Conflict Management in Multi-Ethnic States

CEU eTD Collection Advisors: Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi Professor Florian Bieber In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Conflict Management inConflict Multi-EthnicStates: Management Czechoslovakia andSerbia andMontenegro The Role of Elites in the Dissolution of Nationalism Studies Nationalism Program Studies Central European University Central European Emanuela Macková Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Master of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2009 by CEU eTD Collection answering very myopenly to questions his andsharing thoughtsonhis precious time. Laj Minister Miroslav to goes My gratitude earnest issueinMontenegro. referendum understanding andknowledge he duringhis activitygained EUSpecialas Representative for the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Laj their comments and theirencouragements during confident my research. for Bieber, andFlorian Szabolcs Pogonyi mysupervisors, expressmysincerethanks to I wish to Acknowledgements þ ák willingly shared the experience, þ ák for CEU eTD Collection Czechoslovakia’s dissolution...... 32 32 EXPERIENCES OFCONSOCIATIONALISM:WHATWRONG?...... WENT Serbia and Montenegro...... 24 ...... 20 Czechoslovakia 20 CASE STUDIES BACKGROUND...... Debating consociationalism...... 14 Consociational democracy...... 9 9 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND...... 5 ...... INTRODUCTION Additional factors...... 37 Socio-economic ...... 35 imbalance Lack of elite tradition of accommodation...... 34 ...... 32 Voter volatility The 2002 – 2006 Consociational arrangement in Serbia and Montenegro...... 28 The FRY era...... 25 Pre-1990’ History...... 24 The 1989-1992 Consociational ...... 22 Arrangement Historical ...... 20 Background The problem ...... 16 of elite cooperation Undemocratic ...... 16 democracy A counter-productive theory?...... 15 “Segmented societies”? “Deeply divided societies”?...... 14 The elements of consociational democracies...... 10 The consociational objective...... 9 Table ofContents CEU eTD Collection EEECS...... 71 ...... REFERENCES 66 ...... CONCLUSION The Serbo-Montenegrin partition...... 39 ute atr ...... 59 Further Factors Socio-economic differences...... 53 Lack of elite tradition of accommodation...... 44 Ethnicization of Politics...... 39 ...... 38 Conclusion As a short conclusion...... 65 The ...... 63 minority issue The lack of geographical concentration...... 61 ‘The Prize of European ...... 59 integration’ The State Union...... 55 Historically...... 53 The State Union...... 46 Historically...... 44 CEU eTD Collection Second it also implies that the Lijphart’s power-sharing instruments will be used in a used be will instruments power-sharing Lijphart’s the that implies also it Second first thatelites have deescalatingimpact acentral soothing for and tensions social divisions. implieselitein toexploit expected This thisconducive goal. are and cooperation whichelites to consociation. Most important in necessary not the however are which atradition elite accommodation, of size of or equal in Lijphart’s theorysuch as segments factors, of favorable several admits the positive Lijphartcontribution process, remain his four basic buildgovernmentby conditionscoalition, democracy.representation)this a stable to grand In proportional meant to be of division can beexploited through instrumentspower-sharing mutual (a veto autonomy, right, roots the where level, elite at the canbeneutralized society inaplural social divisions that argues explainsixties to including the stability of Lijphart states, divided ethnicallydividedstates. late in the formula consociational the developed scientist, political renowned Lijphart, Arend consociational theory. of underthe prism inand 2006, 1992 respectively peaceful break-ups of Union State communism in1989and 2002andSerbia of the Montenegro after and their INTRODUCTION This paper will examine the existence of the Czechoslovak Federal fall the after Republic Federal Czechoslovak of the existence the examine This paperwill 5 CEU eTD Collection War Bosnia. War 3 McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1974 2 1980 Bosnia-Herzegovina post-Dayton extent, 1992 for Czechoslovakia, 2006 for Serbia1992 for Czechoslovakia,2006 and Montenegro. live managebutin years, not they did beyond short after whichthey to departed, three peacefully – divisions internal their overcome to managed have should states both requirements Lijphart’s idealdevelop. fulfilled formula for theconsociational background to However they giventhat offering thus Montenegrins, and andSerbs CzechsandSlovaks, between deepened the divisions beginning,the becamemore salient under leaders the pressure of political and gradually after fallthe Miloševi of in especially and nineties the Montenegro and Serbia 1989,and after Czechoslovakia In both to aswell. -andresorted freely beexpressed could identities ethnic where asituation and created but hardly fall diversity the was the ideological ruleof arena expressed, liberated communist the lessthis of more communism Under high are characterized or bya ethnic diversity.degree countries infrom Most European 2002. from 1989 and and MontenegroCzechoslovakia Serbia much of itsustained by politicalthe elites. The consociational formula was applied in stalemates, political and by instability marred existence short arather after actually dismantled they – goal theory’s consociational the to in opposition and - but situation, stable a reach to fail states did notonly thewere present, common fourbasic which, Lijphart’s conditions although 1 consociational model to many different cases from Columbia cooperation. outcome: possible one only have they fact in that and elites by way positive constructive, Nina Caspersen. Good Fences KennethMcRae. Consociational Democracy: Make Political Accommodation inSegmented Societies.Good Toronto: Neighbors? A Comparison of Conflict Regulation Strategies in Post- Robert H. Dix. Consociational Democracy, the Case of Columbia. Lijphart’s theory developed into a broad school of thought. Scholars have applied the applied have Scholars thought. of school broad a into developed theory Lijphart’s Journal of Peace Research. ü in ethnic2000, the andnational issues, although beingmild rather at Vol . 41, No 5: 569 - 588, 2004 3 . However his theory is challenged by two cases in cases by two ischallenged theory his However . 6 Comparative Politics. 1 to Canada Vol 2 , and even to some . 12,No 3: 303- 321, CEU eTD Collection Montenegro, but that the elites - little committed to the preservation of the common state as they as state common the of preservation the to committed little - elites the that but Montenegro, and Serbia or Czechoslovakia in either realities pre-existing not were divisions inter-community survive asconsociationsled andthefactors that to their respective demise.hardIt argues that states heldto thetwo determine chances the to andCzechoslovakia, in Serbia andMontenegro factors at the same time as it investigates the implementation of the constitutional devices in both sharinginstrument- and thus qualified as consociations. The third examines chapter favorablethe institutional background theyheldthat of andeach country demonstrates power- Lijphart’s against it in relation formula studying before major critics held the consociational startingwith Lijphart’s theory, to the thesis’ argument. The second chapterinternational community played a criticalfocuses role at all stages of the process. on the historical governmentand independence referendum tothe in2006,where prior the on the opposition and between and negotiations Montenegrin the the assuchmediated inMontenegro Representative the argument is based of onPart its collapse. complete to country bringingthe of point the to the increase create tensions or to interview with Miroslavcan actually circumstanceeasily exploit institutional Lijphart’s and any instruments in particular Laj Lijphart’s four conditions, without a genuine with even commitment that shown be will it of fact, In elites exist. to to state a commona stable for state mechanisms the leadersinstitutional community tensions and for the preservation of state stability. inter- of escalation of prevention in the elites in the Lijphart by placed responsibility contentious and thereby primary – the challenge seriously break-ups also Their plural democracies. seriously hischallenge theory and the raise of question real the condition for peaceful and stable The isthesis dividedinfour parts.Thefirstchapter gives a critical of overview the The thesis will argue that the motivation of elites is more important than any of the break-ups had qualifying aconsociation, their then states Since features all the both 7 þ ák, which used to work as EU High CEU eTD Collection the the time Statethe Union of found and through Lexisthe Nexis search engine. at published media articles amount of onagood rely also can research the internet the to thanks on the history of the Balkansor the OSCE. All andthe knowledge Yugoslavia extracted inrecommendations international institutionsinvolved such asthe European the region Union of from in these particular, sources was seconded asby scholarlywellanalyses worksas relevant articles. ofextensive Europeanthe give Stability (ESI) (ICG)or Initiative International Group Crisis the Lastly, the as such individual organizations international of Reports charter. constitutional union state the and statespolitical of climate union. state the legal The frameworkand was institutional provided bylaws as wellLaj as ofMiroslav affairs foreign of Minister the Slovak with interview personal the Firstly, sources. of union,array in the focused work on Serbiathe caseits andMontenegro study, freshness whichdueto offereda wide same way greatest dissolution.The its history and on literature Czechoslovak the of additional readings as reports by supported article and Kopecký’s ison Petr basedprimarily case-study Czechoslovak and the while his contenders, and Lijphart of works onscholarly relies part The theoretical commitment of the elites to acommon state. genuine the is andforemost first states plural of andpreservation stability for the needed while four Lijphart’s conditions may acooperativeencourage among attitude elites, whatis really that andargue together drawn are casestudies in two the demonstrated elements the conclusion, Serbs and Montenegrins - and Czechs andSlovaks, of divorce wasthe outcome pointwhere only possible state to the the however in a peaceful process.were -exploited the and ethnic argument Lijphart’s utilized for plural astable recommendations In the last chapter which serves as a þ ák, who used to monitor the used to insightsMontenegrin in referendum ák, who of 2006,providedthe key The thesis on relies rangea broad of which may sources be divided in several categories. 8 CEU eTD Collection 6 5 Institute of Peace, 1997 4 cartel” his theory consociationalism inof byelitesas his or, domination a“government words, by elite Lijphartdeveloped interests. achieve level governmental groups’ the atthe each to between other only of leaders the -assumedbe rival the wiser groups to andhavemore insight-deal reasonable let them and separate isto logical the remedy in contact, enter when communities arise conflicts inter-community well. elite Because to as theory stretches however relevance consociation’s institutions basedon mechanisms between power-sharing The groups. their constituent of thedevelopment through internal divisions of their effects the may overcome plural states that paradigm nation-state and underlines the formula counters Hisis consociational abenchmark. management thecontribution theory in to and dividedstate-building societies deeply conflict of exacerbationin the role crucial a play and issue sensitive a represent may belonging national and ethnicity affairs” “intra-state are conflicts most states, Lederach as John in Paul where, a world fact of tensions topeaceandthreat stability of and regionally sources violence incountries.Andinand host their and20 the divisionLijphart developed it to explainof thesocieties. stability objective The consociational of deeply divided West European In societies. this In the respect, Arend Lijphart’s Tom Bottomore. Elites and Society. Second edition. London: Routledge, 1964 Arend Lijphart. Consociational Democracy. Consociational Lijphart. Arend JohnPaul Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation inDivided Societies. Washington, DC: US th century the existence of national minorities in numerous states of Europe was perceived as a Arend when late sixties in the theme a popular became theory democracy The consociational THEORETICAL THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Consociational democracy Consociational 5 command who and (…)those can directly political influence decisions of class’ whooccupy or‘governing elite’political post the composed those of [is] a minority which rules over classical eliteapproaches, is, to , wherethe according the rest of the society; this minority – the ‘political World Politics 9 . Vol. 21, No 2: 207 - 225, 1969. 6 . 4 , CEU eTD Collection decisions affecting in and each administration state’s inthe participate in state the minorities significant all that requires of them.It Ascondition. important a most consequence, the is perhaps coalition grand by government The 1) elites. of it requires that elites abandon competitive democracies The ofconsociational elements majoritarian system, and obviously more than in an ethnic democracy. a than better integration ethnic to lead would run longer in the which, and mechanisms at be eliteheterogeneity the can corrected level inducedby acooperation byspecific institutional rotation basis. Lijphart’s contribution to conflictmanagement theory is that the social temporary and (at least theoretically)permanently,in the majoritarian groups’ democracy exclusionthe is supposed be to only the different groups arefrom excluded groups whereother power –although power democracy intheethnic unlike are expected to access to power Inon a both of these schemesthe population, and the exclusion of all oneother significant ethnic groups from the spheres(or of power. more) segment entireof the ethnic over spectrum largest of group the by prevalence political characterized the of the population and the sides encourage istwo tocooperate.On otherthe hand, ethnic the is democracy generally excludedconstant from competition with the government unless serious dangers such as a war threaten theas majoritarian,thestate orthe ethnic democracies. In majoritarianthe democracy, the opposition isin from types such other of distinguishesdemocracies consociational democracy circumstance the consensus decision-making in- order to prevent the escalation of tensions into open conflict. This behaviors and cooperative adopt to elites stimulates exactly Lijphart what to which isaccording Lijphart determined four elements which, combined, are expected to catalyze thecooperation to are expected which, combined, four elements determined Lijphart By definition, plural societies are characterized by a constant tension between between by groups, tension a constant societies arecharacterized plural By definition, 10 CEU eTD Collection “the costs of competition outweigh its benefits while the benefits of cooperation outweigh its outweigh cooperation of benefits the while benefits its outweigh competition of costs “the by creating in feeling of asituation likely reducethe dominated other, risk the group which one also wouldgroup a prevalent absence andthe of territorial demographic balanceof groups and In relation thegroups. consensual thisto between element, facilitate thus relations and peaceful and group, another by dominated in aregion living when feel may minorities that domination Thework. geographical concentration mayof ethnic groups suppress thefeeling of insecurity and constructive stimulate thus and claims competing of number the reduce also may segments of strangers. By limiting thenumber of involvedrepresentatives in negotiations,the a small number total were if they than behaviors cooperative adopt to prone more thus and other each to be acquainted arelikely to groups different the of elites thatthe infers it in a consociation that to favorable be may population total small a example For a consociation. support may which factors through admitted times impact positive the other elements may have andhe underlined aseries of climate of trust, itself encouraging cooperation among elites. tensions and breakingreduce the risks one group of away.Thefeeling a security of generates secessionist appease in would process the groups level.all significant of inclusion state the The at segments befear byother dominated to do not asaconsequence, who, groups among ethnic a create feelingargues elements Lijphart of inthese security education Together, - their region. and grantsthem determination control agreedsetof the of –suchasdomains an languageor minority’s will. 4) Lastly, autonomy, territorial or cultural, satisfies the minorities’ desire for self- right veto mutual The 3) ensuresadministration. public the in minorities (significant) all of participation the that no decision 2) Theproportional guarantees basis. representation behaviors decisions onaconsensus and take harmful to the interests of a minority can be taken above a These are the fundamental elements forming a consociational system, however Lijphart however system, consociational a forming elements fundamental the are These 11 CEU eTD Collection and and Considerations on Representative Government. London:Dent, J.M. 1988. 9 1984 8 7 costs” conditions or no conditions at all” in“the necessary unnecessary, clearly may short bequite conditions and or present absent, that sum up to Schendelen ledVan all. even,at This or sametime at the needed necessarily all nor and favorabletrivialized factors Lijphart prerequisites, emphasizedthey these neither absolute are jointheir againstmust enemy. It bestressedwhile however that recognizingtheirpotential, the benefits of external threats which, when perceived by all segments, may encourage them to shared by the population same direction canand benefitingAdditionally, allsides. an acommon loyalty overarching to state positively contributedifferent– diverging –economicinterests and developmentthe encourage of policies goingin the to the consociation. Lijphart also underlined potential opposition hold Itis power. effective more likelyprovoke cooperationto and, consociational model would bemore inclusiveit since “majorities” creates where all including a entrench the segmentsby likely These would situations by other. outcomeis asadefeat the won perceived a party in their differencessystems and throttle constructiveconsociationalists are also concerned about a potential “tyranny of cooperation.the majority” in majoritarian of like. theory, the defense the In and supervision external forced partition, genocide, war, By contrast, a i.e. all, at nodemocracy and democracy aconsociational between is decision-makers before the JohnStuart Mill. Considerations onRepresentative Governments. InH.B. Acton(ed) Utilitarianism, OnLiberty MPCM Van Schendelen. The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms. Collected and Lijphart Arend of Views The Schendelen. Van MPCM Rudy Andeweg. Consociational Democracy. Consociational Andeweg. Rudy Proponents of consociationalism argue that in deeply divided societies, the only real choice real only the societies, divided in deeply that argue consociationalism of Proponents 7 . Mild inexistent or socio-economic differences would reduce the risk that the groups have 9 and argue the latter tend to create a zero-sum game atmosphere, where a favorable a where atmosphere, game azero-sum create to tend latter argue the and 8 . Annual Review of Political Science 12 . Vol. 3: 509-536, 2000. Acta Politica . Vol.19: 19–55, CEU eTD Collection 1250, 1981 13 12 Journal of Political Research. 11 Routledge, 1993. London: Conflicts. Ethnic ofProtracted Studies Case Regulation: ofEthnic Politics The (ed), O’Leary Brendan and 10 communities between interactions positive consequently, the single required condition in consociationalism. Robert Dix factors), from both Lijphart’s he of topluralismwhich helaterreduces concludes which in is fact (absent predominance elite and subcultures stable – consociations the supported really elements AdrianoPappalardofactors: new personal define Some accordingchoices. even to selecta setoffactors simply while others important simplyor valid),many scholars nine considerthe factorshe developed inhis last work, consociationalism,making it difficult later for scholars to assess which he really found most such factorsovertime butdefended onlyseven ninein eitherto of books hison fourteen (he was neverclearhimself developed Asthose on Lijphart itsfactors. favorable builton of proponents alsoconsociationalism do hold Lijphart's model, critiques many over which of economic disparities. More generally, JürgSteiner generally, More economic disparities. from had power socio-been reducethe by which they second to military excluded the rule, political regain to first cooperate to elites political for interest vital the consociation: Columbian the of core atthe elements two instead defines and static be too to factors Lijphart's finds fifties, and of the whole consociational theory. consociational and whole of the in factors of relevance deny favorable principle the the doesn’t previous researches,Steiner other with the along However, improvised character. their case-to-case, and coherence of theoretical Jürg Steiner. Research Strategies Beyond Consociational Theory. Consociational Beyond Strategies Research Steiner. Jürg Dix 1980. Adriano Pappalardo The Conditions ForConsociational Democracy: ALogical andEmpirical Critique. SidNoel. Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism, Federalism and Control. In John McGarry Vol. 9, No 4: 365 – 390, 1981. 11 argues that in the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, only two 13 13 criticizes the favorable factors forlack their factors favorable criticizes the 10 The Journal ofPolitics . However, while supporting itmany 12 , analyzing Columbia in the Columbia analyzing , . Vol.43,. No 4: 1241 - European CEU eTD Collection Butenschen them conductthem asall equalandequallyprone toconflict treated but ethnicity…) religion, (class, of cleavages nature thespecific address not does theory fact the the that criticized Daalder as Hans such Scholars inhis theory. this issueunaddressed issociety’ howeverleft anda matter worldwideof becauseLijphart interpretations debate various a ‘deeply divided constitutes exactly What society’. a‘segmented or society’ divided a ‘deeply societies”? divided “Deeply “Segmented societies”? Montenegro. and andSerbia for Czechoslovakia are relevant critics that some present to perhaps good segmentation of a society and the degree of pluralism required for a society to be considered as a be consideredas forto asociety required pluralism of degree the and of a society segmentation Regulation in Divided Societies. Cambridge, MA: Center forInternational Affairs UP, 1972. Scandinavian Political Studies 17 16 2005 University Press, Queen's Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions inEthnically DividedSocieties. Sid Noel (ed.). Montréal: McGill- 15 CT: Yale University Press, 1999. p.1 14 racism, promoting the apartheid, or even cleansingracism,ethnic apartheid, or promoting the have of of beenvariously accused Proponents consociationalism dividedin societies. ethnically waves of harsh criticism both over the relevance of the theory in general and over its applicability most deeply divided countries, the only only most the solution” countries, deeply feasible divided democracy is not only the optimal form of democracy in deeply divided societies, but also for the Nils Butenschen. Conflict Management in Plural Societies: The Consociational DemocracyTheme. Democracy Formula. Consociational The Daalder. Hans BrendanO’Leary. Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments. InFrom Power- New Haven, Countries. Thirty-six in Performance and Forms Government ofDemocracy: Patterns Lijphart. Arend The element that even predates Lijphart’s four conditions for a consociation is of presence the aconsociation for four conditions Lijphart’s even predates that The element The consociational theory has raised debates worldwide, and by stating that “consociational that stating by and worldwide, debates raised has theory consociational The Debating consociationalism Debating 17 for instanceformeasure about the possibility alsoquestioned Lijphart to the . Vol. 8, No SchendelenVol.Van103,8, . 1985. 1-2: 85- 1984. Eric Nordlinger. Conflict 14 World Politics World 16 14 . Van Schendelen, Nordlinger or Nils . Vol. 26, No 4: 604 – 621, 1974 , Lijphartcertainly raise managed to 15 . Without being exhaustive, it is it exhaustive, being Without . CEU eTD Collection 21 No 4: 477– 505, 1975. 20 19 18 moderation than ethnicrather appeal extremism to to areencouraged lines, elites Donald underlines Horowitz in that a system such where the party system is divided along ethnic theory, Lijphart’s of most critical Amongthe state. joint from the break away and independence seek groups to and encourage tendencies separatist than appease rather exacerbate consociations formula.management Bygrantingminorities a segmental autonomy, Nordlinger arguedthat theory? A counter-productive amatter of controversy. subjectremains the however, clarification his of Inspite social organizations. boundariesand tothe political of economic, correspond boundaries segmental where and segments identifiable clearly with society a as society’ ‘segmented a defined and hisconcept, narrowed somewhat Lijphart response In consociation. prolong conflictby the in divisions reproducing institutional settings the argued that this system insteadof reinforces divisions lessrenderingthem confrontational, and societies divided appropriate ethnically for arenot democracies thatconsociational Barry Brian argues cutting and ties mixed areterritorially cross- nourish divided, mildly are they that however extent the to – societies divided ethnically Pierre Van denBerghe. The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Elsevier, 1981 BrianBarry. Political Accomodationand Consociational Democracy. Paul Brass. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi and Newbury Donald Horowitz. EthnicGroups Park, in Conflict.CA: Berkeley: Sage,University of California1991 Press, 1985. Another group of critics argues that the consociational democracy fails as aconflict failsas democracy consociational the that argues of critics group Another 20 . A little less critical, Pierre Van der Berghe admits consociations may work in may work consociations Bergheadmits der Van Pierre less critical, . Alittle 21 . 15 British Journal of Political Science. 19 . For these reasons 18 . Paul Brass Vol. 5, Vol. CEU eTD Collection respect Dix accused Lijphart’s favorable factors to bestatic to too factors favorable Dix Lijphart’s accused respect and andinleaderactually entire nota this holds the ‘group’, groups that the risk does represent representation per group, consociational democracy alsoignores the potential divisions within 24 23 22 a stableinto democracy” political culture a fragmented “awith and democracy transforming conflicts role have a critical inregulating elites perspective, mechanisms at level. power-sharing and governmental decisions From the accommodative this mentioned the with population of level the at divisions contain to ability elites’ the granted and theory’sthe to dependence on elite In developing cooperation. his for theory, Lijphart took cooperation Theof elite problem ademocracy. can besaid to characterize hardly inert politically individual merit.of alsounderlined thethat be requirement Horowitz thethat population basis the on than rather ‘groupness’ their of basis the on groups rewarding by values basic ignore of rights unrecognized and groups individuals of and proportionalthe through principle, to tends it the violates becauseequality, to respect right democratic the not formula does consociational contestable andbe toopaque doors, behind closed be taken decisions to by encouraging be and, elitist to system accuse consociational the criticstendto these thought, line Inthe of same inthegovernment. toparticipate aresupposed groups sinceall opposition permit any not system does a consociational that thefact for example emphasized Barry Undemocratic democracy Lijphart 1969 Dix 1980. Daalder 1974. However the most severe criticism of consociationalism pertains to the role granted toelites rolegranted the to pertains of consociationalism severemost criticism the However Brian undemocratic. is actually system consociational the that considers of critics set A third 16 24 . Their moderation, Lijphart argues, is argues, Lijphart moderation, Their . 23 . Brass hence argued that the that Brass henceargued . 22 . By allowing one CEU eTD Collection according to him. Several other scholars suchasNordlinger scholars him. other Several to according apathy of the population into actually one of only two conditions crucial to consociationalism 27 26 25 advanced. more radical than their inherently elitespopulations are that assumption the more and generally from attitudes, compromising is rather debatable, moderation.toward Additionally, responsibility the populationsplaced inholdingon leaders its as several critics of leadthe elites necessarily instability will violence or fearthat “mere” future the of self-evident is not consociational theoryitin However,later be thesis, andthe aswill argued conflict. increased or continued of potentials absurd sincein of be they informedtimes can crisis, moreat seeing andmost apt thenegative radical than elites. The and his in explicitly Lijphart assume morethis supporters areinherently stand thatpopulations presumption of the centralityshort, a politically apathetic populationof favorselites consociations and by stating it morein or less conflict In disengaged. bemasses politically would the implies that security,which electoral degree of regulation is far from without fearingbe to electorally enjoyexcluded. To freedom,this elites musthave acertain withcooperate groups other feel free to to elites require thatconsociations Nordlinger argues this by decision population’s the Adrianoinertia.political Later Pappalardo promote state’sthe prosperity to haveadesire ifelites may beworking thataconsociation Ericasserts Nordlinger factor, this particular of absence the In aggression. than rather moderation choose to lead elites would inby and, the past couldway of itconsequence, again: this“self-denying generate prophecy” violenceavoid whichhaveledto by and to situations motivated conflict desire a fearof the open Nordlinger 1972 Pappalardo 1981. In O’Leary in Noel 2005 25 . Lijphart suggests furthermore that elitessuggests furthermore that . Lijphart would in be encouraged 17 27 have later supported thislater have supported premise: 26 turned the political the turned CEU eTD Collection Vol.13, No 3: 313 - 337, 1981. 29 28 to elites for motivations alternative inoffering especially aspects, interesting has stand This position. ruling their secure which – divisions segmental maintain to tends system consociational exchanging winning and or (bargaining) aleadershipposition. power, retaining Only,a system, and elites competing in a majoritarian system: what it is all about anyway - forsee Kieve any does not bargaining in elites between fundamental difference a consociational elites – is behavior, influences stabilityand mutual Infact, political is classstructure. their society’s the elite divisions, segmental determining variable final and first the Kieve, to According element. Ronald Kieve interests. and situations of evolution the and temporality neglect to tends and anymore obvious is not it reality, the to it confront if we however evident, self- theoretically seemsalmost moderation them to motivate further would elites between could also be stimulated by a historical habit of compromise. That a history of accommodation between in bebyfearcooperation elites violence, of andcould brought a consociation future Therefore consociation. a of establishment the favorably influence could if present, that factor as Daalder in considering it an actual condition for the establishment of a consociation, but only a elites and added Daalder’s contribution as an element to his theory. However he didbetween compromise of an not practice of old-time importance the later recognized go crisis. Lijphart as far among the elites’in elites than prudent attitudes rather fearof potentially future devastating actually premised the consociations as considered by Lijphart was a tradition of accommodation what argues that Daalder cases, Swiss Dutch the and Analyzing between elites. cooperation Ronald Kieve. Pillars of Sand. A Marxist Daalder 1974. of Consociational Democracy in the Netherlands. In fact, Hans In fact, Daalder Another critic focusing on the role of elites, somewhat more skeptical than Daalder, than more skeptical elites, somewhat of role the on focusing critic Another 29 argued that Lijphart’s concept is basically flawed in that itlacksin fundamental flawed the is basically that Lijphart’s concept arguedthat 28 argued that the “self-denying hypothesis” was insufficient to explain to was insufficient hypothesis” “self-denying arguedthat the 18 Comparative Politics . CEU eTD Collection 31 30 of society between andgroups. relations the simplifying theissueimpactidentity denying of and in the religious (ethnic, the …) organization is tothat grossly debate struggle reducing of aclass the however, sametime Atthe moderation. social realities that political “pre-existing necessarily they are not rooted, /socially may be historically cleavages segmental elites find on their paths”inter- is nodoubt there Although conflicts. forall regulating at onelites focus the of pertinence actually beactually more successful inbridging and than consociational democracies cleavages deadlocksmajoritarian ratherthansolutions.lead argues Horowitz Eventually to systems that can strong of a veto right in grandfragmentation coalitions isof morethe likelyinstead givesall for incentives the multiplication the further of ethnic parties politicaland the to slow arena. down the In politicalmotivatethisconstructmajoritystrong outthatconsociationspointed to donot elites but parties respect, process he andunderlinedAdditionally, beingon of inclusion the dependent all inparties also Horowitz the coalition, that the bargainingdoso. to incentives providing without them the cooperate to elites it becauserequires myth of elites stronger than any incentive for moderation. Horowitz considers the consociational model as a maybe for violence motivations all thefactthat at address even not –or does neglects Lijphart inter-group segmentation and task the sooth responsibility to them is quite questionable. Indeed, itinputs in hisbut theory,fuel they that can actually -,attributing tensions those fomenting to purposes. Given their relationtensions which between groups, mobilizethey then exploitto the population for political orother to social divisions - not in thatin fostering and encouraging talented rather elitesfact are that tothe themselves pointed others they reduce cleavages as Lijphart Andeweg p.519 Horowitz 1985 But perhaps the most critical challengers of Lijphart’s theory, Horowitz Lijphart’s of challengers critical perhaps But most the 19 31 . Rather, Horowitz, Rudy Andeweg and 30 questioned the CEU eTD Collection gain will support popular need toreach out togroupsoutside their of ethnic groups. in to order in parties for which apreferentialsystem advocates andherather groups integrating needed to form an alliance. Under the leadership of Tomas G. Masaryk, Czech elites Slovak Czech and of G. Masaryk, leadership Tomas Under the form alliance. to an needed butfree onforce, from imperial the their could themselves realized never their people own Firstsituation changed during the Worldcompletely Warasboth Czech leaders and Slovak War the Czech-Slovak relations were more orless reduced tobusiness and cultural relations. The determination and obtain some sort of recognition from the Hungarians. Prior to the First World self- to right achieve their to were desperate policies, magyarization to heavy Slovaks, subject the contrast of way By center. Austrian the from self-rule and autonomy broad a enjoying state distance them only more. The Czechs were then concerned by the claim createto a Czech unified to and contributed as well lands diverged Czech andthe of Slovakia development andeconomic political the ‘heads’, bydifferent were ruled asthey In addition, lands. Czech the and Slovakia separated and deeply areal one was empire parts of the two the line between the however Slovakia from Austria, lands while by them governed on Czech were the increasingly lands grew apart: came under Slovakia Czech the and that heads’ meant an two ‘eagle with into empire the of transformation Hungarian nations very are were undertheAustro-Hungarian both close and although from rule, 1867 the rule. Technically Although two the Czech the from both and thedetermined representatives. decision Slovak theyHistorical Background remained part of the same empire, CASE STUDIES BACKGROUND CASE STUDIES Czechoslovakia The Czech lands and Slovakia werefirstunited in a common in state a 1918, on 20 CEU eTD Collection Stanger(eds). Lanham, Md. :Rowman& Littlefield, c2000 Velvet Split. InIrreconcilable Differences?: Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution. Michael Kraus & Allisonthe Czechoslovakin K. quotes caseotherwise, study are directly stated Unless taken research. from Kopecký‘soriginal an is article. which Petr study Kopecký. case From Velvet Serbo-Montenegrin the Revolution with to comparison 32 liberalization the political changed with situation in The of Council Slovakia. National charge Slovak the and country, entire the managing government state the with state, asymmetric in an reality created thenew constitution circumstances In these institutions. governmental strengthenedalsobut thefeeling providedSlovak its of nationhood Slovakia own with conflict hadnot independence and previous only the experience encouraged during of Slovakian Howeverthe unitary the state. anewreestablishing constitution implemented in of power spheres the newlyarrived andthecommunists reformed was Czechoslovakia state in more – although apuppet of After conflict, was Nazi.theirthe the reality republic peoples faded again, theSlovaks while experienced forfirst theirtime an‘independent’ statehood started to grow among for Slovakia”the Slovaks. During federalism or autonomy of decentralization, extent the [over] dispute political “serious However the Second World War, Slovaksustain anindependent state. necessary andpolitical – economic – developmentto relations between the yet that thislevel reachedhadthey domination not and point becausethey at the realized of two Hungarian rulers and joining with the Czechs in a joint Czech and Slovak state. self-determinationlong-claimedwentto bycuttingformerwith theirthrough their with right ties in This became reality Slovaks of the creation Czechs andSlovaks. 1918 when of state a common for the call wouldactually Slovak Czechresistants and conflict, world beforethe endof the year one and nations, their between bonds political new generated they so, Doing dominators. imperial their from nations their freeing of aim the with abroad movements resistance into joined The Czechoslovak case study is directly based on the article by Petr Kopecký and serves as the basis for the The Slovak endured the union during the inter-war period out of fear of fear Hungarian of inter-war out of the period the union The during enduredthe Slovak 32 already opposed Czech and Slovak elites, and the feeling of domination of a Czech andfeeling the Czechelites, Slovak and already opposed 21 CEU eTD Collection Budapest:CEU press, 1995. p. 246. 33 security state or relations, economic foreign industry, such as agriculture, levels canceledit,federal number two the and – alsoshareda responsibilities of –republican arrangements constitutional Until education and culture. control hadof complete republics The currency. and legislation federal defense, policy, foreign of in charge was government federal the republics. the constitution, Accordingthe federal to institutionsbelonged to the government and afederal assembly.As a principle, the powers that were notexplicitly granted to a federal consisting of hat’ a‘federal under were units reconvened The two council.national which enjoyed broadautonomy and ownedits nationalown assembly,national government and determined units: organized Czechoslovakia asafederation geographicallyuniting andlinguistically two Slovakia on the onenegotiations betweenSlovakleaders and between Czech 1989 and 1992.This arrangement hand, and Bohemiathe and fall Moraviaof communismafter time first the for implemented was inonconstitution 1989. Czechoslovak the1969 the as era, Howevercommunist other, as Kopecký each stresses, of it was also the result Arrangement The 1989-1992Consociational of intense communism. of fall the to function in and implemented before never 1969constitution really way the acentralized was continued Czechoslovakia on then from reality in However federation. a binational into state the inEventually thestate. theirwas claim in enshrined new1969constitutionthe which transformed of Slovakia participation an fairand equitable federalism for morespecifically Slovaks called the democratization, for abroad While Czechscalled Spring. culminated 1968Prague the with that Václav Žák. The Velvet Divorce – Institutional Foundations. In The End of Czechoslovakia. Ji of Czechoslovakia. End In The Foundations. Institutional – Divorce Velvet The Žák. Václav The post-communist Czechoslovak consociational system inheritedwas directly from the 22 33 . The federal assembly federal The . Ĝ í Musil (ed). Musil í CEU eTD Collection communist party communist party and parliament. ofthe the Slovak nationalists After 1992 outside the –remained 102 out inof 150 Chamberthe of Nations.the Themost extremist parties –such as the in of out seats theand Chamberof assembly,with majority People in98 150 held thefederal the population, Czechoslovak entire the roughly and which represented actually revolutionary period the from originating movements mass two (VPN), Violence Against Public the and (OF) majority;form werebrought to Civic (Czech)alliances.they From 1989 until 1991, the Forum Given that no one party in either Slovakia or the Czech lands was strong enough to form a clear in rightveto federal actual entireassembly. the an representatives 31 giving thereby 3/5, majority of aqualified be taken with to decisions were majority both with a be taken to levelwere federal atthe decisions Major federal assembly. atthe requirement in the Chamber of Nations a parity on Slovaksprinciple. andCzechswererepresented and in theprime minister wereof differentrepublics. In high institutionsother such the as supreme council Chamber of nationality if informally, ruled, highestpositions the president thatthe andonly the called and the People. of alternation of principle aninformal addition, In representation. an ethnopolitical effect Constitutionalin thus allowing in republic, either threshold a5% passing for parties wasopen federal assembly in the law electoral the representation According to Czechs. asthe of representatives number (75) the same weregranted they inwhich Nations inthe of Chamber the Slovaks overrepresentation proportional basis – giving Czechs the 101MPsand Slovaksthe 49. republic,was bicameral and of constituted Chamberthe of Nationsthe –formed of 75 PMfor each and the Chamber of the People with representatives elected directly and on a Last consociational condition, the federation was ruled by a broad coalition government. inmemberEach veto rightform enjoyed republics alsoof adoublemajority the the of a by Czechs corrected somewhatthe and between was Slovak The demographic imbalance 23 CEU eTD Collection Congress of inBerlin 1878. the at Serbia and powers international by major recognized was independence Its Ottomans. the against Serbia with was only shortly under34 Ottoman rule in the 15 for centuries status had sovereign enjoyed aquasi Montenegro states. two the Firstthe Worlda Warconflicting aboutideas future common stimulated much between tension resistance in1918.Although hadthey alliedagainst common in enemies past,by the end the of Pre-1990’ History for aconsociation. necessary all conditions completed the thus arrangement Czechoslovak the help the two sides to find a consensus on the terms of theirfigure muchthe from appreciated heldleaders of 1992in Vaclav Havel, were 1989 to hope the coexistence. With his last condition, both republics. In addition thisto institutional informalsetting, mediatedtalks often between, by from includedmajor majority butstill parties cabinet, wasa thegovernment elections simpler aspirations in Montenegro and the opposition between Serbian nationalists and Montenegrin and nationalists Serbian between opposition the and in Montenegro aspirations separatist of saw arevival WarWorld Second The situation. revert the failed to eventually a lack their efforts howeverdueto of support movement, joinedina resistance kingdom. They the of sub-unit marginal a only it making Montenegro of annexation an was really what with Slovenes was proclaimed in 1918 the Montenegrin independentists could hardly be contended unconditioned unification andMontenegroof Serbia within Kingdom the andof Croats Serbs, Montenegro had beenenjoying asovereignstatus muchlonger than its neighbors and especially Serbia,than as it Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the union of Montenegro andproceed without not Serbia union did Montenegro the Unlike inCzechoslovakia, of th century, after which it allied to various western powers and even 24 34 , and when the when and , CEU eTD Collection Socialist FRY a rump the on of Constitution break.The1992 the announced democratic rebranding Federative Theera FRY Republic of YugoslaviaYugoslavia (FRY). Yugoslavia’s it dissolution remainin to partner Serbia’s chose Republic theFederal only of (SFRY), after crisis, and through Yugoslav the Serbia Given with thisproximity republicthe sided however it rather installed a semi- significant in SerbiasuchasPresident politicalfigures Boris Tadi Identity Identity Statehood.and Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003, p.135. 35 of Miloševi followers loyal most and closest the of some to home the was Montenegro fact in and era, communist the through pervaded Montenegrin elites frequently gained powerpositions in Serbian institutions. This tendency Montenegro had Serbia Serbsto before,Montenegrins and beentraveling and Already to evolved smoothly. the two peoplefour republics.Serbia Inthis theand relations theother context andMontenegro between Serbia maintained as samebecame atthe level equal arepublic and with rights Montenegro where Yugoslavia close relations withfederal basis” each other. “a thatwould on anda be forAxis’ calling equal society of peoples a state invasion, restructured In additionmobilized Partisans against the resurfaced the resistance especially after independentists the Serbo Rastoder. Ashort review of the history of Montenegro. InFlorian Bieber (ed.). Transition: Problems of As close as they were however, Serbia and Montenegro’s relations were already slightly already were relations Montenegro’s and Serbia however, were they as As close After the defeat of the Axis, the Montenegrin sovereignty was restored within within communist was restored sovereignty of Montenegrin Axis, the the After defeat the 35 . ü 25 , such asMomir Bulatovi such , ü haveMontenegrin origins. ü , and today several today and , CEU eTD Collection with By West. the hedid call then not for independence, outright butdeveloped a“Slovenian Montenegro’s economic development through democratization and the normalization of relations with broke Miloševi international support (ready go wherever (ready international support to Miloševi that their “interests were insufficiently protected” in union the insufficiently protected” were “interests theirthat felt - bysideeffect -affected Montenegrins level, the international the FRYat isolated policies Serbia’s as and smoothly, fall not did domination Serbian the Yet Montenegro. in opposition little political faced serious on SPSand the aligned was Their party revolution”. bureaucratic Bulatovi http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6be4.html/ Persistent1998.AugustCrisisChallengesSystem,UN1 the UNHCRRefworld,available at: 36 Miloševi Serbiandomination.assuring the had The federal amerepresident function, ceremonial and platform political alimited reflected Assembly federal the (DPS): Socialists of Party Democratic the by its counterpart in Montenegro by and SPS the inSerbia -weredominated deputies – which adoption. parliaments republican however, Practically body federal supplied the of before in adouble thefederal parliament to weresubject majority each) anddecisions federal seats equalstand (twenty onan partners Republics representedboth of Montenegro, theChamber to of out 138 seats secured30 federal Chamberof Citizens the assembly, In the been respected. ever hardly has principle this however in reality - republics different be of to had minister prime by Serbia dominated authoritarian regime Politics. until aslate as2000. Nina Caspersen. Elites Interests and Serbian-Montenegrinthe Conflict. 37 The The constitutionwas adopted by deputies of Yugoslav-era.the WRITENET, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: In fact the European Union refused to recognize FRY until 1996 and the USA or the United Nations refused so Vol. IV, No 2-3: 104-121, 2003, p.107 Loyal partisans of Miloševi ü ü , enjoyed a broad popularbroad support inMontenegroenjoyed a “anti-as leaders in eighties , the of the as the president of entire the federation. of asthe president Serbia dominated ü andunfolded anew,speech pro-western with ambitionthe protect to ü the two leaders of the DPS, Milo 36 . The democratically elected Federal president and president electedFederal democratically . The . Last accessed April2009 26 ü couldbe challenged), 37 . By . By 1997 emboldened bystrong Ĉ ukanovi Ĉ Southeast European ukanovi ü and Momir ü openly CEU eTD Collection nurtured two mutually exclusive visions of While coexistence. twomutually visions of their nurtured exclusive recognize. refused to Montenegro amendments the two republics froze when tworepublicsthe froze Miloševi ajoke” “Federation Yugoslav [wa]s the fueled thefeelingthat and ninetiessides severedthe on practically decisions asboth remaining relations the unilateral forces break the larger reflected pro-Serbian inter-republican by which grew steadier endof the and pro-Montenegrin between division intra-Montenegrin The (SNP). Party People’s Socialist reformist wing, and Bulatovi States Institute for Peace, 2001, Available at Available 2001, Peace, for Institute States 40 39 38 republics. InMontenegro his political shiftled DPS’implosion tothe between syndrome” Montenegro’s competences in the federation and canceling its veto right. veto its canceling and federation the in competences Montenegro’s decisions. 42 federal further ignored and - unrepresentative remained place in already deputies SNP old the which – in organs federal the considered government Montenegrin the In response bank. the of central members Montenegrin the and parliament federal the in deputies DPS new Montenegro’s recognize to refused andand neglect hopelessness” social but“by long-term economic separatism” other orany by Montenegrin beingthreatened was “not http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,WRITENET,,MNE,,3ae6a6be4,0.html Yugoslav federation, or separatism, orany kind of nationalism” in the involveposition not “Montenegro’s anddid astrictly divergence political reflected 41 Stojan Cerovi Stojan Caspersen p.108 WRITENET. These amendments allowed him to run for a second term and secured Serbia’s domination by reducing domination Serbia’s secured and term second a for run to him allowed amendments These Slavko Perovi Slavko In such a context the tensions developed intoa constitutional crisis in which the twosides Ĉ ukanovi 38 42 i.e. called for greater autonomy for Montenegro within Yugoslavia, for to him for to withinFRY autonomyYugoslavia, Montenegro forfor greater i.e. called ü which, with together federalorgansandnewlythe federal elected representatives, . “Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce or Something Else?” Special Report, United Report, Special Else?” Something or Divorce Reintegration, Montenegro: and “Serbia . ü ’s break had major consequences on relations both within and between and within both relations on consequences major had break ’s ü , Chairman of the Liberal Party of Montenegro, quoted in quoted Montenegro, of Party Liberal of the Chairman , ü who, loyal to Miloševi www.usip.org 39 ü , by engaged FRY , president, then constitutional unilateral . At this stage the rift between Serbia and Montenegro 27 , p.3 ü broke off with the DPS to foundhis own 40 41 . . By . By between relations 2000 the . In. federal 1998,the government Ĉ ukanovi ü proposed to proposed Ĉ ukanovi ü ’s CEU eTD Collection Ĉ representatives Montenegrinpresident Milo 43 common understandinga eventually leaders year,came to the negotiatingmuch and all through Serbian Montenegrin on After Agreement. knownastheBelgrade better afterwards Serbiabetween and Montenegro”, a Constitutional Charter and Montenegro inSerbiaand arrangement Consociational theThe –2006 2002 State Union was proclaimed on BelgradeAgreement into transforming FRY Union State the of Serbia and Montenegro. Belgrade resuscitate union.the to Following hisand intervention Montenegro Serbiasigned the to sent was Solana Javier Policy Security and Foreign Common for Representative High totheBalkan referendum in andtheEUswiftly reacted region,anddecision 2002EU USA the whole the would destabilize independence hadMontenegrin Fearing that the powers inmind. international plan the to correspond not did decision this however federation, the of dismantling in agree 2001 tohold This areferendum Montenegro’s announceda comingstatehood. over constitutional hadno leddeadlock passageway, theMontenegrin which andSerbianleaders to the leaders, tothe non-negotiable - being alliance versusasingle-state plans –atwo-state of both and Thevery on insisted of preservation state. the a single bases Serbia andbetween Montenegro Democratic Opposition Koštunica Vojislav and the President independence), Serbia’s of Montenegrin declaration of Serbia integration a preempting European (in Union effect (EU) inworking closecooperation towards (DOS) emphasizedan into and recognizedstates independentinternationally alliance transform federation two the of in their own plan the historical relation The Agreement was signed by FYR President Vojislav Kostunica, Deputy FRY Prime Minister Miroslav Labuš, in ÿLü , and witnessed by EU High Representative Javier Solana. Javier Representative High by EU witnessed , and On March 14 March On 43 signed an agreement with “Proceeding points for the restructuring of relations of restructuring the for points “Proceeding with agreement an signed th 2002 under the supervision Montenegrin Javier supervision underof the Serbianand Solana, 2002 Ĉ ukanovi ü , MontenegrinPrime ministerFilip Vujanovi 28 ü , SerbianPrime minister Zoran CEU eTD Collection http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NATLEGBOD,,SRB,,43e7547d4,0.html 44 Union’s competencies relations to the and foreign maintain states inforeign offices establish capacity ownrepresentative its the to extenthad republic each Charter Constitutional the that to according and Affairs, Foreign of Minister itown did not harm retainedits Montenegro security limited Moreover foreign policy. to and wereoutrighttheits powers other memberin effect Hence, Rights. and Human Minority and Relations; Economic International Internal and state Affairs, Foreign orDefense, ministers: five of conflict formed was and republics, two the for platform with the a common offered federal The andgovernment Ministers. Council the of State constitutional court of consisted thefederal Federal president, national institutions assembly, titular the assembly.the and its republics,wide the each of respectivenational autonomy owned which government to confederation. loose a created agreementthe other, federation on the for acentralized proposal hand, Serbian the and one the on states independent of a union for platform Montenegrin the between way middle a find entities. to Trying two like inCzechoslovakia, uniting, Montenegro” Union and Serbia of “State February 4 Meurs. standards through harmonization the market on a common EU intoharmonization their projected and agreement the market; national its own sustained thus state Each and trade. customs border on sovereignty their retained also republics both Additionally, and SerbianDinar. the Euro’ currency, union the and state functioned ona monetary dual basedsystem on ‘Montenegrinthe its separate retain own to right the obtained Montenegro domains. monetary economy and in autonomy extended forprovided an agreement Belgrade the In particular, governments. Constitutional Charterof the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Available at The forit the fourFirst conditionstext aconsociation. qualifying provided granting a th 2003. The contract transformed the former Federal Yugoslav Republic into a newinto Republic former the Federal Yugoslav transformed contract 2003.The 44 . All otherthe domains remainedinthe responsibility national the of 29 . Last accessed April 2009. Van 2009. April accessed Last . CEU eTD Collection republic as the Federal president. In of In yearsaddition,federal ministers Foreign Federal as republic the two after the president. row. In a in terms the two nationality same the be of nor council republic same the from come not could Assembly of ministers, Federal the federal presidentof president and positionsin structures. rotation highest the at the only two out of the five ministers and body Montenegrin of – wasfordeputies tobeadopted. required decisions could republican–Serbian the Assembly,each of amajority of combined to number of the deputies of be from the same thetotal amajority of instated: was mechanism majority adouble sametime, atthe assembly the of functioning smooth securethe and representation theMontenegrins’ preserve Hence, to system. federal entire the immobilize and decision every and block each to power immoderate federal decisions, butterritorially.With system this however, Montenegrinsonly were likely still be in outvoted to on the other giving fifteendemographicallyuneven Montenegroboth and biggerthan republicsbeing times –Serbia them a simple veto right very otherwise the in between some balance power restore to concern the addressed provision would have given themUnion’s was population, Montenegro overrepresentedthus in Union’sthe assembly. This an the 6%of roughly Representing Montenegrin the deputies. with to going 35 remaining the was formed chamber of 91of a single seats, of composed the Serbian which 126 went to deputies Union’sassembly The by agreement. Belgrade the structures in embedded Union’s were also the Montenegro. and asSerbia simply not when union, confederation, as afederation, to referred interchangeably and of commonly union, the status actual the to as ambiguous rather fact remained which inmanage enjoyedaffairsunderthe newagreement, thus internal their alargecapacity to in prospect the of integrationSerbia intoand Montenegro’s EU.The the Union’s member states In parallel to the Assembly, proportionality was also instated through a principle of – conditions consociational the of third and second – right veto the and Proportionality 30 CEU eTD Collection 45 most ofeither representative parties republicsthrough the two state. the representing agrand coalition federalgovernment wasthus government hardly changed. The seats of however distribution the in republic; the elections parliamentary December2003 the after reflect changes Serbianparliament inthe the federal to wasre-formed 2004, the assembly nine seats.In obtained SNP which growingly the popular to incomparison seats secured fourteen ambiguous DSS,it controlled On 50of Montenegrinthe 91Serbian the seats. side,theDPS power. At this period, radicalinMontenegrin borders toMilosevictheir common opposition and inthe ousthimgoal from to SRS still retained Montenegroa third of Serbia’s seats wasand formed on successivewas party coalitions.together In its first form in 2003, the government of Serbia and composed with the of the eighteenperiod. parties before end the a three-year trial of unconstitutional wasrendered by referendum republic either which – hadbeSerbia to hadand taken Montenegro on basisthe consensus,of andunilateral by secession allied in ofthe decisions –formed Supreme Council Command threepresidents inthe Union, of the 2000 acrossAdditionally, charter. andthe agreement Belgrade the by both leftunclear was representation Serbo- however they occupied ita rotating on principle. Regarding international financial institutions Europe, Council of and EU the the the OSCE, UN, at the seat single a they owned state single As a principle. a parity on were represented Montenegro and Serbia organizations, international and numberrepublics had both equal judges. Similarly, international of at the level and in principle, by parity years. ofJusticethe wasgoverned The court for theremaining two republic) Affairs and Defense had to “ Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. and of Serbia Union State of the Charter Constitutional Last consociational condition of all, the federal government of Serbia and Montenegro exchanged [their] role exchanged [their] 31 ” 45 with their deputy minister (of the different CEU eTD Collection 46 politics, andfor this reason manya great in did sympathizenot 1991 with any political party forty years of more or adeepfeeling until the populationthen andgenerated – disoriented of uncertainty. Moreover, less forcedlives their channeled had that communist order the –of communism of fall The parties. political with - all partisanship had turned them intoVoter volatility sceptics as to republics. two between the imbalance of socio-economic the pertain to the voter volatility, the elites‘ lack of tradition of accomodation and eventuallycrisis the role situationend majorjoint explain federation, existence.the elements their this there Three they to decided and the only support possible thepreservation and,although first to outcome population at the seemed of elites‘ complete led misinformation theelites‘ Eventually the to them as republics‘ divergence proceeded. they inability two the underlined that negotiations protracted from emerge to wereunable elites the deadlock, to compromise commitmentwholehearted political consensus in among the to Stuck a constitutional elites. accordingpolitical instrument. In addition, the context did not offer the appropriate conditions to stimulate a to Kopecký,the two sides’ differences and in fact encouraged the elites to appeal to the nationaland identity as a reemergence of political parties like mushrooms under rain, but consequently the actual support actual underbut consequently likemushroomsrain, the reemergence of parties political the and repluralization a political induced liberalization political post-communist The Sharon Wolchik. The Politics of Transition and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia. In Ji WRONG? OF CONSOCIATIONALISM:EXPERIENCES WHAT WENT Czechoslovakia’s dissolution Czechoslovakia’s After 1989, the majority of the Czechoslovak society –ifat relunctantly identified society rather majority After 1989,the Czechoslovak of the The consociational mechanismsin post-communist Czechoslovakia were unable bridgeto 32 Ĝ í Musil p.226 46 . CEU eTD Collection for an independentfor an new Slovakia. stand His notonlyseveredlinks bloc,it the within but Slovak until tothefederation,then hecommitted his thesituation dramatically changed as raised voice 1989, and Disintegrationthe of State.the In Kraus & Stanger. 48 47 rearrangements federal onthe negotiations the blockedeventually that ethnic tensions the exacerbating in responsibility a great had leaders their that actually believed Czechoslovaks in into supportforlater feararguments. Infact ethnic future many aboutthe crisis,the leaders and political thepopulation’s in –especially –easilychanneled dissatisfaction Slovakia the hand at was element mobilizing other no when border, inter-republican the across Slovaks the – national identity“. in Given that fewaddition institutional mechanisms linked theCzechs and identity with pervasive one electorate „was anavailable population the of majority the Otherwise, (KDU-CSL). Czech Christian-Democrats andthe minorities ethnic representing parties in either Slovakia the or Czech lands retained the loyalty genuinecommunists,the of so did but After cutaccross 1989,only borders. parties communist the republican wide failed to ambitions with federation- movements beandin case, built wasyetto factions any fairly forrecent these lacked the presence of any strong federation-wide party anystrong of presence lackedthe mostly underlined during 1992elections the whichopposed but national/republican parties situation builtthe circumstances for the rapid segmentation of the Czech and Slovak societies, position,in 1991,of Me Vladimir political in elite,manner”. anad who often reacted only hoc Inessence thesuddenshiftof shifting […]positions onthe national issue, paving the way for conflicts with the Czech the “perpetual[ly] into engaged parties in Slovakia As a result state. post-crisis inthe conditions impose reforms favorable twosidesthe wouldstate werethatto granteither with struggling constitutional crisis itself offered the ground for political competition rather than cooperation, as Carol Skalnik-Leff. Inevitability, Probability, Possibility: The Legacies of the Czech-Slovak Relationship, 1918- Wolchik in Musil, p.232 þ iarone of politician (VPN), mostthe trusted in Slovakia and 33 48 . In addition, Kopecký notes that the that notes Kopecký addition, In . 47 . This . CEU eTD Collection Slovak in elite concentrated Slovakthe institutions governmental ignoring federal while theones. the as aconsequence, institution and trusted most wasthe Council National Slovak the Slovakia in contrary the On institutions. Czech rated ‘lower’ the than more powerful as perceived reason and theeliteattaininglands covering entire institutions, for thefederal the aimed at this state Czech the In segmentation. institutional an into translated and 1989 after continued segmentation dissidentthe movement – which mobilized however only few individuals. Therefore the pre-1989 1989wasagainst communistregime in before the Czechscooperated case in and which Slovaks of closeness peoples twothe could alonenot toneutralize. As manage notes, Kopecký only the and which the reduced haddrastically mutual of communism whichdecadesof exchange, ofaccommodation Lack ofelitetradition return. noa pointof grow to to for tensions climate the created objectives of mismatch the Eventually, identity. Slovaks’ the of negation theCzechs’ of archetype the as reforms democratic on the Slovak efforts as obstacles to their goals while the Slovaks considered the Czechs’perceive to insistence Czechsstarted the interests, other’s each of misunderstanding this of a consequence 50 49 toEurope” “return and decommunization the reforms, primary weredemocratic objectives Czechs’ the contrast, By of way quasi independence. in words, clearer – or federation in the issue “visibility abetter theirgaining focused on and onthestatehood efforts Slovakia” of put andfinal elites, Slovak increasingly whose andaims grewIndeed,theSlovaks openly divergent. between thegrowing widenedgapwith Czech also the nurtured Czechleadersthe anddistrust Carol Skalnik-Leff. The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State. Boulder, Žák. p.251 Colo.: Westview Press, 1997. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also hampered from the start by a weak experience 34 50 . As . 49 CEU eTD Collection 19, May 2009. 51 turn of limitedits atthe 20 the laminating development: which policies to subject in andwas Slovakia addition lessHungary was advanced, By center. contrast industrial economy and dueto theirconsiderably advancement economic supplied theAustrian disputeshistorical from times. Under modern the Austrian Czech the rule, lands an developed the hadnurtured differences economic divide. the The Czech-Slovak onlynurtured economies Socio-economic imbalance accept the outcome” problem no had community to international the and“therefore informed international community keptthe and Czechs the negotiations and led to thesidesmeeting defensivewas reached, thetwo which point developed hindered attitudes the only outcome possible limit the for go.When upper limit corresponded Slovaks tothe the under which - they refused to the separation. Doing howeversome their concessions; to were ready so, Czechs The of levels open-mindedness. (limited) both the Slovaks predetermined in with negotiations the sidesboth engaged on theelites In thesecircumstances frame notthe time agradual for accommodation but built for ground the confrontational attitudes. the division of powers liberalization, political the between transition, economic the deal – with hadto they theissues of character the republics and andurgent and the crucial inthe republic, colleagues the other counterpart unfamiliarity their of federation – simply elites’ was heightened bythe did lackof trust byThis elite. Slovak the reservation with great not give they the perceived were government federal Slovak inthe active factthat politicians by more the difficult the all rendered were circumstances, in unfavorable level,already federal the at Negotiations Miroslav Laj Miroslav In this ethno-politically segmented climate, the disparity between the Czech and Slovak þ ák. Personal interview with Emanuela Mackov Emanuela with interview Personal ák. 35 51 . á. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava, Slovakia. th century Slovakia had a CEU eTD Collection economic exploitation contributed for independence. to theircontributed raisingmotivation economic exploitation feeling Slovaks’ of and segmentation, the national the exacerbated economic imbalance As bywhichthe Slovakscolonialism of weredeprived aconsequence the their resources. On the other Czechs feltthey were payingthe Slovaks for their developmentwithout benefiting themselves. hand the SlovaksRepublic preferentialthe grew against tothe treatment granted Slovaks resentment by the which tended IntheCzech 1989. after inter-republican affect relations economic the policies to andcontinued to communist the perceiveunder developed had which Slovakia, and Republic Czech the both in statements the Czechs’ by policies the republics.These mutually the between accusing claims were accompanied assistance of demand distinction the to started Slovaks the Consequently affected. negatively rather emerged as somepolicies, whilebenefiting tothe the Czecheconomy,Slovak maladapted which proved economy new-era a marketeconomy. transition The transition to the after appearedreally policies redistributive of results the negative The identities”. national “reinforc[ed] and Slovakia reemerged lands and the between Czech theeconomic disparity protracted, development Slovak economic the communism, after stopped policies redistributive the When center. Czech the of offshoot much from very asan and Czechlands functioned the on transferred funds relied development incommunism.noAsspecial institution for was created this Slovakthe purpose, Slovakia its after sustainability process and the hindered particularly butremainedsystem centralized Slovak into the inscribednot policies were economic the fact that The superficial. were only lands, gap with development these Czech the developments andreduced drastically actually the economic Slovakia’s encourage did it while However, in Slovakia. policies modernization and states byengaging equalize economic tried reducethe the two communists differences to primarily agrarian economy. The difference persisted through 20 the through persisted difference The economy. agrarian primarily 36 th century, although the although century, CEU eTD Collection Czechs thus favored a “strong federation”, while the Slovaks struggled for a confederal state Slovaks the federation”, aconfederal for struggled favored while Czechs a“strong thus to by remainedobtain international andthus, mobilizedefforts the sovereignty.recognition The attention Slovak the much of reform, economic and political on concentrated Czechs the inelements,peoples diverging developed two 1990 thepriorities two While and aims. diverging these Asaresultmutual of against threats. andSlovaks Czechs reconvene dangercould external 52 disease” “childhood merely as a Czechs considered later theSlovak nation nationalism, encouraged only which communistthe the structure and 1939-1945 Slovak experience of ‘independent’ statehood strengthened theidea of a Slovak hand other create the identity,a Czechoslovakwas developed the on to 1918 nosustained effort Since identity. Slovak the negating as felt were policies federation’s the where inSlovakia such wasvery in“Czechoslovakism” much aform essence of Czech nationalism – and as considered fact the that pertained to This situation ascendancy. theiractual inferred also federation, the in Czechs the perceivedpredominance of the ‘Czech’, name alluding of to to abroad, state’s the reduction, Thefrequent Czechs’ state. asthe –andSlovaks by the state Czechs astheir own Czech elites always effectively the advantage, and political economic their demographic, identification. Dueto under common dominated the Slovaks andthe CzechoslovakCzechs have the thatcould united cement ideological lacked the Czechoslovakia state, very muchsignificant, offour factors.Mostlackedshows, consociation thesupport other Czechoslovak the perceived by the asKopecký However imbalance. socio-economic compromise andmild to elite a tradition of –namely factors favorable Lijphart’s of two of absence the by undermined thus was crisis state’s Additional factors Skalnik-Leff (2000) The capacity of the Czech and Slovak elitescompromise to and workout asolution tothe 37 52 . In 1989 as tensions in Europe faded,noin . In1989astensionsEurope CEU eTD Collection common material material assets”. common of “division a only implied it as separation concrete the eased republic of their limits in the The informal talks also contributed to the peaceful divorce. Lastly, the twonations’ concentration tensions following the dissolution as only the decision impacted only the Czechs and the Slovaks. potential the andreduced “politicking” limitedthe fewparties involved only negotiations the fact that the Additionally, manner”. legalistic “impressively in an separation negotiated partitionconsensusKopecký argues favored positively solution, it findcontributed a to consensus rely on to needed they with thus and secession, a unilateral engage them to havecould permitted that other parties. Me nor Klaus Neither overrepresentation. Althoughdemographic –tothe disproportion by was corrected Czechs’ dissatisfaction Slovaksthe – the requirementrepublics. The two of the separation peaceful the theyeased together that demonstrates Kopecký however, Interestingly it. uphold to insufficient of were they –but consociation the consensus in a climateConclusion closed to communism left alegacy of elite segmentation rather than mutual exchange between republics. population of Czechoslovakia, although small,did noteven manage tobridge the gap as inmostly Thetotal were institutions. Slovaks’political resentful the of overrepresentation thirds roughly demographic imbalance. of total two Czechs represented The the population, and by twoequal union butwascharacterized federation not the of units a addition, the was 53 “strongimplying republics, republican and competent and parliaments”governments Žák. p.247 Hence, all things considered, only three out of supported factors nine of Hence, all favorable only Lijphart’s out considered, three things þ iar had an absolute majority in the federal assembly federal in majority the iar hadanabsolute 38 53 . In CEU eTD Collection however, “the result of the fall of fall Miloševi of of the “theresulthowever, republican tensions as the crisis built primarily on Miloševi on primarily built crisis the as tensions republican survive, andinit sought toattractirrespective of people this context their affiliations. ethnic to in order Serbia authoritarian with links severe to need the on emancipation Montenegrin ethnic lines” competed forthe minorities’As support. a consequence, “political affiliationsfollow [did] not 56 report 8, p.4. March 2002. Available at 55 54 and survey Albanianresults” population according to Muslim, andby the not bebyethnic butminority Croat republic’s decided Montenegrins population, formed they aserious it forcepolitical inthat was said future “Montenegro’s that will was there fixated group. In no minoritiesaddition, in represented aquarter Montenegro of the as politics, in Montenegrin element unreliable an ethnicity made volatility this nineties in the more wereembedded, affiliations deeply whereethnic former Yugoslav Unlike inrepublics other identity is both unstable and dual reflect– capable variousto identifications same atthe time. while others claim Montenegrins are a sub-group of Serbs, and as a result the Montenegrin broader Serbian ethnicbroader core a from distinctiveness its true over matter of debate a identity, Montenegrin issuethe on the of built independence Montenegro’s debates over the of issue. polarization The status Montenegrin Ethnicization ofPolitics Bieberquoted in Caspersen p.116, Bieber2002. Brief ECMI Independence. over dispute Montenegrin the in of Minorities Instrumentalization The Bierber. Florian Caspersen p.116 Ĉ The Serbo-Montenegrin partition Serbo-Montenegrin The ukanovi The fall of Miloševi In FRY since the nineties the climate had increasingly been impregnated by the by impregnated been increasingly had climate the nineties the since FRY In 56 ü and most parties or coalitions were multiethnic. The DPS especially called the and in the Montenegro’s independence issue political independence needed issue political and parties andin simply Montenegro’s the 54 ü in2000 was expectedtobring a both inter-decrease of and intra . Many claim they constitute adistinct. Manyclaimthey Montenegrin constitute ethnic branch; http://www.ecmi.de/download/brief_8.pdf. Last accessed may 2009 ü was increased polarization within Montenegro over Montenegro within polarization wasincreased 39 55 . Therefore in strugglethe opposing Bulatovi ü ’s authoritarian rule. On the contrary the On rule. ’s authoritarian . ü CEU eTD Collection vote for. However, as Caspersen notes, the conflict was not the classic inter-ethnic one but rather but one inter-ethnic was not classic the theconflict notes, asCaspersen However, for. vote union identified pro-independencepro- would which quite determined –one surely or party – Montenegrins identifiedin 32% and asSerbsand as in 2003 61.8%asMontenegrins, 43.2% Montenegro republics). This was by underlined 2003census:whileinthe 1991 only 9.3% identified as Serbs formerin Yugoslav nevertheother as as dramatically ethnic increasingly (although had turned distinguishable from Serbian nationalism, and by 2000’ the politicalthe inconflict Montenegro nationality Serbian the from distinct asanationality statehood” independent to emphasize right the to started increasingly under Miloševi under the falling popular support and fallingthe independence the powersto resistancepopular support Western of “constrainedindependence, inhisstand” by pro-independence political developments the despite to the population’s answer. Morrison, Kenneth. Montenegro: A Modern History. IB Tauris & Co Ltd: 2009. 61 60 59 2003, p.64 In FlorianBieber (ed.). Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 58 57 arguments. Tohis pursue political ambitions issuestatehood” the of independence. After the fall of After independence. the fall Miloševi of Montenegro’s shifted towards politics debate asthe into and translated sharpened Montenegrins Serbsand between distinction nineties,late the West.From the inthe expected than far level cordial less ona and pursued Serbia inMontenegro elite ruling relations between the The census however should Caspersen p.116 be taken withAlliance. Liberal marginal caution somewhat the from Apart as Kenneth Morrison notes it was not exemptMontenegro. and Serbia between frommediation Robust pressure Agreement: Belgrade The Wim. Meurs, Van p.112, as Caspersen Caspersen p.112 This means ethnicidentification that the in political grew also essence: theway one 61 ü . independence was not called for called not was independence 57 , which necessarily held consequences in Serbia. In this context the context this In in Serbia. consequences held necessarily which , 60 . Thisnewfocusfueled Montenegrin hardly nationalism, until then ü the political division had to shift anotherline hadto to division of the political 40 Ĉ ukanovi 59 , after his, after fall“the Montenegrin government ü shifted from shiftedanti-Miloševi from 58 . Hence, while ü to pro- to CEU eTD Collection Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels: 2006,p.4. regularly accusedof ‘anti-Serbian’. being Morrison. ICG. Montenegro’s Referendum. Europe Briefing N°42. Montenegrin domestic and mutually around exclusive theelites politics radicalized – goals i.e.Serbdom” union with Serbia identification a Montenegrin identity either to independence, toa“Montenegrin requiring or asensecreate belongingpopulism to common and of to inorder side)resorted independence pro- the most (although both they however levels; different on campaigns their developed stand retain a neutral its andit advocating for impossible dissolution, union’s was aparty or preservation practically issue,either supporting the thefight, status developed all aposition crucial.on this parties In be would vote every and each - support pro-independence the of lead close the given – where tighten gatherranks and rally in in topopular broadest coalitions the support order a campaign union, state the competingMontenegrin Allthrough partieselites. in to side attempted each instability of issue independence the instability over population the of great deal of its campaign on attacks against the pro-independence blocs – and against against and – blocs pro-independence the against on attacks campaign of its deal great pro- potential the off frighten to risk the unionrun voters. have Instead itwould focusedthat on the social, cultural campaign and economicpro-Serb benefits of the unionwithnationalist Serbia, a to and built much a too resorting avoided mostly bloc pro-union the side, other the On Union. European the to accession state’s the accelerating in primarily Montenegro to bring would independence benefit the on developed and Serbs the from distinct 65 referendum approached in 2006after its leaders couldn’t agree onwhichposition actually Morrisonadopt. p.201 the hope to attract voters from both sides. This ambiguous strategy eventually brought the group to split as the Medojevi 64 accessed May 2009. 2006). Podgorica June 2006. Available at 40.5%. CEDEM, Department for Emprirical Research. Public Opinion inMontenegro.Annual nb2(May 2005-April 39.1%. Beginning from then, it rose againwhile the support unionthe for continued tofluctuate between32.1% and union:the for support forindependence lowered downto 39.2% asopposed tosupport for the union which reached support forindependence followed trend until June2004when adecreasing it actually hardly overmatched support Serbiaand Europeanthe Union.Balkans Report No.129. Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels: 2002.From its adoption, its adoption 61,6% of the populationsupported it against 23% who rejected it.ICG. Still Buying Time: Montenegro, 63 62 identity Montenegrin of the essence the over dispute an intra-ethnic The pro-independence campaign insisted only The one significant which did, the Group forChange on(GZP), eventually becausedisbanded of Nebojsait. the right of the Montenegrins to have their own state as a people Until 2006 support to independence kept fluctuating. While many Belgradesaw the agreement as a back step, after Caspersen p.117. ü , leader of the GZP, publicly favored independence while the GZP itself never cleared its position on it in it on position its cleared never itself GZP the while independence favored publicly GZP, of the leader , 64 , let alone for cooperating across the status issue position. The two sides 65 . The issue over the Montenegrin independence polarized the polarized independence Montenegrin the over issue . The http://www.cedem.cg.yu/publications/files/Godisnjak_2_eng.pdf 41 63 encouraged competition between competition the encouraged 62 . In this context, the Ĉ ukanovi ü in particular, in . Last CEU eTD Collection 69 March 2003. relative to the decriminalizationof the state – adefault which led to his murderby the state’s security forces in Hague, the rule of law, justice and the fight against corruption fightagainst andthe justice law, ruleHague, the of reforms muchthe awaited governmental by for its in from support” Koštunica exchange “extract concessions foreign decisions.powers in particular The ruling with elites’ regards concern to cooperation to preserve with theirthe interests dampened 68 67 report. April 06.Available at http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=1630225348&mode=pdf. European and Black Sea Studies. majority. Brusis Martin. Serbia and Montenegro: Democratic Consensus Susceptible to Populist Actors. He formedout. a project coalitionhis carry but couldn’t SRS, and SPS the government including government” a “concentration for called excludinghe 2004 In the DS, but needed the supporttime he more orof less openly flirtedthe with the SPSSPS theand SRSbecause consistentlyand refused tocooperatehe heldwith the Hague. a very thin [to]theMiloševi“u-turn of SPS the majority, support the on rested had a tight only which Unionthe parties level.being in These two werefarfrom fact Koštunica’s isolated: government, in Serbia of andfifty parliament SRScontrolled toat the (of which 2003, 91 reserved thirty)out Šešejl’sSRS whichvirulent withtogether controlled SPS the 104of in 250 seats Serbianthe was strongest the but popular, andremained the leader’sdeath had surmounted SPS, easily reached such a level by 2003 as to bring conservatives back to power. Miloševi power. level bring by2003 backto reached conservatives a as to such struggles, internal by DOS’ ruling the exacerbated only Populardissatisfaction, guard. corrupt much fall inhis arena 2000 old by occupied of Serbianpolitical the remained nationalistthe 66 inMiloševi remained embedded forces. pro-Montenegrin and pro-Serbian between dialogue than rather competition theunion. or independence and climateonly theelites’ This mutual encouragednurtured distrust ICG. Serbia’s U-Turn. Europe Report N°154. Belgrade/Brussels: 2004. After Miloševi After Id. Koštunica has a rather ambiguous political face: once an anti-Miloševi While Montenegro started to integrate western democratic values, Serbia’s politics western democratic Serbia’s values, tointegrate started While Montenegro ü ’s fall, fall, ’s Ĉ in ü ÿLü era without Miloševi erawithout , concentrated on pleasing the EU, was unable to conduct the necessary reform necessary the conduct to unable was EU, the pleasing on , concentrated Vol. 6,No 1: 103 – Montenegro,main and EIU Country Serbia Profile 2006. 123, ü ’s nationalistic perspectives least open cooperation. Despite open to least perspectives ’s nationalistic ü 42 ” 69 . Salientnational Vojvodina, issues –Kosovo, ü 68 ally of , and ICG a in2005the deplored 66 67 which took advantage which ofit took to and remained influential in influential remained and Ĉ in ÿLü in the DOS, at the same ü ’s own the party, Southeast CEU eTD Collection salient within Montenegro with the appointment of the Montenegrin delegates for the for delegates Montenegrin the of appointment the with Montenegro within salient support, butalsoimpose mechanisms to favor them would that in the newunion. This most was union functionwould thethat elites meantnot wereonlypractically – get popular competing to having leftpracticallynothing from unaddressed –theBelgradeagreement mostway the the of constitutional setting. The fact that in 2002 the elites were left with the task to draft aconstitution bythe wasencouraged elites Montenegro’s and between Serbia competition Czechoslovakia, the insupporter andSerbia, cutoff linkSerbia's strongest with rulingthe elite inMontenegro. Like in itsof strongest agreement the deprived agreement, theBelgrade partisan of strongest perhaps the 71 crisis only benefited the crisis while preserving the union at the same time. On the other hand, the continuation of the Serbo-Montenegrinpositionas the federal president by the Montenegrinlust forindependence, Koštunica struggled to find asolution to in Zoran 2003of the murder March Moreover, elites. Serbian andMontenegrin between the confrontation populism political encouraged to and the resort favored issue, which elites. nationalist” an instrumentalist and […] than a democrat, nationalist “much more a Koštunica, of position the and hold of power 70 DOS within conflict the political the exacerbated Serbia challenging issue another yet as issue Montenegrin the arguments, emotional and nationalist to receptive already acontext In speeches. populist to it opened and population the radicalized Serbia by ofmosques,destructions aswell upsurgesof as nationalist hooliganism inVojvodina, positions.power The ethnic cleansing of ethnic Serbs in in Kosovo 2004 matched in remaining inethnic Bosniapreserve Croatia Serbs by –were exploited and intheirquestto their politicians Morrisonp.183 Caspersen. Cerovi In republics two the politics were markedbyanintensification of ethnicthe national and Ĉ ü in . The Montenegrinissue . The struggle internal to the DOS. Because was he threatenedin his ÿLü , thenSerbia Prime minister, against Koštunica. 71 , andithardened ruling theirposition the Montenegrin against 43 70 , and it strengthened the conservatives’ the strengthened it and , Ĉ in ÿLü , whowas CEU eTD Collection dialogue. Miloševi In nineties the engage a to capacity leaders’ sodid their deteriorated, drastically relations As Serbo-Montenegrin autonomy and for Serbianascendancy the against mounted greater claims voiced. were regularly -,resentment from Serbia them protect intention to also but the interests distinct Montenegro’s in international to representation national the symbols organizations over from debate the and competition, shark opposition of matter bitter a became issue and every stamp. continued to use Yugoslavia’s, issuing passports with the name of “Yugoslavia”using or Yugoslavia’s official remained without a flag at all. The sameownflag in 2004,fate drastically metdifferent fromthe its previousanthem. one to distinguish Initself the from Serbia,end, while the theunion differingunion only by their shade never of blue. But adopted thedeputies were unable to statefind a middle way.symbols Montenegro adopted its butflags - withinsixty days of the union’s implementation. The Montenegrin and Serbianflags were almost identical, 73 72 After the breakwith Miloševi from grewintolerableexpressed, in latethe eighties Serbia'shegemonic attitude Montenegro. little cooperation.While domination butagainst communism protest was Serbia’s under characteristicpreviously been marked mostly by cordiality. Practically however, their relations were more had Montenegrins of and Serbs of coexistence the a tensions, some (Serbian)Despite exchange. mutual of dominationHistorically over a (Montenegrin) ofaccommodation Lack ofelitetradition junior brother rather than of Montenegrin delegates on the agreement the interpretations of respective impose their to inparliament the competed and delegates, Serbian with the debate tothe prior conclusions even commission’s constitutional predetermine theto sought parties independence Pro-union pro- constitutional Charter. and chargedwith commission union’s of the drafting the The constitution stated that the union adopts a new flag - a compromise between the Serbian and Montenegrin and Serbian the between compromise a - flag anew adopts union the that stated constitution The ICG. Balkans Report No. 129. Smooth relations between Serbia and Montenegro were not even encouraged byahistory even not encouraged were SerbiaandMontenegro between relations Smooth ü in 1997 - which fornot onlystressed in1997-which time first the since 1918 ü divided the political spectrum between his supporters and between his his divided spectrum supporters the political 44 73 . 72 . In this context, each this context, . In CEU eTD Collection Montenegro to compromise.to Montenegro and inSerbia leaderships the theof capacity drastically inreduced turn This independence. unitingideologicaltheir against butforced opponents, hardenthem instead to their position on support elites alsocontributed divideto more, them andthe even shaky unions graduallylost popular internal divisions. elites ruling Montenegro’s between and Serbia gap the deepened further -this representative Montenegrin and only by default SNP,winner the with federal assembly the elections in the unilateral DOSrally amendments,the 2000 after constitutional was broughtto in parliamentary federal the boycotted DPS the because addition In union. the supporting majority – from DOS the departed increasingly DPS Hence pro-independence the eroded. unifying element position after Miloševi DS’ Serbia, the DOS was marred by an internal powerstruggle between itstwo prominent members,LSCG DSS’ Koštunica and broke prior toits reformist shift in 1997.its Eventually,accusing the DPS of not moving swiftly forenoughindependence the alliancewhichit represented to DPS the to aserious platform competitor similar a all the more had with thatand it had party the memory of the DPSpro-independence policies and strongest repression the was LSCG The the party. independence DPS and SDP and75 refusedMontenegro’s Independence Drive. Europe Report N°169. Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels: 2005 to participateTransition:(ed.). Problems ofIdentity Statehood. and Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,ICG. 2003. in the74 governing coalition in 2001. In Miloševi itopponents, butalso provided grounds for between cooperation the respectively andpro anti- Consequently when their short-term Miloševi Consequently when short-term (when was reached goal their but had competing views of Miloševi downfall (the objectives basedshort-term on wereonly alliances these However on practically everyDOS otherwith issue the andsupport on DPS. Again in by 2000 supported massive international assistance, eighteen the joinedparties in the status of issuethe Montenegrinin particular.in Zajednoagainstjoined Miloševi coalition the DPS with the aim to oust Miloševi In Montenegro the DPS engaged FlorianBieber. MontenegrinPolitics Since the Disintegrationof Yugoslavia InMontenegro. InFlorian Bieber into a harsh struggle against the LSCG to win the title of the leading pro- Ĉ in ÿLü 75 ü . Elite interests prevented leading politicians primarily in anti-Miloševi the primarily leading politicians prevented . Elite interests . DOS’ politicians added to the coalition’s erosionby petty struggles to preserve theirinterests and parties in Serbia and Montenegro. In mid inSerbiathe Montenegro. Serbian parties parties nineties and democratic ü ’s fall, and their association with corrupt Miloševi 45 ü and established relations with with Montenegrin and relations established ü ’s milieus. By 2003 the coalition fell to 74 . Competition between . Competition ü fell in fell 2000)their ü from power. ü sidefrom ü ), CEU eTD Collection Montenegro in independence for basis the strengthen to years additional gain three move to strategic would independence. hold areferendum much HesignedtheBelgrade on agreementas a WithSerbia. Ethnonational Identity, Security and the Implosionof Yugoslavia: the Case of Montenegro and the Relationship wouldas many as it have disappointed. ICG.Balkans Report No.p.16. Sharyl 129, Pauline Cross Komnenich.and satisfied have would and way either be secured not could itheld, were areferendum, of outcome The independence. 76 In Montenegro other. yield potentialforthe theinstead situationsin negotiation, noside would to created which and eachsidethat firm in stood vision its oftheSerbo-Montenegrin own limitedunion from start the in factyearsSecond the more theissuewaseven ithowever urgent before. was three 2005 than by beyears contrary the anissuethat not referendum would –quite threethe the anymore made itquestion a salient all union’sthe through The existence. EUand believedSerbia probably years) three by it delayed only (but issue status Montenegro’s solve not did agreement the that they weren’t. negotiate had as framework to bemore in inin able to they FRY, beentheformerthis fact and werenotlikelyforit latter partners todecide.the two leaving the function However, practically, Belgradethe agreementremainedspecify ambivalentandfailed to union how the state was to bring sides together, two the thedifficulties to because of Precisely incompatible. were interests conservatives inmorepro-union in reformist and Serbia, and andpro-western Montenegro, their function. Serbia and Montenegro were ruled by two diverging sets of leaders, mostly union make the compromise and to incentives little time offered atthe climate the and exchange, The Union State By the of By time intervention,the Solana’s population the was evenly betweendivided andopponentssupporters of Two circumstances augured from the start an uncertain future for the union. First the fact forFirst the union. the future an uncertain start the from circumstances augured Two mutual in longstanding experience no had thus Montenegro and in Serbia elites The Nationalities Papers. 76 , and never hid his hold intention to it as soon as possiblein - fact he agreed tothe Ĉ ukanovi Vol. 33, No 1: 1 – 27, 2005.. ü had won the 2002 presidential elections on the promise that he that promise the on elections presidential 2002 had won the 46 CEU eTD Collection Kosovo issue. Articles 7, 8, 10. the unresolved status of Kosovo: anindependentwas Montenegro was typically refusal Serb likelyfeared the in to encourage tensions the in pondering More country”. as a new membership seek would Montenegro while organizations, international in seats Serbia-Montenegro current the inherit “Serbia that offered leaders Montenegrin the as make again have to ask to be internationally recognized as such” - although in reality Serbia would not have mucheffort to 81 7. and 80 5. 4, Articles model”. Benelux the on based states only states by “governed from a defense council states” both representatives with Milo Milo another” or way “one independence achieve to plans their abandoned Montenegro” anymore, but the “membership of “membership but anymore, EU” the the Montenegro” [wa]sandfor direr, some“Serbia'slooked union nottopreservetask priority state the Serbia- of EU joining the of prospect the as marriage Serbo-Montenegrin the to commitment weaken the to hadstarted nationalism in much Serbian Serbia – asin2000.The with was reservation welcomed Ĉ as “a serious breach of the Belgrade accord of as “a of serious breach of 2003” Belgradeaccord the “committed towhat[they] in2003than the signed” ever Montenegrin and condemned proposal 79 78 77 Infactindependence. representatives individual of European were states for Montenegro’s drive of US who, standingdisapproved consistently their ground, Montenegro” foreign issues, was“convincedpolicy chances that[they] better stand as a state-union Serbia and “Benelux of type union” in2005 underlines, Belgrade on conditionthe agreement it such that permitted for Ashisa referendum. a proposal the EU accession process, for which Vladeta Jankovi for which Vladeta process, EUaccession the to advanced related argument major foolish. One somewhat and unrealistic proposal Montenegrin Anotherargument against proposal the was it that would require much effort “independent as states would once InMontenegro the opposition to Infact Serbia’s president Boris Tadi Articles 1, 7. Article 9. ukanovi Ĉ ukanovi ü proposed to transform the union into a looser alliance of independent and sovereign ü 81 ’s arguments in favor of his proposal that Montenegro and Serbia form a union of independent states of independent union a form Serbia and Montenegro that proposal of his favor in arguments ’s . The in unionistssupported by were their attitude the position of EUandthe the Ĉ ukanovi ü claimed to be ready to “discuss and listento MontenegrinPrime Minister ü condemned it as a “violation of the Constitutional Charter”. Articles 1 Ĉ ukanovi 47 ü 80 ü , advisor to the Serbian prime minister for minister prime Serbian the to , advisor . The Serbian the pro-unionist considered and leaders Montenegrin the reallynever 79 . However, Koštunicaremainedmore 77 . Similarly in 2000, as 78 . This proposal CEU eTD Collection 85 Montenegro”. Articles 1, 6, 10. formal, beall paymentsonly would would stillindependence be made by“Montenegrin Belgrade, while alliance, Serbia aloose into wouldunion their not have real transform autonomyto from partners two the were 84 83 82 federal institutionsfederal vague mostly remained and installed a“central government and parliament Serbian and Montenegrin elites, whofocused primarily on their respective state institutions. Thus blocking the institutions.union’s Infact federal the institutions much very remained by distrusted tacitly by way, quiet a in union state the of dysfunction the prove to tried consistently but Serbian to domination” did notcontribute to make relations with the Montenegrins easy. In reality, “fearing itwould lead as an certainly partner equal Serbia Montenegro treating wasnot that The fact coalition partner. was Kostunica’s which opposition, Montenegrin union bythe state parliament atthe represented officialPodgorica union’s visit working or duringtheState to Also,Montenegro was existence. single once never a paid partners. Koštunica relations two the between good for limited the scope Montenegrofromtowards did Montenegro Serbian the seriously, take not side, who which necessary” be even not probably independence in2006]will “the[on that referendum point -tothe theirpower lose significantly and soon would separatists Montenegrin the that strong belief sincewas much the as athreat, too proposition Benelux Montenegrin the take to seemed unionists Montenegrin nor Serbian Neither On the other side, the EU also directly suggested the Montenegrin ruling leaders that ICG. Montenegro’s Independence Drive. Europe Report N°169. Podgorica/Belgrade/Brussels: 2005, p.5 otherthe On pro-western hand, parties suchas theG17+ opposed Montenegrinproposition, tothe that arguing Article 7. Interview with Miroslav Laj authorities republican contact discourage to to and Union representatives, and State with the bilateral contacts andpromote encourage level] EU to advised [atthe well and twice about this, because in the eyes of the international community and Italy, the union community has given positive international results the of eyes the in because this, about twice and well before [their]is union consigned history, to it perhaps would beto better think 82 . 85 Montenegro was tobuild Montenegro never committed working institutions,federal þ ák. 84 . This attitude was the expression of contempt a common wasthe expression of . This attitude 48 83 . CEU eTD Collection 91 republics the in the intervention of Solana - and the mandate of federal deputies was prolonged until the next parliamentary elections 90 of no-confidence vote failed to the take place forHowever alack of support amongCharter. federalthe deputies.Articles 11,12. Constitutional the breached thus and elections the called having not for president union’s 89 88 Vol.4: 79 – 106, 2004. alternation governing at appointments top the federal functions of principle the of violation the from rules, the broke frequently but Charter, the respecting federal and the impotence. institutions their complete federal assembly to eitherfederal assembly punish to Montenegrins the 87 86 underlined itthat was “dysfunctional as framework” a negotiating as decisions requiredthe was notattained. quorum of nearcollapse The in union the 2005 evendeputiesnot would upatthefederal show assembly,take impossible rendering thereby to establishedbefore 2004 not constitutional to the court December2002, was draggedto in summer 2002) (expected the automatically blocked from by never-ending debates, negotiationsthe which overthe union’s Charter adoption almost was level federal the at work the All sides. both on behavior political the much morethan cooperation characterized negotiations protracted elites. Hence forexploit the to federalthe institutions surely provide notdid compromise, incentive to afirm butrather ground which neithersides of two the would overfinding think much acompromise. Theweaknessof installed it in any annihilated for federation dialogue, the rather asituation other opening on the unmovableindependence commitment to on onethe side, attachment equallystrong the and to lacking any mercyreal andauthority republicthe atthe governments” of The ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, supposed to be of different republics, were both Serbs. both were republics, different beof to supposed Affairs, Foreign and of Defense ministers The Eventually, and Belgrade Podgorica endorsed theconstitutional amendments proposed by EU the – again thanks to The SPS, the SRS and the Montenegrin opposition parties attempted to engage a vote of no-confidence on the Branko Lukova Branko Dragan Duri Dragan ICG. Report N°169. In itsuch isa context, little surprising thatnone of sidethe much bothered about ü . Montenegro’s Prospects For European Integration: On a Twin Track. a Twin On Integration: European For Prospects Montenegro’s . ü , former ambassador of Serbia-Montenegro to Italy, quoted in article 2. article in quoted Italy, to of Serbia-Montenegro ambassador former , 87 . Apart from . Apart frequently pro-Serbia the deputies, Montenegrin the 49 89 or find a solution 91 to the refusal of to refusalMontenegrins of the 88 90 , as the incapacity of the of incapacity the as , showed the weakness of South-EastEurope Reviews. 86 . The strong and CEU eTD Collection and the government to the negotiation table and find an acceptable compromise to both both sides on to compromise acceptable negotiationto the table andfindan and government the send Laj High Miroslav representative independence Montenegro’s to resistance call it to government were the referendum direct talks with the government altogether haveengageit referendumin the refused about infact to - (backed by refused to talks Serbia) engage in thelatter thereferendum adebate over Montenegrin opposition 2005 to procedures, the first approached government Montenegrin deadlocks. When the create capacity to referendumthe with crucial the EU support. consequences forMontenegro’s future aspirations forEuropean integration”. ICG. Report N°169., p.10 97 at all. ICG. Briefing N°42. by and boycotting pro-unionistsitthe hoped bring the to turnoutunder thus 50% and actually impede the referendum 96 its consultation. Article 1. obligation” considering and Podgorica’s initiatives ‘unnecessarily hasty’ andmostly, moves unilateral without made 95 94 93 13. 1, Article Montenegro. in place taking elections the without passed deadline the and agreement, 2003 by the scheduled elections population to go to the polls to vote foran unpopularinstitution the Montenegrin government simply ignored the institutions scored ratherfederal low onHowever, confidence place. take to among Montenegrins, had elections and as it fearedparliamentary itcould– direct 2005 –in not motivateyears two after the but assemblies, 92 Ĉ “present not Koštunica, engagerather to but adialogue to wasnot aim Montenegrins’ real to hold the parliamentary elections scheduled bytheBelgradeAgreement 2005 for tried to reach an agreement with Belgrade prior toorganizing areferendum” reach with Belgradeprior an agreementtried to Serbia to agree on the Benelux never theMontenegrinexpected referendum government issue. the probably proposal or Most model, but made the offer only to have the “excuse that it has It issued It a “non-paper” threatening the mini-state that its independence would “severely have negative beacknowledged, to the referendum for 50% to reach needed threshold the stated referendum on law existing The It insisted Id. p.3 on IWPR. Montenegrothe Launches New Divorce Bid. Balkan Crisisfact Report No 544. Podgorica: 2005, p.1 that according to the union’s national the from proportionately and indirectly elected were deputies Union’s the agreement, the to Charter, According the referendum was only “a possibility, not an ukanovi The issue, referendum also sides’ which highlylitigious, proved underlined thetwo ü , as the problematic element in element problematic equation” , asthe the þ ák as a mediator with bringingák asamediator of task the theopposition 97 . Eventually to unblock the situation, the EU had to had EU the situation, the unblock to Eventually . 96 95 -surely in itssupported standby EU’sown the . Instead of dialogue it threatened to boycott the boycott to threatened it dialogue of Instead . 50 94 and give an excuse to Podgorica to hold 92 , the Benelux the , 93 . The . CEU eTD Collection opposition whichexists Montenegroin is unparalleled anywhere in Europe”.Article 15. concerned". Article 14. At this time Laj time this At 14. Article concerned". is procedures] referendum the [on consensus apossible as far as optimist an longer “no is he that claim to January. However the opposition started to call again for acoalition government in February opposition2006, whichto ledabandon Laj these requirements and was thus content withthe smoothevolution of thenegotiations in extremist, and less ready to find a compromise”. Interview with Laj with Interview compromise”. a find to ready less and extremist, realistic, while its coalitionpartner Krivokapi the opposition. After much negotiating over the most crucial issue in the debates – the threshold crucial issue inthe negotiatingmuch debates most over the After opposition. the strengthened tensions. On the other side, the ruling elites also displayed attitudes which infuriated lessor intrusion open Serbia inof debates,primarilythe populationover the vote,eligible also to our own international renounce would we dispositions”. meant have would Similarly, it because the pro-independence impossible were which blocsteps was divided, other of “ number and invalid, laws the proposing were parties] pro-union different other unacceptable [the rest propositions.the while They wanted us to remove,compromise, abolishcompletely towards work to the legal system,able most to declare alland process to meet for the Montenegrin government (and for this reason rejected by by Laj this reason rejected (andfor meetfor government Montenegrin the to Laj unionbloc was divided. According to Laj elections, or the sacking of key99 figures in thevote the forunionor toparticipate not in the referendum.policeto either chosen have would many EU, by whomthe be acknowledged not - would it referendum suspected the thus and - procedures of being involvedmajority of Montenegrinthe population –including minorities –wasin pro-European. In case elections. the referendum But thethe pro- other meetings. The oppositionhand,had agreed to the referendum only to the extent that it would be monitored by the the EU. On EU’s support of the referendum was also crucial for the government as unlike in Serbia the government the with talks direct have to refused constantly opposition the crucial.All the time however, the negotiations remained conditioned on Laj and the impossibilities of the situation in which he was sent. His role in Montenegro insee also region the personally its to sensitive and leaders,and ableto possibilities the therefore 2006 was 98 Miroslav Laj AlbaniaMacedonia.Hence FRY, and the to republic ambassador of Belgrade Slovakia’s as in yearsfive officefor he forin Kukan, took Balkans Eduard 2001 the UN Specialenvoy which of appointedFirst asthehe Specialassistant sincethe Balkans, 1998. wascommitted to Laj appointment of The Miroslav entiresupervise process. the andto procedures, referendum the Forexample it requested the formationof a coalitiongovernment in order to stay powerin until new parliamentary All the time the talks were held separately, Laj separately, held were talks the time the All þ þ ák’s presence the opposition kept setting conditions to the negotiations, in effect impossible negotiations,the presence toineffecták’s opposition the conditions kept setting ák was not accidental. A Slovak diplomat, Laj diplomat, A Slovak accidental.not ák was þ ák’s experience made him not only knowledgeable and adapted tothe knowledgeableák’s experience madehimnot only and situation, but adapted þ ák, Bulatovi þ ák deplored that "the degree of distrust between the government and government the between distrust of degree "the that deplored ák ü [speaker of the government and leaderof the SDP] was more þ ák meeting the ruling leaders and the opposition in separate in opposition the and leaders ruling the meeting ák ü –leader of the SNP – was “the most responsible towards the 51 þ ák has an extensive experience of of the experience extensive has an ák þ ák. Laj ák. þ ák eventually managed to bring the bring to managed eventually ák 98 . In addition even in even addition In . þ ák) þ Ĉ ák’s mediation as ukanovi 99 , andthemore ü was more þ ák CEU eTD Collection further decisions affecting union. the sole responsible for the impossibleeffectinforaccept, otherside the look likecrisis making to onlygoal the of the latter the and demonstrate that the state union was dysfunctional sides. two between the tensions to justify union wouldbelonger no takenasasignal state the exists” that “as far that nevertheless 51%percent asthey are concerned of blocclaimed pro-independence the members Montenegrin leading some campaign, referendum the during and signal, a as perceived very clear onresult that. short of 55% would But mean failure theSerbsforces. For this noissueandbecause “grey any presented pro-independence zone” for and a strengtheningthe pro-independence of thecalled “grey zone”50% and between which 54.9%, nurtured tensions between again pro-union union, and the EU was also Montenegrins, any result above 50% was 103 point breaking the really was 55% So them. for easy very be would pro-independencebloc]previous the be [for would to referenda“56%while 53% unachievable because according that assured 55% threshold the credibility: insure referendum’s the possible to high makewouldgivebelegitimacyas theand turnout process the sure as inmind, to to to 102 sign that the EU was backing the union as it gave a lead to the pro-unionist bloc. ICG. Briefing N°42, Morrison. 101 the population campaign, of eligible referendum the voters. in resources state of use the involved issues confrontational Other electorate. entire ofthe majority the requiring law a new demanded opposition the contrast By referendum. the determines majority not afford to lose any. The Montenegrin government100 wished to keep the current law on referendum so that a simple agreea 55%threshold sides on to two bring the be recognized to outcome referendum’s for the required Morrison p.208. Morrison Interview with Laj The threshold was set to 55%, with a50% turnout of the voters at the least. This howeverwas perceived as a clear bloccould pro-independence the and crucial was vote every support, pro-independence ofthe lead tight the Given Similarly as the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, the elites made demands or offered plans in offered plans or made demands elites the inCzechoslovakia, Slovaks asthe Similarly þ ák. 52 101 . Laj þ ák came up with this limit with two aims 100 - eventually Laj -eventually 103 . This effectively heightened effectively This . 102 ”. This in effect left a so- þ ák had managedto ák CEU eTD Collection competition between its politicians, manyof from support whom to resorting followers of stagnation dominated” stagnation and deadlock ground “on the all that after and so remarkable not pacewas infact the admit that months liberalization - and in fact the ICG could be pleased by a “remarkable” pace of reforms in the first anddemocratization economic to its commitment claiming positions power DOS reached circumscribedinof After thedevelopment Serbian the hiseconomy. dethronement 2000,the then markets international to closure of level high the and interference political Corruption, anditsits on interest wastoprotect agricultureeconomy oriented industries. was andproduction, Serbian The economy. of type communist a and rule semi-authoritarian his install to managed 106 105 planning experts. Duri 104 unionthe and eventually itscontributed demise.to differentto amajorpoliticalprimaryconstituted if choices and Itnot – trajectories. to - obstacle indisproportion: relative terms Serbia wasfar behind This Montenegro. difference was partly due tothetwoequally member in nor sensefrom await republics onewould the geographical the apply not label did this however Herzegovina, Bosnia after state and successor second poorest terms in imbalance socio-economic great equally Montenegro both territorially and matcheddemographically. byan This disproportion was a marriage of equals in terms of size and demography: Serbia isfifteen times bigger than Historically Socio-economic differences ICG. Europe ReportN°154, p.16 Some privatization had takenplace, prices were liberalized and inflation muzzled. Brusis p.111 Montenegro accounted for2-3 percentage ofpoints was SFRYand referred to as a“statistical error” by Yugoslav After the dissolution of SFRY Miloševi being was farfrom union Montenegro Serbia and thestate of inCzechoslovakia, as Similarly 105 . In middle-term however the reality butand different however middle-term ICGcould quite the not . In reality the was ü p.94 106 . After Miloševi ü ’s fall the DOS started to crumble under the ü remained in power in the successor FRY and 53 104 . Serbia and Montenegro as a state was the CEU eTD Collection 110 fund. Federal the to contribute to even refused and 109 yoke anymore. Serbian the bare not could it liberalism, western towards eyed international financialcrucial organizations. with contacts Duri establishing from FRY prevented and years several for maintained were sanctions The established by the UN Security Council against Serbia in 1992, althoughwithout holding any criminal responsibility. as the other memberof FRY it had evenborne with no rebellionthen the side-effects of the “outer-wall” of sanctions 108 107 Miloševi barriers were tighter between the two republics than with foreign states foreign with republics thethan between two weretighter barriers within FRY,andthe say becameit internal ajokebusinessmen actually among to customs that economies separate also but development, economic of and types rates different had republics dynamic andhopeful andfared by much 2002, Montenegro itsthan better big The brother. two itwas However for reforms. been used not actually had aid international the of and much remainedimpoverished, small the state perfect: not was obviously picture economic Montenegrin toSerbia.reached incontrast The peaks investment foreign while regularly decreased Serbia from that helpediteconomicrepublic enjoyed heavyinternational support its gain defacto autonomy tourism basedand on services economy open completely and the privatization process slow with crucial enterprises still owned by the state. policy,“stagflation” dampened household the confidence,Serbian unemploymentremained high maintainedhappen. aprotectionist didnot amarketeconomy Serbia towards transition awaited economy” around torestructuringthe got actually democratic “never forces ICG. Report N°154, p.1 Ithaditsowncurrency DeutschMark(the in1999, the Euro 2001),in took overcustoms Serbian atthe borders As long as Miloševi Id. p.8 By contrast Montenegro had taken quite a different path had adifferent taken path since andhad Montenegro quite the midnineties By a contrast ü who by funding them indictments.criminal could As whobyfundingthem avoid aconsequence the 109 . Steady developing tourism also profited the country’s economy, unemployment ü controlled the federation with his party, Montenegro could be subdued at all levels. In fact ü p.82. But as soon as Montenegro brokewith the autocratic leader and 54 108 . From 1997break,the junior the 110 . 107 and the much CEU eTD Collection matched by federala quasiinexistent financial unionsystem. Thestate on relied fundingthe by was autonomy economic Montenegro’s andmarket customs. its own managed itscurrency, own retained Montenegro latter the to According Belgradeagreement. the forsigning his conditions soon as possible, and the preservation of Montenegro’s economic autonomy ranked top among 111 union. speaking the of theend of union-practically meant segmentation the recognition of the which EU, the integrate to process a “twin-track” about totalk started EU the member states, separation. started to talk about evenSerbia’s presidentthat institutions point federalthe financial tothe Second, buildingon two related levels. First, Montenegro consistently and successfully blocked theon functioning of the markets. Inreality their andresistance harmonization happened, never economic the developed previous and harmonize partners weretoactually the how two never agreement cleared the situation. However on the economic a economic as maintainedtemporary autonomy it Montenegro’s European standards, and the on discrepanciesharmonization the through years two within one a single into harmonized be would of markets theunion’sthat two stated thus anyway. Belgradeagreement The economic autonomy the two backthen European the offices dominate not did belief this but economies two the harmonize” to impossible “objectively was it in fact – be economies,andnot overnight speaking practically implemented divergent this could separate Due to the republics’ two in theBelgrade wasenshrined agreement. economy,and this objective The Union State Interview with Laj From From start very the a joint they develop was that Montenegro and for Serbia accession EU for The prerequisite þ ák. Ĉ ukanovi ü claimed the referendum independence the claimed becalledas referendum on would 111 . Montenegro consistently refused to give up its up give to refused consistently Montenegro . 55 CEU eTD Collection actually supported by convincing elements. The engagement of actually supported by engagementnegotiationsof convincing elements.The on a Stabilization evenworking were not provide havingfor sideof other institutions to budgetthat resented federal upto94% the Serbia both states. Montenegro only reluctantly andbarely bailed outfor the federal budget while on the economictwo units. Regulardisputes over funding the opposed generalbudget of elites the the in harmonize thecooperation neededlimited from the to divided start the environment economic ill of for future union.The the rather the obviously quite augured constituency which either, of of obligationsthe definedinternal regarding harmonization” economic non-fulfillment the for side other the blamed constantly states member two the of representatives in the which atmosphere in held “were they an unpleasant that stated have accession and in participants meetingspreliminary for thepreparation of negotiations for theunion’s EU the EU and NATO. Serbia too, blameditsits integrate partnership economic development down Serbiabut chancesalso to with slowed Montenegro for the union’sthe that believed it because resisted Montenegro system. economic the of for Harmonization Plan incapacity to enterAction the on Law the adopt to theMontenegro and Serbia for EU, months six took it however years, i.e.union on Serbia. level institutions” federal and between Serbian “end duplication the to by Serbia over were taken institutions, and 115 114 113 112 account” republicsthe anddidhave its not own of source funding – it “d[id] even not haveits bank own Duri ICG. Report N°169, p.4 ICG. Report N° 129. ICG. Report N°154, p.1 The Belgrade agreement planned the harmonization of the two national markets within within two markets national two the of harmonization the planned agreement The Belgrade ü p.83. 112 . Federal financial institutions in functionedSerbia in as effect Serbianthe 113 . Not only had the union no common market but itbut nomarketno. Notonlyhad financial theunion hadcommon common 114 , and accused of financingits Montenegro future independence onthe 56 115 . These claims were . These CEU eTD Collection separate negotiations on a SAA with Serbia and Montenegro. The twin-track idea wasaccepted Thetwin-track Montenegro. and Serbia with onaSAA negotiations separate possible. In September EUengaged“twin-track” processwhich 2004,the it a to launch allowed failure” would certainlybe almost in shape” worse economy Serbia“its with harmonized hadMontenegro later that The noted do. ICGitself to consentready in toadjust not to Serbian –andit this economic tothe order was pace down slow an for latter the have meant would harmonization expected the aboost: than an burden economic more of for represented which Serbia Montenegro, morethe dynamic thatbelow of remained far their positions, power political instability well andby as the forces democratic by Serbian the whichremainedparliament, primarily preserving concerned were delayed by anti-western mostly, benoticed. crucial However economicreforms some trends could positive and reforms partiesin union the well. G17+ as The which still controlled over two thirds of the seats in the http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/87/8707.htm. Last accessed April 2009. 121 120 119 Briefing N°39. Belgrade/Brussels: 2005,p.6 118 117 116 admitted” [Montenegro] been in“had country Montenegro then latter PfPawaited with convincedthat 2004. the was September independent cooperationat most was then symbolical,at for this and reason engageNATO refused themuchto the time of theSerbia’s Hague.But The cooperation with on fordepended NATOaccession Peace (PfP) NATO summit, it forandin EUintegration, Agreement (SAA) the Association prospect for and onaPartnership surely would have been Id. House of Commons - Committee on Foreign Affairs. Third Report: Montenegro. February 2005. Available at Available 2005. February Montenegro. Report: Third Affairs. Foreign on Committee - Commons of House Id. ICG. Report N°169, p.7 Especially the vacancy of the presidency for almost two years between 2002 and 2004. ICG. ReportEurope Wheels. N°154, its Spinning p.8 Serbia: ICG. Agriculture and care Health ofFinance, 2005. in Ministries the political controlled It turned organization governmental non democratic and pro-western former A Article 16. This situation led the EU to “recognize that this kind of Solana state was a kind of 121 116 and that the integration of Serbia and Montenegro as a union was practically all but . Second, Serbia’s thin economic development after Miloševi after development economic thin Serbia’s Second, . 117 which controlled key economic positions 120 . 57 119 . In . In general the Serbianeconomy ü ’s fall remained fragile remained fall ’s 118 engaged afew CEU eTD Collection 125 124 3, 17. Articles regimes”. economic 123 122 constituency its own, of union state the could practically notspeaking exist. federal With noeconomic Montenegro. and Serbia between deepersegmentation to the with each of the union’s members and abandoning the harmonization project, the EU contributed union state negotiating in processes specific legitimacy general. By the engaging of recognizing of the character ill-adapted the level, and economic republics atthe between two the discrepancy the more only underlined accession WTO Montenegrin the candidacy, WTO Serbia’s of demand immediately Montenegro’s accepted WTOalmost The (WTO). Organization World Trade to the foraccession as the process well atwin-track 2004for inlate leaders called peace, Montenegrin multiethnic andmulti-confessional of andstability governmental record hadSerbia it aproven started to claim for anextension approachthe of organizations.other unliketo Arguing that which – emboldened Montenegro Serbiaand Montenegro between fundamental the discrepancies other way. However this twin-track process - which really was an acknowledgement by the EU of it” unblock impossible no to blockage way was it was and there unblock theprocess, by both sides and by especially Serbsbecausethe they “wanted tomove ahead,they wanted to have a dual process of negotiations seriously to and astate take to impossible with “it[wa]s because survive to chances common state's different parts of the state” and the state independent seriously damaged was viableasan Montenegro perception the that Itstrengthened state. common the for implications andstrategic political had WTOthe serious stilldue until that to reforms earliest,needtobe 2008 atthe carried out” Interview with Laj Article 3 own their have that territories customs rather countries, be to have not do WTO ofthe “members that argued It Interview with Laj The EU decision to engage a twin-track process, and later on Montenegro’s accession to accession Montenegro’s on andlater process, engage atwin-track to The EUdecision 123 while ontheothersidebecome“definitely not Serbia itreckoned could amember þ þ ák. ák. 58 125 . With the parallel refusal 124 . 122 in any CEU eTD Collection Press, 1993. London: Co.,2002. Hurst and Lenard Cohen. BrokenBonds: The Disintegrationof Yugoslavia. Boulder: Westview 126 independence waspresented aslikely destabilize – Balkans the Montenegro’s to because reasons: a numberof crucialfor union was perceived the of Thestaying survival clubs totheir together. tothese accession states’ two the conditioned EU the reforms, political and economic engage international integration inHoping Union’s prospectof the key that inenshrined charter. State the organizationstime) behindtheunion was nottheitself union but integration, prospect of the European the (EU, same at the threat (and motivation The real after. years three held be a referendum that condition OSCE, CouncilThe Belgrade of Europe) agreement would external threat could hasten have stimulated Serbiahad and Montenegro to tighten their relation. been the an create likely to not was climate the adopted anddemocracy, rights of Human in West) the least two states only (at ideology thenew of development by the War characterized era in post-Cold the Additionally, to under the common history could have pressure unifying provided it– but grounds wasalready weak by then. of “Yugoslav” in Union’sthe namein 2003 was a relief for many, still existence the of such a the EU, and giveto uptheir become identity ethnic to ‘Yugoslavs’” on the wereready the Serbs as “only “Serbianism” version of correct apolitically was rather but identity divided them as much itas them.related “Yugoslavism” Historically was neveraprevalent identity of peoplesof two the could facilitatehave to beenexpected the union, butinfact it even by loyalty Serbiacompensated an overarching as a andto Montenegrounion. proximity The ‘The Prize of European integration’ Further Factors Jasna Dragovi As mentioned, Serbia and Montenegro agreed on agreed As mentioned,on by andMontenegro a peaceful Serbia in divorce 2001. referendum not were elites the between compromise of a tradition lack of and instability The political ü -Soso. Saviours of the Nation?: Serbia’s intellectual Oppositionand the Revival of Nationalism. 59 126 . Although the abandonment of the term the of abandonment the Although . CEU eTD Collection of favoring the union played in reality rather counter-effectively. Much of the Serbian population Serbian the of Much counter-effectively. rather in reality played union the favoring of instead member states, two the between disproportion immense counterbalance the to established (togeteconomicallyindependence viable)onSerbia’sbudget moratoriumfor end three-year the call to to its andwasindependence financing actually junior republicasit becomingobvious thatthewas government Montenegrin only waiting the grew against resentment InSerbia, it. needed badly it aid atatime international to obtain latter union the thewas accusedtohave blockadesprimarily byMontenegro, agreedto constant either EU” to the train be aslower would separation EUinformed the unviable. Inaddition, that“inaway inseveral Montenegrins the occasions not asmall inone, and any case an as existence unrecognized inan state was Europe in fact truly 1997 break Montenegro since especially the that be hampered.Given seriously would smallrepublic tothe assistance has relied heavily andinternational state, independent recognizenot it the independencegain would Montenegro to on international financial assistance, this threat was 24 127 processes negotiation SAA andother of opening the in the promised EU-namely EU the the andMontenegro of Serbia accession the towards steps crucial of engagement the favor would union the of respect and EU the with issue. itsthe aim In preserve union, EUthe to cooperation the developed adualstrategy. Good over divided were themselves Montenegrins the because was deemedunviable, or Montenegro KosovoAlbaniansindependenceencourage Bosnian Serbs or toseek –,because independent an 129 128 Julie Kim. Serbia and Montenegro Union: Background and Pending Dissolution. CRS Report for Congress, may Congress, for Report CRS Dissolution. Pending and th Background Union: Montenegro and Serbia Kim. Julie Van Meurs p.66 ICG. Balkans Report N° 129, p.6,8 2006, Van Meurs p.65 . After adoption the of Belgradethe with agreement, unionthe dragging along and the 127 . On the other hand, the EU threatened that were that threatened EU the hand, other the On . 128 60 , but also that tooloose a federation would notdo 129 . In such a context, the parity the context, a such In . CEU eTD Collection debate over Montenegro’s independence raised the issue of issuethe and their independence of workers’ property raised overdebate Montenegro’s hadSerbia andSerbsinMontenegroor owned properties in relatives republic. other The the to study, while Serbs toSerbiaYoung traveled frequently half Montenegrins electorate. represented Montenegro’s of traveled to Montenegro 000 members aninsignificant million bigbut – which was percentage of ten the Serbia to enjoy the sea resorts. Many Montenegrins in no minority held a clear majority a clear held minority no results. referendum influence the to circumstance duringexploit were sideprocedures, madeespecially thethe to Serbian whichattempts on between the tensions of heightening the twoto contributed sides.communities two the of interminglement the violence, In factfor factor a it represent not fueleddid it eventually Although penetration. ethnic a whole inter-republican of level issue during the by high was characterized a and Montenegro Serbia in republics, concentrated their respective debates over the referendumdiverging paths. Moreover, unlike in Czechoslovakia where Czechs and Slovaks were the one hand and Miloševi Albanians (45,163), 3.97% ethnic Muslims (24,625), 1.1% Croats (6,811), and 6.71% others. Bieber2002. inhabitants, 43.16% of which Montenegrins (267,669), 32% Serbs (198,414), 7.77%Bosniaks (48,184), 5.03% 130 couldprevent major noteventually clashes formerly between close allies suchas fact -even this like inCzechoslovakia However – inhabitants. million ten exceeded and barely The lackof geographical concentration rights and the same power in the union. understandcould weigh as and enjoy same how Montenegrothe Serbia indidnot factequally The Montenegrins represented about 43% of the population. Montenegro’s total population numbered to 620,145 to numbered population total Montenegro’s population. of the 43% about represented Montenegrins The At timethe of hosted over Union,the 30%individuals Montenegro identifying Serbsand as Like in Czechoslovakia, the total population of Serbia and Montenegro was relatively small was relatively andMontenegro of Serbia total population the in Like Czechoslovakia, ü and Bulatovi 130 . In Serbia the Montenegrin minority was strong of over 260 over of strong was minority Montenegrin the Serbia In . ü on the other, as diverging interests led them on 61 Ĉ ukanovi ü on CEU eTD Collection 134 133 132 131 before theEUin to vote right 2005 Montenegrins’ June Serbia’s Koštunicapromoted diligently force represent, they could Conscious of the outcome referendum the influence drastically could they voted if they in Montenegro: in electorate total a way the of half almost represented in Serbia electorate thatMontenegrin The Montenegro. independent could haveMontenegrin was government giving all itsigns thatwould preservethe in Serbs’ rights an servedSerbia] willloose all privilegesthe which profiting” arenow [they] Serbia in Montenegrins and[the border wall the be will there independent aon becomes Montenegro and the Montenegrinthem ‘incentives’ supportactually proper to the the by “the union stating that regularly moment independence Montenegro’s oppose to likely more be to minority Montenegrin opposition’s the expected leaders Serbian the inSerbia, and the union favored Montenegro in Serbs alike. andunionists for separatists population acrucial target represented they sametime the aims. within aunion separately,or with cordially or tensions –their entire situation could change.At republics howmovement. wouldfreedom thepursuetheirexistence Depending two– on of their of and benefited, they healthcare and system educational free the of rights, citizenship forward any demands for certain minority and toassimilation” minority for areexposed certain forwardrights anydemands put to unable “are they union Serbo-Montenegrin the within because status” minority gain in Vojvodina Montenegrins inparticular, independence the supported as“the onlyway [they] can claimed that only “Belgrade the but Diaspora” waspro-unionist,in that partsof other Serbia, and living wereinfactautomaticallyMontenegrins pro-union. In Serbia, those Belgrade outside clearexpatriated it that was not Moreover, conflict. hardening ethnic the and tensions up ethnic Article 18. ICG. Report N°169, p.13 Interview with Laj independence. Montenegro’s of case in to be subject would rights their change the of Because þ ák 62 133 - and he was then accused of stirring 132 , while on the other side the 131 . Belgrade gave 134 . Eventually, . CEU eTD Collection was quite different, for two reasons. for two different, was quite the situation however Montenegro Serbia and In consequences. nodirect had Slovak relations Czech- the governing arrangement in theconstitutional involved not fact they that were the Slovakia were not strong enough to represent in autonomy for challenges claim minority’s to theHungarian state’s the territorialespecially and minorities’ the integrity, Czechoslovakia and so York/Washington/Budapest: Freedom House,2007, p.606 , Morrison p.216-217 135 facilitated by the external favored situationthe negotiationsas limited involved a number of moreoverparticipants, intervention undoubtedly segments two only concerned arrangement Serbo-Montenegrin the Czechoslovakia, of Miroslav Laj issue minority The breakup.violent encourageit a political it for exploited ends,didnot was although Czechoslovakia. However, in existed that population the of concentration lacked the geographical Serbia andMontenegro this wasexploitedin bythe As camp Serbia. unionist thissection in the situation underlines, and within eachother, groups the unclear whichfurthercreated divided situations Montenegro the population outside of Montenegrin in vote the dispersion them Hence referendum. the to and get expatriated Montenegrins'raise awareness the to worldmembers around the traveled invote world to support of unionthe in referendum the the around Diaspora the Montenegrin tomotivate borders Serbia’s inacross and on a campaign Venicethe focused Koštunica’s commission andtheSerb demand, refused theirunionists efforts Goehring, Jeannette (ed.). Nations in Transit. Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia. New Eurasia. to Europe Central from Democratization Transit. in Nations (ed.). Jeannette Goehring, This issue leads to the issue of minorities in Serbia and Montenegro. The fact that, like in likethat, fact The andMontenegro. in minorities Serbia tothe issue issueof leads This 63 135 þ ák. However, it also had downfalls. In . In the opposite camp as well, leading CEU eTD Collection state union of Serbia and Montenegro, compared to 5% of Montenegrins and 60% of Serbs. 60% and ofMontenegrins 5% to compared Montenegro, and of Serbia union state 139 inKosovo. as intense as not was tension the However increased. violence when remained unresolved during union’sthe existence, and also posed serious issues to Belgrade -especially 2004 in 138 its capacity to motivate minorities in the pro-independence bloc. ICG. Briefing N°42, p.4, inMorrison. preparation for several months already and which137 could obviously havenationalist waited Serbia. Article 19.a few more months were it not Montenegrinto the independence would and have implied Podgorica that they would be cut off around from – it and even vulnerablemore relied in community the of their center political economic, cultural, the preservation: 136 by advanced- issue wasregularly The Kosovo union institutions. state recognize the refused to an issuelikely Kosovo support the union wasnot unresolved Albanians– theto Kosovo However affair. domestic Serbian, strictly a was it that ground the on arrangement Montenegrin fairstrategies less pro-independence soughttoattract minority coalition crucial the supportof usingmoreparties, or sovereignty, DPS-led to the While right Montenegrins’ the parties. defending pro-independence leadingthe in already more parties in 2001,andeven run-up the 2006 by the referendum to the by solicited intensely were they reason this For issue. status the over competition the of outcome determine in to the thepower they factinfluence detained inMontenegro: politics capacity to and minorities hadareal 30% Montenegrins 40%, over slightly over time Serbsrepresented Serbia nationalist conservative, a with union the to opposed as - state defendedas minorities theirindependence: better ina rights andmulti-ethnic were democratic minorities (mostly Muslims/Bosniaks and Albanians).Albanians and Bosniaks mostly supported regularly presented serious challenges to Belgrade to challenges serious presented regularly independenceluringfor it but conflict, after 1999 the into aUNProtectorate transformed hadprovinces, been of which suspended one (Kosovo) from ineffect Serbianthe directrule and They They numbered to approximately (2002 estimate)two million whichover was – 16%of total population the of the situation The autonomy. increased for voiced minority Hungarian the region, autonomous other the Vojvodina, In Quite ‘timely’ the parliament scheduled forearly May 2006 a debate on anew law on National Minorities – alaw On the other hand, Sandzak Bosniaks in Serbia for example supported the union, for reasons of group First, it isit note First, onequarter remarkablethat enough to of Montenegrin the are population Second, while Montenegro was a unitary state, Serbia was composed of autonomous Serbiaof two was state, was aunitary composed whileMontenegro Second, 137 . 64 138 . Kosovo was excluded from the Serbo- 136 . Given that in the union’s 139 CEU eTD Collection union to function elites. thegenuine union to desireof the without resentment. The disproportion between Serbia and Montenegro was simply too important for the of matter became Montenegro a of overrepresentation the and positions, sides intheir respective two the strengthen to contributed only Montenegro and Serbia between disproportion immense the acontext, Insuch them. could reunite threat noexternal when a time at especially attitudes, experience inmutual among didnotexchange elites providedevelop to cooperative climate the Combinedlack union,loyalty the an distrust. absence the of an of overarching to the to mutual nourished only in republics respective concentrated their werenot Serb populations and Montenegrin the that fact the and minorities significant of presence the in reality segments, two only involved agreement the Although concern. last their became union the of mechanisms respecting power-sharing the that point tothe positions forces respective intheir Serbian and they pro-Montenegrin pro- in Instead, the reinforced was present Serbia and Montenegro. by advocated Lijphart factors nonereally favorable of the analysis that from short this appears couldthat have given elitesthe and incentives cooperate to make function. union the Infactit As ashort conclusion revision and delay referendum.the for union’s the demands Montenegrin the tooppose - asakey astheEU argument aswell Serbia Hence, while Lijphart’s four conditions were present, the climate lacked elements all climate the the werepresent, four conditions while Lijphart’s Hence, 65 CEU eTD Collection Milo issue, both and political instrumentalized For for status the purposes. successfully which elites and in flexible.Yetthepolitical both was climate by increasingly states impregnated ethnicity divided along ethniclines,andtheirpositions futureof wereuncertain onthe common the state violently of wasseverely none or in andearlysocieties these nineties late 2000’, Montenegro the ethnic,linguistic proximity.Moreover inCzechoslovakia in eighties late the andin andSerbia der Berghe would “mildly characterized call byahigh ethnic groups”, divided degree of cultural, avoid.failed to instability and the final states,collapse of which two the Lijphart’s power-sharingmechanisms beginning,the unfavorable the conditions providedfor thecontinued the ground political to maintain relations.elites for incentives little offered environment the Withoutshown has thesis this as However autonomy. the commitment of the leaders in amutual right, proportional government, andadministration alarge veto representation public to sustain the common state from opposingthe find sidesto adurable solution to their coexistencein acoalition asinglestate: of last resort. Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro had all of Lijphart’s four conditions for mosthe and dreadedoutcome asthesolution perceives states’ the what break-ups -Lijphart’s two by contradicted is somewhat conflict, the regulate to responsibility onthe take who elites of the cooperation peaceful and tothe leads eventually state a plural the strength of constitute divisions together. Lijphart’s recognition initial conviction the that and ofethnic institutionalization sets of entities maintain thetwo failed to conflict inter-community the regulate to Czechoslovakia CONCLUSION Ĉ ukanovi Both the Czech and Slovak, and the Serb and Montenegrin populations were what Van what were populations Montenegrin and Serb the and Slovak, and Czech the Both andinThe in Montenegro, and ofpower-sharing Serbia principles application ü inMontenegroand VladimirMe 66 þ iarin independenceSlovakia simply was the CEU eTD Collection fall of fall of Miloševi the after Montenegro, and Serbia In independence. for call outright an into transformed gradually gain As support. for situation protectionthe evolved, theargument nation of Slovakthe and legitimacy their build to which on element solid a elites the for be to proved identity Slovak which tohold toattract the population, and the ethnic question and particularly the defense of the leftby fall the of communism in 1989 providedlittle groundfor theleaders new of parties on vacancy political the In Czechoslovakia independence. versus –theunion objectives exclusive to remainin positionspower pushedthe elites toradicalize their positionsmutually around most effective argumentfor them to remain in power. As aconsequence the political competition uncommitted to the common states as they were – to dig the inter-republican gap. In both cases, both In gap. inter-republican the dig to – were they as states common the to uncommitted andinterests exploited by – diverging objectives, elites the between republics underlined different in republican borders either country exist. could across noparty cutting and question the have)on had aposition to had (and political parties all issue practically thestatus in political debates, streamed all 2006 Serbia andMontenegro, competed for high stakes in future.the Between 1989 and 1992in Czechoslovakia, and 2002and communityinter- exacerbated actually constitution the re-design to need the and setup institutional tensions,the intends, asdeepened Lijphart’s theory pacify states plural the to of instead serving both cases,unions. In the side,other Czech the Republic andSerbia insistedonpreserving the territorial integrity the of segmentationMontenegro and– called theforand –Slovakia republics secessionist two the statehood, their independent of experiences respective antagonism righttheir to toReferring success. self-determination for elements the all provided community, international western the by between to justify their elites their independence, Theissue position. which had of Montenegro’s supported been considerably demands, while as on thethey In this context economic issues only strengthened the segmentation for the discrepancies ü the Montenegrin ruling elites needed to find new supporting arguments toretain arguments newfind supporting neededto elites ruling theMontenegrin 67 CEU eTD Collection Montenegro’s right to self-determinationMontenegro’s right to insisted integrity. union’s on the and territorial The recognize to refused consistently Union Serbia in State –, agreement) the asatacit beinterpreted can divorce the about silence community’s international the (although intervention international directfind without on separation a peaceful enabledto acompromise eventually them self-determination – which right Slovaks’ to the eventually admitted Czechs the Czechoslovakia justify turneither the other into undermined the workingindependence of the union’s institutions.the In both cases, one or the other side worked to uncompromising both sides on ofthe rules breaks and union’s frequent the parliament state the absence from Montenegrin the oneMontenegro, and Serbia In and decisions. constitutional crucial the prevented Slovaks orone responsiblea strengthening rightuse ofveto by frequentthe the In the Czechoslovakia andinand Montenegro. Serbia for the crisis,making slowed down and eventually led into constitutional indead-ends, both Czechoslovakia to further of the centralargument, for a state without its own economy is hardly sustainable.a decisive held powers. independence Montenegro’s of proponents the Thereby irreconcilable. were Howeverperceived – andwhile simplytrack process for the wasunion’s EU accession a recognitionalso greatlyin undermined the elites’ relationsengage by inatwin- decision the EUto the specifically, inMontenegro and In addition Serbia for it was that the republics’ further national especiallyinthe segmentation. digging andMontenegro, the Slovakia awareness economiesreinforce to contributed differences economic the eventually and distrust, and raised developments thereby interests less) for(more or lagging economic Mutually accusatory paces attitudes reforms. of slower less and required sidedeveloped economies – which were other andSerbia –Slovakia model on a market and the policiesfor this it toberequested purposeproved tothe maladapted ambitionsthe of –Montenegroandone side the Czech Republic –torapidly its economy develop The development of The developmentof diverging objectives requirementfor and consensus the decision- 68 CEU eTD Collection elites to develop by exploited actually andwere formula consociational the of implementation hinderedthe the factors crisis and bring unfavorable the function, states common makethe to commitment elites’ the Without factors. the common states to their collapse. The cases analyzed this was a big stepforward” own andaccepta higher to authority – which “in comparison toother post-Yugoslav republics thanks to the ability of the two sides to recognize their incapacity to resolve the problem only and peacefully wenton smoothly Serbia andMontenegro of on again.once break-up The their community international the of intervention the anymore needed and toseparate how agree on even not in such hadworsenedthey two could a way that the between relations the referendum, did the agreement fail to maintain them together, but by the end of the three years deadline for the only not separation. However agree on a peaceful to muchhardship – after managed – previously hadrepublics, although the latter the two by forcedUnion onto Agreement was European the Belgrade the InSerbiaand Montenegro climate. inter-segmental the influence dramatically imposed by power-sharing mechanisms a thirdparty succeedandare unlikely to mayeven sensitive character internationalof involvement inmanagement, conflictfor asit underlines, to the out points case the sametime the At in histheory. unaddressed leaves completely Lijphart community can have a crucial in role managing tensions in – which states plural is a dimension international the shows, case Serbian-Montenegrin As the thecrisis. of escalation the avoid and as well, with which Serbia with he (and remained opposition the and government Montenegrin in the between contactmediation his and role at all times) enabled the two sides to find a solution 140 Laj Miroslav diplomacy’. a ‘preventive develop and intervene to Union European the required eventually claims two the between tension unreleasable Interview with Laj Simply thefour conditionsput, inboth states were weighed downby unfavorablethe þ ák. 140 and for this reason will never be too great to praise.great to betoo reason will never for this and 69 þ ák as EU High representative had a crucial had representative High EU as ák CEU eTD Collection coalition, or on majoritarian or other principles. other or majoritarian on or coalition, grand by a government right, veto a autonomy, representation, proportional a as such principles agree on mechanismsfunction to be makeitthe whichwill they work, basedpower-sharing on elites’ is the it and secondary is rather setup institutional the a common to state, committed finding solutionsitwhen to Eventually,theirbe amicable could divorce. arguedthat are elites to compromise violence– provide Balkans indidnot enough strong incentivesthe for Czech the and Slovak elites but on the otherCzechoslovak hand, crisis: while the itcrisis occurredcertainly at the prevent leadersthe “self-denying from to Lijphart’s during competing prophecy” the same time as the deadly Yugoslavgave wars, the themmechanism, best,the will even fail bridge the to Thisis by oppositions. supported “failure”the of incentives which a common without anyinstitutional state, to is unquestionable elites’ the dedication to compromisehappen for to this real the condition However cooperation. encourage circumstances may insome on fostering divisions as the hasthesis andheunderlined), is inalso right assuming that institutions in angle from (as they reversed are the state plural of stable and a peaceful preservation for the role a paramount hold elites that assumption in his is right Lijphart divided. mildly only initially populations, of the leadersthat than will rather the underthe of occurred divorces Montenegrin andSerbo- Czechoslovak the for both than elites, more radical inherently are populations that assumption Lijphart’s exacerbate This challenges seriously divisions. usedpurposefully to butgroups may in factcounter-productively segmentationsexacerbate – and more precisely be between divisions amend to incapable simply is terms institutional its in formula consociational show that without the genuine commitment of the elites to make the common state function, the 70 CEU eTD Collection ------. 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