IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon

The I. Background A. Hitler expected that the British would make peace after the Fall of France. He had previously written in Mein Kampf about a Anglo-German partnership (with Britain a junior partner) based on differing interests: Germany as a continental power and Britain as an empire and a sea power. He offered "peace" terms to Churchill in a speech on July 19, 1940. B. Churchill never considered any kind of peace with Hitler, although members of his government, such as Lord Halifax, did. It would have made sense from a pragmatic point of view. The circumstances were desperate. C. There were no plans at all to prosecute the war farther against Britain. D. The rejection of Hitler's offer left Hitler with the task of reducing Britain either by U-boat warfare, aerial assault, or invasion. 1. The U-boat fleet at this time (only 57 ocean going vessels) (Calvocoressi 148)was not capable of defeating Britain, and could not in any case do so quickly. E. Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 16, calling for "," the invasion of the British Isles. 1. The Army was enthusiastic; the Navy distinctly unenthusiastic, and the professionals appalled. 2. The Army planned for a landing of ten divisions between and Folkstone over 4 days with a subsidiary landing between Plymouth and Portland. After the first stage, an advance would first be launched to cut off from the west. The second wave would include an exploiting force of 6 panzer and 3 motorized divisions; the third and fourth waves would consist of 9 and 8 infantry divisions respectively. This would require over 3,000 vessels of all types. (Liddell Hart I 89) 3. Both Army and Navy planners would intensely apprehensive of the Royal Navy (with good reason, one could safely assume that the Royal Navy would fight sacrificially to defend British soil from invasion). The German Navy had no chance whatever of defeating the Royal Navy in a surface engagement. The transports could easily be massacred. 4.Consequently, the absolute pre-requisite for an invasion of Great Britain was Luftwaffe command of the air space above the Channel. In the last analysis, the RAF was the chief defense of the British people. 5. Had the Germans succeeded in gaining control of the Channel and landing, it is generally assumed that they could have conquered Britain quickly. I am personally a bit more dubious, but that has more to do with sustaining supply lines in poor weather and at night against desperate air and naval attack than with Britain's ability to defeat the Panzers. Britain rescued much of its army from Dunkirk, but left its equipment behind. The was practically defenseless. II. Balance of Forces IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 2

A. It is misleading simply to compare airplane types between the two air forces, the RAF and the Luftwaffe. The two had dramatically different requirements. In addition, the defense of Great Britain was not simply a matter of how many Spitfires and Hurricanes the British had. B. There are two points that are worth mentioning. 1. At no time were the British threatened with defeat because they did not have sufficient . They came perilously close to defeat due to shortage of pilots from loss and exhaustion. 2. Skill, courage, devotion to duty, quality of aircraft all are closely matched in the Battle of Britain. The British won the Battle of Britain because they knew what they were doing and the Germans did not. C. Luftwaffe order of battle in 1940: 1. 4,549 aircraft; many of these were of no use in the battle at all. 2. The two German Air Fleets which bore the brunt of the battle together deployed in the beginning of August: a. 875 level bombers (all medium) b. 316 dive bombers (the famous Ju 87 Stuka) c. 702 single engined fighters, the Messerschmitt Bf 109E d. 227 twin engined Bf 110 fighters D. The RAF at mid-July had made a remarkable recovery from the loss of 400 fighters in France. 1. Credit should be given to Lord Beaverbrook, who was put in charge of aircraft production. Beaverbrook made many enemies, but fighter production increased 250%. British fighter production exceeded Germany's: 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes to (Liddell Hart 92) E. British advantages: 1. British pilots were fighting over their own soil. Consequently, a pilot who bailed out could return to combat. A German pilot in the same situation, of course, was lost for the war. a. The Germans, however, had a superior Air-Sea Rescue operation. 2. German intelligence was miserable! They had no idea what British fighter production was; they failed to understand the nature of the coordinated British defense system; above all, they did not appreciate the significance of the British radar system! During the entire campaign, the crucial radar systems were attacked just once. a. If you will recall the progress of the Allied air war over Iraq and Kuwait, you will realize that we made none of those mistakes. Radar defenses were taken down first, followed by the command and control system of air defense (the Air Ministry building blown up by a Stealth fighter/bomber, for instance.) 3.Britain utilized an integrated command and control system to provide early warning and to vector fighters to meet attacks under the best possible IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 3

circumstances. a. The most important component, of course, was radar, which is a British invention. The Germans developed their own radar, and captured samples of British sets, but were slow to grasp its significance. The British maintained a technological superiority which was of enormous, if not decisive importance. b. The Home Chain line along the English southern coast was primitive by today's standards, and was not always easy to interpret. Particular mention should be made of the skill and devotion of the W.A.A.F. operators who demonstrated that courage and coolness are not male monopolies. c. Radar was backed up by a system of ground observers, and telephone lines of communication to the fighter fields. Sector stations such as Biggin Hill and Hornchurch were of particular importance in the coordination of squadrons. d. Radar is the most important reason why Giulio Douhet's belief that "The bomber will always get through" (the phrase is actually Stanley Baldwin's) is not true. e. Without this integrated air defense system, Britain would surely have lost the Battle of Britain. III. The Machines A. Technological problems and advances B. Air combat has always been dominated by technological advance, and seems likely to remain so. Even narrow technical advantages in air combat can mean the difference between life and death. C. In the mid-1930s, there was an abrupt shift from biplane to monoplane construction. This is the result of the advance of a number of technologies. I am devoting a lot of space to this in order to illustrate the impact of technological change on war--ie "Causes, Course, and Consequences of War" D. The following discussion is taken from Deighton (63-141) E. The heart of any airplane is the engine. A designer more or less has to start with the engine and build around it. The 1930s showed the development of two really superior engines that provided unprecedented power to weight ratios: the Rolls Royce Merlin (used in the Spitfire, Hurricane, Mosquito, and P-51 Mustang) and the Daimler Benz 610. Both were liquid cooled, "in-line" engines which permitted an aerodynamic airframe. 1. These engines could not be developed until advances in fuels, pioneered chiefly by the Americans. Aviation fuel is a complex chemical product. 2. Better fuel led to super-chargers, which enhanced performance at high altitudes. 3. However, higher engine temperatures led to coolant problems. More work for the chemists and designers. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 4

F. Higher performance required new lightweight alloys. 1. Airframes had to be strengthened in order to take the stresses of flight and house wheels, machine guns, and ammunition. Designers had to learn to use new alloys. G. Combat design implied a number of other problems. High ceiling required oxygen and cockpit heating, as well as a closed cockpit that provided excellent visibility and could be opened at high speed (such as in a precipitate dive . . . ) Reliable two-way radios had to be developed to permit ground control. The higher speeds also required radio communication between aircraft. But the aircraft needed a slow landing speed and good brakes. Decisions on weaponry and ammunition had to be made (a machine gun in the wing must be reliable since a jam cannot be cleared; the rate of fire can be higher than a machine gun firing through the prop, however, but placement of the ammunition must be careful or the trim of the aircraft will be upset. H. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E 1. Willi Messerschmitt designed Germany's only single-engine fighter in 1940, an aircraft that continued through the entire war and was produced in greater numbers than any other aircraft. It went through numerous models. It is a testimony to the soundness of the design that it could accept so many modifications. 2. Messerschmitt's "credo was lightweight, low-drag, high-speed simple design." 3. The Bf 109E went into production in 1938. Its fuel injected Daimler-Benz 610 engine was the best in the world and gave it outstanding performance. 4. It was mounted with a constant speed prop. 5. The gas tanks were self sealing, but it lacked armor plate to protect the pilot. 6. It was armed with two 7.92 mm machine guns in the cowling and 2 20 mm cannon in the wings. The cannons--with exploding shells-- proved to be superior armament to the 8 .30 Browning machine guns mounted by the RAF. 7.For the Battle of Britain, the crucial defect of the Bf 109E was lack of range. Its combat radius was only 125 miles and endurance only about 100 minutes. That allowed it little time over target. We shall encounter the problem of combat range for fighters again. I. The Hawker Hurricane 1. Sidney Camm designed the Hurricane, which was the chief RAF fighter in France and also numerically in the Battle of Britain. 2. The aircraft is an interim design, deliberately planned to use as many existing jigs and forms as possible to speed it into production. It has a wood-and- fabric body stiffened with metal. Oddly, this was an advantage against the cannon armed Bf 109, since cannon shells often passed through without exploding. 3. The engine was the Rolls Royce Merlin. 4. Pilots in France retrofitted the Hurricane with armor plate for the pilot (over IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 5

the objections of the bureaucrats). Pilots also arranged to have constant speed props without going through usual procedures. DeHaviland agreed to fit all Hurricanes and Spitfires without a contract, price, or belief that they would ever be paid. (Proof that capitalist manufacturers can be patriotic too) This added about 7,000 feet of ceiling to both air craft. (Deighton 95) 5. Armament was 8 .30 machine guns. Late in the battle, the British began fitting them with 4 20 mm cannon, a dramatic improvement. (Calvocoressi states that the 8 Brownings were the best armament in the world; I don't understand this. RAF tests determined the relative merits, which is why later RAF fighters were cannon armed. U.S. fighters would have been well- advised to adopt cannon instead of the usual 6 .50 machine guns.) (153, Deighton 92, Liddell Hart 92) 6. The Hurricane began entering service in 1936. 7. In 1940, it was one of the most modern fighters in existence, but not quite as good as the Bf 109E or Spitfire in performance. J. The 1. This very famous and beautiful fighter was loved by every pilot who fought in it. The Spitfire went through many modifications. Its development is romantic. 2. The designer was Reginald Mitchell. 3. In 1932, Mitchell underwent an operation on a lung, and convalesced on the continent during much of 1933. Conversations with German pilots convinced him that war was coming (note the early date!). Mitchell thereafter ignored all doctors' advice and devoted himself to designing the Spitfire. 4. His prototype received the Merlin engine in 1936. 5. The Spitfire was a monocoque (all-metal) design of both enormous structural strength and beauty. The distinctive elliptical wings proved to be far in advance of other designs as air speeds climbed. They provided very great strength as well as low-wing loading. a. Spitfire pilots widely believed that they could out-turn a Bf 109. It was thought of as a dog-fighter par excellence--fast and agile. b. Actually, the Bf 109E had a turning radius of 750 feet. The Hurricane could turn in 800 feet, and the Spitfire in 880 feet. c. However, these aircraft had no instruments to tell a pilot when the plane was about to break up from stress. A high speed turn imposes heavy G on the pilot and plane {my father regularly experienced 5 Gs when pulling out of a dive bombing attack; as I recall, that is about the same as an astronaut experiences when leaving the earth's atmosphere; pressure suits were not in general use yet.) The wing roots and tail of a Bf 109 were weak; the Spitfire's wings and tail very strong; evidently, RAF pilots were prepared to skirt the absolute edge of performance closer. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 6

6. The Spitfire provided outstanding visibility. 7. Performance between the Spitfire I and the Bf 109E was very very close. An edge has to go to the German plane at this time, however, for three factors: a. The Bf 109E could marginally outclimb the Spitfire I b. The Bf 109E was safe in a spin; Spitfire pilots were told to avoid them c. The fuel-injected Daimler-Benz engine gave the Bf 109E an advantage that saved a lot of lives: it could always dive out of trouble. The Merlin used a carburetor, which is inherently less efficient, especially at high performance levels. In addition, in a dive, the fuel is subject to centrifugal force. There was a brief loss of efficiency at the beginning of a dive, or the Spitfire would have to half-roll first, which was also a delay. In either case, the Bf 109 was gone. And, of course, it meant that the Spitfire could not escape by diving either. The British made improvements to the carburetor which solved the problem, but not in time for the Battle of Britain. 8. Reginald Mitchell did not live to see the Spitfire in production. He died in 1937. IV. Training and Doctrine A . There is no doubt that the Luftwaffe was superior to the RAF in training. 1. The Luftwaffe had a well-designed and extensive training program, and had been very selective in air crew prior to the war. Their flight schools produced about 800 pilots a month, or 4 times the production of the British flight schools. (Deighton 127, 129) 2. The Luftwaffe had also had the enormous advantage of perfecting techniques in , and then the practice in Poland and Scandinavia. 3. Fighter tactics, for example, were far ahead of everyone else. , Germany's revered Group Commander and most famous pilot, had evolved the Schwarm and Rotte, what the U.S. calls the "Finger Four." It is still the basis of fighter tactics. A Rotte consisted of a leader (the most experienced and/or best marksman) and his wingman, who protected the tail. A Schwarm was two such elements. Normally, they would fly in line abreast, but at staggered altitudes to avoid collision. A specific drill was used to quarter the sky for the enemy--it is not random. The Germans had many pilots skilled at stalking and gunnery. 4. In contrast, RAF pilots still used vee formations, and were not as experienced. In particular, their gunnery left a lot to be desired (don't be too harsh; consider trying to hit a small target at an angle to you at anywhere between 250 and 350 mph while you are also moving at similar speed. In a closing engagement, you are approaching at 700 mph. Deflection shooting takes skill and practice, as well as exceptional eyesight and lightning reflexes. Bursts are not long. The Spitfire carried enough ammunition for 14 seconds IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 7

of fire. A three second burst is a very very long burst. I recall my father talking about the problems of hitting a Zero fighter with his twin .50 mg. After his tour of duty, he was a gunnery instructor, but he doesn't believe he ever shot a Zero down. In aerial combat, a good deflection shooter has a tremendous advantage.) Deighton notes "Gunnery was the most neglected aspect of the fighter squadron's work. To say that RAF fighter pilots were inferior in marksmanship to the Luftwaffe crews is misleading. Few RAF fighter pilots had had sufficient gunnery experience to know what their skills might be." (131) B . The Luftwaffe was an outstanding tactical air force. In 1940, it was easily the best in the world, and at its peak relative peak in aircraft and quality of air crew. 1. Its principal task was to support the army in its operations. Highly specialized air craft such as the Stuka provided swift, far ranging for the Panzers; Luftwaffe officers accompanied spear heads to coordinate pin point attacks (a very modern technique; look at U.S. army doctrine today); rugged transports could supplies ahead to the panzer spearheads to keep them moving far ahead of truck or horse borne transport. 2. The Luftwaffe was an integral part of the entire concept of Blitzkrieg. C. The Luftwaffe was not designed to engage in strategic air combat, which is what it attempted to do in the Battle of Britain. It possessed no heavy bombers at all, and never developed any. Its most important fighter had a very short radius of operation. D. Some writers, such as Peter Calvocoressi, have been very critical of the organization of the Luftwaffe for the Battle of Britain. (147-152) This is not fair. At the time Germany was rearming, it was evident that Germany had the resources to build a tactical airforce or a strategic air force, but not both. Given the probable enemies that Germany would face, and the specific problems facing the military planners, there can be no doubt whatever that the correct decision was to build a tactical air force. E. The error is not the structure of the Luftwaffe, but asking it to do something which it was ill-equipped to do. Still, if handled properly, the Luftwaffe should have won. The Germans were not so much out-fought in the Battle of Britain as out-generaled. They were also outgeneraled in Barbarossa, Stalingrad, Kursk, and .

V. The Commanders A. German Commanders 1. Never forget that gave the key directives. 2.Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe. Göring is really a disaster for Germany here. Intelligent, cunning, amoral and ruthless, he was also lazy, luxury loving, and already addicted to pain-killing drugs (a legacy of the Beer Hall Putsch). Despite having been the last commander of the great Richthofen Flying Circus and winning the Pour le Merite as a fighter pilot, IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 8

he did not really understand the role of the fighter. His direction is muddled. Had the Germans pursued a well-thought out strategy to defeat the RAF, they would have won. Instead, they pursued no coherent strategy at all, shifting focus without real direction. 3. and Hugo Sperrle commanded the Air Fleets most heavily engaged. B. British Commanders. 1. Air Chief Marshall of Fighter Command Hugh Dowding deserves the undying gratitude of the British people and of free people everywhere. Dowding was disliked within the high echelons of the RAF, did not command Churchill's confidence, was subjected to disloyalty by one of his two crucial Group Commanders, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and was peremptorily sacked after the Battle of Britain. His dismissal was disgraceful. (I am impressed also by his selfless patriotism; he could have defended himself with regard to some criticisms but remained silent for security reasons.) But without him, Britain loses the battle. His performance during the Battle, his husbanding of scarce resources, committing them to battle in careful increments verges on genius. 2. Air Group Commander , who bore the brunt of the fight and who agreed with Dowding's tactics, and Air Group Commander Trafford Leigh- Mallory of the other crucial area, who did not agree with Dowding and who engineered his dismissal by methods that are dishonorable and despicable, and seems to have disliked him very much prior to the war anyway. VI. Strategy A. Shifting German strategies will be discussed in terms of the different phases of the actual campaign. B. Dowding's contribution to winning the battle began before the war, as he worked hard against a stubborn bureaucracy to create an integrated defense network. C. Dowding failed to win Air Ministry support reorganization of the flying schools. Training a fighter pilot requires time. Britain began the war with a shortage of pilots and little capacity to expand their flow from the schools. Dowding predicted the crisis that would come, but the Air Ministry did not face reality until war actually came. D. Dowding was always critically aware that he needed (1) fighter aircraft in sufficient numbers and (2) fighter pilots in sufficient numbers. 1.His fundamental problem was a shortage of pilots. He had no choice but to husband his resources carefully. His tactics were based on that reality. He committed squadrons to combat in small units, the so-called "Small Wing." In this way, he could vector a squadron to attack a German formation quickly, and always maintain a reserve available, but his squadrons were almost always outnumbered by the Germans. 2. Leigh-Mallory advocated a "Big Wing" attack, combining several squadrons IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 9

for mass attacks. These looked more impressive, and on at least one occasion (when circumstances led Dowding to approve it) were very effective, but it took precious time to assemble the squadrons and reduced flexibility. 3.Britain almost lost the Battle of Britain because the pilots were almost worn beyond endurance from losses and exhaustion. VII. The Campaign A. The Battle of Britain falls into five phases: 1. The Channel Battle July 3 to August 12 2. "Operation Eagle" August 8 to August 18 3. The offensive against Fighter Command August 24 to September 6 4. The Battle of London September 7 to September 30 5. Minor raids October 1 to October 30 6. The London Blitz, the night bombing of London is not properly a part of the Battle of Britain. B. The Channel Battle 1. The two German Air Fleets began attacking shipping in the and ports in order to draw out the RAF and destroy it in air-to-air combat. 2. The two Air Fleets did not coordinate their operations in any way, and there was no real plan to the operations. 3. Dowding's "Small Wing" tactics therefore frustrated the German strategy. 4. Actual losses for this period 364 German aircraft of all types to 203 British fighters. (Liddell Hart I 98) This was nevertheless very costly to the RAF since their miserable Air-Sea Rescue did not recover many pilots shot down over water. 5. Actual losses are much lower than claimed losses. Accurate assessment of victories is notoriously difficult in intense air combat. The pilots are not deliberately lying--the situation is just fantastically chaotic. The later adoption of gun cameras helped in this respect. To give an idea of the margin of error, the British claimed to have shot down 2,698 aircraft and the Germans claimed 3,058. The actual tally was a loss of 915 fighters for the British and 1,733 aircraft for the Germans. (Liddell Hart I 108) 6. Hitler became concerned that the Luftwaffe was not destroying the RAF in time for an invasion. Any invasion has to take note of the time of year and probable weather patterns. Führer Directive No. 17 specified massive attacks on the RAF and the aircraft industry. C . "Operation Eagle" 1. On August 12, the Germans attacked the radar stations for the first and only time. A 100 mile gap was torn in the defenses before some stations could be repaired. One station was put out of operation completely, but the Germans never realized this. 2. Action was very heavy at this time, and pilots on both sides were flying multiple sorties per day. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 10

3. German attacks were wasted on airfields that were not part of Fighter Command, and from often poor coordination of bomber and fighter formations. 4. August 15 was Germany's largest effort of the entire battle: 1,786 sorties a. The Air Fleet in for the first time launched a attack in the north. They were badly mauled and did not return. b. In the south, frequent raids confused the radar picture. Some raids got through, others were attacked and disrupted. c. Actual losses for the day were 75 German aircraft to 34 British fighters. (Liddell Hart I 100) d. Churchill was led this day to state, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." 5. The most serious losses were hedge hopping raids on Biggin Hill and Kenley sector stations. It was the type of attack the British most feared, but the Germans failed to appreciate how badly they had hurt the stations. 6. This phase is ended by bad weather. D. The Offensive Against Fighter Command 1. Göring shook his command structure. 2. German tactics were changed and much better organized. For instance, Kesselring put up large dummy formation to confuse radar, since it couldn't distinguish aircraft types. Fighters were used in very concentrated numbers. 3. Attacks seriously damaged many air fields in the southwest as the Germans were using small bomber formations escorted by fighters at a ratio of 3:1 4. British losses mounted to unacceptable levels (ie: a level which they could not sustain) a. Aug. 31 saw a loss of 39 fighters to 41 German aircraft, the heaviest of the battle b. Overall, August saw a loss of 338 Hurricanes and Spitfires with 108 badly damaged to 177 Bf 109s, with 24 badly damaged. (Liddell Hart I 103) c. This time period, August 24 to September 6 shows a British loss of 290 to a German loss of 380, but only half of those were fighters. (Keegan The Second World War 96) d.Surviving pilots began reaching the limits of their endurance. Britain was replacing the aircraft themselves, but the pilots at this moment were virtually irreplaceable. e. Constant attack also made proper repairs impossible. The coordination of the air defense system was eroding. 5. Neither Göring nor Kesselring understood the desperate straits that Fighter Command was in. They began shifting to aircraft production factories, which eased the burden on the pilots. 6. The battle had become one of attrition, with both sides suffering seriously. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 11

7.There seems little doubt that had the Germans continued this phase of the battle, that Fighter Command would have been defeated by attrition. Germany was winning. E. The Battle of London 1. With autumnal gales approaching and unaware of how seriously Fighter Command was hurt, Hitler orders a shift to attacks on London. He hoped that a direct attack on London itself would bring Fighter Command out for a show down battle. 2. The first big attack went in on September 7 and went in cleanly to the London docks. The bombs fell short into the densely populated East End. The docks were bombed again that night, using the fires as beacons. 3. The shift of focus paradoxically allowed Dowding to repair the sector stations and give some of the pilots desperately needed rest. Dowding had to play a difficult game here, balancing the condition of his forces against the strength of the attacks and their potential damage. 4. The aerial fighting was spectacular, since the weather was beautiful and spectators could clearly see the contrails and parachutes. 5. A turning point was reached on September 15. The Germans sent in their largest daylight raid on London, 200 bombers with heavy escort. Dowding took a calculated risk, and threw in all his reserves in a "Big Wing." 250 fighters intercepted the attack. The Germans lost 60 aircraft to 26 fighters (and 13 pilots). a. As spectacular as that defeat was, its effect psychologically was more important. The very massiveness of the British response shook them. (Recall that the Germans' estimates of British losses were grossly inflated and of British production gross deflated). 6.On September 17, Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion until further notice. a. The next day, Hitler agreed to the dispersal of the collected shipping. b. On October 12, "Sea Lion" was postponed until the spring of 1941. c. Hitler's mind is turning East. d.At this point, Britain had won the battle F. Minor Raids 1. There is no clear-cut end to the bombing, which increasingly was at night. "Minor" of course, is in the eye of the beholder. To those undergoing aerial attack, it was not minor at all. To those fighting and dying, it was not minor. But the scale of such that they would certainly not lead to a defeat of Britain's capacity to fight. 2. Sperrle's Air Fleet attacked London for 57 nights with an average of 160 bombers. Night air defense was rudimentary and the bombers got through. The ability to bomb accurately at night was also rudimentary. The result is mindless destruction and suffering which the British will pay back with IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 12

usurious interest. 3. The first target of other than London was Coventry on November 14. , Southampton, Bristol, Plymouth and were also targeted. (Liddell Hart I 108) 4. The Blitz comes to an end on May 16 after Hitler shifts most of the Luftwaffe to face the Russians. VIII. Consequences A. Hitler fails to defeat Britain in 1940. He still has a chance to defeat Britain at sea with U-boats, but that will take time. He rationalizes his attack on the with the thought that, by defeating the one of only two potential allies with sufficient power to defeat Germany, Britain would give up. This reasoning is not convincing, and it is clear to me that the real motive is Hitler's ideological hatred of the Soviet Union. An attack on the Bolshevik empire was an inevitable part of Hitler's make- up. B. The failure to defeat Britain in 1940 leaves a powerful base of operations for the United States in his rear. Hitler cannot win a two-front war, but he is about to open up a second front before he has settled the first. It is a fatal blunder. C. John Keegan writes, "As it was, the pragmatism of Dowding and his Fighter Command staff, the self-sacrifice of their pilots, and the innovation of radar inflicted on its first defeat. The legacy of that defeat would be long delayed in its effects; but the survival of an independent Britain which it assured was the event that most certainly determined the downfall of Hitler's Germany." (The Second World War 102) IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 13

Works Cited

Calvocoressi, Peter, Wint, Guy, and Pritchard, John. Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War. Vol. I, The Western Hemisphere. Rev. 2nd Ed. New : Pantheon Books, 1989.

Deighton, Len. Fighter. New York: Ballantine, 1977.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin, 1989.

Liddell Hart, Basil H. History of the Second World War. 2 Vols. New York: Putnam, 1970. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon The Battle of Britain Page 14

Works Consulted

Gilbert, Martin. The Second World War. Rev. Ed. New York: Henry Holt, 1989.

Messenger, Charles. The Art of Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan Ltd. 1991.

Sontag, Raymond J. A Broken World: 1919-1939. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).