Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis – Geographica, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-34 15

DECENTRALISATION PROCESSES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY

1 Peter Jordan 1 Institute of Urban and Regional Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Postgasse 7/4/2, A-1010 Wien, [email protected]

Abstract Decentralisation has an important meaning in the context of European integration, since a Europe composed of subsidiary spatial units is to be constructed and a “Europe of regions” is on the agenda of many political discussions. From the early 1990s, the European Communities, later the European Union, promoted the idea of administrative decentralisation also in transformation countries. For EU accession decentralisation was made one of the prerequisites. But it met centralistic traditions originating not only in the Communist era and could partly be enforced only with considerable diffi culties. The paper investigates in a comparative way into the efforts made and the results achieved so far in East- Central and Southeast European countries to establish local as well as regional self-government. A special focus is laid on the regional level, to which administrative powers have been devolved only later and partly insuffi ciently. It is also observed to which extent administrative regionalisation has respected historical regional and cultural identities which are strong and vivid in many countries, but had been covered by Communist administrative systems. Decentralisation processes and their progress are illustrated by the examples of Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria.

Key words: political geography, decentralisation, regional identities, administrative regionalisation

INTRODUCTION Jordan (2010) provides for a comprehensive survey over administrative decentralisation procesesses in Research on administrative decentralisation processes the transformation countries of East-Central and in European transformation countries has become Southeast Europe with a focus on the regional level voluminous in the meantime. This paper is essentially and on the background of administrative traditi- based on research as documented by Committee of the ons. It is based on most of the literature published Regions (1999), Jordan et al. (2001) and Jordan (2010). on this topic after 2001 – a literature that is too voluminous to be presented and discussed here The study Committee of the Regions (1999) compri- in detail (see for a more complete list of referen- sed the at that time “fi rst wave accession countries” ces Jordan 2010). In representing this much larger including Poland and Slovenia, the study Jordan et al. number just the various reports of the Council (2001) the “second wave accession countries” inclu- of Europe on the situation of local and regional ding Slovakia and Bulgaria. Both studies investigated governance in transformation countries (see refe- into the progress of the decentralisation process, into rences) and for Poland the article of Czyż 1999 its driving forces and obstacles. may be mentioned.

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES Eventually, the principle of centralism was deepe- AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DECENTRA- ned across all of East-Central, East and Southeast LISATION PROCESS IN THE TRANS- Europe by half a century of Communism, which was FORMATION COUNTRIES OF EASTERN a centralist ideology par excellence, even though some EUROPE Communist countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union) had federative structures. But even In the course of the transformation process, the here, the all-powerful Communist parties (the „Com- countries of Central and Southeast Europe incre- munist League“ in Yugoslavia) controlled every level asingly came under the infl uence of the European of the state and of society right down to the smallest Communities, which had become the European political and economic unit. Union (EU) in 1994. They accepted this and were themselves (with some initial, but in the end only In addition to these older factors, which still rever- a few exceptions) very eager regarding integration. berate strongly today, the current situation provides Amongst other things, this meant the consideration good reasons, which support centralism. In part, of the principle of subsidiarity as it is represented large national/ethnic/cultural minorities are often by the EU (Preamble and Article 2 of the Maast- perceived as a threat to the unity of the nation state. richt Treaty). It is feared that allowing the regions where they live a greater degree of self-government is tantamount to However, in contrast particularly to West-Central increasing this threat. Equally, regions with a strong Europe (Switzerland [Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera], cultural identity are sometimes viewed as danger Germany [Deutschland], Austria), there is little tra- for the state unity. For this reason they should not dition of subsidiarity in the transformation countries receive additional support through self-government. of eastern Europe. This applies especially to East Both of these factors are closely related to the new and Southeast Europe, to a lesser extent to East- sovereignty, only recently (with great effort) obtained Central Europe, where the countries belonging to the and often perceived as vulnerable. Centralist attitudes Austrian part of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, are often justifi ed by pointing to the political apathy Transylvania [Ardeal], Croatia but also Poland and of the population, which is widespread in post- Hungary feature certain federalist traditions. Communist countries, particularly among members of the older generation and in rural areas. This sup- The centralistic administrative principle that was ports the argument that self-government at a regional used early on by the Roman and Eastern Roman and local level meets with little interest anyway, and Empire was faithfully continued by Byzantium and is of use to very few. A further common argument carried into all parts of Byzantine-dominated East used by defenders of centralist administration is the and Southeast Europe. The Ottoman Empire also reference to the (genuinely existing) lack of qualifi ed adopted centralism along with other political and administrative staff, particularly in rural areas and at social models (e.g. the close connection between the lower administrative levels. By shifting competen- church and state). The young nation states, including cies to the subnational levels, one causes the quality those in East-Central Europe with clear subsidiary of public administration and services to decline. traditions, which formed after the disintegration of the multinational empires (the Ottoman Empire, the Against this background it is of no surprise that Habsburg Empire, the Russian Tsardom) during the decentralisation in former Communist Europe 19th and 20th centuries, were additionally impres- only proceeded sluggishly and was often half-he- sed and infl uenced by the French model of a Unita- artedly managed by national governments. The rian and centralist state.1 governments accepted it as a condition of Euro- pean integration, but rarely acknowledged that it 1 Which had fi rst developed from previously subsidiary structures, as it did in England, out of the emergence of absolutism in the may lie in the interests of their own country. This early Modern Age. is particularly true for the regional level in terms of

AUPO Geographica Vol. 41 No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-34 Decentralisation processes in Central and Southeast European transformation countries 17 the large and medium-sized administrative units of the benefi t of the nation states3 and because this the NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 dimension according to process, secondly, has to be driven by representa- the European Union (EU) classifi cation system.2 tives of the nation states themselves, who conse- In contrast, the local level, which consists of many quently effectively disempower themselves. small and therefore „harmless“ units (usually cal- led „communes“, NUTS-4, NUTS-5) was allocated European identity and European awareness, but also many competencies relatively quickly, though often regional identities and regional awareness would be without assigning adequate fi nancial coverage. very helpful here. A European awareness is still barely developed. Regional awareness and regional identities However, it should be recognised, that similar con- do exist, to a certain extent even in those countries that ditions prevail to a large extent in the „old“ EU sta- are not far advanced in the process of regionalisation. tes such as France or Greece [Ellada]. They are often only covered by a thin veil of national identity and could not even be made to disappear in The European institutions (EU, European Council) areas where totalitarian Communist regimes particu- have several reasons for supporting decentralisation larly pursued this objective by introducing frequent and especially regionalisation: changes to the administrative structure. • Both processes correspond to the principle of subsidiarity, which forms part of the guiding The strengthening of regional identities and regio- idea of the EU and the European Council. nalisation could be in a position to halt nationalism • They cause the diffusion of democracy across and to reduce the likelihood of large-scale confl icts. all political levels. Switzerland offers of good example of this: thin- • They contribute to the preservation of Euro- king in national categories (German, French, Italian) pean cultural diversity, because „regions are the is signifi cantly fractured by the existence of small, cultural building blocks of Europe“. but politically and fi nancially powerful cantons.4 • They allow the EU to distribute its (signifi - cant) funds for regional and structural support Political control and structural support by the EU directly to the competent territorial administra- could also ensure that the development of „regio- tive units, rather than to the state governments, nal feudalisms“ and the increase of socio-economic which then determine the allocation. disparities are prevented – two phenomena that are presented as arguments against regionalisation – The primary incentive behind many of these moti- and not without justifi cation. ves is presumably the notion that, following World 3 War II, the European integration project must over- In 1994 the Hungarian historian Ferenc Glatz named fi ve ar- guments that are used against the relaxation of the nation state come the nation state and the associated excesses idea and associated centralism: (1) „Part of the intelligence that of nationalism, which have caused Europe so much is linked to the classical liberal principles of the past century feels harm in the past two centuries. In order to achieve reluctance, because it grew up under the spell of the idea of fre- this it is necessary to break the power of the nation edom introduced by the French Revolution and the French state, which rejects any kind of group privileges and group rights.“ states and to shift some of their competencies to (Glatz 1994: 15) (2) The efforts of the state bureaucracy to main- levels of the EU on the one hand, and to the level tain their position. (3) The survival of classical anti-fascist poli- of regions and communes on the other hand. This tical traditions. (4) Fear of the German economic power, which has proved to be a laborious process, fi rstly because could take root in autonomous areas no longer controlled by nation states. (5) The fear of small nations, particularly in the strong powers and interests continue to operate for Eastern part of Europe, of being taken over by the „large nati- ons“, when the former are unable to protect their identity with 2 NUTS = Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques. the political, educational and economic means of a nation state. The EU currently has 211 NUTS-2-regions with an average area (Glatz 1994: 15ff). of 15,800 sq km and an average number of inhabitants of 1.747 4 However, some examples also exist that show that regions million. At the NUTS-3-level there are 1,093 regions with an ave- support national thinking, in cases where their borders coincide rage area of 3,050 sq km and an average number of inhabitants with the settlement area of nations: Kosovo, the Basque Country of 337,000. in Spain, the Serb Entity in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

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FOUR EXAMPLES OF DECENTRALISATION Communist post-war Poland retained the three-tier PROCESSES AND THEIR PROGRESS administrative system of the inter-war period until 1974, with certain modifi cations. In the territory of post-war Poland it was composed of 17 voivode- Poland [Polska] ships [województwo]5 on the upper regional level, powiats [powiat] on the lower regional level and Cultural and administrative traditions communes [gmina] on the local level. Until 1950 the From the very beginning, Poland developed as an aris- latter enjoyed self-government. As cities, Warsaw tocartic state with relatively weak royal power (central and Łódź were treated like the voivodeships. The authority). With its territorial dominions (voivode- newly acquired, previously German territories were ships) the powerful nobility shaped distinctive regional immediately incorporated into the existing system of identities. These were further reinforced by the fact voivodeships in 1945, though the 1937 state borders that, over the course of history, the function of capi- were not refl ected on the voivodeship borders. tal of the nation wandered from Poznań to Cracow [Kraków] and on to Warsaw [Warzsawa]. The perso- The large voivodeships in the west were subdivided nal union (1386), and later the real union (1569) with in 1950, resulting in the three new voivodeships Lithuania brought Poland dominance over an empire, Koszalin, Zielona Góra and Opole. Later, the large which – next to the Habsburg Empire – was the most cities of Poznań, Cracow and Wrocław were each important adversary against the Ottoman Empire in bestowed the status of a voivodeship as well. The Europe. In the late Middle Ages the Hanseatic Lea- system was heavily centralised and self-government gue spread not only along the coastal regions, but also did not exist on any level. The increasing power of reached far into the interior of the country, e.g. as far the Communist party leaders within the voivode- as Cracow. Together with other cities under German ships led the party central offi ce to reinforce the law they produced the bourgeoisie, which faced the competencies of the communes in 1972 and 1973, sovereign and the nobility as a separate political force. which in turn resulted in the polarisation of the Even before its three partitions in 1772, 1793 and balance of power between the voivodeships and 1795 the country was larger than it is today, and was the communes, and made the powiats appear super- located further to the east. fl uous. The administrative reform of 1975 took account of this, eliminated the level of the powi- During the extremely formative phase of the 19th ats, transferring most of their competencies to the and the beginning of the 20th century (industria- communes and establishing 49 voivodeships (inclu- lisation, railway construction), the total division ding 3 cities at the level of voivodeships), instead of among Prussia (later Germany), Austria, (later the initial 17 (with 5 cities). Austria-Hungary) and Russia from the late 18th century until World War I, produced very different Developments 1989-2007 and the current administrative- economic and cultural infl uences in the three parts -territorial system of the country, which reverberate to this day even though sections of the population were replaced An initial administrative reform immediately after the after World War II. political turn-around in 1990 reintroduced the self- government of the communes in the form that had In 1916, once again a „core Poland“ emerged, which existed until 1950. The issue of the arrangement of expanded signifi cantly until 1923, moving to the the regional level triggered long discussions, mainly east into areas that are Ukrainian and Belorussian due to the number and size of the voivodeships, today. The political post-war order forced Poland and these were not brought to a close until 1999 and to shift to the west by 200-250 km, which brought resulted in the three-tier system that still exists today. with it a massive population transfer. It was as late 5 The offi cial designation of the term in the local offi cial lan- as 1992 that this was fi nally sealed by the German- guage/s is always given in the singular nominative, even where Polish agreements. the English expression does not correspond to number.

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Figure 1 Poland’s current administrative system

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Since January 1, 1999 the Polish administrative- The voivodeships simultaneously have institutions territorial system (see Fig. 1) is composed of 16 of self-government and of deconcentrated state voivodeships [województwo] on the upper regional administration at their disposal (Fig. 1). For the fi rst level, 361 powiats [powiat] on the lower regional time in Poland’s more recent history, the voivode- level, as well as 2,489 rural communes [gmina] and ships are consequently self-governing. 65 urban communes [miasto] on the local level.6 The voivodeships correspond to the NUTS-2 level A Parliament [sejmik województwa] is elected for a of the EU classifi cation, the powiats to the NUTS-4 term of four years and it, in turn, elects the Coun- level, and the communes to the NUTS-5 level. All cil of the Voivodeship [zarząd województwa] as its three levels are exclusively or additionally self- government, as well as the President7 [marszałek governing. województwa]. Voivodeships with up to 2 million inhabitants have 45 delegates, for every additional The following were signifi cant motives for this 500,000 inhabitants, 5 further delegates are added. administrative reform, and in particular for the rein- troduction of large voivodeships and a three-tier The Governor [wojewoda] is a representative of system as was in place until 1975: the expectation the deconcentrated state administration, and coun- of large-scale and effi cient regional planning, the terbalances these institutions of self-government. replacement of the „artifi cial“ Communist system He is appointed by the Polish Council of Ministers symbolised by the structure as it existed in its fi nal and is thus a representative of central government. years, the alignment (of the voivodeships) with his- However, the Council of the Voivodeship has the torical regions, the promotion of democratisation nomination rights. The Governor can annul deci- through self-government and the need to comply sions made by the self-government, if they are in with the requirements of the EU. violation of the national law. However, his decisions can be challenged before the administrative court. In many cases, the 16 voivodeships do indeed He is also responsible for public safety. correspond at least roughly to historical cultural regions, whose identity was frequently shaped early The competencies of the self-governing institutions on in the Middle Ages, and which are fi rmly roo- of the voivodeships comprise ted in the consciousness of the population. They • education, often also bear the names of these historical units • economic and regional development, and cultural landscapes: Greater Poland [wojewód- • transport infrastructure, ztwo wielkopolskie], Lesser Poland [województwo • culture, malopolskie], Masovia [województwo mazowiec- • healthcare and social services, kie], Pomerania [województwo pomorskie], Silesia • development of rural areas, [województwo śląskie], Podlachia [województwo • protection of the environment, podlaskie], to just name those that are better known. • public safety, In most cases there is also a good match with the • bilateral and multilateral cooperation with central place system, the functional regions of the foreign partners. large regional centres (macrocentres). However, in some cases they are too small for the central place The revenues of the voivodeships are only self- macroregions and divide them further (especially generated to a very small extent (mainly as a share of Katowice, Cracow, Poznań, Gdańsk). Indeed, the property tax and income tax). Instead, they primarily initial reformation plans had only provided for 12 consist of national transfer payments. These, too, are voivodeships. The larger number was the result of the consideration of local needs. 7 In this text references to functional titles (e.g. his vice-mayor) always represent both the female and male form. It would impede legibility if both forms (his/her) were used throughout. The use 6 The numbers of administrative units given here and in the of the female form only would introduce a greater discrepancy further text as well as in the fi gures refer to 1 January 2007. with reality, as the majority of offi cials are male at this time.

AUPO Geographica Vol. 41 No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-34 Decentralisation processes in Central and Southeast European transformation countries 21 severely restricted and have to be renegotiated year the Association of Polish Cities, the Association after year. Voivodeships have the option to enter of Small Polish Towns, the Association of Large into contracts with the state about the execution of Polish Cities, the Association of Rural Communes, particular functions, which are then specifi cally fun- the Association of Powiats and the Confederation ded by the state (e.g. road construction). Overall, this of Polish Communal and Regional Associations. represents a rather weak fi nancial basis for the exe- They intervene with the central authorities and are cution of a considerable range of functions within systematically consulted by the Polish government self-government. Consequently, the effect of these in matters of local and regional administration. competencies is very limited. Sometimes communes and powiats surrender functions to the voivodeships, As far as the progress of the decentralisation pro- together with the associated necessary funds. cess is concerned, it can be concluded that among all transformation countries, Poland has made the rela- The primary role of the 361 powiats is to support tively greatest progress. It features self-government and coordinate the communes. They are exclusively on all three subnational administrative levels; the self-governing. The powiat councils are elected for NUTS-2 level is also furnished with self-governing a term of four years and are made up of 20-60 dele- territorial administrative units and corresponds to a gates who, in turn, elect a Chairman [starosta]. The large extent with historically evolved cultural units. competencies of the powiats are relatively restric- However, the fi nancial resources of this administra- ted and consist mainly in the cooperation with the tive level in particular are highly insuffi cient. voivodeships and the communes in relation to their respective administrative territory. In carrying out the spatial delineation of the voivo- deships, the „danger“ of providing ethnic minorities In contrast, the 2,489 rural and 65 urban commu- with a better opportunity to represent their interests nes are endowed with much stronger competencies. by gathering them in one administrative unit was They are also relatively independent fi nancially. For not evaded, even though this „danger“ is objecti- their budget they receive shares of the income tax vely slight in view of the average Polish minority revenue in the commune and they are allowed to own proportion of 3.3% (2002): for the benefi t of the property. The communal council is elected for a term relatively most compact minority, the Germans in of four years and has the duty to elect the communal the area of Opole, the cultural region of Silesia was board, which holds the executive functions. divided into three voivodeships. Thus, the Germans account for a share of 10% of the total population Furthermore, the Polish Constitution provides for in the Voivodeship of Opole [województwo opol- the instrument of the referendum in relation to all skie] and have good opportunities to be represented three subnational administrative levels. This can be in the Council of the Voivodeship. used to remove elected institutions from offi ce. Particularly in the 1990s, the driving forces of the Subnational territorial administrative units have decentralisation process in Poland were the trade several options to represent their interests vis-à-vis union movement Solidarność in cooperation with the state. The Senate is one form of representation the Roman Catholic Church. of interests that is embedded in the Constitution, the second chamber of the Polish Parliament in addition to the Sejm. Already in 1989, this was trans- Slovakia [Slovensko] formed into a representation of the (49 at the time) Cultural and administrative traditions voivodeships with 100 senators. Every voivodeship provided two senators, the two largest voivodeships, The territory of present-day Slovakia formed an Warsaw and Katowice, each supplied three. In addi- integral component of the Hungarian state for as tion there are associations of the local and regio- long as this had been in existence (approximately nal authorities, which have the status of NGOs: since the year 1000), and became part of newly

AUPO Geographica Vol. 41 No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-34 22 Decentralisation processes in Central and Southeast European transformation countries formed Czechoslovakia after World War I. In Developments 1989-2007 and the current administrative- this state, Slovakia was one of the four provinces -territorial system of Bohemia [Čechy], Moravia-Silesia [Morava- -Slezsko], Slovakia and Subcarpathia [Podkar- While still a part of Czechoslovakia, but already patská Rus’]. It adopted the Hungarian county under a post-Communist government, Slovakia system (Slovak for county: župa) and retained it introduced the self-government of communes. The until 1922, when it was replaced by much larger detachment from Czechia and the state of indepen- units (but also called župa). With the First Vienna dence from January 1, 1993 onwards was carried Award dated November 2, 1938 Hitler accorded out without a referendum. Intensive negotiations Hungary, which was allied to him, the majority of began immediately about a new administrative sys- the Hungarian-populated areas in southern Slo- tem at the regional level. This was fi nally introduced vakia. In March 1939, the remainder of Slovakia on 24.7.1996 under the government of Vladimir became an „independent“ state by Hitler’s favour. Mečiar. This new system had three tiers and consis- After the end of World War II, following the will ted of 8 regions [kraj], 79 districts [okres] and 2,867 of the victorious powers, Czechoslovakia was communes [obec]. re-established inside the borders of 1920, but had to cede Subcarpathia [now ukr. Zakarpattja] to the The population sizes of the 8 regions were similar Soviet Union in June 1945. and corresponded to the NUTS-3 level of the EU. However, they did not align with the historical units In the year following the Communist seizure of and cultural regions, for example with the initially power (1949) a three-tier administrative system was Hungarian counties, which were Slovak in the inter- introduced in all of Czechoslovakia, which consis- war years, and which are still very much alive in the ted of regions [kraj], districts [okres] and commu- consciousness of the population. They also do not nes [obec]. Six of the regions and 92 of the districts correspond to the central place system (functional were located within Slovakia. The next reform regions). This regional structuring had the effect of that applied to the entirety of Czechoslovakia was cutting off Bratislava from its hinterland, and the implemented in 1960 and reduced the number of eastern Slovak centre Košice lost the northern half regions within Slovak territory to three (Western of its catchment area. In many regards this regional Slovak Region [Západoslovenský kraj], Central Slo- structuring features similarities with the fi rst Com- vak Region [Stredoslovesnký kraj], Eastern Slovak munist system between 1949 and 1960. Region [Východoslovenský kraj]). These regions corresponded fairly well to cultural identities and Clearly, two political motives also played an impor- functional relationships. At the lower regional level tant part: (1) To curtail Bratislava and Košice, the the number of Slovak districts was reduced to 33, two largest cities, where Mečiar´s structure-conser- but in 1968 again increased to 37. vative and nationalist Movement for a Democra- tic Slovakia [Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, The federalisation of Czechoslovakia from Janu- HZDS] had achieved the weakest results in the par- ary 1, 1969 onwards made Slovakia an autonomous liamentary elections of 1994; (2) to shape the regi- constituent republic of a federal state. At the same ons in such a way that the signifi cant and compactly time, the Slovak capital Bratislava was promoted to settled Hungarian minority was prevented from rea- the status of region and hived off from the Wes- ching 30% anywhere. tern Slovak Region. On August 11, 1969 the regi- ons were temporarily rescinded, but then they were The regions established in 1996 only carried out reintroduced again on December 28, 1970. No deconcentrated state administration, no self-gover- further modifi cations were made to this three-tier nment, and were funded exclusively by the state. administrative system in Slovakia until the political They did, however, have the authority to engage in turn-around in 1989. transnational cooperations.

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Figure 2 Slovakia’s current administrative system

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In the autumn of 1998, not long after Mečiar’s Since January 1, 2002 Slovakia consequently has a autocratic government was voted out of offi ce, three-tier administrative system, which consists of discussions about regionalisation and self-gover- eight regions at the upper regional level [kraj], and nment at the regional level came back to life. The an equal number of higher-level territorial admi- government now formed a broad anti-Mečiar-coa- nistrative units [vyšši územni celky, VÚC], which lition with the inclusion of the Hungarian Party coincide in their territories. The former represent (Hungarian Coalition [Magyar Koalició/Maďarská deconcentrated state administration, the latter koalícia]). By the summer of 2001 the discussi- represent self-government. The lower regional level ons had produced fi ve recommendations. All of is comprised of 79 districts [okres] as territorial these shared a two-tier system consisting of local administrative units of deconcentrated state admi- administration (communes) and regional adminis- nistration, and the local level has 2,887 communes tration. The idea was that the regional administra- [obec], which have been self-governing since 1990. tion was to be made up of two parallel systems, While the regions and higher-level territorial admi- covering the same territory, these being regions nistrative units correspond to the NUTS-3 level, the [kraj] for deconcentrated state administration and districts can be allocated to the NUTS-4 level, and „Higher-level Territorial Administrative Units“ the communes to the NUTS-5 level. [vyšši územni celky, VÚC] for regional self-gover- nment. The VÚC represented the introduction to The eight regions fi nance themselves exclusively Slovakia of self-government at the regional level. through national transfer payments. The eight higher- Districts [okres], as they had existed until this time, level territorial administrative units, which are spati- were to be disbanded and their powers distributed ally identical to the regions, are endowed with elected to the regions [kraj]. The intention was to combine institutions, but are also fi nanced by the state for the the regions into four planning regions without most part. Their competencies are weak and are pri- legal status at the NUTS-2 level. marily related to the coordination of subordinate ter- ritorial administrative units. However, they can enter The differences between the fi ve suggestions into cross-border collaborations with foreign regions. could be found in the number of regions and VÚC (12 instead of 8), and in their confi guration. In 2004 the districts were renamed to administrative The greater number of 12 would have allowed districts [obvod], but retained their functions and the Hungarian minority in the southern part of their territorial confi guration (Fig. 2). the country to achieve a share above 30% in two regions, and to possibly gain political majorities In recent years the relationship between regions and in the elections. The proposal put forward by the higher-level territorial administrative units has shown Hungarian Coalition also provided for a region a tendency towards fusion, with the institutions and that was more or less identical to the compact competencies of self-government gaining the upper Hungarian settlement area. hand. The term used is almost always „region“ [kraj] nowadays, while the (complicated) expression Following severe political clashes, which almost „higher-level territorial administrative unit“ is disap- caused the government’s coalition to shatter, in pearing more and more. Today, road signs at the bor- July 2001 a decision was taken in accordance with ders of the regions only use the term „kraj“. the principle of the lowest common denominator. The spatial structuring that had existed hitherto Since 1998, two to three regions respectively are and that had established a basic structure of eight combined to form four „statistical and planning units in 1996 was retained, the districts were not regions“ at the NUTS-2 level. They do not have disbanded. Higher-level territorial administrative their own juridical personality and are not constitu- units (VÚC) were introduced in parallel to the ted as territorial units of the administrative system. eight regions and were congruent with these (see Financially, and in terms of directives, they are allo- Fig. 2). cated to central government.

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In other words, the reform of 2002 created a (par- The most pronounced and diverse impressions ticularly for a small country) hypertrophic system were left by the Republic of Venice [Serenissima with three administrative levels (one of these being Repubblica di San Marco] in the Adriatic façade double) and one additional planning level. With of modern Slovenia, and the Habsburg Empire regard to decentralisation, it also features conside- in the remaining areas of the country. While the rable defi cits: the subnational territorial adminis- infl uence of Venice found its expression in the trative units have no or only insignifi cant fi nancial Mediterranean architecture and the Mediterra- autonomy; together, the budgets of all subnational nean lifestyle in parts of Slovenia, the Habsburg units only account for 10% of the public budget Empire left its mark in terms of Central Euro- and self-governing territorial administrative units pean (Alpine, Pannonian) traditions. Looking can only decide on the distribution of 16% of their beyond this cultural-historical bisection, the indi- income; regional self-government (VÚC) has very vidual crownlands of the Habsburg Empire also little in the way of own authority; the NUTS-2 level left traces behind, producing a lively regional con- does not consist of separate territorial administra- sciousness that exists to this day: the Slovenian tive units and is therefore entirely dependent upon Littoral [Primorsko] that was Venetian until 1797, central government. then became Austrian; the medieval Habsburg crownlands of Carniola [Kranjsko], Styria [Štajer- Important reasons for this include (among others, sko] and Carinthia [Koroško], as well as Prekmurje which apply to many transformation countries) (1) [Prekmurje], which was ceded by Hungary after the existence of localized regional identities, which World War I. are related to the former Hungarian counties and do not match the present-day regions; (2) the poor None of the administrative-territorial structures correlation between administrative and functional implemented after 1918 refl ected these historical regions; (3) and, last but not least, the large, cultu- and cultural identities. Instead, the area of present- rally very aware and compactly settled Hungarian day Slovenia was always subdivided in numerous minority (9.7% in 2001), which some, or at any rate smaller entities, varying in number between 20 and the nationalist and populist parties, perceive as a 62, and fl uctuating in name between district [okraj, threat to the national integrity. srez] and commune [občina]. Only for the time between 1922 and 1929, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slo- venaca, SHS] did the subdivision of the Slovene Slovenia [Slovenija] territory belonging to this state (the western areas Cultural and administrative traditions belonged to Italy) into the regions [oblast] Ljubljana and Maribor correspond to the historical division Slovenia fi rst emerged as a political entity in 1945, between Carniola and Styria. when it became a constituent republic of the federal Communist state of Yugoslavia. Prior to Between 1945 and 1991, Slovenia was one of the this, Slovenes only existed as an ethnic and lin- six constituent republics of Yugoslavia. This sta- guistic category, which was dispersed across seve- tus, and particularly the degree of autonomy that ral countries and administrative units and which was further deepened through the Yugoslav Con- was dominated by majority populations or elites stitution of 1974, can retrospectively be regarded that belonged to other ethnic and cultural groups as a necessary preliminary stage for the indepen- (with the limited exception of Yugoslavia during dence, which was gained in 1991. During this the inter-war years). The dominance by a variety time, Slovenia was divided into greater communes of other cultures moulded Slovenian culture in [občina], numbering 62 in the end, which were different ways and left its traces in the cultural self-governing. No further administrative level landscape, in regional identities and in the regional existed between these communes and the consti- consciousness. tuent republic.

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Figure 3 Slovenia’s current administrative system

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Developments 1989-2007 and the current administrative- NUTS-4 level, and they represent deconcentrated -territorial system state administration by offering spatially dispersed governmental administrative services. They are lead The fi rst administrative reform to take place in inde- by a governor [načelnik], who is a civil servant. pendent Slovenia on October 3, 1994 (see Fig. 3) replaced the 62 communes, each with an average To date, self-government has not been established area of 336 sq km and an average population of at the regional level, even though the Constitution 28,000, with 147 communes [občina], each with allows for this option and related discussions began an average of 138 sq km and 13,000 inhabitants. as early as 1991. One possibility, which is repeatedly Consequently, they no longer corresponded to the mentioned, would be the elevation of the 12 exi- NUTS-4 level (as the former greater communes had sting statistical regions [statistična regija] to admi- done), but to the NUTS-5 level instead. They too, nistrative regions [pokrajina]. They correspond to were self-governing. By January 1, 2007 their num- the NUTS-3 level, are largely well matched to the ber had been augmented in several stages (August 8, previously mentioned cultural landscapes and their 1998: 192; June 15, 2002: 193; March 14, 2006: 205; respective subdivisions (e.g. the division of Carni- June 14, 2006: 210) to reach 210, gradually reducing ola into Upper Carniola [Gorensko], Inner Carni- the average area to 96 sq km and the average popula- ola [Notransko] and Lower Carniola [Dolensko]) tion to 9,400. Eleven of these are urban communes and also align with the functional territorial units [mestna občina], these being Celje, Koper/Capo- (Vrišer 1998). However, the political parties have distria, Kranj, Ljubljana, Maribor, Murska Sobota, been unable to agree upon a solution so far. There Nova Gorica, Novo Mesto, Ptuj, Slovenj Gradec is also support for the widely held opinion that a and Velenje. Urban and other kinds of communes small country such as Slovenia does not require an are each endowed with the same competencies. additional and costly administrative level. A further argument, mentioned less openly, suggests that self- The communes are defi ned as the basic local self- governing regions could release centrifugal forces, governing units according to the Constitution of if one considers that pronounced regional identi- 1991 and in the Local Government Act (72/1993). ties supported by self-government gain gravitas and Following the Constitution their number can only could pose a threat to the statehood and national be increased up to a total of 300. The institutions unity, which are still young and vulnerable. of the communes are the communal council [občin- ski svet] elected for a four-year term and the mayor [župan], who is elected by the communal council Bulgaria [Bălgarija] and also serves for a term of four years. There can Cultural and administrative traditions be up to three deputy mayors [podžupan]. The communal council also elects the communal gover- From 1360 onwards the territory of present-day Bul- nment [občinska uprava]. garia was the fi rst goal of the Ottoman expansion into Europe. More than half a millennium of direct Communal revenues are sourced primarily from Ottoman rule brought about particularly pronounced taxes and rates. Communes in peripheral areas, Ottoman characteristics. Thus, the Ottoman mano- which are not able to fi nance themselves exclusively rial system became fully effective, a large number of with self-generated revenues, receive state transfer ethnic Turks settled there, parts of the Slav popula- payments in the way of disparity equalisation. tion converted to Islam (Pomaks) and the Roma pre- dominantly became Muslims. Ottoman centralism, Simultaneously more or less with the new commu- bolstered by Islam as state religion, did not allow a nes (October 4, 1994), 50 so-called „administrative strong aristocracy or a strong bourgeoisie. The admi- units“ [upravna enota] were also established. To a nistrative system of the Ottoman Empire that functi- large extent they correspond to the territories of oned according to central state principles also barely the former larger communes, and thus also to the allowed the formation of stronger regional identities.

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Figure 4 Bulgaria’s current administrative system

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After 1878 (Congress of Berlin), Bulgaria passed number of council members is proportional to the through stages of autonomy leading to indepen- size of the commune’s population. dence while simultaneously expanding its territories (1885, 1908, 1912). In this, it was substantially sup- Every settlement [naseleno mesto] within a com- ported by Russia. During the time of Communism mune has a „village mayor“. In settlements with more Bulgaria also maintained its special relationship with than 500 residents the mayor is elected by the popu- the Russian-dominated Soviet Union and among lation, in settlements with less than 500 residents the all Communist states in Eastern Europe it copied mayor is appointed by the communal council. The Soviet Communism most faithfully. This also affec- village mayor does not have a separate budget. ted the subnational administrative system that knew regions [oblast] following the Soviet model. Only the national parliament has legislative autho- rity. The executive powers of the governor include • the regional representation of the state; Developments 1989-2007 and the current administrative- • supervision to ensure that the policies of sub- -territorial system national administrative units do not run con- Based on the Constitution from the year 1991, trary to those of the state; the present-day two-tier administrative system was • supervision to ensure that state law is complied established in 1998 (see Fig. 4). It consists of 28 with in the region; regions [oblast] and 264 communes [obština]. They • organisation, development and implementa- correspond to the levels 3 and 4 respectively of the tion of strategies and programmes for regional NUTS-classifi cation. This system replaced a diffe- development; rent two-tier system comprised of 9 regions [oblast] • the coordination of these strategies and pro- and 246 communes [obština] that had only entered grammes with the communes; into force during the fi nal phase of the Communist • the protection of state property; era, on 1 January 1988. The 9 regions had proved to • the organisation of military mobilisation be too large and too ineffi cient in the exercise of their measures; competencies. A further incentive for the reform was • the organisation of disaster relief; presumably also the desire to move away from Com- • the maintenance of public order; munist structures. • „regional foreign policy“, including contacts to and cooperations with regions in other countries. The 28 regions today are units of deconcentrated state administration. This is exercised in the region Thus, in all public spheres the governor has an by the governor, who is directly appointed by the important control and coordination function. He Council of Ministers (Fig. 4). not only exercises this function vis-à-vis the com- munes, but also as counterpart to the representa- In contrast, the commune is an institution of tives of the social partners, of public welfare and self-government; not just since 1998, but since the healthcare facilities and of NGOs. reformation of 1988, which fell within the phase of (Soviet) perestroika. Compared to 1988, the The executive powers of the communal council are numbers and borders of the communes have not comprised of changed signifi cantly. A few larger communes were • setting commune policies, merely divided. New communes should have at • establishing expert commissions, least 6,000 residents. The executive institutions of a • electing a chairman of the communal council, commune are the communal council and the mayor. • electing the deputy mayor(s) following a pro- Both are directly elected for a term of four years. posal by the mayor, The direct election of both institutions can pro- • passing a resolution on the annual municipal duce a situation where the mayor does not belong budget, to the majority party of the communal council. The • setting local taxes and local rates.

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The mayor is responsible for by unscheduled government grants. De facto, these • the maintenance of public order, grants and their amounts are linked to political con- • the execution of the municipal budget, cessions and leave the communes dependent on • long term development programmes, national, and frequently on party political attempts • protective measures in the event of disasters, at infl uence. The fi nancial scarcity in the communes • „communal foreign policy“, also means that they primarily focus on fulfi lling • construction permits, their basic functions, while additional and optional • environmental protection, duties are deferred or not completed at all. Fre- • organisation and maintenance of educational quently, the national transfer payments are made and healthcare facilities. after long delays, in turn forcing the communes to delay the salary payments to civil servants, teachers While the regional administration is fi nanced solely or hospital staff. A further element of uncertainty by funds from the national budget, communes draw is introduced by the fact that national transfer pay- their fi nancing from several sources. Thus, the share ments to communes (including the basic subsidy) received of the taxes set by the state are important: have to be agreed year upon year with the new property tax, inheritance tax, gift tax, land transfer national budget. The amount with which the com- tax, motor vehicle tax, their own municipal tax, munes are endowed, therefore also depends on the value added tax for juridical persons owning more general state fi nances and on the spending priorities than 50% of businesses in the commune. Added of the respective political majorities. This reduces to these taxes, there are also municipal rates for their planning certainty. refuse collection, market stalls, the commercial use of municipal property, nursery schools, leisure faci- On the national level the interests of the subnati- lities, social services facilities, technical and admi- onal territorial-administrative units can partly be nistrative services, dog licences, graves, as well as leveraged by the delegates to State Parliament. In revenues from approvals, fi nes, interest payments. accordance with the wording of the law these repre- A large part of the commune’s revenue is however sent their constituencies, which correspond to the made up of national transfer payments. These con- regions, with two exceptions (Sofi a [Sofi ja] and Plo- sist of the basic subsidy, which is based on a list of vdiv). Although voting in parliament primarily fol- criteria and is set annually by the national budget; lows party loyalties, there is balancing of interests they further consist of ring-fenced subsidies for within the individual parties between the delegates special and long-term projects; and of subsidies from different regions and communes. As members that are granted in the case of particular needs and of the National Council for Regional Development under specifi c conditions. Since 1999, the share the governors are represented in the Council of represented by these national transfer payments in Ministers. Additionally, there is a national associa- terms of the communes’ revenues lies between two tion of territorial-administrative units that is organi- thirds and three quarters averaged across all com- sed as a non-governmental organisation (NGO). munes, with a variation by commune between 12% and 83%. Bulgaria has no territorial-administrative authorities or units at the NUTS-2 level. In the year 2000 only 6 The main problem that arises from this fi nancing planning regions were established, each comprising arrangement stems from the fact that most com¬- between 3 and 6 of the 28 administrative regions. munes are not able to meet the cost of performing They are not separate legal entities and serve the their functions using regular revenues (statutory purposes of regional development and regional revenues that are fi xed, basic state subsidy). The statistics. They are Bulgaria’s reaction to the corre- numerous functions of the communes are not sponding EU requirements, but do not comply with met with the corresponding (regular) revenues. the intention of these requirements, as decisions for Most communes, therefore, generally generate a these regions are not taken at the subsidiary level, budget defi cit, which ultimately has to be covered but at the state level.

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It can be said that the decentralisation process has of the local units it only embraces political not yet progressed very far in Bulgaria. Only the dimensions that do not pose a threat to the communes can rejoice in self-government, while the central government. NUTS-3 level is occupied by state-controlled regions and the NUTS-2 level merely by planning regions. • The regional administrative levels (NUTS-2 Also, the fi nancial autonomy of the communes is to NUTS-4), on the other hand, are only very restricted. This creates a signifi cant dependency exclusively self-governed in exceptional cases. upon the state and impedes their ability to participate Where, as in Hungary, Croatia and Bosnia- in EU-funded Structural Funds projects. Herzegovina, this is the case, the self-gover- nment is either endowed only with moderate In terms of driving forces behind a greater degree competencies (Hungary, Croatia) or it does not of decentralisation, this term still fi ts the requi- correspond to the ideal type of administrative rements posed by the EU best; these are at least regionalisation, but is rather a form of admi- accepted and supported by part of the political eli- nistratively supported and therefore solidifi ed tes, to an extent also by regional and local media, ethnic segregation (Bosnia-Herzegovina: enti- who articulate regional and local interests. The lack ties on the NUTS-2 level and cantons at the of political participation among large parts of the NUTS-3 level in the federation). Slovenia, population remains a weighty obstacle, particularly Montenegro and Macedonia have no regions. in rural areas. Regional identities that are not very This defi cit in the decentralisation process at distinctive and the signifi cant ethnic minority of the regional levels, in other words – with regard the Islamic Turks (2001: 9.4%), which is concentra- to a “real” administrative regionalisation – can ted in two sub-areas of the country and compactly be explained by administrative traditions, but settled there also play a role that should not be beyond that also primarily by the poorly conso- underestimated. lidated national identity and statehood. Against this background, different central administra- SYNOPSIS tions are keen to interpret various signs (eth- nic and other minorities, pronounced regional The synopsis shown in Fig. 5, of the formulation identities, gravitational pull of foreign centres, of subnational territorial administrative units in the socio-economic spatial disparities, etc.) as good transformation countries of Central and South- reasons for demonstrating restraint in this east Europe with self-government, delegated self- matter. government, delegated state administration and deconcentrated state administration, depicted by • New autonomies, in the sense of partial ter- countries in their spatial arrangement and by NUTS- ritories of a state that are endowed with spe- levels, suggests the following conclusions: cial competencies of self-government, were exclusively the result of national movements • The local administrative level (NUTS-5; in during the transformation phase (Gagauzia, Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Crimea; the Autonomous Province of Vojvo- Serbia and Macedonia NUTS-4) is endowed dina already existed at the time of Yugoslavia), with self-government, with the exception of while regionalist movements, which occurred Belorussia, which is a dictatorship. This self- frequently and with vehemence, (for example, government had already been established in Moravia, Istria [Istra], Transcarpathia [Zakar- the successor states of Yugoslavia during the pattja]) were not able to prevail. Communist years, and was adopted by the other transformation countries immediately before • Administrative traditions display a strong or very soon after the political turn-around. It impact. Thus, for most successor states of the expresses the early quest for democratisation Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, deconcentra- “from the grass roots”, but with the small size ted state administration at the lower regional

AUPO Geographica Vol. 41 No. 1, 2010, pp. 15-34 32 Decentralisation processes in Central and Southeast European transformation countries Synopsis of subnational governance in the transformation countries of Central and Southeast Europe Figure 5

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administrative level (NUTS-4) following the Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional pattern of the Political Districts [Politischer Authorities of Europe, 5th Session (Strasbourg, Bezirk] during the end phase of the Austri- 26-28 May 1998): Recommendation 45 (1998) on an-Hungarian Monarchy is quite characteristic the situation of local and regional self-government (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). The diff- in the Republic of Bulgaria. (http://www.coe.fr/ erent approaches chosen by Croatia and Bos- cplre/textad/rec/1998/rec45(98)e.htm) nia and Herzegovina can be partially (Croatia) Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional or fully (Bosnia-Herzegovina) explained by Authorities of Europe, 5th Session (Strasbourg, the circumstances of war that prevailed in the 26-28 May 1998): Report on the situation of local 1990s. Hungary switched to a different model and regional self-government in the Republic of only recently. In Romania, the Romanian admi- Bulgaria. Strasbourg 1998. nistrative system that was tailored after the Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional French model, unfolded itself over large secti- Authorities of Europe, 8th Session (Strasbourg, ons of the innercarpathian territories, which 29-31 May 2001): Recommendation 88 (2001) on had belonged to Austria-Hungary until 1918. local and regional democracy in the Slovak Republic. In contrast, in most successor states of Com- Strasbourg 2001. munist Yugoslavia, the self-governing large Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional communes were retained at the lower regional Authorities of Europe, 8th Session (Strasbourg, level (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ser- 29-31 May 2001): Situation of the Local and Regi- bia, Macedonia). Only Slovenia and Croatia onal Democracy in the Slovak Republic. Strasbourg returned to small communes immediately after 2001. gaining independence, this being the structure Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs, that had existed there prior to the years of accessed 13 January 2008. Communist Yugoslavia. Czyż, T. 1999: Die neue territoriale Struktur der Verwal- In the successor states of the Soviet Union, tung und die regionale sozioökonomische Struktur state administration generally also comprises in Polen. In: Europa Regional, 7, 1, 33-42. all regional levels of administration. To date, Ekonóm (ed.) 1999: Ekonomika územnej verejnej správy only a very partial loosening of the structure [Economics of Territorial Public Administration]. has been achieved through the introduction of Bratislava. elements of self-government. Gešev, G. 1999: Problemi na regionalnoto razvitie i regionalnata politika v Republika Bălgarija [Problems of Regional • What is less tangible in the synopsis, because Development and Regional Policy in the Republic it does not provide information about the of Bulgaria]. Sofi a. competencies of self-government, the fi nan- Glatz, F. 1994: Die neuen Kräfte der Gemeinschafts- cial resources of self-government, the relative bildung und der Gebietsregelung in Europa. In: size of self-governing territorial administrative Balázs, B. ed., Staat und Nation, Staatsnation, Kultur- units, and the correlation between self-gover- nation. Österreichisch-ungarische Konferenz im Collegium ning subnational units and cultural-spatial Hungaricum, Wien, 9. November 1994. Wien, 11-20. identities, is the lesser degree of decentrali- Jordan, P. et al. 2001: The Europe of the Regions: Strategies sation, particularly at the regional level, in the and Perspectives in the View of the Forthcoming Enlarge- territories that were moulded by the Byzan- ment of the European Union (Part II on Bulgaria, Latvia, tine and Ottoman cultural traditions. Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey). Study on behalf of the Committee of the Regions of the European References Union (COR). COR, Brussels. Jordan, P. 2005: Major problems of administrative Committee of the Regions ed. 1999: Preparing for EU regionalisation and decentralisation in Central and Enlargement. Devolution in the First Wave of Candidate Southeast Europe. In: Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Countries (= COR Studies, E-4/99). COR, Brussels. Geographica, XXXVIII, 2003, 1, 141-155.

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Jordan, P. 2006: Administrative regionalisation in South- s centralistickými tradicemi majícími svůj původ east Europe – Slow progress due to strong regional nejen v komunistickém období a mohla být čás- identities and cultural minorities? In: Henkel R. ed., tečně prosazena pouze se značnými obtížemi. South Eastern European Countries on their Way to Europe. Geographical Aspects (= Forum ifl , 5). Leipzig, 39-59. Článek zkoumá komparativní metodou snahy, které Jordan, P. 2010: Administrative Subdivision of Central and byly učiněny, a cíle, které byly dosaženy v jednotli- Southeast Europe 2007 (= Atlas of Eastern and South- vých zemích středovýchodní a jihovýchodní Evropy eastern Europe, 5.4-G10). Borntraeger, Wien. v oblasti lokální a regionální samosprávy. Zvláštní Kollar, M., Mesešnikov, G. (eds.) 2001: Slovensko 2000 pozornost je věnována regionální úrovni, na kte- [Slovakia 2000]. Bratislava. rou byly administrativní pravomoci převedeny až Marinska, G. 2000: Obšt pregled na zakonodatelstvoto později a částečně nedostatečným způsobem. Dále v oblastta na mestnoto samoupravlenie i mestnata adminis- sledujeme, do jaké míry administrativní členění tracia [General Survey of Legislation on Local Self- respektuje historické regionální a kulturní identity, government and Local Administration]. Sofi a. které jsou v mnoha zemích dosud silné a živé, ale Program PHARE (ed.) 1999: Modernizácia verejnej správy byly zastřeny komunistickými administrativními v Slovenskej republike [Modernisation of Public Admi- systémy. Decentralizační procesy a jejich vývoj jsou nistration in the Slovak Republic]. Bratislava. dokumentovány na příkladě Polska, Slovenska, Slo- Stanev, H., Botev, I., Kovačev, S., Genčeva, S. 2000: vinska a Bulharska. Administrativno-teritorialno ustrostvo na Republika Bălgarija [Administrative-territorial Division of the Republic of Bulgaria]. Sofi a. Stojanova-Novkiriška, M. 2001: Kompetentnosti na obštin- skite saveti, kmetove na obštini i obštinska administracia. Iniciativa za mestno samoupravlenie [Competences of Communal Councils, Mayors and Communal Admi- nistration]. Sofi a. Vrišer, I. 1998: Središčna naselja in vplivna območja pomembnejših središč leta 1994. In: Fridl, J. et al. eds. Geografski atlas Slovenije. Založništvo literature, Inšitut za geografi jo, Geografski inštitut Antona Melika, Ljubljana, 306.

Resumé

Decentralizační procesy v transformujících se zemích střední a jihovýchodní Evropy: komparace

Decentralizace má v kontextu evropské integ- race důležitý význam, protože Evropa musí být sestavená ze subsidiárních prostorových jednotek a „Evropa regionů“ je na pořadu politických debat. Od raných 90. let dvacátého století prosazuje Evrop- ské společenství, později Evropská unie, myšlenku administrativní decentralizace také v transformují- cích se zemích. Aby mohly přistoupit k EU, byla decentralizace jedním z požadavků. Setkala se však

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