Institutional Change and Politics of Constitutional Revision in Japan Megumi Murakami Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in Political Science under the advisement of Katharine H.S. Moon May 2020 2 Acknowledgements The story I tell here would not be possible without the wonderful people mentioned here. The moments I was able to share with each of you motivated me to write and create. No one knows how writing comes about or tells you how to represent an idea. Each of you has showed me how to see things more completely, for what they are, and what they can be. Professor Katharine Moon serves as the impetus for my academic pursuits in historical memory, nationalism, and national-identity. She taught me how to be a critical thinker and refined my ability to make an argument. While I descended into my various rabbit-holes of leads, she would be waiting at the surface to discuss and re-center my efforts. She is both my toughest critic and fiercest supporter. Professor Stacie Goddard guided me when life got off track. In the process of strategizing, I emerged stronger and more resilient. To me, she will always be the ‘empiricist’ as she taught me how put forth a theory and create a research design. At several points during my time at Wellesley, I found myself at a loss for how to proceed. Professor Goddard was always there with a plan. I would like to thank the members of my thesis panel, Professor Lisa Rodensky, Professor Maneesh Arora, and Professor Stacie Goddard for their time and consideration of the ideas I present here. The following professors provided in valuable insight to this research that I would like to thank. In Japan, Professor Koichi Nakano explained how the dynamics of the U.S. – Japan alliance emboldens Abe’s nationalist rhetoric. Professor Alexis Dudden explained the politics of Japan’s territorial claims. Professor Y. Tak Matsusaka taught me the history of Modern Japan and provided context on Japan’s wartime rhetoric. Professors Yoshimi Maeno and Eiko Torii- Williams taught me Japanese and unconditionally supported my research pursuits. Professor Robert Goree provided context on the nexus of Japanese popular culture and right-wing organizations. I would also like to extend a thank you to Daria Hafner and the Clapp Library staff whose efforts gave me access to sources crucial for the empirical work required for thesis research. The team at U.S. Embassy Tokyo – Mike Daschbach, Virsa Perkins, Melinda Pavek, Sharon Ryan, Ai Kaneko, Fumi Tsuchiya, Kaoru Nakata, and Noriko Mizuta – gave me the opportunity to observe and interact with Japanese politicians. Thank you answering my endless questions about the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese politics. You gave me the ability to contextualize my research. Kaneko-san, I am still working on my bid to be prime minister of Japan. Mike, thank you for taking me under your wing. This research crystalized when I was able to observe party institutions during our meeting at LDP headquarters. To my board of trustees – Amy Lau, Joyce Cheng, Karen Su, Kayla Nakeeb, and Maya Nandakumar – thank you for your unwavering support. Though our time together was cut short, I am confident that we will still have our fun in the years to come. For all of my friends -- I look forward to our many milestones together. 3 My grandfathers, Wai Shing and Yoshio, inspired my interest in postwar history and East Asian politics. Their legacies loom large in my mind to this day. My grandmother, Eileen, jumps up and smiles with every education milestone. She reminds me of why it is so important to pursue an education and why I chose a historically all-women’s college. I am thankful for my parents, Joyce and Shin. My mother always contributed her empathy when I needed it most. She took the time to understand the ideas I present here and encouraged my pursuit of them. My father helped me understand the intricacies of Japanese political culture and language. He consistently provided wisdom about how to make my next move. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my little brother, Seiji. He believed in me when I did not believe in myself. He reminds me of who I am and what I stand for. He inspired me to write with his aptitude for how to translate an idea to a visual medium. Thank you for countless hours of guidance and unconditional love. 4 Table of Contents Introduction 6 History of Article 9 13 Structural Change and Centralization of Party Power 18 Jun’ichirō Koizumi and Top-Down Policymaking 32 Shinzō Abe and Constitutional Reinterpretation 46 Conclusion 64 Bibliography 69 5 Note on Japanese Names and Language This research follows the Western convention in which the given or personal name precedes the family name. Key terms related to the Constitution or Japan’s political system will be italicized next to their English equivalent. Note on Japan’s Parliament Japan’s Parliament is commonly referred to as the Diet. The Diet consists of two chambers. The first is the Lower House, or House of Representatives. The Second is the Upper House, or House of Councilors. 6 Introduction In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe unilaterally reinterpreted Article 9, a clause in the Japanese Constitution that prohibits the existence of military forces and renounces the right to war. He sidelined the formal process for revision by using a cabinet resolution, circumventing Japan’s parliament. Tens of thousands of Japanese citizens protested the change and Abe’s failure to respect constitutionalism. To them, Article 9 represents a sincere commitment to the ideals of pacifism and Japan’s unique contribution to the world. Following Japan’s surrender to the United States after World War II, General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. Occupation Government rewrote Japan's constitution to instill a constitutional commitment to pacifism. Since then, pacifism has become part of Japan’s national identity and integral to its mandate for the use of force in the world. However, for Prime Minister Abe and his political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, Article 9 is a humiliating imposition by a foreign power, intended to ensure Japan would never rise again. Prime Minister Abe’s actions are representative of a larger historical movement to revise Article 9. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded in 1955 on the basis of making Japan a ‘normal’ country, or fully sovereign with a standing military. The party has remained in power since then with the exception of 1993 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012. The LDP’s long tenure as the ruling party allowed them to centralize political power and autonomy over the narratives surrounding Japan’s constitution. As a result, the LDP has incrementally reinterpreted Article 9 through legislative changes to make revision inevitable. The right to collective self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the 1945 United Nations Charter, allowing all UN member countries to defend other nations from attack. The Liberal 7 Democratic Party seeks to revise Article 9 to acknowledge the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as well as Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defense, which allows the SDF to use force abroad to defend allies even if Japan is not directly under attack. While Japan has the right to self-defense, the longstanding interpretation of Article 9 was that Japan does not have the right to collective self-defense. To some, the changes that the LDP proposes are insignificant since they are simply updating an outdated document. For example, Japan has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations since 1992. Additionally, the SDF does, in fact, exist, but is not currently included in the constitution. However, the changes the LDP proposes would fundamentally alter how Japan sees itself and its role in the world. Given the implications of such a change in Article 9, the question becomes, how was the LDP able to pursue constitutional revision despite public opposition and why. There are several existing explanations for why the LDP has taken steps to incrementally reinterpret Article 9 beyond its original intent. Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from increased Security Threats in the region Both Japanese and American scholars firmly believe that the motivation for revision is based on a realistic assessment of Japan’s current security threats. Territorial disputes between Japan and China from 2010 to 2012 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands exposed Japan’s lack of military planning for defending a territory they claim as their own.1 Scholars note that China may have intentions to change the regional balance of power in the region, given President Xi Jinping’s ambitious efforts to modernize China’s military.2 In addition, both Japan’s waters and airspace 1 Sheila Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 117. 2 Jennifer Lind, “Asia’s other revisionist power: why U.S. grand strategy Unnerves China,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 2 (March/April 2017). 8 have been challenged by North Korea through naval encroachment and missile launches.3 According to this explanation, the external threats Japan faces in the region motivate the LDP to increase the SDF’s capabilities and remove Japan’s normative constraints on the use of force. Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from increased Nationalism and Militarism Scholars of Japan’s postwar history explain the LDP’s push for revision as the result of increased nationalism within the party. Nationalism can be defined as an ideology that draws on history, religion, beliefs, customs, and traditions to establish group solidarity that serves the purposes of the nation-state.4 Nationalism is invoked by politicians to connect with voters and generate electoral support and, therefore, contributes to the LDP’s ability to stay in power.