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Six Signs of : Part 1 “Scientism” refers to a too uncritically deferential attitude toward science. In this first part of her two-part article, Professor Haack identifies the first three of six signs of scientism: using words like “science,” “scientific,” etc., honorifically; adopting scientific trappings purely decoratively; and preoccupation with the “problem of demarcation.”

SUSAN HAACK

A man must be downright crazy to deny that science has made to avoid both underestimating the value many true discoveries. of science and overestimating it. What —C.S. Peirce (1903)1 I meant by “cynicism” in this context was a kind of jaundiced and uncriti- Scientism . . . employs the prestige of science for disguise and cally critical attitude toward science, an protection. 2 inability to see or an unwillingness to —A.H. Hobbs (1953) acknowledge its remarkable intellectual achievements, or to recognize the real cience is a good thing. As foresaw cen- benefits it has made possible. What I turies ago, when what we now call “modern science” meant by “scientism” was the opposite was in its infancy, the work of the sciences has brought failure: a kind of over-enthusiastic and S uncritically deferential attitude toward both light, an ever-growing body of of the world science, an inability to see or an unwill- and how it works, and fruit, the ability to predict and control ingness to acknowledge its fallibility, its limitations, and its potential dangers. the world in ways that have both extended and improved One side too hastily dismisses science; our lives. But, as William Harvey complained, Bacon really the other too hastily defers to it. My did write about science “like a Lord Chancellor”3—or, as we concern here, of course, is with the lat- ter failing. might say today, “like a promoter,” or “like a marketer.” Cer- It is worth noting that the English tainly he seems to have been far more keenly aware of the vir- word “scientism” wasn’t always, as it is tues of science than of its limitations and potential dangers. now, pejorative. In the mid-nineteenth century—not long after the older, Yet science is by no means a per- means the only good thing, nor—only a broader use of the word “science,” in fectly good thing. On the contrary, like little less obviously—even the only good which it could refer to any systematized body of knowledge, whatever its subject all human enterprises, it is ineradicably form of . There are many other matter, had given way to the modern, fallible and imperfect. At best, progress valuable kinds of human activity besides narrower use in which it refers to phys- in the sciences is ragged, uneven, and inquiry—music, dancing, art, storytell- unpredictable; moreover, much scien- ics, chemistry, biology, and so on, but ing, cookery, gardening, architecture, tific work is unimaginative or banal, not to jurisprudence, history, theology, to mention just a few; and many other 5 some is weak or careless, and some is and so forth —the word “scientism” outright corrupt; and scientific discov- valuable kinds of inquiry—historical, was neutral: it meant, simply, “the habit eries often have the potential for harm legal, literary, philosophical, etc. and mode of expression of a man of as well as for good—for knowledge is As I indicated by giving Defending science.” But by the early decades of 4 power, as Bacon saw, and power can be Science—Within Reason its subtitle, Be- the twentieth century “scientism” had abused. And, obviously, science is by no tween Scientism and Cynicism, we need begun to take on a negative tone—ini-

40 Volume 37 Issue 6 | Skeptical Inquirer tially, it seems, primarily in response to • Looking to the sciences for answers any good evidence for that?” but “Is over-ambitious ideas about how pro- to questions beyond their scope. there any scientific evidence for that?” foundly our understanding of human Needing to craft a test to help judges • Denying or denigrating the legit- behavior could be transformed by ap- determine whether expert testimony is imacy or the worth of other kinds plying the methods that had proven so reliable enough to be admitted, the U.S. 6 of inquiry besides the scientific, or successful in the physical sciences. And Supreme Court suggests that such tes- the value of human activities other by the mid-twentieth century, scientism timony must be “scientific knowledge,” 7 than inquiry, such as poetry or art. 11 had come to be seen as a “prejudice,” arrived at by the “scientific method.” 8 a “superstition,” an “aberration” of Here, I will explain the first three of A historian arguing that there is no 9 science. By now this negative tone is these six signs (leaving the fourth, foundation in the evidence for the idea 10 predominant; in fact, the pejorative fifth and sixth to Part 2)—always try- that ancient Greek philosophy was connotations of “scientism” are so thor- ing, however, to keep their interrela- borrowed from the Egyptians describes oughly entrenched that defenders of the tions in sight, to signal the mistaken this idea as “unscientific.”12 The titles autonomy of ethics, or of the legitimacy ideas about the sciences on which they of conferences and books speak of 13 of religious knowledge, etc., sometimes depend, and to steer the sometimes “Science and Reason,” as if the sci- think it sufficient, instead of actually very fine line between candidly repu- ences had a monopoly on reason itself. engaging with their critics’ arguments, diating scientism, and surreptitiously An editorial in the Wall Street Journal to dismiss them in a word: “scientistic.” repudiating science. describes studies of charter schools So, as the term “scientism” is usually where students are chosen by lottery currently used, and as I shall use it, it is a trivial verbal that scientism should be avoided. It is, however, a substantial question exactly when, and why, deference to the sciences is appro- Naturally enough, once “science,” “scientific,” etc., priate and when, and why, it is inap- have become honorific terms, practitioners uneasy propriate or exaggerated. My primary purpose here is to suggest some ways about the standing of their discipline or approach to recognize when this line has been like to use them emphatically and often. crossed, when respect for the achieve- ments of the sciences has transmuted into the kind of exaggerated deference characteristic of scientism. These are the “six signs of scientism” to which my The Honorific Use of “Science” title alludes. Summarized briefly and and Its Cognates as “scientific and more reliable” than roughly, they are: studies of schools that select their stu- Over the last several centuries, the 14 • Using the words “science,” “scien- dents on merit. The honorific usage work of the sciences has enormously tific,” “scientifically,” “scientist,” etc., is ubiquitous. enriched and refined our knowledge honorifically, as generic terms of Naturally enough, once “science,” of the world. And as the prestige of epistemic praise. “scientific,” etc., have become honor- the sciences grew, words like “science,” ific terms, practitioners uneasy about • Adopting the manners, the trap- “scientifically,” etc., took on an hon- the standing of their discipline or ap- pings, the technical terminology, orific tone: their substantive meaning proach like to use them emphatically etc., of the sciences, irrespective of tended to slip into the background, and often. In 1953, Prof. Hobbs pro- their real usefulness. and their favorable connotation began vided a splendid list of excerpts from • A preoccupation with demarca- to take center stage. Advertisers rou- publishers’ blurbs for sociology texts: tion, i.e., with drawing a sharp tinely boast that “science has shown” “a scientific approach”; “scientifically line between genuine science, the the superiority of their product, or that faces the problems of . . . marriage”; real thing, and “pseudoscientific” “scientific studies” support their claims. “approaches social problems from the imposters. Traditional or unconventional medical . . . scientific point of view . . . unassail- treatments are often dismissed out of able [conclusions]”; “sternly scientific”; • A corresponding preoccupation with 15 identifying the “scientific method,” hand, not as ill-founded or untested, and so on and on. And nowadays, of presumed to explain how the sci- but as “unscientific.” Skeptical of course—though departments of phys- ences have been so successful. some claim, we may ask, not “Is there ics and chemistry feel no need to stress

Skeptical Inquirer | November/December 2013 41 that what they do is science—universi- highly speculative, and that most are subjects”18 he had in mind social scien- ties offer classes and degrees in “Man- eventually found to be untenable, and tists’ efforts to look as much as possible agement Science,” “Library Science,” abandoned. To be sure, by now there like physicists—despite their radically “Military Science,” and even “Mortuary is a vast body of well-warranted sci- different subject matters. And there Science.”16 entific theory, some of it so well-war- certainly is something objectionably But this honorific usage of “science” ranted that it would be astonishing if scientistic about adopting the trap- and its cognates leads to all kinds of new evidence were to show it to be pings associated with physics, chemis- trouble. It makes it all too easy to forget mistaken—though even this possibility try, etc., not as useful transferable tools that, remarkable as the achievements of should never absolutely be ruled out. but as a smoke-screen hiding shallow the natural sciences have been, not all, (Rigid dogmatism is always epistemo- thinking or half-baked research. and not only, scientists are good, thor- logically undesirable, rigid dogmatism Even those who work in disciplines ough, honest inquirers. It tempts us to about even the best-warranted scientific no one would hesitate to classify as dismiss bad science as not really science theory included.) But this vast body of science sometimes focus too much on at all, and it seduces us into the false well-warranted theory is the surviving form and too little on substance. Epi- assumption that whatever is not science remnant of a much, much vaster body demiologists testing the side-effects of is no good, or at any rate inferior. Yes, of speculative conjectures, most of a morning-sickness drug meticulously the best scientific work is a remarkable which came to nothing—a fact bound calculate the statistical significance human cognitive achievement; but even to be obscured if we use “scientific” of their results, but fail to distinguish this best scientific work is fallible, and more or less interchangeably with “re- women who took the drug during the there is plenty of good, solid work in liable, established, solid,” and so forth. period of pregnancy when fetal limbs were forming from those who took it later;19 a medical scientist offers im- pressive-looking tables of cases, but fails to check whether the information This kind of misuse of scientific tools and in the tables matches the information techniques is even commoner in the social in the text.20 And so forth. But this kind of misuse of scientific sciences, where, as Robert Merton puts it, tools and techniques is even commoner practitioners only too often “take the in the social sciences, where, as Robert achievements of physics as the standard of Merton puts it, practitioners only too often “take the achievements of physics self-appraisal. They want to compare biceps as the standard of self-appraisal. They with their bigger brothers. want to compare biceps with their bigger brothers.”21 Those lengthy in- troductory chapters on “methodology” in sociology texts are sometimes only window-dressing; and, more often than one would like, the graphs, tables, and statistics in social-science work focus non-scientific disciplines such as his- Inappropriately Borrowed attention on variables that can be mea- tory, legal scholarship, music theory, Scientific Trappings sured at the expense of those that really etc.—not to mention the vast body of Besides encouraging the honorific use matter, or represent variables so poorly practically useful knowledge accumu- of “science” and its cognates, the suc- defined that no reasonable conclusion lated by farmers, sailors, ship-build- cesses of the natural sciences have also can be drawn. David Abrahamson’s ers, and artisans of every kind, and the tempted many to borrow the man- Second Law of Criminal Behavior is a considerable resources of knowledge of ners and the trappings of these fields, classic example: “A criminal act is the herbs embodied in traditional medical sum of a person’s criminalistic tenden- 17 in hopes of looking “scientific”—as practices. if technical terminology, numbers, cies plus his total situation, divided by And, inevitably, the honorific use of graphs, tables, fancy instruments, etc., the amount of his resistance,” or: “C = “science” encourages uncritical credu- were enough by themselves to guar- (T+S)/R.”22 The highly mathematical lity about whatever new scientific idea antee success. When Friedrich von character of contemporary economic comes down the pike. But the fact is Hayek wrote of the “tyranny” that “the theory has contributed to the curious that all the explanatory hypotheses that methods and technique of the Sciences idea that economics is the “queen of scientists come up with are, at first, . . . have exercised . . . over . . . other the social sciences”—a title to which

42 Volume 37 Issue 6 | Skeptical Inquirer psychology would seem to have a much medical imaging devices to distinguish this on its head. Noting that, while more legitimate claim. But too often the traces of writing on the lead “post- no finite number of positive instances those elegant mathematical models cards” on which Roman soldiers wrote could show an unrestricted universal turn out to be based on assumptions home from the marks of centuries of statement true, a single counter-in- about “rational economic man” true of weathering;27 General Motors uses a stance is enough to show it false, Pop- no real-world economic actors.23 And, model designed by the Centers for Dis- per proposed , testability, or sadly, policy recommendations based ease Control to track an “epidemic” of (as he also says) refutability as the cri- on flawed sociological statistics or flawed economic models often acquire an undeserved status because they are perceived as “science-based.” Inappropriately borrowed scientific In philosophy as in the social sciences, trappings are also common in philoso- technical terminology is often not, as it could phy, where, for example, many journals and publishers have adopted such prac- and should be, a carefully-crafted sign of hard-won tices as the name-date-page-number intellectual advance, but only self-important style of reference used by psychologists, sociologists, etc., and their preference jargon designed to attract others to (what you for the most recent rather than the hope will be) a bandwagon. original dates (which can be misleading even on its own turf, and is inherently more so in a discipline where reliance on authority is wholly out of place, and catastrophic when the historical de- 28 velopment of an idea matters). Even defects in its cars and trucks. And so terion of demarcation of the genuinely 30 giving priority to peer-reviewed publi- on. What is scientistic is not borrowing scientific. A real scientific theory, ac- cation, another practice adopted from scientific tools and techniques, as such, cording to Popper, can be subjected to the sciences, is a kind of scientism; peer but borrowing them for display rather the test of experience and, if it is false, review, hardly perfect as a rationing de- than for serious use. can be shown to be false; while a theory vice even for scarce space in scientific that rules nothing out is not a scientific journals,24 is inherently more suscep- Preoccupation with “the Problem theory at all. tible to corruption the more a profes- of Demarcation” This sounds simple enough. But sion is dominated, as philosophy is, Once “scientific” has become an honor- in fact it never became entirely clear by cliques, parties, and schools. And ific term, and when scientific trappings what, exactly, Popper’s criterion was, in philosophy as in the social sciences, only too often disguise a lack of real nor what, exactly, it was intended technical terminology is often not, as it rigor, it is almost inevitable that the to rule out, nor, most to the present could and should be, a carefully-crafted “problem of demarcation,” i.e., of draw- purpose, what exactly—besides the sign of hard-won intellectual advance, ing the line between genuine science honorific use of “science”—the moti- but only self-important jargon designed and pretenders, and with identifying vation was for wanting a criterion of to attract others to (what you hope will and rooting out “pseudoscience,” will demarcation in the first place; in fact, be) a bandwagon. loom much larger than it should. it became increasingly unclear. For ex- None of this is to deny, of course, Not surprisingly, as the honorific use ample, initially it sounded as if Popper that sometimes scientific tools and of “science” began to take hold in the intended to exclude Marxist “scientific techniques turn out also to be genu- early decades of the twentieth century, socialism,” along with Freud’s and Ad- inely useful to inquirers in other fields: so too did an increasing preoccupation ler’s psychoanalytic theories, as unfal- historians use a cyclotron to determine with demarcation: in logical sifiable. But in The Open Society and whether the composition of the ink in (where a key theme was the demarca- Its Enemies (1945) Popper grants that, two earlier printed versions of the bible tion of empirically meaningful scientific after all, Marxism is falsifiable—in fact, was the same as that in the “Gutenberg work from high-flown but meaningless he tells us, it was falsified by the events Bible” of 1450–1455;25 they use DNA metaphysical speculation); and, most of the Russian revolution.31 What went identification techniques to test the hy- strikingly, in ’s philosophy wrong wasn’t, after all, that the theory pothesis that Thomas Jefferson was the of science.29 The positivists had pro- was unfalsifiable, but that instead of father of the children born to his house- posed verifiability as the mark of the abandoning their theory in the face of slave Sally Hemings;26 and even borrow empirically meaningful; Popper turned contrary evidence, Marxists made ad

Skeptical Inquirer | November/December 2013 43 hoc modifications to save it. So Pop- including federal courts’ interest in dis- nor normative disciplines like jurispru- per’s supposedly logical criterion was tinguishing reliable scientific testimony dence or ethics or aesthetics or episte- transformed into a partly methodolog- from “junk science,”37 or in determin- mology. And at a third approximation, ical test—a test, moreover, according ing whether “creation science” is really to acknowledge that the work picked to which badly conducted science isn’t science, and hence may constitution- out by the word “science” is far from really science at all. ally be taught in public high schools.38 uniform or monolithic, it makes sense Again, for a long time Popper Other criteria of demarcation have to say, rather, that the disciplines we claimed that his criterion of demarca- been proposed: that real science relies call “the sciences” are best thought of tion excluded the theory of evolution; on controlled experiments, for example as forming a loose federation of inter- which, he wrote, is not a genuine sci- (which, however, would rule out not related kinds of inquiry into empirical entific theory but a “metaphysical re- only anthropology and sociology, but questions. search programme.”32 Then he changed also—most implausibly of all—astron- But if we want to get a clear view his mind: evolution is science, after omy). But the fact is that the term “sci- of the place of the sciences among the all.33 And again—quietly shifting from ence” simply has no very clear boundar- many kinds of inquiry, of the place writing of falsifiability as a criterion ies: the reference of the term is fuzzy, of inquiry among the many kinds of human activity, and of the interrela- tions among the various disciplines classified by deans and librarians as sciences, we will need to look for conti- nuities as well as differences. For there With the benefit of hindsight, it looks as if Popper’s are marked affinities between (as we criterion of demarcation proved so attractive to say) “historical” sciences like cosmol- so many in part because it was amorphous ogy and evolutionary biology, and what we would ordinarily classify simply as (or rather, polymorphous) enough to seem to historical inquiry. There is no sharp serve a whole variety of agendas. boundary between psychology and phi- losophy of mind, nor between cosmol- ogy and . Nor is there any very clear line between the considerable body of knowledge that has grown out of such primal human activities as hunting, herding, farming, fishing, of the scientific to suggesting that it indeterminate and, not least, frequently building, cooking, healing, midwifery, is a criterion of the empirical—Pop- contested. The best we might hope for child-rearing, etc., and the more sys- per acknowledged that the category of is a list of “signs of scientificity,” none of tematic knowledge of agronomists, “non-science” includes not only pseu- which would be shared by all sciences, child psychologists, etc. doscience, but also such legitimate but each of which would be found, in Scientific inquiry is recognizably but non-empirical areas of inquiry as some degree, in some sciences. continuous with more commonplace 34 metaphysics and mathematics. By the This is not to say that we can’t, in and less systematic kinds of empiri- time you notice that he describes his a rough and ready way, distinguish be- cal inquiry: inquiry into the causes of 35 criterion as a “convention,” and even, tween the sciences and other human spoiled crops, the design of fishing in the introduction to the English edi- activities, including other human cog- boats, the medicinal properties of herbs, tion of The of Scientific Discov- nitive activities, but it is to say that any etc. It is more systematic, more refined, ery, writes that scientific knowledge such distinction can only be rough and and more persistent; but sometimes it is continuous with everyday empirical ready. I might say, as a first approxima- rediscovers, and builds on, traditional knowledge,36 you can hardly avoid the tion, that science is best understood not knowledge. Linnaeus, for example, conclusion that the apparently simple as a body of knowledge, but as a kind of built on traditional Lap taxonomies of idea with which he started soon became inquiry; so that cooking dinner, danc- plants and animals;39 many drugs now something of an intellectual monster. ing, or writing a novel isn’t science, nor part of the arsenal of modern scientific With the benefit of hindsight, it is pleading a case in court. At a second medicine were derived from what were looks as if Popper’s criterion of demar- approximation, I would add that, since originally folk remedies. An example cation proved so attractive to so many the word “science” has come to be tied would be digitalis, extracted from a in part because it was amorphous (or to inquiry into empirical subject-mat- plant called the foxglove. Long used as rather, polymorphous) enough to seem ter, formal disciplines like logic or pure a folk remedy, digitalis was first named to serve a whole variety of agendas— mathematics don’t qualify as sciences, in 1542; its clinical properties were first

44 Volume 37 Issue 6 | Skeptical Inquirer Notes described by William Withering in 36, 2007: 789–819. 1. , Collected Papers, 25. Robert Buderi, “Science: Beaming in 1785, and by the mid-twentieth century eds. Hartshorne, Charles, Paul Weiss, and (vol- on the Past,” Time, Mar. 10, 1986, available it was in common use by physicians for umes 7 & 8) Arthur Burks (Cambridge, MA: at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arti- the treatment of heart ailments.40 Harvard University Press, 1931–58), 5.172 cle/0,9171,960850,00.html. (1903). 26. Jefferson-Hemings Scholars’ Commis- Suppressing the demarcationist im- 2. A.H. Hobbs, Social Problems and Scientism sion, Report on the Jefferson-Hemings Matter (April pulse enables us to see the Popperian (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1953), p.17. 12, 2001); William G. Hyland, Jr., In Defense of requirement that a theory rule some- 3. Peirce, Collected Papers (n.1), 5.361 (1877). Thomas Jefferson: The Sally Hemings Sex Scandal 4. Susan Haack, Defending Science— (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009). thing out, that it not be compatible Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism 27. “Wish You Were Here,” Oxford Today, with absolutely anything and everything (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003). 10.3, 1998: 40. 5. F.A. Von Hayek, “Scientism and the Study 28. Gregory L. White, “GM Takes Advice that might happen, for what it really of Society,” Economica, August 1942: 267–91, from Disease Sleuths to Debug Cars,” Wall Street is: a mark, not of its being scientific p.267, n.2. Journal, 8 April 1999, pp. B1, B4. specifically, but of its being genuinely 6. Oxford English Dictionary online, available 29. See Karl R. Popper, Unended Quest (La at http://oed.com/, entry on “scientism.” Salle, IL: Open Court, 1979), pp.31–38; and, for explanatory. And willingness to take 7. Hayek, “Scientism and the Study of a detailed critique, my “Just Say ‘No’ to Logical contrary evidence seriously can also be Society” (n.5), p.269. Negativism,” Putting Philosophy to Work (n.23), seen for what it really is: a mark not, 8. E.H. Hutten, The Language of Modern 179–94. Physics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p.273. 30. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Dis- as Popper supposes, of the scientist 9. Peter Medawar, “Science and Literature,” covery (1934; English ed., London: Routledge, specifically, but of the honest inquirer Encounter, XXXI.1, 1969: 15–23, p.23. 1959). 10. Michael Shermer, however, adopts the 31. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its in whatever field. (The historian who word “scientism” as a badge of honor. Michael Enemies (1945; revised ed., 1950), p.374. ignores or destroys a document that Shermer, “The Shamans of Scientism,” Scientific 32. Popper, Unended Quest (n.29), pp.167–180. threatens to undermine his favored hy- American, 287.3, September 2002. 33. Karl R. Popper, “Natural Selection and Its 11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 Scientific Status” (1977), in David Miller, ed., A pothesis is guilty of just the same kind U.S. 579 (1993). Pocket Popper (London: Fontana, 1983), 239–246. of intellectual dishonesty as the scien- 12. Mary Lefkowitz, Not Out of Africa (New 34. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery York: Basic Books, 1996), p.157. tist who ignores or fails to record the (n.30), p.39. 13. For example, the conference at the New 35. Id., p.37. results of an experiment that threatens York Academy of Sciences in which I participated 36. Id., p.18. to falsify his theory.) “Scientism,” as in 1996, and the corresponding volume. Paul 37. Daubert (1993) (n.11). Though the Su- R. Gross, Norman Levitt, and Martin Lewis, Hayek shrewdly observes, confuses “the preme Court doesn’t realize this, it is hard to eds., The Flight from Science and Reason (1996: think of a less suitable than general spirit of disinterested inquiry” Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, Popper’s, which expressly denies that any scientific with the methods and language of the 1997). theory is ever shown to be reliable, to serve as a 41 14. “Do Charters ‘Cream’ the Best?” Wall Street criterion of reliability. natural sciences. Journal, September 24, 2009, A20. 38. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. And suppressing the demarcationist 15. Hobbs, Social Problems and Scientism (n.2), 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Though the court in Mc- pp.42–43. impulse will also have the healthy ef- Lean didn’t realize this, given Popper’s ambivalence 16. Jerome Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its about the status of the theory of evolution it is not fect of obliging us to recognize poorly Social Problems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), clear that his criterion would classify evolution as conducted science as just that, poorly p.387, n.25. science, and creation “science” as non-science. 17. Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Science, Pseudo- conducted science; and of encouraging 39. Føllesdal, “Science, Pseudo-Science and Science and Traditional Knowledge,” ALLEA Traditional Knowledge” (n.17). us, instead of simply sneering at “pseu- (All European Academies) Biennial Handbook, 40. Jeremy N. Norman, “William Withering doscience,” to specify what, exactly, is 2002: 27–37. and the Purple Foxglove: A Bicentennial Tribute,” 18. Friedrich von Hayek, The Counter-Revolu- Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 25, 1985: 479–83. wrong with the work we are criticiz- tion of Science (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), p.13. 41. Friedrich von Hayek, The Counter-Revolu- 19. Olli P. Heinonen, Denis Slone, and Sam- ing: perhaps that it is too vague to be tion of Science (n.18), p.15. uel Shapiro, Birth Defects and Drugs in Pregnancy genuinely explanatory; perhaps that, (Littleton, MA: Sciences Group, 1977), pp.8–29. Susan Haack is Distin- though it uses mathematical symbol- 20. Christine Haller and Neal A. Benowitz, guished Professor in the “Adverse Cardiovascular and Central Nervous Sys- ism or graphs or fancy instruments, tem Events Associated with Dietary Supplements Humanities, Cooper Senior these are purely decorative, and doing Containing Ephedra Alkaloids,” New England Jour- Scholar in Arts and Sciences, no real work; perhaps that claims which nal of Medicine, 343, 2000: 1833–1838, p.1836. Professor of Philosophy and 21. Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social are thus far purely speculative are being Structure (1957; enlarged ed., Glencoe, IL: Free Professor of Law at the Uni- made as confidently as if they were Press, 1968), p.47. versity of Miami (Coral Gables, Florida). well-warranted by evidence; and so on. 22. David Abrahamson, The Psychology of Her books include Defending Science— Crime (New York: Columbia University Press, If we still had a use for the term “pseu- 1960), p.37. Within Reason; Evidence and Inquiry; Devi- doscience,” it might be best reserved to 23. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philos- ant Logic, Fuzzy Logic; Philosophy of Log- ophers (1958: 7th ed., New York: Simon and ics; Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate; refer to such public-relations exercises Schuster, 1999), chapter xi; Susan Haack, “Science, as the Creation Science “movement”— Economics, ‘Vision,’” in Putting Philosophy to Work: and Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry what a revealing word!—which, so far Inquiry and Its Place in Culture (Amherst, NY: Pro- and its Place in Culture (expanded edition, metheus Books, expanded ed., 2013), 97–104. as I can tell, involves no real inquiry of Prometheus Books 2013), from which she ■ 24. See Susan Haack, “Peer Review and Publi- adapted this two-part article. any kind. cation: Lessons for Lawyers,” Stetson Law Review,

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