine, if not subject to order. Throughout our history, we have often thoughtful, constant revision, atrophies and appeared more comfortable in dealing with becomes dogma. And dogma won't hack it in machines and technology than with ideas and today’s geostrategic environment. concepts. We pride ourselves on our pragmatic, Other, more specific, considerations “hands-on" worldview. How do we foster an prompted this latest revision. We especially appreciation of doctrine within this context? needed to buttress AFM 1-1’s assertions with How do we convince our airmen that ideas are solid, documented evidence. Hence, we com- of utmost importance in preparing for and wag- plemented the revised what we think volume 1 ing war? with a why we think it volume 2. We also The answer to these questions lies in commu- wanted to identify the specific tenets of aero- nicating an understanding of doctrine’s defini- space power. Moreover, unlike the 1984 man- tion and function. Without a solid. ual, the new version explains that war is comprehensive grasp of USAF doctrine—of planned and executed at three dynamically what aerospace power is and how to exploit it interrelated levels—strategic, operational, and fully—we will have no strategy. We won't be tactical. Commanders' responsibilities at the able to outfight future opponents. We won't be operational level get fuller, more comprehen- capable of fulfilling our responsibilities to the sive treatment than they did in the 1984 nation. Commanders at all levels need to work version. smarter and harder at getting this message Second. Colonel Bohn raises the issue of how across. the new manual handles leadership. He cor- Finally, I would like to see our USAF people rectly notes that the current AFM 1-1 does not actively involved—not just in reading doctrine use this term as often as the previous version but in shaping it. We need an up-front way of (at least in volume 1). In large part, this is incorporating the type of input Colonel Bohn because aerospace power is AFM 1-1’s princi- offers. pal focus. Certainly, leadership is an essential Right now, the formal process for doctrinal ingredient in that endeavor, as discussed in review solicits inputs only at the MAJCOM chapter 4 of the new 1-1. AFM 1-10 does a good level and above. We are considering how best job of reinforcing these concepts and giving to retool this process. We especially want early punch to leadership’s critical role. As one feedback from personnel at the wing level and charged with responsibility for USAF-wide below—the “shop floor," if you will—so we education, I would much rather have everyone can produce a living document of which every read AFM 1-10 (as well as AFM 1-1 and other airman is an integral part. RICOCHETS 65

I’m grateful that Colonel Bohn took the time incompetent for the bombing of systems like to write. He is taking Air Force doctrine electricity to matter. seriously and raising important points. He has If the strategic campaign is evaluated against joined the dialogue on professional issues and the broader, more truthful set of missions for has used the Airpower lournal as a forum for the war—destroying nuclear, biological, and exchanging ideas. I hope that others follow his chemical capabilities; destroying the Scud mis- example. Our ability to serve our nation well sile threat; attriting the Iraqi military; restoring depends on real leaders, like Colonel Bohn, peace and stability in the region; toppling Sad- engaging themselves and their personnel in dam Hussein—tbe strategic campaign looks these topics. even less successful. The bombing of Iraq’s mil- itary and civilian infrastructure—the 800 fixed Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd. USAF Maxwell AFB. Alabama targets hit by the end of the war—didn't achieve the other five missions. Only after the wrar did w'e learn the degree to which the nuclear and chemical infrastructure survived. STRATEGIC BOMBING STATIC The Scud missile mission was incrementally I read with interest Maj Mark Clodfelter’s first more successful—but at a cost of 1,500 crack at the Gulf air war (“Of Demons. Storms, sorties—and w'as hardly a classical strategic and Thunder: A Preliminary Look at Vietnam’s bombing effort. As for the attrition of the Iraqi Impact on the Persian Gulf Air Campaign,” military, 20 divisions located outside the KTO Winter 1991) because I found his book The w'ere mostly untargeted by air attacks. Gen Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of North Vietnam a good critique of “strategic” Staff, stated on television’s "Good Morning bombing. His article, however, has one nagging America” on 15 January 1992 that Saddam flaw. It insists on conferring a psychological “still had quite a bit of force available to him effect of the strategic bombing campaign on the that was not in the Kuwaiti theater of opera- Iraqi civilian population. Much more empirical tions__ He had a number of divisions that work will need to be done if a clear link is to be were now'here near that theater.” Large seg- established betwreen the performance of air ments of military industry survived, and the forces against Iraq and the supposed useful mil- man, the Baath party, and the government itary effect of strategic bombing. infrastructure are still there. No one disputes that air power was the Here is w'here the theory of strategic bombing “decisive instrument” in the wrar against Iraq. becomes a nearsighted ideology. Without any Questions arise, though, in determining what supporting evidence, Major Clodfelter states a aspect of the air campaign w'as responsible for number of times that the bombing influenced ejecting the Iraqi army from Kuwait. If, as Major the Iraqi populace and their “will to resist." He Clodfelter asserts, the “ nature of our quotes Gen Charles Horner and Col John War- announced aims” was so clear-cut, then the den III as saying that the bombing effort in strategic air campaign should be measured Baghdad and other cities was specifically against the singular military mission of defeat- intended—through target selection or night ing the Iraqi field army. In this regard, strategic bombing—to remind the Iraqi civilian popula- bombing doesn't necessarily stand up very tion “that Saddam wras incapable of con- well. Tactical bombing of Iraqi field forces w'as taining" the fighting and that they should “put more directly responsible for disrupting, some pressure on their leadership to stop the demoralizing, and eventually killing Saddam’s war.” Where is the evidence to support the fragile conscript force. The strategic campaign claims? Precision-guided weapons and over- destroyed many things with great efficiency, whelming force proved that discreet targets and some aspects of the bombing—destruction could be hit with some assurance in a bombing of command, control, communications, and campaign, but it is utterly unclear what effect intelligence targets—had a direct impact on the this had on the Iraqi civilian population. army. But much of the bombing effort outside Writing from Baghdad on 18 January, Marie of the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) was Colvin of the Sunday Times (London) captured directed against a target base that didn’t have the essence of a persistent confusion on the much "direct military advantage.” as interna- part of air power advocates as to the effect of tional law' and Air Force regulations relating to the bombing campaign: the laws of war put it. The war was just too An Iraqi businessman explained to me why people short and the Iraqi army too overrated and were so calm. Listening for weeks to the propa- 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

ganda from Washington, they had expected Arma- indicative of a campaign to humiliate and sub- geddon. Now that the bombing had come at last jugate Arab society. They never had any “will" and they had survived, he said: "W ell, if that's it, to resist in the first place; they were merely we can take it.” swept up in events far outside their control. Having conducted a bomb damage assessment The strategic bombing campaign, as good as it in Iraq in August-September 1991 and having may look to us on paper, didn't change their interviewed hundreds of Iraqis, from ministers outlook at all. and governors to normal soldiers, doctors, and civilian victims of collateral damage, I con- William M. Arkin clude that this was the attitude of most Iraqis. Washington, D.C. Strategic bombing had little or no impact on the population's turning against Saddam Hussein. If anything, the technology and lethality of Major Clodfelter’s Response: warfare had taken such a leap forward that the 1 appreciate Mr Arkin’s willingness to address low immediate collateral damage of the air some of the points I raised in my article, and I attacks may have increased the will to exist. confess that I find some of his notions provoca- Iraqis believed that much worse would happen tive. Yet, I do not agree with his overall conclu- in the war, and when it didn't, they were sion that strategic bombing had a meager baffled. In their minds, they lost their impact on the outcome of the Persian Gulf war. electricity and civilian life-support systems, Mr Arkin argues that strategic air power failed and Saddam was thoroughly outgunned—but to because—in his opinion—it did not independ- no avail for them. Which is to say that I met no ently achieve "the singular military mission of one who thought that the Iraqis would win; the defeating the Iraqi field army,” nor did it question was just how badly they would lose. achieve what he determines to be the cam- This is not a population that can "put some paign's "broader, more truthful set of mis- pressure on their leadership to stop the war.” sions.” He also contends that strategic bombing This is a population that learns how to live failed because it did not break the will of the with an oppressive system that provides them Iraqi populace, and he equates breaking that with a decent life. Somehow I get the impres- will to fomenting a popular revolt and toppling sion that air power theorists thought we were Saddam Hussein. communicating a "message" to this population, Unfortunately, Mr Arkin’s determination of but the nature of the bombing effort and the broader, more truthful missions omits much. mode of communication just weren't that clear. Besides being charged with impairing Iraq’s I believe we were largely talking to ourselves. capacity for offensive warfare and removing the Air power advocates continue to harbor theo- Iraqi army from Kuwait, American military ries about the effect of strategic bombing on chiefs also had to wage a war that would reach enemy “ will,” but those theories remain a rapid conclusion and that would do so with- unproven. We need better analysis of what the out a tremendous cost in American lives. More- civilian side of the strategic bombing effort— over. they had to do their utmost to prevent the the attacks on electricity, oil, transportation, war from expanding to include Israel, which telecommunications, and industry—achieved. would threaten the fabric of the coalition. The precision with which these targets were Against this set of criteria, the Phase 1 air destroyed changed the pattern of modern war- attacks against Iraq achieved significant results. fare casualties. It is now clear that some The loss of electric power degraded Iraq’s air 2,500-3,000 civilians died when rubble fell on defense network—particularly its computer them, while another 70,000-90,000 died after interface—and thus facilitated the achievement the bombing stopped because life-support sys- of coalition air superiority. Command of the tems were taken away. Iraqi skies was vital to prevent the Iraqi air Major Clodfelter doesn’t go into civilian force from attacking coalition ground and sea casualties—the long-distance cost for our “com- forces—a threat that Gen Norman Schwarzkopf munication.” Those deaths are attributable to feared throughout the conflict and one that por- the efficiency of the attacks on the civil system. tended disastrous consequences. The destruc- They are one measure of the “success" of the tion of electric power facilities also deprived strategic bombing effort. For many Iraqis, par- nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare ticularly the majority of the population living plants the means to continue operations, in the center of the country, the bombing thus regardless of whether all those plants were seemed to victimize the civilian population. identified and attacked. In addition, the attacks RICOCHETS 67

on Iraq helped to ensure that the coalition numerous factors—including the devastating ground offensive would be a rapid one. By the effects of tactical air power—caused Saddam third week of the air campaign, raids against Hussein to throw in the towel. command and control centers had severed the Mr Arkin’s claim that strategic bombing was Iraqi army in Kuwait from its ties to Saddam inhumane rests on the assertion that air power Hussein, and unrelenting attacks on Iraqi road ultimately caused the deaths of 70,000-90,000 and rail transport leading to that army pre- civilians. That those numbers are based on vented it from receiving the sustenance it had interviews conducted with 90,000 Iraqi families to have to survive. Captured Iraqi officers have by a team of Jordanian doctors and nurses stated that the inability to communicate with makes the accuracy of the statistics question- higher headquarters and to feed shell-shocked able at best. More importantly, Mr Arkin dis- soldiers contributed directly to the Iraqi exodus misses Saddam Hussein’s postwar allocation of from Kuwait. Mr Arkin acknowledges that the resources to Ba’ath party officials and the air offensive against command, control, com- rebuilding of Baghdad at the expense of the munications, and intelligence ‘‘had a direct bulk of the Iraqi populace. He further ignores impact" on Iraqi troops. That impact is difficult the effects of Saddam’s savage reprisals against to overestimate, because it prevented Saddam the Shi’ites and Kurds, as well as Saddam’s Hussein from orchestrating a coordinated refusal to comply with the terms of the United defense against the coalition's ground assault. Nations resolutions that would permit the UN The attacks on Scud missile sites, which Mr to sell Iraqi oil in exchange for medical sup- Arkin dubs “hardly a classical strategic bomb- plies and food. ing effort," were nonetheless vital to keeping Finally, Mr Arkin contends that the “theory the coalition intact. Without them, the Israelis of strategic bombing” has become "nearsighted would likely have entered the conflict, an even- ideology.” I disagree. The successful applica- tuality that would have contributed little tion of air power is the result of carefully gaug- towards "restoring peace and stability in the ing the nature of the enemy and his method of region.” The strategic attacks against Iraq’s war- fighting, and then blending “strategic" and making capability were never intended to "tactical'' air attacks in synergistic fashion achieve a "singular” military objective, and the against the enemy’s centers of gravity. The Des- multifaceted results achieved by them—against ert Storm air campaign did precisely that, and targets that indeed provided the enemy with strategic bombing was a key aspect of that “direct military' advantage"—were essential to endeavor. the success of the coalition war effort. Mr Arkin goes on to say that the strategic air Maj Mark Clodfelter. USAF campaign was a failure because it did not Maxwell AFB. Alabama destroy the will of the Iraqi populace to resist; furthermore, he contends that much of the destruction that it did cause was inhumane. DOCTRINAL DEBATE Volumes have been written about the efficacy While I found Lt Col Price T. Bingham’s article of strategic bombing against civilian morale, “Air Power in Desert Storm and the Need for and the debate will likely continue—with Doctrinal Change” (Winter 1991) interesting inconclusive findings—far into the future. Mr and enlightening, his limited understanding Arkin is certainly correct that strategic bombing and research on both Navy doctrine and carrier did not produce a revolution or coup that air power in Operation Desert Storm is ousted the Iraqi dictator. But the impact of the unforgivable. His errors of analysis on naval strategic attacks may well have caused Saddam warfare severely detract from an otherwise Hussein to perceive that he was in danger of excellent article. losing power and thus contributed to his deci- Colonel Bingham asserts that the Navy does sion to end the fighting. The precise impact of not have a published doctrine similar to AFM strategic bombing on Saddam Hussein will 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United probably never be known, much like the spe- States Air Force, or the Army’s FM 100-5, cific impact of Linebacker II on the North Viet- Operations. This is simply not true. The US namese Politburo’s decision to sign the 1973 Navy's basic doctrine is published in NWP-1A, Paris Accords remains uncertain. Just as I con- Strategic Concepts for the US Navy. This docu- tend that Hanoi’s decision was the result of ment covers Navy missions, roles, and func- many variables, of which strategic bombing tions in a manner very similar to that of AFM was only one, I would also maintain that 1-1. He compounds his error by looking for 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Navy doctrine in the outdated and nonapplica- operate too far from critical targets to be effec- ble maritime strategy. By comparing old Navy tive. It’s interesting to note that, in conflicts in strategy against other services’ doctrines, he Korea, Vietnam, and Libya, carrier strike air- compares apples and oranges. The lieutenant craft were much closer to the action than their colonel is correct in observing that the Navy Air Force counterparts. The bottom line is that, must update maritime strategy. This issue was because every power projection requirement is recently addressed by the chief of naval opera- different, it seems fairly pointless to argue tions in US Naval Institute Proceedings. In the range of carrier-based air versus land-based air. future, Navy strategy will shift to one of “sta- Desert Storm was a prime example of what bility” instead of “containment.” While the land- and sea-based air power can accomplish weakening of the Soviet navy lends itself to a when used in concert. In the aftermath of the different maritime strategy, the essential US conflict, several observers have used various Navy functions of sea control, deterrence, and yardsticks to assess which service “won" the power projection will not change. The next war. The use and misuse of statistics and ques- conflict may not provide 12 friendly, suitable tionable logic only adds to the “rock throwing” airfields to support full-scale tactical air between the Navy and Air Force. It’s time to requirements next to the battle zone. Carrier put down the rocks and realize that truly joint battle groups might again be first on the scene. air campaigns use the strengths of all available In his analysis of “problems associated with assets for power projection. The goal is not to carrier operations." he uses sortie rates and his see who flies more sorties; it is to inflict the own definition of strike aircraft to support his maximum amount of damage with minimal air- views on Navy doctrine. To begin with. Colonel crew losses. Services that work together under Bingham states that the only attack aircraft on a joint guidelines can accomplish that and much carrier are the A-6s. In actuality, a carrier air more. wing includes not only A-6s, but two squad- Lt Comdr Terry B. Kraft, USN rons of F/A-18s and one squadron of S-3s (mar- M axw ell A F B , Alabama itime strike). Thus, out of an air wing of 80 fixed-wing aircraft, 50 of them are strike aircraft—not 20 as cited by the lieutenant colo- Colonel Bingham’s Response: nel. If Colonel Bingham’s criteria for “deep- strike" attack aircraft are applied to the Air I strongly agree with Commander Kraft that Force, both the F-16 and the F-117 would seem truly joint air campaigns should use the to fail his test. strengths of all available assets for power pro- In looking at sortie counts from the war. jection. At the same time, I believe that to con- Colonel Bingham makes his most notable error. duct more effective joint air campaigns in the He baldly states that carrier air flew only 12 future, we need better service and joint doc- percent of combat sorties flown during the first trine. Developing better doctrine is not easy, in two weeks of Operation Desert Storm. Accord- part, because it requires making an honest ing to official statistics from US Central Com- effort to identify current problems and limita- mand, carrier air flew 4,754 of the 28,540 tions. This was the point of my article. How- sorties flown by US aircraft during the period ever, since Commander Kraft clearly thinks that 17-30 January 1991. That equates to more than I did not make an honest, professional effort 17 percent of total sorties flown for the but merely engaged in "rock throwing,” I feel period—quite a difference from the figure obligated to note that naval officers who have stated and, considering that three aircraft car- studied Navy doctrine and carrier operations riers were operating long-range from the Red have come to conclusions similar to mine. Sea at the time, quite significant. If Marine air On the subject of Navy doctrine, Comdr sorties are included, the total jumps to over 25 William E. Short, Jr., USN, wrote a 1991 Naval percent. In both cases, the percentage of sorties War College paper titled "The Concept of Doc- flown equates nearly exactly to the percentage trine: Of Critical Importance But Frequently of aircraft in theater. For the entire conflict, car- Misunderstood.” His paper should be read by rier air flew 25 percent of the total sorties while anyone interested in Navy doctrine. After Marine air added another 10 percent. Colonel examining the doctrines of the other services. Bingham’s endnotes reveal that the sortie fig- Commander Short did not find that NWP-1A ures he used for his piece were an estimate was very similar to AFM 1-1. Instead, he wrote from an article in the Air Force Times. that “ traditionally, U.S. Navy doctrine has The author’s final assertion is that carriers focused upon the tactical level of war. To RICOCHETS 69 solve this problem, Commander Short recom- Libyan action of 1986, but not to sustained mended that “the Navy should acknowledge campaigning." However, as Captain Ramsdell the need for sound current U.S. Naval doctrine pointed out, this view beyond the tactical level of war." In his opin- ignores the use of carriers in both Korea and Viet- ion. a rewrite of NWP-1A or a revision to the nam and the fact that our huge investment in car- maritime strategy would not do. Instead, he riers cannot be justified by such limited usefulness. wanted "a basic Navy doctrinal publication In fact, the implication of this attitude is that car- [that] would parallel the Army’s FM 100-1 and riers are little more than political instruments, not 100-5. the Air Force's AFM 1-1 and the Marine real warfighters. Corps' FMFM 1 and 1-1.” A report by Capt Steven U. Ramsdell, USN, Commander Kraft is also mistaken when he concerning his visit to carriers involved in asserts that I stated the A-6 is the only attack Operation Desert Storm provides a further cri- aircraft on the carrier or that carriers operate tique of Navy doctrine. Captain Ramsdell noted too far from critical targets to be effective. Instead, I wrote that the A-6 is the only aircraft that which can deliver "a fairly significant payload the Navy did not bring to Desert Storm any system against targets located far from where a carrier for planning and directing air campaigns because can safely operate.” This does not mean that the Navy does not possess such a system. The Navy carriers would not be effective when critical does not possess a system to plan the integrated targets are near a body of water where carriers employment of aircraft from more than a single car- can safely operate. rier, let alone plan and execute an air campaign involving several carriers. Moreover, when Rear Adm Riley D. Mixson, USN, analyzed Desert Storm in a recent issue of He further reported that US Naval Institute Proceedings, he did not the concept of conducting campaigns and the pro- appear to see the range of carrier-based air cess of implementing an approach to war in which power as a “pointless" issue. Instead, he noted tactical decisions are driven primarily by strategic that “the Navy is becoming hostage to Air Force objectives have not been within the field of view of land-based tanking for sustained power- our leaders in the fleet. projection warfare beyond 200 nautical miles from the battle force." As a result, he said there Instead, he said the Navy had confined itself to is a pressing need “to develop a true 700- the “technical and logistical issues of fleet nautical-mile standoff capability.” He also operations at the tactical level.” noted that until the midpoint in the war, 50 On the subject of command arrangements, percent of the sorties from carriers in the Per- Captain Ramsdell reported that several senior sian Gulf were devoted to force defense. When officers “expressed reservations about the the threat permitted placing the carriers within Navy’s involvement in an air campaign cen- 150 nautical miles of the targets, “the Navy’s trally directed” by a joint force air component sortie count over the beach increased commander using the air tasking order (ATO). dramatically.” According to him. these officers were con- cerned that “ independent Navy operations Lt Col Price T. Bingham. USAF were threatened” by their participation. Yet, as Maxwell AFB, Alabama Captain Ramsdell observed, “The Navy has no alternative to the ATO system. Without it. the campaign would have been planned and Colonel Bingham’s article in the Winter 1991 directed manually. Sortie rates would have issue made an excellent case for abolishing the been far lower and strike deconfliction much superior/subordinate relationship that has less certain." existed between ground and air operations in Captain Ramsdell also found that many sen- the past. But I question the validity of his belief ior naval officers expressed concern about that air power—embodied in a strategic air and problems presented by carrier operations in deep interdiction campaign—now dominates Desert Storm that were similar to those I modern warfare. Rather, it seems that surface expressed in my article. He said that in the and air operations are as inextricably entwined opinion of these senior officers—an opinion he as ever and must still be closely coordinated. found widely held in the fleet—Desert Storm Operations during Desert Storm were no was not well suited to carrier operations. In the exception. For over a month, coalition air view of these officers, “CVs [aircraft carriers] forces were directed against an essentially inert are suited to one-time raids similar to the enemy, had complete control of the air, and 70 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

were relatively unhindered by targeting restric- sufficient to develop simplistic dogmas (or doc- tions. Nevertheless, by the end of this period, trines) that immediately mandate a strategic air power by itself had not achieved any US bombing campaign (or naval blockades, or war aim. The strategic air campaign had not armored offensives, etc.) in response to every broken the enemy’s will (has it ever?), had not set of hostilities. After the Gulf war, even Gen prevented Scuds from being fired at Israel, had Charles Horner pointed out (during testimony attrited—but not eliminated—Saddam’s before the Senate Armed Services Committee) weapons of mass destruction, and had not that air power should not be oversold or held starved the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. Deep air up as the solution to every crisis. Unfor- interdiction may have been partially effective, tunately, that would be the effect of the doctri- but the Iraqis had already amassed large stock- nal changes that Colonel Bingham proposes. piles of supplies in Kuwait and in the southern Euphrates Valley. In the end, it took ground Lt Edward H. Feege, Jr., USNR Upper Marlboro. Maryland units to reassert control over Kuwait, and it took United Nations teams on the ground to discover that the coalition had not, after all, had the perfect intelligence necessary to Colonel Bingham ’s Response: destroy Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical Lieutenant Feege apparently has misun- capabilities. derstood my position regarding coordinated air Instead, what air power did was impair the and ground operations. I certainly did not Iraqi military's ability to fight as a coherent intend to imply that such operations are a whole, which was a contribution of inestimable waste of effort. In fact, I wrote that “Desert value. But much of this disruption took place Storm revealed how essential ground and in the Kuwaiti theater itself. Coordinated amphibious forces can be to air power’s effec- ground and air operations in Kuwait and south- tiveness" (page 40). ern Iraq, which Colonel Bingham implies were Perhaps Lieutenant Feege’s confusion results a waste of effort because they were not directed from the word dominate. When I say air power at the Iraqi leadership and war industries, can dominate the conduct of modern conven- appear to have played a more direct role in tional war. I mean that our air forces (of the Air achieving the top US war aim (i.e., the libera- Force, Navy, and Marine Corps)—employed tion of Kuwait) than did independent, strategic under the control of the joint force air compo- air operations. Not that the latter were nent commander (JFACC)—can (and often unimportant—far from it. The strategic strikes should) play the central role in the campaign. paralyzed Iraq’s air force, suppressed its air Due to technologies that have enhanced air defenses, disrupted its command and control, power’s capabilities, we must recognize that and reduced the offensive threat posed by Iraqi while surface forces are still very important, aircraft and missiles. In addition, the damage to they should not dictate how air forces are Iraq’s war industries, in conjunction with the employed. Instead, our campaigns should be continuing blockade and UN inspections, will planned and executed so surface operations impair Iraq's ability to rapidly rearm and again complement and reinforce air operations. threaten its neighbors. But these actions were Exploiting our technological advantages and important only inasmuch as they contributed to recognizing the value we place on friendly overall war aims, and the latter were not lives, we should use air power as our primary achieved without an integrated air and ground means of fighting the enemy and, where neces- campaign within the Kuwaiti theater itself. sary. neutralizing his armed forces. This does Beyond Desert Storm, it would be a mistake not mean that surface forces will not be neces- to assign dominance to either surface or air sary to perform the coup de grace, as they did power based on the last data point of warfare. in Desert Storm. In another article in the Winter 1991 issue. Maj The differences I see between the roles that Mark Clodfelter correctly points out that the air forces and surface forces should play in a war with Iraq was unique and that the condi- campaign are similar to the differences between tions under which it was fought are unlikely to the roles that tanks and infantry played in the be repeated. In the late twentieth century, war German and British armies of 1940. The British is increasingly becoming as much an intrastate tended to employ tanks in the same role they as an interstate affair. In this environment, the had in 1918—as a supporting arm of their application of any type of military force will infantry. In contrast, the Germans recognized have to be carefully considered. It will not be that due to advances in technology, the tank RICOCHETS 71

should play the dominant role in a combined- tives for military institutions to resist change. arms panzer division, in which infantry was Yet, when change is successfully resisted, these used to complement and reinforce the tank. bureaucratic victories often contribute to future Today, many people see air forces in the same military defeats. Therefore, before rationalizing way the British saw their tanks—as an arm that more data points need to be collected whose primary role is supporting the surface regarding air power's effectiveness, all of us force’s scheme of maneuver. This perspective should remember that after ignoring the data fails to recognize air power’s dominance. point on Allied air power that Field Marshal Instead, we should treat our air forces as the Erwin Rommel had collected in North Africa, central element (similar to the role that tanks Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt got his next played in the German panzer division) in a data point in Normandy. joint air-surface campaign. This means that the JFACC should have a major—and often a Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF deciding—role in determining surface schemes Maxwell AFB. Alabama of maneuver. Moreover, while recognizing that all wars are unique, military professionals still must look to PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT the past for guidance on how to conduct war in I just wanted to let you know that I am using a the future and. therefore, how they should orga- reproduction of CMSgt Robert D. Lewallen’s nize. train, and equip. As they look to the past, article on “Sex, Power, and Ethics: The Chal- military professionals can see that the history lenge to the Military Professional" from the Fall of warfare is filled with people who seem sur- 1991 Airpower fournal for teaching the senior prisingly slow to recognize how new develop- ROTC class at this detachment. It was ments were changing the conduct of war. A excellently written and is a valuable resource major reason for this is that change is difficult for incoming lieutenants. and that there are powerful bureaucratic incen- Capt Janet M. Modi, USAF Rochester, New York net assessment

Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Air Command had so joined the rush to deliver Why by Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Maxwell AFB, nuclear bombs that its techniques for the deliv- Alabama 36112-5532: Air University Press, ery of conventional ordnance had been sadly June 1991, 308 pages. $12.00. neglected. Setup is well worth reading for anyone Setup is a scholarly, detailed, critical history seriously interested in air power, particularly of the USAF air war in Indochina from late for Air Force officers whose interests in air 1961 through early 1973. Tilford's criticism is power go beyond the mechanics of its applica- lucid and straightforward, if arguable in some tions. The fact that some 8 million tons of areas. He states that senior Air Force generals bombs were dropped by US air forces in Indo- failed to develop a winning air strategy to china (4 million tons in South Vietnam, 3 mil- match the political limitations imposed by lion tons in Laos, and 1 million tons in North President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Vietnam) should interest readers and spark Defense Robert S. McNamara. He attributes this their curiosity about the lack of favorable in large part to a “bomber mentality" charac- results. terized by blind adherence to the doctrine of Jane’s Defence Weekly of 29 June 1991 strategic air offensive developed during the reported on a conference held at the Joint Stud- 1930s and put into practice during World War ies Center in Minot, North Dakota, which dealt II. He notes that the development of nuclear with the air campaign during the Gulf war. Col weapons served to complete the doctrine and, Dennis M. Drew is quoted as saying the Gulf consequently, to reduce USAF interest in other war was “clear evidence to all the doubters of aspects of air power. He points out that Tactical airpower in warfare [that] airpower now domi- 72 AJRPOVVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 nates land warfare.” There is more than a hint Asia was the Air Force’s fascination with tech- there of an attempt to lay a ghost to rest. Yes, nology" (page 209). However, the Air Force’s air power did dominate in Iraq and Kuwait, but “fascination with technology” seems to have what about Afghanistan and Vietnam? The US borne very good fruit in the Gulf war. I must established air superiority over Iraq and Kuwait disagree, therefore, with Tilford's analysis. The and used it to defeat the Iraqis in a crushing political constraints set by President Johnson, fashion reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg of the preindustrial nature of North Vietnamese 1940. But we also had air superiority in society, the jungle terrain, and the North Viet- Vietnam—most of the time over North Vietnam namese commitment to victory made it highly and always over South Vietnam—yet we were unlikely that any air power strategy short of ultimately unsuccessful. Why? For that matter, total annihilation could have “won the war.” I why were the Soviets unsuccessful in Afghani- agree that the USAF's historic interest in tech- stan, where they had air supremacy? nology increased as its leaders sought a tech- Tilford goes deeply into the air campaign that nological solution to an essentially political was directed against the flow of men and mate- problem. But I don’t believe that it was a pri- riel down the Ho Chi Minh trail. He notes that mary cause of the failure to develop a winning Vietcong forces required only about 100 tons of air strategy—because none was possible, given logistic resupply per day (about 50 truckloads) all the circumstances! and that it was not possible (by air action) to It remains for someone to articulate a theory prevent this amount from getting through, of air power which will take into account all given the jungle terrain and the enormous effort the significant variables—including terrain and the government and people of North Vietnam the nature of the society under air attack—and were willing to expend. That particular air to develop a comprehensive theory that campaign, therefore, was unsuccessful despite explains a Gulf victory and a Vietnam (and, for the number of sorties flown and trucks that matter, an Afghanistan) failure. Tilford has destroyed. A serious question is whether any not done that, but his volume is well worth conceivable air campaign was capable of inter- reading. His challenge to the Air Force reader is dicting North Vietnamese resupply of the Viet- to avoid defending air power as dogma and to cong to a level that would cease to provide better understand why it works, how it works, them adequate support for the kind of war they and under what conditions. chose to wage. Capt John F. O'Connell. USN, Retired On the plus side for air power, Tilford notes Alexandria. Virginia that it clearly dominated the Khe Sanh bat- tlefield in January 1968 and prevented Gen Vo Nguyen Giap from repeating his 1954 Dien Bien Saying the United States lost the war in Viet- Phu triumph over the French. Similarly, he nam because ‘‘the military had their hands points out that air power was a key factor in tied” is a cliche that can be true or false, breaking the back of the North Vietnamese depending on one’s viewpoint of the con- offensive in the spring of 1972, which straints placed upon the use of America's mili- unleashed 14 regular divisions against South tary might during the entire Indochina Vietnam in conventional assaults. He also dis- experience. Dr Tilford’s premise in Setup cusses Linebacker I, an operation in which pre- seems to be that the constraints on the use of cision guided munitions were used for the first US air power were self-imposed doctrinal time to attack strategic targets, helping bring restrictions that did not permit air power to be the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. adapted to the war at hand, which was a As Tilford’s book shows, there were both air limited-objective, limited-geographic conflict power successes and failures in Vietnam. defined by political considerations rather than Frankly, it is not clear to this reviewer that it military objectives. was possible for the Air Force generals to According to Dr Tilford, the LJSAF—since its develop an air strategy which could have inception—had developed a strategic bombing defeated the North Vietnamese within the polit- doctrine to the near exclusion of other forms of ical and operational limitations that the presi- aerial warfare. If a war could be won by striking dent and secretary of defense imposed. Many of enemy centers of gravity, shapers of Air Force Tilford’s criticisms are warranted, but it would doctrine and dogma were well prepared for a be interesting to see what strategies he might full-scale strategic nuclear exchange. However, suggest in place of the failed ones. the limited conventional conflict that devel- For example, Tilford states that ‘‘part of the oped in Southeast Asia (SEA) did not fit this setup leading to air power’s defeat in Southeast mold. NET ASSESSMENT 73

When the USAF first sent people and planes Storm. Air power is a powerful, flexible tool of to SEA. neither was prepared. Pilots, having so military might. Used with the proper doctrine, long concentrated on things nuclear, were not equipment, training, and leadership, it can skilled in conventional bombing, rocketry, or influence the outcome of any conflict. Without strafing. Weapons for conventional warfare these elements, it is a waste of valuable were obsolete leftovers from Korea and World national treasure. War II, and airplanes were borrowed from the Air National Guard (B-26s) and the Navy Col lames S. Mosbey, USAF Moody AFB. Georgia (A-ls). The all-jet, supersonic, nuclear-capable Air Force did not have the equipment, training, or doctrine to engage in limited combat. Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf by While the Air Force struggled to adapt its Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie. New York force to the war, any changes in force or tactics 10022: Random House, 1990, 268 pages, were generally reactive to the initiatives of the $5.95 (softcover). enemy. The use of forward air controllers to locate the movement of war-sustaining supplies Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography by along the Ho Chi Minh trail resulted from the Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi. New York inability to interdict these supplies at the 10022: Free Press. 1991, 309 pages, $22.95. source. Missions to suppress active enemy defenses resulted from our restrictions on Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein’s Ambitions bombing the sites while they were under con- for Iraq by Simon Henderson. San Francisco struction. Air-to-air engagements resulted, in 94133: Mercury House, 1991, 240 pages, large measure, from the fact that airfields them- $21.95. selves could not be attacked, thus allowing And other books on Iraq. North Vietnamese aircraft to fly at will. The political decision not to blockade North Any major news event, especially if it Vietnam and Cambodia and not mine the har- endures for more than a few weeks, is certain to bors meant that all imported war materiel had produce a rush of books. A swarm of instant to be located and destroyed after disbursement books by putative experts who do “in-depth” into a convoluted and diverse distribution sys- analyses of yesterday’s Big Story is an inevita- tem. Could air power alone have strangled the ble by-product of commercial publishing, resupply of Vietcong and North Vietnamese where topicality guarantees quick sales. Thus, units in South Vietnam had all targeting con- even before Operation Desert Storm had con- straints been lifted? Most people agree that it cluded, the confrontation in the Gulf had could not. Air power is not designed, even already about doubled the number of books in under optimum circumstances, to do so. print on Iraq. These works divide into two Setup identified the biggest constraint on the groups: those concerned primarily with the use of US air power in Vietnam as the fear of diplomatic and military aspects of the crisis widening the war and thus involving the Chi- and those dealing more broadly with Saddam nese or Soviets. This overriding concern was Hussein, the Baath party, and their place in one of the primary reasons that we did not Iraqi history. bring the full force of air power against the The three principal books under review fall North Vietnamese. There was a belief at the into the latter category. All of the authors have highest levels of government that by gradually at least passable credentials that qualify them increasing the bombing intensity against the as experts on the Middle East. Two of the three North, we could reach a pressure point that books are the products of two-person teams, would cause North Vietnam to stop supporting and the professional background of the authors the insurgency in South Vietnam but would not divides evenly between journalism and aca- cause the Chinese or Soviets to intervene. We demia. To place both Saddam Hussein and the never reached this pressure point, although invasion in context, all three works try to strike some people would say that Linebacker II came a balance among biographical treatment of Sad- close. According to Setup, the use of American dam’s life, discussion of the dictator’s motives air power in SEA slowed, but did not stop, the in invading Kuwait, and an overview of post- ultimate North Vietnamese victory. World War I Iraqi history. In order for Setup to be an accurate assess- The first of the three to appear in print was ment of Air Force doctrine, it needs an epilogue Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf, the that analyzes the differences between air power collaborative fruit of a journalist and an aca- employment in SEA and in Operation Desert demic. Its authors are Judith Miller, who has 74 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 covered the Middle East extensively for the motivating goal. Probably rooted in unhappy New York Times, and Laurie Mylroie, currently childhood experiences as the unwanted a fellow at Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern adopted son of his mother’s second husband, Studies. Using interviews, press reports, and Saddam’s will to mastery has eliminated what- general scuttlebutt. Judith Miller weaves fact ever moral instincts he may once have had. The and rumor to produce an exciting, colorful por- result is a shrewd but ruthless tactician who trait of the Iraqi leader. We learn that Saddam's espouses causes and principles only so long as favorite movie is The Godfather and that his they serve his purposes. The Karsh and Rautsi activities and those of his entourage are point- biography documents the many—and always edly compared to the goings-on of a Mafia self-serving—reversals of course that have crime family. Saddam’s alleged acts of personal marked his career. The head of a party com- violence and the institutionalized violence that mitted to secularism and Arab unity, Saddam has characterized his reign are recounted in has not hesitated to preach holy war and has chilling detail. gradually replaced Pan-Arabism with an Coauthor Laurie Mylroie provides back- increasingly xenophobic Iraqi nationalism. He ground on the history of Iraq. Unfortunately, has publicly denounced Israel’s and Egypt’s her efforts are less than successful. Mylroie’s accommodationism, while secretly seeking encyclopedic tone is out of place alongside Mil- favors from both. ler’s style, which has a penchant for anecdotes. This reading of Saddam Hussein as a driven The social structure of Iraq is largely the prod- man, w'illing to stop at nothing to survive in uct of the last 70 years, and much of the tur- power, is plausible enough. The Iraqi dictator bulence of those years stems from the shows few signs of harboring any selfless precipitous decline of traditional elites and impulses. Moreover, Karsh and Rautsi’s reduc- customary practices. Yet, Mylroie captures lit- tion of Saddam’s character to a towering will to tle of the complex forces at work behind the power gives their treatment of the available political events she describes. The attempt of materials a classical and aesthetically pleasing the Hashemite monarchy, established by the unity of theme, but it runs the risk of turning British after World War I, to move the country genuine evil into melodramatic villainy. True toward a stable—perhaps moderately evil is always a socially complex product. The authoritarian—parliamentary regime is covered sources of Hitler’s hold over the German people summarily. The ordinary reader is more likely have proven an inexhaustible subject for histo- to remember the garish demise of the royal fam- rians, political scientists, psychologists, and ily in the bloody revolution of 1958. theologians. No doubt Saddam’s place in his- Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography is tory will be smaller than Hitler’s, yet the rela- likewise the result of a collaboration. The tionship between him and the Iraqi people is authors are Efraim Karsh, a well-known surely an interesting and important case of authority on the Iran-lraq War and a lecturer in sociai pathology. It is one, however, that the the Department of War Studies at King’s Col- authors neglect. Karsh and Rautsi include the lege. London, and Inari Rautsi, a research fel- obligatory background material on Iraqi history low' in international relations at Helsinki and geography yet make no serious effort to University, specializing in the politics and his- decipher the bond linking Saddam Hussein to tory of the Middle East. In fluent, economical the nation he rules. Of course, the limitations of prose, their-book recounts the life of Saddam the sources available for a life of Saddam—a Hussein from his humble birth and unhappy self-glorifying autobiography, an equally pro- childhood, through his rapid and violent rise pagandists official biography, and interview's into the hierarchy of the Baath party, up to his and press reports that are an uncertain mixture current apotheosis as a tyrant wielding as near of fact and gossip—render so ambitious an to absolute power as any man has come since endeavor difficult to achieve. At this stage, it Joseph Stalin. The story of the Iraqi dictator’s would probably be doomed to failure. If a biog- ascent to power, however, covers less than half raphy is to be attempted at all. the larger assess- the book. The remaining pages are devoted to ments required to understand the Iraqi leader the dynamics of the Saddam/Baathist regime and his place in the recent history of the Mid- and a detailed recounting of the Gulf crisis dle East might as w'ell also be undertaken. through the conclusion of Desert Storm, with Simon Henderson’s Instant Empire: Saddam the focus on Saddam Hussein’s perceptions and Hussein's Ambitions for Iraq also mixes biogra- motives. phy and reportage w'ith chapters devoted to Karsh and Rautsi see a fanatical determina- sociohistorical background. How'ever, Hender- tion to stay in power as Saddam’s central son’s emphases differ. As did the authors NET ASSESSMENT 75 already mentioned, he retells the same facts regions, Iraq did not really come into existence about Iraq’s violent political tradition and oil- until roughly 1917, when the British shaped imbalanced economy but devotes less space to the once-Ottoman provinces of Mosul, these subjects. The life of Saddam is likewise Baghdad, and Basra into a League of Nations recounted somewhat hurriedly, as if Henderson mandate. Scholars divide the subsequent his- were eager to get on to other matters. Very tory of Iraq into four periods: the era of direct much the working journalist with his eye on British rule, 1918-33; a quarter century of nom- the Big Story, the author saves space for the inal independence under Britain’s watchful “scoops” he has collected on Iraq’s efforts to eye; a decade of political turmoil beginning develop superweapons (e.g., an artillery gun with the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in the with the range of a ballistic missile), the com- revolution of 1958; and the current era of panies and countries that have supplied Iraq increasingly totalitarian and militaristic Baath with arms, and such sensational events as the rule, which commenced when the second arrest and execution of an Iranian reporter/spy. Baath government assumed power in 1969. Henderson’s investigative-journalist ap- Specialized studies exist for each of these peri- proach, with its focus on the high-profile news ods, but a student without much previous aspects of the Gulf crisis, makes his book per- knowledge of Iraq will probably want to start haps the most exciting of the three to read, with a general survey of the subject rather than although there is a nervous edge to his revela- with a narrow monograph. tions that at times spills over into melodrama. For this purpose, Christine Helms’s Iraq: His stories are spiced with fax messages surrep- Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, titiously obtained, anonymous informants, and D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984) probably attendance lists from meetings whose attendees ought to be avoided. The book’s opening chap- clearly wished their presence to remain a ters provide a good overview of Iraq, describing secret. Surely, this is front-page stuff, but its geography, economy, and principal ethnic opportunities for serious analysis are too often and religious groups. Helms, however, is sacrificed to headline splashiness. excessively sympathetic to the Baath party, and Still, garishness aside, Henderson’s detective many of her statements—possibly pardonable work in the demimonde of international poli- misperceptions seven years ago when the book tics does manage to clarify at least one impor- was published—sound ludicrous in the light of tant and much controverted issue. Seeking to what is now known about the Iraqi regime. The prevent Iraq’s defeat by Iran and to curry favor Baath party may once have been a relatively with the Saddam regime, the United States—it small band of elitist intellectuals as Helms con- has been said (and Miller and Mylroie repeat tends, but its expansion over the last 10 to 15 the allegation)—supplied Iraq with arms subse- years to include, by some estimates, as many as quently used against Kuwait and the coalition 1.5 million members has certainly by now forces. Contrary to this claim, Henderson’s transformed the party into a mass organization. research establishes that direct US military aid As for the collective decision-making processes to Iraq was almost nonexistent, that high- at the higher levels of government described by ranking American officials remained deeply Helms, everything we know of the Revolution- suspicious of Saddam even during the apparent ary Council and the Baath National Command thaw in US/Iraqi relations which occurred in indicates that they have for some time been 1988-90, and that these officials saw the sur- totally subject to the will of Saddam Hussein. vival of the Iraqi strongman as at best a sorry Phebe Marr’s Modern History of Iraq (Boul- pis aller to an Iranian victory. Until the very der, Colorado: Westview Press. 1985) is thor- eve of the Kuwaiti invasion, Iraq’s principal ough and well documented. The author arms supplier remained the Soviet Union (and concentrates primarily on political events but that by a large margin). France came second, includes chapters dealing with Iraq’s social and with China and a handful of West European political evolution. The chief flaw of Marr's and Eastern Bloc countries bringing up the rear. book may indeed be its evenhanded treatment While each of these three books has its of its subject. Well acquainted with all phases merits, all of them in some measure sacrifice of modern Iraqi history, Marr remains unwed- depth to topicality. None, therefore, is a suita- ded to any dominant interpretation. As a result, ble introduction to Iraq for the reader who she adopts an impersonal, value-neutral, wishes to place recent events in the Gulf in per- encyclopedic tone that makes her writing dull spective. Where, then, should a reader with an to read. intellectual curiosity about Iraq turn? If Marr’s study lacks overriding ideas to give A fusion of at least three quite distinct it an analytical edge, two other works on Iraq 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 verge on the tendentious. Saddam's Iraq: Revo- Samir provides historical and sociological lution or Reaction (London: Zed Books, Ltd., background, his close reasoning is often hard to 1989), a collection of historical and sociological follow, and it would probably be better for gen- essays produced by the Committee against eral readers to first familiarize themselves with Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq Iraq via a general survey before undertaking a (CARDRI), and Peter Sluglett and Marion book as demanding as the Republic of Fear. Farouk-Sluglett’s Iraq since 1958 (London: Now that Iraq, whether for good or bad, has Kegan Paul. 1988) interpret the Baath regime as established a firm grip on the attention of the the morbid outgrowth of a distorted economy Western world, more books on its history, poli- in an underdeveloped country. To these tics, and social structure will doubtless appear. authors, Baathist Iraq—for all its socialist Several dealing specifically with the diplomatic pretentions—is an instance of state capitalism. aspects of the Gulf crisis or offering provisional Awash in oil revenues but with little domestic military assessments of Desert Shield/Desert industrial capability, Iraq—it is alleged—has Storm have already been published. Hopefully, generated a weak middle class of army officers, new research will repair the many gaps in our bureaucrats, and government contractors who knowledge of the region. At present, the only depend upon an authoritarian state for favors monograph-length treatment of the Iraqi army and protection. Both books handle this admit- is Mohammed A. Tarbush’s The Role of the tedly neo-Marxist thesis adeptly, skillfully Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to applying it to Iraqi conditions. This lends their 1941 (London: Kegan Paul, 1982). The CARDRI analysis a force and clarity that is lacking in volume contains a section that brings the story most other works on Iraq. forward into the present, but there exists little Equally interpretive but very different in hard information on how the Baath party man- style and temperament is Samir al-Khallil’s aged to subdue an officer corps which all pre- Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq vious regimes had found difficult to control, (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of Cal- what effect Baath tutelage has had on the ifornia Piess, 1989). The best single work on army’s professionalism and esprit de corps, or the Saddam dictatorship, Samir al-Khallil’s what capability or ambition the Iraqi military book is a major contribution to the study of may yet harbor for playing an independent part totalitarianism, and many of its insights are no politically. John Devlin's The Ba'th Party: A less relevant to Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s History from Its Origins to 1966 (Stanford, Cal- USSR, or Khomeini’s Iran than they are to con- ifornia: Hoover Institution Press, 1976) and temporary Iraq. Samir’s complex analyses are Kamel S. Abu Jaber’s The Arab Ba'th Socialist difficult to summarize briefly. In essence, how- Party: History. Ideology and Organization (Syr- ever, he argues that Saddam’s hold over the acuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, Iraqi people is based on a combination of fear 1966) likewise need updating to reflect the and guilt. The fear is instilled through the transformations in party structure, leadership, regime’s all-pervasive police and security appa- and ideology that have occurred in the last ratus and by the well-known ruthlessness and quarter century. cruelty with which these organs destroy their For the nonspecialist, however, these defi- victims. The guilt stems from a sense of com- ciencies are unlikely to present great problems. plicity in the crimes of the regime, which The books by Marr and the Slugletts, as well as leaves Iraqis with a feeling—perhaps only the CARDRI collection, are more than sufficient semiconscious—that the punishment which to provide the general reader with the most might someday be visited upon them is essential available information on the Middle deserved. The Baath party has cultivated this East’s troubled eastern fringe. They supply the sense of complicity through wide networks of critical wherewithal for assessing the more informers, secret denunciations, show trials, topical—if not sensationalist—books on the and public executions. Samir’s comments on subject that have already begun to appear on the party’s systematic corruption of language our bookshelves and whose numbers will (e.g., the substitution of paranoic analysis for surely multiply in the months and years ahead. the popular subversion of storytelling) reveal Lawrence ). Kilbourne the degree to which the regime has left individ- Washi ngt on. D. C. uals defenseless before it and bear comparison with George Orwell’s explorations of total- itarian language in 1984. Yet, for all its bril- liance, Republic of Fear is not the best place for To Fly and Fight: Memoirs of a Triple Ace by the neophyte student of Iraq to begin. Although Col Clarence E. (“ Bud”) Anderson with NET ASSESSMENT 77 Joseph Hamelin. New York 10010: Saint Mar- Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, The First World tin's Press. 1990, 302 pages, $19.95. War: vol. 2, The Interwar Period; vol. 3, The Second World War edited by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray. Winchester, Massa- chusetts 01890: Unwin Hyman, 1988, $50.00 each ($24.95 paper). The cover photo and title of To Fly and Fight might suggest that this book is just another in an endless series of memoirs produced by “The battle is the payoff!" Versions of this retired pilots. Nothing could be farther from the axiom have served since time immemorial to truth. The book is oral history at its best—a par- underscore the simple but important truth that ticipant’s view of history and his impressions military organizations exist to fight and win of it. To Fly and Fight not only tells the story of wars and that, traditionally, success in battle Col Bud Anderson, it helps capture the essence has been the path to overall victory. Yet, in of the period from World War II to Vietnam. The title would lead one to believe that being modern warfare, success on the battlefield has a fighter pilot and triple ace was Colonel become only one component (if the Second Anderson's greatest achievement. Although he World War is used as a guide, perhaps not even goes into detail about this aspect of his life, the most important component) of military much of the book deals with his exploits as a effectiveness. The very definition that Allan test pilot after World War II, as well as with Millett and Williamson Murray craft to define other events in his career. Anderson and modern military effectiveness in their three- Hamelin do a masterful job of balancing the volume study of this phenomenon—“the pro- various parts of an amazing career. They cover cess by which armed forces convert resources the war years in a matter-of-fact way. avoiding into fighting power” (1:2)—illustrates how any glamorization of war and aerial combat. modern war has broadened and extended our The events flow as easily as in a well-told war ideas about this subject. As this definition story, and—like all good tales—it is told thor- emphasizes, military effectiveness has oughly, warts and all. The tone of the book is increasingly become concerned with far more reminiscent of casual conversation—the kind of than simply applying combat power suc- talk that comes naturally and easily, without cessfully; now military forces must be con- bravado or varnish. There is no attempt to cerned with the complex processes that impress the reader with feats of derring-do. produce combat power. How well they accom- Colonel Anderson relates the truth, and it is far plish this transformation, with all the interplay more interesting than any fiction. between competing civilian and military agen- To Fly and Fight contains no startling revela- cies, is a new and vital aspect of “military tions. ft has no profound thesis. Although it effectiveness.” declines to indict US policy or military opera- Why this concept of military effectiveness tions, it is not blindly patriotic. The author is has been extended is intricately intertwined in straightforward when he reveals that he and the history of modern warfare. Napoleon “the system” often did not see eye to eye. but imbued several generations of commanders he has no rancor. Like a good soldier. Anderson with the idea that decisive battle was the pre- chooses not to voice any opposition he may ferred means of terminating war. Unfortunately, have had to US policies at the time. Indeed, he the post-Napoleonic, industrially revolu- was no policymaker or planner, but an opera- tionized. nationalized state proved far less vul- tor. As such, he orients his memoirs accord- nerable to battlefield collapse. This was true in ingly. One gets the impression that because he large part because this new kind of state pro- has few illusions about himself and the Air duced an army whose firepower prevented its Force, he is able to excel at his job and enjoy quick destruction, and whose lack of mobility life. prevented it from performing Napoleonic ara- Put simply, To Fly and Fight is a great book. besques of maneuver against an opponent with Anderson’s account is vivid and rich in detail, equally lethal defensive combat power. Attri- painting an unforgettable picture of life as a tion, not annihilation, became the route to vic- fighter pilot from World War II to Vietnam and tory. As Paul Kennedy notes in assessing beyond. Not just one man's story, To Fly and military effectiveness as a whole during World Fight is a piece of history that can serve as both War I, attritional warfare by its very nature an inspiration and challenge to all of us. moves the focus of military effectiveness away Capt Thomas J. Van Kleef, USAF from the operational and toward the strategic Sheppard AFB, Texas and political levels of war (1:338). Attritional 78 AJRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

warfare required the piling up of men, and overview and summary pieces—will serve as especially of equipment, in great quantity and the starting point for any serious study of of every kind. Thus, the modern military found twentieth-century military performance by the itself forced to ask for more and more of the scholar or the military professional. state’s resources in order to produce the requi- The work’s seminal qualities are well illus- site combat power. But in competing for men trated in the very first volume. Though some and materiel, the armed forces extended their might see an extended discussion of military area of operations from the battlefield to the effectiveness in the First World War as an oxy- councils of state. Thus, the political level of moron, the essays do a commendable job in war and the military’s facility in this arena bringing to the study of this period a sense of became an increasingly important aspect of its complexity and—most importantly—of the overall military effectiveness. context in which so many of the conflict’s most Millett and Murray insist that the definition controversial actions were taken. Perhaps the of military effectiveness continued to broaden, most interesting piece from a very strong vol- even in the realm of ’’purely” military affairs. ume is David R. Jones’s ‘‘Imperial Russia’s As wars grew in size and the individual battle Forces at War” (1:249-329). Jones challenges generally took on less and less importance, mil- conventional views that Russia was somehow itaries had to be increasingly concerned with unique in its unpreparedness in 1914 and in their effectiveness at the operational level, in the incompetence of its leadership. He asserts conducting campaigns, and often in applying that the Russian army was in fact better power nearly simultaneously throughout the equipped in 1917 than it was at the beginning breadth and depth of a theater of operations. At ot the war, and that the key to Russia’s collapse the same time, the strategic level of war—the lay in the same kinds of problems that afflicted critical nexus where operational concerns and all the other combatants—and in the unique political realities collide—emerged as a crucial character of the country’s economic and social platform in war fighting, primarily because of unrest. Certain to provoke interest and debate is the new-found strength of civilian political Holger Herwig’s dissection of German military leaders, all of whom had seemingly taken to ineffectiveness in the Great War, due in large heart Georges Clemenceau’s dictum that “war part to her initial adherence to Gen Alfred von was too important to be left to the generals.” Schlieffen’s “encirclement panacea” and Adm Thus, according to Millett and Murray, mod- Alfred von Tirpitz’s “maritime annihilation ern military effectiveness must be measured obsession” (1:105). and studied at four levels: political, strategic, Volume 2 is perhaps the most compelling of operational, and tactical. As the term level the series. Certainly, the situation that con- implies, there is a hierarchy of values here, and fronted the armed forces of the period is identi- failure at the higher level can seldom be com- cal to that of most modern soldiers: spending pensated for by superior performance at the long years in peacetime thinking and preparing lower. The Wehrmacht, for example, excelled for the next war. Because the outcome of these in the tactical phases of combat, but even sus- years of preparation (1919-39) is so well tained brilliance in battle could not make up known, the essays in The Interwar Period are for the army leadership’s—quite apart from the particularly instructive. They illustrate once albatross that was Hitler and the Nazi Party— again the fundamental difficulty in taking gross operational miscalculations, abysmal stra- “lessons” from the past, as the French army tegic ignorance, and willingness to submit to had done so diligently and so well by 1939. and political thralldom under Hitler (2:180-220). applying them to the present. Military' Effectiveness surveys the American, Inevitably, readers are drawn to certain key British, French, Soviet, Italian, German, and interpretations that buttress or challenge their Japanese war machines from 1914 to 1945 at own understanding of the period. Was France the above-mentioned four levels of war. Editors really much better prepared in 1914, as Robert Millett and Murray have assembled 23 of the Doughty asserts, than she was in 1940? (2:66) world's leading military historians, each an And was her undeniably superior military expert for one of the countries during the Great effectiveness during the Great War attributable War, the interwar years, or the Second World to the army’s preparation or to the explosion of War. Each essayist was provided with a list of national will that served to carry France questions to consider in evaluating the armed through to victory? Manfred Messerschmidt forces’ effectiveness at all four levels of war. rather cautiously indicts the German military The resulting 21 essays—plus six additional for accepting unrealistic goals that the nation’s NET ASSESSMENT 79

resources could not support. This may disap- tantly. they forgot that a key characteristic of point people who see a more fundamental successful evolution is adaptation. As Michael problem in the unholy alliance between the Howard has so cogently pointed out. while mil- military, criminals, and psychopaths that itary men have an obligation to study and pre- inhabited the Nazi pantheon. pare for the next war—and to be as right as World War II indubitably was the “payoff” possible in their assessments of the nature of for so many efforts discussed in the second vol- future conflict—the key to victory is not pre- ume. MacGregor Knox’s assessment of Italian dicting the future, but adapting quickly to new ineptness in World War II (in vol. 3) abun- conditions once that future becomes present dantly justifies Brian Sullivan’s assertion that reality. Italian military leaders, in failing to prepare In so massive a work, the reviewer can seriously for war and in lying to Mussolini always find errors or perceived omissions for about their efforts, clearly betrayed their coun- which he may mount his hobbyhorse. One try (2:205). Jurgen Forster’s emphasis on might wish, for example, that the Soviet articles Hitler’s creation of a militarized national “com- had taken greater notice of the scholarship of munity spirit" (Volksgemeinschaft) t h a t David Glantz, who has contributed so much to stripped away class and sectional differences our understanding of Soviet operational tech- shows how Nazi ideology cannot somehow be nique. Inevitably, the essays with their repeti- strained off the heady brew of German tactical tive formats are at times difficult; some are, brilliance. Apologists for the German army frankly, heavy going. Yet, such criticisms must must keep in mind Forster’s contention that not detract from the overall assessment of the ' Auschwitz was defended at Stalingrad too" three volumes: they are of very high quality and (3:181). Perhaps most importantly. John Jessup, will serve the academic or the professional sol- in assessing the Soviet armed forces in their dier long and well. Scholars will find in Mili­ “Great Patriotic War,” reminds all of us that tary Effectiveness much with which they may even modern military enterprise often defies wish to argue, but also a ready starting point for the conviction that “there must be some way of discussing the military operations of the quantifying the factors involved” (3:274). powers during this critical 30-year period. Is there a "bottom line,” a way to encapsulate While soldiers will not find lessons from the the 30 years of intense military activity past in these volumes readily applicable to assessed in these volumes? Clearly, one result their own situations, they will find examples, of this searing experience was the absolute questions, and provocative conclusions that dominance that civilians asserted over the mili- will enhance their own understanding of how tary establishment, beginning in the Second modern military systems function. World War. Rightly or wrongly. World War I Lt Col Gary P. Cox, USAF was commonly perceived as an episode in Maxwell AFB, Alabama which civilian governments lost control of their armed forces. Churchill. Roosevelt, Hitler, and Stalin were all determined to prevent this from Other Losses: The Shocking Truth behind the happening again; each developed his own Mass Deaths of Disarmed German Soldiers unique method of maintaining control. and Civilians under General Eisenhower’s A second conclusion relates to the utility of Command by James Bacque. New York 10010: Prima Publishing. 1991, 296 pages, ‘lessons" from history and the military’s ability to react to such lessons. Certainly, no war was $22.95. more studied than World War I. Military intel- Canadian journalist James Bacque has written lectuals in virtually every country attempted to a fairly simple and concise book about a very find a doctrine or strategy that could avoid a complex and diffuse subject. He, along with his repetition of the hecatombs of France and colleague Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., a retired histo- Flanders. Yet. despite the tank and the air- rian at the US Army Center of Military History plane, despite strategic bombing and the and author of the book’s foreword, is concerned blitzkrieg, World War II was fundamentally a with German prisoners of war (POW) during war of attrition on an even larger, bloodier scale World War II, in particular with their treatment than its predecessor. Perhaps the post-Great as that conflict reached its conclusion. Thus, War military intellectuals—J. F. C. Fuller, B. H. they set out to do what no other military histo- Liddell Hart, Giulio Douhet, Erwin Rommel, rian has done to date. Unfortunately, their Mikhail Tukhachevsky—learned the “wrong" study is driven more by their conclusions than lessons from their experiences. More impor- their research. 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

The thesis of Other Losses is simple. The the historiography of the war. However, they lengthy subtitle screams it out in bold red let- judged Other Losses to be “worse than worth- ters from the dust cover. Such sensationalism less.” Among major discrepancies, they noted no doubt led to the book’s being a best-seller in that there was a food shortage throughout Canada and several European countries and the Europe in 1945 that led to SHAEF's decision subject of a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation not to provide more food for German POWs but television documentary prior to its publication to feed them the same amount that German in the United States. civilians consumed. Indeed, the Allies had Relying on documents discovered at the anticipated a famine in 1945, and Eisenhower National Archives, Bacque and Fisher claim had personally ordered attempts to stockpile that the status of German military prisoners in foodstuffs prior to the end of the war. 1945 was changed from POWs to disarmed With regard to the document that cited a 30- enemy forces (DEF). Their captors, the US percent loss of POWs in one camp, historians Army of the Supreme Headquarters Allied pointed out that this figure was an obvious Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), then deliber- typographical error made by a clerk and should ately deprived them of minimum rations. Con- have been 3 percent. As to the testimony of sequently, untold thousands—“800,000, almost Colonel Lauben, the group of scholars noted certainly over 900,000 and quite likely over a that he was 90 years old and legally blind when million"—died in Allied POW camps. Because Bacque and Fisher interviewed him. Further- General Eisenhower was SHAEF commander at more, he later repudiated his statements to tele- the time, he was aware of these losses. Indeed, vision documentary officials. The conference according to Bacque and Fisher, he personally also asked. Where are the bodies? If over 1 mil- made the decision to withhold rations. lion prisoners died in this period, how were The crucial evidence for their conclusion is a they disposed of? Ambrose thought that the document that Bacque and Fisher found in the maximum German POW losses were probably National Archives (and reproduced in the about 56,000. Lastly, they correctly noted that book), which notes a 30-percent death rate in while Eisenhower, as the World War II com- one particular POW camp. With this informa- mander in chief in Europe, was responsible for tion in hand, Bacque tracked down and inter- everything that occurred in his theater, to make viewed Col Philip S. Lauben, SHAEF officer in him personally accountable for all high-level charge of German prisoner transfers and policy decisions as well as for individual acts repatriation in 1945, who allegedly confirmed of brutality misses the point totally. Though Ike Eisenhower's decision as well as the number of detested the Nazi ideology and the soldiers deaths. Additional interviews with selected US who fought to perpetuate it. his own sense of Army POW camp guards, mostly of lower rank, military professionalism and personal decency document extreme food shortages and poor simply would not have allowed a policy of medical treatment at various POW camps, as deliberate starvation. well as individual acts of brutality against Ger- In short. Other Losses is bad history. Given man prisoners. the Air Force's interest in the treatment of Other Losses was initially published in Can- POWs, readers of Airpower Journal would ada and Great Britain because US publishers profit from reading a scholarly account of Ger- were apparently concerned about the authen- man POWs during World War II. In that regard, ticity of its conclusions. Responsible World thev would be disappointed with Other Losses. War II scholars led by Stephen Ambrose, the Dr Alexander S. Cochran author of the definitive wartime biography of Maxwell AFB. Alabama Eisenhower and director of the Eisenhower Center for Leadership Studies, convened a spe- cial conference in December 1990 to consider A German Odyssey: The Journal of a German Bacque and Fisher’s findings. (Bacque and Prisoner of War by Helmut Horner. Trans- Fisher were invited to attend but refused.) His- lated and edited by Allan Kent Powell. torians from both German and American offi- Golden, Colorado 80401: Fulcrum Publish- cial military history offices and academic ing.1991, 428 pages. $23.95. specialists examined the charges in light of the historical evidence. The publication in 1991 of James Bacque's Ambrose and his colleagues acknowledged revisionist work Other Losses drew attention to that by bringing attention to the lack of histor- the issue of Allied treatment of former soldiers ical studies on the treatment of enemy POWs of the Third Reich. Bacque alleged that, as a during World War II, Bacque had contributed to result of a deliberate policy enacted by Gen NET ASSESSMENT 81 Dwight D. Eisenhower, nearly 1 million Ger- ments of the individual American officers and man army prisoners of war (POW) died in men. Although Horner and his fellow prisoners American and French captivity from 1945 to understandably held many anxious discussions 1946. Although Bacque’s thesis and methodol- about international agreements and conven- ogy have been thoroughly discredited, interest tions, the lot of the average enlisted POW was in the fate of German POWs remains high. strictly a day-to-day affair. Likewise, discus- Aside from Arnold Krammer’s excellent Nazi sions of politics, grand strategy, or war aims Prisoners of War in America, augmented by a were limited to their impact on the POWs’ few regional studies and ‘‘escape’’ accounts, the immediate situations or on those of family German POW experience until recently has. members back home in the Reich. been little studied. This gap in the literature is A German Odyssey will disappoint readers particularly glaring when contrasted with the who are looking for dramatic evidence of Nazi vast and diverse body of writing dealing with indoctrination among the German army regu- Royal Air Force officer POWs in Germany. lars captured in Normandy. Although Horner For this reason, the appearance of A German and his comrades looked with disdain upon fel- Odyssey, an expanded diary/memoir of a Ger- low prisoners who collaborated with their cap- man noncommissioned officer captured in Nor- tors, there is little evidence of the National mandy in August 1944, is especially welcome. Socialist zeal demonstrated by the POWs cap- Horner’s experiences at POW camps in France, tured in Tunisia in 1943 (before hopes of a Nazi his transatlantic crossing, and his internment at victory had completely receded). Additionally, POW camps across the United States typify the Horner’s account seems to bear out the points condition of the average German soldier cap- made by Bacque’s detractors: that the poor con- tured in the debacle in France in the summer of ditions suffered by many German POWs in 1944. In effect, this book gives a voice to the Allied hands were the product of local condi- long, grey columns of German POWs seen in tions and individual acts of spite or negligence. grainy newsreels. The conditions of Horner’s captivity gradually The core of the manuscript is a typewritten improved, and German POWs in the United account which Horner wrote in the late 1940s, States certainly wanted for little in the months itself based upon a rough diary kept between following Germany’s collapse. July 1944 and June 1946. With the assistance of A German Odyssey fulfills the hopes held by his editor/translator. Horner wrote a new pro- its editor/translator when he embarked upon logue and epilogue, wisely allowing the central the project. While making no claim to objec- narrative to remain untouched. While some of tivity or analysis, the account provides an inter- his reminiscences no doubt reflect postwar esting and worthwhile counterpoint to the reorientation and denazification, many of the more well-known POW memoirs. observations have the ring of authenticity about them. Witness Homer’s recollection of his reac- Richard R. Muller tion to news of the 20 July 1944 bomb plot Maxwell AFB, Alabama against Hitler: “A feeling of distress lies on my heart and the picture flashes before my eyes of Hagen as he stabbed Siegfried in the back with Panama: The Whole Story by Kevin Buckley. his spear” (page 37). His descriptions of small- New York 10020: Simon and Schuster, 1991, unit action in Normandy and of German infan- 304 pages, $21.95. try battling against near-total Allied superiority in air power and artillery also provide valuable Much work is in evidence in Panama: The insights. Whole Story, most of it meticulously Yet, this book's primary value lies in its researched. Kevin Buckley, a seasoned journal- depiction of the POW experience. Many of the ist, tends to stay within a historiconarrative for- holding camps for German prisoners— mat in this absolutely riveting book. A slight particularly those in France in the final months bias emerges occasionally, but that can’t be of the war—were poorly organized, maintained, humanly avoided. and supplied. Prisoners often had to fall back Throughout my reading of this study, I on their own resourcefulness and guile in order attempted to identify the single strongest mes- to avert starvation (e.g., some made “gold” sage. There were too many: that Panama's and rings out of scraps of copper and traded them to Washington's politics were interlinked: that gullible American guards in exchange for food). Miami is the shadow capital of Panama; that Maltreatment in the camps appeared to be Panama’s entire population served the personal dependent upon the attitudes and tempera- interests and was the victim of one man, Man- 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 uel Noriega: that Noriega emerges not so much was a flunky, yet ‘‘to North, Noriega was a as a buffoon as an outright goon; and that the spymaster, an operator, a man who made things ongoing struggle between numerous US govern- happen. He worshipped him like a schoolboy.” ment agencies rivalled the struggle between the People did their best to use everyone else for US and Noriega. The silliest expectation was their private purposes. The problem was that in that once Noriega was removed from power, Panama we had only a few alternatives because Panama would enjoy democracy. Any society power was concentrated in only a few hands. from which such utter lunacy emerges is not But Noriega could pick us apart in Washington, about to respect the parliamentary process. where people were tripping over each other, Many people appear to have enjoyed Noriega’s which made Noriega’s task all the easier. antics—until they became his victims. Although Buckley stays close to the history, Buckley presents a good, intensive history of many questions are raised, all of which are well the events leading up to America’s invasion of known to students of foreign relations. One Noriega's stronghold in December 1989. Nori- question concerns the concerted effort by US ega had often worked with US intelligence and agencies to put the squeeze on Panama’s econ- other government agencies, making a point to omy in order to pressure Noriega to relent. Of rub elbows with everyone who surrounded course, he never felt the effects, but the President Ronald Reagan—including then-Vice people—the victims—did. Was this another President George Bush. Noriega was useful but case of destroying a village in order save it? a pest—an apt observation which we shared Another problem surfaces. If, to get one man, with the Medellin cartel. The banks were Nori- we spent millions of dollars, lost 23 of our mili- ega's private piggy banks; the army was his tary men, exposed many others to dangers, personal bodyguard and goon squad; public killed hundreds of Panamanians, and reduced facilities were his personal property; govern- that country’s economy to a shambles, is it not ment workers were his personal cheering high time to implement strategies that permit squad; and the people were his buffer against us to make war on only one man and not (in enemies, internal and external. How the US effect) on virtually everyone else except him? government ever became so deeply involved This needs serious rethinking. Secretary of with him emerges as the biggest perplexing Defense Dick Cheney had promised all along question, although Buckley does not delve into that no Americans would be lost, but in the end this sufficiently. He tells us what happened, too many were—not to mention hundreds of rarely why. Panamanians. Was Noriega worth it? Buckley’s story is frightening because no Finally, the book is not without its faults. It is clear, single motive for Washington’s obsession intensively written and uses frequent flash- with removing Noriega emerges. Was it his sub- backs, a technique that often makes the author’s stantial role in peddling drugs? His threats to train of thought hard to follow if one’s reading the functioning of the Panama Canal? Or was it is interrupted. Buckley appears to be afraid of all an ego showdown between Noriega and leaving out the least detail; consequently, too Bush, who inherited the mess from the pre- many players are involved. Yet, the treatment vious administration? Noriega played with of the final war itself is too brief. There is also a Washington. He gave just enough to keep ’em "Woodwardesque” element in the book. Buck- coming back for more—but always on his ley writes, "In private, Noriega did not believe terms. At one time. Buckley has Noriega toying any of his own words." Or, after Noriega was with Ollie North, who maneuvered to use Nori- safely ensconced in the nunciature in Panama ega in the perennial search for some shred of City. Buckley offers, “His room was austere but evidence that Nicaragua was indeed aiding the far more comfortable than he imagined a U.S. rebels in El Salvador. Noriega ultimately prison cell would be.” How does Buckley know stabbed Ollie in the back to prove Ollie's what was in Noriega’s mind? Buckley also does naivete and the power of his own agenda. the unpardonable when he suggests that Nori- The ongoing relationship between Noriega ega could stay at the nunciature for years. He and the [CIA director William] Casey-North could become, says Buckley, “a tropical Minds- axis was indicative of the ball game they were zenty [Joseph, Cardinal, granted asylum by the playing—except that North used a softball and US government in its legation in Budapest dur- Noriega his usual hardball. “To Noriega and his ing the Hungarian revolt of 1956)." Mark that entourage," writes Buckley, “North was a figure one down for the worst analogy of the year! of fun.” "To Noriega, North had always seemed However, such exercises in journalistic license untrustworthy and gullible." To Noriega, North do not appreciably discredit the work. NET ASSESSMENT 83

Panama: The Whole Story is a fabulous book. which were flown by the most experienced I learned a lot from it. We were able to make pilots with the highest morale, and greatly out- short shrift of Saddam, but I’ll wonder forever numbered the Allied forces in the air. The loss how we ever came to be manipulated by Nori- ratios were heavily in the Germans’ favor. As ega and how we became so intimate with him the war progressed, however, all these factors in the first place. A movie will have to be made changed to favor the Allies. By 1945, German of this piece of history. But it will have to be aircraft were being flown by pilots with as little toned down considerably—to make it more as 10-15 hours in type: the experienced combat believable! leaders had been lost: and the Allies owned the Dr Karl P. Magyar skies—even over German airdromes, where M axw ell A FB , Alabama they often outnumbered the Germans 10:1. The fact that pilots of JG 26 continued to fly at all in the face of these odds, according to the author, JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe by Donald L. was certainly not a result of a fanatical devo- Caldwell. New York 10022: Orion Books. tion to Nazism, but of their individual profes- 1991. 427 pages, $25.00. sionalism and the remaining pride they had in their fighter groups. In this detailed documentary, Donald L. JG 26 is a carefully researched book valuable Caldwell takes us on a day-to-day, up-close to any serious student of World War II. look at one of World War H's most famous Ger- Although it is likely to have some factual man fighter wings, lagdgeschivader 26 (JG 26). errors, as Adolf Galland says in his foreword, If one could cast aside the ideology and fanati- "The Luftwaffe destroyed most of its records at cism of the Third Reich and look at a single war’s end, and men’s memories of events fifty World War II German fighter wing from the per- years ago must be considered fallible. Neverthe- spective of the employment of air power and less, I feel this book, with its unique perspec- the makeup of the individual pilots, the tive on the air war, is a suitable memorial to the similarities—not the differences—between an fallen men of Jagdgeschwader 26.” American wing and JG 26 would be most strik- Col fames S. Mosbey, USAF ing. JG 26, known to both Royal Air Force and Moody AFB. Georgia American pilots as "the Abbeville Kids.” was one of the most respected and best German wings for the most part of the war, having the In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea by responsibility of defending the Continent, Larry Zellers. Lexington, Kentucky 40508: essentially from the banks of the English Chan- University Press of Kentucky, 1991, 224 nel all the way back to the fatherland. In order pages. $24.95. to present a complete history, the author has interviewed over 50 former members of JG 26, The military spends large amounts of money from their commander to the ground support each year to train its people on survival tech- troops, and has carefully researched the war niques for life as a prisoner of war (POW). The records in the US. Great Britain, and Germany. various programs all use the expertise of former His technique of juxtaposing—in time and POWs to ensure the training is as realistic as geography—the records of aerial combat possible. Nonetheless, training effectiveness encounters from both sides has shown many has inherent limitations because we cannot combat engagements for the first time according subject the trainees to the kinds of physical and to the true course of events. As one would sus- mental abuse they would find in a real POW pect in combat reports, enemy losses were camp, nor can we leave them there for indefi- exaggerated by both sides (although friendly nite periods of time without any idea of when, loss records appear to have been accurately or whether, they will get out. As a result, cap- kept). This book will possibly give many of the turing the experiences of former prisoners and participants, both German and Allied, of passing that experience to others is especially Europe’s air battles their first look at the actual important to the POW training system. outcome of their individual fights. Larry Zellers brings his Korean War POW Another interesting facet of the book is what experiences to us from a unique perspective. may be best described as "reverse mirror- While he had been enlisted in the Army Air imaging" of the Allied and German fighter Forces during World War II, he was in Korea as wings. At the beginning of the war. the German a civilian when the war broke out. He was a units were equipped with the best aircraft, missionary teacher who found himself thrust 84 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

into the unreal world of North Korea as a civil- The Heart of a Man: A Naval Pilot’s Vietnam ian prisoner of war. Entering this world Diary by Frank C. Elkins. Edited by Marilyn basically unprepared for what he was to face R. Elkins. Annapolis, Maryland 21402: Naval makes Zellers’s experience especially valuable Institute Press, 1991, 133 pages, $17.95. to us because it lets us see how individuals react when the norms and references they have If you are searching for insight into the mind known and accepted in their lives are suddenly and heart of a Vietnam-era pilot, this book is for removed. It lets us view how an individual you. It is candid, moving, and—at the same reacts to overcome adversity and how human time—challenging. Its message is all the more frailties affect our reactions. From this we can trenchant since the author’s hope that learn possible methods to prepare others for a “everything will be perfect if I can just get similar experience. At the very least, we can through the next three months alive" was better understand the experience of others. ultimately unfulfilled. Zellers spent three years as a prisoner of In reading the brief accounts of the numerous North Korea. In Enemy Hands describes the missions described in this book, one gets the harsh mental, and sometimes physical, interac- strong impression that this is not simply the tion between himself and his interrogators. His story of one man, but a revelation of the shared analysis of those sessions is perhaps the most experiences of many Vietnam warriors. The useful part of the book for aiding others in Heart of a Man unveils a spirit common to understanding the POW experience. Under- many military members once they find them- standing what is happening to you and why selves in combat. Now that we have a new gen- can be extremely important in being able to sur- eration of pilots whose mettle has been tested vive continuous interrogation and to suc- in war, it would be intriguing to compare their cessfully react to it. The same can be said of experiences and emotions to those of Vietnam Zellers’s chilling description of his time in the veterans. Although the wars were quite dif- death cells, when he could have been executed ferent, many of the pilots’ reactions could be at any moment. From there he narrates his hor- similar. rific experiences along with those of his civil- The text is edited by Elkins’s widow and was ian comrades during the forced death march originally published in 1973, seven years after across North Korea in increasingly worse his aircraft was shot down. Elkins had been weather and under universally bad treatment. maintaining an extensive diary of his actions On a different level, Zellers relates the inter- and emotions, since “he planned to write a action with other prisoners and the effect their novel after he returned and felt that a record of individual personalities had on how, for better his own immediate reactions to the war would or worse, they handled life as prisoners and serve as valuable source material.’’ Marilyn how they contributed to the entire POW com- Elkins was fortunate to receive her husband’s munity. His group included a mixed bag of mis- “unexpurgated" diary to read. A pilot was sionaries. diplomats, and ordinary civilians appointed to censor the material before it was from various nations. Most interesting to note is sent home, but he took a risk, stating, “I will that a number of his companions were pris- not be responsible for changing one word of his oners of a brutal regime for a second time, hav- diary.” Only a week later, this aviator himself ing been held by the Germans or the Japanese died in the tragic fire aboard the USS Oriskany. during World War II. The special insight they Marilyn Elkins relates that his death “freed me brought to the other POWs is especially worth to publish the diary.” reading and reemphasizes to us the importance The Heart of a Man records a dramatic trans- of capturing and passing on that insight to oth- formation. We begin with an enthusiastic avia- ers who may suffer the same fate in the future. tor, eager to make his mark in combat. He is concerned about his career progression and rec- In Enemy Hands is a well-written memoir, ognizes the key role that his combat experience devoid of the self-serving pulp that often fills will play in future assignments. He displays memoirs. It reads clearly and is well paced. It is worth reading as a history of a little-known por- farsighted plans: tion of the Korean War, as a training aid for I’ve noticed that as officers grow more senior, they POWs, and as a help in understanding the forget (honestly forget, not just disregard) the human experience of war. things that really bugged them as junior officers.... So I am writing down every really notable thing Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF that 1 honestly feel should be done in cases where Maxwell AFB. Alabama something else was done. NET ASSESSMENT 85

On the cruise toward Southeast Asia, he tem- back. It's those who have too much to live for; pers his enthusiasm by recognizing that ‘‘hav- they’re always the ones who get it. And me, I've got ing never been shot at. I may be premature in too much to live for now. asking for a lot before I taste a little.” Even after One of the most appealing aspects of this tasting the bittersweet flavor of combat, he has book is its uncompromising honesty. After mixed feelings about the prospects of transfer- recounting an onboard party featuring "some ring early to a special-duty assignment before 200 proof stuff mixed with Hawaiian Punch," the completion of his tour. Finally, toward the he states, "When I woke up the next day I felt end of the tour, he relates his sleeplessness due like pure hell!’’ At the conclusion of the to his fear over an impending "night hop”: account, he confesses, "I’m really ashamed of I couldn't go to sleep.... The very idea of a whole all this, but 1 don’t want to color it in the career in the Navy was so remote to me that 1 account, since I’ll later like to remember it as it decided that I wanted out of all this, decided that was, good or bad.” This candid spirit makes the the thing for me to do was go through three years of book valuable not only to aviators, but to all shore duty and then go back to North Carolina and students of the human psyche in combat. One do something: law. teach, anything— I could think critical example follows: of all that, knowing that if 1 turned in my wings, that I'd have to live all my life in that same feeling I don’t like to admit this, and if I get killed and of shame, having the medals but secretly knowing Barry reads this as 1 have given him permission to that I had given up because I didn't think 1 had the do, 1 think it may make him cringe as it would me stuff to keep going when it got rough. if I were reading the same thing in his journal. However, the truth is, 1 downed an aircraft on deck Even from the beginning, he saw the for a bad gyro, and it just wasn’t the truth. dilemma of war (‘‘I deeply believe in what’s happening here__ Still war is legal murder"). As enlightening as the book is, it does pos- In this book we witness the gradual transforma- sess one distinct drawback—its price. Admit- tion of a man who is trained to fight and kill tedly, book prices continue to rise, but to into a person truly struggling with deep moral charge this much for so brief a volume (printed, dilemmas. for that matter, with widely spaced text) is unfortunate. Perhaps the diary should have Bob and I found some trucks__ We turned one been released in paperback so it would be more over and left four burning and exploding, but you affordable. Nevertheless, the account certainly only think about the trucks and supplies and not people. It's cruel, but it's almost necessary to keep merits reading, and we can be grateful that it yourself sane if you have any humanitarian has been republished. sensitivities. Due to both its engaging content and its brev- ity, this is a book easily read in a single sitting. Early on in his combat flying, he had sensed Yet, it raises significant issues which can be that "I guess I need to hate a little.... I’m just pondered for long hours. While his widow not vindictive enough. I hope it doesn’t take the acknowledges that "finding any justifiable rea- loss of one of us to get me on the proper plane." son for Frank's death remains problematic,” Elkins was lost during a particularly difficult she takes some comfort in the hope that his period of the war. We hear his initial optimism diary may ‘‘serve as a permanent example of dissipate to the point that 50 days before his the personal cost of wars in American life.” life ended, he lamented the fact that he had This, most certainly, is something none of us "too much to live for." He regarded this as an can afford to forget. Two days before his death, ill omen which took the keen edge off his com- Lt Frank C. Elkins reflected a genuine, battle- bat abilities and made him ‘‘afraid I’ll lose won courage that had dispelled the bravado of something that’s really necessary to get me short months earlier, when he wrote, through all this." I hate night hops__ Every time 1 walk up on that One thing that's really difficult about being married deck knowing what's coming up, it’s like facing to her is that my attitude is now not as good as it death. Hell, more than that, it is facing death: but 1 was when I felt I had nothing really to lose. 1 enjoy think I face it sometimes more heavy-hearted than living more than some, and if I'm killed, surely other folks. I think I'm sometimes more cowardly there are plenty who will say. "Too bad," and about it than others, more hesitant. But dammit. I mean it. But I've never felt that the world would be do it. greatly altered. I've lost that attitude, though it's the best possible frame of mind to be in when you Chaplain Cap! Robert C. Stroud know there’s a good chance you won't make it RAF Alconburv, United Kingdom 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Command Performance: The Neglected Dimen- crises. Furthermore, Stares finds that NATO’s sion of European Security by Paul B. Stares. forward defense and the development by both Washington, D. C. 20036: Brookings Institu- NATO and the Warsaw Pact of a quick, deep- tion, 1991, 240 pages, $29.95. strike doctrine only compounds the problem of command performance should a conventional With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the war escalate quickly to nuclear exchange. decline of the Warsaw Pact, some strategists Stares examines command performance and might conclude that the need for NATO no military effectiveness in three key battles of longer exists. Not so, argues Paul Stares. World War II. He finds that intelligence collec- Instead, the alliance’s command and control tions and processing, command decision mak- (C2) system assumes new importance because ing, and communications played pivotal roles. of the instability in Eastern Europe. In this During the battle of France in 1940, the Allies compact and well-written study, Stares makes failed to act on important intelligence that Ger- two significant arguments. First, he maintains many was massing for attack. Such intelligence that the NATO command system has been conflicted with the view held by Allied leaders neglected because most battlefield analysis of what they thought Germany would do. Fur- focuses on weapons and doctrine. This resulted thermore, the Allied chain of command was in less emphasis on the command structure, highly centralized and cumbersome, allowing— which—in the author’s view—could have led to for instance—the British to appeal command inadvertent war. Stares then uses this main decisions directly to Great Britain. On the other argument as a springboard to suggest that an hand, the German chain of command was improved C2 system in NATO can make the decentralized, paralleling the Germans’ speed alliance a factor for stability in a rapidly chang- of attack. In another case study, the author cites ing European context. the advantages of an integrated air defense sys- Stares breaks new ground. The literature tem that afforded British Fighter Command the dealing with C2 systems does not deal with capability to scramble aircraft on warning, NATO to the same degree that the author does. thereby avoiding the necessity of having to Managing Nuclear Operations, edited by Ash- patrol British airspace. By contrast, Germany’s ton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Second and Third Air Fleets each planned and A. Zraket, and Bruce G. Blair’s Strategic Com­ communicated separately to the German High mand and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Command, confusing Germany’s air effort Threat, both published by the Brookings Insti- against Britain. The author also cites US code- tution, discuss C2 systems as they relate to breaking efforts and the flexible US chain of nuclear operations in a war between the Soviet command as important factors contributing to Union and the United States. NATO C2 systems victory at Midway. receive a general overview. Stares, on the other Stares gives NATO’s C2 systems low marks. hand, reviews command performance in three He finds NATO's system vulnerable to conven- battles; discusses in great detail the NATO tional attack and its key posts, surveillance sys- command structure; illustrates the problems tems, and intelligence centers incapable of inherent in the system at the theater, opera- withstanding a high-intensity attack. He decries tional, and tactical levels if NATO were wholly unrealistic exercises which fail to attacked; and concludes with his recommenda- approximate real war conditions and the failure tions for the future. to standardize communications equipment The author begins by explaining why C2 sys- throughout the alliance. Stares recommends tems have been neglected. Stares faults histo- that NATO’s mission be changed to that of cri- rians for assessing past wars and neglecting any sis management and conflict prevention. In discussion of C2. He thinks this is because of order to accomplish this new reorienation, the prevailing perception that command sys- NATO would need its own intelligence and tems are not really part of weapons systems. In warning satellite system, more realistic his view, the nature of command systems cuts exercises, standardized communications and across lines of technology, organization, and technical support, a rapid-reaction force to human behavior. The author finds another rea- respond to any emergency, and greater flex- son for such neglect in the political systems of ibility in its contingency plans to respond to a the European alliance members. The necessity variety of situations with the goal of stabilizing for NATO’s too consultative body to report to crises. individual member governments could, in the Command Performance is well written and author’s view, hamstring decision making in interesting. The author makes extensive use of NET ASSESSMENT 87 personal interviews and secondary sources. ment beyond controlling the Atlantic Ocean Still, the question remains as to who will pay and providing material and financial aid to for such extensive retooling of NATO’s C2 sys- China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. As tem in this period of fiscal restraint. a result, “ provocative" actions such as the Maj William S. Borgiasz, USAF Lend-Lease Act were “indistinguishable from Washington. D.C. incitements to war" (page 401). (That lend- lease was not a slavish concession to a de facto ally goes unsaid in A Time for War, since it A Time for War by Robert Smith Thompson. does not fit the author’s conspiratorial portrait New York 10023: Prentice Hall Press, 1991, of FDR. In fact, the goods received did not out- 449 pages, $24.95. value payments for two years.) To Thompson the real question is not whether Roosevelt Robert Smith Thompson’s A Time for War is provoked a fight but rather why he did so. He an unoriginal and historically inaccurate New did not enter the fray, according to the author, Left critique of America's entry into World War to save democracy or because there was a clear D. In the tradition of Charles Beard’s President and present danger to the security of the United Roosevelt and the Coming of the Pacific War, States. Instead, the United States declared war 1941 (1948), the present volume is a polemical because Roosevelt-inspired interventionists screed against Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) saw themselves, and the nation, "engaged in a imperial presidency and his duplicitous deter- titanic struggle for the right to make the rules mination to embroil the United States in war. for the world” (page 402). Specifically, the Roo- Unfortunately, the muckraking author commits sevelt administration wanted to reestablish the so many historiographical sins that A Time for "golden yesterday” of the nineteenth century, War becomes yet another example of how pun- with its political stability and unparalleled dits use and abuse history to confirm a pre- prosperity but with the United States as the determined point. preeminent power rather than Great Britain. Thompson’s goal is to repudiate traditional (Since it would upset the author’s ahistorical explanations of America's entry into World portrait of the United States as a reactionary War II. even though scholars have significantly power, A Time for War ignores the possibility modified them over the last 20 years. Accord- that any American would remember the late ing to Thompson, postwar historians were actu- nineteenth century as an era that included the ally mythographers. They promulgated the depressions of 1873-78 and 1893-97.) myth that prior to 1941 the United States was The limitations of A Time for War have their an inward-looking and neutral nation and that roots in the Wisconsin school of historiogra- it initially failed to recognize incipient German phy, which began with William Appleman and Japanese aggression. With recognition Williams’s The Tragedy of American Diplo­ came appeasement, which unnecessarily macy (1959). The latter’s emphasis on delayed American rearmament and left the economics, the impact of business elites on nation vulnerable to attack. Consequently, it government policies, and the role of self- was Japan's cowardly and unprovoked attack interest in US foreign policy was new and on Pearl Harbor that drove the United States to important. Williams's New Left disciples subse- war. quently (and rightfully) challenged the mixture In contrast to the above interpretation, which of fact and fiction that plagued traditional the American people readily accepted, the American studies, but their works sometimes author argues that the United States did not degenerated into "blame-America-first” enter the fray because of Pearl Harbor. By late jeremiads. This occurred because Wisconsin 1941, America was already in a naval "war” school historians also saw themselves as social with Germany and an economic “war” with activists. To buttress their revisionist agendas, Japan. Further. FDR "possibly” (“probably” in they used and abused history in dubious ways. the author's lexicon) had advanced warning of A Time for War. a volume that restates famil- the Pearl Harbor attack and allowed it to hap- iar New Left themes, stems from the above tra- pen. Despite congressional neutrality laws and dition, and thus commits many of the public unease. Roosevelt did so because he was historiographical sins found in other Wisconsin less interested in containing Germany and School-inspired studies. For example, by delib- Japan than in provoking a fight. According to erately focusing on a short period of time the author, FDR wanted to precipitate "an inci- (1938-41), Thompson can establish bogus dent'" that would extend American involve- cause-and-effect relationships, accept the moral 88 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1992

equivalency of Japanese and American defended only by those who confuse studying behavior, and neglect the role of 75 years of history with suffering it.” Japanese colonialism as an impetus to war. The Ultimately, and because it is an example of author further depends on secondary rather history by omission, misplaced emphasis, and than primary sources, and the authorities he innuendo, A Time for War is an untrustworthy does cite are overwhelmingly Western. As a guide to America’s path to war. Instead, inter- result, A Time for War completely ignores ested readers should consult Waldo Heinrichs's recent Japanese analyses of the Pacific war that Threshold of War (1988) and the works of acknowledge Japan’s war guilt. Thompson does William Langer and S. Everett Gleason. cite a limited number of primary sources, but Maj Peter Faber, USAF he ultimately depends on experts rather than documents to support his themes. (Tellingly, New Haven, Connecticut the most frequently cited “document” is the New York Times.) The above strategies thus allow the author to demonize President Roosevelt. Since New Left The March of Conquest: The German Victories historiography has its philosophic roots in the in Western Europe, 1940 by Telford Taylor. Enlightenment, it typically assumes that history Baltimore 21201: Nautical and Aviation Pub- is rational. Human events are not driven by lishing Company, 1991, 374 pages. chance, nor do they stagger from one crisis to another. If the cause of an event is not appar- Only a few books that were written in the ent. it exists nevertheless. Unfortunately, such 1950s about the German army are important an assumption can support conspiracy-based enough to be kept in print. Walter Goerlitz’s interpretations of history, and one of the great History of the German General Staff, Gordon conspiracy theories of American historiography Craig's The Politics of the Prussian Army, centers on Franklin D. Roosevelt. As suggested 1640-1945, and Harold Gordon’s The earlier, Thompson is not the first to character- Reichswehr and the German Republic all come ize FDR as an omniscient and Mephistophelian to mind as works still essential for a student of figure who single-handedly manipulated Amer- the German army. Telford Taylor's The March ica and Japan into war. Nor is he the first to of Conquest, originally published in 1958, push this single theme far beyond its capacity belongs with the above list. Fortunately for the to explain the actions and reactions of different serious military history reader, the Nautical nations, governments, and military establish- and Aviation Publishing Company has just ments. As a result, the author empties people reprinted Taylor’s study. and events of their true complexity. He mini- The March of Conquest examines the German mizes FDR's genuine idealism, as embodied by campaigns of 1940 from the Scandinavian inva- the Four Freedoms, his frequent indecisiveness, sions through the battle for France to the and his anticolonialism, which strained US aborted Operation Sea Lion. Taylor concen- relations with Great Britain; he focuses on the trates his research and narrative on the strategy Japanese-American endgame and ignores how and plans of the Wehrmacht High Command the diplomacy (or its absence) of eight different and the senior German commanders. He writes nations contributed to the Pacific war; and he as one of a very few historians who has a realis- suggests, since the Japanese were “ mired tic grasp of the problems of friction in war and down" in China and the Germans were “bog- the effect of circumstance and personality upon ging down” in Russia, that the inviolable grand strategy. Taylor also belongs to a minor- United States could have accepted a stalemate ity of historians who possess an in-depth famil- with the Axis powers in 1941. (Thompson iarity with the German army system and the seemingly draws the latter conclusion from personalities of the senior commanders. Taylor Bruce Russett’s ahistorical No Clear and Pres­ had the advantage of serving as an Army intel- ent Danger (1972), a text delimited by Professor ligence officer in World War II and as chief Russett’s pacifism and the specter of the Viet- counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg nam War.) To say that in 1941 America and its trials. Needless to say, Taylor has a knowledge interests were not in danger and that World of German General Staff documents that few War II was more or less over is historically irre- historians have been able to equal. sponsible. Considering that tens of millions Taylor’s familiarity with both the German were yet to fall, Sheldon Cohen is right to military and the original documents shows to observe that “there are positions that can be its best advantage when he outlines and NET ASSESSMENT 89

explains the planning for the 1940 campaign. France 1940 (published 1969), and several of He corrects several serious misconceptions Taylor's mistakes concerning Allied numbers popularized in the works of B. H. Liddell Hart, and equipment have been corrected. Walter Goerlitz. and Alan Bullock due to an In summary, Taylor’s The March of Conquest overreliance on postwar memoirs, recollec- is a good book for the well-stocked military his- tions, and a superficial approach to original tory library. It contains a thorough examination documents. For example. Taylor effectively of the strengths and weaknesses of German sinks the myth that the original plan for the strategy. Further, it is extremely well 1940 German advance into the Low Countries researched and well written, and displays a was no more than an unimaginative copy of the high quality of historical and military Schlieffen Plan. Since developing campaign understanding. plans is a complex process. Taylor skillfully takes the reader through the several stages of Dr James S. Corum the evolution of the plan that shattered the Maxwell AFB, Alabama Allied armies in 1940. While acknowledging that the concept of the armored thrust through the Ardennes came from Gen Erich von Man- stein, he details the work of Gen Gerd von From Sumer to Rome: The Military Rundstedt and others in developing the plan Capabilities of Ancient Armies by Richard A. and getting it adopted by the High Command. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz. Westport, Con- necticut 06881: Greenwood Press, 1991, 182 Another myth popularized by Liddell Hart pages, $45.00. and others that Taylor demolishes is the story that von Manstein was demoted and pushed This fascinating study appears in the Green- aside in January’ 1940 by a reactionary General wood series of Contributions in Military Stud- Staff that resented his brilliant planning. Taylor ies, which includes explorations that are points out that von Manstein's transfer from his refreshingly novel such as Carl Van Dyke’s Rus- post as army group chief of staff to command of sian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education. an infantry corps was by no means a demotion. 1832-1914. and Joseph Lepgold's Declining The transfer was in accordance with normal Hegemon: The United States and European personnel policy, and—after several years on Defense, 1960-1990. In keeping with the nature the staff—Manstein was due for a field com- of this scouting operation, the work under mand. He was not offered a mechanized corps review looks at the military history of antiquity as a slight but simply because such commands from a standpoint unusual among military his- were given to generals of higher or equal rank, torians and analysts, namely that of military such as Hermann Hoth, Heinz Guderian. Erich sociology and military medicine. Furthermore, Hoeppner, and George-Hans Reinhardt, who the book is distinctive inasmuch as it resorts to already had field experience in leading contemporary field trials that reproduce and armored forces—something Manstein lacked at approximate the effects of various weapons of the time. antiquity. This is a commendable initiative; Taylor’s study of the General Staff also sheds details of the procedures used in these simula- light on important questions, such as the cause tions are set forth in the introduction. for the German delay in cutting off the Allied The first third of the book provides the foun- retreat at Dunkirk. With a common-sense dation and framework in describing the histor- approach, he points out that the Germans, dis- ical sociology of war and organized military organized after their swift advance to the forces from about 4000 13.C. (Sumer [part of English Channel, took their time in destroying ancient Babylonia]) to about A.D. 100 (imperial the Dunkirk pocket because the continental- Rome at its height). Another way to describe minded General Staff had no idea that naval this span of centuries is to say that it begins power could intervene so effectively and evacu- after the Stone Age ends—namely with the ate the majority of the trapped Allied troops. Bronze Age—and that it continues with the The primary drawback to The March of Con­ Iron Age, most famously symbolized by the quest, which Taylor acknowledges, was that gladius, the sword of the Roman legionnaire. books and articles detailing the Allied side of The Iron Age, which the authors date from the story were scarce when the study was writ- about 1500 B.C., “saw the practice of war firmly ten in 1958. Since then, numerous good books rooted in man’s societies and experience and, from the Allied perspective have appeared, perhaps more importantly, in his psychol- such as Alistair Horne's To Lose a Battle: ogy__ At this time armies produced the pro- 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992 totype of every weapon that was developed for ing detail about the accomplishments of the the next 3.000 years” (page 19). ancients, especially Sumerians and Romans, in This historical sociology is not. contrary to matters military. Further, the footnotes and a appearances, a venture into military history by substantial bibliography guide the reader to some metallurgist. The authors make it clear specialist literature in the English language. more than once that their thesis is not one of John Tashjean technological determinism (e.g., page 48). The Arlington, Virginia sociology is essentially political and, though it recognizes the importance of irrigation in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, makes no use Fall of Eben Emael by Col James E. Mrazek, Jr. of the concept of hydraulic society or any refer- Novato, California 94949: Presidio Press, ence to Karl August Wittfogel’s Oriental 1991, 192 pages, $19.95. Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. Father Time has scythed away two full de- The historical aspect of the thesis is summed cades since this tale by an old Army colonel up in a curve of twin peaks separated by mil- first appeared in print. However, the passing of lennial decline. Rising from Sumer to imperial a generation has failed to diminish the elo- Rome, the curve drawn by the authors sums up quence, acuity, or drama with which this singu- a very impressive and fairly cumulative lar military escapade is told. Further, the achievement. After Rome (the New Rome of intervening score of years has not lessened the Byzantium is excluded without acknowledge- relevance of Colonel Mrazek's central message. ment or explanation), all is decline and dark- His book documents by example the inevitable ness until Napoleon and after. The validity of result of ignoring technological progress and of this grand curve depends in part on the defini- adhering to antiquated dogma in the face of the tion of the term military. The curve will pre- surprise application of new weapons. It also sumably find a friendlier audience among documents, for the military thinker interested historians of ground forces than among naval in defending against future Hitlers, a creative historians. The early modern breakthroughs in military plan carefully laid out by Adolf Hitler cartography, celestial navigation, and the deter- himself. mination of longitude by the surprising method Hitler knew that Fort Eben Emael was the key of chronometry—all of which is the standard to the defense of Belgium. Its capture meant story of modern naval power—might make one that mobile armed forces and the logistics trail doubt the long valley between the peaks. necessary for a successful blitzkrieg could be Quite independently of that issue, however, funneled through the border at that point. The this book makes a substantial and distinctive result, in fact, led the Allied armies to the brink contribution in its several chapters on military of destruction. They were saved only by their medicine. This is a field in which most military miraculous evacuation to England from Dun- historians—and presumably most military kirk. By contrast, if Eben Emael had withstood commanders—are traditionally inexpert in the the attack for just a few days, the German extreme. The simplest way, perhaps, to high- assault might have been delayed enough to light the importance of military medicine to the allow the Belgians, British, and French to take nonmedic—military or civilian—is to define significant countermeasures. the entire variable of preventive and therapeu- In 15 chapters. Colonel Mrazek describes tic military medicine as a major part of what every aspect of this mission (code-named Gran- Clausewitz called friction: that is to say, the dif- ite). He outlines the military significance with ference between military capability on paper maps. He takes the reader deep into the and military capability as exercised in the real “impregnable” fortress, down dark, concrete world. There are still too many people who tunnels, through heavily riveted steel doors, consider war a matter of arrows on maps; for into the command center, into the ammunition them, especially, this book should be an eye- chambers, and into the gun-turret casemates. opener. It is clear, in any case, that the authors His descriptions throughout the book are viv- are aware of contemporary concerns in the US idly interlaced with quotations from survivors. Army, ranging from the ever-shrinking tooth-to- He outlines the German glider program: the tail ratio (most recently at about 1:11) and cur- promotion of sport gliding, the secret research rent issues in military medicine such as ‘‘quan- into military models, the specialized training of tum healing" (page 160, note 3). the glidermen assault forces. He tells of the The book is chock-full of vivid and surpris- invention of “hollow-charge" explosives and NET ASSESSMENT 91

the fact that secrecy forbade even the glidermen monplace in aviation lore today. Readers who from learning, in exercises, of their tremendous romanticized the aviation pioneers during their power against fortifications. formative years will enjoy such stories as Glenn The actual assault was replete with surprises. Martin’s barnstorming campaigns against rival For example, the lieutenant leading the 77-man Glenn Curtis, Donald Douglas's combined air- assault force had the misfortune to be in a plane and potato enterprise, and the Wright glider prematurely thrown off its towplane, due brothers' sullen and tragic descent into endless to a near midair collision on the way to the tar- litigation. get. The clarity of the writing allows readers to Barons of the Sky, however, is far more than put themselves in the place of the characters. a book of chatty reminiscences, and on another Imagine having to recross the Rhine (as did the readership level it appeals to the social critics lieutenant), land in a field, and attempt to scare who cast a jaundiced eye on the end products up a quick tow to continue the mission! of the aviation pioneers—the supercharged Fall of Eben Emael is thorough, well docu- aerospace corporations which now bear their mented. well organized, and clearly written. names, if not their elan. Those rakish individ- Even for those readers outside the military uals, after all, had to contend with a hostile ranks, it makes exciting reading. business base and a wildly unsettled economy, Maj Thomas C. Blow II, USAF as well as infant technologies and unfamiliar Scott AFB. Illinois laws of physics. These problems were less easily conquered than the air itself, and the sur- vivors were those entrepreneurs who were able to fabricate and sell their products in the face of Barons of the Sky: From Early Flight to Strate- a wary general public and a decidedly flabby gic Warfare; The Story of the American civil aviation market. Biddle finds that their Aerospace Industry by Wayne Biddle. New salvation lay in the federal government, par- York 10020: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 365 ticularly in its growing demand for warplanes, pages. $22.95. and proceeds to paint the entire industry in darker tones of greed and international amor- Readers expecting a lively and gossipy ality. The economic rescue represented by the account of the birth and growth of the Ameri- military market was certainly true and obvious can aviation industry will be both pleased and enough, but the path from innovative aeronaut perplexed by this book. On one level, their to soulless weapons industry was neither slip- expectations will be well rewarded. Wayne pery nor inevitable, and the author frequently Biddle, a respected aviation writer for the New becomes too glib in his assertions to the York Times and Smithsonian Air &■ Space, has contrary. used the personal papers of Glenn Martin and The practical constraints of length make this Robert Gross as a starting point for an anecdote- study disappointing in some ways; it would be filled reminiscence of the early years of not nearly impossible in one book to decently sat- only Martin Marietta and Lockheed, but most of isfy Biddle’s ambitious topic. The World War II the other early pioneers in the new and highly and postwar eras are only lightly touched upon, speculative airplane business. Instead of and the wartime expansion of the aviation com- emphasizing advances in technology, he panies alone begs for a substantial book of its approaches aerospace development as a human own. Lawrence Bell's story is neglected, Roy history, moral pitfalls and all. In complete rap- Grumman never appears, and one wishes for a port with his subject, Biddle gives us numerous more satisfying discussion of the demise of Jack matchless and entertaining insights into the Northrop’s cherished flying wings. Even so, the personalities of Prof Samuel Langley. Donald book is worthwhile in that it is usefully Douglas, Jack Northrop, the Loughead brothers, detailed for the newcomer to the subject and and many others whose names are com- entertaining for the old hand. Dr Raymond L. Puffer Norton AFB, California Basis of Issue

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USAFA Instructor Opportunities retired USAF intelligence officer, takes a crit- The Military Studies Division at the United ical look at how the Air Force flew and fought States Air Force Academy is seeking highly in Southeast Asia. He argues that although the qualified captains for instructor duty. This duty Air Force effectively applied air power at par- involves motivating and teaching cadets in ticular places (e.g., Khe Sanh, An Loc) and university-level courses that stress air power, times, it was unable to devise a strategy and the art of war. military theory, doctrine, and doctrine appropriate for the conflict in South- force employment. Since its inception in 1980. east Asia. Tilford surmises that the Air Force’s the curriculum in professional military studies institutional experience and the mind-set of its has evolved into one of the most interesting leadership doomed it from the beginning to and demanding areas of study at the academy. expect much but achieve little w'ith air power. A master’s degree is required of all applicants. He points out that the 94-targets list devised by Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- the Air Staff was deeply rooted in the mind-set tors are in history, military history, political of the strategic bombing offensive that emerged science, and international relations, or in area in AWPD-1 during World War II. The Air Force studies of the former Soviet Union. Eastern leadership firmly believed in the efficacy of Europe, or the Middle East. Experience in tacti- that strategy. Air Force doctrine, rooted as it cal or strategic operations or in operationally was in the World War II experience, prevented related specialties is highly desirable. The divi- the generals from realizing that Vietnam was a sion can sponsor a few highly qualified appli- far different war and that North Vietnam did cants with the appropriate background for a not have a clearly defined center of gravity (i.e., master's degree through the Air Force Institute a modern industrial and transportation of Technology (AFIT). with a follow-on assign- infrastructure that supported the war machine ment to the Military Studies Division. Appli- of North Vietnam). cants should have three to seven years of Other recent books and monographs: commissioned service, an outstanding military ANZUS in Revision: Changing Defense Fea­ record, and impeccable military bearing and tures of Australia and New Zealand in the appearance. Interested individuals should con- Mid-1980s bv Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF, sult chapter 8 of AFR 36-20. Officer Assign­ 1991 (book). ments. for application procedures or write Capt Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Chal­ Jeff Cohen. Headquarters USAFA/CWIS. USAF lenges by Dr Stephen Blank et a 1., 1991 (book). Academy CO 80840-5421 or call DSN Space Control and the Role of Antisatellite 259-3255/3258. Weapons by Maj Steven R. Petersen. USAF. 1991 (monograph). New Publications from Military Airlift: Turbulence, Evolution, and Air University Press Promise for the Future by L,t Col Thomas E. Eichhorst, USAF. 1991 (monograph). Air University Press announces the release of Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and To order the above publications, contact the Why by Dr Earl H. Tilford. Jr. Dr Tilfnrd, a Air University Press, Publication Support

93 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1992

Branch, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532 or call Air Force Historical Foundation Award (205) 953-6452 or DSN 493-6452. Lt Col Brian W. ("Bingo”) McLean, presently assigned to Headquarters USEUCOM/ECJ5-T (long-range plans), is the winner of the James Conference Announcement Cannell Memorial Award for 1991. From 1990- The United States Air Force Academy will hold 91, Colonel McLean was a PACAF command- the Fifteenth Military History Symposium, “A sponsored research fellow at the Airpower Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transforma- Research Institute (ARI) of the Center for Aero- tion of the Post-War World,” 14-16 October space Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1992. For further information, contact Capt T. located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His mono- N. Castle, Headquarters USAFA/DFH, USAF graph, entitled Joint Training for Night Air Academy CO 80840-5701 or phone (719) Warfare, was one of nine considered for the 472-3230. Cannell Award. The award is named in honor of the late, long-time executive director of the Air Force Historical Foundation and is pre- sented annually to the author of the best 1992 Military Review Writing Contest command-sponsored research project com- pleted at ARI. Projects are evaluated on depth The commandant of the US Army Command and breadth of research: quality of writing and and General Staff College is pleased to organization: and interest and importance to announce the 1992 Military Review writing the Air Force. Colonel McLean receives a $500 contest. Entries on the topic "The US Army in joint, Combined, and Coalition Warfare" will US savings bond, has his name engraved on the Air Force Historical Foundation plaque that is be accepted through 1 July 1992. The winning author will receive a $500 cash award, and the maintained at ARI, and will have his study manuscript will be published in Military published as a book by Air University Press. Review in the fall of this year. Second- and third-place winners will receive $200 and $100, AFM 1-1 Published respectively, and all entries will be considered The new AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of for publication in Military Review. Appropriate the United States Air Force, has been released. subjects include, but are not limited to, current Gen Merrill A. McPeak. Air Force chief of staff, and future roles and missions: doctrine: histor- says this edition has special significance to all ical perspectives: service relationships: recent Air Force members, both in the field and at operational lessons; and education and train- headquarters levels. In the foreword to the ing. The principal consideration should be manual, he stresses the importance of every joint, combined, and coalition war-fighting commissioned and noncommissioned officer’s capabilities of the present and future. Entries studying and understanding this basic doctrine, will be judged for relevance to current Army which is the foundation of the profession of needs, research, and scholarship. Manuscripts arms for airmen. The two-volume manual not must be original and not previously offered only sets out the doctrinal concepts which elsewhere for publication. They should be guide the employment, organization, and train- between 2,000 and 2,500 words, typed, and ing of aerospace power, but also provides his- double-spaced. Entrants must indicate clearly torical examples and experiences which have that the manuscript is a contest entry. A shaped Air Force beliefs. Every active duty writer’s guide is available upon request. Send officer and chief master sergeant in the Air entries to Military Review, US Army Command Force will receive a copy so that they can easily and General Staff College, Funston Hall, Fort make it the centerpiece of their professional Leavenworth KS 66027-6910. knowledge. contributors

Office of Space Systems. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He has published articles on air and space issues, has been a previous contributor to the Airpower /ournul. and helped write Department of Defense and Air Force space pol- icies. Colonel Temple is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College, and Naval War College.

1st Lt Gary A. Vincent IBS, Gen Russell E. Dougherty, USAF. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) is Retired |AB. Western Kentucky Uni- assigned to the 727th Air Control versity; |D. University of Louisville) Squadron (Test). Ilurlburt Field. was commander in chief of the Stra- Florida, as an air weapons director tegic Air Command and director of for the modular control equipment Strategic Target Planning (Joint Stra- (MCE| system. tegic Target Planning Staff) from 1974 until his retirement in 1977. He served as commander. Second Air Force, and as deputy chief of staff, plans and operations at Headquarters USAF He was chief of staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe from 1972 to 1974. He was a command pilot and served in operations, maintenance, judge Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland (BA, Coe advocate, political'military. and College: MPA. University of Colo- command duties during active ser- rado) is a military doctrine analyst at vice in theAir Force.General Dough- the Airpower Research Institute, erty also had four assignments in Center for Aerospace Doctrine, joint and international duties. Dur- Research, and Education. Maxwell ing World War U. he was an instruc- AFB, Alabama. He was a member of tor pilot in the Air Training the initial cadre in the development Command and Third Air Force. and deployment of ground launch Since retiring he has been executive cruise missiles, serving at the train- director of the Air Force Association ing squadron and as chief of training and is now an attorney with a Vir- at Florennes, Belgium. He served as ginia law firm. General Dougherty is a military studies instructor at the a graduate of National War College. US Air Force Academy and as a Titan II missile launch officer. He Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, USAF, was the first associate editor of the Retired (USAFA; MBA, University of Airpower /ournul and has published Northern Colorado; MS, West Coast in numerous military publications. University), is a private consultant He compiled and edited the Air Uni- on space policy and programs. Dur- versity Review Index and is cur- ing his 20 years in the Air Force, he rently completing the editing of the flew the F-4 and T-37 and was five-year index of Airpower /ournul. assigned to Air Force Systems Com- Colonel Kirtland is a graduate of mand. Tactical Air Command, and Squadron Officer School. Air Com- Air Training Command. At the time mand and Staff College. Air War Col- of his retirement. Colonel Temple lege. and the National Security was chief. Database Development. Management Program.

95 Capt Lawrence A. Cooper (USAFA; MBA, Webster University; MS, AF1T) is a satellite operations officer, Air Force Space Command, Falcon Col Dennis M. Drew (BA. Willamette AFB, Colorado. In a previous assign- University; MS. University of Wyom- ment at the Air Force Weapons Labo- ing; MA. University of Alabama] is ratory, he was a space systems dean of the School of Advanced Air- physicist and a mission planner on power Studies, Air Command and the Relay Mirror Experiment. Cap- Staff College (ACSC), Maxwell AFB. tain Cooper was recently a student in Alabama. He has served as chief of the Graduate Space Operations Pro- the Strategy and Doctrine Branch gram at the Air Force Institute of and chief of the Warfare Studies Technology. He has published sev- Division, both at ACSC, and as a eral articles on space systems and missile combat crew commander, space systems survivability. missile operations staff officer, and staff division chief at Headquarters SAC. Prior to assuming his current position, he was director of the Air- power Research Institute, Air Uni- versity Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at Maxwell. Colonel Drew is a dis- tinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College.

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15. Do yo u fe e l Ih e Airpower Journal is written at the 18. Do you feel the operational level of war is the proper ippropriate level and focus for you? focus for the Air Force's professional military journal? 1. □ About right 3. □ Too low 1. □ Yes 2. □ Too high 2. □ No. It should be at the tactical level 3. □ No. It should be at the national strategy/policy 16. What would you like to see the Airpower Journal level >ublish more articles about? 4. □ Not sure what the operational level of war is 1. □ Campaign planning t 5. □ Other______2. □ Weapon system development/procurement 19. Would you be more or less likely to locate and read 3. □ Leadership

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: SON 92-29 BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Retired Brig Gen fames L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Chief of Safety, Headquarters USAF Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Dr Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

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