MSc Thesis

Water Scarcity: Trigger for Conflict or Cooperation A case study on the & Tigris river basin

Faculty of Disaster Studies, Wageningen University, August 2009

1 Author: S.Pz. van Weezel Supervisor: Dr. J.F. Warner

Type of work: MSc Thesis Date: August, 2009

Course code: RDS 80733 Total credits: 33

Author name: Stijn Paulszoon van Weezel Registration number: 850211­935­040 Study program: International Development Studies

Supervisor: Dr. J.F. Warner University: Wageningen University and Research Centre Group: Faculty of Disaster Studies Address: Hollandseweg 1 6706 KN Wageningen the Netherlands

Second reader: P.A. van Hooft, MSc University: University of Amsterdam Group: Amsterdam School for Social Science Research Address: Kloveniersburgwal 48 1012 CX Amsterdam the Netherlands

2 Content 1. Introduction...... 5 2. Methodology...... 8 2.1 Introduction...... 8 2.2 Focus and purpose of the research...... 8 2.3 Case Selection...... 8 2.4 Research Question...... 9 2.4.1 Research methodology; Literature Study...... 9 2.4.2 Research methodology: Model Analysis...... 10 2.4.3 Research methodology: Scenario Analysis...... 11 3. Theoretical Background...... 13 3.1 Defining water scarcity...... 13 3.2 How the environment can cause conflict...... 15 3.2.1 Toronto...... 16 3.2.2 Zürich: Environment & Conflict Project...... 18 3.2.3 Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo...... 19 3.2.4 GECHS...... 20 3.3 Water; the new oil?...... 22 3.4 Triggering and Inhibiting factors...... 26 4.The Euphrates­Tigris river basin...... 27 4.1.1 Introduction...... 27 4.1.2 The river system ...... 27 4.1.2 Euphrates...... 27 4.1.4 Tigris ...... 28 4.1.5 Climate...... 29 4.2 The riparians ...... 29 4.2.1 ...... 29 4.2.2 ...... 30 4.2.3 ...... 30 4.3 Historical overview on conflict and cooperation...... 31 4.4 the Kurdish question...... 32 4.5 Current perceptions...... 33 5. Setting the scene: development and trends towards 2050...... 34 5.1 Introduction...... 34 5.2 World prospects...... 35 5.2.1 Iraq...... 35 5.2.2 Syria...... 36 5.2.3 Turkey...... 36 5.3 Economic outlook...... 37 5.3.1 Iraq...... 38 5.3.2 Syria...... 38 5.3.3 Turkey...... 38 5.4 State of the environment...... 39 5.5 Water resources...... 40 5.6 Scenarios: shaping the possible pathways...... 41 5.6.1 Business as Usual...... 42 5.6.2 Turkish Century...... 43

3 5.6.3 the Coming Anarchy...... 44 5.6.4 New Caliphate ...... 45 6. Analysis: the possible outcomes by 2030­2050...... 46 6.1 Introduction...... 46 6.2 The triggering and inhibiting factors...... 46 6.3 Outcome of the scenarios...... 50 7. Conclusions...... 55 8. Discussion...... 56 Acknowledgements...... 57 References...... 58 Annex A: Environmental Security Theories...... 62 Toronto...... 62 Zürich: Environment & Conflict Project...... 66 Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo...... 69 Irvine: Global Environmental Change and Human Security...... 70 Annex B: Euphrates­Tigris river basin...... 72 Euphrates...... 72 Tigris...... 73 Climate...... 74 Water resources...... 74 Annex C: The Riparians...... 75 Iraq...... 75 Background...... 76 Geography...... 77 Climate...... 77 Water Resources...... 77 People...... 78 Government ...... 79 Economy...... 79 Syria...... 79 Background...... 80 Geography...... 80 Climate...... 81 Water resources...... 81 People...... 82 Government...... 83 Economy...... 83 Turkey...... 83 Background...... 84 Geography...... 84 Climate...... 85 Water resources...... 85 People...... 86 Government...... 86 Economy...... 87 Annex D: Environmental outlooks...... 88 Global Environmental Outlook 4...... 88 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change...... 89

4 Annex E: Assumption WaterGAP 2.0 Model...... 91 Annex F: Scenario Storylines...... 93 Business as usual...... 93 Turkish Century...... 94 The Coming Anarchy...... 95 New Caliphate...... 95 Annex G: Scoring of the scenarios...... 97

5 1. Introduction

In the past, wars have been fought over numerous causes such as territory, ideology, colonial interests, nationalism or more tangible things such as oil. Some people suggest that in the 21st century water will be added to this list of casi belli. Water is a vital resource in society: it is essential for the survival and well­being of every form of life we know. At first glance there seems to be enough water on earth; it covers 75% of the earth's surface. Unfortunately, the majority (96.5%) of the total amount of water present is salt water stored in the global oceans, and not directly consumable. The remaining amount of freshwater is stored in ice caps, aquifers, surface water, and the atmosphere. Only 1.7% of all water on earth is suitable for use by mankind.1 Furthermore, earth's supply of water is a finite resource which imposes constraints on its use. Due to the fixed amount of water, earth has a limited carrying capacity for its inhabitant species. The limited supply of water is jeopardized by the impacts of , rural to urban migration, rising wealth, rising resource consumption and climate change.2

The forecasts regarding fresh water availability tend to be pessimistic and grim. Some scientists even speak of peak water, which indicates that we are reaching a point where the rate of water demand is higher than the rate at which water supply is replenished.3 Others speak about a water crisis, which addresses the overall scarcity of fresh water and water pollution.4 The general expectation is that, due to population growth, unsustainable consumption patters and climate change, 1.8 billion people will live under circumstances of absolute water scarcity by 2025 and a staggering two­thirds of earth's population will be subjected to water stress.5 The negative environmental and societal effects of such a situation will be severe as it will cause humanitarian crisis, social unrest, and it might even trigger violence.6

A region already burdened by the severe conditions and effects of water scarcity is the Middle East. Having only 1% of the world's freshwater reserves, it harbors 5% of earth's population.7 Forecasts predict that the current conditions will deteriorate in the future. Population is expected to increase in most countries on the Arabian peninsula, while water availability is expected to decline due to environmental changes.8 All rivers in the region cross at least one border, making countries dependent on each other's good will, which last can be troublesome since relations between some of the nations have been difficult in the past. Over the past decades the region has been experiencing several violent conflicts: the Israeli­Arab conflict remains unsettled and is one of the most enduring conflicts in the world today. Over the past 30 years the region experienced the bloodiest interstate

1 “The Water Cycle : Feature Articles,” http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Water/water.php. 2 Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development, Global Environment Outlook (Malta: Environment Programme, 2007). 3 “The World's Water,” http://www.worldwater.org/data.html. 4 UN Water, Water: A shared responsibility, The United Nations World Water Development Report (New York: United Nations, 2006). 5 Bryson Bates et al., Climate Change and Water, Technical paper of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC, 2008). 6 Marc Foster, Quantum of Solace (MGM, 2008); Bates et al., Climate Change and Water; “Water shortages 'foster terrorism',” BBC, March 18, 2003, sec. Science/Nature, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2859937.stm. 7 Food & Agricultural Organization, Review of world water resources by country, Water reports (Rome: Food & Agricultural Organization, 2003). 8 Joseph Alcamo and Thomas Henrichs, “Critical regions: A model­based estimation of world water resources sensitive to globa changes,” Aquatic Sciences 64 (2002): 352­362; “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database,” http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=4.

6 war of that period (­Iraq 1980­1988) and hosted two wars with the most international participants (Gulf War in 1991 and the 2003 USA­UK invasion in Iraq). The Middle East is one of the most militarized regions in the world and average national expenditure on arms has increased over the last 10 years.9 Due to the regional instability the region lags behind in economic, social, and political development.10 There is competition and strife between various Islamic factions present in the region such as the Sunni, Wahhabi, Shi'a, and other offshoots of Islamic faith. The Islamic religion is an important factor in the region. It has shaped the local culture for centuries and it remains an important political factor. In the past the introduction of secular ideologies has failed in most cases. As a result there are few regimes in the region that can be labeled as democratic. Of the 19 countries only two qualify as somewhat democratic: and Turkey, the latter is roller­coasting between being secular or theocratic. The region shows little democratic development, and in general it is characterized by the presence of authoritarian regimes. Most national economies are dominated by and dependent on the oil sector. Revenues from the petroleum industry constitute large parts of the national incomes. As a result most economies are not very diversified making them very vulnerable to shocks in the oil price.

Reference is often made to Middle Eastern exceptionalism to describe and understand the state of affairs in this region. It entails that there is something that makes the region unique and therefore prone to conflict, autocracy and economic misery.11 Since the beginning of civilization the region has been an important pawn in the geopolitical chess game. Due to its geographical location and the large availability of oil, the Middle East is still generally considered to be of great strategic importance to the superpowers dominating geopolitical developments. Considering all these factors the region creates almost the perfect venue for an interstate conflict over water as it contains the most important factors for this to happen.

But is water thé resource prone to conflict as some suggest and what is the link between scarcity and violence, in the case of water? To answer these questions it is important to understand the circumstance that can cause water scarcity in the first place. Water scarcity can be a problem of availability or a problem of demand. Water scarcity being an availability problem implies that there is a reduced supply of water. This can be caused for instance by environmental changes, such as shifts in temperature and precipitation patterns, which influence the water levels. Water scarcity being a problem of demand is mainly caused by societal factors. Due to population growth or increased agricultural or economic activity, water withdrawals might surge to unprecedented levels. Levels that might even exceed the supply levels. The link with violence comes into play when the access to limited water resources is regarded as a zero sum game; which might induce or trigger predatory behavior by some of the actors. Securing water resources may become a matter of national security and therefore will have top priority on the political agenda.

In this thesis the links between water scarcity on one side and conflict, and cooperation on the other will be explored. The likeliness of conflict or cooperation in a water­scarce situation will be analyzed by the use of various theories on environmental security. An overview will be given of factors that contribute to a larger risk for violent conflict, as well as on which factors that contribute to a more positive outcome. Using various environmental, economical, and societal forecasts the 9 Mark Bromley et al., “SIPRI Arms Transfer Data 2008” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2009). 10 United Nations Development Programme, Arab human development report, Regional Report (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2003). 11 Mirjam Sorli, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Harvard Strand, “Why is there so much conflict in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 141­167.

7 major expected developments concerning environmental change, population growth, and economic development will be explored and discussed, focussing on how these developments interact with the previously mentioned factors and what the political consequences might be in order to determine what this will imply for the risks for water conflict in the Euphrates­Tigris river basin in the coming 20­40 years.

2. Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapters explains and discusses the design of the research. First the purpose and the focus of the research are explained, followed by an elaboration on the specific case selection of this research. In the second part, the main research question is presented with the sub­research questions. The last part of this chapter explains the methodologies used in this study to find an answer to the sub­ and main research question are explained.

2.2 Focus and purpose of the research

This research focuses on the possible effects of future water scarcity on international relations, specified on the Euphrates­Tigris river basin. Main aim is to investigate whether a situation of increased water scarcity between the riparians of a transboundary river, is likely to trigger violent interstate conflict or whether such a situation might be more prone to catalyzing cooperation between the riparians. In literature several discourses can be found on the nexus between scarcity and violent conflict. These discourses range from pessimistic models, stating that scarcity will lead to violent conflict, to more optimistic theories confident in the adaptive capacities of society and the believe that scarcity might even lead to a more efficient distribution of resources and even better cooperation between competing actors. The aim of this research is to investigate which developments are there to take place the coming 20­ 40 years in the Euphrates­Tigris river basin and what would be the most likely outcome, given those circumstances. A second aim of this research is to study whether the use of models and scenarios can be helpful within this field of environmental security research.

2.3 Case Selection

The focus of this research is specifically directed at the Euphrates­Tigris river basin because of its robust presence in academic literature about water and conflict. The surrounding region of this river system, the Middle East, is rife with conflict and most countries are in a process of modernization making it a dynamic region.12 The three (major) riparian countries, Turkey, Syria and Iraq, all have a very different regime type which makes the relation between them somewhat complex, and therefore interesting. The presence of a large transboundary minority, the , adds complexity to the whole situation. The region through which the Euphrates and Tigris flow is an extremely arid region and water is a very precious good. Because water is essential for the well­being of individuals and society, securing sufficient water resources might become a matter of national security. Within this research a long­term approach is used with the time horizon set at 2030­2050. This time period is chosen because of the time required for some of the processes to take place.

12 Ibid.

8 Various ecological and environmental projections expect the levels of water scarcity in the region to increase in the future while the economy is expected to grow as well as the population. These ecological and societal developments will have an effect on both water demand and availability which will have its consequences on the relations between the three riparians and on how they jointly manage the transboundary waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. A last aspect that makes this case interesting is the fact that in the possible case of an interstate conflict about water where Turkey is attacked, the Western world could be involved because Turkey could invoke article V of the NATO charter.

2.4 Research Question

The main question of this research is:

Regarding the case of the Euphrates and the Tigris, what is the more likely outcome of the situation in the river basin by 2030­2050; conflict or cooperation, and under which circumstances is this to happen?

This main research question can be divided into several sub questions which can aid in finding a sensible answer to the main research question:

• Which drivers and mechanisms contribute to and/or mitigate the link between water scarcity and violence, according to the academic literature on environmental security? • Which environmental changes might take place in the Euphrates­Tigris river basin and with which outcome by 2030­2050? • What are the important socio­cultural, economic and political factors present in the basin region and how might these develop towards 2030­2050? • Concerning these outlooks: on which assumptions are these models based, and what kind of input generates the specific outcome? • What might be the possible political consequences of the environmental, socio­cultural, economic, and economic developments by 2030­2050?

In order to answer the sub questions, and eventually the main research question, data needs to be gathered and analyzed. To succeed in this the following research methodologies are used:

• literature study • model analysis • scenario analysis

2.4.1 Research methodology; Literature Study

The starting point of this research is a literature study in order to establish what the dominant views in the field of water scarcity, conflict and cooperation are. The aim of this study is to identify the relevant variables that can be used for the second part of the research. Firstly, an overviews is made of the dominant and most influential theories in the field of environmental security. Four groups are selected which have been active in the debate about environmentally induced conflict and have earned their stripes. These groups are the Toronto group of Homer Dixon, the Zürich group of Bächler and Spillmann, the group around Gleditsch of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and

9 the Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) group of the University of California directed by Matthews. In the literature study their line of argumentation and the assumptions of their models are reviewed and analyzed.

The next part of the literature study includes a further investigation on the nexus between water and conflict. While the first part is more focused on environmentally induced conflict in general, this part focuses on identifying drivers behind water scarcity induced conflict and cooperation. Other influential theories and researches are involved in the discussion, such as Gleick of the Pacific Institute, the Basins at Risk project of Wolf et al. at Oregon State University, and the Water Research Group centered around Tony Allan. These theories and researches incorporated into the literature study will give a fairly accurate and complete overview of the current debate and existing theories in the field of water and conflict/cooperation. The literature will also result in an overview of factors that add vulnerability or resilience regarding the river basin.

The literature study also addresses the problems around defining water scarcity and on how to measure it. It is important to acknowledge this problem because it will determine to a large extent the relative weight of environmental and societal causes of water scarcity, and explain more clearly the difference between water scarcity as a demand or a supply problem.

The literature for this study is retrieved via academic literature search engines such as Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar, as well as via the library of Wageningen University. The results of the literature study are shown in chapter 3 and Annex A.

2.4.2 Research methodology: Model Analysis

The aim of this research is to see what the outcomes of water scarcity would be in the 2030­2050 period. Therefore, data is needed that can give information about how the state of the world will be around that time period, in terms of environmental change, population growth, and economic development. In order to do so various outlooks and forecasts are used and investigated in order to get a complete picture of all these factors and how they might develop in the coming decades. Not many organizations or institutes have the manpower, funds or capacities to make an extensive and accurate forecast of the future. The options for acquiring data are therefore somewhat limited but nevertheless qualitative of a sufficient quality to be used for this research.

For the expected economic development in the coming decades, projections are used from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but mainly from the World Bank since they make longer range forecasts. Regarding population growth, the United Nations Population Division (UNDP) has made extensive prognoses on urbanization and and these are included in this research. For the environmental and ecological data, reports are used of the United Nations Global Environmental Outlook (GEO4), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the WaterGAP model of the University of Kassel.

The data used in this research is not simply taken for granted. The models used in these projections and outlooks are based on various assumptions and different storylines. In order to make sensible use of this data, these assumptions and storylines are reviewed an analyzed. It is important to note that none of the data in these reports will be an exact projection of future levels but the reports do give a fairly clear image of how the future might take shape and where the boundaries of these

10 developments realistically would be. The estimates made in these various projections as well as the trends and developments set out for the future are also incorporated in the scenario­building part of this research. The results of the model analysis are shown in chapter 5 and Annex D and E.

2.4.3 Research methodology: Scenario Analysis

The key uncertainty of this research is the development of the political landscape within the region and the power relations between the riparians. There is no academic data available, and no forecasts are made covering this aspect of the research. To overcome this obstacle four scenarios are designed covering a broad range of possible futures. Aim of these scenarios is thus to overcome the political uncertainty and provide a beacon to attach the economical and environmental data for analysis. Although using this scenario construction is useful, it does contain some negative points. For instance, within these scenarios the riparians are supposed to act according to a certain set of assumptions leaving little room for flexibility. Furthermore, since the data from the other models are used in these scenarios it might be that they do not correlate which will result in some strange interaction between the data and factors involved.

In order to somewhat minimize the lack of flexibility and to cover a wide range of possible pathways up to 2050, four scenarios are used:

• Business as Usual • Turkish Century • Coming Anarchy • New Caliphate

Scenario development is traditionally characterized by identifying the key drivers and uncertainties surrounding their future evolution and making assumptions about how these uncertainties will evolve and what kind of implications this will bring.13 In this research a study will be used done by NATO about future requirements for this organization. A part of this study is benchmarking and analyzing various scenario exercises done by other organizations, such as governmental bodies and private companies like Shell and Rabobank, in order to identify important drivers.14 For this research some of the drivers of the NATO research are selected. The drivers are selected based on their relevance for this research. The drivers include:

1. Power 2. Attitudes and world views 3. Regional stability 4. Technology 5. Demography 6. Economy

The first three drivers are of importance with regard to international relations; they focus on the perception of the riparians vis à vis (2), the way in which the power is distributed among them (1), and the impact of the region's (in)stability (3). The other three drivers (4­6) are more focused on the influences of society on water demand. Population growth is an important driver (5) behind the

13 Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 14 Stephan de Spiegeliere et al., NATO future worlds: An input into the NATO long term requirements study. (the Hague: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2005).

11 increase of water demand for instance, while improved technology (4) can be an important mitigating factor. The economy (6) is an important driver both because of its influence on water demand but also because of its influence in international relations. In order to make these drivers easier to implement and to construct scenarios with, they are broken down into, what are believed to be, key aspects of the specific driver. To make the drivers measurable and comparable a metric scale is used ranging from 1 to 3. In the overview below the specific characteristics of each of the sub­drivers is explained as well as the values on the metric scale for each of these key aspects:

1. Power variables: • Distribution of power: Whether power is relatively evenly balanced (3) among the riparians, or whether there are large power discrepancies (1). • Polarity: Whether the world is a unipolar one (1) or a multi polar one (3)­ 2 for anything in between. 2. Attitudes: These variables reflect the perceptions of the government/people about the world around them. • Fear/Opportunity: whether the situation is viewed in terms of opportunities (3) or more in terms of fear (1). • Openness: whether countries have a more defensive inward­looking attitude towards the world with protectionist policies (1) or a more offensive, outward­looking one where the countries are more pro­active (3). 3. Regional stability: • Stability: Whether there are many regional conflicts (Middle East), both intra­ and interstate. 1 denotes high instability, such like today and 3 denotes low instability such as in most part of Europe today. • Impact of regional instability: whether these regional conflicts have an effect on the situation between the riparians (1) or not (3). 4. Technology: • Progress: whether technological progress continues at its current high pace (3) or whether it slows down (1). • Distribution: whether technology is widely available (3) or confined to the higher income countries, Turkey in this case (1). 5. Demography: In terms of demography we look at the situation in the countries in terms of 'stocks' or total population and in terms of 'flows' which entails migration and refugees. • Stock: overall population level; 1 Low 3 High. • Flow: volumes of people moving within the country and across borders. 1 High. 3 Low. 6. Economic situation: concerning the state of the economy • Shape: whether the world economy is in good (3) or bad (1) shape. • Integration: whether the economy between the riparians is integrated (3) or disintegrated (1).

The next step of this process is to use these drivers to produce the four different scenarios. To do so values are given to the metric drivers based upon the individual characteristics of the scenarios. The characteristics of the scenarios are written out in a storyline in which certain developments determine the shape of the scenario. In for example the Turkish Century scenario the main development is the economic and political development of Turkey as a regional power.

12 Final step in the process is to analyze these scenarios and determine whether the given circumstances provide an environment where there is a greater risk for escalation into violence or where cooperation is a much more likely outcome. This analysis is made using the result of the literature study. The literature study results in a list of factors that either add to basin resilience or vulnerability. All scenarios are checked on how many of these inhibiting and triggering factors they contain in order to determine what would be the most likely outcome. The result of the scenario development can be viewed in chapter 5 and Annex F & G.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1 Defining water scarcity

Water scarcity can be a supply or a demand problem. Both variations entail different causes and demand different solutions to overcome the societal problems caused by the phenomenon. Water scarcity being a supply problem means that there is an insufficient amount of water to foresee in the demand. This can be caused, in the case of the Euphrates and Tigris, for instance by a reduced precipitation pattern which reduces the river flow. It can also be caused by a higher temperature in the region which causes more water to evaporate. Water scarcity as a supply problem is mainly caused by natural phenomena such as climate change, making it a fundamental ecological problem which is hard to solve and which needs societal adaptation and mitigation. The supply problem can however also be man­made. An example of this is intense regulation of water flows, as for instance has been done by the GAP project, which can influence the amount of water flowing from Turkey to the downstream riparians. Water scarcity can also be a demand problem which means that the demand from society is higher than the amount that can be supplied. This demand problem is caused entirely by societal factors. A cause can be population growth where the population exceeds the carrying capacity of the Euphrates­Tigris river basin. Consumption pattern is also an important influential factor; due to economic growth, water consumption may rise to unsustainable levels. This type of water scarcity however can be mitigated by changes in society such as technological innovations and a more efficient use of water.

Over the years various approaches have been designed in order to measure the level of water scarcity. Defining water scarcity is very complex because water is a dynamic resource, in contrast with land for instance. Water scarcity can express itself as a quantity issue, where there is a lack of water in general such as in the Middle East or as a quality issue such as in the Monsoon struck region in Asia where there is an abundance of water but not safe potable water. In general water scarcity can be considered as an imbalance between the availability and the demand. Contributing to water scarcity are the degradation of ground water and surface water quality, intersectoral competition, and interregional and international conflicts about water.15 A very popular yardstick for water scarcity has been the Falkenmark Index. The critical point of this index is 1,700 m³ of renewable water resources per capita per year. This threshold is based on estimates of water requirements in the domestic sphere, agricultural, industrial and energy sectors as well as the needs of the environment. When a country is not capable of sustaining this amount of water it is said as to be experiencing water stress. When the supply of renewable water resources drops below 1000 m³ per capita per year the country experiences water scarcity. In a situation where

15 “FAO Water Unit | Water News: water scarcity,” http://www.fao.org/nr/water/issues/scarcity.html.

13 the available amount of water is below the 500 m³ we speak of absolute water scarcity.16 The Falkenmark Index is widely referred to in the academic water literature. The index is easy to understand and the data needed to compile the index is easy to get. The index fails however to take in account adaptation mechanisms that could mitigate water scarcity. Small scale (sub­country) is also not well represented. To overcome the problems of the Falkenmark index others have tried to focus more on an accurate assessment of the demand for water rather than taking fixed requirements per capita on national scale. Shiklomanov and his group from the State Hydrological Institute in Saint Petersburg made a global supply­demand analysis in which they compared the national annual water availability with assessments of water demand in the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors.17 Raskin et al. used this method as well but replaced demand with water withdrawal, where water withdrawal is defined as the amount of water taken out of rivers, streams or groundwater aquifers to satisfy human needs for water. Raskin et al. used withdrawal instead of demand in order to make a more objective assessment of use. In his results he presented water scarcity as “the total annual withdrawals as a percent of available water resources”. They suggest that a country is water scarce if the withdrawals are between 20­40%, a country will be severely water scarce if the amount exceeds the 40% limit.18 These percentages are also used by the Center for Environmental Systems Research (CESR) from the University of Kassel. They define their critical ratio as the ratio of water withdrawals for human use to total renewable resources.19 The limitations of these indicators are that they do not take into account the amount of water that could be made available for human use. It does not indicate which amount is evotranspired and how much could be available for recycling. Again the indicators do not take into account the adaptive capacity of society to cope with water stress.20

The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) tried to overcome the problems the other indices had, by taken into account the human water needs, the part used for consumption and the amount of water withdrawal that remains and forms a return flow. They make a distinction between two kinds of scarcity. The first is physical water scarcity which occurs when more than 75% of river flows are withdrawn for agriculture, industry, and domestic purposes.21 Water resources development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits. The other type is economic water scarcity where water resources are abundant relative to water use, with less than 25% of water from rivers withdrawn for human purposes. Economic water scarcity is often the result of human, institutional or financial constraints. The water is locally available but there is limited access to it.22 This approach is an improvement with regard to the other models but the scale problems remain. Another problem with the definitions is that it is often hard to use them in

16 Malin Falkenmark, Janlu Lundqvist, and C Widstrand, “Macro­scale water scarcity requires micro­scale approaches. Aspects of vulnerability in semi­arid development,” Natural Resources Forum 13, no. 4 (November 1989): 258­267. 17 Igor Shiklomanov, “The world's water resources. ,” in Proceedings of the International Symposium to Commemorate 25 Years of the IHP (presented at the International Symposium to Commemorate 25 years of the IHP, Paris: UNESCO/IHP, 1991), 93­126. 18 P Raskin et al., Water Futures: Assessment of Long­range Patterns and Prospects (Stockholm: Stockholm Environmental Institute, 1997). 19 Joseph Alcamo et al., “Global change and global scenarios of water use and availability; An application of WaterGAP 1.0” (Center for Environmental Systems Research University of Kassel, June 1997). 20 Frank R. Rijsberman, “Water scarcity: Fact or fiction?,” Agricultural Water Management 80, no. 1­3 (February 24, 2006): 5­22. 21 D Seckler et al., World water demand and supply, 1990 to 2025: Scenarios and issues, Research Report (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 1998). 22 Ibid.

14 research and it does not take into account the possible change in consumption patterns.23

3.2 How the environment can cause conflict

One of the main questions addressed by this research deals with the link between environmental degradation and conflict. As will be described later on in this thesis, the Euphrates­Tigris river basin is an area where in the future the environment will probably change due to climate change and societal factors such as for instance urbanization. Although there are historical examples of the link between environmental change and conflict, the environment has not been accorded any great significance as a contributory factor.24 There is a body of research that investigates whether certain environmental factors may play a role in triggering or intensifying wars and armed conflicts, making a distinction between interstate and intrastate war.

Scientific research about these so­called environmental conflicts can be traced back to the 1970s. It was however not until the 1990s that scientists and scholars engaged in a serious academic debate and systematic research about, what up till then, had been vague assumptions about the presumed link between scarcity and conflict. The topic got renewed attention from policy makers as the Cold War drew to a close and was fueled additionally by the widespread attention for the concept of human security.25 During the 1990's two pioneer groups emerged conducting empirical research on the assumed nexus between environmental scarcity and the escalation of conflicts. In Toronto a group was formed around Homer Dixon and in Zürich a group emerged around Bächler and Spillmann. The theories posed by these two schools sparked a lively debate and research on the topic. It proceeded producing some alternative views on environmental scarcity and conflict. In Oslo a group of critiques emerged at PRIO headed by Gleditsch. They criticized the validity of the research done by the previous groups and opted that cooperation is a much more likely way of mitigating environmental scarcity rather than violent conflict. A fourth influential group came from the University of California (GECHS ). Their view was also more optimistic than that of the two pioneer groups and they argued that human ingenuity will prevent, in most cases, the eruption of violent conflict. The group's discourses will be discussed in the following section.

3.2.1 Toronto

One of the pioneer groups on environmental security research was the Toronto group formed around Homer Dixon which was very influential during the 1990's and whoes theories sparked a lot of debate. The group has carried out several qualitative case studies on conflicts in developing countries where they assumed a close link between environmental stress and acute conflict. The group assumed two causal linkages in the chain from environmental change towards conflict:26 Environmental change → Social effects → Violent conflict.

As the simplified linear model above shows, environmental change will not be a direct cause of conflict. It is in combination with other factors, such as social and physical factors, that

23 Rijsberman, “Water scarcity: Fact or fiction?.” 24 German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk (London: Earthscan, 2008). 25 Ibid. 26 Thomas Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

15 environmental scarcity can trigger violent conflict. A key concept in the theory of the group is of course the concept of environmental scarcity. By the group it is defined as the scarcity of renewable resources, such as water.27 Environmental scarcity can be divided into three types:28

• Demand induced: an increase in population growth and in the consumption behavior of individuals forces the amount of resources available to each person to decline dramatically. • Supply induced: degradation and depletion of renewable resources causes the net amount of resources available to decline sharply. • Structural: more institutional scarcity occurs as a result of imbalanced power and wealth within a society.

The group uses a basic neo­malthusian logic in their assumptions upon which this model is based. They propose that in the future there will be an increase of environmental related conflicts due to environmental change, population, and economic growth. This will lead to a decrease in quality and quantity of renewable resources and unequal resource access.29 Accordingly, scarcity is not absolute but relative. It is shaped by social and political circumstances; these social effects might trigger conflict.30 The group identified two types of conflict that were frequent to occur as a result of these social effects in a situation of environmental scarcity; these two types are resource capture and environmental marginalization. Resource capture is the situation where resource depletion and population growth cause unequal resource access. For instance a scarce renewable resources is privatized by an elite group in society in order to secure their access to this resource.31 This leads to the exclusions of other parts of the population to use this resource which will might lead to feelings of relative deprivation and could feed grievance which can be politicized and eventually lead to violent conflict. Ecological marginalization is the situation where unequal resource access and population growth cause resource degradation and depletion. This can happen for instance when groups dependent on an depleted resource migrate to other areas that are ecologically fragile. High population densities in these areas in combination with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local resources, causes severe environmental damage and chronic poverty.32 Social effects might pave the way for escalation into violence, this is however not an inevitable result. The effects of environmental scarcity can be overcome by social and technical ingenuity. The Toronto group is however pessimistic about the capacities of some countries to overcome these situations of increased scarcities, especially developing countries. They speak of a so called ingenuity gap. In developing countries the absence of adaptation mechanisms leads to weakened institutions and states. Furthermore, market failure, social friction, shortage of capital, and constraints on science contribute to environmental scarcity.33 It is often a vicious cycle where unsuccessful adaptation leads to further environmental scarcity which constraints economic development and leads to migration. This further weakens states and increases the possibility for violent escalation of the conflict. Serious scarcities tend to affect greater regions which makes it

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Thomas Homer Dixon, “On the threshold.Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (1991): 76­116. 30 Thomas Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5­40. 31 Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. 32 Thomas Homer Dixon, “The ingenuity gap: Can poor countries adapt to resource scarcity?,” Population & Development Review 21, no. 3 (September 1995): 587­612. 33 Ibid.

16 hard for a single state to counter the symptoms.34 The models and theories of the Toronto group have been of great influence on further research conducted in the field of environmental scarcity. The Toronto group gives an interesting insight into how environmental degradation might contribute to violent conflict. In the study they mention two types of conflict that are often to occur (resource capture & environmental degradation) and these seem very plausible. Also the relation between the social effects and the causal effect with conflict seem tenable. The model contains some weaknesses as well. Troublesome is one of the key factors that contribute to environmental scarcity: unequal resource access. Using this factor makes it hard to determine whether conflict is the result of environmental degradation or that it is the result of distribution mechanisms that are not optimal. The Toronto model distinguishes two elemental causal relations within the chain and it points out the social effects that can be of influence. There are however some threats to this model. A fundamental problem of the theory is that it is based on case studies that were selected on the dependent variable; the presence of violent conflict. The group did notlook at cases were environmental scarcity was present but where there was a different outcome than violent conflict. The model is also a bit too linear. The Toronto group initially did nottake into account the appliance of technology and human ingenuity. Homer Dixon did elaborate on this topic in a latter article, remaining skeptical however.35

3.2.2 Zürich: Environment & Conflict Project

The other pioneering group during the 1990s was the Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) of the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology in Zürich headed by Bächler and Spillmann. This group conducted a number of qualitative case studies on developing countries where both environmental change and violent conflict were present. The group assumed that environmental change may indirectly lead to conflict by intensifying existing potential for social and political conflict, to a point of escalation into violence. Accordingly conflicts are socially or politically motivated and not the result of environmental change. Rather environmentally induced intensification of conflict is a symptom of the modernization crisis entailed by the transformation from a subsistence economy to a market economy.36 The line of reasoning of the group is visualized by the Figure1.

Figure 1: ENCOP Model.37 In their model, environmental transformations do not affect only nature, but social and political systems as well, and therefore produce violence. The social and political order cannot be detached 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 37 Günther Bächler and Kurt Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation.,” Report of the International Conference at Monte Verità, Ascona, Switzerland, 3 ­ 7 October 1994 (September 1995); Günther Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis. (Zürich: Swiss federal Institute for Technology, 1998).

17 from its environmental context because it depends on the opportunities and constraints the environment provides for social and economic development.38 The ENCOP model relies on various triggering and inhibiting factors to determine which developments lead conflict.39 These triggering and inhibiting factors include:40

Triggering factors • Inevitable environmental conditions • Scarcity of regulatory mechanisms and poor state performance • Institutionalizing the environment • Opportunities to build organizations and find allies • Spillover from a historic conflict

Inhibiting factors • Legal and civil institutions • State capacity

Beside these factors, the role of environmental discrimination is essential to understand the causal mechanisms at work. The study showed that an alarmist position on environmental security is not very tenable because conflict will only occur within certain conditions. This conclusion resulted in seven different typologies of environmental conflict, among which is international water conflict between states sharing a river basin. 41 The research carried out by the ENCOP group resulted in a more theoretical model than that of the Toronto group. It draws the same conclusions however: that in the future there will be an increase of environmentally induced conflicts. The theoretical framework is a clear way to look at the process of environmental change to conflict outcomes. Another strength is that the assumption of the model is based upon the given fact that the social and political order cannot be detached from the environmental context. The model also takes into account adaptation. Their model also displays some weaknesses. The definition of scarcity they use is very broad for instance. Another problem is the use of the triggering and inhibiting factors. In some cases the factors mentioned are not mutually exclusive. The model itself lacks some explanatory power with regard to the outcome of environmental scarcity. As a analytical tool the group devised a typology with seven types of environmentally induced conflict. Despite the fact that some conflicts can be assigned to multiple types of conflict it can be quite useful.

38 Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 39 Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis. 40 Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 41 Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis.

18 3.2.3 Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo

Figure 2: PRIO Model.42

At the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway researchers expected a different result of environmental scarcity with regard to the theories from previous authors. The group assumed that cooperation is a much more likely result from environmental stress than conflict. However, in view of the ever increasing environmental stress worldwide they do not argue that cooperation will be the norm. The aim of the PRIO research was to counter the complexity of the qualitative models and to provide a correction to the deficiencies regarding the selection of the case studies were in general the outcome was violent conflict.43 The PRIO research criticizes other theories on their shortcomings such as lack of testable multivariate theories, un­testable case selection, and little consideration for democratization levels.44 The PRIO team compared in their research cases where resource conflict was conducted violently and cases where there was no escalation into violence.45 This requires a heavier weighing of political, economic and cultural variables than was done in previous studies.46 The Oslo group does confirm the link between environmental problems and violent conflict. They stress however that it is only one of many variables that may contribute to the escalation of conflict. Environmental factors might increase the risk of violent conflict; political and economic variables remain crucial in explaining the intensity and the outbreak of conflicts. Gleditsch and his team assume that given the increasing level of democracies in the world the number of violent conflicts will decline because democracies rarely fight with each other.47 They assume that established democracies are not likely to be weakened by environmental degradation and competition for resources. So, although local and national environmental problems will still occur, the cause for this will be other than shortages of resources and will in many cases be mitigated by social and political means. The conclusion they draw, having examined other studies, is that there is no empiric result that supports an explicit theory to why or whether resource scarcities will have a greater violence generating potential in the future in comparison with the past.48 The PRIO model is much more optimistic than the previous two models. This is also one of the strengths of the model. It takes into account other outcomes of environmental scarcity rather than violent conflict. It also pays more attention to the role of political and economic variables. Another strength is the linkage the group makes between violent conflict and the dependence on agricultural factors. The PRIO group has great belief in human ingenuity and democracy and this makes the model a bit technocratic. Another weakness in the model is that the group assumes that in the future

42 Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3, Special Issue on Environmental Conflict (May 1998): 381­400. 43 German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 44 Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” 45 German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 46 Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 299­317. 47 Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” 48 Ibid.

19 the number of democracies in the world will increase and therefore the possibility for environmentally induced conflict will reduce. There is no real empiric proof for this assumption. The model is a useful analytical tool in that it takes into account that environmental scarcity is just one of many variables that might induce violent conflict. In this assumption lies also it biggest threat, namely that the model does not really have any explanatory power. Some of its assumptions on mechanisms that will promote cooperation rather than conflict are based more on beliefs than on scientific evidence.

3.2.4 GECHS

Another theoretical model was designed by the GECHS research group headed by Matthew of the University of California in Irvine. The group examines environmental conflict from the perspective of human security. The Irvine group's focus is on the long­term adaptability of societies. According to the group what lacks in current research is quantifiable research on the relevance of demography as a factor, on whether resource abundance or resource scarcity holds the greater risk, and on whether environmental degradation might actually promote cooperation rather than fuel conflict.49 The theoretical model devised by the GECHS group is depicted below:

Figure 3: GECHS model.50

The GECHS group does not exclude the possibility of environmental conflict. The group sees that conflict can be an agent of change and a valve for societal pressure. Furthermore, conflicts know various gradations.51 In the figure that visualizes the GECHS model we see that the starting point of the causal chain is environmental stress. Environmental stress reduces adaptive capacity and promotes conflict according to the authors. Environmental stress is however not monolithic or cumulative.52 The occurrence of environmental stress will lead to an increased vulnerability of livelihoods; there is a causal relationship between the two. Where in other models there is a causal link between social effect and conflict or cooperation, the GECHS group added the factor of adaptation to the equation. Adaptation will take place on micro as well as macro level. Most effective adaptive variables may be involvement in regional regimes, development of democratic institutions, and participation in international trade. Adaptation is a slow and continual process with

49 German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 50 Richard Matthew, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research,” in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT , 8 (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002). 51 Richard Matthew and et al., Analyzing environment, conflict and cooperation. (Nairobi: UNEP, 2004). 52 Matthew, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research.”

20 social, economic, cultural and political­economic components.53 The process of adaptation is part of a feedback loop. Adaptation can succeed or it can fail. This should be viewed however in the long­ term. Adaptation can thus succeed or fail with various social effects as a result. In the worst case it can lead to conflict and state failure which will negatively influence the environmental and social circumstances.54 Although the group argues that environmental conflict is unlikely there are circumstanced under which it can happen. For instance, when there is a sudden and rapid loss of livelihoods and impoverishment coming from inadequate access to critical natural resources this might deepen the fault lines between groups and mobilize angry mobs towards violent ends.55 The group takes a long­term approach, so when there is a history of animosity between actors a violent outcome is more likely. The GECHS model looks promising because it differs from the dominant paradigm where environmental stress will have social effects which will evolve into violent conflict due to a limited adaptive capacity. The GECHS model counters this paradigm with more attention for the adaptive capacities of societies and a longer time frame. When looking at the hypotheses proposed by the group one could ask oneself if the group is not a bit too optimistic in stating that environmentally induced conflict is unlikely to happen because humans will most of the time find a way to cope with new situations. The use of the model for analysis poses both opportunities as well as threats due to the long­term approach character it has. On the one side, it adds an extra interesting element to the whole process of environmental scarcity, especially the part of ancient animosity between actors. On the other hand however one can state that in the long run all processes might lead to a peaceful equilibrium or at least a situation where violence is absent.

3.3 Water; the new oil?

Although the various schools disagree on the likeliness of environmentally induced conflict they do seem to agree that in the future there will be a possibility that under some circumstances environmental degradation might contribute to the escalation of a situation into violence. Can the same be said when we consider an increased scarcity of water? Since the 1990's bold statements have been made about the causal effect water scarcity has in triggering violence. Water is stated to become the oil of the 21st century and water wars were sure to emerge. Water has been identified as the most conflict­prone resource of the 21st century by policy makers as well as by academics.56 International water relations are often very complex, rarely transparent or easily quantifiable and the users often take very bold positions which are often conflicting. There is no consensus on the statement that water will be a conflict­prone resource, there is also little historical evidence to prove this. We do not have to assume however that the future will be the same as the past. In the following part the some theories on the nexus between water and conflict will be discussed.

Gleick of the Pacific Institute has executed extensive research into the state of water and the relation with conflict. One of the results of this research is the Water Conflict Chronology which gives a nearly complete overview of all water related incidents throughout human history. The overview 53 Richard Matthew and Leah Fraser, Global environmental change and human security: Conceptual & theoretical issues. (Irvine: GECHS/University of California, 2002). 54 Ibid. 55 Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer, Conserving the Peace: Resources, Livelihoods and Security (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002). 56 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, and Havard Hegre, “Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries?,” Political Geography 25 (2006): 361­382.

21 shows that water has been the root as well as instruments of war. According to Gleick, not all water resources disputes will lead to violent conflict; most will lead to negotiations and non­violent resolutions.57 However, in certain regions water is a scarce resource that has become increasingly important such as the Middle East and . Here water evolves into an issue of high politics, adding tension to the situation in regions that are already characterized by tensions and instability. There are several characteristics that make water likely to be the source of strategic rivalry, such as:

• degree of scarcity • the extent to which the water supply is stored by more than one state • relative power of the basin states • the ease of access to alternative fresh water resources

The pessimistic view of Gleick was shared to some extent by the Toronto group who also claimed, already in 1991, that water will be a chief resource issue in the 21st century.58 The rising demand will be the key problem, driven by population growth, and will cause water availability to drop, in certain regions, below 1,000 m3 per capita per year. Over the years the Toronto group has adjusted its alarming position on the happening of water wars. A surge of water wars is unlikely according to them because the phenomenon can only take place in a very narrow set of circumstances which include that:59

• downstream country must be highly dependent on the water source for its national well­ being • upstream country must be restricting substantially the river's flow • there is a history of antagonism between the two countries • downstream country must believe its military stronger

The alarming sounds of the Toronto group and Gleick where resonated by Zürich's ENCOP group. They listed water shortage as the number one environmental problem of the 21st century. One of the conclusions of the group was that water shortage was prone to lead to violent conflict and even war.60 The argument behind their conclusion was that water is a vital resource, for the individual as well as for society, which makes it probable that states will perceive the availability of water as an issue of national security.61 Therefore transboundary rivers for instance, will create situations of direct competition between riparians where it is perceived as a zero sum game.62 Another aspect that contributes to the violent conflict character water shortage might inherit is that water is a lootable resource, one that can be captured, which makes it more volatile for conflict. Other aspects that played a role in the emergence of conflict were:63

• climate

57 Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” International Security 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 79­112. 58 Homer Dixon, “On the threshold.Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict.”

59 Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. 60 Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis.

22 • geography • population growth • economic structure • state's ability to cope with vulnerability

According to the authors water problems around pollution and water quality will be easier to solve than access issues because the former can be dealt with technically.64 The development of water issues between countries or regions does not inevitably lead to violent conflict. Cooperation is tenable but only if political compromises are regarded as desirable and technical solutions as feasible. In their environmental violence typology they added four subtypes of conflict focused on conflict related to transboundary rivers. These four models are:65

• Mekong: Poorly integrated region with countries that have relatively symmetrical relations (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand). Although the region is full of conflicts, the river plays no role at all as an object of international conflict, although the individual countries definitely have water problems. Apparently there are specific cultural elements at work here. This situation could change if China, the hegemonic power of the region, were to realize its plans to build a cascade of fifteen dams upstream. • Rhine: In a strongly integrated region with industrial countries that have relatively symmetrical relations, there are now and then environmental conflicts, but they are solved on a political level thanks to existing regulatory mechanisms . • Colorado/Rio Grande : In conflict­rife bilateral relations between an industrial country and a developing country, water is also the object of numerous conflicts, but without having led to the threat or use of military force. Relations between the upstream and the downstream countries are asymmetric, but the economically powerful industrial country upstream usually after protests from the weaker downstream partner has been willing to mitigate conflicts by political compromise as well as financial and technical measures. • Euphrates/Tigris : A poorly integrated region rife with conflict. The countries of the region are in the process of modernization, under authoritarian and military regimes. The inter­national waterways, in a region plagued by aridity, are the object of political conflicts and lead to the use of force and even to threats of military action by the more powerful state upstream.

Contradicting the pessimism, at PRIO they doubted if there is a significant nexus between water scarcity and violent conflict. They conducted various statistical researches where they examined which factors were significant in the outbreak of violence. The hypothesis they tested was whether countries that share a river exhibit more conflict behavior.66 They found that sharing rivers significantly increases the risk of outbreak of a militarized dispute.67 However, these kind of disputes an sich are very low probability events. Over the years they conducted several other statistical researches and they found that the chance of conflict increases when there are inconsistent regimes, only one democracy among the actors or when there are multiple autocracies. They also found that if population growth is large, the chance on conflict is greater this because the effect of water scarcity is more stronger.68 Furthermore, combined resources present within a basin, such as fresh water and groundwater, present a potential source of conflict. Another finding of their research was that the conflict potential may also increase if the production of certain goods indirectly are based upon the availability of water or the presence of other dependencies on the scarce resources such as high population densities, fisheries, agricultural areas or cities located by the river because 64 Ibid. 65 Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 66 Kathryn Furlong, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Havard Hegre, “Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict,” International Interactions 32, no. 1 (2006): 79­108. 67 Ibid. 68 Ragnhil Nordas and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Climate change and conflict,” Political Geography 26 (2007): 627e638.

23 of their historical economic importance.69 In other words, the societal dependency on a certain source of water significantly influences conflict potential, albeit that the eruption of these situations into violence is not very likely. Also raising question marks about water wars were Wolf et al. from the University of Oregon. They strongly doubt if there is a link between water and conflict, at least at a national level. Throughout history water often has been a tool of war or a target but never the main cause. Wolf et al. argue that violence over water does not seem strategically rational, hydrographically effective or economically viable and therefore the chance of a water war is slim to none.70 It is likely that tensions will arise around a basin; this happens when the rate of change within a basin exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb change.71 Disputes often erupt in the downstream regions.72 Violent outcomes of disputes on lower levels are more plausible.73 Wolf makes the distinction between factors that will add to the resilience of a basin and factors that will add to the vulnerability of a basin:

Adding to basin resilience: • international agreements and institutions • history of collaborative projects • generally positive political relations • higher levels of economic development

Adding to basin vulnerability: • rapid environmental change • rapid population growth or asymmetric economic growth • major unilateral development projects • the absence of institutional capacity • generally hostile relations

Most groups tend to see that drivers such as population growth, environmental degradation, basin regimes, international law etc. tend to either promote conflict or cooperation. A group in London centered around Allan argues that often conflict and cooperation co­exist with changing intensities.74 When seeing conflict and cooperation as two opposites of a spectrum, relations around water issues are simplified, the group argues. In order to better interpret the differences between conflict and cooperation they came up with the Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS).The group identifies four levels of conflict: When an issues in not of concern to the state than it is non­ politicized; when it does appear on the political agenda the issue becomes politicized. The issue is then part of political decision making. The next step is the phase when an issue becomes

69 Gleditsch, Furlong, and Hegre, “Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries?.”

70 Aaron Wolf, “Shared Water: Conflict and Cooperation,” The Annual Review of Environment and Resources, no. 32 (2007): 241­269. 71 Aaron Wolf, Kerstin Stahl, and Marcia Macomber, “International Water Conflict and Cooperation: A Survey of the Past; Reflections on the Future,” in , 2003. 72 Sandra Postel and Aaron Wolf, “Dehydrating conflict,” Foreign Policy (September 2001). 73 Wolf, “Shared Water: Conflict and Cooperation.” 74 Naho Mirumachi and J.A. Allan, “Revisiting Transboundary Water Governance:Power, Conflict, Cooperation and the Political Economy,” in (presented at the CAIWA International Conference on Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Scarcity, Basel, 2007).

24 securitized. This is when the issue is an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifies actions outside the bound of the normal political procedure. The final stage on this ladder is when the issue becomes violized; this is when violence becomes part of the issue; an already securitized issue becomes a reason of war.75 For cooperation they identified five different levels. At the lowest level there is the confrontation of the issue where the issue is recognized but no joint action is taken or shared goals are stated. When joint action is taken, but no shared goals the issue can be perceived as ad hoc interaction. When the opposite is true, there are shared goals are stated but no joint action, then there is technical cooperation. The difference between the two is how the goals are shaped by the actors. A higher level of cooperation intensity is the risk averting level where there is joint action and shared goals and the actors expect that the other will execute its actions. In this stage the actors do not undertake the unforeseen costs in the future. When these risks and costs are taken into account cooperation intensity is high and is called risk taking cooperation.76

3.4 Triggering and Inhibiting factors

The theories differ significantly in their assumptions about the likeliness of violent conflict induced by water scarcity. Despite these differences they all discuss the matter into detail and identify various factors that would certainly add to the tensions between actors and factors that have a more positive effect on international relations connected with the use of water resources. In this chapter we have discussed the various theories and their assumptions and based upon these overviews we can compile a list with so called triggering and inhibiting factors: Table 1: Triggering & Inhibiting factors over water­induced violence.

Triggering factors Inhibiting factors Rapid environmental change Higher levels of economic development Large population growth Involvement in international regimes Downstream country is highly dependent on the resources Participation in international trade Presence of groundwater besides surface water History of collaborative projects Inconsistent regimes; only 1 democracy or multiple autocracies History of antagonism/ Spillover from historical conflict General hostile tensions Large unilateral development projects Upstream country substantially restricting river flow Asymmetric economic growth Downstream country believes it has more military power than upstream riparian Absence of institutional capacity Lack of regulatory mechanisms Chance of institutionalizing the environment Opportunity to find allies Scarcity exceeds the adaptive capacity of the state

75 Ibid. 76 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, “Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation,” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics 8, no. 4 (December 2008): 297­316.

25 These factors form an important analytical tool in analyzing the possible outcomes of the scenarios used further on in this research. As presented in the table this list of factors is still somewhat unrefined. If we take a closer look at the list we can see that some of the factors are very similar, such as the triggering factors “absence of institutional capacity”, “lack of regulatory mechanisms”, and “chance of institutionalizing the environment” coupled with the inhibiting factor “involvement in international regimes”. The value of some of the factors is independent from developments in the environmental or societal sphere such as “history of antagonism” and “history of collaborative projects”. The factors will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

4. The Euphrates­Tigris river basin.

4.1.1 Introduction

This chapter includes a quick overview of the area of the Euphrates­Tigris river basin. It entails the characteristics of the two rivers and of the three riparians complemented with some additional background information about the Kurdish minority in the region, a historical overview of conflict and cooperation within the basin, and the current perceptions of the riparians concerning water issues around the two rivers. A more elaborate version of this chapter's content and more elaborate information can be found in annexes B and C.

4.1.2 The river system

Figure 4: Euphrates­Tigris river basin. The red line indicates the total area of the watershed.77

The Euphrates and the Tigris are the two largest rivers in the Middle East and of great importance in the region. Historically the land between the two rivers, known as Mesopotamia, has been the birthplace of civilization fostering ancient empires such as Sumeria, Babylon, and Assyria. Both rivers originate in the Anatolian Highlands in Eastern Turkey and flow through Syria and Iraq. At

77 “South West Asia Project,” http://www.yale.edu/ceo/Projects/swap.html.

26 Al Qurnah in southern Iraq the two rivers join and form the Shatt al­Arab which empties in the Persian Gulf and forms a border between Iran and Iraq. The combined river basin covers an area of an estimated 789,000 km², which is slightly more than twice the size of , and has an average annual flow of 46 km³ per year. The total length of the Euphrates is about 2,800 kilometers; the Tigris covers some 1,900 kilometers in length. The riparians include Iran (24.80% of total area), Iraq (40.48%), (0.25%), (0.01%), Syria (14.73%) and Turkey (24.80%).78 Relevant riparians, considering this research only include Turkey, Syria and Iraq since they make most extensive use of the river flow as it flows through their territory. It is hard to determine the average annual discharge of both rivers because the Euphrates and Tigris experience large yearly fluctuations. In the mid 1970's the annual discharge reached over 84 km³ while in the early 1960's the rivers experienced some severe droughts where the discharge was well below 30 km³.79 These fluctuations make it very hard to develop an adequate plan for water allocation for competing sectors as well as to ensure fair sharing of water amongst the riparians.

4.1.3 Euphrates

The Euphrates originates on the Armenian Plateau in northeastern Turkey where it is formed by the Murat and Karasu rivers. These rivers form the Euphrates at the Keban dam, due to heavy alteration in the 20th century, which was completed in 1974.80 From the Taurus Mountains the river flows to southeastern Turkey through the Karakaya and Atatürk dams which where built during the 1980's. The Atatürk dams contribute to a large irrigation project for .81 The Euphrates is largely a snow fed river and is therefore dependent on the winter rain and spring snow melt in the Zargos and Taurus mountains. In general this melting period spans from March to July when the river receives 45­80% of its annual flow. During the low period, which spans from July to September, the river does not receive more than 10% of its annual flow. 82Turkey contributes about 90% of the annual flow on the Euphrates while the remaining 10% originates in Syria.83

Passed the Karakaya and Atatürk dams the river flow continues to the south in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea and bends southeast in the direction of Syria. In Syria it enters into a barren region where the cultivable area is only a few miles wide.84 The Euphrates dam, which was completed in 1973, collects water from the Euphrates to form Lake Al Asad which is important for Syria's agricultural and hydro­electrical production. Downstream the dam the reduced flow receives water from the Balĩkh and Khãbũr rivers which are its only tributaries. Here the river, also fed by rainfall, is able to support intensive agriculture.85 In Iraq the flow of the river narrows again, the

78 “International River Basins of the World: Asia,” http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/register/tables/IRB_asia.html. 79 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture,” Turkey, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/turkey/index.stm. 80 Peter Beaumont, “Agricultural and environmental changes in the upper Euphrates catchment of Turkey and Syria and their political and economic implications,” Applied Geography 16, no. 2 (April 1996): 137­157, doi:doi: DOI: 10.1016/0143­6228(95)00033­X. 81 State Hydrolic Works, Turkey Water Report 2009, Turkey Water Report (Ankara: State Hydrolic Works (DSI), March 2009). 82 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture,” Iraq, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/iraq/index.stm. 83 “Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia,” http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/595616/Tigris­Euphrates­river­system. 84 Ibid. 85 Beaumont, “Agricultural and environmental changes in the upper Euphrates catchment of Turkey and Syria and their

27 stream widens again after passing the city of Hit. In Iraq the river splits in to separate stream which support local irrigation and make cultivation able in the desert areas in the south and east. Due to irrigations and dam reservoirs the river loses much of it flow.86 At Al Qurnah, below Baghdad, the Euphrates joins with the Tigris to form the Shatt al­Arab which empties in the Persian Gulf.

4.1.4 Tigris

The Tigris, which originates in Lake Hazar, is fed by a number of tributaries and drains a wide area of eastern Turkey. It receives water from winter rain and spring snow melt in the Zagros and Taurus Mountains, which occurs from February through June, and accounts for 60­80% of its annual flow. It forms the border between Turkey and Syria and receives water from the Khãbũr at the border with Iraq. In April and March the volume of the Tigris is doubled by the contributions of the Zab rivers in Iraq; this increased flow is controlled by the Bakhma and Dukan dams which prevent extreme flooding.87 The Tigris receives water from various tributaries which originate in Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi Kurdistan. These flows make the river susceptible for short­term flooding. Turkey contributes about 38% directly and another 11% through tributaries which confluence with the Tigris further downstream in Iraq. The majority of the flow, 51%, originates in Iran and confluence with the Tigris through three tributaries: the Little Zab, Dyala, and Karkeh.88 The Tigris reaches the alluvial plain near Samarra where it is regulated by Lake Al Tharthar in the west which is in connection with the Euphrates via Lake Al Habbaniyyah. Around Baghdad the river is artificially embanked to control the river flow from flooding the surroundings. South of Baghdad the Tigris is a source for irrigation for the eastern Baghdad region. At al Qurnah the river joins the Euphrates to form the Shatt al Arab.

4.1.5 Climate

The Euphrates and Tigris make one of the harshest regions in the world habitable. The course of both rivers flows through various terrains before it empties in the Persian Gulf. The region has a continental subtropical climate with average temperature in summer higher than 32°C and temperatures lower than 10°C in winter.89 Precipitation is light in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates but increases considerably at higher elevations in their source areas.90 Much of the precipitation falls as snow. During winter, the mean temperature in the mountains is well below freezing point. With the melting of the snow in spring, the rivers’ volume increases. The mountain flow is augmented in their middle courses by seasonal rainfall, which reaches its peak between March and May. In the lower courses of the rivers in the alluvial plain, rain can be torrential in winter but usually does not exceed 200 mm per year. 91 On the Mesopotamian plain in Iraq, the most characteristic climatic feature is the extreme heat of the summer, with daytime temperatures rising as high as 60 °C. Often, there are drops of 22 °C from day to night.92 The rivers experience two periods of flooding; the irregular period from November till March and the main flooding period caused by the melting of snow in spring in April and May.

political and economic implications.” 86 Ibid. 87 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 88 Ibid. 89 “Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia.” 90 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed,” Turkey, http://www.fao.org/sd/climagrimed/c_1_04_09.html. 91 “Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia.” 92 Ibid.

28 4.2 The riparians

4.2.1 Iraq

Over the past few years Iraq has been tangled up in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. It has been occupied with reconstructing the country and trying to establish civil order. It has been successful to some extent in decreasing the attacks of Islamic militias and in the improvement of the security environment in many parts of the country. The country however still suffers from regularly heavy attacks by several of the many fundamentalist militias active in the country. Relatively, the most stable part of the country is the northern part at the border with Turkey where a large Kurdish minority lives and which is ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Regarding the economy, the country is dominated by its oil sector as it ranks fourth in the world on proven oil reserves and also has substantial natural gas reserves.93 Iraq is an arid country with large areas covered by deserts. The majority of the 29 million inhabitants therefore live in the area between the Euphrates and Tigris. These two rivers are essential for the agricultural sector and water supply in general. The Euphrates and Tigris drain an area the size of Great Britain. Estimates of water use in 2000 were that a total of 66 km³ of water was withdrawn, 79% thereof agriculture, 6.5% for domestic purposes and 14.5% for the industrial sector. Per capita water withdrawal was 2,632 m³ per year, while availability per capita was estimated at 2,652 m³.94 The water resources of Iraq depend largely on the surface water of the Euphrates and Tigris and most renewable water resources in Iraq come from outside the country. The water dependency ratio of Iraq, as calculated by the FAO, is 53.5%.95

4.2.2 Syria

Since 1970 Syria has been under control of the Ba'ath party. Although the country is officially a parliamentary republic, due to a 1963 emergency law the country has been under an authoritarian military dominated regime. The emergency law has ever since been justified in the light of the continuing war with Israel, which occupies the Golan Heights on Syrian territory. The survival of the Ba'ath party has been due partly to the strong desire for stability and its success in giving small minorities a stake in society. Due to the regime Syria has become an important regional power. The country's economy is dominated by the petroleum and agricultural sectors which account for about 50% of national GDP.96 The agricultural center of the country is a triangular shaped area between Hassakeh, and . Due to its Mediterranean climate, Syria is an arid country. For water supply it depends on a lot of external renewable resources, the Euphrates being the most important. The dependency ratio of the country is therefore quite high at 72.3%.97 Of all water withdrawn 87.9% is for the agricultural sector, 8.5% for domestic use, and 3.5% for industrial purposes.

93 “Iraq Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis ­ Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Oil.html. 94 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 95 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 96 “DDP Quick Query,” http://ddp­ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport. 97 “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture,” Syria, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/syria/index.stm.

29 Total water withdrawal in Syria has been estimated at 16.69 km³ per year or 860 m³ per capita per year, with an availability of 865 m³ per capita per year.98

4.2.3 Turkey

The modern republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 on the remains of the former by national hero Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Under his authoritarian rule the country underwent some wide ranging political, social, and legal reforms. Aim of Atatürk was to create a modern European state. Since then, the number of Turkish political parties has multiplied but democracy has been fragile and regularly interrupted by military coups which in each case resulted in the return of power to the civilian authorities. The military sees itself as the safeguards of the secular state and will intervene whenever it feels that the government becomes too much Islam­oriented. A separatist insurgency begun in 1984 by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has dominated the Turkish military attention and the ongoing conflict has claimed more than 35,000 lives so far.99 Since the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 the rebels have largely withdrawn form Turkey to northern Iraq from where they conduct their insurgency operations. Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and NATO in 1952. In 1964 Turkey became an associate member of the European Union. Over the past decade it has undertaken many reforms to strengthen its democracy and economy. It began membership talks with the European Union in 2005.100 Turkey has a modern economy, a mix of modern industry and commerce combined with the traditional agricultural sector which still employs about 30% of the total labor force. Turkey is also an important transit country between Europe and the oil rich regions of the Middle East and the . In 2006 the Baku­Tbilisi­Ceyhan pipeline was finished, which will bring up to one million barrels per day from the Caspian to market.101

Regarding water use, in 2003 around 40.1 km³ of water was withdrawn, 74% for the agricultural sector, 15% for domestic purposes, and 11% for the industrial sector. In Turkey there is an increasing trend in groundwater withdrawal in order to meet the demand, especially in areas where surface water is scarce. Since Turkey is in its region a relative water rich region, it has a by the FAO calculated dependency ratio of only 1%. Water availability per capita is 2,889 m³ per year while water withdrawal per capita per year is estimated at only 542 m³.102

4.3 Historical overview on conflict and cooperation

1946: A first agreement was made on the Euphrates­Tigris river basin between Turkey and the then Kingdom of Iraq. The were allowed to do surveys and collect data in Turkey in order to locate a suitable location for building dams in Iraq.103

1960's: Various bilateral and tripartite meetings were held, sometimes with Soviet involvement.

98 Ibid. 99 “Kurdish rebels kill Turkey troops,” BBC, April 8, 2007, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6537751.stm. 100“CIA ­ ­­ Turkey,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the­world­factbook/geos/tu.html. 101“Caspian pipeline is declared open,” BBC, July 13, 2006, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5175676.stm. 102“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 103“No 580 Treaty of friendship and neighbourly relations between Iraq and Turkey signed at Ankara on 29 March 1946,” March 1946.

30 1973: Start construction of Tabqa dam in Syria. 1973: Keban dam in Turkey filled up. 1974: Syria and Iraq agree that Syria will guarantee an additional flow of 200 million m³/y on the Euphrates. 1975: Iraq claims that the flow in the Euphrates has dropped from the normal 920 m³/sec to 197 m³/sec.104 The Iraq government requested the intervention of the Arab League. The denied the allegations and dropped out of the Arab League. Tension between the two countries rose to unprecedented levels and both countries sent troops to their mutual border. At the brink of war the crisis was averted by mediation of Saudi Arabia. No official agreement was reached but in the future water from the Euphrates would be for 42% Syria and Syria would guarantee 58% of the water to flow to Iraq.

1980: Turkey and Iraq specify the 1946 agreement and erect a joint economic committee which allowed for meetings to take place about water resources. 1983: Syria joins the committee. 1983: Turkey unilaterally guarantees to to allow 15.75 km³/y water flows across the border into Syria. 1986: Tripartite meeting held but with little results. 1987: Agreement reached between Turkey and Syria guaranteeing that Turkey would pass 500 m³/sec of Euphrates water into Syria. 1989: Syria officially reached an agreement with Iraq in which they confirmed that of the amount of water from the Euphrates flowing into Syria, 42% will be used by Syria while the other 58% will flow into Iraq.105

1990: The flow of the Euphrates is interrupted for a month as Turkey finishes the construction of the Atatürk dam which is part of the Grand Anatolia Project. Syria and Iraq protest that Turkey now has a weapon of war. In mid­1990 Turkish president Turgut Ozal threatens to restrict water flow to Syria to force it to withdraw support for Kurdish rebels operating in southern Turkey .106 1990: Talks were being held between the three countries as a result of the filling up of the Ataturk dam by Turkey. Iraq insisted that 300 m³/sec should reach the border. The talks were aborted because of the outbreak of the Gulf War. 1991: Turkey refuses to block the Euphrates despite allied requests to do so. Water is life and Turkey will not use water as a military instrument. 1992: Completion of the GAP project by filling up the Atatürk dam. This act was in the Arab media portrayed as belligerent. Euphrates river flow was shut for a month. Other riparians blame Turkey for not informing them. Iraq threatens to bomb the dam. 1992: Negotiations between the three riparians continued but were soon aborted after Turkey's rejection of the Iraqi demand to increase the flow from the Turkish borders from 500 m³/sec to 700 m³/sec. 1996: Syria and Iraq formed a joint committee to discuss what would be a fair distribution of the water from the Euphrates and Tigris between Syria, Turkey and Iraq. 1998: Status qua turns for the worse when Turkey threatens Syria with military action if it did not

104Aaron T. Wolf and Joshua Newton, “Case study transboundary dispute resolution: the Tigris­Euphrates basin” (University of Oregon; Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 2007). 105“Law No. 14 of 1990, ratifying the Joint Minutes concerning the provisional division of the waters of the Euphrates River,” http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/257ENG.htm. 106“The World's Water,” http://www.worldwater.org/chronology.html.

31 stop supporting the rebels from the Kurdish Labor Party or PKK. 1998: Agreement was reached between the two rivals in Adana Syria declared that it will not longer support the rebels. It is often stated that this agreement was linked to water issues.107

2001: Syria and Iraq held talks to establish water sharing deals and both express their desire and intention to hold tripartite meetings with Turkey. 2001: Turkey and Syria reach an agreement on a protocol for cooperation between Turkey's GAP and Syria's corresponding GOLD (General Organization for Land Development) projects.108 This cooperation is in general confined to technical cooperation. 2008: In March the three countries decided to form a water institution in order to end the problems in the region. The riparians have decided to cooperate on water issues by establishing a water institute that will consist of 18 water experts from each country to work toward the solution of water­related problems among the three countries. This institute will conduct its studies at the facilities of the Atatürk Dam, the biggest dam in Turkey, and plans to develop projects for the fair and effective use of transboundary water resources. Institute is fully financed by the Turkish government.109

4.4 Current perceptions

The most important issue in this case study is the division of the water from the Euphrates among the three riparians. On this topic Turkey does not agree on identifying the legal position of Iraq and Syria by considering the Euphrates as a transboundary river rather than an international river. Flash point has been the filling of two dams in the 1970's which severely reduced the flow downstream to Iraq. Water quality issues play a role as well. Between Turkey and Syria there is also the issue around water division of the Orontes which flows from Syria to Turkey. Although there has been a near military clash between Iraq and Syria, the most troublesome relation seems to be between Syria and Turkey. They share multiple rivers, such as the Orontes, and throughout the years the Syrian government has supported the Kurdish PKK rebels. Syria has also been upset by the Turkish military support to Israel.110 There have been frequent military tensions between Turkey and Iraq as well, as Turkey invaded northern Iraq to attack Kurdish rebels.111 The 2001 Adana agreement has been a breakthrough in the negotiations, as well as the protocol for the coordination between Turkey's GAP and Syria's GOLD. The last years there seem to be an intensification in negotiations and cooperation initiatives; Turkey transfers technical experts to the other riparians. It seems that the riparians start their cooperation on the lowest level by confining their cooperation to focus on pure technical and technological issues, thereby possibly ignoring the need to create a legal framework as the basin's main mechanisms to regulate this transfer of technology and knowledge. It is hard to say how the developments might progress in the coming years. Fact is that due to climatic change the Euphrates­Tigris basin will suffer from water scarcity not only in the middle and lower reaches but also in the upper reaches.112 This can be good news for

107“MINUTES,” http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/381ENG.htm. 108“JOINT COMMINIQUE between the Republic of Turkey and the Arab Republic of Syria,” http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/188ENG.htm. 109“Turkey­Iraq­Syria to form a water institution,” http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=8447636. 110Wolf and Newton, “Case study transboundary dispute resolution: the Tigris­Euphrates basin.” 111“Turkey continues Iraq assault,” BBC, February 25, 2008, sec. World, http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_7260000/newsid_7263900/7263995.stm? bw=nb&mp=wm&news=1&nol_storyid=7263995&bbcws=1. 112“Mapping future water stress,” BBC, February 2, 2009, sec. Science & Environment, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7821082.stm; Joseph Alcamo, Martina Flörke, and Michael Märker ,

32 the downstream riparians because this might entail that Turkey needs to cooperate with them, forced by nature. But it can also mean that Turkey, in the future, might restrict the flow due a diminished availability of water.

4.5 The Kurdish question

A factor that certainly added tensions in the past between the three riparians is the presence of a large Kurdish minority. In the whole basin area there live an estimated 30 million Kurds. The term 'Kurds' itself is used to refer to a large and divers ethno­linguistic group. The Kurds are the largest minority in such a concentrated area in the world without an own state.113 The majority of the Kurds live in an area also referred to as Kurdistan which consists of parts of eastern Turkey, northern Syria, western Iran, and northern Iraq. The Treaty of Sevres, in 1920, which created the modern states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey initially also included the creation of a independent Kurdish state. The treaty was however never ratified after Atatürk came to power in Turkey in 1923, together with Iran and Iraq they agreed to not recognize the sovereignty of an autonomous Kurdish state.114 During the 20th century the Kurdish minority has received harsh treatment from especially Iraq and Turkey. In Turkey the government did not recognize the Kurds as a minority group. They outlawed their language and forbid them to wear their traditional clothing in the cities as well as encouraged the migration of Kurds to the cities in order to dilute the population in the eastern part of the country. Turkey's GAP is also considered by the Kurdish population in Turkey as an attempt to assimilate them with the .115 Similar treatment was received by the Kurds in Northern Iraq, especially by the hand of the Saddam Hussein regime. After the Kurds supported Iran in the 1980­88 Iran­Iraq war, Hussein retaliated hard in the rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan by destroying villages and bombing them with chemical weapons, such as the village of Halabja, claiming 5,000 casualties.116 Despite the common goal of autonomy, the Kurds are hardly unified. From 1994­98 two Kurdish factions­ the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)­ fought a bloody war for power in northern Iraq. At the same time the PKK was waging a guerrilla insurgency in southeastern Turkey, and rejected the Iraqi Kurds decision to seek local self­government within a federal Iraq.117 Initially the KDP and PUK were supported by the Turkish government in order to get a grip on the PKK. The situation became a double­edged sword however; while the establishment of a de facto state kept refugees from Turkish territory it also created a safe haven for the PKK to launch its insurgency actions into Turkey.118 As a reaction Turkey launched counterattacks on Iraqi territory without the consent of the Iraqi government which caused irritation with the Iraqi government and led to some political disturbance between the two countries.119

“Future long­term changes in global water resources driven by socio­economic and climatic changes,” Hydrological Sciences–Journal–des Sciences Hydrologiques 52, no. April (2007): 247­275. 113“Kurdistan ­ Kurdish Conflict”; “Kurdish people ­ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia”; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey.” 114“Washingtonpost.com: Terrorism Report,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp­ srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm; “Timeline: Iraqi Kurds,” BBC, June 10, 2009, sec. Country profiles, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/2893067.stm; “Kurdistan ­ Kurdish Conflict.” 115“Washingtonpost.com: Terrorism Report”; Heinz Brill, “Die Türkei auf dem Weg zu einer "Wassergrossmacht",” Österreichische Militär Zeitschrift, no. 5 (2006). 116“Washingtonpost.com: Terrorism Report”; “Timeline.” 117“Washingtonpost.com: Terrorism Report.” 118International Crisis Group, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds; Conflict or Cooperation?, Middle East report (Brussel: International Crisis Group, November 2008). 119“Turkey continues Iraq assault.”

33 Figure 5: Kurdish inhabited area.120

The usage of northern Iraq as a safe haven came after Kurdish rebels were expelled from Syria. In the past the PKK has been alleged to be supported by Syria. Kurdish rebels used Syrian territory to launch their attacks into eastern Turkey. This deteriorated the relations between Turkey and Syria. In 1998 the two countries reached an agreement in which Syria stated that it would no longer tolerate Kurdish rebels on its territory. It is said that this agreement was reached by linking it to water issues.121 Nowadays Turkey advocates stronger ties with the KRG. They probably do this in order to extend their influence, ensure that action is taken against the PKK, and possibly to secure Turkey as a trans­shipment country for Kurdish oil and gas.122 Furthermore, they view the area as a buffer between Turkey and the rest of Iraq, in the event of a violent escalation of the situation in Iraq after the USA withdraw their troops.123 The empowerment of the KRG is not welcomed with open arms by all parts of Turkish society. Many of the Kemalist national establishment and armed forces see the existence of this autonomous area as an threat.124

5. Setting the scene: development and trends towards 2050

5.1 Introduction

It is very hard to make any kind of solid prediction about how the future may take shape.125 To make

120“Kurdish people ­ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people; “Kurdistan ­ Kurdish Conflict,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan.htm. 121“MINUTES.” 122“Turkey frees more Euphrates water for Iraq ­ UPI.com,” http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/07/02/Turkey­frees­more­Euphrates­water­for­Iraq/UPI­ 84941246556375/. 123International Crisis Group, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds; Conflict or Cooperation? 124Ibid. 125 unless you are Nostradamus

34 a projection on how a society in a certain region will look like in a 50 year time span is very complex because there are a lot of uncertainties. Still, various forecasts are made that try to give us an idea of what our future possibly look like. Often these projections are based on the continuation of existing trends, which is a somewhat limited approach since it does not really take into account various shocks or spikes that could occur in the future. To overcome these kind of major uncertainties, forecasts are also frequently based on scenarios which identify possible approaches, societal choices, and the implications of various actions. The result is not a prediction but a possible pathway to the future. In this chapter, as well as in chapter 6, a sketch will be made about how the future might take shape in the Euphrates­Tigris river basin. The focus lies on key areas such as environmental change, economic development, and population growth, regarding the period 2030­ 2050. This sketch is based on research done by various leading institutes and organizations in their field of research, such as the World Bank, IPCC, various divisions of the UN specialized in environment and population growth, and the WaterGAP model developed by the University of Kassel and the Dutch Institute for Public Health (RIVM).

5.2 World population prospects

World's population is expected to increase in the coming decades. Various projections estimate that population will peak around 2075, at which earth's population will count 9.2 billion people.126 Other projections range from a total world population as low as 7.4 billion, which is only about 1 billion more than the current population, to one as high as 10.6 billion people.127 In general the expectations are that every year earth's population will expand by as much people as there live in Italy today. Most of this demographic change will take place in the developing world, especially in Africa and Asia.128 Besides an absolute growth of population there will be another important demographic trend in the future: the increase of urbanization. The urban areas will absorb all the estimated growth in the future. In 2008, for the first time in history, the urban population equaled the rural population. In the coming decade the rural population is expected to decrease and 0.6 billion less rural inhabitants are expected by 2050.129 These trends will be no different for the situation in the river basin. The population in the river basin will increase towards 2050 and the largest part of this increase will be absorbed by the urban areas.

5.2.1 Iraq

Iraq's population is likely to increase in the coming decades. If fertility rate is kept constant at the 2005­2010 levels, Iraq's population can increase up to 91 million people by 2050, which would mean that will equal 208 inhabitants per km². More moderate projections expect a population between 55.8 million and 72.8 million people by 2050 which is a large increase taking into account the fact that current population number would double.130 In 2005 about two­thirds of the total population lived in urban areas. This share will increase in the future. By 2050 almost 80% of all Iraqis will live in urban areas and only 20% will live in the rural

126United, World Population to 2300 (New York: Department of Social & Economic Affairs; Population Division, 2004); United Nations Development Programme, World Urbanization Prospects: the 2007 Revision; Highlights (New York: Department of Social & Economic Affairs; Population Division, 2008); World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Managing the next wave of globalization, Global Economic Prospects (Washington D.C: World Bank, 2007); Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 127United Nations Development Programme, World Urbanization Prospects: the 2007 Revision; Highlights. 128United, World Population to 2300. 129United Nations Development Programme, World Urbanization Prospects: the 2007 Revision; Highlights. 130“World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database.”

35 countryside. The population of Baghdad will increase from 5 million (2007) to 8 million by 2025.131 Iraq has a young population with an average age of around 19 years. In the coming decades population will increase and living conditions will improve benefiting the median age which will reach an average of approximately 30 years while life expectancy will increase from 67 to 76.132 Due to population growth and the mild aging of society the labor force of Iraq will grow the coming decades, which implies that the economy needs to grow as well to employ these people. This trend is illustrated by the change of the so­called dependency ratio of the country. This ratio, which is measured as the number of dependents in the age range of 0­14 and 65+ on every 100 people working in the age range of 15­65, is estimated to decrease significantly. In 2005 for every 100 people working 83 people were dependent on them, of which the majority (76) were children. This ratio will gradually decrease to a level of about 50 by 2050. The number of children that are dependent will decrease, remaining larger, and the number of old­aged will slightly increase.133 The overall increase in population implies that Iraq is in need of a larger economy to sustain this number of inhabitants as well that it will need more water and food to sustain them. Because most of the growth will take place in the urban areas, this will mean that these urban areas need improved facilities to absorb this change.

5.2.2 Syria

Syria has had a strong population growth over the last five years with an average annual growth of about 3%. Syria's population will continue to grow in the coming decades albeit at a lower rate. In 2005 Syria inhabited 19 million people; this number will have increased by 2050 to at least 31 million with a possibly even reaching 49 million. As a result of this increase, population density will increase as well, from 100 people per km² to 200 people per km².134 According to the general expected trend, also in Syria the urban areas will increase. By 2025 the population of and Aleppo will be 3.6 and 4 million respectively which is in total 2.5 million people more than current levels. The rural share of the total population will decrease from 50% (2005) to 30% (2050).135 Like Iraq, Syria has a young population of which the median age will increase in the coming decades while life expectancy will rise from 74 to 80 years. Syria more or less will experience the same trends in demography as Iraq although the levels will be a bit lower overall. With regard to their dependency ratio, 2050 levels might well equal 2005 levels as it will decrease with a lowest point in 2035.136 These trends, which again are very similar to those in Iraq, imply that Syria's economy needs to grow in order to sustain this number of people and the need for food and water will increase.

5.2.3 Turkey

The trends in Turkey are expected to be different from those in Iraq and Syria. Turkey's population will have a sharp population growth in the period from 2010 to 2020. After that period the growth rate will diminish to a rate below 1% per year. In the low projection Turkey will even experience a negative growth in the period 2040­2050, be it marginal.137 Of the three riparians Turkey is to expect the least dramatic increase in its population. In 2005 Turkey had a population of 71 million; under 131“World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database,” http://esa.un.org/unup/index.asp. 132“World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database.” 133Ibid. 134Ibid. 135“World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.” 136“World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database.” 137Ibid.

36 the highest projection this will be 111 million by 2050. In absolute numbers this increase equals Syria's possible total population by 2050 but viewed in percentages it is smaller than the increase in Iraq and Syria, even at the low projections. Turkey's growth will be completely absorbed by the urban areas as 84% of total population will live in urban areas by 2050. By 2020 this share is already 75%, compared with the 2005 level of 67%. This also entails that by 2050 only 16% of total population will live in the rural areas which might have consequences for Turkey's traditional agricultural sector and for the economy in general.138 By 2025 the country will have eight cities with a population larger than one million people. The outlier will be with a total population of 12 million people which is about 13% of Turkey's total population. Under constant fertility, median age will rise from 26.5 (2005) to 38.1 (2050). Life expectancy will rise from 71.8 to 78.5 years. Where in the other riparian countries the dependency ratio decreased over time, the opposite is true in Turkey. In most projections 2005 and 2050 levels will be more or less equal. The extreme projections estimate a rise from 52 (2005) to 61 (2050). What is interesting is that the ratio between children and old ages people will shift. In 2005 the ratio between the two groups was 80­20 in favor of the children, while by 2050 this ratio will be more equal, at 50­50.139 This means that in the coming decade Turkey might encounter societal problems due to the aging of population.

5.3 Economic outlook

Making economic outlooks can be done and is done by many organizations, but one can raise question marks about the validity of many of these models. Within these economic projections it often occurs that mathematical models are coupled to human behavior which is questionable regarding the 2008­2009 economic crisis where reality caught up with these fancy theoretical models. In this research, data is used mainly from the World Bank economic outlooks since they are one of the few who make a fairly detailed long­term forecast on the state of the global economy. This part will also refer to figures given by for instance the IPCC which uses economic data in their environmental models in order to calculate emissions and temperature change etc.. Unfortunately there is little data available on economic forecasts for specific countries for such a long period. Therefore regional expected trends were downscaled to national levels. Some major trends that are likely to occur will also have their effect in the river basin area but very accurate detailed changes in the economy for the three riparians cannot be given.

The global economy is expected to grow in the coming decades. Under the IPCC scenarios the increase in ratios for the GDP range from more than double to a fivefold of GDP.140 Economic growth will be accompanied by a significant increase in global trade. Markets will become more integrated. Most of the increase in economic output will be accounted for by the growth of consumer markets in developing countries.141 Forecasts predict that the annual growth rate for the economy in the period 2006­2030 will be higher than that of the period 1980­2005. The World Bank's expectation is that in the coming decades an average annual growth might be expected of 4.2%. This projection was made before the 2008­2009 economic crisis however. The IPCC have also made some economic forecasts in order to determine carbon emissions and water withdrawal and in their scenarios they expect an average growth between 2­3%.142 A major driver of economic development will be population growth. Having a lot of people in a country

138“World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.” 139“World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database.” 140Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 141World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Managing the next wave of globalization. 142Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development.

37 means needing a bigger economy to sustain this number of people, as the Chinese example has showed us the past decade. The economies in the Middle East will experience a large absolute growth because of the fact that they will have relatively the largest population growth. What matters however to determine wealth, is GDP per capita. Although Middle Eastern economies will grow in an absolute sense, the economic development regarding growth per capita will be of a lower level.143 The region will probably still benefit from their large share of oil reserves, and other fossil fuels, which will be the dominant fuel until 2050, and the rise in demand and high oil prices will boost national revenues.144

5.3.1 Iraq

The priorities of Iraq in the near future will be to reconstruct the country and to establish civil order. It is vital to decrease the hostility between the various ethnic groups, thereby reducing the number of insurgents' attacks and improving the security environment in the country. Iraq is rich in oil and the oil industry has dominated the economy in the past and it will likely continue to do so in the future. Iraq has a proven oil reserve of 115 million barrels which will guarantee government revenues in the future.145 The international isolation under the regime of Saddam Hussein and the past war has had a crippling effect on the Iraqi economy and led to an isolated position for the country. World economy is predicted to increase in the next 20 years and trade will be an important catalyst of this development. In order for Iraq to benefit from this next wave of globalization it is essential that its economy becomes more integrated in the regional and global economy and that the country attracts more foreign investments.

5.3.2 Syria

Syria's economy is dominated by the petroleum and agricultural sectors. In the future Syria can benefit from higher oil demand and prices, but its proven oil reserves of 2.5 billion barrels is rapidly declining which puts constraints on the development of the economy in the long run. Another problem is the high unemployment in the country and the high inflation. The economy is to a large extent under strict control of the government which makes it hard for the private sector to develop itself. Another constraint is the increasing pressure on water supplies created by intensive agriculture, rapid population growth and industrial expansion.146 Syria can profit from a possible economic growth in Iraq since that is its largest export partner with a 30% share. Another constraint put on the development of the Syrian economy is its security environment. Syria remains on the alert for a possible Israeli attack. Syria spends on average 5% of its GDP on the military which is relatively large and in general public spending on the military apparatus is not beneficial for the country's economy.147

5.3.3 Turkey

Turkey's economy is built on sound fundamentals which are marked by moderate economic growth and foreign direct investment. The economy is a dynamic mix of modern industry and commerce

143Ibid. 144World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Managing the next wave of globalization. 145“Iraq Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis ­ Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal”; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the­world­factbook/geos/iz.html. 146“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Syria,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the­world­factbook/geos/sy.html. 147“­ SIPRI Internet,” http://milexdata.sipri.org/.

38 combined with the traditional agricultural sector which still employs more than 35% of the labor force.148 The rural population is expected to decline rapidly in the coming 30 years which could diminish the agricultural share in the economic output. A possible burden on the country's economy might be posed by the aging of society. The largest industrial sector is the textile and clothing sector which accounts for one third of the total industrial output but faces stiff competition from the international market. Growing sectors in Turkey are the automotive and electronic sector. Turkey could also benefit from the rising oil demand forming a transit country transporting oil from the to the European market. In general Turkey's economy is expected to grow and its living conditions will be improved by 2030 and comparable with those of Spain today.149

5.4 State of the environment

Environmental change, such as climate change or depletion of water resources, can be the result of both natural processes of the earth, and external processes such as variations in sunlight intensity and human activities. There is a fierce debate among researches whether climate change is largely anthropogenic or if the changes we have experienced the last decades are the result of solely natural processes. Fact is that environmental change is occuring and that this will have its effects on society. There have been various researches over the past years using different scenarios to chart the future possibilities. The consensus among them is that in the coming decades earth's environment will change. How severe these changes will be is still unclear.150

The forecasts for the Middle Eastern region do not look too bright. The Middle East is a naturally arid region with a fragile ecosystem and under the expected trends for the coming decades the environment in the region might come under severe pressure due to population growth and climate change. Regarding climate change, the average temperature on earth is expected to increase the coming decades with an average of 0.2 °C per decade. This might seem little but it is an average, so in some regions the increase will be higher and in some it might be lower or even negative. The expectations are that in the Middle East the increase will be higher than this average. Under the IPCC scenarios the average temperature in the Middle East will be 1.5­2 ºC higher in the period 2020­2029 compared to the period 2000­2009,Making the region hotter and drier than it already is. As a result of the higher temperature, snow cover in the Zargos and Taurus mountains, which feeds the Euphrates and Tigris, will have an earlier spring peak discharge due to melting.151 The runoff of the rivers will therefore increase which increases the risk of flooding as more water flows through the river concentrated in a s hortertime frame.152 Other cases of extreme weather become more frequent such as heat waves, sandstorms and heavy rainfall. In the basin region this all could have a negative effect on the availability of water. In the long run, due to warmer seasons, the snow cover will contract thereby reducing the flow for the rivers. Increased temperature will also stimulate evaporation of water. The region is one of the few regions to experience a decrease in precipitation. Worldwide precipitation is expected to increase but the Middle East, together with Central Asia, is

148“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture,” http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/dbase/index.stm. 149Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 305­320; Bromley et al., “SIPRI Arms Transfer Data 2008”; “­ SIPRI Internet.” 150Andy Reisinger and Rajendra Pachauri, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Contribution of working groups I, II & III to the 4th assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC, 2007); Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 151Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 152Reisinger and Pachauri, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.

39 one of the regions to form an exception, in some parts precipitation might decrease with as much as 30% per year.153 Climate change will exacerbate the water scarcity situation in the Middle East. Likely it will increase the number of people living under water stress conditions.154

5.5 Water resources

In this chapter we discussed three important factors that have a significant influence on both the use and availability of water: population growth, economic development and environmental change. What are the combined results of these processes on the state of future water resources? To find out we use data from the WaterGAP 2.0 model. All the data concerning water withdrawal in this research are based on the projections made by this model. The reason why is because it is one of the few, if not the only, openly available model which is the most complete. This model is also used by the Global Environmental Outlook as well as the forecasts made by the IPCC. It is more complete than the models of for instance the IWMI, because the scenarios entail more than only agricultural efforts as it uses a more integrated approach that tries to couple economic development, population growth, agriculture, and climate change in order to estimate future water levels.

The Water Global Assessment and Prognosis (WaterGAP) is a global model developed at the Center for Environmental Systems of the University of Kassel. The model analyzes the impact of climate change and socio­economic driving forces, which are derived from the A2 and B2 scenarios of the IPCC, on future global water stress. These two specific scenarios provide a broad range of estimates for important driving forces of water resources and were therefore selected. The A2 scenario assumes population and economic trends consistent with an economically oriented world , but with a relatively low level of integration. The B2 scenario supposes lower population levels, higher economic growth and a stronger accent on non­climate­related environmental policies. The B2 rate of climate change is lower in comparison with the A2 scenario.155 The model also takes into account, besides climate change and population growth, the effect of income (as GDP per capita), electricity production (as a measurement of economic development) and, water­use efficiency. The data for climate change were derived from the ECHAM4/OPYC3 model of the Max Planck Institute of Climatology and the HadCM3 model of the UK­based Hadley Center, in order to cover for some of the uncertainties of the current climate models. The assumptions underlying the WaterGAP model can be viewed in Annex E. The graphs below show how water withdrawal might develop in the coming decades. The figures in the graph represent the possible situation in 2009 and 2050. Averages were calculated based on the two climatic models in order to get an overview of the likely trends instead of a wide range of numbers. The model specific output can be viewed in Annex E.

153Bates et al., Climate Change and Water. 154Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 155Alcamo, Flörke, and Märker , “Future long­term changes in global water resources driven by socio­economic and climatic changes.”

40 Figure 6: Future water availability & withdrawal on the Euphrates & Tigris.156

The graphs above show that for both the rivers the availability of water will decline towards 2050. The average decline of water availability will differ at its 3 km³ maximally compared with the current situation. This might seem very much, but it does result in large discrepancies if coupled with the expected increase of water demand in the same period. In the most positive scenario, where a lot of attention is given to sustainable forms of water management and cleaner industrial practices, the increase of water withdrawal will be around 2 km³ extra on a yearly basis. In other scenarios this increase can amount up to 14 km³ of water, needed extra per year for both rivers which is quite significant. Current water withdrawal levels on both rivers are approximately 40 km³ per year. The average estimated level of water withdrawal will be at least 46 km³, which is a significant difference which can be hard to cope with in an arid region in combination with the decline in availability.157 Another shift that will take place according to this model is the distribution of water resources. In all of the countries the share of water going to the agricultural industry will decrease and shift towards more water usage by the industrial sector, and more prominent, the domestic sector.

5.6 Scenarios: shaping the possible pathways

In this section of the chapter the scenarios of this research will be further introduced and explained. The previous parts of this chapter showed that extensive research has been done on mapping environmental, economical, and demographical trends that will shape the future of our world and society. For these topics, to imagine how the future might evolve is already quite daunting, but to do this for the political landscape might be even harder. It is impossible to determine accurately how the political situation will develop the coming 40 years. To overcome this uncertainty the use of scenarios is included in this research. The future might be somewhere in between the scenarios used in this research or a combination of them, or completely difference of course. At best, these scenarios compile an image of a limited number of possible futures, based upon a set of coherent assumptions about the choices made by the dominant actors, and the progresses of social processes. In the methodology chapter the process behind the development of the scenarios was already explained, so we will focus directly on the content of the scenarios and the metrical values of the drivers. For the complete storylines behind each scenario you are referred to Annex F.

156Ibid. 157Christof Schneider, “Assumptions WaterGAP 2.0 model,” June 2, 2009; “Center for Environmental Systems Research,” http://www.usf.uni­kassel.de/cesr/index.php? option=com_project&Itemid=143&task=view_detail&agid=47; Alcamo and Henrichs, “Critical regions: A model­ based estimation of world water resources sensitive to globa changes.”

41 5.6.1 Business as Usual

Figure 7: Business as Usual scenario scoring.

The Business as Usual scenario (BaU) is basically an extrapolation of the current state of affairs towards 2030­2050, corrected for expected population growth, economic development and environmental change. It resembles to some extent the A2 scenario used by both IPCC and WaterGAP.

1. Power variables: • Distribution of power: 2, Turkey being the primus inter pares. • Polarity: 1, USA still the sole world hegemon, China and Russia play second fiddle. 2. Attitudes: • Fear/Opportunity: 2, riparians are still careful towards each other. • Inward/Outward: 2, moderate. 3. Regional stability: • Stability: 1, region is characterized by instability such as the Israeli­Arab conflict, the situation in Iraq, and the Kurdish problem. • Impact of regional instability: 2, impact is moderate, does not pose a large threat. 4. Technology: • Progress: 3, high pace of technological progress. • Distribution: 1, not evenly available, confined to richer countries. 5. Demography: • Stock; 3, comparable to A2 scenario of WaterGAP model. • Flow: 2, medium flow of people due to regional instability. 6. Economic situation: concerning the state of the economy • Shape: 2, medium growth of world economy around 2%. • Integration: 2, same situation as in 2009.

42 5.6.2 Turkish Century

Figure 8: Turkish Century scenario scoring

The Turkish Century scenario (TC) is a scenario based largely on the A2 scenarios concerning economic and population growth. Under this scenario the power of Turkey as primus inter pares has grown and it has become the uncontested basin hegemon. Iraq and Syria have both benefited from the growth in world economy and the continuing demand for fossil fuels such as oil.

1. Power variables: • Distribution of power: 1, clearly in favor of Turkey as it has become the regional power. • Polarity: 1, USA being the sole world power, China being a good second. 2. Attitudes: • Fear/Opportunity: 3, comparable to the 1990s. • Inward/Outward: 2. 3. Regional stability: • Stability: 2, stability in region has improved a bit compared to 2009 although tensions remain. • Impact of regional instability: 3, impact of instability is very low. 4. Technology: • Progress: 3, high pace of technological progress. • Distribution: 2, technology not evenly distributed but not confined to only the rich either. 5. Demography: • Stock; 3, high population growth. Comparable to A2 scenario of WaterGAP model. • Flow: 1, little intra­ and interstate movement of people due to slight stabilization of the region. 6. Economic situation: • Shape: 3, world economy has recovered fully from 2008/2009 financial crisis. • Integration: 2, economic integration between the three remains modest as Europe is the most important market for Turkey.

43 5.6.3 The Coming Anarchy

Figure 9: the Coming Anarchy scenario scoring

The Coming Anarchy (CA) is based on the infamous article by Robert Kaplan. Essentially, this scenario represent a rogue world where there is no clear leadership or regulatory mechanisms. The instability in the basin region has been aggravated due to a lack of economic development and further environmental degradation.

1. Power variables: • Distribution of power: 3, there is no clear superior power. • Polarity: 3, USA, Russia and China are the main world powers with a lot of regional powers. 2. Attitudes: • Fear/Opportunity: 1, riparians approach each other with contempt. • Inward/Outward: 1, protectionist environment. 3. Regional stability: • Stability: 1, Israeli­Arab conflict has flared up again, situation in Iraq has deteriorated and the Kurdish problem has increased. • Impact of regional instability: 1, situation has a severe impact on the situation between the 3 riparians. 4. Technology: • Progress: 1, slow progress of technology. • Distribution: 1, distribution confined to the wealthier nations. 5. Demography: • Stock; 1, comparable to B2 scenario. • Flow: 1, large flow of refugees. 6. Economic situation: concerning the state of the economy • Shape: 1, the world economy is in bad shape. • Integration: 1, disintegrated regional economy.

44 5.6.4 New Caliphate

Figure 10: New Caliphate scenario scoring

The New Caliphate scenario (NC) is a scenario twith two sides. On the one hand the world situation has deteriorated since the economic crisis of 2008­2009; There is no clear world power, the world economy is in bad shape and technological progress is very slow. On the other hand the basin region has become more integrated with the result that the Arabian countries have formed a union for, in the first place, economic cooperation but also political.

1. Power variables: • Distribution of power: 3, evenly balanced among riparians. • Polarity: 3, multi polar world with the West as main power but China, India and the Caliphate are also powerful, as is Russia. 2. Attitudes: • Fear/Opportunity: 3, due to increased integration in the region the riparians are open minded towards each other. • Inward/Outward: 3, open attitudes toward each other. Initiative coming from all the riparians. 3. Regional stability: • Stability: 3, not many regional conflicts. • Impact of regional instability: 3, instability is no major concern anymore. 4. Technology: • Progress: 1, technological progress slows down, and various parts of the world descend in obscurantism • Distribution: 3, technology is fairly even balanced throughout the world. 5. Demography: • Stock: 1, overall population growth slows down (economic hardship and attitude of fear) • Flow: 3, number of people moving across borders is low. 6. Economic situation: concerning the state of the economy • Shape: 1, world economy is in bad shape.

45 • Integration: 3, comparable with the European Union.

6. Analysis: the possible outcomes by 2030­2050

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter the possible outcomes of the scenarios will be analyzed. The aim of this chapter is to determine, per scenario, whether conflict or cooperation is the more likely, or logical, outcome. The conditions provided by the expected future developments and the characteristics of the scenarios will be checked upon the availability of the so called triggering and inhibiting factors. The availability of these factors will give a good insight into the conflict potential within the specific scenario. In annex G a schematic overview is given of the results of this analysis.

6.2 The triggering and inhibiting factors

The list of triggering and inhibiting factors introduced earlier in this thesis report will be discussed in greater detail in this section. For the analysis of the scenarios the original list has been trimmed down in order to make things not unnecessarily complicated. For instance the triggering factors “absence of institutional capacity”, “lack of regulatory mechanisms”, “chance of institutionalizing the environment”, and inhibiting factor “involvement in regional regimes” are very similar, and therefore these four factors are merged into one factor: “lack of regulatory mechanisms”. The lack of regulatory mechanisms is mentioned by all of the theories as an important factor that will add to vulnerability and instability. Often violence is used by an actor when it sees no other means by which it can solve the problem. In a situation where there is thus a lack of regulatory mechanisms this point will be reached relatively quickly. Therefore this factor is an important aspect to keep in mind. This factor is correlated with the factor that scarcity exceeds the adaptive capacity of the state. When there is a lack of regulatory mechanisms the logical result will be that at a certain point the state's capacity will not be sufficient anymore to counter the effects of the scarcity. Although the two factors to some extent overlap each other, the 'lack of regulatory mechanisms” in this research focuses more on international forms of regulation while the other one is more directed at national capacities.

Excluded from usage in the analysis is the factor that focuses on the opportunities to find allies. Within the context where it is mentioned in the academic literature this factor is important with regard to conflicts that play at intrastate level between government and citizens or between groups within societies. In such a situation, finding allies on subnational or transnational level can be key in order to strengthen one's position. An example of this within the basin itself is the whole debate around the Ilisu dam. The start of the Ilisu dam construction has been controversial because it would ruin the ancient archaeological site of Hasankeyf and displace ten thousands of people.158 As a result opponents have formed a coalition which constitutes out of local government ministries, community groups, and NGOs. As a result of the commotion around the project some important financiers and participants have withdrawn from the project because of environmental and societal concerns.159

158“Turkey begins controversial dam,” BBC, August 5, 2006, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5249086.stm. 159“Balfour abandons Turkish dam project,” BBC, November 13, 2001, sec. Business, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1653727.stm; “Turkey begins controversial dam”; “Swiss bank quits Turkish dam project,” BBC, February 27, 2002, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1844465.stm; “Turkey dam project

46 This case illustrates that on national level a rally by local actors with the support of international actors such as NGOs can be a powerful tool. In the case of the Ilisu dam which is to be positioned on the Tigris, Iraq would not be unhappy at all with the result of the local rally. The questions rises in how far one of the riparians can interfere in the other riparian's internal issues? It might be plausible that for instance in this case Iraq could give support to some of the actors involved in the coalition opposing the dam. It is however an unlikely scenario because most NGOs, and especially the ones which are concerned with societal and environmental issues, do not wish to be involved in international politics. A transnational actor that would be more likely, and maybe also more willing, to form a sort of pact with one of the riparians are the Kurds, and then especially the PKK. The PKK still strives for an entirely autonomous Kurdish state and remains active in the eastern regions of Turkey conducting insurgency operations. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, so according to this logic Syria or Iraq might give support to Kurdish rebels in order to frustrate the central government in Ankara. The downstream riparians and Kurds might share a dislike about the Turkish water projects in the southeastern part of Turkey. The riparians might see their water resources threatened while the Kurds see it as an attempt to assimilate them into Turkish society and annihilate Kurdish culture. It is a likely option that one of the riparians might use the Kurds, but it must be said that both in Iraq and Syria the Kurdish claim for autonomy is seen as a security problem as well.160 The possible collaboration between the Kurds and some of the riparians is within the analysis not included in a separate factor but dependent on the storyline.

Despite the variation in the scenarios and other possibilities regarding future developments, there are some factors that will stay constant over all of the four scenarios. One important aspect is the level of dependency of the downstream countries. For both Syria and Iraq the Euphrates and Tigris (Tigris for Iraq alone) are unmistakably important. As the FAO dependency ratio already indicated they are both highly dependent on water coming from the river system for use in all of their sectors. Being situated in an arid region there is little to no opportunity to diversify their water resources. The current wastewater treatment and desalination capacities of Syria and Iraq are not contributing a significant amount to the nations' water resources and it is not likely that this will change dramatically in the future since these are costly technologies.161 According to literature this certainly is a factor that will add to the vulnerability of the basin, and in the past there have been tensions between riparians when water levels showed abnormal fluctuations claimed to be caused by the other riparian.

Also present in all of the scenarios are the factors based on history. These factors include the history of collaborative projects and the history of antagonism between the riparians. In chapter 4 a historical overview was given of the developments over the last 60 years. This overview showed that there have been frequent attempts at setting up joint technical committees and other cooperative projects, but most of these initiatives were either low intensity projects or ended because of a lack of commitment or confidence. Recently there have been positive developments as Turkey allowed more water to flow to Iraq and Syria and Turkey started a joint coordinated project on agriculture and water management.162 Despite these positive developments there are still some tensions between the riparians based upon past events. Possibly one of the largest obstacles between the three riparians is back to haunt Kurds,” BBC, August 5, 2006, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5243588.stm. 160Marwa Daoudy, “Syria, Water Scarcity & International Relations,” August 6, 2009. 161“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed”; “CLIMAGRImed,” Syria, http://www.fao.org/sd/climagrimed/c_1_04_08.html. 162“Turkey frees more Euphrates water for Iraq ­ UPI.com.”

47 the cultural difference between them, and especially the position of Turkey versus the Arabian countries Syria and Iraq. There are still some historical grievances caused by the Ottoman legacy of Turkey. One example is the territorial claims by Turkey concerning the areas in northern Iraq, around Mosul an Kirkuk, where ethnic Turkish groups live, the Turcomans.163 Besides the presence of a Turkic ethnic minority the presence of oil reserves might also play a role. Syria has also claimed that the Turkish province of Hatay belongs to its territory.164 Another historical problem in the region dating back to the end of World War I is the appeal for autonomy made by the large Kurdish minority in the region. This unresolved Kurdish problem still has the potential to form a flash point between the riparians as it has in the past. It is difficult to say how this issue might develop the coming decades as the Kurds themselves are hardly unified. Some of them stick to their claim of an independent Kurdistan while others are willing to accept a form of autonomous government in a federal Iraq. Turkey, who has the biggest problems with the Kurdish minority, is also internally divided about the question on how to solve this problem. Some suggest that the establishment of political relations will benefit Turkey since it will keep the PKK at bay and Turkey can act as a transit country for oil and gas from northern Iraq, while others suggest that such a solution will increase the risk of violent attacks by Kurdish militia.165 Although this historical antagonism is present in all of the scenarios the intensity of the related sentiments will vary. It is expected that in scenarios where there is less stability and prosperity (CA and BuA) these sentiments will play a bigger role.

The Oregon groups mentions the undertaking of large unilateral water development projects, such as the construction of a dam, as a factor contributing to basin vulnerability. The last large dam in the basin that is under construction is the Ilisu dam on the Tigris which is part of GAP in Turkey, and it has caused a lot of ruckus, especially in Iraq.166 According to planning this dam will be finished by 2011/2014, but the withdrawal of German and Austrian financiers and the unstable state of Turkey's economy make this deadline hard to reach.167 This delay opens the possibility that in the period towards 2050 Turkey can restrict the river flow substantially by filling up the Ilisu dam. Because of the credit crunch, which also has its effects on Turkey's economy, and the fact that there have been environmental questions around the Ilisu dam, it is hard to forecast when the dam will be finished and when it will be filled up. During this research no evidence was found that one of the riparians is planning on starting a large water development project in the near or mid­term future. Although the possibility of such a large unilateral project in the time span of 20­40 years is not ruled out, it is not incorporated in one of the scenarios because it is simply too hard to make any realistic assumption about it. The flow can also be restricted on the Euphrates. The current dams can be used to do this, this can happen in a situation where there is a major disagreement or threat involving Turkey; Turkey can decide to restrict the flow on the Euphrates by blocking the flow with the Atatürk dam in order to put pressure on Iraq and Syria and steer regional politics.168 Whether this is technically safe to do so is another question. There is also historical proof that this might not happen since when the allies requested to use this instrument during the Gulf War, in order to put pressure on the regime in Baghdad, Turkey refused to do so. Although dams might interrupt the flow of the river for a while, they can also help to better manage the river flow. The discharge of the Euphrates and Tigris is characterized by large fluctuations. Due to snow melt, which feeds the rivers in spring, the

163“Turkey Prepares to Stake Claim in Iraq's Oil Fields,” http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/40511.html. 164“TURKEY/SYRIA,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1998/10/981013­kurd2.htm. 165International Crisis Group, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds; Conflict or Cooperation? 166“Turkey begins controversial dam.” 167Ibid. 168Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1994.

48 rivers cause some severe flooding in the basin. By using dams the flow can be better regulated which reduces the chance of flooding and guarantees a more constant average annual discharge.

A last triggering factor present in all of the scenarios is the availability of groundwater. According to the statistical research of PRIO the presence of groundwater reserves besides surface water is a factor that will add risk. The presence of groundwater increases the amount of available water and thereby increasing the stakes.169 Within the basin a groundwater aquifer is present between Turkey and Syria. This aquifer stores an amount of 1.2 km³ water per year, which is very little. In comparison the available water from the Tigris for Syria equals 1.3 km³/year which is considered as being an insignificant amount of water. The presence of ground water reserves is acknowledged and taken into account but it is it is assumed not to make a very big difference and the relative weight of this factor is very low.

The rest of the factors used are dependent on the scenarios and the developments that will take place in the coming 20­40 years. Among these factors there are however again some that are relatively fixed among the scenarios. One factor mentioned is “rapid environmental change”; this factor is largely dependent on the environmental changes that will occur in the coming 20­40 years. The large environmental changes such as shifts in precipitation patterns are often long­term processes. The change will thus not be experienced as very rapid but in the long term the consequences can be felt in the region and have severe effects. One of the environmental changes that do has a rapid and sudden character is the more frequent occurrence of extremities such as heat waves and torrential rains.170 The effects of environmental change will stress the importance of regulatory mechanisms to cope with these effects. Also stressing the adaptive capacities of the states is the triggering factor of “large population growth”. According to the forecasts the population in the region and in the individual countries is expected to increase. The levels of this increase vary from large to very large. Large population growth will occur in all the scenarios. The intensity of the population growth is adjusted to the individual scenarios. In the more prosperous scenarios Business as Usual and Turkish Century the growth will be larger in comparison with the other two scenarios. Large population growth is an important driver of the increase in water demand. More people in effect means more thirst to quench. A first effect of an increased population is that there will be a larger demand for water; a second effect is that it requires regulatory mechanisms to cope with the increase, while it also requires a larger economy to sustain the increased population. Large population growth is a factor that will have a substantial influence on water stress and scarcity and can be disastrous when not mitigated.

A final, relatively constant factor is the inhibiting factor “participation in international trade”. According to the economic forecasts the role of international trade in national economies is expected to increase in the coming decades. None of the scenarios will break with this trend considering the fact that there are very few countries that are isolated from international trade. Although international trade will be present in all of the scenarios, the intensity varies across the scenarios with a focus on the economic ties between the riparians. This last notion of economic dependency of the riparians among each other is a very important inhibiting factor, since countries that are dependent on each other in economical terms are less inclined to go to war with each

169Gleditsch, Furlong, and Hegre, “Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries?.”

170Reisinger and Pachauri, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report; Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development.

49 other.171 Regarding the other two economical factors in the list: the factor focusing on asymmetric economic growth is not used. In the original context of the theories, this factor focuses on subnational levels where grievances between various groups within society are exacerbated by an unequal economic growth benefiting only a minority or only certain groups within society. This notion is not a very useful concept when looking at the possibility of a violent clash between nations. While it is very plausible that in the future there will be an asymmetrical economic growth between the countries as well as in the countries themselves it is not believed that this will increase the chance of interstate conflict set in a context of water scarcity. The other economical factor; higher levels of economic development is incorporated since it is relevant mitigating factor. Higher economic levels boost the development of institutions as well as technological research. The application of more efficient water management is strongly correlated with economical development since more wealth means more funds available for technological development. Often in times of economic crises the budget for the development and implementation of technology is reduced. Although economic development has some merits it still remains an important driver behind the increase of water use. As economy increases so does the demand for water. When not dealt with properly economic development can become environmentally unsustainable. But if handled with the correct political attitude, economic development might benefit more efficient use of water resources.172

The majority of the triggering and inhibiting factors are determined by the outcome of the forecasts and projections. A limited number of factors will be entirely dependent on the characteristics of the scenarios. These factors include “inconsistent regimes”, “general hostile tensions”, and “downstream riparian believes it is military stronger”. The important aspect of the first two factors is the way in which they will interact with some of the other factors. The presence of hostile tensions will certainly diminish the rate in which the riparians trade with each other and will have a negative influence on the presence of joint regulatory mechanisms. The presence of inconsistent regimes will also have a negative influence on the presence of joint regulatory mechanism and on the participation rate in international trade and thus on economic development. The presence of inconsistent regimes or authoritarian regimes was claimed by PRIO to be a major factor adding to the risk of violent conflict. This seems logical if we consider the interaction of this factor with some of the other factors; it negatively influences some of the important inhibiting factors.

6.3 Outcome of the scenarios

In the table below an overview is given of how the scenarios scored on the availability of triggering and inhibiting factors. In the table an 'X' indicates the presence of a factor while an 'O' indicates the absence of a factor. The cells are marked either red or green; the red colour indicates that this particular score will add to the basin's vulnerability while green on the other hand indicates that this

171Havard Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 33­48; Furlong, Gleditsch, and Hegre, “Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict.”

172Wolf, “Shared Water: Conflict and Cooperation”; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992” ; Homer Dixon, “The ingenuity gap: Can poor countries adapt to resource scarcity?.”

50 score will benefit the basin's resilience. The table is divided into two parts. All the factors above the line are constant over all of the scenarios as discussed in section 6.2 of this report, hence the same score for all of the scenarios. The score of the factors under the line is based on the scenarios. A more elaborate version of this table can be found in Annex G; this version includes a short explanation on the score.

Table 2: Presence of triggering and inhibiting factors within the scenarios

Because the factors above the line are fairly constant, the factors under the line are more interesting for determining what can trigger scarcity­induced conflict. What strikes is the red dominated scoring of the CA scenario. All of the triggering factors are available while there is no inhibiting factor. The basis of the CA scenario is comparable with the other scenarios with the difference that population growth will be at a slower rate than in the BuA and TC scenario. There are less people to supply but the fact remains that also under this scenario water availability will decline due to environmental change.

Concerning the scenario itself, as a logical result of the CA storyline there is a total lack of regulatory mechanisms mainly caused by anarchic state of the world by that time. The key aspect of this scenario is that there is a lot of instability in the region which is not a good breeding ground to form economic ties or to cooperate in the field of water management. Attitudes of the riparians towards each other are grim as there is a lot of hostile tension. State capacity declines which leads to the danger that eventually the increased state of water scarcity might exceed the adaptive capacity of the state. With little state power and good functioning institutions it is hard to mitigate the effects of water scarcity. This almost desperate situation might certainly be a breeding ground for scapegoating where a downstream riparian can blame the upstream riparian for their deprived situation. Such behavior might be used by political leaders in order to divert the attention away from

51 internal problems and focus the people's irritation and hatred on a foreign power. Whether or not this will result in violence depends on the confidence a riparian has in its military apparatus in comparison to that of the adversary. In this specific scenario such a believe is plausible, and most likely Syria will be the one riparian with enough boosted confidence. In the CA scenario Iraq is in a state of civil war and therefore, probably, the federal state or central government will have too little power to unify or direct its armed forces in a direct encounter with for instance Syria. Syria on the other hand invests a relatively large share of its GDP into the military apparatus and it forms an important body of the government. In the CA scenario the military power of NATO might be weakened and therefore not able to aid Turkey if it is in distress by an attack from Syria. Furthermore Syria possibly make use of the Kurdish rebels and it is allied to Iran which rather sees that Turkey's influence in the region remains limited. Syria might legitimize military violence by its self­proclaimed entitlement of Turkish territory. The situation in the CA scenario is further deteriorated by the fact that world economic growth comes to a standstill. Oil revenues for the riparians will diminish which has major implications for the and Iraq. Lower economic development in general harms the democratic process. Internally the deprived situation can be politicized by populists to overthrow the government or lead to coup d'états eventually resulting in inconsistent regimes which will add to the basin's vulnerability.173

This scenario seems to tick all the boxes that increase the risk for water conflict. We have the standard situation where there is a significantly large population growth combined with a decline in water availability where some of the riparians are highly dependent on the water resources and have little to no opportunity to diversify their water resources. This last aspect is strengthened by the fact that economic development has come to a standstill, and that technological development has slowed down. There is thus little money to invest in more efficient water management technologies. The situation is further deprived by the fact that states lack capacity to cope with the increased levels of scarcity and there is a total lack of international cooperation between the riparians to regulate this water crisis. In this deprived situation there is a serious risk that the riparians approach this situation as a zero sum game. Is there a chance that in this situation water scarcity might lead to violent conflict? Yes, this is plausible but under the condition that Turkey decides to restrict the flow of the rivers significantly. It would make perfect sense for Iraq or Syria to bomb some of the infrastructure of Turkey in order to allow more water to flow downstream. Of course this entails a serious risk of flooding but in the long term Turkey will not be able to restrict the flow because of the damaged water infrastructure. This kind of military action is also the only efficient form of military action in order to gain better access to water. Large military campaigns to secure water resources would be more costly; it would cost the same as building a water desalination plant.

While the CA scenario might easily be described as a worst case scenario, as the name already suggests, the TC and NC scenario predict a much brighter future; both scenarios are characterized by an absence of the major triggering factors. To start with the NC scenario; the key aspect of this scenario is that in the 2030­2050 period the Muslim countries in the region will start to form a sort of union based on their shared cultural heritage of the Islamic faith. It is to some extent comparable to the European Union in its early years. This scenario has in common with the CA scenario that the rate of population growth is not as large as in the other two scenarios.

173Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases” ; Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.

52 As a result of the union formed by the riparian countries some of the triggering factors' role do not weigh as heavy as in other scenarios. Because of this union historical grievances may be put aside, and the danger that for instance Turkey restricts water from the Euphrates to flow is also decreased due to the political ties. This development states thus that there is no lack of regulatory mechanisms as the riparians have a functioning platform to negotiate and talk with each other. Also other triggering factors are effectively diminished over time; Iraq has stabilized and acquired a federal government reducing the level of inconsistent regimes which is said to be a beneficial development by some of the literature.174 Also the adaptive capacities of the state has increased as technologies have become more widely available according to the scenario storyline which entails that the riparians can apply more efficient irrigation and water management techniques which is much needed when overall water availability has gone down. Although the world economy's growth has slowed down, the economic integration of the riparians has improved again benefiting the overall relations between the riparians. Due to the fact that for instance Iraq has become more stable and Turkey and Syria have not experienced any major political or economic setbacks, it is possible that one the of the downstream riparians might think it has more military power than an upstream riparian. In the case of the NC scenario this is however not a factor that will contribute heavily to the vulnerability of the basin or add tension because if there are conflicts between the riparians they will have other, more peaceful, options to resolve them and these options are more beneficial for all of the riparians.

It is very unlikely that under the given circumstances of this scenario, water scarcity could induce violent conflict. Of course there are some factors that add to the vulnerability of the basin but their role is marginal in comparison with the effect of the inhibiting factors. Due to the ties the riparians have by the sort of union they have formed it will be logical that they settle their differences concerning water issues in a peaceful manner. Under the NC scenario it is much more likely that the riparians will intensify their cooperative initiatives. It seems that the NC scenario is a pragmatic approach in which Turkey's Islamic roots are recognized, asserting its ties and its membership to the Muslim world.175

The TC scenario also has an expected positive outcome despite the unequal position of the riparians towards each other. Main cause for the stable situation in this case is the hegemonic position of Turkey. Key aspect of the scenario itself is the forecasted growth of the world economy.176 Due to this growth and the increasing role of international trade the economies of all the riparians are expected to experience a boost in GDP growth and in overall wealth. Syria and Iraq will be able to profit from the increased demand for oil and the rise of oil prices. Also Turkey can benefit from this development as it can become an important transit country for oil and gas from northern Iraq. This increased income from the oil sector can backfire as Syria's and Iraq's economies depend too heavily on the incomes from this sector. They can suffer from what is called the Dutch Disease.177 Another downside of the increase of the oil sector is that the growing industry will lead to an increase in water demand thus jeopardizing the water supply for other sectors such as the agricultural or domestic sector. Problem is however that population is also expected to grow at unprecedented rates which will increase the water demand in both the domestic and agricultural

174Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992.”

175Daoudy, “Syria, Water Scarcity & International Relations.” 176World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Managing the next wave of globalization. 177 an increase in revenues from natural resources will deindustrialise a nation’s economy by raising the exchange rate, which makes the manufacturing sector less competitive and public services entangled with business interests.

53 sector. The dilemma caused by this scenario of increased economic growth is that on the one hand it will increase wealth and may therefore lead to a better awareness of environmental issues and the improvement of the democratic process as we have experienced in Europe after the Second World War. However on the other hand industrialization might lead to an increased deterioration of the environment due to industrial activities.178 Increased economic activities in the region might be a catalyst for integration between the riparians and when the riparians are economically bonded to each other violence is a less likely manner of settling conflicts as we have seen in the NC scenario. The main power in the TC scenarios is the sacrosanct position of Turkey as a political, economical, and military power. Due to its geographic position combined with its economic growth it has become a dominant regional power. Syria and Iraq are by no means capable to pose a military threat against Turkey. Although the unbalanced situation might result in some grievances and hostile tensions there is little reason to believe that this might lead to a military confrontation. The position of Turkey in political, economic, and military sense will be strong enough for Turkey to act as a regulatory mechanism. Conflict is not a very likely outcome of this scenario. Possibly the main reason for it concerns the triggering factor of military power. In this scenario Turkey is by far the strongest military power in the region and it can count on the support of the USA and NATO. It would be therefore rather unwise for Iraq and Syria to try to secure water resources via military means. Concerning Syria and Iraq, Iraq will have a more or less democratic form of government and Syria will be military stronger, so there will be little incentive for Iraq to attack Syria over water resources. It is much more likely that conflicts existing over water resources will be settled in a diplomatic way.

The BaU scenario, as the name already indicates, resembles the current situation in the river basin most closely. The key characteristic of this scenario is that it shapes a kind of tenuous equilibrium where there is not really a direct risk of violent conflict but things are not entirely at ease either. This scenario is in general a sort of extrapolation of the current political and social factors towards 2030­2050. If we compare that situation with the current affairs, we can see that two developments primarily cause water scarcity to increase. Firstly we have the trend that population numbers will rise significantly over the coming decades. Secondly we have that, due to a rise in temperature, precipitation shift, and the occurrence of more extremities, the availability of water will decline. In this case we thus see that water scarcity will become a larger problem caused by both the demand as the supply side.

To counter the effect of these developments adequate measures are necessary and these measures must be taken rather sooner than later. There is a chance that the levels of scarcity, especially combined with a more frequent occurrence of extremities, might exceed the capacity of national institutions. The situation in Iraq might have improved slightly under this storyline but it might not be effective enough to deal with these events. Syria and Turkey will also be challenged to take effective measures. Due to the problems that might arise on the national level, cooperation becomes a more serious option because it offers a platform where they can learn from each other. The level of scarcity and dependency on water resources will force Iraq and Syria on the one side and Turkey on the other to interact with each other. Under this scenario there possibly will be some regulatory mechanisms such as joint technical commissions but these efforts might lack in efficiency. A factor

178Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development; Nebosja Nakicenovic et al., Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change, 2000); Reisinger and Pachauri, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.

54 contributing to this status quo is that there still are some hostile tensions between the riparians. Hostile not in the sense that there is an immediate threat of a military escalation caused by some minor provocation, but in the sense that the riparians remain closed and reserved towards each other which will cause a lack of commitment exists. It is not unthinkable that in the years to come Turkey will continue in executing hot pursuit actions in northern Iraq to eradicate insurgency operations by Kurdish rebels. In the past this has lead to irritation with the Iraqi government.179 Syria will also be careful in approaching its neighbors. Chances are that it is still ruled under emergency law and the Syrians still live with the idea of a continuous military threat of Israel. As a result it will also be careful and reserved in approaching countries like Iraq and Turkey which are to some extent allied to the Western powers, the same Western powers that support Israel. Two last important developments to consider in case of this scenario are the expected economic development and the progress and distribution of technological developments. These two factors combined might lead the way for Iraq and Syria who will be able to benefit from oil revenues, to buy and implicate better irrigation and other water management techniques. Desalination might become an option for instance. This will lower the stress put on water resources.

7. Conclusions

This research has tried to find an answer to the question whether in the future it is plausible that in the Euphrates­Tigris water basin a war will be caused by water scarcity. The focus has been on the Euphrates­Tigris river basin because it is situated in a region that is rife with conflict and is mentioned in academic literature as the basin were violent conflict caused by water scarcity is plausible. The result of this research can be divided into three parts: the major developments for the coming 20­40 years, the political consequences of these developments, and to what extent this will increase the risk for water­related conflict. This research started by distinguishing the different forms and levels of water scarcity in order to understand the causes and consequences. Scarcity induced conflict is not the direct result of environmental deprivation but it is influenced by the social and political factors attached to the use of a certain resource. We also distinguished that water scarcity can either be a demand or a supply problem. Concerning the major developments in the coming 20­40 years, we saw that developments will take place that will cause, or increase, both the demand and supply side of the water scarcity problem in the region. Major contributing factors to future water scarcity are the expected population growth and the effects of environmental change such as the alteration of the local climate. In essence this means that in the future there will be less water available, which will be used by more people.

The Euphrates and Tigris are unmistakably important for all of the riparians who rely on the rivers for hydropower, irrigation water, and water for domestic use. Syria and Iraq rely heavily on the rivers' water since there are little alternative sources of fresh water in their territory. For water withdrawal the downstream riparians are dependent on the goodwill of the upstream riparians. Turkey can decide to restrict the flow of the water on both rivers since it is the upstream country, while Syria can decide to withdraw more water from the Euphrates which will leave less to use for Iraq. Reducing the flow of the river often leads to firm reactions. Water is a vital resource for the well­being of the individual and society, and in an arid area such as the Middle East the availability of sufficient water can be viewed as a matter of national security. Some suggest that due to the fact that water is essential for mankind this resource is prone to conflict and this potential will be unleashed in circumstances of increased scarcity. In academic literature a number of factors are

179“Turkey continues Iraq assault.”

55 given that will add to the conflict potential of a situation. This research found that a majority of these factors are present in the river basin region and that some of them might have an increasing influence due to the absence of sufficient coping mechanisms such as institutions and cooperative initiatives. The role of these factors is likely to increase in the future due to the given circumstances. This research used four scenarios in order to see how these factors interact with the social and political circumstances and to check whether the political consequences would give indication to suspect a violent escalation of the situation by 2030­2050. This research found that only under the circumstances of one scenario there will be an increased risk on violent conflict and that there will be a large possibility that one of the downstream riparians might use force in order to secure its water resources. This scenario included that this riparian must believe that its military is stronger and military action would only be logical if it followed after a significant restriction of the flow of river water. The other outcomes of the scenarios were much more positive. In all the cases the conclusion was that conflict is not very likely, even with remaining hostile tensions between some of the riparians. Military action in order to secure water resources is only viable when there are no other solutions. It is much cheaper to solve the problem by peaceful means such as diplomacy or by using technologies, than by initiating a military operation which will bring about large costs. In the one scenario where violent conflict is possible, the initial action would only concern the destruction of water infrastructure. Is cooperation a more likely outcome? In some scenarios it is, but the intensity of these cooperative initiatives differ per scenario. In one scenario this research found that closer cooperation between the riparians would be a logical result of the given circumstances. This development would be mainly caused by the improved relations between the riparians. The remaining two scenarios also show no significant signs that the chance of violent conflict would increase although there are no significant signs either suggesting cooperation as a more likely outcome. In one case the river basin would be regulated by the strong hegemonic position of Turkey, while in the other cooperation between the riparians would remain at a technical level.

The analysis of the scenarios and their interaction with the various triggering and inhibiting factors showed that probably the most likely decisive triggering factors, those that significantly increase the risk of violent conflict, are the presence of multiple inconsistent regimes and one of the regimes believing to have a more powerful military than the others. The basin history has known one situation where there was almost a military confrontation (1975), where these two factors were present together with an (alleged) restriction of the river flow. If we consider the current situation and extrapolate this to the future, military action would not be a logical outcome given the triggering factors since, considering the riparians position on the river, we can see that Iraq is military not stronger than Syria or Turkey and Syria will face the problem that when it attacks Turkey it will probably get struck back by a NATO­backed Turkey. When we take into consideration a more positive outcome of the current situation and look at the circumstances needed for cooperation, or better cooperation we see that the presence of consistent regimes benefits the situation. Although events succeed each other, this does not imply they there is a causal link between them. However, in the case of the basin we see that since the fall of the Hussein regime there have been an increase in negotiations and cooperative initiatives in Iraq. Also the ties between Syria and Turkey have been intensified over the past few years. Syria seems to prefer diplomacy and issue linkage between water and other security related concerns as the best way to solve problems. Syria also has been developing diplomatic ties with Iraq in the recent years which is also a positive development. Regarding the developments over the past years, it is not unthinkable that these might continue in the future and possibly with more success than earlier

56 attempts. The forecasts of increased scarcity might actually force the riparians to think about their position within the basin and towards each other. They might also come to the conclusion that given the estimated levels of scarcity it is wise to engage into cooperation as early as possible in order to secure sufficient water resources for the future.

8. Discussion

The link between environmental degradation and conflict is a complex link influenced by a large number of factors and accompanied effects. In this research extensive efforts have been made in order to discuss the state and development of these factors and effects as thoroughly as possible. This research also has tried to show how these factors and effects are interlinked with each other and how these mechanisms work. In order to tackle the complex nature of the problem and the anticipating approach. This approach has had some shortcomings however. The shortcomings of the use of scenarios in this research results from the incoherence of the data of the forecasts combined with the storylines. The problem is that the storylines and the characteristics of the scenarios are to some extent based upon the results of the environmental, economical, and population forecasts. However, the scenarios are intended to overcome political uncertainties. A scenario thus has a certain political dimension but in the case of this research the outcomes of that political dimension are not entirely synchronized with the data concerning environmental change, economical development, and population growth. This would not be a problem if the scenarios were relatively simple with only two key uncertainties. But in this research the scenarios contained more uncertainties because of the complexity of the situation and the factors involved that contribute to the problem. This results some incoherence between data and scenario. For a better use of scenarios it would be recommendable that the data for the environment etc. would be based upon the scenarios in stead of the other way round, as it is done in the IPCC researches and WaterGAP prognosis. This research was forced to do it in this manner because of time constraints and practical problems such as a knowledge gap for some of the factors. There were also some scaling problems. Most of the data used in this research was on national levels. The focus of this research was to a large extent also based upon river basin level. Most of the WaterGAP data is already outdates. The predictions of the WaterGAP are based on models made in the beginning of this decade, and these models themselves are based upon data collected through the 1990's. As a result the economic forecasts for the 2020's and 2050's contain levels which were already exceeded in 2009. Also irrigated area is kept constant within the model while in Turkey GAP is meant to increase the irrigated area within the region. These assumptions of the models pose some very serious constraints on the use of them. There is also a lack of flexibility within the scenarios. Actors are perceived to behave according to a certain manner. As a result the outcomes of the scenarios are forced to conform to a certain storyline not benefiting the reliability of this research. Due to the availability of several factors it is hard to determine which factor would be decisive, a problem that was already identified within the field of environmental security research.180

Concluding, the use of scenarios can be a useful tool. As discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis report, scenarios can help to overcome uncertainties. It provides a foundation upon which an analysis can be based. Another strength of use of scenarios is that it is a powerful explanatory 180Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature”; Matthew and et al., Analyzing environment, conflict and cooperation.

57 tool easy to understand. There are also weaknesses. A scenario can only represent one specific pathway, there is little room for flexibility, and actors are expected to behave in a certain manner. Another weakness might be that within the storyline behind a scenario, due to the set characteristics, no changes can be made along the way. A scenario is often static and can hardly represent a dynamic world. The usefulness of research based upon scenarios is that it can make complex problems more easy to digest. In other words, the use of a scenario can helpful by making a research problem easier to analyze and understand. To build a scenario one has to have an understanding of the drivers and key aspects that constitute that scenario. The problem of the use of scenarios in the field of social sciences is that in order to build good, solid, comprehensive scenarios a lot of input is needed on very diverse subjects and thus a lot of knowledge on those subjects, and as with all research garbage in means garbage out. When the foundations or drivers of a scenario are not correct, neither will be the analysis.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Jeroen Warner from the faculty of Disaster Studies at Wageningen University for supervising me in the process of doing research and writing this Msc thesis and for the helpful discussions. I also thank Drs. Paul van Hooft from the University of Amsterdam, for being the second reader and giving many useful comments on my work and for being critical. Furthermore, I would like to thank Stephan de Spiegeleire from the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies who supplied me with some very useful information on conducting scenario exercises. My thanks also go to Christof Schneider from the Center for Environmental Systems Research at the University of Kassel for answering many of my questions concerning the WaterGAP model. Last but not least special thanks go out to Patricia Dijkman for reviewing this thesis report.

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61 Annex A: Environmental Security Theories

Toronto

One of the pioneer groups on environmental security research was the Toronto group formed around Homer Dixon which was very influential during the 1990's and which theories sparked a lot of debate. The group has carried out several qualitative case studies on conflicts in developing countries where they assumed a close link between environmental stress and acute conflict. In their research they focused on 6 types of environmental change:181

1) climate change 2) depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer 3) degradation of agricultural land 4) deforestation 5) degradation of water resources 6) depletion of fish stocks

The group assumed two causal linkages in the chain from environmental change towards conflict:182

Environmental change → Social effects → Violent conflict.

As the simplified model above shows, environmental change will not be a direct cause of conflict. It is in combination with other factors, such as social and physical, that environmental scarcity can trigger violent conflict.

A key concept in the theory of the group is of course the concept of environmental scarcity. By the group it is defined as the scarcity of renewable resources such as water.183 Environmental scarcity can be divided into three types:184

• Demand induced: an increase in population growth and in the consumption behavior of individuals forces the amount of resources available to each person to decline dramatically. • Supply induced: degradation and depletion of renewable resources causes the nett amount of resources available to decline sharply. • Structural: more institutional scarcity occurs as a result of imbalanced power and wealth within a society.

The group uses a basic neo­malthusian logic in their assumptions upon which this model is based. They propose that in the future there will be an increase of environmental related conflicts due to population and economic growth. In the view of the Toronto group, environmental scarcity is caused by three interrelated factors which often increase each others magnitude. These three factors

181Homer Dixon, “On the threshold.Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict.”

182Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.”

183Ibid. 184Ibid.

62 are:185

• decrease in quality and quantity of renewable resource (environmental change) • population growth • unequal resource access

These factors show that scarcity is not to be viewed as an absolute phenomenon but that it's relative. It is shaped by the social and political circumstances. According to the group environmental scarcity will produce in time four interrelated social effects:186

1) reduced agricultural production 2) economic decline 3) population displacement 4) disruption of regular and legitimized social relations

As the simplified model earlier showed, social effect might trigger conflict. The group identified two types of conflict that were frequent to occur as a result of these social effects in a situation of environmental scarcity:

• resource capture • environmental marginalization

Figure 1: Resource capture187

Resource capture is the situation where resource depletion and population growth cause unequal resource access. For instance a scarce renewable resources is privatized by an elite group in society in order to secure their access to this resource.188 This leads to the exclusions of other parts of the population to use this resource which will might lead to feelings of relative deprivation and might

185Homer Dixon, “On the threshold.Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict.”

186Thomas Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5­40. 187Homer Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.”

188Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.

63 feed grievance which can be politicized and eventually lead to violent conflict.

Figure 2: Ecological marginalization189

Ecological marginalization is the situation where unequal resource access and population growth cause resource degradation and depletion. This can happen for instance when groups dependent on an depleted resource migrate to other areas that are ecologically fragile. High population densities in these areas in combination with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local resources, causes severe environmental damage and chronic poverty.190

Social effects might pave the way for escalation into violence, this is however not an inevitable result. The effects of environmental scarcity can be overcome by social and technical ingenuity. The Toronto group is however pessimistic about the capacities of some countries to overcome these situations of increased scarcities, especially developing countries. They speak over a so called ingenuity gap. In developing countries the absence of adaptation mechanisms leads to weakened institutions and states. Furthermore market failure, social friction, shortage of capital and constraints on science contribute to environmental scarcity.191 It is often a vicious cycle where unsuccessful adaptation leads further environmental scarcity which constraints economic development and leads to migration. This further weakens states and gives greater possibility for violent escalation of the conflict. Serious scarcities tend to affect greater regions which makes it hard for a single state to counter the symptoms.192

189Ibid. 190Thomas Homer Dixon, “The ingenuity gap: Can poor countries adapt to resource scarcity?,” Population & Development Review 21, no. 3 (September 1995): 587­612. 191Ibid. 192Ibid.

64 The Toronto group model is outlined in the figure below:

Figure 3: Toronto model193

The models and theories of the Toronto group has been of great influence on further research conducted in the field of environmental scarcity. The Toronto group gives an interesting insight in how environmental degradation might contribute to violent conflict. In the text they mention two types of conflict that are often to occur (resource capture & environmental degradation) and these seem very plausible. Also the relation between the social effects and the causal effect with conflict seem tenable. The model contains some weaknesses as well. Troublesome is one of the key factors that contribute to environmental scarcity: unequal resource access. Using this factor makes it hard to determine whether conflict is the result of environmental degradation or that it is the result of distribution mechanisms that are not optimal.

The Toronto model distinguishes two elemental causal relations within the chain and it sets out the social effects that can of influence. There are however some threats to this model. A fundamental problem of the theory is that its based on case studies that were selected on the dependent variable; the presence of violent conflict. The group did notlook at cases were environmental scarcity was present but where there was a different outcome than violent conflict. The model is also a bit too linear. The Toronto group initially did nottake into account the appliance of technology and human ingenuity. Homer Dixon did elaborate on this topic in a latter article but his view remains pessimistic.194

Zürich: Environment & Conflict Project

One of the other pioneer groups during the 1990s was the Environment and Conflict Project of the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology in Zürich headed by Bächler and Spillmann. This group conducted a number of qualitative case studies on developing countries where both environmental change and violent conflict were present. The group assumed that environmental change may

193Homer Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. 194Thomas Homer Dixon, “The ingenuity gap: Can poor countries adapt to resource scarcity?,” Population & Development Review 21, no. 3 (September 1995): 587­612.

65 indirectly lead to conflict by intensifying existing potential for social and political conflict, to a point of escalation into violence. Accordingly conflicts are socially or politically motivated and not merely the result of environmental change. Rather environmentally induced intensification of conflict is a symptom of the modernization crisis entailed by the transformation from a subsistence economy to a market economy.195

The group argues that three types of environmental transformation can produce conflict:196

• Non­anthropogenic: Caused by non­societal sources such as natural disasters. Can lead to struggle between affected groups struggling for damage control and survival. • Anthropogenic, planned/desired: Caused by a known source such as governmental action. Can lead to conflicts between those who cause the damage and those affected by it. • Anthropogenic, unplanned/undesired: Caused by unrecognized human source such as the cumulative effect of individuals. Can lead to conflicts between groups that struggle for damage control and survival.

The line of reasoning of the group is visualized by the figure below:

Figure 4: ENCOP Model.197

The ENCOP model uses a broad definition of environmental scarcity which includes the following:198

• overuse of renewable resources • over strain of the environment's sink capacity (pollution) • impoverishment of the space of living

In the model environmental transformations do not affect nature only but social and political systems as well and therefore produces violence. The social and political order cannot be detached

195German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 196Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 197Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis. 198Ibid.

66 from its environmental context because it depends on the opportunities and constraints the environment provides for social and economic development.199 The ENCOP model relies on triggering and inhibiting factors to determine which mal development has lead to a particular conflict.200 These triggering and inhibiting factors are listed below:201

Triggering factors

• Inevitable environmental conditions; when a group depends on a degraded resource for which no substitute exists • Scarcity of regulatory mechanisms and poor state performance; when a political system is not able to produce required social and political conditions which makes sustainable use or renewable resources impossible. • Institutionalizing the environment; when a dominant group manipulates the environment in order to pursuit group interests, making environmental discrimination a ideological issue of group identity. • Opportunities to build organizations and find allies. • Spillover from a historic conflict; when environment discrimination gains a new impulse within the context of an already existing conflict

Inhibiting factors

• Legal and civil institutions • political pluralism • ability for the opposition movements to make their claim • regulatory mechanisms • established rule of law

• State capacity • act consistently regarding environmental transformation • ability to adapt existing international regimes to new challenges and delegate substantial authority to supra­national regional organizations • assume political responsibility for environmental crisis

Beside these factors the role of environmental discrimination is essential to understand the causal mechanisms at work. The study showed that an alarmist position on environmental security is not very tenable because conflict will only occur within certain conditions. This conclusion resulted in seven different typologies of environmental conflict:202

1) Etho­political conflicts: environmental and ethnic discrimination coincide. 2) Center­periphery conflict: people dependent on local resources are pitted against the government, elites or multinational cooperations that are appropriating local resources. 3) Internal migration conflicts: degraded resources forces people to migrate to other areas in the same countries increasing competition for resources in that area.

199Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 200Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis. 201Bächler and Spillmann, “Environmental Crisis: Regional Conflicts and Ways of Cooperation..” 202Bächler, Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis.

67 4) Cross­border migration conflict: degraded resources forces people to migrate across borders thereby increasing competition for resources in that area. 5) Demographically caused migration conflict: high population growth puts pressure on existing resources and can force people to migrate. 6) International water conflict: conflict between states sharing a river basin. 7) Global environmental conflicts: international conflict arising from distant sources where climate change contributes to the collapse of local rural structures and regional political authorities

The research carried out by the ENCOP group resulted in a more theoretical model than that of the Toronto group. It draws the same conclusions however: that in the future there will be an increase of environmentally induced conflicts. The theoretical framework is a clear way to look at the process of environmental change to conflict outcomes. Another strength is that the assumption of the model is based upon the given fact that the social and political order cannot be detached from the environmental context. The model also takes into account adaptation. There model also displays some weaknesses. The definition of scarcity they use is very broad for instance. Another problem is there with the usage of the triggering and inhibiting factors. In some cases the factors mentioned are not mutually exclusive.

The model itself lacks some explanatory power with regard to the outcome of environmental scarcity. As a analytical tool the group devised a typology with 7 types of environmentally induced conflict. Despite the fact that some conflicts can be assigned to multiple types of conflict it can be quite useful.

Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo

Figure 5; PRIO Model203

At the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway the researchers expected a different result from environmental scarcity with regard to the theories from previous authors. The team, centered around Gleditsch, assumed that cooperation is a much more likely result from environmental stress then conflict. However, regarding the ever increasing stress worldwide they do not argue that cooperation will be the norm. At PRIO the aim of the research was to counter the complexity of the qualitative models and to provide a corrective to the deficiencies regarding the selection of the case studies were in general the outcome was violent conflict.204

The PRIO research criticizes other theories on their shortcomings such as lack of testable multivariate theory, un­testable case selection and little consideration for democratization

203Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” 204German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk.

68 levels.205 The PRIO team compared in their research, cases where resource conflict was conducted violently and cases where there was no escalation into violence.206 This requires a heavier weighting of political, economic and cultural variables then was done in previous studies.207 The Oslo group does confirm the link between environmental problems and violent conflict. They stress however that it is only one of many variables that may contribute to the escalation of conflict. Environmental factors might increase the risk of violent conflict; political and economic variables remain crucial in explaining the intensity and the outbreak of conflicts. Gleditsch and his team assume that given the increasing level of democracies in the world the number of violent conflicts will decline because democracies rarely fight with each other. In this case there are six mechanisms at work:

1) freedom of expression/information 2) pluralism 3) pragmatic trial & error policies 4) international cooperation 5) market economy 6) greater respect for human life

They assume that established democracies are not likely to be weakened by environmental degradation and competition for resources. So although local and national environmental problems will still occur, the cause for this will be other then shortages of resources and will in many cases be mitigated by social and political means. The conclusion they draw having examined other people's work is that there is no empiric result that supports an explicit theory to why or whether resource scarcities will have a greater violence generating potential in the future in comparison with the past.208

The PRIO model is much more optimistic than the previous two models. This is also one of the strengths of the model. It takes into account other outcomes of environmental scarcity rather than violent conflict. It also pays more attention to the role of political and economic variables. Another strength is the linkage the group makes between violent conflict and the dependence on an agricultural. The PRIO group has great belief in human ingenuity and democracy and this makes the model a bit technocratic. Another weakness in the model is that the group assumes that in the future the number of democracies in the world will increase and therefore the possibility for environmentally induced conflict will reduce. There is no real empiric proof for this assumption. The model is a useful analytical tool in that it takes into account that environmental scarcity is just one of many variables that might induce violent conflict. In this assumption lays also it biggest threat namely that the model does not really have any explanatory power. As said before it's assumptions regarding mechanisms that will lead to cooperation rather than conflict are weak.

Irvine: Global Environmental Change and Human Security

Another theoretical model was designed by the Global Environmental Change and Human Security research group headed by Matthew from the University of California in Irvine. The group examines

205Ibid. 206German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 207Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 299­317. 208Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.”

69 environmental conflict from the perspective of human security. The Irvine group's focus is on the long term adaptability of societies. According to the group what lacks in current research is quantifiable research on the relevance of demography as a factor, on whether resource abundance or resource scarcity holds the greater risk and on whether environmental degradation might actually promote cooperation rather than fueling conflict.209 The group devised two hypotheses:

H1:Environmental stress only becomes an important explanatory variable when it's level exceeds the adaptive capacity of the state. H2: This scarcely happens because societies almost always find ways to cope210

The theoretical model devised by the GECHS group can be viewed below:

Figure 6; GECHS Model211

It is important to note that the GECHS group does not exclude the possibility of environmental conflict. The group sees that conflict can be an agent of change and a valve for societal pressure. Furthermore conflicts knows various gradations.212 In the figure that visualizes the GECHS model we see that starting point of the causal chain is environmental stress. Environmental stress reduces adaptive capacity and promotes conflict according to the authors. Environmental stress is however not monolithic or cumulative.213 The occurrence of environmental stress will lead to an increased vulnerability of livelihoods. There is a causal relationship between the two. Where in other models there is a causal link between social effect and conflict or cooperation the GECHS group added the factor of adaptation to the equation. Adaptation will take place on micro as well as macro level. Most effective adaptive variables may be involvement in regional regimes, development of democratic institutions and participation in international trade. Adaptation is a slow and continual process with social, economic, cultural and political­ economic components.214 The process of adaptation is part of a feedback loop. Adaptation can succeed or it can fail. This should be viewed however on the long term. Adaptation can thus succeed or fail with various social effects as a result. In the best case it will succeed with will lead to a tenuous equilibrium. In the worst case it can lead to conflict and state failure which will negatively influence the environmental and social

209German Advisory Council on Global Change, World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk. 210Matthew and Fraser, Global environmental change and human security: Conceptual & theoretical issues. 211Matthew and et al., Analyzing environment, conflict and cooperation. 212Richard Matthew and et al., Analyzing environment, conflict and cooperation. (Nairobi: UNEP, 2004). 213Richard Matthew, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research,” in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT , 8 (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002). 214Matthew and Fraser, Global environmental change and human security: Conceptual & theoretical issues.

70 circumstances.215 Although the group argues that environmental conflict is unlikely there are circumstanced under which it can happen. For instance when there is a sudden and rapid loss of livelihoods and impoverishment coming from inadequate access to critical natural resources this might deepen the fault lines between groups and mobilize angry mobs towards violent ends.216The group takes a long term approach so when there is a history of animosity between actors a violent outcome is more likely. Contemporary conflicts are build and shaped by histories.217 The GECHS model looks promising because it differs from the dominant paradigm where environmental stress will have social effects which will evolve into violent conflict due to a limited adaptive capacity. The GECHS model counters this paradigm with more attention for the adaptive capacities of societies and a longer time frame. When one looks at the hypotheses proposed by the group one could ask oneself if the group is not a bit too optimistic in stating that environmentally induced conflict is unlikely to happen because humans will most of the time find a way to cope with new situations. This statement seems to be based on beliefs rather than empirical evidence.

The use of the model for analysis has poses both opportunities as well as threats due to the long term approach character it has. On the one side it adds an extra interesting element to the whole process of environmental scarcity, especially the part of ancient animosity between actors. On the other hand however one can state that in the long run all processes might lead to a peaceful equilibrium or at least a situation where violence is absent.

215Ibid. 216Richard Matthew, Mark Halle, and Jason Switzer, Conserving the Peace: Resources, Livelihoods and Security (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002). 217Matthew, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research.”

71 Annex B: Euphrates­Tigris river basin

Figure 7: Euphrates­Tigris river basin. The red line indicates the river water catchment.218

Euphrates

The Euphrates originates on the Armenian Plateau in northeastern Turkey where it is formed by the Murat and Karasu rivers. These two rivers form the Euphrates at the Keban dam, due to heavy alteration in the 20th century, which was completed in 1974.219 From the Taurus mountains the river flows to southeastern Turkey through the Karakaya and Atatürk dams which where build during the 1980's. The Atatürk dams contributes to a large irrigation project for Anatolia. After the dams the river flow continues to the south in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea and bends south east to flow in the direction of Syria. In Syria it enters into a barren area where the cultivable area is only a few miles wide. The Euphrates dam which was completed in 1973 collects water from the Euphrates to form lake Al Asad. Below the dam the reduced flow receives water from the Balĩkh and Khãbũr rivers. Here the river, also fed by rainfall, is able to support intensive agriculture. The river flows down to Abu Kamal through a agricultural province. After entering Iraq the stream narrows again. At the Hadithah dam a reservoir is formed which decreased the irrigated area which formed the agricultural base of the middle Euphrates. South of Hit the river widens again and irrigation increases.220

Near Al Hindiyyah the river splits into two other streams; Al Hillah and Al Hindiyyah. The latter has been the main channel while the Al Hillah branch is divided into numerous channels which supports cultivation in the desert areas to the south and east. Below Al Kifl the Al Hindiyyah has been regulated and support rice cultivation. South of Al Nasiriyyah the Euphrates flows into the wetlands before it joins the Tigris at Al Qurnah to form the Shatt al­Arab which empties in the Persian Gulf.

218“South West Asia Project.” 219Beaumont, “Agricultural and environmental changes in the upper Euphrates catchment of Turkey and Syria and their political and economic implications.” 220“Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia.”

72 The Euphrates is largely a snow fed river and is largely dependent on winter rain and spring snow melt in the Zargos and Taurus mountains. On it's way to Iraq it only receives water from two spring fed tributaries; Balïkh and the Khãbũr. Due to irrigations and dam reservoirs the river loses much of it flow.221

Tigris

The Tigris, which originates in Lake Hazar ,is fed by a number of tributaries and drains a wide area of eastern Turkey. It forms the border between Turkey and Syria below Cizre and receives water from the Khabur at the border with Iraq. The river fills a reservoir above the city of Mosul in northern Iraq and there it contributes to a large irrigation project in the region of Tall Afar Sinjar.222 Further downstream the Tigris joins with the Great Zab and Little Zab rivers at the ancient ruin of Ashur. In April and March the volume of the Tigris is doubled by the contributions of the Zab rivers, this increased flow is controlled by the Bakhma and Dukan dams which prevent extreme flooding.223

The Tigris reaches the alluvial plain near Samarra where it is regulated by lake Al Tharthar in the west which stand in connection with the Euphrates via lake Al Habbaniyyah. Below Sammara the river is fed by the Uzaym river. Around Baghdad the river is artificially embanked to control the river flow from flooding the surroundings. Below Baghdad the river Diyala joins the Tigris and is an source for irrigation fro the eastern Baghdad region. At al Qurnah the river joins the Euphrates to form the Shatt al Arab.

The Tigris also receives it water from the winter rain and spring snow melt in the Zagros and Taurus Mountains. On it's course it is fed by four strong other rivers; the Great and Little Zab, Uzaym and Diyãlá. All these rivers derive their water mainly from snow melt in Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. The flow of these tributaries makes the Tigris more susceptible for short term flooding.

Climate

The Euphrates and Tigris make one of the most harshest regions in the world habitable. The course of both rivers flows through various terrains before it ends in the Persian Gulf. The region has a continental subtropical climate with average temperature in summer higher then 32°C and temperatures lower then 10°C in winter. Precipitation is light in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates but increases considerably at higher elevations in their source areas.224 Much of the precipitation falls as snow, which can lie in some places for half the year. During winter, the mean temperature in the mountains is well below freezing. With the melting of the snow in spring, the rivers’ volume increases. The mounting flow is augmented in their middle courses by seasonal rainfall, which reaches its peak between March and May. In the lower courses of the rivers in the alluvial plain, rain can be torrential in winter but usually does not exceed 200 mm per year. 225 On the Mesopotamian plain, the most characteristic climatic feature is the extreme heat of the summer, with daytime temperatures rising as high as 60 °C. Often, there are drops of 22 °C from

221Beaumont, “Agricultural and environmental changes in the upper Euphrates catchment of Turkey and Syria and their political and economic implications.” 222“Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia.” 223“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 224“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 225“Tigris­Euphrates river system (river system, Asia) ­­ Britannica Online Encyclopedia.”

73 day to night. The river knows two periods of flooding. The irregular period from November till March and the main flooding period caused by the melting of snow in spring in April and May.

Water resources

It is hard to determine the average annual discharge of both rivers because the Euphrates and Tigris experience large yearly fluctuations. In the mid 1970's the amount reached over 84 km³ while in the early 1960's the rivers experienced some severe droughts where the amount was well below the 30 km³.226 These fluctuations make it very hard to develop an adequate plan for water allocation for competing sectors as well as to ensure fair sharing of water amongst the riparians. The yearly fluctuations have caused some disastrous floodings as well as some severe droughts. The major part of the rivers flow occurs during the spring flood period, when the snow in the Anatolian highlands start to melt. In general this period is from February through June for the Tigris and March through July for the Euphrates. The percentage of annual flow the rivers receive during this period is 60­80% and 45­80% respectively. During the low period, which is from July through September, the rivers do not receive more than 10% of their annual amount. Turkey contributes about 90% of the annual flow on the Euphrates while the remaining 10% originates in Syria. On the Tigris, Turkey contributes about 38% directly and another 11% through tributaries which confluence with the Tigris further downstream in Iraq. The majority of the flow, 51%, originates in Iran and confluence with the Tigris through 3 tributaries: the Little Zab, Dyala and Karkeh.227

226Ibid. 227Ibid.

74 Annex C: The Riparians

Iraq

Figure 8: Map of Iraq228

Background

Iraq has been known for centuries by its Greek name; Mesopotamia, meaning the land between the rivers. These rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, formed a fertile crescent, where agriculture flourished in an arid region. Since the 16th century the country has been part of the former Ottoman Empire. It was occupied by Great Britain during the First World War and in 1920 it was declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration. In 1932 the country gained its independence and became a kingdom. In 1958 Iraq was declared a republic but in effect the country was ruled by a serie of strongmen and from 1968 the country was ruled by the Baath party headed from 1979 till 2003 by the notorious Saddam Hussein.

Territorial disputes with Iran led to a bloody war form 1980 till 1988. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait but was expelled from the country by a UN coalition under auspices of the US during the Gulf War. Following the Gulf War the UN Security Council requires Iraq to abolish all weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles and allow the UN to conduct inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US­led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the end of the regime by Saddam Hussein. US forces remained in Iraq under a UNSC mandate until 31 December 2008 and under a bilateral Security Agreement thereafter, helping to provide security and to support the freely elected government. In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, pursuant to this document, elected a 275­member Council

228“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.”

75 of Representatives in December 2005. On 31 January 2009, Iraq held elections for provincial councils in all provinces except for the three provinces comprising the Kurdistan Regional Government and at­Ta'mim (Kirkuk) province.229

Geography

Iraq with a total area of 438,320 km², is bordered by Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, the Persian Gulf to the south east, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the south and Jordan and Syria to the west. Iraq's territory covers the Great Mesopotamian alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The basin is surrounded by mountains in the north and east, forming the border with Iran and Turkey, which can reach up to 3.500 meter. The south and west of the country is largely formed by desert areas which account for 40% of the country.230 In the south there are also large areas of marshes. It is estimated that about 11,5 million ha (26%) of the total area of the country are cultivable. 35,250 km² are irrigated.231 50% of the total cultivated area is in northern Iraq is rainfed.232 The country is rich on natural resources. It ranks fourth in the world on proven oil reserves and also has substantial natural gas reserves.233

Climate

Iraq has a continental subtropical climate which is semi arid. In the north and northeastern parts of the country the climate has more Mediterranean influences.234 As a result of climate, the winters are usually mild to cool with average day temperatures of 16 °C dropping to 2 °C at night and the summers hot and dry with day temperatures exceeding 60 °C and 26 °C at night. The northern mountainous regions along the border with Turkey and Iran experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snow falls. The snow melts in spring time causing extensive flooding in the central and southern parts of Iraq. Rainfall is very seasonal and occurs in the winter from December till February in the north and north eastern the rainfall period is from November till April. Average annual rainfall is estimated at 216 mm, ranging from 1,200 mm in the north east to less than 100 mm in the south.235

Water Resources

Iraq depends to a large extent on water from the Euphrates and Tigris. The rivers flow for 1,000 (Euphrates) and 1,300 (Tigris) km through Iraqi territory before they for the Shatt Al Arab and empty in the Persian Gulf. The Tigris river basin area covers 253,000 km² which is about 54% of the whole Tigris river basin. Its annual run off as it enter Iraq is estimated at 21.3 km³. The Tigris has several tributaries:236

• The Greater Zab, originates in Turkey. Discharge averages 13.2 km³ at its confluence with the Tigris. Of its river basin 25,810 km² (62%) is in Iraq.

229“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 230“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 231“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 232“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 233“Iraq Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis ­ Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal.” 234“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 235“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 236Ibid.

76 • The Little Zab, originates in Iran. Discharge averages 7.2 km³ at its confluence. 21,475 km² (74%) is in Iraq. River is equipped with the Dokan Dam (6.8 km³). • The Al Adhaim, drains 13,000 km² in Iraq. Discharge averages about 0.8 km³ at its confluence. • The Diyala, originates in Iran. 75% or 31,896 km² of its basin is in Iraq. Discharge averages 5.74 km³ at its confluence. Is equipped with the Derbendi Khan Dam. • The Nahr at Tib, Dewarege and Shebabi rivers drain about 8,000 km² in Iraq. All originate in Iran and generate about 1 km³ water at their confluence with the Tigris. Water is highly saline. • The Karkheh originates in Iran and has a drainage area of 46,000 km². Discharges about 6.3 km³ water into Iraq into the Hawr Al Hawiza during the flood season and into the Tigris in the dry season.

The Euphrates has an average estimated run off of 30 km³. This amount fluctuates heavily however between the 10 km³ and 40 km³. The Euphrates does not receive any water from tributaries. In the southern course of the Euphrates the river drains a marsh called Hawr al Harnmar with about 10 km³ per year. In Iraq the Tigris and Euphrates join and form the Shatt al Arab which has a course of 190 km before it flows into the Persian Gulf. The Shatt al Arab receive water from one other river, the Karun, which originates in Iranian territory and has a mean annual flow of 24.7 km³.237

It was estimated that in 2000 a total of 66 km³ of water was withdrawn, of which 79% for agriculture, 6.5% for domestic purposes and 14.5 % for the industrial sector.238 Per capita water withdrawal was 2,632 m³ per year. The water resources of Iraq depend largely on the surface water of the Euphrates and Tigris and most renewable water resources in Iraq come from outside the country. The water dependency ratio of Iraq as calculated by the FAO is 53.5%.239

Iraq's dam capacity is 139.7 km³ of which 102.2 km³ is positioned on the Tigris and the other 37.5 km³ on the Euphrates. The country furthermore has eleven major wastewater treatment centers. Three of them in Baghdad. All of the treatment plants are located near rivers and their total capacity is 650,000 m³ per day. The treated wastewater is released into the rivers. In 2002, Iraq had a desalination capacity of about 384,513 m³/day.240

People

Iraq has a estimated population of 29 million, 66.4% of the population lives in urban areas and 33.6% in the rural areas.241 Average population density is about 64 people per km² but varies greatly from the almost uninhabited Anwar province in the south to the most inhabited Babylon province in the center of the country. Average population growth is estimated at 2.5% , the growth rate was higher during the 1990's but the war had has a severe effect on population growth. Iraq has a young population with a median age of 18.9 years. The majority of the population consist out of (80%) with a large minority of Kurds who live mainly in the northern part where they enjoy a certain level of autonomous governance. There are some small Assyrian and Turkmen minorities as

237Ibid. 238“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 239“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 240Ibid. 241United Nations Development Programme, World Urbanization Prospects: the 2007 Revision; Highlights.

77 a result of the Ottoman occupation.242 Main religion in the country is Islam. The majority of the population is Shia Muslim and a large minority is Sunni. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 there has been a bloody struggle between the two Islamic fractions resulting in many casualties.

Government

2003 marked the end of the authoritarian rule by Saddam Hussein as an US led coalition invaded the country and expelled and captured the former tiran. Since then the Americans have tried to bring democracy to the country. In 2005 a constitution was approved and in May 2006 the country's first constitutional elected government was installed. Besides these first steps towards becoming a democracy the country is still de facto ruled by anarchy and bloody attacks by various Islamic fractions occur regularly. The most stable part of the country is the north which is ruled by the Kurdistan regional Government.

Economy

Over the past few years Iraq has been tangled up in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. It has been occupied with reconstructing the country and stabilizing civil order. It has been successful to some extent in decreasing the attacks of Islamic militias and the improvement of the security environment in many parts of the country has helped to get the country's economy back on track. The economy of Iraq is dominated by its prime natural resource: oil. Traditionally this sector has provided for over 90% of its foreign exchange earnings.243 Oil exports are around 1,83 bbl per day. Still Iraq's GDP is at a low level of €68.7 billion in 2008 which is a per capita GDP of €2,930.244 The past years the government revenues have benefited from the high oil prices, these revenues have declined sharply however since the drop in the oil price in the autumn of 2008. The government is pursuing economic reforms and to integrate the Iraqi economy in the regional economy to strengthen it. There is still a lot of work needed to rehabilitate Iraqi's industrial and private sectors. The country is busy with building institutions and to promote and facilitate for instance investments on the local level in order to improve the the lives of ordinary Iraqis.

242“Demographics of Iraq ­ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Iraq; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 243“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Iraq.” 244“DDP Quick Query.”

78 Syria

Figure 9; Map of Syria245

Background

After the break up of the Ottoman Empire, Syria came under the control of France until its independence in 1946. The country lacked political stability and experienced a serie of military coupes. In 1958 Syria united with Egypt to form the . In September 1961 the two countries separated and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In 1970 Hafiz Al Asad, a member of the Socialist Ba'th party and the minority Alawite sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. In the 1967 Arab­Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel. During the 1990's Syria and Israel held peace talks over it return. Following the death of president al Asad, his son Bashar al Asad was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2001. Syrian military troops stationed in the since 1976 in a peacekeeping role, were withdrawn in April 2005. During the 2006 conflict between Israel en Hezbollah, Syria place its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hezbollah.246

Geography

Syria covers an area of 185,180 km² and is bordered by Turkey in the north, in the east and southeast by Iraq, by Jordan in the south in the southwest by Israel and in the west by Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. The country is characterized by a semiarid and desert plateau. There is a narrow coastal plain between the Mediterranean Sea and the mountains. The mountains and highlands in

245“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Syria.” 246“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Syria.”

79 the west extend from the north to the south parallel to the Mediterranean Sea. East of the highland there are the plains around the major cities of Aleppo, Damascus, and Hassakeh. In the south eastern part of the country the desert forms the border with Iraq and Jordan. About 5.9 million ha or 32% of the total are of land is cultivable.247 13,330 km² was irrigated in 2003. Hassakeh, Aleppo and Raqqa form the agricultural centers of the country.

Climate

The climate in Syria is of the Mediterranean type with some continental influences; cool rainy winters and warm dry summers. The spring and autumn seasons are relatively short. Large parts of Syria are exposed to high variability in day temperatures. The difference can be as high as 32 degrees C in the inlands and 13 degrees C in the coastal regions. Total annual precipitation ranges from 100­150 mm in the northwest, 150­200 mm in the south, central and eastern­central parts, 300­ 600 mm on the plains and the foothills of the west and 800­1.000 mm along the coast increasing to 1,400 mm in the mountains. Making a country average of 252 mm per year.248

Water resources

Renewable water resources generated by precipitation is estimated to amount 7.1 km³ per year. Internal surface water resources are estimated to contribute 4.3 km³ per year and there is a groundwater recharge of 4.8 km³ per year from which 2 km³ has some overlap with surface water. Total annual renewable internal water resources are estimated at about 16.8 km³ per year which is only 882 m³ per capita per year. 249

Syria can be divided into 7 main hydrographic basin:250

• • Aleppo • Al Badia • Al Yarmook • Damascus • Orontes • Al Sahel

The major supply for these basins come from precipitation, only exceptions are the Al Jazeera and Orontes basin which main sources are located in neighboring countries. There are 16 main rivers and tributaries in the countries from which 6 are transboundary rivers:251

• Euphrates; comes from Turkey. • Afrin; comes from Turkey and flows back to Turkey. • Orontes; coming from Lebanon and flows to Turkey. • Yarmouk; sources in Syria and Lebanon and forms the border between these two countries

247“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 248“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed.” 249“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 250Ibid. 251“CLIMAGRImed.”

80 before flowing into the Jordan. • El Kabir; has sources in Syria and Lebanon and forms the border between the two before flowing into the sea. • Tigris; forms the border between Turkey and Syria.

The average natural run off from these transboundary rivers is estimated at 28.5 km³ per year. The actual external renewable surface water resources are estimated at 17.3 km³ per year from which 15.8 km³ alone comes from the Euphrates as unilaterally proposed by Turkey. 0.3 km³ is entering via the Orontes guaranteed by a agreement with Lebanon. The Tigris contributes 1.3 km³ per year. The Tigris has an actual flow of 18 km³ but since it only forms a border between Syria and Turkey most of it is not available.252

Syria also receives some water from groundwater aquifers. It has an estimated inflow of 1.3 km³ per year from which 1.2 km³ comes from Turkey and 0.1 km³ from Lebanon. Groundwater outflow to Lebanon and Israel is 0.1 km³ and 0.3 km³ respectively. The main groundwater aquifers are those in the Anti Lebanon and the Alouite Mountains.253

Total water withdrawal in Syria has been estimated at 16.7 km³ per year. Which is more then the amount of renewable water resources. 87.9% of it is for the agricultural sector. The Euphrates and Orontes basins account for about 50 and 20% of water withdrawal respectively. Syria does not have a lot of renewable water resources intern, and it uses most of what is available. The dependency ratio of the country is therefore quite high at a level that equals 72.3%.254

Syria's total dam capacity is estimated at a storage level of 19.7 km³. This amount is divided over 166 dams. The largest dam is positioned on the Euphrates and forms Lake Asad and has a storage capacity of 14.1 km² with a surface of 674 km²; the Al Tabka dam. The majority of dams in Syria are located near and which is in the western part of the country. Together with Jordan, Syria was planning to build the 110 million m³ capacity Unity dam on the Yarmouk but this was resisted by Israel.255

Syria reuses its wastewater and has several treatment plants, mainly outside the big cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Salamieh. Total water treated in 2002 was 1,364 million m³. The desalination capacity of Syria is marginal with only 3 million m³/y.256

People

Syria has a estimated population of 19 million, 64.9% of the population lives in urban areas and 45.1% in the rural areas.257 Average population density is about 103 people per km². Average population growth is estimated at 2.1%. Syria also has a very young population with an average median age of 20.6 years. The majority of the population consist out of Arabs (90.3%), the remaining population is made up out of small minorities of Kurds and . The country's

252“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 253“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed.” 254“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 255Ibid. 256Ibid. 257United Nations Development Programme, World Urbanization Prospects: the 2007 Revision; Highlights; “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.”

81 main religion is Islam. 74% of the total population is Sunni Muslim and 16% has some other kind of Muslim faith such as and Alawite. There is a substantial Christian minority in Syria which consists out of 10% of the population. There are some small Jewish communities in Damascus, Al and Aleppo.258

Government

Syria is a parliamentary republic under an authoritarian military dominated regime. The power is in the hands of the president and the ruling Ba'th party. Since 1963 an Emergency Law has been effect which removes the constitutional protection for citizens. Syrians therefore do not have the right to change their government. The government has justified this state of emergency in the light of the continuing war with Israel.259 The Asad regime has been in power since the 1970's. Its survival has been due partly to the strong desire for stability and its success in giving small minorities a stake in society. The expansion of the government bureaucracy also created a great class loyal to the regime. This combined with the army's continued loyalty and the effectiveness of a large security apparatus contributes to the president's continuing strength.

All three branches of government are ruled by the Ba'ath party whose power is assured by the constitution. The party is both socialist and revolutionary, dedicated to bring a socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world. The Ba'ath ideology embraces and has attracted supporters in many countries in the Arab world. Iraq's Saddam Hussein was a member of the Iraqi branch of the Ba'ath party. Since the 1990's the Syrian Ba'ath party has tended to de­emphasize socialism and now stresses pan­Arabian unity.

Economy

Syrian economy grew by an estimated 2.4% in real terms in 2008 led by the petroleum and agricultural sectors which together account for about 50% of GDP. GDP was estimated at € 32.6 billion or €3,519 per capita.260 The government has implemented some modest economic reforms over the past few years including cutting lending interest rates, opening private banks and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange. In 2008 president al Asad signed legislative decrees to encourage corporate ownership reforms and to allow the central bank to issue treasury bill ans bond for government debt. However the economy still remains to be under the strict control of the government. Long run economic constraints include declining oil production, high unemployment rate (9% in 2008) and inflation (14.9% in 2008) rising budget deficits and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, rapid population growth, and water pollution.

258“Demographics of Syria ­ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Syria; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Syria.” 259Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 305­320. 260“DDP Quick Query.”

82 Turkey

Figure 10; Map of Turkey261

Background

The modern republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 on the remains of the former Ottoman Empire by national hero Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Under his authoritarian rule the country underwent some wide ranging political, social, and legal reforms. Aim of Atatürk was to create a modern European state. After a period of one­party rule a experiment with multi party elections lead in the 1950's to a victory for the opposition Democratic Party. Since then the number of Turkish political parties have multiplied, but democracy has been fragile and regularly interrupted by military coups which in each case resulted in the return of power to the civilian authorities. The military sees itself as the safeguards of the secular state and will intervene whenever it feels that the government becomes too much Islam­oriented.262

In 1974, Turkey intervened military on to prevent a Greek takeover of the island and established a Turkish Republic of Northern Turkey which is only recognized by Turkey. A separatist insurgency begun in 1984 by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), has dominated the Turkish military attention and the ongoing conflict has claimed more than 35,000 lives so far.263 Since the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 the rebels largely withdrew form Turkey to Northern Iraq.

Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and NATO in 1952. In 1964 Turkey became an associate member of the European Union. Over the past decade it has undertaken many reforms to strengthen its democracy and economy. It began membership talks with the European Union in 2005.

261“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey.” 262“Army 'concerned' by Turkey vote,” BBC, April 28, 2007, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602375.stm; “Excerpts of Turkish army statement,” BBC, April 28, 2007, sec. Europe, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm. 263“Kurdish rebels kill Turkey troops.”

83 Geography

Turkey occupies an area of about 783,560 km². It forms the bridge between Europe and Asia with about 3% of its land in Europe () and the remaining part in Asia (Anatolia). It is bordered by the Caucasian countries of , and in the east, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the southeast, by the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea in the south and west, by the and in the northwest and by the in the north. It has a coastline 7,200 km compared with land border of 2,648 km. The total cultivated area is about one third of the country which equals 26.6 million ha of which about 10% is occupied by permanent crops such as vineyard, fruit trees and olives.264

Climate

Turkey has four seasons, but the climate varies widely across the country. The country is under the effect of both maritime and continental weather patterns which, combined with a highly varied topography, cause extreme geo­climatic diversity. The Black Sea region in the north receives rain throughout the year and has both mild summers and mild winters. The southern coastal Mediterranean region is regarded as subtropical, characterized by hot, dry summers and mild, rainy winters. The Aegean region has mountains which run roughly east to west, which are interspersed with grassy floodplains. It also has a Mediterranean type of climate with hot, dry summers and mild winters. Central Anatolia is a vast high plateau with an average altitude of 1,132 meters above sea level and a semi­arid continental climate with hot and dry summers and cold winters.

The average annual temperature is 18­20°C on the south coast, falls to 14­15°C on the west coast, and fluctuates between 4 and 19°C in the interior regions, depending on the distance from the sea and the altitude.

The average annual rainfall in Turkey is about 643 mm, with important spatial and temporal fluctuations. Rainfall is scarce during the growing season in normal years in most parts of Turkey. Overall, the western and southern coastal regions receive 800­1,000 mm of rainfall per year. The northern coastal zone receives the highest annual rainfall (1,260–2 500 mm). Central Anatolia receives the lowest rainfall (200­600 mm) which, combined with high temperature and high evaporation rates, causes drought during the summer months. Evaporation is high particularly in the southeast region, which receives almost no rainfall during the summer, and can reach more than 2, 000 mm/year. The southeast region records very low humidity levels, while the coastal regions have quite high levels, in line with precipitation rates.265

Water resources

Turkey is a large country and includes some 26 hydrological basins with great variety in discharge. Most rivers have their source in Turkey. The total amount of internal renewable water resources is estimated at 227 km³ per year. It receives some water from sources outside the country such as the Orontes from Syria (1.2 km³), the Tunca from Bulgaria (0.6 km³) and from the Meric (2.9 km³)

264“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey”; “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed.” 265“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey”; “CLIMAGRImed.”

84 which is the border between Turkey and Greece. This adds to a total amount of renewable water resources of 231.7 km³/y.266 A total of 53.7 km³/y surface water leaves the country which goes to Syria (26.3 km³), Iraq (21.3 km³) and Georgia (4,3 km³), groundwater that leaves the country equals 11 km³/y. The total amount of actual renewable water resources is estimated at 213.6 km³/y or 2,918 m³/y per capita. In 2003 around 40,1 km³ of water was withdrawn, of which 74% for the agricultural sector, 15% for domestic purposes and 11% for the industrial sector. In Turkey there is a increasing trend in groundwater withdrawal in order to meet the demand. Especially in areas where surface water is scarce. Since Turkey is in its region a relative water rich region, it has a by the FAO calculated dependency ratio of only 1%.267

Turkey has a total amount of 579 completed dam and about 210 dams are under construction. The total capacity of all dams is 651 km³. The Atatürk dam on the Euphrates is with its storage capacity of 48.7 km³ one of the 10 largest dams in the world. An estimated 1.7 km³ of wastewater is treated every year. In 2000 the government ordered every village to have a wastewater treatment plant which uses special absorbent crops such as grass.268

People

Turkey is a big country with a population of around 71 million from which 67.3% lives in the urban areas and 32.7% in the rural areas.269 Population density is 91 per km². The annual growth rate of the population lays around 1.3%.270 The population is somewhat older then the other two riparians and more “European”. Turkey has a median age of 26.5 years.271

The majority of the country (80%) is of Turkish descent. This Turkishness is however not defined by but by sharing a Turkish culture and having a Turkish modern tongue. Due to the former vast Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey inhabits a lot of different ethnicities coming from its former territories such as people from the Balkan (, ), Caucasus (Armenian, , ), Central Asia (Tartars, Cossacks, Kazahks), and the Arab world (, Arabs, Assyrians).272 The largest minority with a 20% share of the total population is formed by the Kurds who live primarily in the eastern and southeastern part of Anatolia. Since the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire in 1453, Turkey has been an Islamic country. At present 99.8% of the population is Muslim, primarily Sunni.273

Government

Turkey is a republican parliamentary democracy. Since it foundation as a republic in 1923 it has had a strong tradition of secularism. The head of state is the president which has more a ceremonial function. Executive power is in the hands of the prime minister and the council of ministers which are at the head of the government and the multi party system.

266“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed.” 267“CLIMAGRImed”; “AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture.” 268“AQUASTAT ­ FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture”; “CLIMAGRImed.” 269“World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database.” 270“World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database”; “CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey.” 271“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey”; “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database.” 272“Demographics of Turkey ­ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Turkey. 273“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey.”

85 The constitution which was approved on 7 November 1982, establishes Turkey as a unitary centralized state. The constitution followed after a period of military rule and firmly establishes Turkey as a secular state. The military sees itself as the guardian of Kemalism, the official state ideology. It has a record of intervening in politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Most recently the army was responsible for the removal of the Islamic oriented minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1997.274 In the advance of the 2007 elections and as a reaction on the ruling of the Justice and Development Party, the army issued a statement of its interests. Message was that the military was ready to intervene in politics when it felt necessary.275

Economy

Turkey's economy is a mix of modern industry and commerce combined with the traditional agricultural sector which still employs about 30% of the total labor force.276 It has a strong and rapidly growing private sector but the state plays still an important role in banking, industry, transport and communication. The largest industrial sector is textiles and clothing, which accounts for one third of industrial employment. Turkey's GDP is €548.8 billion which is €8,786 per capita. Real GDP growth in 2008 was 1,5% while the years before were significantly better with growth rates of 4.6% (2007) and 6.9% (2006). The economy has been interrupted by some sharp declines in 1994, 1999 and 2001. After the implementation of economic reforms the 2004 GDP reached a growth of 9%. Inflation was 10.2% in 2008.277 Despite the strong economic gains from 2002­07, which were largely due to renewed investor interest in emerging markets, IMF backing, and tighter fiscal policy, the economy is still burdened by a high current account deficit and high external debt. Further economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership are expected to boost foreign direct investment.278 Turkey is an important transit country between Europe and the oil rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. In 2006 the Baku­Tbilisi­Ceyhan pipeline was finished, which will bring up to 1 million barrels per day from the Caspian to market.279

274“Army 'concerned' by Turkey vote.” 275“Excerpts of Turkish army statement.” 276“DDP Quick Query”; “Data ­ Key Development Data & Statistics,” Turkey, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694 ~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. 277“DDP Quick Query.” 278“CIA ­ The World Factbook ­­ Turkey.” 279“Caspian pipeline is declared open.”

86 Annex D: Environmental outlooks

Global Environmental Outlook 4

The UN Global Environmental Outlook research team uses 4 different scenarios to outline how the future might possible look like based upon the dominant actors, their approaches and the implications of their choices. Briefly summarizing the scenarios assume the following:280

Market First : The private sector, supported by the government pursues maximal economic growth as it is perceived as the best way to improve human as well as environmental well­being. There is a narrow focus on the sustainability of markets. Technological solutions to environmental problems are preferred above other solutions.

Policy First : The government tries to improve the human and environmental well­being supported actively by civil institutions and the private sector. Economic development is still of major importance. There is some attention for sustainable development but tensions between environmental and economic policies are biased towards social and economic considerations. Emphasis lays on top down approaches.

Security First: The government and private sector compete in order to improve, or at least maintain, human well­being. This scenarios is focused on the minority: rich, national and regional. It only emphasizes sustainable development in the context of maximizing access and use to the environment by the powerful.

Sustainability First: Government, private sector and civil society collaborate in order to improve human and environmental well­being with a strong emphasize on equity. Equal attention is given to environmental and economic policies. There is a long term focus.

Implications of the scenarios.

Under each of the scenarios world population continues to grow. In the security first scenario world population peaks in 2050 having 9.2 billion inhabitants. The lowest level is under the sustainability first scenarios were by 2050 the world's population will be just under 8 billion. The projections of the UN range from 7.8 billion to 10.2 billion people by 2050. These differences are caused by other expectations about population policies, income growth and female education. The Middle Eastern region will have relatively the largest growth in the world under all 4 scenarios. Also the world economy is expected to grow significantly driven by the expected population growth. Particularly under the market first and policy first were there is an expected fivefold increase of world's average GDP. Even in security first there is a doubling of world's GDP. The average annual growth rate outlined by the scenarios ranges between the 2.6­3.9%. Besides population growth the increase and intensification of world trade is an important driver. Due especially the rapid population growth the absolute size of the economy of the Middle East is expected to grow at the same rate as the Asian economy and even faster in the security first scenario.281

Under the market first scenario, the consequence of the desire for improvement of living standards is

280Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development. 281Ibid.

87 that water withdrawal will increase. Trends differ between countries as developed countries will reach a saturation point during the time span of the scenario while developing countries demand continue to increase due to growing incomes. Under policy first there is a decrease in water withdrawal in developed countries due to more efficient use and change in water use behavior In other countries the growth will be at a lower pace. Under security first a neglect of water conservation and population growth tends to increase water withdrawal, but this trend is lowered by a lesser economic development. Under sustainability first the rate of increase is also not so high because of slower population growth and widespread adoption of integrated water management strategies.282

Climate change will have its effect on the availability of water. In the arid regions of the Middle East higher temperatures and lower levels of precipitation will decrease the availability of water. Changes in the climate might also lead to more frequent periods of high and low run off increase the variability in river flows which will result in more extremes like periods of severe droughts and periods of flooding. These factors combined with the increased demand and population growth will increase the number of people living under conditions of water stress certainly in the Middle Eastern region.283

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

The IPCC researches the impact of climate change on our ecological systems and the possible consequences this might have for our society. Also the IPCC uses 4 different scenarios , narrative storyline which they named A1, A2, B1 and B2. Each of the storyline represent a different set of demographic, social, economic, technological and environmental developments. The 4 storylines combine 2 sets of divergent tendencies. One set varying strong between economic and environmental values and the other set between increasing globalization and regionalization. The storylines are summarized as follows:284

A1: a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid­ century and declines thereafter, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies.

A2: a very heterogeneous world with continuously increasing global population and regionally oriented economic growth that is more fragmented and slower than in other storylines.

B1: a convergent world with the same global population as in the A1 storyline but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource­efficient technologies.

B2: a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability, with continuously increasing population (lower than A2) and intermediate economic development.

282Ibid. 283Ibid. 284Nakicenovic et al., Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

88 The IPCC research concludes that with respect to climate change and water supply the cost will outweigh the benefits. One reason is that the variability in precipitation is very likely to increase resulting in a more frequent occurrence of periods of flooding and severe droughts. In snow­melt fed basins, such as the Euphrates, the risk of drought in the low flow season will increase. The higher temperature and increase in precipitation variability in general would also lead to an increased irrigation water demand. The water demand from the domestic and agricultural sector is expected to increase but this increase is likely to be rather small, less than 5% by 2050.285

Annex E: Assumption WaterGAP 2.0 Model

285Bates et al., Climate Change and Water.

89 In the tables below the input data for the A2 and B2 scenario specified for the riparians can be viewed. The area of irrigated land is assumed to remain equal. GDP per capita is measured in 1995 U.S. Dollars. The level of the GDP differ significantly from the current conditions this is caused by the fact that the input used for the model were based on data from 2001, therefore the projections on some GPD are somewhat outdated. The assumptions of the WaterGAP model for the 2 scenarios are depicted below. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is measured in American Dollars at 1995 levels. The electricity production is in 10⁶ MW/h, and the irrigated area is measured in km².

Table 1:Assumptions WaterGAP 2.0 model.286

There is only data available for water withdrawal and not for water availability on country level. This is caused by the fact that some rivers are transboundary and don't stop at the border. In the case of the Euphrates and Tigris some of the rain that falls in Iran and Turkey is available in Iraq due to the river network. It is difficult to say how much water remains in country A and how much flows to country B. The hydrological unit were calculations were made for in the WaterGAP model are on basin level.287

Table 2: Output WaterGAP 2.0288

286Schneider, “Assumptions WaterGAP 2.0 model”; Alcamo, Flörke, and Märker , “Future long­term changes in global water resources driven by socio­economic and climatic changes.” 287Schneider, “Assumptions WaterGAP 2.0 model.” 288Alcamo, Flörke, and Märker , “Future long­term changes in global water resources driven by socio­economic and

90 Annex F: Scenario Storylines

climatic changes.”

91 Business as usual

As the name already suggests the Business as Usual scenario is a rather conservative scenario extrapolating the current state of affairs towards the future. A status quo is the main assumption of this scenario. Under this scenario the world is still a unipolar world dominated by the economic and military power of the of America (U.S.A, hereafter US.) while China and Russia also exercise their influence on the geopolitical world stage. The power distribution among the riparians is still in favor of Turkey which is the primus inter pares. Due to its upstream position on both rivers it has de facto control over the river flows. As a result of this power distribution the attitude of the riparians towards each other is still a bit careful. There are some cooperation initiatives but these are often limited to sharing information about water levels and do not include collaborative water management. Water remains a very sensitive topic. Another factor influencing the cold terms among them is the state of the region. The Middle East is also in the period towards 2030­2050 characterized by instability. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians hasn't been solved yet. The relation between Israel and its neighbors is still hostile. In Syria the Ba'ath party is still the leading party and no major economic or political reforms have taken place over the past decades. The security apparatus is still the pinnacle of government spending receiving an average of 5% of GDP annually. The situation in Iraq hasn't improved very much either. After the withdrawal of American troops in the 2012 conflict between various fractions flared up again. In the aftermath of this troublesome period that lasted about a year a government of national unity has been formed. Since then the situation has become more stable but violent attacks still occur. Reconstruction has been slow but the situation now is much better when compared with the post bellum period of 2005­2012. Largest problem in the country which still discourages foreign investment and proves to be a real burden on the economy is the increased corruption in the country. Turkey on its turn, still under secular government, has experienced moderate economic growth over the past decades. By 2030 the average living standards in the country were comparable with those of Spain in 2009. The Kurdish problem hasn't been resolved yet. In North Iraq the Kurdish minority enjoys a form of autonomous government. The Kurdish separatists use this part of the region as their base for insurgency operations in northeastern Turkey. Occasionally the Turkish army strikes back with large operations hot pursuing the separatist into Northern Iraq.

The rate of technological progress is still high and has increased in comparison with its levels during the period 2000­2010. As a result various new irrigation and crop production as well as water management techniques have become available in the region. Still the distribution of these new technologies is confined to the more financial powerful countries such as Israel, Turkey and Iran.

Population experienced a very large increase. In Syria and Iraq the population has almost doubled while Turkey's population is approaching the 100 million. As a result population density in Syria has doubled, in Iraq the city of Baghdad has grown so that it exceed 8 million inhabitants. Also in Turkey the cities have grown tremendously. The number of migrants and refugees are equal to those of 2009, in percentages.

The state of the world's economy has improved after the 2009 credit crunch, but growth has been very moderate with an annual average rate of 2%. As expected, driven by globalization, trade has become a more important aspect of national economies. In the region especially Turkey with its diversified economy has benefited from these developments. Iraq's economy is still largely dependent on revenues from oil sector. In Syria the economic growth has slowed down due to the

92 large state influence. Syria was able to benefit from the growth of the Iraqi economy being its biggest export partner. Syria's and Iraq's economy are integrated with each other while Turkey relies more on the European economy.

Turkish Century

As already stated in the early 1990's, by the then Turkish president Özal, the 21st century will indeed become a Turkish century. Turkey not only becomes a major regional power in the Middle East but it will also extend its influence in the Caucasus as well as in Europe as it finally has become a member of the European Union in 2014. Turkey was able to benefit from its geostrategic position between the Middle East, the Caucasus and Europe. Due to the rise of Islamic extremism and the military power of China the Western powers (US and EU) needed to extent their sphere of influence. Although China has translated its economic growth into political power in Africa and Central Asia, the West, led by the US remains the sole world hegemon. Due to 2 successful terms of Obama as president the United States were able to recover from the economic crisis in 2009. Under his regime Turkey became an important ally to increase US influence in the Middle Eastern region. Turkey also formed a buffer against the revival of Russia and the power aspiration in the region of Iran. As a result of Turkeys role in world politics it has also strengthened its position as hegemon in the river basin. Due to its influence Turkey was able to steer the political developments in the riparian countries together with US influence of course. In Iraq the situation has stabilized after the withdrawal of the American troops. Due to successful decentralization of government a state of relative peace returned in the country and it was able to reconstruct its civil order and economy. In Syria the Ba'ath party has achieved some economical reforms over the years improving the wealth of it citizens. Syria remains an important regional player due to its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, its control of Hamas and Hezbollah and as being an ally to Iran. Syria has opened up slightly. Also towards each other the riparians have opened up slightly understanding that its in each other's benefit that they come to a solution. Although the military power of Turkey causes them to have some concerns about Turkey's intentions. Over the years Turkey has improved the capabilities of its military forces due to its integration in the EU. Also the other regional power Iran looks with envy to Turkey's rise. Syria as Iran's ally is caught between fires as it faces Turkey on the one side and Israel on the other. Although the situation might be tense the impact of these developments is low because of the uncontested power of American backed Turkey.

The technology variables take the same values as under the Business as Usual scenario. Population growth has been moderate to high over the past decades. Most riparians expect their population peak around 2050. In all riparian countries the share of urban population has increased. The number of refugees and migrants has decreased mainly due to the stabilization of Iraq. In Syria there are still some 400,000 internally displaced people because of the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights.

The shape of the world economy has altered very much and has fully recovered from the 2008/2009 financial crisis.. Turkey's economy has grown over the past decades as well as the Iraqi due to reconstruction efforts. As a result the integration of the regional economies has increased slightly but remains modest. The Coming Anarchy

93 This scenario is based on the future set out in the 1994 article in the Atlantic by Robert Kaplan.289 The 2008­2009 economic crisis was the beginning of the end for the US position of sole world power. After 3 further years of recession the US$ devaluated and was replaced by the € as standard monetary value for commodities. The void left by the US was quickly filled by the emerging economies of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India & China). Among the riparians the distribution of power has become more equal due to the influences of other powers such as some of the BRIC countries. The situation is viewed by the riparians more in terms of 'fear' as an atmosphere of opportunity has abated. All 3 are very defensive towards each other. These attitudes are also experienced in the state of regional stability. The Israel­Arab conflict has flared up again and there have been Israeli military interventions on foreign territory. In Iraq the situation of 2009 has deteriorated severely after the withdrawal of the US troops. The government in power is lamed by corruption of the bureaucratic system while the economy is laid lame by the frequent occurrence of assault by Islamic fractions. Many of the Shi'a fractions are supported by neighbor Iran. In the North of the country a de facto Kurdish state has emerged which facilitate insurgency operations on Turkish territory. Within all the turmoil Syria tries to extend its influence and power in the region still being led by the authoritarian military regime. Turkey, once a democracy, has become an unstable state were orthodox m is fan uslim parties have gained in power and military coups occur regularly in order to secure the secular state. Furthermore the country experiences a lot of troubles with the Kurdish insurgents who strike deeper and deeper in the Anatolian heartland.

As a result of the world's new situation technological progress has slowed down while the distribution of new technologies is confined to the wealthiest countries. Another result of the new uncertainties is that population growth has slowed down most levels in 2030 equal those of the lowest projections. On the other side the number of migrants and refugees has increased due to local turmoil. The security environment discourages investments and as a result the shape of the world economy is very bad. Most countries, also the riparians, take protective measures in order to sustain their own economic levels. Therefore the integration of the riparians economies is very low and marginal.

New Caliphate

Under the New Caliphate scenario the Muslim world, of which Turkey, Syria & Iraq, starts coalescing. First economically and later on also politically and military. The world in which these developments take place is multi polar world where the West's main antagonists are the caliphate, China and Russia. Forming a union comparable to the European Union, the power among the 3 riparians is distributed more or less equally. Turkey still is the first among equals as it has the benefit of having the upstream position while Syria is politically an important player because of its leading role in Pan Arabism. The attitudes of the 3 countries are to be called positives as they view the situation as one where there are opportunities. The governments conduct pro active policies. As a result of the economic and political unification of most countries in the region the stability has improved. In Iraq there is finally a sustainable peace and the country is working hard on its reconstruction driven by the revenues of the oil sector. In Syria the Ba'ath party has achieved economic reforms and a stable domestic situation. It regained the Golan Heights in a peace treaty with Israel. Technological progress has slowed down but the distribution of technologies is equally distributed and not confined to only the richer countries. Population growth has also slowed down although 289Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.”

94 compared with 2009 the absolute population has increased significantly. The number of migrants and refugees is very low due to the stability in the region in political and economic terms. The world economy has slowed down severely and the annual average growth rate is below the 2%. The riparians economy are able to cope because of the integration of their economies across the region. The caliphates economic zone stretches from Central Asia, via the Caucasus and Middle East to Northern Africa.

Annex G: Score of the scenarios

95 96