DOCSLIB.ORG

Disinformation) Narratives in the 2021 Bulgarian Parliamentary Election Campaign

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Disinformation) Narratives in the 2021 Bulgarian Parliamentary Election Campaign FOUR POPULAR (DISINFORMATION) NARRATIVES IN THE 2021 BULGARIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN Policy Brief No. 99, April 2021 The Bulgarian society has long been exposed to KEYThe POINTS brief also discusses whether certain pre- disinformation narratives in traditional and social electionFacebook has become a key instrument for media. The deterioration of media freedom on the political campaigning through political back of the oligarchization of the media market has advertising and content creation. undermined the quality and objectivity of Political parties have tried to use the digital journalism. 1 The media environment has been nature of the election campaign to increase their further undermined by the indiscriminate leverage through pursuing popular divisive penetration of social media networks, which (disinformation) narratives. These have been mostly related to the COVID-19 pandemic and algorithms have further amplified sensationalist Bulgaria’s geopolitical orientation. disinformation. Many cash-strapped media outlets The largest political parties have the largest have resorted to sensationalist content aimed at share of social media interactions. Yet smaller click baiting audiences and not reporting truthfully. political groups with strong pro-Russian views, Government and EU funds have sometimes been have significantly increased their activity in used to encourage and supercharge such outlets, March 2021. while public media have been pressured to fall in Interactions (likes, shares, comments, user line with the official government position. clicks) of Facebook posts by pro-Russian pages and groups disseminating COVID-19 related The analysis focuses on the dissemination of disinformation reached more than 170,000 in popular (disinformation) narratives that target March voters ahead of the Bulgarian Parliamentary Another major (disinformation) narrative has elections due on 4 April 2021. It examines what are been that the European Green Deal is a utopian the objectives of these messages and how are they ideal that will harm country’s economy and linked to the main political actors in the country. future development. Nationalist parties have focused their anti-EU 1 rhetoric on the topic of gender norms and The Bulgarian position in the 2020 World Press Freedom place (out of 180 countries) a decade later. Reporters Index rankings developed by the Reporters without Borders sexuality.without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom organization has nosedived from 78th place in 2010 to 111th The proliferation of anti-democratic propaganda place (out of 180 countries) a decade later. Index: Bulgaria Country Report, 2020. in Bulgaria’s captured media environment is contributing further to the deterioration of media freedom and journalistic standards. No. 99 POLICY BRIEF April 2021 A key question is whether certain pre-election ● The European Green Deal is ruining the disinformation narratives are aiding the growth of Bulgarian economy leading to massive the Russian political and economic influence in unemployment in coal regions. It is based on EU Bulgaria2. and liberal delusions that ignore the lack of reliability and excessive costs of green energy. Key narratives ● The EU is hypocritical in its democracy and transparency demands as it enables the survival The analytical framework includes a sample of 756 of a corrupt Bulgarian government. It promotes public Facebook pages and groups, which have liberal over traditional national conservative been observed over a three-week period (between values. 1 March and 22 March 2021). These include mainstream media outlets and influencers, pro- Russian propaganda pages, pages that disseminate The digital election campaign xenophobic, racist, homophobic and, in general, The digital nature of the election campaigns has anti-liberal messages, as well as all the major increased the public’s susceptibility to online political parties’ pages and the most influential disinformation. They have also sought to peddle political figures’ pages. A special cluster of COVID- narratives that aim to confuse voters and push related pages has also been analyzed to evaluate them to embrace political notions often not based how political actors have leveraged different COVID on evidence but feed off people’s fears and narratives (including conspiracy theories) to insecurities in relation to the pandemic and their improve their popularity among Bulgarian voters. political preferences and choices. The pre-election The assessment zooms in on the prevalence and campaign for the Parliamentary vote has revealed connections to the pre-election campaign of the very high activity by both mainstream political following four popular (disinformation) narratives: actors and fringe political groups in the digital ● COVID-19 is a hoax or at least exaggerated, space. Facebook along with YouTube have become meaning that measures to restrict infections are key instruments for political campaigning through not necessary while vaccines are dangerous and political advertising and digital presence and could be more harmful than the disease itself. content creation. The public pages of the leaders of the political parties have been leading the process ● Russian energy projects need to be supported of digital content creation, including the president because they improve Bulgaria’s energy and the prime minister. The digital activity of many security, relations with Russia and ensure political leaders has been further amplified by a economic development. The EU cannot afford number of public groups and related pages that re- to stop the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream share content and provide a tribune for political projects and the U.S. is selfishly meddling in supporters (including troll accounts) to increase the domestic decisions of EU member states. reach of the campaign or to smear political 2 To analyze the most prevalent pre-election disinformation the scope of interactions with different posts and the types of narratives, the assessment employs the CrowdTangle public reactions to them, one could draw conclusions about the insights tool that tracks public Facebook groups and pages publication’s impact and the observed patterns of specific allowing for the easier sorting through a large volume of content sharing. content for a given period of time. By better understanding 2 FOUR POPULAR (DISINFORMATION) NARRATIVES IN THE 2021 BULGARIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN opponents. Media outlets with a partisan spin For example, Vazrazhdane (Revival), which is and/or government backing and/or government unlikely to surpass the electoral threshold of 4% to backing have further added exposure. enter the Parliament, has taken up 15.44% of the total posts by political parties. The nationalist Combined, the large political parties have the VMRO party has accounted for another 12.61% of largest share of social media interactions. Yet the total publications. The publication of content smaller political groups, some of which with strong has not necessarily translated into more pro-Russian and extremist views, have significantly interactions though. (Figure 1). increased their activity in March 2021. Figure 1. Interaction intensity and number of posts for the main political parties Source: CSD based on CrowdTangle Dashboards 3 No. 99 POLICY BRIEF April 2021 Figure 2. Interaction intensity and number of posts for the● main political leaders Source: CSD based on CrowdTangle Dashboards ● Key Themes i) The government’s vaccination policies are Political parties and influencers have tried to use inadequate (at worst characterized as a failure the digital nature of the election campaign to and at best chaotic), ii) Chinese and Russian increase their leverage through pursuing popular vaccines should be imported immediately into divisive (disinformation) narratives. These have the country, iii) Sputnik V is effective, even been mostly related to the COVID-19 pandemic and better than Western vaccines, iv) Vaccines have Bulgaria’s geopolitical orientation. strong side effects and are linked to deaths. The disinformation narratives have seeped into Exploiting COVID-19 Conspiracies mainstream media and the posts of political parties and figures. However, the conspiracy ● Prevalent Narratives: Disinformation element is more diluted, redirecting the public narratives about COVID-19 have been some of discussion instead towards vaccine diplomacy, the most nuanced and complex in the lead up i.e. the narrative that Bulgaria should be to the parliamentary elections. The main narratives are often overlapping and accepting Russia’s vaccine just as the claim goes contradictory to one another: Slovakia, Greece and others have done. 4 FOUR POPULAR (DISINFORMATION) NARRATIVES IN THE 2021 BULGARIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN ● Messaging style: Pro-Russian (including posts being on the benefits of Bulgaria partisan) media outlets such as Bulgarian Free purchasing and implementing the Russian Television (Bulgarian Socialist Party’s TV Sputnik V vaccine. channel), the Bulgarian subsidiary of the ● Data indicators: In the first three weeks of Russian propaganda channel Pogled Info, the March, there were a total of 727 posts coming pro-Russian popular online outlet ONovini and from FB pages and groups of different political the AnonymousBG chapter have amplified the parties, pro-Russian outlets and mainstream impact of the vaccine disinformation by using a channels disseminating messages linked to strong inflammatory language. For example, COVID-19 with
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • R01545 0.Pdf
    Date Printed: 11/03/2008 JTS Box Number: IFES 2 Tab Number: 10 Document Title: The 1990 Bulgarian Elections: A Pre-Election Assessment, May 1990 Document Date: 1990 Document Country: Bulgaria IFES ID: R01545 ~" I •••··:"_:5 .~ International Foundation fo, Electo,al Systems I --------------------------~---------------- ~ 1101 15th STREET. NW·THIRD FLOOR· WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005·12021 828-8507·FAX 12021 452-0804 I I I I I THE 1990 BULGARIAN ELECTIONS: A PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT I I MAY 1990 I I Team Members Dr. John Bell Mr. Ronald A. Gould I Dr. Richard G. Smolka I I I I This report was made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy. Any person or organization is welcome to quote information from this report if it is attributed to IFES. I 8CWlD OF DIREQORS Barbara Boggs Maureen A. Kindel WilHam R. Sweeney. Jr. Randal C. Teague Counsel Charles T. Manatt Patricia Hutar Frank 1. Fahrenkopf Jr. Jean-Pierre Kingsley leon). Weir I Chairman SecretaI)' Judy Fernald Peter M(Pher~On DIREQORS EMERITI Richard W. Soudricne David R. Jones Joseph Napolitan James M. Cannon Director I Vice Chairman Treasurer Victor Kamber Sonia Picado S. Richard M Scammon I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ii I TABLE OF CONTENTS I Part I. overview I Mission 3 Executive Summary 4 I The Historical context 6 I Current Political Scene 13 I Part II. Election Law and procedures Constitutional and Legal Foundations of Electoral Law 20 I The Law on Political Parties The Election Act I Analysis of the Law I The Electoral system 30 structure and Procedures I Comments and Analysis I Electoral Needs 38 I Team Recommendations 41 I I Appendices A.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bulgarian Monarchy: a Politically Motivated Revision of a Historical Image in a Post-Socialist Transitional Society
    The Bulgarian monarchy: a politically motivated revision of a historical image in a post-socialist transitional society Markus Wien American University, Bulgaria From its foundation in 1878, which was a consequence of the previous Russian- Turkish war, up to 1946 pre-socialist Bulgaria had a monarchic constitution. It was finally abandoned on 8 September 1946 by a manipulated referendum, which turned Bulgaria into a ‘People’s Republic’. The last king, Simeon II, had to leave the country, but did not abdicate formally instead, but he kept his title as a monarch in exile.1 During the years of communist rule, which lasted until 1989, it was unthinkable for Simeon to return to his home country – let alone resume political functions. The rejection of the monarchy and its representatives as reactionary and feudalist by the communists was too clear. On the contrary, they were eager to eliminate any positive memory of the monarchy in the public. They did so by creating an official image of history which blamed the monarchy for being the main reason, or at least, a very important precondition for all negative developments in the history of Bulgaria since 1878. Significant terms, such as “adventurism” for Bulgaria’s participation in the Balkan wars and the First World War under King Ferdinand or ‘monarcho-fascism’ for the authoritarian regime of Boris III, were chosen in order to make the period before 1944 a part of the public memory as a past which was dark but had been overcome.2 After the change of 1989 and the end of the communist monopoly on public opinion, all of a sudden the possibility of a historical re-evaluation of the Bulgarian monarchy occurred.
    [Show full text]
  • Bulgaria's 1996 Parliamentary Elections
    BULGARIA April 1996 Parliamentary Election Report Copyright© 1996 International Republican Institute Issued July 1996 Table of Contents Tab 1......................Background Tab 2......................The 1994 Elections Tab 3......................Parliamentary Groups Tab 4......................Non-Parliamentary Groups Tab 5......................Representative Seating Charts Tab 6......................Bulgaria Political Situation Update Tab 7......................Appendix 1: Chronology of 1994 Activities Tab 8......................Appendix 2: Chronology of IRI's Early Efforts BULGARIA BACKGROUND In March 1994, the International Republican Institute (IRI) renewed its program to assist Bulgarian national parties and coalitions with the development and operation of their grassroots structures and to strengthen communications between national and local party organizations. IRI's resident program officer conducted over 80 one-day workshops throughout the country during 1994 and four major conferences on media communications, voter contact programs, message development, research and polling, local party organization and election law. The conferences and workshops were designed to assist the development of parties not represented in parliament and prepare them for the upcoming parliamentary elections as well as continue to help parties represented in the Parliament with the strengthening of their organizations and coalitions. The ultimate goal was to help all parties extend their outreach to voters in Bulgaria, ensure electoral success for a
    [Show full text]
  • Bulgarian Parliamentary Elections.Pdf
    DENNIS DECONCINI. ARIZONA . CHAIRMAN COMMISSION ON STENY H. HOYER, MARYLAND, CO-CHAIRMAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE DANTE 8. FASCELL FLORIDA FAANK LAUTEN8ERG, NEW JERSEY EDWARD J. MARKEY , MASSACHUSETiS TIMOTHY WIRTH . COLORADO 237 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 2 BILL RICHARDSON. NEW MEXICO WYCHE FOWLER. GEOAGIA EDWARD HIGHAN, OHIO HARRY REID. NEVADA WASHINGTON. DC 20515 DON RITTER, PENNSYLVANIA ALfONSE M. O' AMATO. NEW YORK CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH NEW JEASE'' JOHN HEINZ. PENNSYLVANIA JOHN EDWARD PORTER. ILLINOIS JAMES McCLURE, IDAHO (202)225- 1901 FRANK R. WOLF . VIRGINIA MALCOLM WALLOP , WYOMING SAMUEL G WISE, STAFf DIRECTOR MARY SUE HAFNER DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL JANE S, FISHER , OEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR REPORT ON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA June, 1990 Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on security and Cooperation in Europe July 1990 This report is based on the findings of a Helsinki Commission staff delegation to Sofia , the capital of Bulgaria , as well as the Kurdzhali , Khaskovo and Kyustendil regions. In Bulgaria , Helsinki Commission staff met with a wide range of electoral officials poli tical party and movement representatives , as well as with candidates , journalists voters and other observers of the BUlgarian political scene. It also observed the voting in 29 polling stations in all these regions as well as aspects of the counting of ballots in three polling stations. The staff delegation appreciates the assistance of the U. S. Embassy in Sof ia and Bulgarian Desk at the Department of State , as well as the information they provided. Other valuable sources of information include Radio Free Europe (RFE-RL Daily Reports), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Human Rights Law Group (with the law firm Gibson , Dunn and Crutcher), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs , and Helsinki Watch.
    [Show full text]
  • The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism Supplementary
    The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism Supplementary Online Appendix Yann Algan Sergei Guriev Sciences Po and CEPR EBRD, Sciences Po and CEPR Elias Papaioannou Evgenia Passari London Business School and CEPR Université Paris-Dauphine Abstract This supplementary online appendix consists of three parts. First, we provide summary statistics, additional sensitivity checks and further evidence. Second, we provide details and sources on the data covering regional output and unemployment, trust, beliefs, attitudes and voting statistics. Third, we provide the classification of non-mainstream political parties’ political orientation (far-right, radical-left, populist, Eurosceptic and separatist) for all countries. 1 1. Summary Statistics, Additional Sensitivity Checks, and Further Evidence 1.1 Summary Statistics Appendix Table 1 reports the summary statistics at the individual level for all variables that we use from the ESS distinguishing between the pre-crisis period (2000-08) and the post-crisis period (2009-14). Panel A looks at all questions on general trust, trust in national and supranational institutions, party identification, ideological position on the left-right scale and beliefs on the European unification issue whereas in panel B we focus on attitudes to immigration. 1.2 Additional Sensitivity Checks Appendix Table 2 looks at the relationship between employment rates and voting for anti- establishment parties. Panel A reports panel OLS estimates with region fixed effects. Panel B reports difference-in-differences estimates. In contrast to Table 4, the specifications now include a dummy that takes on the value of one for core countries (Austria, France, Norway, Sweden) and zero for the periphery countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia).
    [Show full text]
  • Print This Article
    518 Reviews of Books era Eastern Europe will enjoy reading Mr. Lendvai’s booK and profit from the first-hand information he brings to the problems of this area. Indiana University, Northwest FREDERICK B. CHARY Nissan Oren. Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power 1934-1944. (“East Central European Studies of Columbia University and Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University”) New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. XIV+294. Nissan Oren was bora in Bulgaria, but educated in Israel and the United States. At present he is a member of the Departments of Inter­ national Politics and Russian Studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Although he is a political scientist, Bulgarian Communism is a history booK —a worthy successor to another Columbia Press history by a pol­ itical scientist, Joseph Rothschild’s The Communist Party of Bulgaria. Furthemore, because the author never uses obscure jargon, Bulgarian Communism is readily understandable to the non-specialist. Oren’s monograph is one of impressive research and at times even investigation worthy of a detective into a subject whose secrets are not always the easiest to discover. An excellent example of the author’s forthright uncovering of hitherto “unsolved mysteries” of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) is his explanation of Traicho Rostov’s reprieve from a capital sentence by the Bulgarian government in 1942 (pp. 183-4). The party secretary was saved on the intervention of Stanislav Balan, the king’s secretary, whose son went to school with Rostov. Furthermore, much of the booK is not solely about the Bulgarian Communist Party per se but is as well a chronicle of the events in Bulgaria during the period (a similarity with Rothschild).
    [Show full text]
  • Populist Parties in European Parliament Elections: a New Dataset on Left, Right and Valence Populism from 1979 to 2019
    Electoral Studies 71 (2021) 102312 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Electoral Studies journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left, right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019 Mattia Zulianello a,*, Erik Gahner Larsen b a Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS), University of Birmingham, UK b School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral Dataset performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the Populism European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral Populist parties performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing EP Elections and valence populist parties. We show that there is significantvariation both across countries as well as between Left-wing populism Right-wing populism the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is Valence populism concentrated in specificareas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of Populist radical right EU countries. 1. Introduction Specifically,we introduce an extensive dataset in terms of temporal and spatial coverage including 92 populist parties that in at least one EP The 2019 European Parliament election was the first EP election election over the period 1979–2019 received at least 1% of the votes.
    [Show full text]
  • Populist Far Right Far Left Eurosceptic Comments* Austria Freedom Party
    Populist Far right Far left Eurosceptic Comments* Austria Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ x x x Team Stronach TS x x Alliance for the Future of Austria BZÖ x x x Hans-Peter Martin's List Martin x x Belgium Flemish Interest VB x x x Workers' Party of Belgium PVDA/PTB x x Libertarian, Direct, Democratic LDD x National Front FN x x x Bulgaria Attack Ataka x x x Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria GERB x Reload Bulgaria / Bulgaria Without Censorship BBZ/BBT x x IMRO - National Bulgarian Movement IMRO x x United Patriots VMRO-NFSB-Ataka x x x National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria NFSB x x x Order, Law and Justice RZS x x National Movement Simeon II NDSV x Croatia Croatian Labourists - Labour Party HL-SR/CL-LP x x Croatian Party of Rights HSP x x Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja HDSSB x x UNTIL 2015 Human Shield Zivi Zid x x Bridge of Independent Lists MOST x Cyprus Progressive Party of Working People AKEL x x National Popular Front ELAM x x Citizens' Alliance SYM / SYPOL x x x Czech Republic ANO ANO x Dawn-National Coalition Dawn x x x Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura SPD x x x Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia KSCM x x Party of Free Citizens SSO x Public Affairs VV x Sovereignty -- Jana Bobosikova Bloc S-JB x x Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia SPR-RSC x x x Denmark Danish People's Party DF x x x Red-Green Alliance En-O x x Socialist People's Party SF x Progress Party FrP x x x Estonia Res Publica ERP x Conservative People's Party EKRE x x x Finland Finns Party Ps
    [Show full text]
  • The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe WORKING PAPER N
    WORKING PAPER SERIES The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe WORKING PAPER N. 166 SEPTEMBER 2021 By Luigi Guiso, Massimo Morelli, Tommaso Sonno and Helios Herrera This Paper can be downloaded without charge from The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3922661 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3922661 The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe∗ L. Guisoy M. Morelliz T. Sonno§ H. Herrera{ September 1, 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to seg- ments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic inse- curity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space.
    [Show full text]
  • Pavel Valnev
    Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/01/2021 4:11:19 PM Republicans for Bulgaria Pavel Valnev Pavel Valnev and his brother Rumen are Bulgarian-American entrepreneurs who own a freight transportation business in Chicago, IL, which they built from scratch in a highly competitive environment. A strong believer in the importance of a stable, prosperous, and democratic Balkans, Mr. Valnev has made strategic investments in various countries in Southeast Europe in order to further regional integration and prepare their economies for full membership in the European Union. His firms have remained commercially inactive in Bulgaria and Mr. Valenv’s only initiative in Bulgaria to date has been the founding and operation of Bulgaria International Television (BiT), which was an independent television station that broadcast simultaneously from Chicago, IL, and Sofia, Bulgaria, from 2013 until 2018. BiT was permanently closed because of the severe challenges associated with media freedom in Bulgaria, which is ranked 111th in the world by Reporters without Borders, behind all of its neighbors and on par with many countries that Freedom House defines as non-democratic. Operating from the United States and on the basis of Western media standards, BiT’s mission was to bring objective and independent coverage to Bulgaria’s centralized and often corrupt media landscape. Despite this environment, BiT was able to rank fourth in terms of viewer trust, competing successfully with oligarchic and Russian-backed media, as well as outlets that receive billions of levs of support from the state budget. Quickly recognizing BiT [email protected] www.republikanci.bg Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/01/2021 4:11:19 PM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/01/2021 4:11:19 PM Republicans for Bulgaria as a threat to the status quo, the political-advertising cartel in Bulgaria moved quickly to starve BiT of advertising revenues.
    [Show full text]
  • Proquest Dissertations
    INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis arxf dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while otfiers may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, ookxed or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleodthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the autftor did rx>t send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unautfxxized copyright material had to be removed, a note will irKficate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9” black and white photographic prints are availat)le for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Artwr, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 UMT PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN POST-COMMUNIST BULGARIA DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Rossen V. Vassilev, M.A. The Ohio State University 2000 Dissertation Committee: Professor Richard Gunther, Adviser Approved by Professor Anthony Mughan Professor Goldie Shabad Adviser Department of Political Science UMI Number 9971652 UMI UMI Microform9971652 Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company.
    [Show full text]