THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN By Efraim Inbar*

Abstract: A nuclear Iran constitutes a serious threat, not only to the Middle East, but to the entire world. Diplomatic efforts have failed to halt Iran’s nuclear program. As the Iranian acquisition of a nuclear bomb nears, the threat of using force--and even actual use of force--seems the only viable preventive measures. Middle Eastern states can hardly establish a nuclear “balance of terror” with Iran, and there is no foolproof defense against nuclear tipped missiles. Military action against Iranian nuclear installations involves many risks and complications, but the difficulty is exaggerated, and inaction is bound to bring about far worse consequences.

With each day, Iran grows closer to acquiring warned that Iran's strategic decision to nuclear weapons. Tehran has evaded the acquire the technological basis to become a International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear power would be realized within a few safeguards and has built a militarily months.3 The Chief of Staff of the significant nuclear program. Iran has resisted Defense Force (IDF), Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, all diplomatic pressure to discontinue this offered a similar evaluation on December 4, program and seems intent on producing 2005, while a few days earlier the Chief of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the IDF Intelligence Department, Maj. Gen. constitutes the final and critical stage in the Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) had warned that construction of a nuclear bomb. In mid- March 2006 constitutes the "point of no January 2006, Iranians decided to break the return," indicating that after such a date, any IAEA seals on some of their nuclear diplomatic efforts to curtail the Iranian facilities, signaling Tehran's determination to nuclear program would be pointless. No proceed with its centrifuge uranium explanation of the term "point of no return" enrichment program. was offered, leaving it unclear. However, the Official statements by the leaders of term "point of no return" probably refers to a western countries indicate growing certain measure of nuclear technological exasperation with Iran's behavior on the ripeness. nuclear issue and unwillingness to bow to This article initially reviews Iran’s nuclear demands that the country abandon its plans to program and presents its strategic rationale. It produce fissile material.1 Even Mohammed subsequently analyzes the nature and the ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, magnitude of the Iranian nuclear threat. The said that the world is losing patience with article ends with a review of the available Iran. 2 options for halting the country’s nuclear Within the international community, Israel program, including the viability of a military seems most concerned about the prospects of strike aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear effort. a nuclear Iran. In December 2005, Meir Dagan, the chief of the Israeli Mossad,

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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM and the bomb design itself. Work on the two The Iranian nuclear program began during enterprises can be undertaken concurrently. the reign of the Shah, reflecting Iran's The Islamic Republic of Iran has invested perception of itself as a great power and an tremendous political capital and vast ancient civilization with hegemonic resources in going nuclear. This behavior has aspirations in its region.4 After a period of added strain in its relations with the United suspension by the Islamic republic, the States. The tense relationship was reinforced program was resumed. Despite the cover-up by the hostility displayed by radical Islamic attempts, a great deal of Iran's nuclear elements of the regime. Tehran’s overall anti- infrastructure is known. Many known Iranian American foreign policy has resulted in the nuclear activities are suitable for military inclusion of Iran by President George W. nuclear applications, and some activities have Bush, in January 2002, on his “Axis of Evil” little or no suitability for any other purpose.5 list. Iran has been constructing a reactor at Arak The Iranian sense of vulnerability and moderated by heavy water and fueled with threat perception increased following the natural uranium, a type highly suitable for American military presence in Afghanistan, producing weapon-grade plutonium. This on Iran's eastern border, and the U.S. fissile material comprises the core of any invasion of , on its western border. The nuclear bomb. Iran has also built a uranium two invasions caused Tehran to feel encircled conversion facility at Isfahan, to convert by the United States and more exposed to a uranium core concentrate (Yellowcake) into potential American attack. Tehran's assiduous the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas suitable attempts to augment its deterrence stem from for enrichment at the centrifuge enrichment its fear of attacks on the part of an imperially plant in Natanz. Highly Enriched Uranium disposed America and/or its Middle East (HEU) is also fissile material.6 allies. In addition, Iran shares a border with There are additional indications that Iran Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation since 1998. has worked on plutonium separation and on a These factors provide Iran with an additional bomb design. Technology transfer from strong incentive for walking the nuclear path. China, Russia, and especially Pakistan, From an Iranian perspective, the North complemented by purchases of nuclear- Korean example is also a compelling one. relevant components in Western Europe, While the United States did not hesitate to provided the technical and engineering know- invade Iraq, which it believed to be striving how for the Iranian nuclear scientists to make towards weapons of mass destruction progress along the nuclear path. While Iran's (WMD), it refrained from attacking North rate of progress is disputed among Korea that abrogated the 1994 Agreed intelligence services, it could clearly become Framework with Washington, defiantly a nuclear power in the near future. The withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation timetable for assembling a nuclear device is Treaty, and announced its possession of a influenced by Iran's capability to cross two nuclear deterrent. The mere fact that North thresholds: the production of a sufficient Korea was much closer to producing a amount of fissile material for the bomb’s core nuclear bomb than Iraq seemed to have

86 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran constituted a critical difference that could serve as a guarantee to its future at moderated the American response to a similar home. Destabilizing the regime of a nuclear challenge.7 North Korea's more developed state, which may lead to chronic domestic nuclear program provided a modicum of instability, civil war, or disintegration, is a deterrence. While the regional context, i.e. more risky enterprise than undermining a the proximity of great powers such as China, non-nuclear regime. Russia, and Japan, probably played no less of In light of the growing widespread a role in determining the U.S. reaction, Iran concern about its nuclear aspirations, may have learned the lesson that the nuclear Tehran’s best option is to bomb can serve as a good insurance policy continue negotiations with various against outside intervention. representatives of the international Accelerating its nuclear program seems community. Even after the Iranian matter is the most appealing option for Iran. The brought to the UN Security Council (UNSC), country has admitted that it has clandestinely diplomatic negotiations are likely to continue produced small amounts of fissile material in order to determine the reaction of the (plutonium). It might succeed in acquiring UNSC. This amounts to a temporary sufficient weapon grade plutonium or HEU, stalemate. Tehran will try to buy time as and probably has worked for some time discussions drag on or are temporarily on assembling a deliverable nuclear weapon-- suspended between rounds to allow for though it may stop short of actually testing a additional consultations. Such an Iranian nuclear device. Iran could, therefore, rely on strategy of "talk and build" capitalizes on interested intelligence agencies and European and American reluctance to attentive observers to surmise that a weapons escalate. Deciding that negotiations are capability exists or could quickly be realized. useless requires alternative action, which is Nuclear opaqueness, which is not an Iranian not an enticing option. invention, has its strategic benefits.8 Essentially, inconclusive talks preserve a It is highly unlikely that Iran will adopt a status quo, a tense standoff in which Iran can policy of nuclear reversal reminiscent of go on with its opaque, though no longer South Africa, Argentina, or Brazil.9 Its clandestine, nuclear program. Indeed, a security predicament is very different from strategy of "talk and build” accompanied by the strategic environments of Sub-Saharan temporary concessions postpones diplomatic Africa or Latin America that allowed nuclear and economic pressures and, most abstinence. Moreover, the stakes of the ruling importantly, preventive military strikes elite in Iran in the nuclear program are by the United States. Tehran is undoubtedly inextricably connected to its political and watching the developments in Korea, and even physical survival, with an infinitely insufficient American determination to put an greater intensity than in the other states end to the Korean nuclear program will mentioned. The regime in Tehran may well encourage Iranian procrastination. Moreover, have come to the conclusion that the speedy Iran's sense of vulnerability is accompanied and successful conclusion of nuclear efforts by an evaluation that a U.S. embroiled in Iraq

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Efraim Inbar is weak, while the higher energy prices nationalistic aspirations for grandeur rooted enhance the Iranian hand in international in a historic awareness of being an ancient negotiations. civilization. In its behavior, revolutionary Iran's nuclear program was initiated with Iran largely conforms to what Yehezkel Dror the intention of acquiring hegemony in the termed a "Crazy State."11 Such a state is region and the ability to play the role of a characterized by far-reaching goals in its great power in world affairs. Nowadays, it foreign policy, a propensity for high risk also seems to be designed to provide a policies, intensive commitment and strategic response to American political and determination to implement these policies, cultural hegemony in world affairs. Tehran and unconventional diplomatic style. If Iran wants to be able to continue to oppose becomes nuclear, these foreign policy American policies and to deter possible features will probably be even more American action against the radical Islamic pronounced. regime. Similarly, it wants to block the Iran actively supports the insurgency in influence of American culture, which is Iraq against the establishment of a stable, perceived as decadent and particularly pro-American regime. Tehran encourages dangerous. Yet Iran's current nuclear appetite radical Shi’a elements in Iraq in order to also stems from theological motivations. promote the establishment of another Islamic Some Ayatollahs also view an Iran armed republic and foments trouble in the Shi’a with nuclear weapons as an instrument in communities in the Gulf states. It opposes a Allah's hand to impose Islam upon the entire more liberal regime that could potentially world, believing that they, the Ayatollahs, serve as a catalyst for democratization in the have been chosen by Allah to carry out His area. Iran is allied with , another radical mission. 10 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad state with an anti-American predisposition, reported having a vision when defending and seeks to create a radical Shi’a corridor Iran's right to master nuclear technology at from Iran to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the UN General Assembly in the fall of 2005. Tehran lends critical support to terrorist This ideological dimension of the Iranian organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and nuclear rationale is quite troubling. Indeed, a Islamic Jihad.12 According to the U.S. State stalemate that permits Iran to move forward Department, Iran is the most active state with its nuclear program would pose grave sponsor of terrorism.13 threats to regional security as discussed Iran's nuclear program coupled with long- below. range delivery systems, in particular, threatens regional stability in the Middle THE NATURE OF THE THREAT East. Iran's possesses the Shehab-3 long- The Islamic Republic of Iran is the range missile (with a range of 1,300 greatest, most urgent threat to regional order kilometers) that can probably be nuclear- in the Middle East and a challenge to tipped and is working on extending the range American hegemony in world affairs. Iran is of its ballistic arsenal. American allies, such a revisionist state trying to export its Islamic as Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf revolution, a mission intertwined with the States are within range, as well as several

88 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran important U.S. bases. The Chief of the IDF counter Iranian influence by adopting similar Intelligence Department, Maj. Gen. Aharon nuclear postures. Zeevi (Farkash) reported that Iran has also The resulting scenario of a multi-polar acquired 12 cruise missiles with a range of up nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for to 3,000 kilometers and with an ability to disaster. This strategic prognosis is a result of carry nuclear warheads.14 two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive Further improvements in Iranian missiles posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and would initially put most European capitals, b) the difficulties surrounding the and eventually, the North American establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in continent, within range of a potential Iranian the region. attack. Iran has an ambitious satellite Missiles are the most effective means of launching program based on the use of multi- delivering nuclear weapons. While the United stage, solid propellant launchers, with States is developing a Ballistic Missile intercontinental ballistic missile properties to Defense (BMD) system and Russia claims to enable the launching of a 300-kilogram have a missile intercept capability with its S- satellite within two years. If Iran achieves 300 missile system, only Israel possesses a this goal, it will put many more states at risk serious capability to parry a nuclear missile of a future nuclear attack.15 attack. Israel has developed a defensive layer The nuclear ambitions of the Islamic around the Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile, Republic of Iran are, of course, a challenge to which is designed to intercept the family of the international nuclear non-proliferation Scud missiles. This program, which began in regime (NPT). A nuclear Iran might well the late 1980s, benefited from generous bring an end to this regime and to American American funding and amounts to the only attempts to curb proliferation in the Middle deployed operational anti-ballistic missile East and in other parts of the world. system so far in the world.17 Since 2000, Indeed, the emergence of a nuclear-armed Israel has deployed several operational Iran would have a chain-effect, generating batteries of Arrow missiles. The interception further nuclear proliferation in the immediate range is about 150 kilometers away from region. Middle Eastern leaders, who Israel’s borders. invariably display high threat perceptions, are On December 2, 2005, Israel launched an unlikely to look nonchalantly on a nuclear Arrow missile that successfully intercepted a Iran. States such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi mock-up of an Iranian Shehab-3 missile. The Arabia, and, of course, Iraq would hardly be goal of the test was to expand the range of persuaded by the United States that it can Arrow missiles to a higher altitude and to provide a nuclear umbrella against Iranian evaluate the interface between the Arrow and nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. the American-improved Patriot missile American extended deterrence is very system, which is meant to go into operation if problematic in the Middle East.16 Therefore, the Arrow fails to shoot down its target. The these states would not resist the temptation to interception of a missile armed with a nuclear head at a lower altitude and closer to home

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Efraim Inbar by the Patriot system is, of course, such fears by releasing optimistic evaluations problematic. While this test and others have regarding a potentially stable "balance of proven that the Arrow does hit its target, no terror" between Israel and Iran, modeled on defense system is foolproof. The Arrow-2 the relationship between the two superpowers provides a certain measure of protection, but during the Cold War. Such a bilateral it is a first generation weapon system, and relationship, where the two sides deter each even its developers do not claim a one other, cannot be easily emulated in the hundred percent interception rate. Moreover, Middle East. A "balance of terror” between it is not clear how the Arrow would function two nuclear protagonists is never automatic, if enemy missiles were equipped with and could not be taken for granted even countermeasures or if the enemy were to use between the United States and the Soviet saturation tactics. Union. Unfortunately, the situation in the Israel has hitherto had the upper hand in Middle East is even less stable. the regional technological race, but there are A second-strike capability, which allows a no assurances that this will always be so. The state to respond in kind after being subjected difficulties that Israel faces in dealing with to a nuclear attack, is critical in establishing Katyushas, Qassams, and tunnels show that credible deterrence. During the Cold War, Israeli ingenuity may not come up with submarines constituted the platform for any immediate adequate responses. This is true of second-strike capability; the difficulty in the United States as well. Even if defensive locating them under water rendered them less solutions are eventually devised, there may vulnerable to an enemy first-strike attack. be windows of vulnerability, which could be Indeed, the Soviet Union and United States of catastrophic dimensions in a nuclear relied on the survivability and mobility of scenario. submarines, characteristics that would enable All Middle Eastern states are so far them to carry out a second-strike with defenseless against Iranian missiles. Indeed, nuclear-tipped missiles. While the as the Iranian nuclear program progresses, superpowers possessed large submarine one can clearly detect a rise in threat fleets, it is doubtful that any Middle Eastern perception on the part of most Arab states in power owns enough submarines equipped to the region. Several states within Iranian do the job. Israel's current fleet includes three range, such as Turkey and India, have shown Dolphin-class submarines, to be augmented interest in purchasing the Israeli BMD by the end of the decade by two additional system, whose export requires American vessels recently purchased in Germany. approval. However, at present, while Israel is However, it is not clear whether the Israeli partly protected from Iranian nuclear submarines carry enough punch to deter missiles, the rest of the region remains adversaries. In this context, it is important to vulnerable to such a threat. note that no fleet can ever be fully The Iranian nuclear threat is also to be operational. Some vessels are in port for taken seriously in light of the difficulties of maintenance, while others are en route to the achieving a stable deterrence with Tehran.18 designated area of operations or on their way Unfortunately, there are scholars who belittle back to the homeport. Furthermore, the most

90 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran appropriate launching area in the Indian complicated. In addition, the rather Ocean is far away from Israel.19 rudimentary nuclear forces in the region More significant is the fact that would be likely to be prone to accidents and maintaining a second-strike capability is an mistakes. The newly acquired nuclear ongoing process requiring continuous arsenals would lack the sophisticated improvement, which depends to a large technology of the great powers, which extent on the adversary’s actions. Such a reduces such mishaps through devices for process is inherently uncertain and locking, fusing, remotely controlling, and ambiguous. Moreover, before an initial releasing nuclear warheads from afar. “effective” second-strike capability is Nuclear arms in the hands of several Middle achieved, a nuclear race may create the fear East powers would actually increase the of a first-strike nuclear attack, which might in possibility of preemptive strikes and catalytic itself trigger a nuclear exchange. This is all wars. the more probable because adequate warning While it can be argued that Middle East systems cannot be erected when the distances leaders behave rationally, many of them between enemies are so small, as is the case engage in "brinkmanship" leading to in the Middle East. The influence of haste miscalculation. Even of greater consequence, and the need to respond quickly can have their sensitivity to costs and their attitudes to extremely dangerous consequences. human life hardly conform to Western The discussion above has focused on the values. Iranian leaders have said that they are problems of establishing bilateral nuclear ready to pay a heavy price for the destruction deterrence between Iran and Israel. In a of the Jewish state. For example, on nuclear multipolar environment, achieving December 14, 2001, the Ayatollah Ali Akbar stable deterrence would be even more Hashemi-Rafsanjani declared that the use of a difficult. Deterrence may work in part nuclear bomb against Israel would destroy because a threat is transmitted correctly and the Jewish state, producing only "damages in not misread by the enemy. Yet, Middle the Muslim world."20 Moreover, while Arab Eastern countries have not established any leaders issued similar statements in the past, hotlines or special communication links with the historical animosity between Persians and Iran and/or each other, which could have Arabs could also produce motivations to use serious consequences in a nuclear crisis. In nuclear weapons under extreme the Middle East, communication is not only a circumstances. Strong mutual mistrust, a technological problem, but is also a political basic feature of Middle Eastern political problem, as several states have refrained culture, creates a psychological environment from establishing diplomatic links with a that is conducive to rigidity and inflexibility. number of regional capitals. Middle Eastern These are highly dangerous qualities in a powers would also have to establish early nuclear situation, where it is important to warning systems searching in all directions. leave the enemy a way to retreat, what Moreover, the requirements for an "all Thomas Schelling calls the "last clear directions" second strike force are very chance."21 The "dialectics of the

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Efraim Inbar antagonists"22 in the Middle East can hardly ability to intimidate the governments turn a "balance of terror" into a "balance of controlling parts of this huge energy reservoir prudence," in which each adversary exerts would further strengthen Iran’s position in maximum caution and consideration, the region and world affairs. Such a position permitting coexistence. Nuclear deterrence is would also make Iran's containment even probably harder to achieve than deterrence more difficult and would necessarily theorists had believed, because there is great embolden Islamic radicals everywhere. variation in how people calculate their For Israel, a nuclear Iran constitutes an interests and react to threats. existential threat. The tripartite combination Furthermore, as the nuclear taboo is of a radical Islamic regime, long-range eroding at the interstate level, Iran, or a missile capability, and nuclear weapons is faction, or even individual officials in the extremely perilous. Due to its small and government may decide to pass a nuclear dense population, Israel is exceedingly device to a terrorist organization, such as vulnerable to a nuclear attack. In December Hamas or Hizballah, to be used against Israel 2005, Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon or a "heretic" (Muslim or Christian) regime.23 termed the Iranian program “a grave threat” This possibility is intensified by the fact that stressing that Israel "cannot accept a nuclear the weapons are apparently institutionally Iran."25 This statement is a reflection of a under the control of hardliners even in the long-held high-threat perception of a large context of the Iranian government, such as part of Israel's strategic community. Indeed, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Prime Minister (1992-95) "crazy state" posture may be conducive already perceived Islamic Iran, which was toward Iranian nuclear largesse to other engaged in acquiring a nuclear capability and radical Islamic groups operating outside the in sponsoring terror, as Israel's arch-enemy,26 Middle East. The Iranians have used proxies while all of his successors maintained this to carry out attacks against their enemies in assessment. While Israel was pleased with the past. An indirect mode of operation the change of tone in Tehran toward the would put many capitals in the world in United States after Ayatollah Mohammed danger and make Iran a somewhat less likely Khatami was elected as president in 1997, subject to retaliation. In any case, a nuclear Tehran continued to retain its anti-Israeli Iran might provide emboldened global policy. 27 Jihadist terrorist groups a haven where they Iranian President Ahmadinejad, elected in think they are immune to Western reach. June 2005, has contributed to Israel's fears by A nuclear Iran would also enhance Iranian issuing a series of inflammatory statements. hegemony in the strategic energy sector, by On October 26, 2005, he called for “Israel to its mere location along the oil-rich Persian be wiped off the map.” On December 14, Gulf area and the Caspian Basin. These two 2005, in a speech that was televised live, adjacent regions form the "energy ellipse," Ahmadinejad denied that the Holocaust had which holds over 70 percent of the world's ever happened, suggesting that Israel's Jews proven oil and over 40 percent of natural gas be relocated to Europe or even to Alaska. reserves.24 Giving revolutionary Iran a better Such statements from high-ranking officials

92 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran cannot be dismissed as pure rhetoric; they nuclear bomb and to provide incentives for reflect a policy preference. An Iran Iran to cooperate on the nuclear issue. strengthened by a nuclear arsenal may pursue Yet, after several suspensions in the talks such a policy. with the Europeans, the Iranians have In summary, an Iranian nuclear bomb rejected the European "carrots" offered to would bring about additional nuclear them. In all probability, the West has nothing proliferation in the region, enhance the power to offer that can dissuade Iran from going of a "crazy state," and embolden Islamic nuclear, particularly since the nuclear radicals elsewhere. In addition, the program is viewed as the best insurance technological uncertainties of a defensive policy for the current leadership and is system and the possibility of establishing probably the single most popular policy stable nuclear deterrence lead to the associated with this regime. Iran is a clear inescapable conclusion that regional security case where all means of persuasion, short of is best served by denying Iran a nuclear the use of force, are ineffective. "Soft power" bomb. has its limitations.28 The United States probably decided to go BLOCKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR through the motions required by the ASPIRATIONS Europeans in order to secure European There are several ways to deal with the support for a tougher approach when Iranian nuclear challenge. These options are diplomacy has run its course. The United discussed below. States even lent its support to the Russian Diplomacy offer to conduct the enrichment of Iranian For many years, Iran deceived the IAEA, uranium on its soil for the same reason. violating the safeguards agreement and Washington preferred to raise the issue of failing to report the full scope of its nuclear Iran at the UN Security Council (UNSC) in activities. Finally, Iran was asked to freeze its order to impose economic sanctions and uranium enrichment program, and to sign the eventually secure international legitimacy for Additional Protocol to the safeguards military action against the nuclear agreement with the IAEA, allowing for more installations. intrusive international supervision. An Iran's intransigent behavior and growing October 2003 high-profile visit by the foreign impatience on part of the international ministers of France, Germany, and the United community, combined with U.S. pressure, Kingdom (EU-3) signaled the European convinced the IAEA to finally recognize attempt to apply heavy diplomatic pressure. Iran’s non-compliance with its treaty For two years, the Europeans conducted obligations in September 2005, although the negotiations with Iran in attempt to reach an Board of Governors of the IAEA that met agreement. The European approach, which again in November 2005 postponed the Washington decided to go along with for a referral of the Iranian case to the UNSC in while, was to create a political atmosphere order to allow more time for negotiations. that delegitimized the Iranian quest for a This postponement served Iranian interests in

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Efraim Inbar gaining time within its "talk and build" against Iran have also long been in place strategy. Only in February 2006 did the without forcing Tehran to change policy. United States finally win approval from all While economic sanctions would certainly key players in the IAEA, especially Russia hurt the Iranian economy, which is much and China, to send the issue of Iran's highly dependent upon refined oil products,30 suspect nuclear program to the UNSC. economic pressures are not the best means to stop Iran from going nuclear. The Economic Sanctions international studies literature displays As the diplomatic option is being serious skepticism regarding the effectiveness exhausted and in the absence of a clear of economic sanctions.31 Often, such unequivocal nuclear reversal on part of Iran, sanctions merely serve to make a point and to the United States will try to prod the UNSC keep an issue alive in the absence of the into eventually imposing a strict set of political will to take military measures to sanctions against Tehran that include remedy the situation. Moreover, in the past, economic and political isolation combined societies and regimes have demonstrated with a military quarantine tightly controlling great resilience in the face of economic what flows in and out of Iran. While, the sanctions and capacity to withstand pain. Europeans may join the United States in Islamic Iran, which seeks a nuclear bomb mandating and applying sanctions, China and primarily to gain regional hegemony and to Russia, which have veto power in the UNSC, allow it to oppose a Pax Americana, is ready are less likely to cooperate in engineering an to pay a high price for its foreign policy American-sponsored campaign against Iran. orientation. Actually, external pressure has They have their own economic interests in been used more than once as a focal point for Iran and want to play a role in the region rallying domestic support for the embattled rather than defer to American leadership. regime. Another major problem with Eventually, the UNSC may decide on economic sanctions is that it takes time to put sanctions, whose content effectiveness is them in place and to make them felt in the primarily dependent upon the need to forge target country. In the case of Iran, time is of an international consensus.29 Clearly, China critical importance, particularly if Iran wants and Russia have no strategic interest in a to present the world with a nuclear fait nuclear Iran and would eventually join the accompli. sanctions, but they prefer Iran to respond to their proposals rather than to American Indirect Pressure on Iran initiatives. The Iranian challenge could also be dealt There are also a number of specific factors with by adopting an indirect strategy. This discouraging countries from supporting might require focusing on Syria--the weak sanctions against Iran, ranging from fear of link in Iran’s strategic outreach--possibly Tehran’s sponsorship of terrorism to even leading to the demise of that regime-- economic costs, or desire to gain Iranian and on Iran’s client Hizballah group in cooperation on other issues. U.S. sanctions Lebanon. The Ba’th regime is under increasing international and domestic

94 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran pressure. Cornering Tehran's regional allies Coercive Measures will weaken and isolate Iran possibly making Covert operations to block the Iranian the Islamic republic more susceptible to nuclear program, if ever used, have clearly Western pressures. failed. U.S. Ambassador John Bolton Another aspect of the indirect approach on declared in October 30, 2003, when serving the nuclear issue, though in this case dealing as under secretary of state for arms control with Iran itself, would be to encourage and international security, that the United regime change in Tehran. This is particularly States was actively seeking to curb difficult in police states, such as Iran, where proliferation. "Rogue states such as Iran, suppression is effective in paralyzing any North Korea, Syria, and Cuba, whose meaningful political opposition. pursuit of weapons of mass destruction Nevertheless, such situations are not stable, makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will and Iran has a history of popular uprisings.32 learn that their covert programs will not If it is true that human beings prefer to live in escape either detection or consequences," he freedom than in fear and that many are ready warned. "While we will pursue diplomatic to take personal risks to realize this dream,33 solutions whenever possible, the United Iran could be ripe for removing the yoke of States and its allies must be willing to deploy the mullahs. Being more advanced than Arab more robust techniques, such as the states according to almost every socio- interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the economic criterion, Iran could be a better disruption of procurement networks, candidate for democratization. American sanctions, or other means."35 diplomacy aimed at strengthening the While Israel was more taciturn about the dissenting voices in Iran might be successful issue, as threat perception increased, Prime in fostering an effect similar to the one that Minister Sharon decided in November 2003 brought about the Soviet empire’s to place the responsibility for an integrated disintegration. 34 strategy to prevent the nuclearization of Iran The indirect strategy is advantageous, as it in the hands of the Mossad.36 Its head, retired rests on regional and domestic dynamics Major General Dagan, who has a rich history while minimizing a popular Iranian in combating terror, was appointed in antagonism towards the American activist September 2002 to hone the skills of this approach. Yet even if it were to be organization in covert operations. The successful, such a strategy may again take too declarations of Israeli senior officials in the much time. International procrastination and winter of 2005-2006 indicated greater alarm past diplomatic failures to delay the Iranian than before, meaning, inter alia, that program may leave no other choice but the whatever means were taken failed to achieve military option to prevent a nuclear Islamic the intended results. Republic of Iran. One variant of covert operations is to focus on the highly skilled elements of those working for the Iranian program. The Iranian nuclear program has a limited number of

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Efraim Inbar scientists whose contribution is critical to its strategy, but this approach may well be the successful completion. The interested only alternative to either a direct attack or intelligence services have probably already accepting Iran's possession of nuclear identified the key scientists who keep it weaponry. moving. Removing these scientists would The final option is the use of force. also affect the possibility of renewing the Presumably, the United States already has nuclear efforts in case a freeze of the Iranian contingency plans and training assets for an program were to take place. Therefore, attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel serious offers of refuge and a professional conducted such a strike in 1981 against Iraq’s career in the West should be extended to nuclear reactor, which effectively ended these scientists. Alternatively, they should be Saddam Hussein’s nuclear potential. In a intimidated from further cooperation with the similar fashion, prior to concluding the 1994 Iranian nuclear program. It would not be Agreed Framework with Pyongyang, the impossible to organize a well-orchestrated Clinton Administration contemplated surgical campaign to do so against those who prefer strikes to end the North's nuclear weapons the patriotic option of continuing to serve program. their state. In fact, the mere beginning of such While it is probably true that intelligence a campaign of carrots and sticks may deter services cannot provide military planners others from cooperating with the Iranian with a full and comprehensive picture of the nuclear program and hasten their exit from Iranian nuclear program, what we know Iran. seems to be enough to allow identification of Another coercive option is a blockade on the main targets. The military capability to hit Iranian oil exports to signal to Iran that the all targets is important, but a partial United States and the West mean business. destruction would be enough to cripple Iran’s With oil selling at over $60 per barrel ability to build a nuclear bomb in the near (February 2006), oil exports are the source of future. Moreover, no large-scale invasion is enormous wealth used by the ayatollahs to needed in order to do the job, but only a buttress the regime and pursue its nuclear sustained bombing campaign with commando program. Denying a hefty income constitutes strikes. a threat to the regime. A blockade may While Iran has spread out its nuclear indeed escalate into a tanker war as witnessed facilities and built a large part of the nuclear in the last years of the Iraq-Iran war, which complex underground in order to protect it ended in Iran backing down. 37 from conventional air strikes, technological In the first decade of the 21st century, the advances in penetration of underground U.S. naval and air forces can police the facilities and increased precision might allow Hormuz Straits in order to prevent Iranian oil total destruction. The difficulties in dealing a from reaching the market. While smuggling severe military blow to the Iranian nuclear oil would still be possible, most Iranian oil program are generally exaggerated.38 A exports would be affected. Concern about the detailed analysis of the military option is overall effect on oil markets and supply beyond the scope of this paper, but the would be a major factor deterring such a American military definitely has the muscle

96 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran and the sophistication needed to perform a if defiance persists.43A Pew Research Center preemptive strike in accordance with its new poll, released February 7, 2006, showed that strategic doctrine, as well as the capability for public concern over Iran's nuclear program a sustained air campaign, if needed to prevent has risen dramatically in the past few months. the reparation and reconstruction of the Today, 27 percent of Americans cite Iran as facilities targeted. the country that represents the greatest danger American declarations on this issue to the United States. In October, just nine indicate a willingness to consider all options. percent pointed to Iran as the biggest danger In January 2005, U.S. Vice-President Dick to the United States, while there was far more Cheney expressed concern that Israel might concern over Iraq, China, and North Korea. attack Iran: "Given the fact that Iran has a Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) believe that stated policy that their objective is the Iran's nuclear program is a major threat to the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well United States, placing it on par with North decide to act first, and let the rest of the Korea's nuclear program, and far ahead of world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic China's emerging power among possible mess afterwards," he said.39 This statement threats to the United States. Overwhelming actually legitimized such action and subtly numbers believe that if Iran were to develop threatened the Iranians that the United States nuclear weapons it would likely launch might not be able to stop Israel from acting attacks on Israel (72 percent), and the United unilaterally. In August 2005, on the eve of a States or Europe (66 percent). There is even trip to Europe, President Bush insisted that he greater agreement that a nuclear-armed Iran wanted a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the would be likely to provide nuclear weapons Iranian nuclear problem but refused to rule to terrorists (82 percent).44 Even if these out military action. 40 On several occasions, trends do not hold for long, second-term Bush repeated this viewpoint.41 Several U.S. presidents such as Bush are less susceptible senators also recognized that a military strike to the vagaries of public opinion. The on Iran must be a foreign policy option. 42 personality of the current president and his Despite the difficulties faced by the worldview well suit such an approach. administration with regard to its Iraq policy, American public opinion could conceivably The American perceptions of Iran reflect a be enlisted to back a military strike on Iran if a clear-cut case is made that all other options have been exhausted in the quest to prevent a very dangerous development, especially in the period following a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The changing atmosphere toward Iran in Washington's corridors of power affects the national mood. Indeed, a Los Angeles Times poll of January 27, 2006 indicates that 57 percent of Americans back an attack on Iran

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Efraim Inbar global phenomenon. A major BBC World wait for better times to complete it. Such an Service poll exploring how people in 33 ultimatum could be accompanied by force countries view various countries found not a concentration along the borders of Iran (in single country where a majority has a Afghanistan and in Iraq), naval maneuvers in positive view of Iran’s role in the world (with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and the exception of the Iranians themselves).45 reconnaissance flights over Iranian air space. Indeed, the United States is not alone in The threat of military force should be considering the use of force. British Prime preceded by intensive American efforts to Minster Tony Blair warned that the West explain the danger of a nuclear Iran and might have to take military action against active public diplomacy to gain international Iran after worldwide condemnation of Iranian approval for military action. Israel and President Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be Turkey can add to this atmosphere by things “wiped off the map.”46 France also seems to like conducting civil defense and military realize that use of force may be necessary. 47 drills. Since Iran practices brinkmanship as a Washington has been trying to gain Ankara's regular part of its policy, only the threat of support for U.S. policy toward Tehran's imminent American military action will nuclear program. By one report, CIA Director define the boundary that the Iranian Porter Goss visited Ankara in December leadership does not want to cross. 2005 and asked Turkey to help the United This series of steps is exactly what most States deal with the Iranian nuclear issue.48 Arab states in the region expect. None of As the threat perception in Turkey increases, them wants a nuclear Iran, as it threatens the country is more likely to cooperate. them and their interests. It is worth If military action is to be taken, the timing remembering the support most Arab states of an attack must be sensitive to collateral lent to Baghdad during its long war with damage, particularly after the nuclear Tehran (1980-88). Indeed, the danger to the program has reached a stage where nuclear Arab world is more immediate than it is for radiation and contamination might occur. the United States or perhaps even Israel. Only Moreover, it would be preferable for the the actual use of nuclear weapons by Iran attacks to precede the consummation of the would endanger Israel or American forces, Russian sale of 30 Tor-M1 air defense while the mere possession of such weapons-- systems to Iran (to be delivered in the 2006-8 and their use for leverage and intimidation-- period), as well as upgrades of the Mig and could force Arab countries to submit to Sukhoi fighter jets used by Iran. This $1 Tehran’s demands. Consequently, most Arab billion arms deal will bolster Iran's leaders--except for those in Syria--hope to capabilities to exact a higher price from the see the hegemonic superpower take a resolute adversary's preemptive strike.49 stand on the matter. Whatever public reaction However, in reality, military action may may surface in the region, in private the not prove necessary. An ultimatum that majority will savor such an American includes an unequivocal American threat to demonstration of leadership and use force might be enough to convince the determination in obstructing the Iranian Iranians to freeze their nuclear program and nuclear program.

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domestic support in the event that Israel If the United States does not act in decides to launch military strikes against accordance with its international Iranian nuclear facilities. Such support may responsibilities as a superpower, Israel will erode, however, if the military operations are have to face the difficult choice of how to unsuccessful and if the toll of casualties is respond. Since June 1981, Israel’s position very high. has been that a military nuclear program Any decision to use force must take into implemented by a hostile state constitutes a consideration the Iranian reaction to a casus belli warranting preemptive action. military strike and prepare for it. The Iranians With more to lose if Iran becomes nuclear, can interfere with the flow of oil from the Israel would have more incentive to strike Gulf, and launch a counter-attack with than the United States. ballistic missiles (probably using Israel can undertake a limited preemptive conventional warheads) against its neighbors strike. Israel certainly commands the and Israel. They can also instigate Shi’a weaponry, the manpower, and the guts to revolutions in the Gulf States and use proxy effectively take out key Iranian nuclear terrorist organizations to attack the United facilities. Capable of carrying as much States and its allies, in particular Israel. The ordnance as a World War II heavy bomber, Gulf States are likely to prefer facing any the F-15I can also deploy precision-guided Iranian challenge before it goes nuclear. munitions and penetrate enemy air space at Probably, the West can bear the limited cost low levels and high speeds. Israel's likely to be exacted by Iran. The cost issue is submarines can launch cruise missiles at long not really relevant for Israel, because it will distances, and its commandos have a very suffer the wrath of Iran even if the United good record of operating at great distances States alone bombs the Iranian installations. from home. Conventional missile attacks on America's The air strike route is of course allies are unlikely to cause much damage, problematic, as Israeli airplanes would have although they could partly paralyze their to fly over Arab airspace. Although Israel and economic activities. The results would Turkey have a well-developed strategic probably resemble those of the Iraqi missile relationship, it is unlikely that an AKP-ruled attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991. Ankara would allow the use of its airspace in Acts of terrorism could create greater an attack on Iran, but damaged Israeli aircraft damage, although more intensive intelligence or gunned-down Israeli air crews would have efforts and higher alerts of the internal a chance of landing or surviving in Turkey or security forces could limit the effectiveness in the Kurdish areas of Iraq.50 While it would of such operations. In any case, military be very difficult for Israel to carry out a strikes against Iran need to be accompanied sustained air campaign, creative solutions by preemptive measures against terrorist cells could be devised to increase Israeli projection and Iranian personnel involved in supporting of power at distances of over 1,000 and activating terrorist activity. kilometers. Israel's leaders are likely to enjoy

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Damaging oil fields and installations in hostility towards Israel coupled with its the Gulf, as well as meddling with the oil emerging military capabilities puts the Jewish flow, is a major affront to the well-being of state in a particularly vulnerable spot. the international community and would put Diplomacy is doomed to fail and economic Iran in conflict with most of the world. sanctions are usually ineffective, leaving only Interruptions in the export of Iranian the threat to use force and the actual use of petroleum would also negatively affect the force as viable options to delay the Iranian economy and subsequently the completion of the Iranian nuclear program. regime survivability. In any case, an Iranian Resolute action against Iranian nuclear decision to attack the oil routes, before the installations involves many risks, but state has acquired the bomb, might be inaction, it seems, will have far more serious deterred by a clear American commitment to repercussions. use its military power to assure the security If the United States refrains from action, of these routes. However, even without such Israel will face the difficult decision of a commitment, America would act if whether to act unilaterally. While less suited confronted by Iranian attempts to block the to do the job than the United States, the Hormuz Straits. While revolutionary Iran Israeli military is capable of reaching the may become bold and adventurous with a appropriate targets in Iran. It remains to be nuclear arsenal at its disposal, before seen whether Jerusalem will be forced to act acquiring such awesome weapons it is in accordance with its strategic doctrine. If, unlikely to estrange the whole international despite local and/or international efforts the community by causing serious damage to the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeds in supply of a critical commodity such as oil. emerging with a nuclear arsenal, however, it The determination of the West, displayed by will not be the end of the current crisis, but the use of force against Iran's nuclear rather the beginning of a new and far more installations might even have a paralyzing dangerous one. effect on the regime. In any case, to counter a scenario where Iran brings about serious *Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political supply shortages in oil supply, the U.S. can Science at Bar-Ilan University and the exploit its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, as Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center well as the oil strategic reserves of its allies for Strategic Studies. The author appreciates to allow for replacement of the Iranian crude the comments of an anonymous reviewer and oil output in the world oil markets for some the research assistance of David Leitner and time. Tamara Sternlieb.

CONCLUSION NOTES A nuclear Iran poses a serious threat to the Middle East. Moreover, a nuclear bomb in 1 See, inter alia, Ian Cobain and Ian Trainor, the hands of such an extremist regime may "Secret Services say Iran is trying to have widespread repercussions, far beyond assemble a nuclear missile," Guardian, the region. Iran’s deeply rooted ideological January 4, 2006,

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http://www.guardian.co.uk./iran.story/0,1285 Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly 8,1677542,00.htm; Hillary Leila Krieger, Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical "Vienna Envoy: EU could impose Iran Threats (Washington: Carnegie Endowment sanctions if UN doesn’t," Jerusalem Post, for International Peace, 2005), 2nd edition, January 1, 2006, p. 1. "Alpogan: Turkey pp. 295-314. See also the fact sheet at against Iran obtaining nuclear weapon http://www.armscontrol.org; and Douglas capability,” New Anatolian, January 26, Frantz, “Iran Closes in Ability to Build a 2006, p. 3; "Stop Iran," Defense News, Nuclear Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, August January 16, 2006, p. 20. See also: 4, 2003. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/ 6 Natural uranium consists mostly of the FA989EBF-4EE0-43BD-9C68- uranium-235 isotope, with about 0.7 percent C42A5338D385.html; by weight of uranium-235. The uranium 235 http://www.forbes.com/business/manufacturi isotope is fissionable material. Enriched ng/feeds/ap/2006/02/18/ap2537453.html; uranium is uranium whose uranium-235 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1 content has been increased through a process 139395436735&pagename=JPost%2FJPArtic of isotope separation. The fissile uranium in le%2FShowFull; nuclear weapons usually contains 85 percent http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/12/ or more of uranium-235, known as weapon- world/main1203654.shtml. grade. 2 Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, "Israel 7 For estimates of Korean capabilities, see Readies Forces for Strike on Nuclear Iran," Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, London Times, December 11, 2005. see also North Korea, and the End of the Agreed http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005- Framework," Naval War College Review, 12-09-iran-nuke_x.htm?csp=34; Vol. 56 (Summer 2003), pp. 11–49. http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10858243/site/news 8 For such a posture, see Benjamin Frankel, week/. ed., Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: 3 "Dagan: Iran will be become independent in Methodology and Policy Implications its nuclear program within months," Haaretz, (London: Frank Cass, 1991). December 28, 2005, p. A12. 9 For an analysis of denuclearization, see 4 For the quest of nuclear weapons of the Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Islamic Republic, see Patrick Clawson and Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran. Continuity and Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), Chaos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59-88. 2005), pp. 139-46; for a backgrounder and 10 Mordechai Kedar, "N ucleotheism," chronology of the nuclear program, see Jerusalem Post, December 14, 2005, p. 13. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1 11 See Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States 819.html. (Lexington: Heath Lexington, 1973), chapter 5 For a comprehensive review of the nuclear 2. For an early reference to "rogue states," program, see Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. see Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash

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States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 nuclear warhead that could explode (March/April 1994). immediately after launch in the vicinity of the 12 For the rationale of state-supported launcher. This weapon system is still in a terrorism and for Iran's links to the Hizballah, development stage, and it is not clear if it will see Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections. be operational by the time Iran goes nuclear. States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: 18 For the formative argument that nuclear Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 21- deterrence is context-dependent, see Albert 52; 79-116. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of 13 U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 Global Terrorism – 2003," April 29, 2004, (January 1959), pp. 211-34. For an http://www.state.gov./s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/316 application of this argument to the Middle 44.htm. East, see Yair Evron, "Nuclear Weapons in 14 "Ze'evi: US-Iran diplomatic process stuck the Middle East," in Asher Arian (ed.), in the mud," Jerusalem Post, December 21, Israel: A Developing Society (Assen: Van 2005, p. 2. Gorcum, 1980), pp. 105-26. For a similar 15 Uzi Rubin, the father of the Israeli Arrow argument about the Indian sub-continent, see missile program, noted that Iranian capability S. Paul Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable to launch a satellite—an ability that Iran is Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like aggressively pursuing—amounts to the Cold War Europe," International Security, country's possession of intercontinental Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 125-52. The missiles. See Julie Stahl, "Iran's Space counter argument that nuclear proliferation Launch Program May Put US at Nuclear might bring stability is extremely Risk," CNS News, December 9, 2005, problematic. For a recent formulation of this http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBurea thesis, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "For Better: us.asp?Page=\ForeignBureaus\archive\20051 Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect 2\FOR20051209e.html. Peace," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. 16 Kathleen J. McInnis, "Extended Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, Middle East," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 2003). 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 169-86. 19 One reason for the Israeli interest in 17 For the Arrow program, see Uzi Rubin, cooperation with India is to facilitate a naval "Meeting the 'Depth Threat' in Iraq - The presence in the Indian Ocean. See Efraim Origins of Israel's Arrow System," Jerusalem Inbar, “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” Orbis, Issue Brief, Vol. 2, No. 19, Jerusalem Center Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 99-100. for Public Affairs (March 5, 2003). The 20 http://www.iran-press- United States and Israel have also shown service.com/articles_2001/dec_2001/rafsanja interest in the Boost Phase Intercept option ni_nuke_threats_141201.htm. (BPI), when missiles are slow and have a big 21 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of electronic signature. This option is of Conflict, Fourth ed. (Cambridge: Harvard particularly appealing if the missile carries a University Press, 1970), p. 37.

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22 Raymond Aron uses this phrase to 30 Mel Levine, Alex Turkeltaub, and Alex emphasize that the dialogue between the Gorbansky, "3 Myths About the Iran participants in a conflict establishes the Conflict," Washington Post, February 7, meaning of the action. See his War and 2006, p. A21. Peace: A Theory in International Relations 31 See Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. Sanctions Do Not Work,” International 167. Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 90- 23 The author thanks Steven David for 136; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. bringing this point to his attention. For a Risman, “Asking the Right Question: When balanced discussion of nuclear terrorism, see Do Economic Sanctions Work Best?,” Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism After Security Studies, Vol. 9, Nos. 1/2 (Autumn 9/11, Adelphi Paper No. 378 (London: IISS 1999- Winter 2000), pp. 219-53. and Routledge, December 2005). 32 Clawson and Rubin, Eternal Iran, p. 158. 24 The term energy ellipse was coined by 33 Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Strategic Geography and the Changing 34 See Abbas Milani, "U.S. Foreign Policy Middle East (Washington: Carnegie and the Future of Democracy in Iran," Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 113. (Summer 2005), pp. 41-56. 25 Jerusalem Post, December 1, 2005, p. 1. 35 http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25752.htm. 26 “Interview with PM Rabin,” Bamahane, 36 Haaretz, November 24, 2003, p. A. 5. September, 23, 1992, p. 9. For Rabin's 37 Barry Rubin, Cauldron of Turmoil. attitude toward the introduction of nuclear America in the Middle East (New York: weapons in the Middle East, see Efraim Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), pp. 102- Inbar, Yitzhak Rabin and Israel’s National 109. Security (Washington: Wilson Center and 38 Inter alia, see Edward N. Lutwak, "In a Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. Single Night," Wall Street Journal, February 118-24. 8, 2006. 27 For Iranian attitudes toward Israel, see 39 "Cheney: Iran at 'top of list of Trouble David Menashri, "Iran, Israel and the Middle Spots' asks' Israel to carry out the Attack," East Conflict," Israel Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 Centre for Research on Globalisation, (January 2006), pp. 107-122. January 12, 2005. Available at: 28 For the notion of "soft power," see Joseph http://globalresearch.ca/articles/501A.html. S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in 40 Bush declares solidarity with Europe on World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, Iran," MSNBC February 18, 2005. Available 2004). at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6992154/. 29 See Farah Stockman, "US and Allies Eye 41 "'All options are on the table', President Sanctions on Iran," Boston Globe, February George W. Bush on Iran," Disarmament 21, 2006. Diplomacy August 12, 2005. From Yaron

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Deckel, “Interview of the President by Israeli Television Channel 1,” Israeli TV Channel 1, Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas, August 11, 2005. http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0508/doc04 .htm. 42 Carol Giacomo, "US Senators say military strike on Iran must be an option," Reuters, January 15, 2006. 43 "57% Back a Hit on Iran if Defiance Persists" - from LA Times - January 27 - based on LA Times poll, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na tion/la-na- fornpoll27jan27,0,5687029.story?coll=la- home-headlines. (And another presentation of BBC poll results: http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bb cpoll06-3.html). 44 See http://people- press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=269 . 45 See http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bb cpoll06-3.html. 46 Philip Webster, "Blair hints at military action after Iran's 'disgraceful' taunt," Times Online, October 28, 2005 (Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251- 1846793,00.html). 47 Interviews of the author with senior French officials, February 2006. 48 Cumhuriet, December 13, 2005. 49 Lyubov Pronina, "Russian Arms Sale to Iran Draws U.S. Scrutiny," Defense News, December 12, 2005, p. 6. 50 See Efraim Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente (London: King’s College Mediterranean Program, 2001), chapter 2.

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