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THE NEED to BLOCK a NUCLEAR IRAN by Efraim Inbar*

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THE NEED to BLOCK a NUCLEAR IRAN by Efraim Inbar* THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN By Efraim Inbar* Abstract: A nuclear Iran constitutes a serious threat, not only to the Middle East, but to the entire world. Diplomatic efforts have failed to halt Iran’s nuclear program. As the Iranian acquisition of a nuclear bomb nears, the threat of using force--and even actual use of force--seems the only viable preventive measures. Middle Eastern states can hardly establish a nuclear “balance of terror” with Iran, and there is no foolproof defense against nuclear tipped missiles. Military action against Iranian nuclear installations involves many risks and complications, but the difficulty is exaggerated, and inaction is bound to bring about far worse consequences. With each day, Iran grows closer to acquiring warned that Iran's strategic decision to nuclear weapons. Tehran has evaded the acquire the technological basis to become a International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear power would be realized within a few safeguards and has built a militarily months.3 The Chief of Staff of the Israel significant nuclear program. Iran has resisted Defense Force (IDF), Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, all diplomatic pressure to discontinue this offered a similar evaluation on December 4, program and seems intent on producing 2005, while a few days earlier the Chief of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the IDF Intelligence Department, Maj. Gen. constitutes the final and critical stage in the Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) had warned that construction of a nuclear bomb. In mid- March 2006 constitutes the "point of no January 2006, Iranians decided to break the return," indicating that after such a date, any IAEA seals on some of their nuclear diplomatic efforts to curtail the Iranian facilities, signaling Tehran's determination to nuclear program would be pointless. No proceed with its centrifuge uranium explanation of the term "point of no return" enrichment program. was offered, leaving it unclear. However, the Official statements by the leaders of term "point of no return" probably refers to a western countries indicate growing certain measure of nuclear technological exasperation with Iran's behavior on the ripeness. nuclear issue and unwillingness to bow to This article initially reviews Iran’s nuclear demands that the country abandon its plans to program and presents its strategic rationale. It produce fissile material.1 Even Mohammed subsequently analyzes the nature and the ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, magnitude of the Iranian nuclear threat. The said that the world is losing patience with article ends with a review of the available Iran. 2 options for halting the country’s nuclear Within the international community, Israel program, including the viability of a military seems most concerned about the prospects of strike aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear effort. a nuclear Iran. In December 2005, Meir Dagan, the chief of the Israeli Mossad, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) 85 Efraim Inbar THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM and the bomb design itself. Work on the two The Iranian nuclear program began during enterprises can be undertaken concurrently. the reign of the Shah, reflecting Iran's The Islamic Republic of Iran has invested perception of itself as a great power and an tremendous political capital and vast ancient civilization with hegemonic resources in going nuclear. This behavior has aspirations in its region.4 After a period of added strain in its relations with the United suspension by the Islamic republic, the States. The tense relationship was reinforced program was resumed. Despite the cover-up by the hostility displayed by radical Islamic attempts, a great deal of Iran's nuclear elements of the regime. Tehran’s overall anti- infrastructure is known. Many known Iranian American foreign policy has resulted in the nuclear activities are suitable for military inclusion of Iran by President George W. nuclear applications, and some activities have Bush, in January 2002, on his “Axis of Evil” little or no suitability for any other purpose.5 list. Iran has been constructing a reactor at Arak The Iranian sense of vulnerability and moderated by heavy water and fueled with threat perception increased following the natural uranium, a type highly suitable for American military presence in Afghanistan, producing weapon-grade plutonium. This on Iran's eastern border, and the U.S. fissile material comprises the core of any invasion of Iraq, on its western border. The nuclear bomb. Iran has also built a uranium two invasions caused Tehran to feel encircled conversion facility at Isfahan, to convert by the United States and more exposed to a uranium core concentrate (Yellowcake) into potential American attack. Tehran's assiduous the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas suitable attempts to augment its deterrence stem from for enrichment at the centrifuge enrichment its fear of attacks on the part of an imperially plant in Natanz. Highly Enriched Uranium disposed America and/or its Middle East (HEU) is also fissile material.6 allies. In addition, Iran shares a border with There are additional indications that Iran Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation since 1998. has worked on plutonium separation and on a These factors provide Iran with an additional bomb design. Technology transfer from strong incentive for walking the nuclear path. China, Russia, and especially Pakistan, From an Iranian perspective, the North complemented by purchases of nuclear- Korean example is also a compelling one. relevant components in Western Europe, While the United States did not hesitate to provided the technical and engineering know- invade Iraq, which it believed to be striving how for the Iranian nuclear scientists to make towards weapons of mass destruction progress along the nuclear path. While Iran's (WMD), it refrained from attacking North rate of progress is disputed among Korea that abrogated the 1994 Agreed intelligence services, it could clearly become Framework with Washington, defiantly a nuclear power in the near future. The withdrew from the Nuclear Proliferation timetable for assembling a nuclear device is Treaty, and announced its possession of a influenced by Iran's capability to cross two nuclear deterrent. The mere fact that North thresholds: the production of a sufficient Korea was much closer to producing a amount of fissile material for the bomb’s core nuclear bomb than Iraq seemed to have 86 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran constituted a critical difference that could serve as a guarantee to its future at moderated the American response to a similar home. Destabilizing the regime of a nuclear challenge.7 North Korea's more developed state, which may lead to chronic domestic nuclear program provided a modicum of instability, civil war, or disintegration, is a deterrence. While the regional context, i.e. more risky enterprise than undermining a the proximity of great powers such as China, non-nuclear regime. Russia, and Japan, probably played no less of In light of the growing widespread a role in determining the U.S. reaction, Iran concern about its nuclear aspirations, may have learned the lesson that the nuclear Tehran’s best option is to bomb can serve as a good insurance policy continue negotiations with various against outside intervention. representatives of the international Accelerating its nuclear program seems community. Even after the Iranian matter is the most appealing option for Iran. The brought to the UN Security Council (UNSC), country has admitted that it has clandestinely diplomatic negotiations are likely to continue produced small amounts of fissile material in order to determine the reaction of the (plutonium). It might succeed in acquiring UNSC. This amounts to a temporary sufficient weapon grade plutonium or HEU, stalemate. Tehran will try to buy time as and probably has worked for some time discussions drag on or are temporarily on assembling a deliverable nuclear weapon-- suspended between rounds to allow for though it may stop short of actually testing a additional consultations. Such an Iranian nuclear device. Iran could, therefore, rely on strategy of "talk and build" capitalizes on interested intelligence agencies and European and American reluctance to attentive observers to surmise that a weapons escalate. Deciding that negotiations are capability exists or could quickly be realized. useless requires alternative action, which is Nuclear opaqueness, which is not an Iranian not an enticing option. invention, has its strategic benefits.8 Essentially, inconclusive talks preserve a It is highly unlikely that Iran will adopt a status quo, a tense standoff in which Iran can policy of nuclear reversal reminiscent of go on with its opaque, though no longer South Africa, Argentina, or Brazil.9 Its clandestine, nuclear program. Indeed, a security predicament is very different from strategy of "talk and build” accompanied by the strategic environments of Sub-Saharan temporary concessions postpones diplomatic Africa or Latin America that allowed nuclear and economic pressures and, most abstinence. Moreover, the stakes of the ruling importantly, preventive military strikes elite in Iran in the nuclear program are by the United States. Tehran is undoubtedly inextricably connected to its political and watching the developments in Korea, and even physical survival, with an infinitely insufficient American determination to put an greater intensity than in the other states end to the Korean nuclear program will mentioned. The regime in Tehran may well encourage Iranian procrastination. Moreover, have come to the conclusion that the speedy Iran's sense of vulnerability is accompanied and successful conclusion of nuclear efforts by an evaluation that a U.S. embroiled in Iraq Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) 87 Efraim Inbar is weak, while the higher energy prices nationalistic aspirations for grandeur rooted enhance the Iranian hand in international in a historic awareness of being an ancient negotiations.
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