IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon the Battle of Britain I. Background A. Hitler Expected That the British Would Make Pe

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IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon the Battle of Britain I. Background A. Hitler Expected That the British Would Make Pe IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain I. Background A. Hitler expected that the British would make peace after the Fall of France. He had previously written in Mein Kampf about a Anglo-German partnership (with Britain a junior partner) based on differing interests: Germany as a continental power and Britain as an empire and a sea power. He offered "peace" terms to Churchill in a speech on July 19, 1940. B. Churchill never considered any kind of peace with Hitler, although members of his government, such as Lord Halifax, did. It would have made sense from a pragmatic point of view. The circumstances were desperate. C. There were no plans at all to prosecute the war farther against Britain. D. The rejection of Hitler's offer left Hitler with the task of reducing Britain either by U-boat warfare, aerial assault, or invasion. 1. The U-boat fleet at this time (only 57 ocean going vessels) (Calvocoressi 148)was not capable of defeating Britain, and could not in any case do so quickly. E. Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 16, calling for "Operation Sea Lion," the invasion of the British Isles. 1. The Army was enthusiastic; the Navy distinctly unenthusiastic, and the Luftwaffe professionals appalled. 2. The Army planned for a landing of ten divisions between Brighton and Folkstone over 4 days with a subsidiary landing between Plymouth and Portland. After the first stage, an advance would first be launched to cut London off from the west. The second wave would include an exploiting force of 6 panzer and 3 motorized divisions; the third and fourth waves would consist of 9 and 8 infantry divisions respectively. This would require over 3,000 vessels of all types. (Liddell Hart I 89) 3. Both Army and Navy planners would intensely apprehensive of the Royal Navy (with good reason, one could safely assume that the Royal Navy would fight sacrificially to defend British soil from invasion). The German Navy had no chance whatever of defeating the Royal Navy in a surface engagement. The transports could easily be massacred. 4.Consequently, the absolute pre-requisite for an invasion of Great Britain was Luftwaffe command of the air space above the Channel. In the last analysis, the RAF was the chief defense of the British people. 5. Had the Germans succeeded in gaining control of the Channel and landing, it is generally assumed that they could have conquered Britain quickly. I am personally a bit more dubious, but that has more to do with sustaining supply lines in poor weather and at night against desperate air and naval attack than with Britain's ability to defeat the Panzers. Britain rescued much of its army from Dunkirk, but left its equipment behind. The British Army was practically defenseless. II. Balance of Forces IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 2 A. It is misleading simply to compare airplane types between the two air forces, the RAF and the Luftwaffe. The two had dramatically different requirements. In addition, the defense of Great Britain was not simply a matter of how many Spitfires and Hurricanes the British had. B. There are two points that are worth mentioning. 1. At no time were the British threatened with defeat because they did not have sufficient fighter aircraft. They came perilously close to defeat due to shortage of pilots from loss and exhaustion. 2. Skill, courage, devotion to duty, quality of aircraft all are closely matched in the Battle of Britain. The British won the Battle of Britain because they knew what they were doing and the Germans did not. C. Luftwaffe order of battle in 1940: 1. 4,549 aircraft; many of these were of no use in the battle at all. 2. The two German Air Fleets which bore the brunt of the battle together deployed in the beginning of August: a. 875 level bombers (all medium) b. 316 dive bombers (the famous Ju 87 Stuka) c. 702 single engined fighters, the Messerschmitt Bf 109E d. 227 twin engined Bf 110 fighters D. The RAF at mid-July had made a remarkable recovery from the loss of 400 fighters in France. 1. Credit should be given to Lord Beaverbrook, who was put in charge of aircraft production. Beaverbrook made many enemies, but fighter production increased 250%. British fighter production exceeded Germany's: 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes to (Liddell Hart 92) E. British advantages: 1. British pilots were fighting over their own soil. Consequently, a pilot who bailed out could return to combat. A German pilot in the same situation, of course, was lost for the war. a. The Germans, however, had a superior Air-Sea Rescue operation. 2. German intelligence was miserable! They had no idea what British fighter production was; they failed to understand the nature of the coordinated British defense system; above all, they did not appreciate the significance of the British radar system! During the entire campaign, the crucial radar systems were attacked just once. a. If you will recall the progress of the Allied air war over Iraq and Kuwait, you will realize that we made none of those mistakes. Radar defenses were taken down first, followed by the command and control system of air defense (the Air Ministry building blown up by a Stealth fighter/bomber, for instance.) 3.Britain utilized an integrated command and control system to provide early warning and to vector fighters to meet attacks under the best possible IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 3 circumstances. a. The most important component, of course, was radar, which is a British invention. The Germans developed their own radar, and captured samples of British sets, but were slow to grasp its significance. The British maintained a technological superiority which was of enormous, if not decisive importance. b. The Home Chain line along the English southern coast was primitive by today's standards, and was not always easy to interpret. Particular mention should be made of the skill and devotion of the W.A.A.F. operators who demonstrated that courage and coolness are not male monopolies. c. Radar was backed up by a system of ground observers, and telephone lines of communication to the fighter fields. Sector stations such as Biggin Hill and Hornchurch were of particular importance in the coordination of squadrons. d. Radar is the most important reason why Giulio Douhet's belief that "The bomber will always get through" (the phrase is actually Stanley Baldwin's) is not true. e. Without this integrated air defense system, Britain would surely have lost the Battle of Britain. III. The Machines A. Technological problems and advances B. Air combat has always been dominated by technological advance, and seems likely to remain so. Even narrow technical advantages in air combat can mean the difference between life and death. C. In the mid-1930s, there was an abrupt shift from biplane to monoplane construction. This is the result of the advance of a number of technologies. I am devoting a lot of space to this in order to illustrate the impact of technological change on war--ie "Causes, Course, and Consequences of War" D. The following discussion is taken from Deighton (63-141) E. The heart of any airplane is the engine. A designer more or less has to start with the engine and build around it. The 1930s showed the development of two really superior engines that provided unprecedented power to weight ratios: the Rolls Royce Merlin (used in the Spitfire, Hurricane, Mosquito, and P-51 Mustang) and the Daimler Benz 610. Both were liquid cooled, "in-line" engines which permitted an aerodynamic airframe. 1. These engines could not be developed until advances in fuels, pioneered chiefly by the Americans. Aviation fuel is a complex chemical product. 2. Better fuel led to super-chargers, which enhanced performance at high altitudes. 3. However, higher engine temperatures led to coolant problems. More work for the chemists and designers. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 4 F. Higher performance required new lightweight alloys. 1. Airframes had to be strengthened in order to take the stresses of flight and house wheels, machine guns, and ammunition. Designers had to learn to use new alloys. G. Combat design implied a number of other problems. High ceiling required oxygen and cockpit heating, as well as a closed cockpit that provided excellent visibility and could be opened at high speed (such as in a precipitate dive . ) Reliable two-way radios had to be developed to permit ground control. The higher speeds also required radio communication between aircraft. But the aircraft needed a slow landing speed and good brakes. Decisions on weaponry and ammunition had to be made (a machine gun in the wing must be reliable since a jam cannot be cleared; the rate of fire can be higher than a machine gun firing through the prop, however, but placement of the ammunition must be careful or the trim of the aircraft will be upset. H. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E 1. Willi Messerschmitt designed Germany's only single-engine fighter in 1940, an aircraft that continued through the entire war and was produced in greater numbers than any other aircraft. It went through numerous models. It is a testimony to the soundness of the design that it could accept so many modifications. 2. Messerschmitt's "credo was lightweight, low-drag, high-speed simple design." 3. The Bf 109E went into production in 1938. Its fuel injected Daimler-Benz 610 engine was the best in the world and gave it outstanding performance.
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