Institutional Change and Politics of Constitutional Revision in Japan

Megumi Murakami

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in Political Science under the advisement of Katharine H.S. Moon

May 2020

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Acknowledgements

The story I tell here would not be possible without the wonderful people mentioned here. The moments I was able to share with each of you motivated me to write and create. No one knows how writing comes about or tells you how to represent an idea. Each of you has showed me how to see things more completely, for what they are, and what they can be.

Professor Katharine Moon serves as the impetus for my academic pursuits in historical memory, nationalism, and national-identity. She taught me how to be a critical thinker and refined my ability to make an argument. While I descended into my various rabbit-holes of leads, she would be waiting at the surface to discuss and re-center my efforts. She is both my toughest critic and fiercest supporter.

Professor Stacie Goddard guided me when life got off track. In the process of strategizing, I emerged stronger and more resilient. To me, she will always be the ‘empiricist’ as she taught me how put forth a theory and create a research design. At several points during my time at Wellesley, I found myself at a loss for how to proceed. Professor Goddard was always there with a plan.

I would like to thank the members of my thesis panel, Professor Lisa Rodensky, Professor Maneesh Arora, and Professor Stacie Goddard for their time and consideration of the ideas I present here.

The following professors provided in valuable insight to this research that I would like to thank. In Japan, Professor Koichi Nakano explained how the dynamics of the U.S. – Japan alliance emboldens Abe’s nationalist rhetoric. Professor Alexis Dudden explained the politics of Japan’s territorial claims. Professor Y. Tak Matsusaka taught me the history of Modern Japan and provided context on Japan’s wartime rhetoric. Professors Yoshimi Maeno and Eiko Torii- Williams taught me Japanese and unconditionally supported my research pursuits. Professor Robert Goree provided context on the nexus of Japanese popular culture and right-wing organizations. I would also like to extend a thank you to Daria Hafner and the Clapp Library staff whose efforts gave me access to sources crucial for the empirical work required for thesis research.

The team at U.S. Embassy Tokyo – Mike Daschbach, Virsa Perkins, Melinda Pavek, Sharon Ryan, Ai Kaneko, Fumi Tsuchiya, Kaoru Nakata, and Noriko Mizuta – gave me the opportunity to observe and interact with Japanese politicians. Thank you answering my endless questions about the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese politics. You gave me the ability to contextualize my research. Kaneko-san, I am still working on my bid to be prime minister of Japan. Mike, thank you for taking me under your wing. This research crystalized when I was able to observe party institutions during our meeting at LDP headquarters.

To my board of trustees – Amy Lau, Joyce Cheng, Karen Su, Kayla Nakeeb, and Maya Nandakumar – thank you for your unwavering support. Though our time together was cut short, I am confident that we will still have our fun in the years to come. For all of my friends -- I look forward to our many milestones together. 3

My grandfathers, Wai Shing and Yoshio, inspired my interest in postwar history and East Asian politics. Their legacies loom large in my mind to this day. My grandmother, Eileen, jumps up and smiles with every education milestone. She reminds me of why it is so important to pursue an education and why I chose a historically all-women’s college.

I am thankful for my parents, Joyce and Shin. My mother always contributed her empathy when I needed it most. She took the time to understand the ideas I present here and encouraged my pursuit of them. My father helped me understand the intricacies of Japanese political culture and language. He consistently provided wisdom about how to make my next move.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my little brother, Seiji. He believed in me when I did not believe in myself. He reminds me of who I am and what I stand for. He inspired me to write with his aptitude for how to translate an idea to a visual medium. Thank you for countless hours of guidance and unconditional love.

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Table of Contents

Introduction 6

History of Article 9 13

Structural Change and Centralization of Party Power 18

Jun’ichirō Koizumi and Top-Down Policymaking 32

Shinzō Abe and Constitutional Reinterpretation 46

Conclusion 64

Bibliography 69

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Note on Japanese Names and Language

This research follows the Western convention in which the given or personal name precedes the family name. Key terms related to the Constitution or Japan’s political system will be italicized next to their English equivalent.

Note on Japan’s Parliament

Japan’s Parliament is commonly referred to as the Diet. The Diet consists of two chambers. The first is the Lower House, or House of Representatives. The Second is the Upper House, or House of Councilors.

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Introduction

In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe unilaterally reinterpreted Article 9, a clause in the Japanese

Constitution that prohibits the existence of military forces and renounces the right to war. He sidelined the formal process for revision by using a cabinet resolution, circumventing Japan’s parliament. Tens of thousands of Japanese citizens protested the change and Abe’s failure to respect constitutionalism. To them, Article 9 represents a sincere commitment to the ideals of pacifism and Japan’s unique contribution to the world. Following Japan’s surrender to the United

States after World War II, General Douglas MacArthur and the U.S. Occupation Government rewrote Japan's constitution to instill a constitutional commitment to pacifism. Since then, pacifism has become part of Japan’s national identity and integral to its mandate for the use of force in the world. However, for Prime Minister Abe and his political party, the Liberal

Democratic Party, Article 9 is a humiliating imposition by a foreign power, intended to ensure

Japan would never rise again.

Prime Minister Abe’s actions are representative of a larger historical movement to revise

Article 9. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded in 1955 on the basis of making

Japan a ‘normal’ country, or fully sovereign with a standing military. The party has remained in power since then with the exception of 1993 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012. The LDP’s long tenure as the ruling party allowed them to centralize political power and autonomy over the narratives surrounding Japan’s constitution. As a result, the LDP has incrementally reinterpreted Article 9 through legislative changes to make revision inevitable.

The right to collective self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the 1945 United Nations

Charter, allowing all UN member countries to defend other nations from attack. The Liberal 7

Democratic Party seeks to revise Article 9 to acknowledge the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense

Forces (SDF) as well as Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defense, which allows the SDF to use force abroad to defend allies even if Japan is not directly under attack. While Japan has the right to self-defense, the longstanding interpretation of Article 9 was that Japan does not have the right to collective self-defense. To some, the changes that the LDP proposes are insignificant since they are simply updating an outdated document. For example, Japan has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations since 1992. Additionally, the SDF does, in fact, exist, but is not currently included in the constitution. However, the changes the LDP proposes would fundamentally alter how Japan sees itself and its role in the world.

Given the implications of such a change in Article 9, the question becomes, how was the

LDP able to pursue constitutional revision despite public opposition and why. There are several existing explanations for why the LDP has taken steps to incrementally reinterpret Article 9 beyond its original intent.

Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from increased Security Threats in the region

Both Japanese and American scholars firmly believe that the motivation for revision is based on a realistic assessment of Japan’s current security threats. Territorial disputes between Japan and

China from 2010 to 2012 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands exposed Japan’s lack of military planning for defending a territory they claim as their own.1 Scholars note that China may have intentions to change the regional balance of power in the region, given President Xi Jinping’s ambitious efforts to modernize China’s military.2 In addition, both Japan’s waters and airspace

1 Sheila Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 117. 2 Jennifer Lind, “Asia’s other revisionist power: why U.S. grand strategy Unnerves China,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 2 (March/April 2017). 8 have been challenged by North Korea through naval encroachment and missile launches.3

According to this explanation, the external threats Japan faces in the region motivate the LDP to increase the SDF’s capabilities and remove Japan’s normative constraints on the use of force.

Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from increased Nationalism and Militarism

Scholars of Japan’s postwar history explain the LDP’s push for revision as the result of increased nationalism within the party. Nationalism can be defined as an ideology that draws on history, religion, beliefs, customs, and traditions to establish group solidarity that serves the purposes of the nation-state.4 Nationalism is invoked by politicians to connect with voters and generate electoral support and, therefore, contributes to the LDP’s ability to stay in power. Scholars who support this explanation state that revision is the long-term goal of the LDP’s consistent ‘war’ on the historical memory surrounding World War II. The LDP has revised Japanese textbooks to portray a whitewashed version of Japan’s war history in 2000. Similarly, Japan’s prime ministers have routinely visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a war memorial that includes Class-A war criminals.5

Prime Minister Abe has stated that while Japanese soldiers committed devastating crimes, they did so for Japan and are “honorable.”6 Additionally, scholars who study Japan’s constitution find that the LDP’s efforts to change postwar history serve to undermine the pacifist undertones of

Article 9.7 Therefore, the Liberal Democratic Party is simply fulfilling the party’s mandate to revise the Constitution. Incremental changes to historical memory serve to undermine Article 9 and make formal revision the next logical step.

3 Smith, Japan Rearmed, 125. 4 Jeff Kingston, Nationalism in Asia: A history since 1946 (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), xv. 5 Patrick Hein, “Leadership and Nationalism: Assessing Shinzō Abe,” in Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered, ed. Jeff Kingston (London: Routledge, 2015), 87-88. 6 Alexis Dudden, “A Push to End Pacifism Tests Japanese Democracy,” Current History 114, no. 773 (2015): 225. 7 Maciej Pletnia, “Back to the Past: Analysis of the Amendments Regarding Emperor and the National Symbols of the LDP 2012 Constitutional Draft,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2017): 182. 9

Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from the U.S. - Japan Alliance

Another explanation for why the LDP is trying to revise the Constitution comes from the U.S. -

Japan Alliance. The U.S - Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the basis for the alliance, was a ten- year, renewable agreement established in 1951 that stationed U.S. forces to protect Japan given its pacifist Constitution. Domestic debates on Article 9 in Japan correlate with each renewal of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. Abe’s decision to reinterpret Article 9 in 2014 to allow for collective self-defense was the first step before the renewal of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty in

2015. The LDP has legislated for each occurrence when Japan supports U.S. military action.

Following Japan’s support of the U.S. War on Terrorism in 2001, the LDP discussed the need for a general law that allows Japan to support U.S. operations instead of legislating for each occurrence.8 Hence, revision of the Constitution would provide this general mandate.

Japan’s Constitutional Revisionism stems from Institutional Change

The central argument of this thesis is that structural and institutional change in Japan’s political system explains constitutional revisionism. The centralization of the Liberal Democratic Party in

1994 allowed for greater collaboration between party members on the issue of revision. With a more unified party, LDP politicians expanded control over Japan’s bureaucracy, increasing the

LDP’s policy making power. Additionally, centralization made the prime minister leader of the party not only in name, but also in authority. The party and prime minister’s direct control over state institutions and processes have created the possibility for revisionism.

8 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014),” Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, accessed November 25, 2019, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/crrp/resources/chronology. 10

Certainly, the explanations above contribute to why the LDP has pursued revision against the fierce public opposition. However, these explanations do not account for how the LDP has been able to do this. While provocations by China and North Korea provide compelling reasons for why Japan should revise, these concerns still must be translated into policies on the domestic level. The LDP has, since its founding, had a strong contingent for constitutional revisionism; however, the party has been divided about how to approach this issue.9 The alliance explanation provides some insight into how reinterpretation occurs, namely through treaty obligations, but it cannot explain how domestic processes operate to meet those obligations. Therefore, the explanations above are necessary, but not sufficient in explaining the LDP’s path towards revision.

This thesis will trace structural and institutional changes that allowed the centralization of power in the LDP starting from 1992 to the present. The study begins with the passage of the

Peacekeeping Operations Law in 1992, which was the first time the SDF was legally allowed to be dispatched abroad. Additionally, electoral reform in 1994 marks the beginning of the LDP’s centralization. The two cases that will be explored are the administrations of Prime Minister

Jun’ichirō Koizumi (2001-2006) and Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006-2007, 2012-present).

Both prime ministers are members of the Liberal Democratic Party and have pursued constitutional revision directly during their time in office. They have had the longest tenures in office and are possibly the most popular prime ministers in Japan’s postwar history. Finally, Abe was groomed to be Koizumi’s successor in 2006 and, therefore, these cases allow for an understanding of how revision can be a cumulative process.

9 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan,” East-West Center, Policy Studies 19 (2005): 17. 11

The second and related argument is that Prime Minister Koizumi was more successful in pursuing revision than Prime Minister Abe because Koizumi used the authority of the office to tell a story about revisionism that is more consistent with Japan’s narrative of its identity: contributor to peace. Prime Minister Abe is less successful because he is proposing a more revolutionary argument for revision, which prevents him from accomplishing his aims. However, when Prime Minister Abe reached office in 2012, authority and policy making power endowed in the prime ministership allowed him to unilaterally reinterpret Article 9 through anti- democratic maneuvers. His actions have, in effect, made formal revision obsolete.

Chapters

Chapter I focuses on how the 1994 Electoral Reform allowed the Liberal Democratic Party to consolidate power in the 1990s. Reform disrupted factional politics within the party, incentivizing party unity and ensuring party discipline. The reduced influence of faction leaders facilitated the rise of a new leadership structure in the party that vests greater autonomy and authority in the Office of the Prime Minister. Changes in electoral policy also disrupted the policy creation process in the government bureaucracies, which long controlled policymaking in

Japan and now had to bow down to politicians. With the increased influence of the executive and the LDP, political elites could work towards their party goal of revising the constitution.

Chapter II explains how Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi (2001-2006) used the centralized policy making authority of the prime minister in his bid to revise the Constitution in

2005. Koizumi first established a top-down policymaking apparatus to incrementally reinterpret the Constitution through legislative changes. Building on the momentum of legislative changes, he justified the necessity of revision in existing narratives of Japanese national identity to convince the public of the need for revision. In 2005, Koizumi had fifty percent of the public 12 support required to pass revisions through a public referendum even though he had proposed the most controversial changes to date. However, he lacked the two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet required for revision. Koizumi’s tenure shows the importance of a strong, decisive prime minister and how this translates to his ability to make a convincing case for revision that appeals to the public’s sensibilities.

Chapter III centers on Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s (2006-2007, 2012-present) efforts to revise the Constitution. Abe politicized constitutional revision to increase the stakes of the issue and justified revision using a nationalist revival narrative along with existing narratives. While

PM Abe has been less successful in garnering public support for a referendum, he has been able to secure a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet. The majority has allowed him to pursue a strategy of reinterpretation, rather than formal revision, of the Constitution.

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History of Article 9

The early history of the Constitution is crucial to understanding the contemporary debates on revision, particularly, the debates on the meaning of relinquishing belligerency as a sovereign right and the right to self-defense. There are two different forms of national narrative that emerge from the 1947 Constitution, which become associated with national identity. The first is a narrative often espoused by the current prime minister, Shinzō Abe, who argues that the

Constitution represents humiliation imposed on Japan by American conquerors.10 The second narrative views the Constitution as a precious gift from the United States. As a result, Japan emerged as a shining example of the “enlightened thinking of the 20th century.”11

After Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers, the U.S. occupational government sought to demilitarize Japan through induced democratization. General Douglas

MacArthur, or the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), put together a group of

Americans to write Japan’s post-war constitution, implanting Anglo-American and European democratic ideas such as sovereignty rooted in the people, the rule of law, separation of powers, rights of citizens, and protections against future government abuses of power.12 The Constitution was first written in English, in secret, and presented to the Diet for deliberation and ratification.13

In order to protect the sanctity of the Emperor in the new Constitution, conservative politicians capitulated on the right to belligerency. General MacArthur made the preservation of the emperor conditional on establishing popular sovereignty, the renunciation of war, and

10 BBC News, “Protests as Japan paves way for self-defence law change,” BBC, July 15 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33532557. 11 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 386. See Prime Minister Kijiro Shidehara’s statement. 12 Ibid, 347. 13 Ibid, 364. 14 prohibition on Japanese armament.14 The reformation of Japan was in tandem with America’s establishment of a world order built on collective security after the second World War.15

Constitutional revisionists cite this particular moment as a reason for why the Constitution was forced rather than defined by Japan.

While the conservatives accepted the Constitution as a way to protect the emperor, early revisions on Article 9 aimed to open the article up for future debate. The article written by the

Americans for Diet approval was as follows:

War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.16

After the draft was submitted to the Diet, The Diet Subcommittee on Constitutional Revision revised the clause into the form it exists today,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.17

The mention of international peace in the first paragraph was an explicit reference to the sovereign right to self-defense as chartered by the United Nations. The committee added the prepositional phrase, “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” to give Japan the flexibility for armament in the name of self-defense. The chair of the subcommittee, Ashida

14 Shigenori Matsui, “The Constitution: Context and History,” in The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), 15. 15 Sheila Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 6. 16 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 394. 17 Ibid, 395-396. 15

Hitoshi, later commented that the addition was intentional; “In reality, [Article 9] is meant to apply to wars of aggression. Therefore, its provisions do not renounce war and the threat or use of force for purposes of self-defense.”18 On the other hand, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara

(1945-46) who oversaw the process of Japanese revisions to the American draft interpreted the second paragraph to explicitly state that, “Japan cannot possess any war potential to fight a foreign country.”19

“War potential” [senryoku] received further interpretation by the Cabinet Legislation

Bureau in 1952. War potential came to be defined as, “a force with the equipment and organization capable of conducting modern warfare,” which alone are the capabilities of a modern military force.20 However, defining war potential also required a judgement of the temporal and spatial environment of Japan.21 Hence, maintaining forces short of this potential or using forces to defend the country from direct attack is allowed by the Constitution.22

Japan’s definition of war potential is tied to how it can be used, which has influenced how various Cabinets have pursued revision. Politicians who seek to expand the activities of

Japan’s Self Defense Forces are limited by using means short of war potential. Others have argued that Japan’s security environment has changed, which requires advanced capabilities.

Advanced capabilities might be justified under this definition of war potential, but would still have to find ways to justify how these capabilities can be used. Minister of State Tokujiro

Kanamori, an early architect of Japan’s postwar Constitution, stated to the House of Peers that

Japan cannot possess war potential whilst also agreeing to keep arms for the maintenance of

18 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 396-398. 19 Ibid, 397. 20 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan.” East-West Center, Policy Studies 19 (2005): 6-7. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 16 international peace to the Privy council.23 The Constitution was formulated in ambiguous and broad terms, even the original intentions behind phrasing remain unclear.

Japan is not the only country that continues to debate the interpretation of their

Constitution and intentions of the framers. The Japanese case is unique in that the Constitution was originally written in a foreign language and centered on democratic ideals that had not naturally taken root in society. These factors contribute to the ambiguity of the language. John

W. Dower, a historian of the U.S. Occupation, notes an important example of this is the concept of “the people.” Japan had no tradition of popular sovereignty: the Meiji Constitution referred to

“subjects” [shimin].24 In translating the American draft of Japan’s postwar constitution, Japanese leaders considered the use of jinmin which is often used in Japanese translations of “people” in the U.S. Constitution or Abraham Lincoln’s House Divided speech.25 The Japanese contingent settled on kokumin which is a word constructed by the Japanese characters of “country” and

“people” to connote the idea that people merged with the nation-state.26 The process of translation was not simply procedural since the choice of words and intentions behind their selections have ramifications for the meanings they connote today.

Shelia Smith in Japan Rearmed considers the strength of normative constraints on the use of force given that Japan’s security environment has changed considerably in the post-cold war era. Smith states that Japanese leaders have not taken any military capability off the table and have “wielded Article 9 as a statement of intentions.”27 The original intent of Article 9 has two different, but interrelated histories. While the U.S. occupation government sought non-

23 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 397. 24 Ibid, 381. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Smith, Japan Rearmed, 6. 17 aggression and politicians led by Prime Minister Shidehara intended nonviolence, Committee

Chairman Hitoshi and his supporters included language in the text for Japan to rearm itself in the future.28

28 Boyd and Samuels, “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan,” 4.

18

Chapter I: Structural Change and Party Centralization

A variety of factors in 1993 led to the end of a 38-year reign of the Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP), which provided an opportunity for LDP-detractors and opposition parties to change electoral policy in Japan. LDP dominance faltered due to the economic bubble that emerged when Japan’s carefully regulated export-led economy became incompatible with the effects of globalization.29 In addition, a number of political scandals involving corruption in the LDP motivated voters to oust the party from power.30 Reform was first led by LDP Secretary General

Ichiro Ozawa (1989-1991) within the party and later accomplished in opposition to it.31 Ozawa left the LDP to push Japan towards a two-party system and reduce political corruption.32 Ozawa established the Japan Renewal Party and gained the support of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to form a government able to pass electoral reform in 1994.

1994 electoral reform put Japan on a mixed-member electoral system that created incentives for party centralization. Now, half of the seats in Japan’s parliament are designated single-member districts (SMD), which means that each electoral district returns one officeholder elected by plurality rule, or winner takes all. The other half is elected through proportional representation (PR). These districts have multiple seats where the party gains seats in proportion to the number of votes garnered. By contrast, the old rules, referred to as the 1955 system, used

Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) in multi-seat districts. In the old rules, citizens would have a single vote for multiple candidates in their district. This meant that two candidates from

29 Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, Japan Transformed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 97. 30 Ibid. 31 Ichiro Ozawa left the Liberal Democratic Party in 1993 to form the Japan Renewal Party and later called the New Frontier Party. 32 Ray Christensen, Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2000),12. 19 the same party would compete against each other for a seat. Under the new proportional representation (PR) rules, however, if the party wins a high enough percentage of the vote, both candidates can be awarded seats.

The shift to the mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM) in 1994 resulted in several important consequences to this research. First, parties no longer had to pit their candidates against one another, thereby reducing the intraparty competition that occurred among various factions within the LDP. This led to the creation of a more centralized party platform.33 Second, the new rules fundamentally changed the relationship between voter and representative. A unified party platform made candidates and representatives more accountable to their campaign promises. Third, the centralization of the party platform and increased intra-party collaboration made voters assess the personalities and abilities of party leadership as a measure of party effectiveness.34 Fourth, the shift increased the potential for the formation of a two-party system as it required coalition building. Since the installation of the 1994 system, the LDP has maintained control of the Diet through a coalition. Two of the largest parties in the Diet, the

LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), compete in Single Member Districts (SMDs) while smaller parties such as the Japan Community Party and Komeito, a long-time coalition partner to the LDP, use the Proportional Representation (PR) system to maintain their position in the

Diet.35

Before the 1994 system, factions were the basis for party leadership, the designation of the prime minister, and the appointment of cabinet members. There was a weak central leadership in the party since factions competed for autonomy on policy issues, budget

33 Rosenbluth and Thies, Japan Transformed, 96. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid, 107. 20 allocations, and campaign financing. Cabinet ministers represented each of the factions and would occupy the seat for a one year tenure.36 Similarly, the prime minister would serve for two years and was highly constrained in the position.37 The Prime Minister’s Office was often understaffed and had little autonomy over policymaking.38 The prime minister was regularly replaced by factional leaders based on his standing with the public, but had no official abilities to change his or her public image.39

The decline of factionalism and increased incentive to centralize allowed for the redefinition of the prime minister as the national leader, policy initiator, and accountability figure in the eyes of the public. The decline of factionalism made it possible for Prime Minister Ryutaro

Hashimoto (1996-1998) to change the selection process of prime ministers. No longer was this role selected through private deals between faction leaders; rather, Hashimoto appealed to younger politicians within the Diet to gain support and created a party presidential leadership election system.40 This system was later formalized by Jun’ichirō Koizumi (2001-2006), arguably the most popular Prime Minister in Japan’s history and focus of Chapter II. 41 Since popularity within the party and with the public became the determining factor for party leadership, this leader would be required to articulate a platform, lead the party, and be accountable to the public, which required greater decision-making autonomy and authority.

The centralization of the LDP also led to the formation of a stronger opposition to the

LDP, but not a two-party system. The opposition does play a role in policy related to Article 9 by influencing how the LDP brings a bill to the floor. Diet law allocates a short time for

36 Ibid, 110. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid, 114-115. 41 Ibid. 21 deliberations on policy and the opposition can threaten to use delay tactics as a way to gain concessions in the proposed bill.42 That said, prime ministers have since found ways to circumvent the opposition, which will be the focus of Chapter II and Chapter III.

LDP Politicians and Bureaucrats: a new Principal - Agent Problem?

Historically, politicians would delegate policymaking to government ministries rather than write bills themselves; however, the 1994 electoral policy reform moved this process into the public eye and, therefore raises important questions regarding Japan’s democracy. Scholars of Japan often refer to a saying when discussing the Liberal Democratic Party: it is neither liberal nor democratic. However, 1994 electoral policy reform could be seen as the final step in Japan’s democratic development as it incentivizes elected representatives to be more involved in the policymaking process rather than delegate these tasks to bureaucrats and ministries, which occurred during the 1955 system.43 Under the 1955 system, legislators do not write policy; rather, this is delegated to bureaucrats. It was a case of classic principal-agent theory: legislators incentivized bureaucrats to create a policy that reflects party preferences through positive inducements such as promotions and retirement pay.44 Legislators conducted oversight of the bureaucracy, and therefore, bureaucrats were incentivized to remain in line and not challenge the

LDP.45 Finally, bureaucrats also wanted to keep the ruling party in power to secure their own rise within the bureaucracy and, on occasion, in the party itself.46 TJ Pempel (1974), Chalmers

Johnson (1982), Ramsayer and Rosenbluth (1993), come to similar conclusions in their analysis

42 J. Mark Ramsayer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 29. 43 Rosenbluth and Thies, Japan Transformed, 116. 44 Ramsayer and Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace, 102. 45 Ibid, 107. 46 Ibid. 22 of this relationship and argue that during the 1955 electoral system, policymaking took place outside of the public arena of the Diet floor and instead occurred within bureaucracies by officials who had not democratically elected or be held accountable by the public.

To what extent does the 1994 electoral system and centralization of the LDP move policymaking into the public arena for the contestation by the opposition and Japanese public? If the debate on Article 9-related policy takes place in the public arena, the LDP would not only beholden to the opposition, but also the public. The opposition could harness public protest against the policy and delay its ratification given unanimity norms in the Diet. However, the increased authority of the prime minister has weakened unanimity norms. A notable case includes opposition parliamentarians who protested against Shinzō Abe’s collective self-defense cabinet decision in July 2014, which will be explored in Chapter III.

The 1994 electoral system actually served to maintain party discipline, which eased the ratification of highly controversial legislation that undermines Article 9. The increased centralization of the LDP and the unified party platform provided a “code of conduct” for politicians, keeping them in line. As long as the LDP can maintain a majority in both houses, they could easily ratify policies. The older electoral rules were, in some sense, more democratic since they forced LDP politicians to compete against one another, ensuring deliberation. Even though national security-related policy takes place in the public arena due to the 1994 reforms, the centralization of the LDP in response to the 1994 system allowed for greater LDP autonomy in defining these policies without consultation from the opposition and public.

Increased Capacity Building of the SDF and Constitutional Change 23

This chapter began by tracing how changes in election policy and party structure vests larger autonomy in the executive branch to pursue constitutional revision. Starting in 1994, the Prime

Minister’s Office had greater formal powers over bureaucracy because cabinet members are appointed by the executive and, hence, more likely to do the bidding of the prime minister as they were no longer representatives of their respective factions. This section will trace particular policy developments related to revising the Constitution, specifically Article 9, and legitimizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to understand how the increased influence of executive has allowed for political elites to work towards their party goal of revising the constitution.

The main pattern of policy change examined in this chapter is how the Prime Minister’s

Office and the LDP have increased the capacity of the SDF forces in an attempt to make constitutional revision inevitable. By regularly deploying the SDF on UN peacekeeping missions, the LDP has increased the capacity of the forces and justified deployment in terms of

Japan’s commitment to international peace. In addition, the LDP’s ability to retain control of the

Diet for large periods of time allowed for subsequent administrations to build upon the policies of those before it. The iterative nature of sending out the SDF troops on UN peacekeeping missions, in turn, supported reinterpretations of Article 9 and legitimized the SDF as a force for not only Japan’s defense, but also defense of its values and interests abroad.

This discussion also explores the correlation between the deployment of the SDF and the

LDP’s rhetoric on constitutional change to present a broad overview of their strategy.

Subsequent chapters will then explore the process by which the prime minister, Cabinet, and

LDP pursued reinterpretation and the narratives they employed. Within this pattern, instances when the executive exercises unilateral policymaking are evidence of how the centralization and autonomy of the Prime Minister has allowed for the LDP to exercise greater control on 24 constitutional revision and also reveals the conditions when LDP elites felt emboldened to act against the opposition and public.

The prime minister’s increased control over bureaucracy prevented organizational interests opposing the policies of the executive. The next section will show how bureaucracies attempted to exert their role in policies regarding the dispatch of the SDF and, instead, came under the control of the prime minister’s Cabinet. The process by which this occurred will be further explored in Chapter II.

1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law

The first case of how LDP elites began formalizing the use of the SDF for international contingencies and the move towards reinterpreting the constitution was the Peacekeeping

Operations Cooperation Law (1992).47 While the law passed before the 1994 reforms, it is an important case of national security policy and shows the challenges of establishing such policy before the centralization of the LDP in 1994. The law was passed mainly due to international criticism around Japan’s lack of participation in the Gulf War (August 2 1990-February 28

1991), which was later mocked as “Checkbook diplomacy” 48 since Japan only contributed funds to the war even though it sourced ninety percent of its oil resources from the region. Japanese officials realized that they had to send personnel abroad rather than Overseas Development

Assistance (ODA) funds to gain international legitimacy as a global leader on par with its economic power. High ranking officials within the SDF have attributed the increased use of the

47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Contributions to UN Peacekeeping,” accessed November 14 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005.html. See full list of Japan’s PKO records. 48 Checkbook Diplomacy is a term that describes when states or political actors offer their cash reserves to supplement their diplomatic efforts. 25

SDF forces in overseas contingencies to the Gulf War, and therefore the peacekeeping law serves as a first case of SDF capacity-building for this study.49

Amidst the conflict in the Gulf, LDP elites pushed for Japan to contribute personnel in

1990 which was later formalized into the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Cooperation Law. In

August 1990, LDP Secretary Ozawa Ichiro (1989-1991) stated that the SDF could contribute to defense in the Middle East, “even under the current constitution,” in a meeting with political party chiefs.50 In November 1990, the Diet shelves and rejects the LDP Bill for Peaceful

Cooperation with the United Nations, which would volunteer Japanese personnel to peacekeeping operations.51 Shortly after, the LDP, Komeito, and Democratic Party of Japan

(DPJ) released a joint-memorandum agreeing on the creation of a separate force, other than the

SDF, to participate in UN operations.52

The LDP’s push for dispatching SDF personnel abroad in 1990 was unsuccessful; however, the continuation of the war and international criticism served to justify a UN

Peacekeeping Operations plan in September 1991. The official government statement that accompanied the 1991 PKO plan explicitly stated that military force would be required in peacekeeping. The mention of “military force” was a direct reference to the existing constitutional ban on force and, hence, marked the beginning of Article 9 revision.53 The justification for the use of military force was as follows: force is required to defend one’s life and, therefore, is purely defensive and allowable under the Constitution. This argument reveals

49 Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Gulf War trauma began Japan’s retreat from pacifism,” Reuters, December 19 2005, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-military-history-insight/gulf-war-trauma-began-japans-retreat-from- pacifism-idUSKBN0U300D20151220. See SDF officials’ comments. 50 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014),” Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, accessed November 25, 2019, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/crrp/resources/chronology. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 26 that to justify the use of the SDF for international conflict, compared to the direct defense of the

Japanese territory, required political maneuvering and planned redefinition on the part of the

LDP.

The LDP justified the use of force required for peacekeeping operations as force that does not violate Article 9 in order to pass a law that legalizes the dispatch of the SDF abroad. In

February 1992, before the PKO Law passed in the Diet in June, the LDP created a Special

Investigative Council on Japan’s Role in International Society, which proposed that the SDF’s larger role in UN peacekeeping efforts does not violate Article 9. The leadership used the Gulf

War as a critical juncture in defining Japan’s role in the world and the part the SDF should play in this role instead of engaging in normative debates on how Japan should use military force. The

PKO Law passed in the Diet by majority approval by the LDP, Komeito, and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Shortly after, LDP Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa (1991-1993) issued a statement stating that the LDP was not pursuing constitutional revision in an effort to maintain control over the parliament and assure opposition parties who wanted to engage in a larger debate on the use of force abroad.

When the LDP was ousted from power in 1993 by the Socialist Party, the opposition parties began to chip away at the gains made in deploying the SDF to peacekeeping missions.

They argued that the SDF, “may be considered in actuality a violation of the Constitution.”54

Therefore, even the extension of the SDF towards peacekeeping was challenging to accomplish politically.

After the LDP returned to power in 1996, the 1992 PKO Law served as the basis for

Japan to take a more active role in ensuring peace and security in the world. In Japan’s

54 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014).” 27

International Humanitarian Relief Operations, for example, they have used airlifting units in East

Timor (1999-2000), Afghanistan (October 2001), and Iraq (2003).55 The SDF airlifting established in this law later forms the basis for Japan’s support of U.S. military operations in the

Iraq War (2003-2011), which will be further explored in the next chapter. The formal establishment of the PKO law allowed for the LDP to build on it over time further legitimizing the use of force abroad. The 1998 revision of PKO Law, for example, transferred the principle of weapon usage to be determined by the superior at the front, which vested greater autonomy in the SDF.56

1997 U.S. - Japan Security Cooperation on Humanitarian Efforts

The Japanese Government has used U.S. - Japan Security Cooperation Guidelines (1997, revised

2015) as a way to justify increased deployment of the SDF to assist in supporting global peace and security goals. The guidelines served to bolster Japan’s move towards proactively contributing to UN international peacekeeping.57 However, the guidelines also provided external opportunities for the LDP to reinterpret Article 9 by crafting individual laws that incrementally increased the abilities of the SDF abroad. The U.S. War Against Terrorism, in particular, regularly dispatched the SDF in various activities that expanded SDF abilities beyond that of humanitarian assistance. Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) were dispatched during the Iraq

War for humanitarian mission and airlifting support. The Marine Self Defense Forces (MSDF) provided refueling to U.S. and coalition ships. The iterative nature of dispatching the SDF forces

55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Record of Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law,” last modified March 2005, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005-2.pdf. 56 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014).” 57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Guidelines for Japan – U.S. Defense Cooperation,” accessed May 3 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html. 28 justified the necessity of increased defense spending, training and military exercises with allies, and strengthened internal SDF leadership. The U.S. has consistently expressed support for a larger role for the SDF especially in regards to the U.S. War on Terror.58 Support of U.S. operations has also been framed as a way to shift more of the burden on Japan in the alliance.

The dispatch of Ground Self Defense Forces to Iraq in 2003 reflects how the

Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law (1992) and the iterative nature of sending out the

SDF forces for humanitarian missions has reduced the constraints on deploying the SDF. Unlike in the Gulf War, Prime Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi ensured Japan would play an active role in the Iraq War (2003-2011) and in a speech to the Diet in March 2003 he remarked:

In no situation is it easy to make a decision to support use of force...I have come to the conclusion that as a responsible member of the International community, it is in accordance with our national interest to support the actions taken by the United States and its coalition partners.59

The use of force was justified as Japan’s national interest, and this reasoning allowed the Diet to pass the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law, which sanctioned the use of the SDF in December of the same year. The law was justified based on UN resolutions that supported Iraqi reconstruction efforts 60 That said, the SDF was under considerably fewer constraints and given greater autonomy on the ground since this deployment did not have the same type of UN guidelines the forces normally operated under.61 The lack of constraints contributed to the clash between the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

58 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014).” 59 Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government, “Prime Minister Koizumi's Report on Japan's Measures in Response to the Situation following the Use of Force against Iraq,” Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister, last accessed November 25, 2019, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20houkoku_e.html. 60 David Fourse, “JAPAN’S DISPATCH OF THE GROUND SELF DEFENSE FORCE TO IRAQ: LESSONS LEARNED,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (July 2007), https://apcss.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/03/Japans-Dispatch-of-the-GSDF-to-Iraq.Fouse_.doc.pdf. 61 Ibid. 29

(MOFA) on the ground in Iraq around how to conduct reconstruction. MOFA officials hired their own security professionals and kept their distance from Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF).

Meanwhile, the GSDF forces lacked the Arabic skills MOFA officials possessed.62 The mediation of conflict by the Cabinet resulted in the government’s creation of the “two-wheels of the cart” approach, namely the designation of roles by the Cabinet Office where the GSDF works exclusively on humanitarian efforts and MOFA focuses on the financial dispersion of ODA.63

This case shows the increased influence the Prime Minister’s Office had over the SDF once a mission is cleared by the Diet.

U.S. - Japan Alliance and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

In October 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed in the Diet, allowing the SDF to support U.S. military operations. This law is later used to expand the capabilities of the SDF in the air, ocean, and on land as the U.S. War on Terrorism progressed. After passing the law, Japan first supported U.S. operations in the Middle East where the Maritime Self-Defense Forces

(MSDF) provided refueling of U.S. vessels, which started in November 2001. The use of the

SDF as a support force occurred simultaneously with its humanitarian reconstruction mission in

Iraq. For the Japanese public, LDP political elites used both events to justify the need to pursue constitutional revision. Two months after the dispatch of SDF forces to Samawa, Iraq for reconstruction in February 2004, the Yomiuri Shimbun found that sixty-five percent of respondents supported constitutional revision, which was the highest percentage since the poll was first taken in 1981.64 In that same month, LDP General Secretary Shinzō Abe (2003-2004)

62 Ibid. 63 Ibid, 3. 64 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014).” 30 stated at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C. that, “Japan cannot maintain its national security under the current Constitution.”65 Later in November, former Prime Minister

Yasuhiro Nakasone stated that Japan should establish a National Defense Force in his remarks at the House of Representatives’ Constitutional Research Group.66 Shortly after, the LDP

Constitutional Research Group published a proposal for constitutional reform, including the exercise of collective self-defense. In March 2005, the House of Representatives Constitution

Research Group wrote a proposal to recognize the SDF within the Constitution and a roadmap for revising Article 9 which gained the support of the LDP, Democratic Party, and Komeito, representing majority support.

The deployment of the MSDF to the Indian ocean for refueling missions during the U.S.

War on Terrorism was politically contentious at home, revealing the calculation of risk on the part of LDP elites to expand the activities of the SDF for their larger goal of constitutional revision. Notably, during Shinzō Abe’s first term as prime minister (2006-2007), the opposition’s lack of support for the refueling mission was cited as a reason for his resignation in

September 2007. Since the LDP still held the majority coalition, Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008) was elected as Abe’s successor and continued to extend the MSDF refueling mission amidst opposition. Shortly after Fukuda came into power, his Cabinet approved an Anti-Terrorism Bill, which allowed the MSDF to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Even though the bill was voted down in the House of Councilors, which was held by the DPJ, the LDP forced the bill in the House of Representatives using its two-thirds majority to override the decision in the House of Councilors in 2008. After they redeployed the MSDF, the LDP discussed the creation of a

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 31 permanent law that allows the SDF to be dispatched overseas to eliminate the need for a Special

Measures bill in each deployment.67

This chapter outlined how the 1994 electoral policy reform centralized the LDP party and vested greater policy making autonomy to the prime minister and Cabinet. In response to political corruption and scandals, the LDP centralized its party platform and controlled party members to retain control over the Diet. The long tenure of the LDP allowed for the expansion of the SDF forces to humanitarian missions and support for U.S. forces in the War Against

Terrorism. Instances where the LDP pushed their bill against the opposition was possible due to their majority in the Diet, but also the increased autonomy of the Prime Minister’s Office and

Cabinet since the 1994 reforms. The prime minister and Cabinet would pass expansions of the

SDF forces while prominent leaders in the LDP would engage in larger discussion about constitutional revision.

The next chapter will compare the political legacies of Jun’ichirō Koizumi and Shinzō

Abe as it relates to SDF capacity building and constitutional revision. There will be specific attention to how each prime minister used their centralized policy making authority to justify revision of Article 9.

67 Ibid. 32

Chapter II: Jun’ichirō Koizumi and Top-Down Policymaking

The previous chapter outlined key structural changes that allowed for greater centralization within the Liberal Democratic Party and authority in the Prime Minister’s Office. After reform, the prime minister was held responsible for executing the party platform and, therefore, had greater control over which policies to pursue and the legislative process. That said, establishing the use of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) overseas in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions even with a centralized leadership structure continued to be challenging. Opposition parties established a connection between dispatching the SDF and constitutional debates. In debates on peacekeeping legislation, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa (1991-1993) had to explicitly state that constitutional revision was not being pursued at the time.

The potential for constitutional revision reached its peak during the tenure of Prime

Minister Jun’ichirō Koizumi (2001-2006). Koizumi continues to be the most popular prime minister in Japan’s postwar history due to the public’s affinity to his personal leadership style.

His rise led to a shift in scholarship on Japan’s governance from focusing on bureaucracy to the executive.68 By capitalizing on the Administrative Reforms of 1999, Koizumi interrupted traditional bottom-up policymaking that occurred in bureaucracies such as Ministry of Finance

(MOF) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as well as in the Liberal Democratic Party

Headquarters. Instead, he strengthened the authority of the prime minister, Cabinet, and Cabinet

Office to acquire greater autonomy over Japan’s foreign and security policy. In doing so,

Koizumi established a top-down system of policymaking that led to unprecedented expansions

68 See Ellis S. Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade, “ ‘Presidentialization’ in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan,” British Journal of Political Science 35, (2005). 33 on previous interpretations of Article 9 in the Constitution while convincing the public of the need for revision.

The Koizumi Administration was incredibly successful in this effort. Over a majority of the public approved of constitutional revision in 2005.69 Ultimately, revision failed because the

LDP did not have a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the Diet. Koizumi’s tenure not only makes the case for the strength of a decisive prime minister, but also the methods of revision that appeal to the public’s concerns over the Constitution. Finally, some of Koizumi’s policy making and leadership methods are later used by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006-2007, 2012-present).

Therefore, a study of the Koizumi Administration can provide insight into the ways in which successive administrations can build upon one another in the larger effort of revision.

“Change the LDP, Change Japan”

Similar to how the 1994 reforms disrupted factional intra-party politics, Koizumi’s bid for the

LDP presidency was a concerted effort to destroy the “LDP system”. The system served as the basis for the LDP’s longstanding party dominance in government. By redistributing national wealth to rural districts through grants, farm subsidies, and “pork barrel” politics,70 the LDP staked their base in rural Japan. However, cracks in this strategy began to appear in 2001 with the unpopularity of LDP Prime Minister Yashiro Mori (2000-2001) and economic stagnation.

Koizumi made a bid to become the party president to serve as the next prime minister. He used the decline of the party to his advantage and was the first to use popularity with the public

69 Associated Press International, “Poll: More than half of Japanese support revising country’s pacifist constitution,” AP – International News, May 3 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 70 Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, “The Koizumi Revolution,” Political Science and Politics 40, No. 1 (Jan 2007): 79. 34 instead of his effectiveness as a political operative within the party to run for Prime Minister.71

Koizumi ran on a message of anti-entrenched power, anti-wealth, and anti-elite, which would later become the campaign of the party, “Change the LDP, Change Japan.” Candidates for the

July 2001 House of Councilors election broke with their faction alliances, staking themselves on the larger mission of ensuring the survival of the party.72 “Change the LDP, Change Japan” allowed the LDP to regain control of the House of Councilors in the 2001 election.

Institutional Reform as a pathway for Top-Down Policymaking

By disrupting long standing alliances between factions, bureaucrats, and big business, Koizumi established the authority of the prime minister and Cabinet. Institutional reform allowed Koizumi to establish a top-down form of policymaking under the guise of his ‘destroying the status quo’ narrative. The LDP had a longstanding problem regarding the public’s distrust in political leadership. Only five years earlier, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996) sought to instill confidence in the party with several administrative reforms. He was unsuccessful, in part, due to his continued reliance on the faction system within the party. Both prime ministers show that structural reform is often a strategy for the executive to centralize power and policymaking abilities.

As prime minister, Hashimoto established several reforms that centralized the executive’s policy making capacity and were later utilized by both Koizumi and Abe in constitutional revision. First, Hashimoto weakened the veto power of the Cabinet against the prime minister, which was a revision upon the Japanese Constitution. Article 3 of the Constitution states, “The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of

71 Ibid, 79. 72 Ibid. 35 state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.”73 Not only does the prime minister appear after, in Article 6, but the Cabinet was strengthened to ensure Japan’s leaders would never again lead their country down the path of war. Therefore, the Cabinet had the ability to vote against the prime minister’s policy when their interests conflicted. Additionally, Cabinet ministers were selected by factions within the LDP rather than the prime minister. Cabinet ministers would grow to be partial to their ministry’s interests as the ministry would become the basis for their reputation. Hashimoto reduced the number of cabinet members from twenty to a range between fourteen and seventeen. In addition, he gave the prime minister and Cabinet Office the authority to designate specific duties to each member based on the situation at hand, asserting the authority of the prime minister in the Cabinet.74

Second, Hashimoto strengthened the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate the prime minister’s policies. The secretariat presides over the Cabinet Office which includes policy and administrative experts able to coordinate the prime minister’s policy across the various ministries. Cabinet secretaries are mainly in charge of policy coordination, resolving cabinet issues, and chairing sub-cabinet meetings.75 These meetings ensure that the prime minister’s intentions are reflected in the bureaucratic process of policymaking.76 Importantly,

Cabinet secretaries and the prime minister had the authority to appoint administrative vice- ministers in each ministry to have direct communication with bureaucracies, effectively rebalancing the power between the prime minister and ministries.77

73 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” accessed April 14 2020, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 74 Yuko Kaneko, “Government Reform in Japan,” in Management and Coordination Agency - Government of Japan, July 1999. PDF, 5. http://www.iam.or.jp/asia-pacific_panel/pdfdownloads/london99-paper2.pdf. 75 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011), 66. 76 Ibid. 77 Tomohito Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics Institutional Changes and Power Shifts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 82. 36

Administrative reform allowed subsequent prime ministers to establish their policymaking authority and pursue the LDP’s founding goal of revising the Constitution. Prime

Minister Koizumi capitalized Hashimoto’s reforms and weakness of the party to institute the prime minister’s autonomous policymaking apparatus. Such changes led to the Special Anti-

Terrorism Law, which reinterpreted Article 9 for collective self-defense in humanitarian missions. Abe, similarly, used his control over the Cabinet and the strength of the Cabinet Office to make collective self-defense the government’s official policy in 2014, which will be further discussed in Chapter III.

Koizumi’s Top-Down Policymaking

To ensure his broad appeal in the public, Koizumi had to show that he would stand up against the establishment of his own party, or the Old Guard, while also effective in carrying out his policy goals. Koizumi was skilled in capturing the popular imagination through political drama.78 He would explain the inter-party politics as a battle between good and evil.79 This allowed the public to easily “choose” a side, vesting their support of Koizumi. In addition, the public would buy into the reforms Koizumi wanted to make, like decreasing the size of government and security policy. These tactics, however, made him unpopular within his own party, hampering his ability to accomplish his policy goals. Therefore, the Koizumi Administration utilized the opportunities created from the Administrative Reforms of 1999 to be able to initiate policy from the Cabinet

Office to the various ministries. This process removed the Liberal Democratic Party’s policy apparatus from the process.80 Previously, LDP Diet members would be placed in Zoku, or policy

78 Kabashima and Steel, “ The Koizumi Revolution,” 80. 79 Ibid. 80 Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, 5. 37 tribes, based on their expertise and experience in a policy field.81 Zoku members often had client industries to protect and, hence, were incentivized to maintain their control over their policy area.82

Koizumi’s popular support, coupled with ongoing UN peacekeeping missions, allowed for the normalization of dispatching the SDF for international humanitarian reasons. From there,

Koizumi narrated the importance of revising the Constitution to meet present security challenges of the country. Operating on the theory set forth in the previous chapter, namely that the regular dispatch of SDF forces made constitutional revision inevitable, this section discusses how these policies were implemented and justified to suggest that institutional changes give political elites the ability to control the narrative surrounding the revision of the Constitution.

2001 Anti-Terrorism Legislation

The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law legalized the use of the SDF in collective action in foreign countries, which represents a break from past government’s interpretation of Article 9.

Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special

Measures Law, which dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships and personnel to the Indian Ocean in November 2001 to refuel the ships of countries engaged in Operation

Enduring Freedom.83 The law also authorized the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) to transport cargo for U.S. forces. Refueling operations from 2001 to 2009 cost approximately $208 million dollars and supported military forces from 11 countries.84 The actions of the SDF authorized

81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ministry of Defense, Japan, “Defense Policy: The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law,” Accessed March 10 2020, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no09/policy.html. See operations. 84 Ibid. 38 under this law were an unprecedented expansion of SDF operations and demonstrated Japan’s commitment to global security. While the legislation was time-limited, or only valid for this particular contingency, it marked a significant shift in Japan’s national security policy. Breaking from precedent, this law allowed Japan to exercise collective self-defense. The main justification for why this legislation did not violate the Constitution was the fact that SDF operations were not conducted in combat zones. However, commentators at the time saw the implications of this justification. If supporting a ‘war’ on terrorism was a defensive action and the Constitution allows for self-defense, then the law claimed that, “The best defense is good offense.”85 In addition, the law also gave SDF personnel full authority to return fire should the occasion arise, meaning that the prime minister was no longer required to authorize this action.86

This section will proceed as follows: first, it will outline how the Koizumi Administration used top-down policymaking established under administrative reform to pass this controversial bill in a little over a month. Second, the discussion will follow on how Koizumi justified the policy as it relates to the Constitution.

The method adopted by the Koizumi Administration to pass the Anti-Terrorism Special measures avoided public and opposition scrutiny, revealing how structural change shifted considerable authority solely to the executive branch. The method could be seen as a practical method since Japan had to act in a timely manner for their closest ally. Koizumi had to ensure that the legislation would not get deadlocked in the Diet. However, the intentional sidelining of the MOFA and circumventing of the Liberal Democratic Party policy process was strategic and not solely for the sake of timeliness.

85 Canon Pence, “Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi’s Bid to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution,” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 32, No. 2 (2006): 365. 86 Ibid. 39

The resources endowed in the Cabinet Office allowed the Cabinet Secretariat and

Koizumi sole authority over the current issue. Traditionally, policy was drafted within the LDP and sent to ministries to be further developed. In this case, however, the Cabinet Secretariat drafted the policy in consultation with the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), independently of the

LDP.87 In the case of the Anti-Terrorism Law, the entire process was reversed where the Cabinet

Secretariat first verified its plan with LDP coalition partners, thereby sidelining the LDP and

Diet Members.88 The reformed communications ability Cabinet Secretariat, particularly the prime minister- appointed vice-ministers, prevented any potential veto from MOFA or the

JDA.89 The autonomy of the Cabinet Secretariat is best exemplified by the fact that they fielded questions on the policy on the Diet floor.90 Next, Koizumi had to find a way to justify it to the

Diet and public to ensure its passage into law.

In contrast to the UN PKO Law, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law engaged more directly with the constitutionality of using the SDF and future of Article 9. Koizumi intended to directly engage in questions regarding the Constitution during debates on the Anti-Terrorism

Law. In a policy speech to the Diet on September 27 2001, Koizumi defined Japan’s need to act in constitutional terms:

In the preamble of the Constitution of Japan we have declared to the world our firm resolve: "We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources." Now is the time for our nation to confront the present difficulties with its full power in a spirit of international cooperation in order to defend peace and freedom for all humankind.91

87 Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, 101. 88 Ibid, 109. 89 Ibid, 79. 90 Ibid, 109. 91 Cabinet Office of Japan, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 153rd Session of the Diet,” last modified September 27 2001, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2001/0927syosin_e.html. 40

Throughout the debates on this law, Koizumi often referred to the Constitution’s preamble as a way to justify the need for Japan to act. He argued that in light of the terrorist attacks on the U.S.,

Japan cannot be only dedicated to its own defense and ignore the plight of their allies. Koizumi defined the purpose of the bill as acting in the spirit of international cooperation, particularly the responsibility Japan holds in the international community. The justification of sending troops abroad for the sake of international peace also became the basis of Shinzō Abe’s bid to revise

Article 9, which will be further explored in the next chapter.

Avoiding the Politicization of Article 9

Koizumi used the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law as a path towards reinterpretation of the

Constitution to allow for collective self-defense, or the use of military force to defend UN member nations from attack. Additionally, he argued that the law was necessary for the security of Japan as it prevents terrorist attacks against the homeland. During debates on the anti- terrorism legislation, he was transparent about his actions and stated, “If I am asked whether the

SDF has military capabilities or not, I would say that it does,”92 an interpretation of Article 9 that breaks from government precedent. He argued that the Constitution is flexible for interpretation as long as Japan, “respects the boundaries of it.”93 Rather than changing the laws, Koizumi argued that Japan should continue to interpret based on the context. To justify why his administration has discretionary power in the case of the Anti-Terrorism Law, Koizumi referred

92 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014) – October 12 2001,” Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, accessed November 25, 2019, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/crrp/resources/chronology. 93 Diet Record Search System – Japan, “The 153rd Diet Lower House Special Committee on International Terrorism Prevention and Japan's Cooperation Support Activities No. 3,” October 11, 2001, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115304303X00320011011¤t=363. (Translated from Japanese) 41 to the fact that his government was chosen by democratic procedure. Therefore, those who did not feel represented in the government’s decisions must vote his administration out of government.94 He believed that Diet Members who oppose the legislation did so because of the gap in how politicians interpret the Constitution.95 The interpretation was not what is a stake, he argued, but rather the fact that the current peacekeeping operations law was ill-equipped to face the challenges of terrorism.96 By separating concerns about interpretation and Japan’s present challenge, Koizumi was successful in passing the law against the opposition parties even with the public’s concern over the U.S. threat of war against Iraq.97

Notably, Koizumi accuses the opposition parties of politicizing Article 9 unnecessarily during the debates on the Anti-Terrorism legislation. Similar to his tactics of good versus evil in intra-party conflict, Koizumi successfully portrayed his actions as logical even though they broke from precedent. He argued that the opposition wanted to make the security of Japan a political issue when they get bogged down in the longstanding debates of Article 9’s interpretation.98

Unabashedly, Koizumi requested the people to vote him out of office if they do not agree with his interpretation whilst arguing that his interpretation already resonates in the public. He cited how it has become, “Common sense that the SDF can also be dispatched overseas. In the past, I think that there were many voices saying that the SDF couldn’t be dispatched abroad.”99 His efforts reflect the pattern outlined in Chapter I, namely that the iterative nature of dispatching the

94 Diet Record Search System – Japan, “153rd Diet Lower House Special Committee on International Terrorism Prevention and Japan's Cooperation Support Activities No. 4 ,” October 12, 2001, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=115304303X00420011012¤t=357. (Translated from Japanese) 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Protestors marched in Japanese cities against the U.S. threat of war against Iraq in February. 98 Diet Record Search System – Japan, “153rd Diet Lower House Special Committee on International Terrorism Prevention and Japan's Cooperation Support Activities No. 4 .” 99 Diet Record Search System – Japan, “The 153rd Diet Lower House Special Committee on International Terrorism Prevention and Japan's Cooperation Support Activities No. 3.” 42

SDF is a strategy to make constitutional revision inevitable. He concluded confidently, “That is why I am changing the interpretation of the Constitution, the circumstances of Japan, the circumstances of the world, the things that can be done within the Constitution, and the differences between the past and the present.”100

Koizumi’s Bid to Revise the Constitution

While Koizumi confidently argued the necessity of constitutional reinterpretation in the case of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2001, he later stated in 2004 that his government has, “adopted a stance not to change the [government’s] conventional interpretation of the Constitution.”101 The conventional interpretation prohibits Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense, which directly contrasts his comments during the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law debates. By creating a discrepancy between the existing language of Article 9 and the law passed in 2001, Koizumi then proceeded to make his case for why Japan must revise its Constitution. Arguably, this discrepancy was the makings of a long-term strategy. In Koizumi’s first press conference as prime minister, he stated, “If Japan is to be allowed to exercise collective self-defense, why don’t we revise the Constitution?”102 By assuming the government’s position has always allowed for collective self-defense, Koizumi presented revision as simply updating the document. However, the government’s stance established in the early debates on the Constitution in 1954 defined self- defense as defense of national territory.103

100 Ibid. 101 Reiji Yoshida, “Koizumi urges LDP-DPJ effort to revise Constitution,” Japan Times, January 15 2004, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2004/01/15/national/koizumi-urges-ldp-dpj-effort-to-revise- constitution/#.XqnBINNKi8E. 102 Japan Press Weekly, “Koizumi’s open call for amendments to the Constitution analyzed,” Japan Press Service Co. Ltd., August 27 2005, http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2003/2348/koizmi.html. 103 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan.” East- West Center, Policy Studies 19 (2005): 8. 43

The public’s support for revision in 2005 served as the impetus for the LDP’s 2005 draft

Constitution, which included some of the most controversial changes proposed by the LDP to date. Yet, the potential for the changes to pass in 2005 was considerable. An Asahi Shimbun poll in April 2005 found that fifty-six percent of respondents believed the Constitution should be changed.104 In particular, fifty-eight percent of respondents argued that it should explicitly refer to the existence of the Self-Defense forces.105 Fifty-one percent of respondents supported keeping Article 9 as is while thirty-six percent argued for it to be changed.106 In response to what seemed to be favorable conditions for revision, civil society organizations protested publicly against any change to Article 9 in the summer of 2005.107

In November 2005, Koizumi proposed a draft Constitution on the 50th anniversary of the

LDP. The 2005 draft proposed revisions that departed substantially from the original text. The title “Renunciation of War” that precedes Article 9 was changed to “National Security.”108 The first paragraph of Article 9 which includes the formal renouncement of war was kept. However, the outlawing of, “land, sea, and air forces” and “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” in the second paragraph was removed.109 The draft added new language, allowing

Japan to, “exercise all rights of self-defense, including forming military alliances with other countries and deploying [military force] overseas” in the name of international peace.110 The

104 Associated Press International, “Poll: More than half of Japanese support revising country's pacifist constitution,” May 3 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, “Thousands rally in Tokyo against revision of the Japan constitution,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 30 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 108 Pence, “Reform in the Rising Sun,” 379. 109 Ibid. 110 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan moves to amend pacifist clause in the 1947 constitution,” The Vancouver Sun, October 25 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 44 prime minister would be designated as the “supreme commander” of the self-defense forces.111

Commentary at the time suggested that the draft did not address concerns regarding whether the

Constitution authorizes collective self-defense.112 Instead, the draft allowed for the exercise of all rights of self-defense including alliance agreements and international humanitarian activities.

The changes proposed were controversial in the public given the ambiguity on collective self-defense and alterations to Article 9. Support for revision after the LDP draft was mixed. On the one hand, peace activists rallied against the draft arguing that changes would allow for the creation of a military.113 Activists stated that the U.S. was pressuring Japan to change its pacifist stance.114At the same time, the draft also emboldened ultra-nationalist public support for revision. Even with the mixed support for revision of Article 9, the public trust in the Koizumi

Administration could have potentially secured the majority for revision if the changes went to referendum. After a successful snap election in September, Koizumi’s cabinet approval in

November stood at sixty-two percent.115 Even after the proposed revisions, Cabinet approval ratings remained at fifty-nine percent in December. In the same poll, fifty-seven percent of supporters backed Koizumi due to his “leadership.”116 In the end, constitutional revision was unsuccessful, however, due to the lack of a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet.

In 2005, Koizumi and the LDP proposed the largest changes to the Constitution and

Article 9. However, framing revision in existing narratives of the Constitution and incrementally

111 AFX Asia, “Japan’s Koizumi vows to give firm legal basis to its military,” October 3 2006, LexisNexis Academic. 112 The Daily Yomiuri, “LDP finalizes top law draft/New constitution aimed at spur,” October 25 2005, ProQuest International Newsstream. 113 Agence France Presse, “Over 400 protest Tokyo’s moves to alter the peace constitution,” November 3 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 114 Ibid. 115 The Yomiuri Shimbun, “Most voters give cabinet thumbs-up,” November 2 2005, LexisNexis Academic.

116 Associated Press, “Poll: Support for Japan’s Koizumi Cabinet rises slightly,” December 26 2005, LexisNexis Academic. 45 reinterpreting the Constitution on the basis of international peace, resonated with the public and provided an opportunity for discourse about revision. Koizumi’s personal leadership style gave him the broad public support which had the potential to reach the fifty percent requirement for a public referendum on revision. Even though revisions did not meet the two-thirds requirement in both houses, Koizumi expressed his dedication to working with the opposition parties to find common ground and acknowledged that the LDP alone could not pass the changes.117 For the majority of his tenure, Koizumi chose to reinterpret the Constitution incrementally through consistent dispatch of the SDF forces and began the process of revision in the final year of his term. Koizumi severely damaged relations with China and South Korea due to his annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine, home of Class-A war criminals from WWII. In addition, he sought to revise upon the collective memory of the war creating the national holiday, Showa Day, to commemorate Emperor Hirohito (1926-1989). These contentious policies were, however, softened by his public approval. Koizumi did not explicitly include his efforts in shifting the collective memory surrounding Japan’s postwar history in his bid to revise Article 9.118 His groomed successor, Shinzō Abe, weaved the LDP’s larger efforts to change the collective memory of the war in his strategy for constitutional revision.

117 Yoshida, “Koizumi urges LDP-DPJ effort to revise Constitution.” Also see his public remarks to reporters, Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,” Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister, last modified January 4 2005, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2005/01/04press_e.html. 118 Courts ruled that Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine were unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of church and state. However, this is in reference to Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution. 46

Chapter III: Shinzō Abe and Constitutional Reinterpretation

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006-2007, 2012-present) has presided over the largest reinterpretations of Article 9. First, he initiated the 2014 Cabinet Resolution that overturned the then existing interpretation of Article 9, namely that Japan cannot engage in collective self- defense, to allow the Japanese Self- Defense Forces (SDF) to defend allies if Japan’s security is threatened. Second, he used the LDP’s two-thirds majority in the Diet to push eleven security bills related to the renewal of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty in 2015 against the concerns of both the opposition and the Japanese people. Given his ability to take big steps towards the

LDP’s party mandate, to normalize Japan, scholarly work has focused on the unique aspects of

Abe’s leadership to understand how he was able to pass controversial legislation despite opposition to the changes. Some of these aspects include his personal family history, affiliations with right-wing associations, and nationalist rhetoric. While important to investigate, these aspects do not necessarily translate into his ability to pass legislation. In fact, these aspects of his character often hinder his ability to justify constitutional revision. Rather, Abe’s success at reinterpretation comes from his ability to capitalize on the centralized powers of the LDP and the office of the prime minister, or the institutional changes that preceded him.

When Abe returned to power in 2012 after a humiliating first term as prime minister in starting 2006,119 he was better suited to capitalize on the centralized abilities of the LDP, Prime

Minister’s Office, and Cabinet to pursue revision of Article 9. Abe has made constitutional

119 Abe’s first term was only one year (2006-2007). A series of political scandals led to his resignation. Abe’s Agricultural Minister, Toshikatsu Matsuoka, was found bid-rigging road construction projects and padding his office expenses. After being found out, Matsuoka committed suicide due to the shame. Similarly, Justice Minister Jinen Nagase accepted money in exchange for giving a business that recruits foreign workers advice on visas. Finally, Abe took the blame for a pensions scandal when the Social Insurance Agency (SIA) failed to document 14.3 million records and was unable to match 50 million payment records to the correct beneficiaries. 47 revision a legislative priority from his first day in office, but has since realized that even if the

LDP was successful in revision, this would not change how the people think about their history.120 Therefore, Abe politicized the issue, meaning he justified revision beyond bona fide security concerns. He embarked on a strategy to associate revision with a conservative ideology centered on Japan’s revival from its postwar history. He has largely been unsuccessful in this strategy, which is evident in public protest against how he uses his leadership to champion this framing of revision.121 Even though he has been unsuccessful, he still has retained considerable authority over Japan’s legislative priorities given the centralized powers of both the LDP and prime minister. Therefore, he also pursued a strategy of reinterpretation to make formal revision obsolete and has used the narratives of pacifism, instead, to justify these reinterpretations. By making revision obsolete, Japan will have no choice but to revise, which allows Abe to accomplish his goal of revision, or his legacy.

Japan’s Revival

Abe’s family history is the source of his obsession with constitutional revision and explains the conservative ideology that underpins his understanding of Article 9. In Japan, Diet seats often are informationally designated as “belonging” to political families. As of 2018, thirty percent of

Lower House parliamentarians and forty percent of LDP parliamentarians has inherited their political seats.122 Third- and fourth-generation hereditary politicians are also on the rise.123 Abe

120 Maciej Pletnia, “Back to the Past: Analysis of the Amendments Regarding Emperor and the National Symbols of the LDP 2012 Constitutional Draft,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, no. 1 (2017): 192. 121 Satsuki Eda, “Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?” Council on Foreign Relations, July 15 2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/satsuki-eda-will-japanese-change-their-constitution. 122 Purnendra Jain and Takeshi Kobayashi, “Political Dynasties dominate Japan’s democracy,” Australia - Japan Research Centre, 6 No. 3, March 2018, https://ajrc.crawford.anu.edu.au/department-news/12278/political-dynasties- dominate-japans-democracy. 123 Ibid. 48 has viewed his tenure as an opportunity to continue the mission of his grandfather, Prime

Minister Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960), to regain Japan’s honor from its postwar history. Kishi rewrote the 1947 Constitution when he was imprisoned and investigated as a Class-A war criminal from 1945 to 1948124 with the objective of ensuring Japan’s autonomy within the U.S. -

Japan Alliance. Later, during his tenure as prime minister, Kishi forced the renewal of the 1960

U.S. - Japan Security Treaty by physically removing left-leaning Diet members from the parliamentary precincts.125 The renewal drew sharp criticism from the public, resulting in the largest grassroots political movement in Japanese history. War memory and Japan’s colonial past fueled the people’s opposition to the treaty as they did not want to participate in the United

States’ “war of aggression” in Korea.126 From the 1960s to the 1980s, support for Article 9 ranged between sixty to ninety percent.127 Public opinion aside, Abe has viewed his grandfather’s efforts as advancing Japan’s sovereignty since the treaty required a formal U.S. obligation to protect Japan; but did not require Japan to reciprocate. Abe has justified constitutional revision along similar lines, arguing that revision would ensure Japan’s “equality” in the alliance.128

Kishi had considerable influence over Abe’s interpretation of postwar history, a fact that shaped Abe’s efforts to change collective memory regarding the Constitution. Abe recounted that he started to align himself with conservative political ideas after watching the political downfall

124 James Gibney, “Blame Abe’s bad history on diplomat George Kennan,” Japan Times, May 3 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/03/commentary/japan-commentary/blame-abes-bad-history-on- diplomat-george-kennan/#.Xq9JLdNKj2Q. 125 Hein, “Leadership and Nationalism: Assessing Shinzō Abe,” 85. 126 Justin Jesty, “Tokyo 1960: Days of Rage & Grief, Hamaya Hiroshi’s Photos of the Anti-Security-Treat Protests, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Visualizing Cultures, accessed April 27, https://visualizingcultures.mit.edu/tokyo_1960/anp2_essay01.html. 127 Ibid. 128 Hein, “Leadership and Nationalism: Assessing Shinzō Abe,” 85. 49 of his grandfather over the 1960 Security Treaty.129 In addition, Kishi’s wartime leadership role and possible Class-A war criminal status could be the source of Abe’s sympathy with the wartime regime.130 While Abe acknowledged that wartime leaders were responsible for Japan’s atrocities, he argued that Class-A war criminals should not be regarded as such because a majority of the people supported their military during the war.131 In addition, he has stated that the leaders were not criminals under domestic law because the government continued to pay their pensions even after conviction.132

Abe’s goal to revise the Constitution must be seen in his larger efforts to change historical memory surrounding World War II. During his administration, he has promoted a nationalist framing regarding comfort women, the national flag and anthem, and educational textbooks. Akio Takahara, Professor of Law and International Relations at Tokyo University, noted during the 2013 tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, “Abe is very rightwing by traditional measures. He is a historically revisionist at heart.... He is a nationalist [pursuing] his ‘new nationalism.”133 By using the word “new,” Takahara is referring to explicit attempts to shape the collective memory regarding Japan’s postwar history. The 2012

Constitution draft put forth by the LDP, when Abe began his bid for prime minister, revealed elements of this “new” nationalism. Maciej Pletnia, a scholar on Japan’s postwar history, defines one of the main mechanisms of this nationalism as a deliberate attempt to reshape the collective

129 Reiji Yoshida, “To fathom Abe, just look at his grandfather,” Japan Times, December 28 2006, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/12/28/national/to-fathom-abe-just-look-at-his- grandfather/#.Xq9YYdNKgUF. 130 Ibid. 131 Hein, “Leadership and Nationalism: Assessing Shinzō Abe,” 88. 132 Ibid. 133 Simon Tisdall, “Shinzō Abe: Militarism or reform? As the sabres rattle, Japanese PM must decide,” The Guardian, December 17 2013, ProQuest International Newsstream. 50 history regarding Japan’s war past in the Constitution itself.134 Pletnia is concerned with the

LDP’s decision to include language on how the emperor stands as a “symbol of unity for the people” in the preamble of the Constitution.135 As discussed in the history of Article 9, both

Americans and post-war Japanese politicians wanted to enshrine the sovereignty of the people in the Constitution to ensure that a small group of militaristic leaders never lead Japan down the path of war again. Hence, the framers placed the sovereignty of the people clause in the preamble of the Constitution before the article on the emperor. In addition, the draft associates the

Japanese people’s suffering during the war to that of other uncontrollable events like Japan’s susceptibility to natural disasters.136 Pletnia argues that this change reduces the responsibility of

Japan’s wartime leaders,137 which is in line with Abe’s sympathy for the wartime regime. Both the LDP and Abe erode Japan’s pacifist principles by undermining the reasons for why the 1947

Constitution was created.

The draft also included language that makes citizens legally responsible to respect

Japan’s flag, hinomaru, or the rising sun, as well as the national anthem, Kimigayo, or His

Imperial Majesty’s Reign.138 The inclusion of these symbols is in line with what Takahara believes is Abe’s attempt to convince the public that now is the time for Japan to stand up for itself and be proud again.139

134 Pletnia, “Back to the Past: Analysis of the Amendments Regarding Emperor and the National Symbols of the LDP 2012 Constitutional Draft.” 135 Ibid, 185. 136 Some more recent natural disasters include the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami and 2018 Japan Floods. The history of Japan’s natural disasters is part of a larger culture around Japan’s resiliency against great odds, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Tisdall, “Shinzō Abe: Militarism or reform? As the sabres rattle, Japanese PM must decide.” 51

“Take Back Japan”

Abe and the LDP crafted the “Take Back Japan” campaign in 2012 promising to “take back”

Japan from the failed leadership of the DPJ and from its postwar history and negative image. The campaign shows Abe’s strategy to promote a revivalist narrative surrounding constitutional revision. From 2009 to 2011, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party though a dramatic election victory that upset the LDP’s near-continuous power in the postwar period. However, DPJ leadership faltered due to the devastation caused by the 2011 Tohoku

Earthquake and mishandling of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu boat collision incident. The LDP won by a landslide victory and took back the House of Representatives, which gives the ruling party the formal authority to override the House of Councilors.

Abe instilled the necessity of revision domestically by likening it to a larger mission of taking back the country economically. In response to the decades-long economic stagnation, Abe proposed his “three arrows,” otherwise known as “Abenomics,” to stimulate the Japanese economy, which drew the attention of the world. In his first term, Abe has failed to deliver on the economy and the public interpreted his pursuit of constitutional revision as de-prioritizing economic growth at a time when the public was increasingly concerned about the state of the economy.140An unnamed close aide to Abe noted that; “[Abe] became the epitome of Japan’s declining power when he chose to step down as prime minister after just a year. He and Japan became mirror images - a weak country and a weak leader.”141 By contrast, Abe’s rise to power in 2012 symbolically came to represent the rise and renewal of Japan.

140 Tina Burrett, “Explaining Japan’s Revolving Door Premiership: Applying the Leadership Capital Index,” Politics and Governance 4, No. 2 (2006). 141 David McNeill, “After nearly 70 years of restraint, Japan moves toward ditching its pacifist stance: A ‘reinterpretation’ of the constitution would allow for collective defence,” Irish Times, April 15 2014, ProQuest International Newsstream. See aide’s comments. 52

Given the experience of his first term as prime minister, Abe was aware that rhetoric alone does not secure his position and tenure. In fact, he knew that his reputation as a nationalist hindered his ability to establish the broad public appeal required for a long tenure in office.142

Therefore, he demonstrated his commitment to recovering Japan’s stagnant economy as a way to garner public support. When he entered office in 2012, the Japanese economy was shrinking and had fallen into a recession due to reduced exports to China. In addition, Japan slipped to become the third largest economy, falling behind China in 2011. Abe’s message of “Take Back Japan” was a response to both Japan’s drop in economic status as well as ongoing conflict with China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The campaign demonstrated that Abe had the resolve to take on both issues, which appeased the concerns of the Japanese public. Economists have since assessed whether Abenomics has worked and most argue it has not.143 The aims of the strategy, like reaching two percent inflation and a budget surplus by 2020, were overly ambitious, which has led experts to believe that Abenomics was simply a political tool designed to give Abe the public approval required to pass more controversial national security policies.144

Abe also corrected mistakes he made in his first time to ensure complete autonomy over the legislative process through the formal authority of the Prime Minister’s Office. Abe’s ability to pass controversial legislation was due to his ability to maintain strict intra-party discipline, control over Japan’s bureaucracy, and two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet. Abe was only able to exercise control in these three dimensions due to previous institutional change.

142 In November 2019, Abe became the longest serving Prime Minister in the history of Japan’s constitutional government. 143 Robin Harding, “Abenomics on trial as Japan teeters on brink of recession,” Financial Times, February 18 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/f1320946-5208-11ea-8841-482eed0038b1. Also see Silvia Merler, Abenomics, five years in: Has it worked?” World Economic Forum, January 10 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/abenomics-five-years-in-has-it-worked. 144 Tom Holland, “The hidden agenda behind Japan’s Abenomics,” South China Morning Post, September 12 2016, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2018059/hidden-agenda-behind-japans-abenomics.

53

Intra-Party Discipline

In his 2006 term, Abe was forced to resign, in part, due to pressure from within the party. For example, his refusal to visit the Yasukuni Shrine was not popular within the party as it was interpreted as being soft on China. Therefore, in 2012, Abe sought to use the reduced influence of factions to his advantage. He won the position of party leader in the LDP presidential election by appealing to the younger LDP representatives, who had a vested interest in supporting Abe’s rise to advance themselves within the party rather than wait their turn in the party’s seniority system.145 These representatives were already loyal to Abe as many of them were elected when he was LDP General-Secretary from 2003 to 2004.146 With their support, Abe had the majorities inside the party to stand up against the older members who opposed revision.

Control of Bureaucracy

A prime minister’s success, as measured by the extent to which a leader can influence outcomes in policy making, comes from his strict control of the bureaucracy. In 2012, Abe and his supports hand-picked vice-ministers to bureaucracies in order to calibrate the various ministries to fulfill his policy goals,147an ability offered by the reforms under Prime Minister Koizumi.

Traditionally, prime ministers do not assert themselves on bureaucracy given the norms on maintaining neutrality and autonomy of the ministries.148 Abe’s emphasis on strict control comes from the fact that he was abandoned by them in his first term as prime minister.149 He

145 Tina Burrett, “Abe Road: Comparing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s Leadership of his First and Second Governments.” Parliamentary Affairs 70 (2017): 414. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid, 417. 148 Ibid. 149 Author’s interview with an LDP expert at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, July 2019. 54 made a list of people who had wronged him and those that stood by him to ensure loyalty in his second term.150

Two-Thirds Majority

A two-thirds majority in both houses allows Abe to pass controversial legislation through the

Diet. While the majority was established in 2012, Abe was necessary, but not sufficient to establish control over the Diet. The LDP’s long-standing coalition with the Komeito Party was established shortly after the 1994 reforms, as discussed in Chapter I. He also was able to capitalize on a weak and fractured opposition in the Diet. In addition, the centralized nature of the LDP lends itself to maintaining the majority. As long as Abe and the party leadership can deliver on electoral outcomes, Diet Members will remain loyal to Abe’s policies. Even amidst

Abe’s declining public popularity, LDP candidates know that riding on Abe’s coat-tails ensures their re-election.151

Abe’s Long Game

The “Take Back Japan” campaign was extremely successful in terms of shoring up Abe’s broad public appeal. Abe’s approval ratings in his first year were higher than those of Koizumi despite

Koizumi’s unmatched popularity.152 That said, Abe exercised restraint on his revision plans in his first year, focusing mainly on the economy, which explained his popularity with the people.

In addition, the LDP only had majority control of the House of Representatives in 2012 and,

150 Ibid. 151 Aurelia George Mulgan, “Is there a crisis of Japanese democracy?” East Asia Forum, July 19 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/17/is-there-a-crisis-of-japanese-democracy/. 152 Burrett, “Abe Road,” 205. 55 therefore, Abe did not want to threaten the LDP’s electoral bid for the House of Councilors. Abe and the LDP won back the majority in July 2013.

Unsurprisingly, this win coincides with the start of Abe’s strategy to reinterpret the

Constitution. On December 17 2013, Abe released Japan’s first National Security Strategy which, “ examines [Japan’s] national interests and identifies its national security objectives.”153

Notably, the strategy was focused on how Japan could maintain its “pacifist orientation.”154 Abe used the narrative of pacifism to advocate for the concept of a “Proactive Contribution of

Peace,”155 which later formed the basis for Japan’s move to collective self-defense in 2014.

While Abe is partial to his revivalist narrative given his family background and conservative ideology, he used the pacifist narrative to push for reinterpretation. Yuichi Hosoya, a member of

Prime Minister Abe’s Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, argues that Abe’s nationalist stance towards revision can be separated from his efforts to ensure

Japan is secure.156 Hosoya interprets Abe’s actions as efforts to ensure Japan remains a pacifist nation.157 The 2012 LDP draft Constitution indeed maintains language to enshrine Japan’s long- held pacifism. Similarly, Abe’s official remarks on the 70th anniversary of World War II included a pledge that Japan will continue to walk the path of as a “peace-loving nation” and,

“will remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course.”158

The rest of this chapter will review how Abe has reinterpreted the Constitution using existing methods established by the LDP for three decades, the pacifist narrative, and the

153 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “National Security Strategy,” last modified April 6 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Yuichi Hosoya, “Japanese Politics Concerning Collective Self Defense,” in Asia’s Alliance Triangle: US – Japan – South Korea Relations at a Tumultuous Time, ed. Gilbert Rozman (New York: Palgrave Macmillian 2015): 139. 157 Ibid. 158 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe,” August 14 2015, accessed April 27 2020, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html. 56 centralized policymaking authority. In contrast to Hosoya’s claim that the reinterpretations are to maintain Japan’s pacifist stance, this research finds that the implications of these changes will significantly alter Japan’s role in the world due to the broad and ambiguous language adopted.

The public opposed the changes arguing that they undermine Japan’s pacifist principles. While

Abe has not been successful in changing how the people view their Constitution, he has certainly initiated a process that reinterprets the meaning of Article 9 for Japanese national identity.159

Making Revision Obsolete

Abe has found ways to circumvent the formal revision process for the Constitution through policymaking capabilities that exist in the executive. In order for constitutional revisions to be ratified, the changes must pass both chambers of the Diet through a two-thirds majority and receive fifty percent approval by public referendum. The LDP sought to change the revision process, or Article 96, to lower the majority in the Diet to fifty percent in 2012 to 2013, but was unsuccessful. Abe and the LDP did not have the two-thirds majority in the Diet since their coalition partner, the Komeito Party, does not support explicit revision of Article 9. Additionally, public polling on whether the Constitution should be revised was mixed. Both the Asahi

Shimbun, a liberal newspaper, and the Yomiuri Shimbun, a conservative newspaper, found that majority of people supported revision from 2012 to 2012.160 However, the framing of why the

Constitution should be changed was different between the two newspapers. In the Yomiuri poll, majority of people supported revision because, “Policy change by reinterpreting the Constitution

159 Pletnia, “Back to the Past: Analysis of the Amendments Regarding Emperor and the National Symbols of the LDP 2012 Constitutional Draft,”192. 160 Masatoshi Asaoka and Ayumi Teraoka, “Japanese Public Opinion on Constitutional Revision in 2016,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 1 2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/japanese-public-opinion-constitutional-revision- 2016. See polling results over time. 57 has become too confusing.”161 Reinterpretation here refers to Koizumi and previous prime ministers’ time limited legislation that allowed for collective self-defense. On the other hand, people who supported revision in the Asahi poll argue, “new rights and rules need to be included” in the Constitution.162 Since public support for revision is dependent on the revision being made, Abe could not be certain that the public referendum would pass. Given these barriers, Abe has, “...laid the groundwork for Japan to take one step closer to… supporting the

U.S. in combat for collective interests.”163 Therefore, the following two cases will explore how

Abe has reinterpreted Article 9 using his policymaking authority.

2014 Collective Self Defense Reinterpretation

The Abe Administration’s unilateral reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense in July 2014 is the single greatest ‘revision’ of Article 9 since its conception in 1947. The reinterpretation allows the SDF to use force abroad to defend allies even if Japan is not directly under attack. Past prime ministers have interpreted Article 9 of the

Constitution to include measures of self-defense, to the “minimum extent necessary”, if Japan is attacked. But the Abe Cabinet resolution stated that due to changes in the global power balance since the Constitution was established, use of force must be allowed not only for an armed attack against Japan; but also, against a foreign country because it might threaten Japan’s security.

The basis for the interpretation rests on the preamble of the Constitution, namely that

Japan has an international obligation to contribute to the “preservation of peace.” The decision to

161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Linda Sieg, “Mission Unaccomplished -- Abe’s drive to revise pacifist Constitution,” Japan Times, November 19 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/19/national/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-revise- constitution/#.XrILnRNKjkI. See comments by Professor Ellis Krauss. 58 reinterpret was, in part, due to U.S. pressure, as reflected in the resolution’s language. Japan can respond to an armed attack against a foreign country that is “in a close relationship with

Japan.”164 There is no country ‘closer’ to Japan than its longstanding alliance partner. Following the Cabinet resolution, Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel supported the Japanese cabinet and its efforts, “to make a greater contribution to regional and global peace and security.”165 Notably, the U.S. - Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, first presented in

April 2015, had almost the exact language of the 2014 Abe Cabinet resolution.166

This interpretation of Article 9 is a strict departure from past practice with several key implications. First, by justifying this change in Japan’s international peace obligation, Japan can engage in collective security operations potentially outside of the UN mandate and outside of

Article 9.167 Second, the mention of “minimum extent necessary” is crucial to understand the limits of force as it relates to the Constitution. Japan has always retained the “minimum necessary level” of war potential [senryoku] to defend its sovereignty. Defining this level continues to remain relative since it must account for changing external security conditions.

However, if the 2014 collective self-defense interpretation increased the number of operational domains and range of activities, the “minimum necessary level” for the defense of Japan also developed.168

The Cabinet resolution was highly problematic since the Cabinet lacks the formal authority to place a bill to amend the Constitution before the Diet. Rather, critics of the 2014

164 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People,” last modified July 1 2014, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html. 165 Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, “Collective Self Defense,” last modified October 27, 2015, https://spfusa.org/research/collective-self-defense/. 166 Ibid. See 2015 Defense Guidelines. 167 Marta McLellan Ross, “The Abe Restoration: Pushing Past Japan’s Wartime Legacy and Restoring a Responsible Use of Force,” Pacific Forum CSIS Vol 15, No. 14 (Honolulu, Hawaii: December 2015), 4. 168 Ibid. 59 decision argued that the Cabinet has a duty to protect the nation’s Constitution.169 However, the

Cabinet reformed under both Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Koizumi gave the prime minister the mandate and infrastructure to initiate policy independent of the Diet or government ministries, as discussed in Chapter II. And there was a precedent: Koizumi established top-down policymaking to pass the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law when he was in office.

The Komeito Party, the LDP’s coalition partner, hampered one of the original goals of the resolution. While the Abe Administration was able to legalize security activities related to assisting an ally partner, they also wanted to expand Japan’s role in international collective security operations.170 The Komeito would be consequential for the LDP to pass the resolution and, hence, used this leverage to halt the LDP’s proposed expansion of international collective security operations. That said, the resolution still allows Japan to provide logistical support and participate in peace-keeping operations (PKOs).171 In addition, Japan can exercise the right self- defense, legal under Article 9, in limited circumstances that threaten the, “people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness,” 172 or when the attack of an ally threats the peace, which, yet again, is subject to the interpretation of the Government.

The public strongly reacted to Abe’s backhanded tactics to formalize reinterpretation. An

Asahi Shimbun poll found that fifty-five percent of voters opposed the reinterpretation, compared with twenty-nine percent who supported it.173 Of those polled, sixty-seven percent of respondents stated that Abe’s method of reinterpretation was “improper.”174 The Yomiuri Shimbun found that

169 Eda, “Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?” 170 Hosoya, “Japanese Politics Concerning Collective Self Defense,” 132. 171 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People.” 172 Ibid, 7. 173 Constitutional Revision Research Project, “Timeline: Heisei (1989-February 2017) Chronology (Jan. 1990-Dec. 2014),” Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, accessed November 25, 2019, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/crrp/resources/chronology. 174 Ibid. 60 around eighty percent of respondents did not believe the Cabinet’s decision was sufficiently explained and fifty-one percent opposed the new right.175 In the days leading up to the Cabinet resolution, thousands of protesters gathered in front of Abe's Official Residence to voice their opposition to the decision. Notably, protest posters caricatured Abe in the likeness of Adolf

Hitler, condemning what opponents regarded as a return to fascism. Opposition legislators and even the LDP’s coalition partner, the Komeito Party, protested the lack of deliberation to create consensus on the proposed change and the lack of transparency. Abe’s method led to increased public attention to how ruling elites interpret Japan’s military power.176 Satsuki Eda, chair of the

Democratic Party’s Research Commission on the Constitution, stated that since the Japanese people witnessed the forced attempt to change Article 9, public support for revision declined.177

2015 Security Laws and New Defense Guidelines

Following the 2014 cabinet decision, Abe and the LDP passed eleven security bills to define and legalize the ways in which Japan will “proactively contribute to peace” outlined in the 2014

Cabinet Resolution. The 2015 Security Laws were also designed to allow Japan to take on a more active role in the U.S. - Japan Alliance because the U.S. and Japan had set new Defense

Guidelines on April 24 2015. While Japanese troops would only support refueling and transport of materials, the public and opposition parties were mainly concerned that these bills could inadvertently cause Japan to be “caught up in a war” initiated by the United States.178 Their concerns are legitimate. By reducing the legal restrictions that the Constitution imposes on the

175 Clint Richards, “Polls give Abe a bump, but not one Collective Self-Defense,” The Diplomat, August 5 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/polls-give-abe-a-bump-but-not-on-collective-self-defense/. 176 Sheila Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 164. 177 Eda, “Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?” 178 Jonathan Soble, “Japan’s Parliament Approves Overseas Combat Role for Military,” New York Times, September 18 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/asia/japan-parliament-passes-legislation-combat- role-for-military.html 61

SDF, the security legislation sanctions the deployment of Japanese troops for U.S. operations as a support force. The bills removed the geographical limitations for the deployment of the SDF since Japan’s security can be threatened even if Japan has not come under attack itself, which was originally outlined in the 2014 Cabinet Resolution.

While Abe argues that the bills passed democratically,179 the legislation altered the meaning of Article 9 and, therefore, changed the Constitution without due process of law. A

Mainichi Shimbun editorial noted that passage of the bills made the 2015 guidelines supersede that of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty and the Constitution.180 Ninety percent of constitutional scholars in Japan argue that the bills are in violation of the 1947 Constitution.181 Fifty-four percent of the public opposed the bills, citing the lack of explanation from the government.182 In the same poll, thirty-one percent of the public supported the bills.183 While the bills passed through the Lower House easily, given the LDP’s two-thirds majority, they were debated in the

Upper House for two months. The debates revealed Abe’s unwillingness to build consensus with the opposition and how confident he was in the centralized powers of the LDP to pass the bills.

At one point, he yelled “hurry up!” to an opposition member’s questions and she only spoke for three minutes.184 The opposition parties used a number of delay tactics, but were unsuccessful in blocking the LDP-Komeito majority. When the bills went for a final vote, opposition politicians wrestled the committee chairman’s microphone to prevent him from calling the vote.

179 Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation: What Does This Mean to East Asian Security?” American Foreign Policy Interests 37 (2015): 300. 180 The Law Library of Congress, “Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution,” Global Legal Research Center, September 2015. PDF, 40. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-interpretations-article- 9.pdf. 181 Ibid, 297. 182 Thomas Wilson, “Support for Japan’s Abe sags after security bills passed, “ Reuters, September 21 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-security/support-for-japans-abe-sags-after-security-bills-passed- idUSKCN0RL08Z20150921. 183 Ibid. 184Alexis Dudden, “A Push to End Pacifism Tests Japanese Democracy,” Current History 114, no. 773 (2015): 225. 62

Figure 1. Democratic Party of Japan Parliamentarian Hiroyuki Konishi (top) met with fist of Liberal Democratic Party Parliamentarian Masahisa Sato as legislators attempted to wrestle the committee chairman on September 17 2015. Image from “Japan Military Bills Provoke Scuffling in Parliament,” accessed April 14 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/asia/japan-military-bills-provoke- scuffling-in-parliament.html.

Even former members of the LDP spoke out against how Abe passed these controversial bills, emphasizing the lack of consensus in the Diet. The former Diet Members held an emergency press conference with constitutional scholars a few days before the Diet would discuss bills to declare that Abe’s method was, “a triple insult: to the legislative process, to precedent, and to history.185 Former Prime Minister Koizumi spoke out against Abe, stating his unwillingness to accommodate the opinions of the opposition parties and “railroading” the policies past the public was unacceptable in Bungeishunju, a monthly conservative magazine, in

185 Ibid. 63

December 2015.186 His comments reveal the inner workings of the LDP at the time of the 2015 security bills. Koizumi expressed his concern for the fact that members of the LDP have become

“yes-men” to Abe’s policies,187 which the former prime minister sought to change during his tenure by breaking up factions. On the state of the party Koizumi asserted, “Members of the LDP used to be free to say whatever they wanted to the prime minister, now it is odd how they make no noise about what the prime minister wants.”188 Koizumi’s comments reveal Abe’s ability to maintain strict intra-party discipline in the passage of the 2015 security bills.

Abe’s actions in both cases raised questions about the status of Japanese democracy.

Nancy Snow, the Abe Fellow at Keio University in 2015, noted that the LDP’s majority in both houses was a result of record-high voter abstention in Japan, questioning the extent to which the people’s opinions were represented in the government’s decisions.189 In addition, it is a well- known fact that rural districts, which are the LDP’s voter base, receive more weight in the Diet than urban districts. The Tokyo High Court ruled that rural votes weighed about two times more than urban votes in the 2012 House of Representatives election,190 which was the same election in which Abe returned to power. Given these obvious disparities in representation, the

Constitution, Snow posits, should not, “be ‘reinterpreted’ arbitrarily by the government of the day.”191 Without due process, as designated in the Constitution and democratic principles more generally, the public cannot serve as a check against such methods.

186 Julian Ryall, “Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi accuses Shinzo Abe of ‘railroading everything,’” South China Morning Post, December 11 2015, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east- asia/article/1889773/former-japanese-prime-minister-junichiro-koizumi-accuses-shinzo. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Nancy Snow, “The Abe administration’s arrogance of power moment,” Japan Times, July 16 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/07/16/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-administrations-arrogance- power-moment/. 190 Kyodo, “Vote disparity in ’12 ‘unconstitutional’,” Japan Times, March 2014, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/07/national/vote-disparity-in-12-unconstitutional/#.XrSAb9NKhlr. 191 Snow, “The Abe administration’s arrogance of power moment.” 64

Conclusion

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its leaders have been able to pursue their goal of constitutional revision through direct control over state institutions and processes. Through incremental reinterpretation, the LDP has eliminated the necessity for formal revision. An impetus for this study was to understand the extent to which harmful nationalist rhetoric promoted by leaders like Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and the right-wing of the LDP can influence policymaking in Japan’s Government. Ever since Abe’s return to power in 2012, both

Japan and U.S. media have been relentless in reporting on the rhetoric he employs, given his strong desire to change the Constitution. Similarly, scholars have traced where this ideology comes from and where it takes root in present-day Japan. Abe’s rhetoric on Japan’s history is certainly concerning, especially when considered alongside his ties to right-wing organizations.

Therefore, this research focused on the various ways his rhetoric could transcend from words to action.

Institutional reform in the 1990s created opportunities for the LDP to centralize and establish their long-standing dominance in the Diet. Party centralization led to a need for a prime minister to hold increased policymaking authority and control over Japan’s bureaucracies.

Capitalizing on the decentralizing effects of the 1994 electoral reforms, Prime Minister

Jun’ichirō Koizumi increased the powers of the prime minister. With increased policymaking authority, the LDP regularly dispatched the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on humanitarian missions. The frequency of such missions led to the development of the forces themselves and justified the creation of institutional infrastructure within government to facilitate their activities.

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With the strength of the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet, Koizumi also established the precedent for top-down policymaking. Previously, bureaucracies formulated policies that would move up the levels of government for approval. Disrupting this process reduced the number of checks each policy received and allowed a smaller number of people to lead Japan’s foreign and security policies. Koizumi began the process of reinterpreting Article 9 through legislative changes. The legislation would be time-limited, or only for the contingency at hand.

However, these changes had implications for Japan’s role in the international order. Even if SDF forces were dispatched in “non-combat zones'' and for the sole purpose of “peace” in 2001, these reasons cloud the risks SDF personnel face and Japan’s territorial security as SDF actions abroad could have consequences back home. In addition, each dispatch increased the autonomy of the

SDF, evidenced by the ability to return fire in 2001. Finally, the SDF is often deployed in a coalition as representatives of Japan, thereby shifting how other countries and international organizations view Japan’s force presence in the world. Koizumi increased the public’s awareness of the SDF forces and the role they could play in peacekeeping activities. While

Koizumi was unsuccessful in revising the Constitution in 2005, he seemed to have the public majority required to formally initiate the process of revision, which has not been established since.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe rode the wave of reform and precedent established by the

LDP and his predecessors. His timely return to power in 2012, coupled with past experience in the position and a weak opposition, allowed him to grasp the top-down powers of the prime minister to reinterpret Article 9. No longer were interpretations time-limited; rather, they became general guidelines for the SDF. Abe’s ability to force the passage of both the 2014 Cabinet

Resolution and 2015 Security Bills was due to his control over bureaucracy, his party, and the 66

Diet, all of which were formal powers that he inherited from previous institutional changes. That said, his choice to use these formal powers simultaneously, and on controversial legislation, raises significant concerns about Japan’s democracy, namely whether the centralization of institutions that govern Japan have gone too far and now allow for the abuse of power.

Abe’s choices reveal how obsessive nationalist imaginings can lead to both anti- constitutional and anti-democratic policies. In response to the public’s opposition to the 2015 security legislation, Abe stated, “I would like to remark once again that, in Japan -- a world-class model of a democratic nation -- referring to such a bill as a ‘war bill’ is baseless, fearmongering and entirely irresponsible.”192 Abe justified his actions as democratic, but the public saw this in name only. Even the Yomiuri Shimbun, a conservative newspaper with readers that support revision, disapproved of Abe’s anti-democratic practices.193 Using his Cabinet powers and the two-thirds majority to make changes against the will of the people undermines the extent to which these policies are representative of the people.

While Abe may not be able to formally revise the Constitution, he has established the normalization narrative in the public. People who want to maintain Article 9 often use the word mamore, or protect, in response to the erosion of the article.194 Abe and his supporters use mamore to argue that reinterpretation serves to protect Japan’s sovereignty and territory.195 The dual meaning of protect was reflected in a 2019 Kyodo poll where forty-seven percent of respondents believed Japan should not revise Article 9 and forty-five percent argued change is

192 Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation: What does this mean for East Asian Security?” American Foreign Policy Interests 37 (2015): 300. 193 Clint Richards, “Polls give Abe a bump, but not one Collective Self-Defense,” The Diplomat, August 5 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/polls-give-abe-a-bump-but-not-on-collective-self-defense/. 194 Alexis Dudden, “Push to End Pacifism Tests Japanese Democracy,” Current History 114, no. 773 (2015): 227. 195 Ibid. 67 necessary.196 Of those who supported revision, twenty-six percent cited the need for including the SDF in the Constitution whereas fifty-six percent argued that Japan should revise given the rise of China and increased North Korean missile threats.197 Abe’s efforts to politicize the issue have, in fact, succeeded in that the camps of support and opposition are more defined.

Japan continues to oscillate between the narratives of normalization and pacifism.

However, the evolution of Japan’s security and foreign policy institutions reveals that a small number of political elites have a large influence in shaping Japan’s role. At the same time, leaders and administrations come and go, but institutions remain in place. The same institutions could also allow for Japan to move towards a strictly pacifist role. Given its history and economic prowess, Japan could act as a global arbiter on when the use of force is justified. How

Japan chooses to use force could inspire deliberation and restraint in the international world order. This role is reflected, for example, in Japan’s ongoing bid for a UN Security Council seat or its commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. By officially reinterpreting Article 9,

Abe has set Japan on a new course towards a more “normal” role in the world. Scholars of Japan state Abe’s quest for normalization should not be construed with that of a return to militarism.198

In fact, the public opposition to Abe’s efforts to change the Constitution has forced him to reduce his aims.199 The broad language of the 2014 collective self-defense decision has, however, created a scenario whereby successive governments can decide how they will wield the language. Rather than working to define the instances where Japan would use force, Abe has

196 Kyodo, “Poll shows 54% oppose revision of Japan’s pacifist Constitution under Abe’s watch,” Japan Times, April 11 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/11/national/politics-diplomacy/poll-shows-54-oppose- revision-japans-pacifist-constitution/#.XrizddNKh-i. 197 Ibid. 198 Richard Samuels, “Who Defines Japan’s Past, And Future,” The National Interest, May 26 2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/who-defines-japans-past-future-12964. 199 Ibid. 68 made the language vague for interpretation and removed constraints on the use of force in the

2015 security legislation.

Ultimately, the Japanese people face the consequences of any change to their

Constitution. The LDP’s efforts to reinterpret Article 9 have circumvented democracy, placing the Japanese people in a situation where they may be led down a path that is unrepresentative of their interests. Up until now, Japan’s Constitution has remained intact, but its future is uncertain.

69

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