Summer I99Z fwM ill i V* : )f $*<•• W& '• •<%> MflkS■ >*vr* Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Ervin C. Sharpe, Jr. Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor M a r v i n VV. B a s s e t t , Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong. Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1992, Vol. VI, No. 2 AFRP 50-2 Editorial . 2 Roots and Wings: A Perspective on Reorganization Gen Russell E. Dougherty, USAF, Retired 4 In the Loop: Superiority in Command and Control 1st Lt Gary A. Vincent, USAF 15 Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads, and Doctrine Lt Col L. Parker Temple III, USAF, Retired 26 Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in the Korean War Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF 37 Assured Access to Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and Launch-on-Demand Capt Lawrence A. Cooper, USAF 47 Jointness: The Fundamental Problem A Review of Joint Pub 1 Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF 58 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 71 Notams Notices of Interest 93 Contributors 95 We make business decisions with our EDITORIAL heads; logic, thought, and pros and cons are involved in the process. But there are other, less tangible factors involved. What makes this decision so difficult for many A Terrible Choice of us is not the loss of benefits such as the Big BX or the 20-year retirement package. That’s not why we joined and stayed all of VER THE PAST couple of months, these years. Culturally, the Air Force has thousands of us bluesuiters have had been just too damn neat for some of us to toO make what for many amounts to a ter- want to voluntarily jump from what seems rible choice. We must either accept an to be a perfectly good airplane. Many of us attractive separation bonus and leave the will prefer to wait it out and hope that a Air Force for good, or stay in, leave the KC-135 appears before the gas runs out. separation decision to a possible reduction As of this writing, there is still time for in force (RIF) board, and—if RIFed— us to ponder the choice between leaving accept a smaller severance payment. now or taking a pretty big (expensive) From a business standpoint, it may chance on the results of a RIF board. For make sense to accept the separation bonus those of you who, like me, are extremely and leave the service. Think rationally vulnerable to forced separation and hap- about it, and ask yourself some important pen to enjoy the Air Force, D day questions. How good are my records (not approaches. In mid-March, I’m reminded me, but my records)? How valuable is my of the words of a gruff colonel who, after AFSC to the Air Force? How many years listening to an exasperated lieutenant do I have invested? Perhaps most impor- describe his hectic schedule, replied, tantly, How many of my peers have taken “Good! Helps build character!” I’ve had the separation package? and. How do the my dose of character the past couple of numbers look? months. Only after all the facts are in, after By the time this is printed, the choices you’ve talked with your supervisor, will have been made and the die cast. The coworkers, and family, and the options are larger issue, then, is the excruciating deci- clearly before you, do you go to the per- sions that must be made by both the indi- sonnel office and ask for the paperwork. vidual and the institution as we draw Yes, you can rationalize the decision from down for the first time in the truly all- a business standpoint. After all. the num- volunteer force. Perhaps these decisions bers just ain’t there. Ninety-five percent of are just the first pains in the process of your year group may get whacked by a RIF birthing an Air Force for the new world we board. The choice is clear. live in. JJD HOW ARE WE DOING? We need to know how you feel about the Airpower Journal. We are genuinely interested in providing you. the reader, as well as the Air Force, the best possible professional journal, it is, after all, your journal. In that spirit, we have provided a tear-out readership survey ju st inside the back cover. Please take a few minutes to complete it and return it to us. (We’ll pay the postage.) It will help us further define the focus and scope of the Journal. and it will help us determine how well we are reaching our target audience. Thanks for your help. The Editor 2 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre­ It was my privilege to serve on a special spondence should be addressed to the Editor, study group looking at our doctrine while I was Airpovver Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, a student at Air War College (AWC). Inter- Maxwell AFB AL 36112—5532. We r es er ve the estingly enough, the team I was on concluded right to edit the material for overall length. that our "old” doctrine was actually pretty good. Indeed, the now-famous air campaign of Operation Desert Storm appeared to follow’ the AIR POWER VINDICATED tenets of chapter 2 very well! Specifically, para- graph 2-7's ‘‘Broad Plan of Employment” The article by Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt explains how' to conduct simultaneous strategic Col Charles M. Westenhoff ("Air Power Think and tactical actions after gaining air superiority. ing: Request Unrestricted Climb' ”) in your Under "Attack an Enemy's Warfighting Poten- Fall 1991 issue was excellent. High-tech air tial,” we find, inter alia, explanations of the power was certainly vindicated in the Gulf war, "how” and “why" of relentlessly attacking an as were the many hard battles in the Pentagon enemy in depth, planning/coordinating inter- and on the Hill to get the equipment and the diction with surface forces, and constantly weapons the Air Force needed to fulfill its assessing the battlefield situation (pages 2-13 promise. through 2-15). There is also a now-obvious The authors quote Alfred the Great on good reminder that "close support can create oppor- fortune, but he also noted that success breeds tunities, protect maneuver, and defend land arrogance; we learn by our failures. In our pres- forces." Additionally, the “old 1-1" emphasizes ent euphoria, we should remember that many seizing the initiative w’ith a flexibly structured of the key systems which vindicated them- force to compel the enemy to react. That is just selves in the Gulf overcame hard times—from what we did in Iraq. Congress, the administration, and the operators While not meaning to offend the rated themselves—before they could be fielded. I force—and General Boyd in particular—1 hope refer to the E-3, A-10, F-16, and joint sur- the first volume of the draft AFM 1-1 is not, as veillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) he characterized it, a "summation of Air Force inter alia. Among weapons, the Paveway series thinking” (page 4). It certainly is "bare bones” is a great example. Paveway I was unwelcome and the format is definitely easy to read, but it in Vietnam until it showed its prowess. Pave- neglects any significant mention of the role of way III was cancelled by Secretary of the Air leadership. In fairness, chapters 3 and 4 do talk Force Verne Orr in the eighties. Now it’s back about several important things commanders do. in production. Fortunately, even though we How'ever, the 1984 version at least explains that have been late and overpriced, we seem to be "command is the exercise of leadership and the best in the world anyway. power of decision” (page 1-4), w'hile mention- Maj Gen J. C. Toomay, USAF. Retired ing leadership another 15 times in the text and Carlsbad, California two more times in annex A. The draft, on the other hand, uses the term only four times, and three of those deal with the enemy! Nonethe- less, both the old and new versions lack the LEADERSHIP AND DOCTRINE punch of AFM 1-10, Combat Support Doctrine, I want to thank Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd and Lt when defining and explaining leadership. Col Charles M. Westenhoff for bringing our Our curriculum at AWC provided the oppor- attention back to basics in their Fall 1991 arti- tunity to read AFM 1-10. In my opinion, that cle, ‘‘Air Power Thinking: Request Unre- short document contains some of the best offi- stricted Climb’.” At the same time, I would like cial comments on leadership that I have to offer some observations about the draft of the encountered in over 21 years.