拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 13 期 Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°13

A PYRRHIC VICTORY ? THE BOLIVARIANISM AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN VENEZUELA AFTER CHAVEZ

Moises Lopes de Souza1 PhD. Student IDAS. NCU,Taipei

Abstract The election of Nicolas Maduro as the first president after the death of Hugo Chavez has unveiled new challenges to the Bolivarian cause. The first challenge Maduro is to renew the Bolivarian leadership style and show himself as capable of being the translator of the general will of Venezuelans. Secondly, he necessarily has to bring effective changes in the economy in order to cool down the current social anxieties principally among the poor population. The poor, who have historically been on the side of the Bolivarian cause, sent a strong message that they might be potentially migrating to the opposition camp. The third –and more complex– task is that Maduro will have to include the country’s elite to the political debate and contemplate part of its demands regarding how the democratic game should be, in order to be able to

TAO implement all these changes.

Key Words: Democracy, Venezuela, Chavism, Bolivarianism.

1Moises Lopes de Souza - PhD. Student National at International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS). National Chengchi University (Taipei). Associate Researcher of the Center of Latin America Trade and Economy. Chihlee Institute of Technology . Member of the Group of Studies on Asia of the Center of Research in International Relations (NUPRI - Sao Paulo).，感謝作者惠允轉載。

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Introduction

“Another such victory and I come back to Epirus alone”. This quote is generally accepted as from the King Pyrrhus of Epirus (c. 318 - 272). After arriving at where is

Italy now, the king brought along with him 25,000-30,000 men and more than 20 elephants to defend his fellows Greek allies against the powerful Roman Empire domination. However, after winning the first two battles Pyrrhus realize that it had cost him a large number of his men, including generals and personal friends. Ever since, victories have got different tastes and interpretations. Some victories can come at costs that turns it much more problematic than an eventual defeat. That is what the newly elected president Nicolas Maduro has been experiencing after his narrow victory against the oppositionist Eduardo Capriles in Venezuela.

This article argues that the results obtained by the opposition camp in the recent elections in Venezuela are the first consequences of the disappearance of Chavez of the political scene. Moreover, the article's main argument is that the decreasing of circulos bolivarianos, the civil arm of the Chavism in Venezuela even during

Chavez’s time, was a sign that the presidential inspiring image and speech was no longer having the same effects it used to. The distance between words and concrete

results was already in their inception since 2012, and the classicTAO Bolivarian leadership already started to reveal its weaknesses during Chavez’s twilight. With the end of an emotional moment followed by the announcement of Chavez’s death, Maduro has three primary tasks. The first is to renew the Bolivarian leadership style and show himself capable to be the translator of the general will of the Venezuelans. Secondly, and linked with the first, he has necessarily to bring effective changes in the economy in the way of cooling down the current social anxieties principally among the poor population. The poor, who have historically been on Bolivarian cause side, suddenly sent a strong message that they might be migrating to the opposition camp. And here

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade N°13 16 頁 拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 13 期 Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°13 is the third and more complex task: in order to operate all these changes, Maduro will have to include the country’s elite to the political debate and contemplating part of its demands regarding how the democratic game should be. The question is how to do it without flirting with liberal policies and thus giving ammunition to Capriles and the

Venezuela’s wealthy and powerful elite against himself.

The 2012 elections and Its Discontents

The victory of Maduro in the most recent and one of the most important elections in Venezuela’s history could probably make the former President Hugo Chavez shake in his grave in Sabaneta, his hometown where he was buried. If the victory guaranteed the continuation of the “chavism without Chavez”, at the same time it launched a thick layer of skepticism over its medium and long term future.

Against all forecasts, what really surprised all analysts was not the predictable victory of Maduro, but the amazing performance of the oppositionist Henrique

Capriles. Based on Chavez’s performance in 2012 and after the high emotional demonstrations on Venezuela’s streets after his death, Chavez’s followers believed that another landslide and reaffirming victory were on its way. However, the results showed that Bolivarianism will have to find its own path in case it wants to survive

beyond the shadow of the “comandante”. The emotional toneTAO of the demonstrations in the streets after former president Hugo Chavez was pronounced dead was just another proof of a regime that was and still is highly based in emotions. Or, better placed, a regime that always knows how to access the emotions of the majority of the population and make it works in favor of the government projects and world view.

Since his theatrical coup d’etat attempt in 1992, Chavez had consistently used emotional expedient to communicate with his supporters and his dramatic battle for his life was his final act. By using such emotive elements in a high volatile environment followed by his successive landslide electoral victories, Venezuela

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade N°13 17 頁 拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 13 期 Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°13 seemed totally immersed and taken by Chavez’s ideas of Bolivarianism and twenty-first century socialism. But the last election showed that this is not necessarily true.

Chavez consecutive electoral victories concealed an important aspect present in the 2012 elections. During that year, and for the first time, the opposition in Venezuela surpassed the barrier of 37% of the votes. Different from all other elections that

Chavez has won since 1998, in 2012 Henrique Capriles started to be able to conquer votes that also contemplate parts of the poor people that traditionally have been seduced by Chavez’ eloquence. Capriles performance gets more clear when analyzed in historic perspective compared with the performance of all other candidates from the opposition camp since the advent of the chavism. In the 1998 elections, Chavez garnered 56.4% of the votes while the second, Henrique Salas, stayed with 39,9%. Later in 2000, already under a new constitution promulgated in

1999, Chavez got an impressive 59.8% of the votes, while the opposition candidate, Francisco Arias, stayed with a distant 37.5%. Later, in 2006, the chavism saw its best electoral performance since its first election in 1998. In that election, Chavez garnered 62.8% while, again, the opposition stuck with

36.9% at that time with Manuel Rosales as their candidate. In 2012,TAO although keeping comfortable of difference of 12% from its opponent Henrique Capriles, that election showed what now seems like a trend.

Chavez, with 55.1%, experienced his lowest performance while with Capriles the opposition overcame the barrier of 37% of electorate jumping to 44.3%. Follow the decline tendency in 2013, Maduro garnered 50.6% while Caprilles got surprisingly 49.07 % of the electorate. The difference now was only about 1,5% very distant from the comfortable and secure 12% that Hugo Chavez have had in 2012. In absolute numbers, Maduro won with only 234.935 votes. In 2012 Chavez had

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8,191,320 million votes while Capriles got 6,591,304 votes. In six months, the opposition in Venezuela gained about 680,00 votes while the government lost about

700,00 votes (Maringoni, 2013). To know why this migration happened is absolutely vital for the “Bolivarian Revolution”in Venezuela, mainly because the majority of more than 7 million votes that Capriles garnered in the last election is composed of poor people.

The Seeds Of Decline

Despite of criticism of the flamboyant personality of the former president Hugo

Chavez or about his populist speeches, it is undeniable that his presidency was able to operate profound changes in the Venezuelan society, for good and bad at the same time. According to the UN-Habitat Report of 2012, in 1999 –first year of Chavez as president– Venezuela had 49% of its population in the poverty and indigence. In 2010, this percentage was reduced to 28%. The capital Caracas is among the 26 Latin

American cities with the lowest Gini index with 0,40. Performing better than many cities in Brazil for instance, that on average has Gini Index of 0,5. What means that

the social inequality in Caracas at least, is lower than many citiesTAO in Latin America.

Still, the UN-Habitat reported that in Venezuela, 80% of the residences are occupied by their own owners. In countries like Colombia for instance this number never surpassed by 50%. At the same time , the basic sanitation (sewage) infrastructure in Latin America is in average available for 80 to 85% of the population.

In Venezuela this number is about 95%, with Caracas also performs very well in urban garbage collection staying in the top of a list of 21 cities (Maringoni, 2013).

The Bolivarian Revolution initiated by Chavez in 1998 obtained impressive results by any standards. One of the main reasons of its initial success was the decision to

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canalize the wealth generated by the oil revenues to social programs targeting the

poorest sectors of the population. Besides of the results described by the UN-Habitat

2012, Venezuela has become the less unequal nation in South America, reducing the

illiteracy rate for almost zero percent and also rescuing millions of people from the

poverty. The simple diversion of the oil revenues from the state owned PDVSA was

the main responsible for these drastic changes on the Venezuela’s social panorama.

With social programs reducing inequality , also it helped to increase the domestic

consumption market, which became the engine of the economy.

TABLE 1 – Total Social Spending (1999-2011)2

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Social Spending 12.8 14.9 16.7 16.3 16.7 18.1 17.6 21.9 21.3 19.5 18.5 15.4 22.8

Education 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.0 5.7 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.3 4.8 5.1

Health 2.5 2.6 3.4 3.4 2.5 3.2 2.6 3.7 4.4 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.3

Housing 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.8 2.9 2.4 1.7 1.5 4.2

Total:education, 9.0 10.7 11.0 11.5 10.4 11.7 11.4 14.0 13.0 11.6 10.9 8.8 12.6 health,and housing

Social Security 2.3 2.7 3.8 3.2 4.2 4.0 3.8 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.0

Soc.Dev.Participation 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.1 2.0 1.4 4.7

TAO Culture/ 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3

Communications

Science/Technology 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2

Source: adapted from Mark Weinsbrot and Jake Johnston. “Venezuela’s Economic Recovery: is it sustainable?”. Center for Economic and Policy Research. September 2012.pg. 11.

2 Table 1 shows clearly the effects of this extremely reliance on global economic over the government’s social investment. After coming under an ascending trend since 1999 when the social spending figured in 24.5% reaching at 40 % of GDP in 2006, it suffers drastic reductions in the next three years ahead. It fell sharply by more than 5 % to 34.9 % in 2007 and even more with 32.5% in 2008. During 2009-2010 at the peak of the financial global tsunami originated in housing and derivative markets in the US, the public spending on social programs dropped dramatically to 28.3 % (2009); and another 5 % reaching its lowest point 23.9 % in 2010. From 2011 the social public spending starts its recovery shooting up strongly to 29.3% (Weisbrot and Johnston, 2012:8).

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So why did the Bolivarian cause lose approximately 700,000 followers in the last presidential elections, even considering the performance of Chavez in the social camp?

The response to this question relies upon the very essence of the chavist regime itself.

The social progress achieved by Chavez during the last fifteen years of Chavism were built up at the expenses of the other half of Venezuelan society. Venezuela by all means is an ideologically and socially divided country in such way that manifestation of the defeated camp in the last elections consolidated the idea of zero-sum game mentality in the country.3 More than a question of whether the country is better or not is the perception of part of the population that it is not better in a way that they expected to be. This perception tends to ignore the gains to see as negative everything that don’t reflect the value and ideas of this “minority” creating a social narcissism where everything that does not reflect its image is ugly. However, even among the “majority” doubts about the Chavez project was also raised, and the case of the Circulos Bolivarianos is very illustrative on this aspect.

The Circulos Bolivarianos was Chavez’s strategy to involve the civil society in the early stage of the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela. Composed on average of 11 members (although it varied from 11 to hundreds due the lack of formal structure of

4 these groups), these Circulos sworn to defend the Constitution,TAO be faithful to ideas of

3 According to to Ronald M. Schneider, zero-sum mentality in Latin American politics has its roots at the colonial period. During that time from the end of the fifteenth century through the early decades of the nineteenth, witnessed the implantation of political institutions bearing of medieval corporatism, in which the hierarchically organized church, military, and largely peninsular (Iberian-born) bureaucracy each enjoyed special privileges, and the Creole aristocracy (New World-born Europeans) pursued its interests through them. Early on , the bureaucracy became a vehicle for patronage and payoffs to reward and ensure loyalty. Mentality that politics is a zero-sum game was a natural result of this scenario where strong personal loyalties and intolerance of opposing views, which would later translate into intransigent partisanship, became prevalent political traits. See (Schneider, 2010) 4 The Circulos members oath was inspired on the Simon Bolívar’s oath that took place on August 15, 1805 in the hill of Monte Sacro (Rome): “I swear in front of you, for the God of my parents; I swear for them. I swear for my honor and for my motherland that I will not rest my arms nor my soul until we have broken, finally, the chains that oppress Venezuela as an inheritance of the powerful who destroyed the motherland. I swear that I will completely dedicate my work to the bolivarian ideology, to the popular organization, to popular mobilization, to popular power, to never abandon the struggle; every day and every night that I have left with the bolivarian circles in the bolivarian web, in the bolivarian current, in the bolivarian forces and in the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 that

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Simon Bolivar, and serve the interests of their community (Hawkins and Hansen,

2005:102). In 2001 among 20,000-30,000 people attended the swearing-in ceremony, a few years later the government estimated about 2.2 million people were active member of the Circulos across the country. Although characterized by a high level of democratic values and actively involved in a variety of important activities in their communities, these Circulos end up playing an important role in accrete support for Chavez government projects or even taken the leadership against the coup in 2002.

These Circulos in a microscopic perspective provide us clues to understanding what happened in the last elections.

According to a study conducted by Hawkins and Hansen (2005), the Circulos

Bolivarianos ramified throughout the country working at the shanty town communities in a variety of initiatives as poverty alleviation and civil organization.

Although composed under voluntary basis that could identify them as “civil society”, these groups lacked one of the most fundamental attributes of a civil society capable of sustaining participatory democracy: autonomy from the state. These Circulos embodied the charismatic linkage to Chávez that undermined their ability to act independently as civil society groups does in liberal democracies compromising the

very essence of autonomy as mentioned above. Additionally,TAO the dependence of high expectation from the government established a clientelistic relationship and the governments and high ranked figures of the Chavez party. One of the most evident proofs of this affirmation was the linkage between who could be considered eligible to take part of the government’s program and ideological support. According to

today is born again after 19 years, by the will of the Venezuelan people. I swear that I will fight without rest for the defense of the revolution, even if I have to sacrifice my life, for the glory of Venezuela. I swear that we will consolidate forever the bolivarian revolution and the motherland of our children. I swear.” See István Mészáros. “Bolívar and Chávez: The Spirit of Radical Determination”. Monthly Review (2007), Volume 59, Issue 03 (July-August).

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Hawkins and Hansen5:

“The problem was that the Círculos unwittingly (and sometimes wittingly) served as new clientelistic brokers, ensuring the provision of these programs in neighborhoods that supported Chávez. The advocacy of the Círculos has been often important for helping neighborhoods receive these government services or receive them ahead of other neighborhoods. In addition, many of these programs were subsequently run with the understanding that the only people who supported the Chávez government were entitled to benefits.” That was and is the greatest mistake of Chavez as president. Due to his personality and ideas, he did not want, and would have problems doing it, to find a place for the country’s elite within the Bolivarian cause. This initially persistent minority, made the domestic politics in Venezuela a classic case of majority vs. minority game which the democracy has been built since its inception. In fact, the

Chavism in Venezuela based on referendums that almost invariably just was utilized as a tool for Chavez implement his personal ideas and projects rather empower the civil society of capacity to decide the nation’s choices and destiny. In other words, the sophistication that the Chavism reached in Venezuela was such that the very idea of the referendum was just part of the Bolivariam cause as the natural organ of its body.

Consequently, the minority, despite being powerful, did not have institutions as congress to lobby or independent media6 to mediate or carry their demands. In fact,

TAO they did have but as the political environment was always highly inflammable by both sides any demand from this minority as always was seen has obstacle to the Chavism project resulting again in the zero-sum game mentality. But here is necessary highlight some aspects of this “minority” also. This minority being referred to in this analysis has nothing to do with the vulnerable groups oppressed by other groups but a

5 Kirk A. Hawkins and David R. Hansen. “Dependent Civil Society: The Circulos Bolivarianos in Venezuela”. Latin American Research Review (2005), Vol. 41, No 1, February 2006. pg. 118. 6 Because they are the owners of media’s companies in Venezuela what make the newspapers and tv channels propaganda machines to the opposition. By the same token, the government uses the the public tv stations as tools to promote the cult of Chavez figure and the Bolivarian cause. This way, In Venezuela today there in no space for free press in a liberal sense of the term.

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade N°13 23 頁 拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 13 期 Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°13 wealth and extremely powerful minority. The economic elite in Venezuela is a small group separated both economically and socially from the rest of society by an enormous income gap and by a whiter and more European ethnic roots (Haggerty,

1990). It is the owner of the most important business groups in the country besides to control the media and the industrial sector as whole:

In general, those who considered themselves the Venezuelan elite, and were thus considered by their fellow citizens, thought of themselves as the upholders of superior values. Most claimed at least one postsecondary degree, possibly with a further specialization abroad. Concentrated in business and the professions, the Venezuelan upper class tended to disdain manual work and to patronize (in both senses of the word) members of the lower classes. In this particular sense, Venezuela was one of the very few countries in Latin America where a number of elite-supported scholarly and community welfare foundations provided support for an imaginative variety of programs and scholarships. These foundations often carried the names of elite families who prided themselves on their sense of civic duty”.7 Taken this definition above, makes easier to explain the level of polarization in the Venezuelan society in current days. Chavez made the a group that sees

“themselves as the upholders of superior values” as villains of the system that he dreamed to establish. The Bolivarian project made the elite of the country a persistent minority without almost rights what by definition violates public equality. However, there is no way to govern a country by isolating its wealthier citizens, at least in a

minimally democratic regime. To deal with the economic problems,TAO Maduro will have to find a way to integrate the elite into debate and eventually waive with some flexibility with their demands.

The ironic situation is that the very surviving of the Bolivarian Revolution in such extent relies upon individual or sectors that it absolutely antagonizes. With the growth of domestic consumption by the poor, it created a structural disequilibrium between the population's consumption appetite and the growth of agricultural and

7 Richard A. Haggerty, ed. Venezuela: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990.

The Quarterly of Latin American Economy and Trade N°13 24 頁 拉丁美洲經貿季刊第 13 期 Revista Trimestral de Estudios Economía Latinoamericanos N°13 industrial production to respond to this demand. Historically, the model of oil dependence that characterizes the Venezuelan economy has been an obstacle for the domestic development of the country. According to Brazilian analyst Breno Altman, the increase of the domestic demand generated inflationary pressures reflecting directly on the trade balance with the growth of the importations what consequently reduced the country’s international reserves. In addition, besides of to be the main source of resources to the continuation of the social programs, the PDVSA under

Chavez’s guidance also has operating huge subsidies for the population buy gasoline which some specialists arguing that could be more than 10% of the PDVSA revenues8.

In a short term perspective, any alternative to untied this knot will necessary a concert with the private sector to invest more and thus generating more jobs. There is a primary need of economic diversification of Venezuela’s economy and this task only can accomplished by an alliance between the private investors and the Maduro’s

Bolivarian government.

It is crucial for the new president to give more muscle to other industrial sectors not related to the petroleum sector in order to create job opportunities and revenues that could alleviate the dependence of oil revenues and its volatile performance at the

international market as happened during times of international TAOeconomic recession as in 2008-20109.

8 In responding to the questions about the PDVSA lossess 2012, the Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez, who is also PDVSA president said: "This is not a company designed to generate profits. This is a national company. We're not here to provide benefits to private individuals”. The revenues of PDVSA in 2012 were of US$ 124.5 billion which US$ 43.9 billion were diverted to finance the social programs in Venezuela. See “Debts to service providers jump 35 pct from 2011.” Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/venezuela-pdvsa-idUSL1N0CEB7U20130322 Access: April, 16,2013. 9 Breno Altman, “ Vitória de Maduro é incontestável, mas representa novos desafios”. Available: http://operamundi.uol.com.br/conteudo/opiniao/28373/vitoria+de+maduro+e+incontestavel+mas+repre senta+novos+desafios.shtml . Access: April 17, 2013. (Portuguese).

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Conclusion

These obstacles were already noticed by Chavez’s cabinet in 2012. In his electoral program, he made clear the government's intention to develop an ambitious program to boost the productive sector. However, with his death, this task relies upon Maduro’s shoulders. Based on the data above, after the process of social inclusion and “rescue of social debt” has been consolidated and approved by the majority of the Venezuelan people, it is time for the government try to go beyond of the PDVSA dependence by boosting the domestic industrial sector. And the only way to do it is establishing new forms of dialogue with the economic elite and private industrial sectors.

By doing this, Nicolas Maduro could give a new face for a regime that is lacking for a new boost to not say direction. The possible scenarios are opposite ones. The best scenario would lead to a pact between the government and the industrial sector

(consequently the economic elite) that is possible keep the social inclusion, reduce the inequalities and all social programs at the same time that basic elements of a market economy are maintained. It could provide predictability to the political system in

Venezuela making those sectors of the society that today antagonizes the regime believe that is possible the coexistence inside the Bolivarian system. However, is the

second scenario the most probable and gloomy. The tendenciesTAO is that under the renewed leadership of Capriles the opposition will try to seize its momentum to destabilize a government elected by a very narrow margin of votes. With the partial demobilization of the Bolivarian militancy as described in this article and the lack of experience and principally charisma of the new president it could lead a disastrous consequence for the Venezuela’s economy and mainly for its population.

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Literature Cited Charlip, E. Bradford Burns Julie A. (2007). Latin America: An Interpretive History. New Jersey: Pearson-Prentice Hall. Hansen, Kirk A. Hawkins David R. (2005). Dependent Civil Society. Latin American Research Review, 41(N. 1), 102-132. Johnston, Mark Weinsbrot Jake. ( 2012). Venezuela’s Economic Recovery: is it sustainable? Center for Economic and Policy Research. September, 2-30. Mészáros, István. (200 ). Bolívar and Chávez: The Spirit of Radical Determination. Monthly Review, Volume 59, Issue 03 (July-August). Mott, Margaret Macleish. (2002). Democracy in the Catholic South: Iberia and Latin America. In H. J. Wiarda (Ed.), Comparative Democracy and Democratization. Orlando: Hartcourt College Publishers. Schneider, Ronald M. (2010). Comparative Latin American Politics. Philadelphia: Westview Press. Whitehead, Laurence. (2006). Latin America: A New Interpretation. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.

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Document

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Transition.” United Nations Human Settlements Programme.UN-Habitat, August,

2012. TAO

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