Conflict Management in Multi-Ethnic States
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Conflict Management in Multi-Ethnic States: The Role of Elites in the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro by Emanuela Macková Submitted to Central European University Nationalism Studies Program In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Advisors: Professor Szabolcs Pogonyi Professor Florian Bieber CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2009 Acknowledgements I wish to express my sincere thanks to my supervisors, Szabolcs Pogonyi and Florian Bieber, for their comments and their confident encouragements during my research. Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Lajþák willingly shared the experience, understanding and knowledge he gained during his activity as EU Special Representative for the referendum issue in Montenegro. My earnest gratitude goes to Minister Miroslav Lajþák for answering very openly to my questions and sharing his thoughts on his precious time. CEU eTD Collection Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 5 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................... 9 Consociational democracy.........................................................................................................9 The consociational objective....................................................................................................9 The elements of consociational democracies..........................................................................10 Debating consociationalism.....................................................................................................14 “Segmented societies”? “Deeply divided societies”?..............................................................14 A counter-productive theory?.................................................................................................15 Undemocratic democracy ......................................................................................................16 The problem of elite cooperation ...........................................................................................16 CASE STUDIES BACKGROUND................................................................................. 20 Czechoslovakia ........................................................................................................................20 Historical Background ...........................................................................................................20 The 1989-1992 Consociational Arrangement .........................................................................22 Serbia and Montenegro...........................................................................................................24 Pre-1990’ History..................................................................................................................24 The FRY era..........................................................................................................................25 The 2002 – 2006 Consociational arrangement in Serbia and Montenegro...............................28 EXPERIENCES OF CONSOCIATIONALISM: WHAT WENT WRONG?...................... 32 Czechoslovakia’s dissolution...................................................................................................32 CEU eTD Collection Voter volatility ......................................................................................................................32 Lack of elite tradition of accommodation...............................................................................34 Socio-economic imbalance ....................................................................................................35 Additional factors..................................................................................................................37 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................38 The Serbo-Montenegrin partition...........................................................................................39 Ethnicization of Politics.........................................................................................................39 Lack of elite tradition of accommodation...............................................................................44 Historically........................................................................................................................44 The State Union.................................................................................................................46 Socio-economic differences...................................................................................................53 Historically........................................................................................................................53 The State Union.................................................................................................................55 Further Factors ......................................................................................................................59 ‘The Prize of European integration’ ...................................................................................59 The lack of geographical concentration..............................................................................61 The minority issue .............................................................................................................63 As a short conclusion.........................................................................................................65 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 66 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 71 CEU eTD Collection INTRODUCTION This paper will examine the existence of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic after the fall of communism in 1989 and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro after 2002 and their peaceful break-ups respectively in 1992 and 2006, under the prism of consociational theory. Arend Lijphart, renowned political scientist, developed the consociational formula in the late sixties to explain the stability of divided states, including ethnically divided states. Lijphart argues that social divisions in a plural society can be neutralized at the elite level, where the roots of division can be exploited through power-sharing instruments (a mutual veto right, autonomy, government by grand coalition, proportional representation) to build a stable democracy. In this process, Lijphart admits the positive contribution of several favorable factors, such as segments of equal size or a tradition of elite accommodation, which are however not necessary in the consociation. Most important in Lijphart’s theory remain his four basic conditions meant to be conducive to elite cooperation and which elites are expected to exploit in this goal. This implies CEU eTD Collection first that elites have a central soothing impact for deescalating tensions and social divisions. Second it also implies that the Lijphart’s power-sharing instruments will be used in a 5 constructive, positive way by elites and that in fact they have only one possible outcome: cooperation. Lijphart’s theory developed into a broad school of thought. Scholars have applied the consociational model to many different cases from Columbia1 to Canada2, and even to some extent, post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina3. However his theory is challenged by two cases in which, although Lijphart’s four basic conditions were present, not only did the common states fail to reach a stable situation, but - and in opposition to the consociational theory’s goal – they actually dismantled after a rather short existence marred by instability and political stalemates, much of it sustained by the political elites. The consociational formula was applied in Czechoslovakia from 1989 and in Serbia and Montenegro from 2002. Most European countries are characterized by a more or less high degree of ethnic diversity. Under communism this diversity was hardly expressed, but the fall of the communist rule liberated the ideological arena and created a situation where ethnic identities could freely be expressed - and resorted to as well. In both Czechoslovakia after 1989, and Serbia and Montenegro in the nineties and especially after the fall of Miloševiü in 2000, the ethnic and national issues, although being rather mild at the beginning, became more salient under the pressure of political leaders and gradually deepened the divisions between Czechs and Slovaks, and Serbs and Montenegrins, thus offering ideal background for the consociational formula to develop. However given that they fulfilled Lijphart’s requirements both states should have managed to overcome their internal divisions – but they did not manage to live beyond three short years, after which they peacefully departed, in CEU eTD Collection 1992 for Czechoslovakia, 2006 for Serbia and Montenegro. 1 Robert H. Dix. Consociational Democracy, the Case of Columbia. Comparative Politics. Vol. 12, No 3: 303 - 321, 1980 2 Kenneth McRae. Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1974 3 Nina Caspersen. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? A Comparison of Conflict Regulation