The Caribbean
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CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISK BRIEF THE CARIBBEAN Carlos Fuller, Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth, Beatrice Mosello This is a knowledge product provided by: CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISK BRIEF: THE CARIBBEAN AUTHORED BY Carlos Fuller is a meteorologist and the International and Regional Liaison Officer of the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre. His primary responsibility is to coordinate the region in the inter national climate change negotiation processes. Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth is an Analyst in the field of climate diplomacy at adelphi. As part of her work, she supports Weathering Risk, a global, multinational climate and security risk and foresight assessment. Beatrice Mosello is a Senior Advisor at adelphi, working at the intersection of environmental change, peacebuilding, sustainable development, and foreign and security policy. EXPERT REVIEW BY Kishan Kumarsingh (Head, Multilateral Environmental Agreements at Ministry of Planning and Development Trinidad and Tobago) Benjamin Pohl (Head of Programme, Climate Diplomacy and Security, adelphi) PROVIDED BY The Climate Security Expert Network, which comprises some 30 international experts, supports the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the Climate Security Mechanism of the UN system. It does so by synthesising scientific knowledge and expertise, by advising on entry points for building resilience to climate-security risks, and by helping to strengthen a shared understanding of the challenges and oppor- tunities of addressing climate-related security risks. www.climate-security-expert-network.org The climate diplomacy initiative is a collaborative effort of the German Federal Foreign Office in partner- ship with adelphi. The initiative and this publication are supported by a grant from the German Federal Foreign Office. www.climate-diplomacy.org SUPPORTED BY LEGAL NOTICE Contact: [email protected] Published by: adelphi research gGmbH, Alt-Moabit 91, 10559 Berlin, Germany www.adelphi.de CORPORATE DESIGN MANUAL The authors would like to thank Kishan Kumarsingh and Benjamin Pohl for their invaluable advice and review STAND VOM 08.12.2010 for this paper. The analysis, results, recommendations and graphics in this paper represent the opinion of the authors and are not necessarily representative of the position of any of the organisations listed above. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on included maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by adelphi or any of the funding parties. Date: December 2020 Editorial responsibility: adelphi Layout and design: Sebastian Vollmar (vividshapes.com) and Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth (adelphi) Infographics: Hannah Elisabeth Kurnoth (adelphi) © adelphi 2020 © Fernando Jorge / Unsplash CONTENTS SUMMARY 1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 3 Social and demographic context 3 Political context 4 Economic context 5 Security context 6 CLIMATE CONTEXT 8 Current climate situation and future projections 8 Climate vulnerability 9 Policy and institutional context 12 CLIMATE AND FRAGILITY RISKS 14 Climate-induced disasters can cause political instability through their impacts on key economic sectors 14 Climate impacts could lead to social unrest by compounding livelihood and food insecurity 16 Climate-induced loss of livelihoods could increase opportunities for criminal activity and increase urbanisation challenges 17 ENTRY POINTS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISKS 18 REFERENCES 20 RISKRISK BRIEF BRIEF: THE MALI CARIBBEAN - CONFLICT ∤ SUMMARY CONTEXT 1 6 tensions. These dynamics overlay local histories of contestation. Although livelihoods co- SUMMARYexist and overlap depending on the season and cut across communities, common narratives hold that the Fulani and Tuareg are pastoralists, Dogon and Bambara are farmers, and Bozo Theand CaribbeanSomono are region those is who considered engage into fishingbe relatively and river peaceful transportation. and politically Conflicts stable, over but nat highlyural resources within and between these groups are not new and have tended to be resolved vulnerable to direct and indirect impacts of climate change. Caribbean countries, most of non-violently with sporadic violent incidents. which are small-island developing states (SIDS), have long suffered from the destructive impacts of natural hazards, including hurricanes, severe weather events, drought and However, tensions have been rising and manifesting in violence. Social relations within the seaFulani level have rise. frayed. Climate Marginalised change isgroups, projected particularly to make nomadic them andworse; semi-nomadic rising temperatures ones, who andtake anup increasearms for inself-defence flooding risksare challenging are anticipated. hierarchical Tropical aristocratic cyclones structuresare becoming of power more frequentand dominance. and intense. These Changingstructures precipitation are seen as politicised patterns, asand well linked as sea to anlevel abus riseive and and ocean rent- acidification,seeking state. areIn addition, threatening there the is livelihood seasonal conflictand physical between security Fulani of nomadiccoastal communities.and settled pastoralists during the rainy season in the western area near the Mauritania border over However,access to naturalclimate resources.change is Indeed,not acting these alone. dynamics Its impacts can be are partially adding explained to the pressure as a crisis of populationbetween generations growth and and rapid of modernity, urbanisation with on older land peoplespace andhoarding already power limited and wealthfood, water that andyounger energy people resources, are barred resulting from accessingin environmental in the context degradation of a highly and unequalrising unemployment, society, with inequalitysome people and owning poverty many levels. heads This of willcattle have and significant poorer Fulani consequences people no longer for the owning Caribbean any countries’but rather economies.herding cattle Climate belonging change to others.impacts will also amplify existing social and security challenges, such as loss of livelihoods, urban migration, crime, labour market inequalities, andAs well the as feminisation intra-Fulani conflict,of poverty. there In areturn, heightened these dynamics tensions risk between putting different additional past oraliststress communities and between pastoralists and farmers. The impunity granted to Tuareg AOGs on governmental support structures, which could lead to political instability as citizens in peace talks that excluded AOGs linked with jihadism exacerbated the sense of increasingly question their legitimacy. The COVID-19 pandemic is adding a further layer to abandonment and injustice – and need for self-protection – felt by some Fulani people, these risks, slowing foreign direct investments, halting tourism, increasing unemployment particularly in areas where Fulani and Tuareg pastoralists compete for natural resources. In and decreasing remittances. other areas, expansion of farming onto grazing land, encroachment of cattle onto farmland, and government policies favouring agricultural over pastoralist livelihoods have led to Toincreased address clashesthese challenges between farmersfully and and effectively, pastoralists. it is important that these risks are analysed and understood in an integrated way. In this paper, we identify three possible pathways throughThese dynamics which climate have changeinflamed interacts inter-communal with other tensions drivers ofand fragility led toand the insecurity formation in theof Caribbeancommunity region: militias. Fulani people say Dogon and Bambara militias have banned them from buying and selling at markets, while the Dogon say armed Fulani men prohibit them from 1. Climate-induced disasters can cause political instability through their impacts on key working in their fields. Violence by community militias and state forces, who tend to see all economic sectors; Fulani as linked to jihadi AOGs, has driven even more Fulani people to join community militias2. Climate and jihadiimpacts AOGs could that lead maximise to social these unrest dynamics by compoundingas well as cleavages livelihood between and rivalfood communitiesinsecurity; by offering protection. Southern3. Climate-induced Mali, the country’s loss of livelihoodsbread basket could and increasemost populous opportunities area, is relativelyfor criminal stable activity but thereand is increasea risk that urbanisation existing conflict challenges. dynamics will deepen. Events in the north and centre show how grievances can take hold and be mobilised into violence. The Sikasso region Thesealready threats sees land are conflictnot inescapable. due to intensified Governments land speculationin the region and have land takengrabbing important, which initiativescreates grievances to address over climate elite economicrisks and arepredation at the amongforefront those of climateeconomically action, and especially socially inmarginalised. terms of disaster There riskis dissonance response. between However, local to date,customary they andhave formal failed state to implement norms, corrupt more comprehensivepolitical practices, and and integrated the absence responses of or disregard that go beyondfor shared climate rules adaptationof use. Local and leadership disaster riskinstitutions response, and and custom have that overlooked places control other of socio-economic familial land in andthe hapoliticalnds of maledrivers elders that often also work against the structurally