] THE planted was that others General a otic—anci Stauffenberg
depicted mancling 20 firing Prussian become majority German the Hans mation. future ocob coup courage Juiy allowed day Since squad Mommsen, c1’tctt executed. Pcmbcrton course when an an POLITICS so.2 Ludwig nationalists. Colonel of headquarters, officer as 20, treasonous—act. that attempt explosive
the JULI quickly to martyrs were It to returned of 1944 ycars stand fateful may conspirators German who save Beck. Beck, Claus “Long “did was to of seem evaporated. and up face device t’as besmirch day, Many who planning to After not the both to von live political traitors, Berlin OF himself by that the the was Wolfschauzc. yet hidden holy argue committing summary But Stauftcnberg, were the Nazi members to A seem the to secure fitially when apex criticize implicated development Germany!”1 freedom Colonel- have Coup wedded that, good in regime. historically a and in courts news came served briefcase of despite The names the suicide. the the the General fighters the and to in came knowledge resulting to martial, conspiracy as conspirators political nadir is the leading of who fruition their Regent under an the obsolete,” Stauffenberg’s that plot, and Friedrich exercise of gave opposition only Frornm explosion the Hitler ideas the member reactionaries, in arrested and that okill to their the people German conference for in then, even that he had new Fromm, had their lives malicious Hitler had of Stauftenberg to killed within last in in suddenly, though Stauftenberg Provisional the Viclcrstand National in inability fact succeeded the words have universal the table Stauffenberg’s military several words survived, Germany posthumous process. they been at collapsed. in Socialism, to , Government, and Hitler’s the in people, of front had and predict heroes Widcrstaucl, alternately his historian Colonel- plans who moment But several indeed of patri corn defa East and this and had the the On the for 20j LII
issue ofpoliticsis not about defamationofcharacter—itis crucial. Inpost war Germany, politiciansofallsorts havesought to expropriate the memoryofthe Vidcrstandforpolitical ends. It is not only fair, then, to askwhat the membersofthe Wiclcrstcmdthought politically; it is imperativeforaproper understanding ofrecent Germanhistory. Hereit becomesclear that the ideasofthe conspiratorswere,indeed,“obsolete,”and norat allin keepingwith the valuesof the German Federal Republicin which they havebecomeenshrined as national heroes.
Historiography and Politics in the Federal Republic
It is difficult—andperhapsnot wise—toattempt to separate popular reactionsto the July 20coupinsideand outside ofGermanyfromthejudgments macicbyhistorians. What is surprisingis that forallofthe disagreementsregardingthe historiographyofJuly 20,the initial reactionsfromthe Alliedand Nazi campswere remarkablysimilar. AdolfHitler fa mouslybranded hiswould be assassinsasa “verysmallcliqueofambitious,unscrupulous, and at the sametimecriminallystupid officers,”and attributed his survivalto divineprovi dence.3 The Nm’YorkTimescompared the conspirators and their methods to that of the “gangster’sluridunderworld,”whiletheNewYorkHeraldTnbtincremarkedcold heartecily,“Let thegeneralsIdilthe corporal.orvice versa,preferablyboth.”1Winston Churchillechoedthe HeraldTribunewhen he expresseddelight at the fact that his enemieswere devouringthem selves.TheofficialAlliedpositionstated that “weendorsethejudgmentofthe generalsifnot their motives,”while clarifyingthat the Allieswould welcomea new7government,but only provided that it was willing to surrender.5 For the Allies,whose solegoal was military victory,the coup seemeda desperate attempt to win last-minute concessions,which w’ere not forthcoming. Humiliated by their defeat and occupation, the German public largelycontinued to agreewith the originaljudgmentoftheirdeadFührerregardingtheJuly 20conspiratorsafter the war’send. Evenby 1952,asurveyshowedthat 40 percentofWest Germansfeltthat the conspirators shouldbejudged positively,and only20 percent approvedof their resistance duringwartime.6 EmmiBonhoeffer,wifeofKlausand sister-in-lawofDietrich,both mem bers ofthe resistance,recalledthe experienceofher daughter Cornelia. Upon revealingher father’sidentity to a stranger, the girl was met with a condescending“poorlittle traitor’s kid.”7RosemarieReichwein,wifeofAdolfReichwein,a Socialistmemberofthe resistance, foundthat the public reactionw’asboth critical and ambivalenttow’arclsthe conspirators. Most peoplesimplydid not understand the conspirators’motives,nor did they attempt to learnabout them. Butthis public reactionalsomanifesteditselfin formsfarmoremenacing than the occasionalcruel remarkfroma stranger. Bythe early1950s,numerousright-wing politiciansin Germanyopenlydenouncedthe conspirators’behavioras treasonous. Otto-
4 far
its counter Theodore book exile Ernst historiographical Nazi and men many that from cynically, theory able. exploited against resistance fieci then, became existence efforts taneouslv, heroes, question a Britain, scape One ideas, assumption
fact,
Bennett,
regime? success
as
addressed
the
who
\Vithin of
The there
the Also
a tyranny,
Hans with
became to \‘Vhat
Remer, could
in
few
simple
of
the by
a
criticism
resisters
say
and
clear
what
conspirators
who, then new Cold the collective worked
of the
in KonradAdenauer,
politicians
Hamerow
of
the or
questions existed of
the
Rothfels,
that
be
is
the it
that
the
those
this failure
Federal which
who that resisters the
moral
school
becomes: it
most declaration became he
War
government
to with
rebuilt
Federal is
the
rnid-1950s,
as
historical any
a
by
saw
for
orthodoxy.12 atmosphere
to
hardly
had committed
potentially
“good”
guilt
martyrs
changed
remarkable
surviving as
his standpoint
declaring
pointed
the
in associate
of it calls
opponent
clearly
Republic
expressed
in
as
by a
necessary
actually
attempted
historiography
writing
w’ould
Republic, 1954 political
day
cooperation was
overly
claiming
surprising
that
Germans
the
proof
of
and
the
of
the
indicated book, Prime now
the
conspirators
to
the
oF
hostile
that
Eulogistic the the reckoning.”
“the
participated
of the
had of Eulogistic about
harsh called
tenor
Christian a
act,
to
sharp
way
that
thereby German a
dizzying, resisting
Nazism conspirators to that conspirators
justify
Nemcsisof “their historian’s
Minister
hindrance
first
with
shifted that but
answer
with
audience, not
Jacob
to
of Rothfels’ criticisms.
their
his
more
a criticism
scholarly
the
Germany’s rather
desire
a
School.9 act all
whom
offering
party
the support values.15
must,
School
revisionist
Federal
should Pcmbc
evil,
resistance
and
such debate
critical Germans
in
was It
and
Powcr, helped
free
to
foremost
was
crushing the
themselves
to with
is
book,
alone the
sometimes
the
leader iron ipso
to toward
precisely
that
that
became
link account
world.” legitimacy
He
be underlying
Republic for
his
Rothfels,
regarding
founded
conspirators’
cooperate.1’
But
of
democratic
policies facto,
establish
democracy
tried
could
viewpoint had
written thereby
the
“a
the w’ithin
belief
the
the
of
whether duty
the
gift
the
the
be
new conspirators
dutifully dominant.
President
as July
have the
deeds
of
contradictory,
trace
coup
that
of tile
to
saw’
should
a to
betraying most traitors.8
the
Christian just
theJuly moralprineiples.
as the
one
founded
proponent
West
the
the
the
wanted
20
future. Critical was
cynical emerged. it
The its
of the failed
fit actions
attempt
basis a
posed
United
visible is German
conspirators
democratic
followed
few the
“historical be
Theodor
to
key
to in
Germany
July
As
20
to
defend
was coup,
his
what
conspirators a
Democratic
make years to
upon
or
SirJohn
conspirators. School
to the
above. defensive
were
pay
of
resisters
be States
in 20
array
laudatory,
And
July bias,
future.”11 starting
democracy.
political Hitler.
1944,
linked
Heuss it
tribute attempted which conspirators,
the the
the
unimpeach
roots”
regime.
by became
so
20
of
of
For
begins
were
and
Wheeler- Certainly
fallacious
historian
insisting
resisters
German
went July political
x’as manner
against
to Union,
identi it
Sirnul
to
a
to to
Great
to
More
land
these
soon Ger
such
now
rise.
The
The 20h
not
the the
the the his
so
to
In ) is
to
in as
by
by
op
her it
that But
pro
tend
con true,
with
as
mat resis
histo
Mem
rather,
major
cadres used
means, within staying sympa
politics.
cleverly, and
both
is
positions served the
Eulogistic
well
London
major
but,
The
Widcrstand.’6 .
their
recent
as .
these
key that their
the
military
acknowledges certainly
however,
the
Hamerow, plans concludes
and
Empire.2 the
contact
By
which Schlabrendorff,
is associates, within
country, on influence in
heritage cell.2’
Gestapo,
more
Gestapo.2°
from not,
predominantly to the For
from
of
“fundamentally
left
193$,
the
von
as This among
do recalled
their
the The
Gestapo,
in
question
Germany, motives, their and
specific
the
held
entire
programs. other
men
of
fled
of Mommsen
much.
the
on
also
an
ideas
removed effectively
they
freedom much
still
Paris
and
Fabian
their
School camp.
when positions
had by democracy”
as
as these
1990s, but
that
instance,
behalf of
Communists.
“concentration
justice.N
Republic
1933,
outside were
parties
plans
their
for
on
and
that
even
quickly operate
political enough in
the even
conspirators’
the
destroyed
them, that
Critical
the
to
as
social
criticizing
the
politicians just power resistance.
were elements 19$0s the and
operate meanwhile, just
grant
surveillance
of
both
of
political
notes and under
Prague
of concentration
maintain
and
to
cci to
the out
of dishonourable.”’
a
unable
not
to
to
interpretations
Reichwein,
themselves
in right-wing presumably
in
leftists 20J
free
(SPD),
conspirators,
resisters certainly
post-war constraints
able
carry
were
dignity
specific
constant
speaking her, “attacked”
of
that
positions the
positions
was nothing
to
moving
behavior
historians
on
unwilling
Party
conspiracy,
of discussing
were same it,
towards
were
their
they by
the fact
threatened
adherents the Rosemarie
under
The
human
in the
the These
detainment
actions
the regime.
conspirators
been
people contemporary
instance, of in
“there
especially,
to held
or
about
spying Communist
views
not
State
by before courage
the
were
the
the Socialist
leadership for
agendas,
the
gained
advance
have tendency
that had
friends.
lies to
by
ideal
of
base
belief
service. and
were
Party,
and
the
Nazi
controlled
a
subject
partly
member
from
surveillance
rightist
Nazi and
the of
who
exiled
strength the potential on School
execution
civil
principles.”7
political
the
and state,
honor in
were the not
unavoidable. heritage universal
enemies
concedes nothing
with
apart
writings
of
Hamerow,
mailman
high
the
allow
and
effectively
as complicated
constant within
was explained
the
grow
Critical Communist
were
possible
neighbors
officer
while
those
them is
and
and specific
nearly leadership is
aristocrats
ahead
Wheeler-Bennett, insistence
natural it
an
and
The the
the often
German)’ democratic
becomes
such
Army
enduring
and But from
the men
sets
own
The “there
of Only
as
step
Gestapo same Army
of
disparage their
the
But clear lustoriography, rians,
posed School.
to that This
“their in though
promote grams
Autonomy their spirators in neighbor tance. arrest bers thizers
would ity one 1940. the
within obvious the the
these 6
himself JCtCOI)Pcnibcrton ters macic[the averageGerman officer]incompetent in non military questions, and particu larly in politics.”24Acklitionally,most ofthese men bad only reluctantly served the ‘vVeirnar Republic, and had, in fact, rejoiced at the founding ofthe Nazi regime. Major-General Hans Oster, activein the Abwehr circleof resistance,noted that it was only“withaheavyheart”and after “themost clifficuftinner struggles”that the officercorps was ableto bring itself to serve the Weimar Republic.13 GeneralBeck,meanwhile,greeted the new regimeasthe ‘“firstrayofhope’since the end of the war.”26 But there were advantages to using the Armyas a tool for resistance. Most obviously,in the words of Schlabrenclorff,“‘onlythe Armyhad at its disposal the weapons and the powet’necessary to overthrow the firmly entrenched regime.”27Also,the military and upper classeshad three keytools against the Gestapo. First, due toa certain levelofsocial exclusivity, criticisms of the regime could generally be expressed freely within circles of friendswithout fearofbetrayal to the police.28Second,the loose affiliationsofthe conspiracy macicit difficult forthe Gestapo to distinguish between normal discontent and moreserious opposition.29 Third, resisters within the highest echelons of the regime,especially those within the Abwehr, were able to act as counter-intelligence “shields”to dlisguisethe true nature ofthe conspiracy. Just as members ofthe upper classwere able to insulate themselvesfromthe machina rions of the Gestapo, the Armyas a wholew’asable to maintain its autonomy apart fromthe rest ofthe Nazi State. The process that led to this autonomy within the state is complex,but can he traced broadilyto the interplay betw’eentw’odistinct threads ofpolitical development within Germany. The first thread w’asthe obvious,but important, fact that the Army,unlike the SSor many other organizations, was created not by the Nazis, but had its own separate centuries-old roots ancltraditions.3’ Amongthese traditions, drawn originallyfrom Prussia, was the separation of the Army from the political sphere. Schlabrcnciorffalludes to this in the quote above—Germanofficershad little political competence because they deliberately avoidedpolitical matters. Aspart ofthis trade-off,then, officersexpected politicians to avoid military matters, and bristled when they did not. Stauffenberg, for instance, was moved to act partly because of“meddling”in the Army’saffairsby Hitler.32But it should be noted that this tradition waslimited exclusivelyto the Army the Navyand AirForce,much morerecent creations, did not have the sametraditions.33 The secondthread, which at least partially contradicted the separation ofthe Armyfrom politics, was the submission and meekness of the Armyin the faceof Hitler’sbullying in the earlyyearsof the Nazi regime.This was exemplifiedby two events in 1934:the ROhrnPutsch and the institution of the loyalty oath. Hitler understood, according to Andre François Poncet, the French Ambassador to Germany, “that the general staff was an enemy camp
[and] . . . that this clique ofJunkers and conservative armyofficersrepresented a permanent threat to his authority.”34The Putsch, on the night ofJune 30,1934,resulted in the summary execution ofErnst Rohm,aleaderofthe paramilitary Sturmabtciiiing(SA)who was thought by
7 20]uu
manyArmyofticersto bea dangerousradical,andwho bad advocatedthe mergingofthe SA with the regularArmy,amoveto which the officersstronglyobjected. Hitler’smoveagainst the radicalwing ofhis own party delighted the officers,as it seemedto affirmthe Army’s unique position in the state. Followingthe Putsch,the regime’spopularity shot to 95 per cent, accordingto an unnamedotfieialinthe War Ministry.35Butthis cameat a highprice. Effectively,the Armyhad to assentto the murderoftwo ofits generals:KurtvonSchleicher, the former Chancellor,and Kurt von Breclow,whose murder had occurred as part of the Putsch. Thiswas followedon the secondofAugustby the institution ofa newloyaltyoath forallofficersand menin the Rcichswchr.The changedwording ofthe oath meant that the soldierswere nolongerswornjust to defendGermany,but no’ owedpersonalallegianceto AdolfHitler. Throughthesetwo events,Hitler effectivelyco-opted the loyaltyofthe Army, which madeits complete Nazificationunnecessary,but alsoleft open a smallwindow of opportunity forthosewith the will to resist.
Motivations for Resistance
The autonomyof the Army servesto explain how it was possible forsomeofficersto resist,but it doesnot explainwhy they choseto do so. Here,it isimportant to note that the resistancewas not,accordingto Schlabrendorff,“anorganizedpoliticalmovementbut... the reactionofindividuals.SoAssuch,there canbe noclearconnectionbetween belongingto a particularsocialgroupandparticipationin the resistance.37ft must he rememberedthat the number ofconspirators in the Army numberedno morethan a fewhundred, and therefore beingan Armyofficerdidnot, ipsofacu, makeone aresister. Instead, as Countess Margarethc vonHarclenberg,secretaryto the conspiratorMajor-GeneralHenningvonTresekow, stated, joiningthe resistance“dependedonsomethinginsideoneself.”SSEmmiBonhoefterclarified that joining the resistance was not a conscious act of free will, but was based on “inner necessity.”39Activeresistancerequired notjust the opportunity to resist,but alsothe con victionthat resistancewas correct. It was agreatrisk,notjust legallyandphysically—dueto the threat ofarrest,torture,andexecution—butalsosocially.Resistance“entailedforeachof
[the resisters] an existential leap. . . into self-sufficiencyanclloneliness.”4° Resistance was, afterall,an antisocialact, althoughmembersofthe resistancewho had like-mindedfriends wereat leastpartiallyshieldedfromthis.4’ One oftheimpedimentsto resistanceamongtheArmyofficers was,however,the oath of loyaltytheyhad swornto AdolfHitler. Manyofficers,evenif they did not support Hitler and the Nazis,claimedthat they could not bring themselvesto resist because they felt them selveshonor-bound to serveHitler, and honor‘as not somethingto be trifledwith among traditional minded officers. At the same time, Hans Rothfelsclaimsthat the officershad been “tricked”into swearing an oath to Hitler. ft seemsunlikelythat officerswould feel
S ]acobPcmbcttcm honor bound to adhere to an oath that they were tricked into swearing.12The very fact that numerous soldiers of unimpeachable honor, such as Srautfenberg,did indeed defy the oath proves that the issue of upholding the oath was not a matter of honor. Instead, it was a personalchoice Schlabrendorff,borrowing phrases fromthe Swisshistorian Ernst Gagliardi, argues that thosc who resisted despitc the oath w’erefollowing the “highest virtue,” while those who stayed faithful to the oath followed“manlyvirtue.”It is clear that Schlabrendortf finds the latter group much less virtuous, especiallygiventhat, in his opinion, many stayed true to their oaths becauseoftear ofjoining the resistance.43The oath, therefore, became for manysimply a convenient excuse to avoid the harsh consequences of failed resistance. Ifthose who did resist were indeed compelledby an “innernecessity”that enabled them to defytheir allegianceto Hitler, it was patriotism that fueled that necessity. far more than the oath, patriotism provided for the true moral dilemma of the resisters. The choice they faced was whether they could serve their country better by working for or against its war effort. Certainly, this was not an easydecision, because as criminal as the Nazi regime may haveseemed to the conspirators, it came to enjoytremendous popular support once the war began.44 The Nazis possessed a “semblance of legality” and successfully identified them selveswith the “national cause,”both ofwhich secured the support of the populace.15 This was not insignificant, either, because the conspirators had hoped to garner popular support for their eoup.4 Evenwithout this support, many went ahead with the coup because they thought that ageneralwar would be ruinous fortheir nation, and oncethe war started, that it was necessary to end it as quickly as possible, and in the most honorable way. Germany’shonor wasofparticular importance to the conspirators. for example,though many ofthe conspirators were aware ofthe terrible crimes carried out on the Eastern front, and were indeed appalled by them, it was not the crimespcrscthat lead them to action, but the damage they perceived those crimes doing to Germany’sreputation. Stauffenberg, for instance, resented that Hitler had, in the w’ordsofHoffmann,“besmirchedthe good name of the German people through cruel mass murder.”47Once it was clear that a coup had little chance of success, manyof the conspirators decided that the attempt must still be made, if only to saveGermany’shonor by proving that aresistance did, in fact, exist. “Theonly point now . . . is that action against this criminal regime should come from within the German people,”GeneralBecksaidon the dayof the attempted coup.4 For Freyavon?\Ioltke, this act ofresistance,provingits existence to the outside world, allowedher to ascribesomemeaning to the death of her husband, Helmuth.49
Early Resistance: The Sudeten Crisis
In the history of the Vidcrstand,the Sucleten Crisis in the fall of 193$was a decisive moment that brought together the issues of popular support, autonomy,patriotism, and
9 201 cii
politics. Thiscrisisofferedperhaps the best opportunity foracoup. Hitler,thoughpopular, was threateningwar,andthe Germanpeoplewerenot yetwholeheartedlyinfavorofsuchan aggressivepolicy.° Additionally,the autonomyofthe Armyand civilservicehad provided plentyofconspiratorswillingto take the necessarystepsto preventwar.5’GeneralBeck,for instance,wrote that “allupright and serious-mindedGermanmen... [are]obligedto useall conceivablewaysandmeans,includingthculrimatcrccoursc,inorderto avertwaragainstCzecho slovakia.”52Beckwas motivatedbythe factthat,in hismind,awarwouldbringaboutthe finis Gcrmanictc.”53It iswith this in mindthat the membersofthe nascent Vidcrstanc1madeseveral attempts at negotiatingwith the Allies,especiallythe British,which includedoverseastrips byCarlGoerdelerandAdamvonTrott zu Solz.Thebasicstrategyofthe resistance,dubbed the Setback Theory by Klemensvon Klemperer,was devised by Colonel-GeneralFranz Halder,the seniorArmyofficerin the conspiracy,andwasbasedonthe ideathat onlyamajor policyfailurewouldleaveHitlervulnerableto acoup.54Theonlyfailurelargeenoughforthis purpose in the fall of 193$was for the Alliesto call Hitler’sbluff on Czechoslovakiaby threateningwar. Theprobleminherent to this strategy was that it couldwork onlyin con junction with the Allies,whosesupport was not forthcomingat this time. Theinabilityto w’inAlliedsupport forthe coupcanbe attributed to three mainreasons: Alliedreluctanceto go to war,Allieddistrust ofthe conspirators,and the conspirators’un willingnessto moderate their political views. This first point is key becauseit was what separated the conspirators’understanding ofthe SudetenCrisisfromthat ofHitler. Hitler understoodthat theAllieswereloath togoto war overCzechoslovakiain 1938andwouldbe willingto accept almostanyplan that appeared to preservethe peace;this was, in fact, the basis of his strategy.55 The conspirators, meanwhile, failed to grasp this concept. Scliabrenclorff argues that the Allies should have threatened war because even if the coup hadfailed,acivilwar wouldhavefollowedandthe resultingeventswouldhavebeendamag ing only to Germany.56 But this argument is specious; Schlabrendorff fails to acknowledge that bydeclaringwar, and thereby likelyinvolvingtheir nations in battles where their sol diers would die,the Britishand French would certainly suffer. Though he does not say as much, the implication is that these losses would be minor and bearable. But here Scfflabrenclorfffailsto takeinto accountthat at this pointin time, anylosseswouldhavebeen unbearableto the Western Powers. This theoryis borneout by the eventsofthe so-called PhoneyWar of 1939—40,when the Alliesstrictly maintained a defensiveposture despite Hitler’stotal concentrationwith Poland. Second,it is clear that, evenwhen emissaries for the opposition did venture abroad they w’erenot necessarilywellreccived. The cifiemmathey facedwas that they were virtually unknown people emerging from a totalitarian country claiming to be willing to commit treason and offeringplans forpeace. Forthe Allies,it was quite unclear what faction these groups represented and how seriouslytheir ideas should be entertained. Gocrdeler,for instance, visitedthe United States forseveralmonths in lite 1937,includinga lengthy stay
10 Jacol,Pcmbcrtou withJohn Wheeler-Bennctt,then livinginVirginia.DespiteGocrclcler’savowed opposition to the Nazi regime, many were unconvinced and assumedthat he must be a Nazi agent ofone form or another.57 Sir Robert Vansittart, a member ot Prime Minister Chamberlain’s gov ernment, at first befriended and admired Gocrcleler. But shortly after the Munich agree ment, evenhe concluded that Goerdeler “was merelya stalking-horse for German military expansion,”which was different in name only fromNazi expansionism.56 Additionally, the emissariesarrivedin the middle of the debates overappeasement and whether there existed goodGermanswith which to deal. Those, like Vansittart, who argued against appeasement, which the resistance also opposed, tended to not want to make a distinction between good and bad Germans. Theywere thus lesslikelyto welcomethe ideasofthe emissaries. Besides, even had British anti-appeasers wanted to make this distinction, it is not clear that the conservativemembers ofthe resistance would havequalified asgood Germans in the eyesof the British, since many of them had only recently come to reject Nazism.59 Third, what made the British so wary of the emissaries from the opposition was pre cisely the fact that their political ideas and plans very much resembled those of the Nazis. ForGoerdeler,especially,Hitler’splans forCzechoslovakiawere dangerous and offensivenot because Goercielerdid not w’antthe Sudetenland absorbed into Germany, but because he did. Hitler’saggressiveexpansionism,which threatened aworld war which Germany might lose, was a danger to Goerdeler’smore conservative irredentism—to his mind, the British were “negotiating with the wrongpartner.”° EwaldKleist-Schmenzin,a conservativejunker and long-time opponent of the Nazis, was sent to London in August 1938 by Oster and Canaris, with Beck’s approval. He was to make contact with Vansittart and Churchill, who was then a minor member of Parliament. But Kleist failed to win British support when he made it clear that he and his associates wanted the Polish Corridor returned to Germany— a territorial demand that the Nazis had not even made yet.6 This followed a brief episode where a Germanjournalist named Victor von Kocrber,working on his own, approached the British Military Attaché advocating a revolution to restore the Hohenzollern monarchy.62 The British, ofcourse, were absolutely opposed to the restoration ofthe monarchy that had started a w’aragainst them a mere twenty-four years earlier. It is clear that the frankness of these various opposition members regarding their plans to build a more powerful Germany was disturbing to the British,who, after all, were not concerned with helping to serve the interests ofconservativeGermans,but rather with servingthe interests oftheir own country. It is therefore not surprising that the British found it unacceptable to offer aid to these resisters at the time of the Sucleten Crisis, and preferred to attempt appeasement of the Nazis.
11 20J ULI
The Major Conspirators
Afterthe aborted coup of1938,the conspiracy went into hibernation. Dependent UOfl the Setback Theory, the resistance was unable to act in the key period of 1939-42,when Hitler’smistakes w’erefew and his popularitywas massive.61After the defeat at Stalingraci, the resistance gained adherents, and was able to attempt several assassination attempts. Of those operating within the conspiracy at this time, three men stand out as particularly im portant to the coup. The first was ClausvonStauffenberg,the manwho planted the bomb on July20,1944 and was the driving forcebehind both the political and militaryprepamtion for thc coup. The second was Carl Goerdeler, the mainright wing politician in the coup, and oneofthe seniormembersofthe conspiracy. The third was Helmuth von Moltke, who,as the head of the Kreisau Circle, was involvedwith much ofthe planning for post-coup German society.
ClausSchcukvon Stauffcnbcrg Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg was, first and foremost, a soldier, and possessed, therefore, a keenly attuned sense of honor, loyalty, and discipline.61 As a young man, his political and social ideas were shaped mainly by his involvement, along with his brothers Alexander and Berthold,in the circle of followers around the poet Stefan George. George.in hislater years,was especiallyfascinated by nobility,and so those in the circletook to these three young counts eagerly. Claus himselfwrote in a poem that he and his brothers were “theblond heirs ofthe Staufens and Ottonians”—a referenceto old German royallines. It is noteworthy that, according to the brothers’ biographer, Peter Hoffmann, “significant ideas” from this and other poems of Claus’swould remain with him until his death.65 The sense ofnoble privilege,especially,was evident in the oath Stauffenbergwrote for members ofthe conspiracy,which included the nowinfamousline, “wedespise the lie that all men are equal,andacceptthe natural ranks.”66Georgewas alsowedded to the vaguelyfascistideology of a “SecretGermany”composed ofthe “dormant forcesout of which ... the Nation was to rise,”so it is not surprising that manyof his followers became acthercnts to Nazism, espe cially given that “National Socialists often talked in exactly the same way as the Poet [George].”67Claus, though he was never a member of the Party, did, by his widow’s admis sion, welcome the changes the Nazis brought.68 And his brother Berthold, speaking for himselfand Claus after the faileclcoup, told the police that they had approved ofmost ofthe Nazi’sdomestic policies.69 Though Claus von Stauffenberg is,in the popular imagination of the coup, the central figure,the fact is that he onlybegan to actively oppose Hitler in mid-1942,when he sent the first of many letters to high-ranking officersurging them to resist the regime.7°He had been aware ofthe coup as earlyas 1938,at the time ofthe SudetcnCrisis.71Once that coup attempt failedto materialize and the war beganayearlater, Stauffenbergmaintained, like manyother
12 ]cicobPcmbctton officers,thatthewar effortshould be the primary duty ofeverysoldier. Anymoveagainst the regimewould haveto wait until after victory was achieved.72It was onlyonce victorycameto seemimpossible that Stauffenberg and his brother Rerthoiddeciclecitojoin the resistance.73 Morality also played a part in Claus von Stauffenberg’sdecision, as he w’asquite disturbed by the war crimes committed against Russians, Poles,andJews. But again, it seems that he did not allow this to affecthis thinking until 1942. However, once Stauffenbergjoined the conspiracy, hewas the impetus behind the coup and never ceased insisting on the necessity fortyrannicicle.75
CarlGocrdclcr Beforedevoting his lifeto opposing the Nazi Party, Dr. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was a member of Alfred Hugenbcrg’s German National People’sParty (DNVP), and he served as Burgomaster ofLeipzigand then as RcichPrices Commissioner under the Bruning Chancel lorship. The latter position forced him to resign from the DNVP,since Hugenberg did not support Bruning. With the rise of the Hitler chancellorship, Goerdeler came into conflict with the Nazis over various issues, incluelingthe mistreatment ofJewish businessmen in Leipzig. This did not keep him fromreturning to the PricesCommissioner position in 1934- 5. He remained as mayor of Leipzig until 1937when he resigned to protest the dismantling ofa statue of \ Iendelssohn, the famousGerman-Jewish composer fromLeipzig.76After his resignation,he becamea tireless opponent ofNazism,working as an overseasemissaryofthe resistance,as stated above. Butthis oppositionto the Third Reichdid not meanthat Goerdeler wanted a return to the pre-Nazi status quo. He was a staunch opponent of the Treaty of Versailles,which had handed his native West Prussia and Posen to Poland, and thus never cameto accept Germany’sdefeatin World War T. He also never fullyaccepted the Weimar Republic, and in fact never supported parliamentary democracy, preferring rule by oligar chy.zsHowever,although he was anti-democratic,hedid favorthe ruleoflaw’as well as basic freedoms of thought, speech, and the press.79
HclmuthJamesvonMolthcandtheKrcisatiCircle Unlike most of the other major conspirators, Helmuth James Graf von Mohke was neither a politician, civil servant, nor solder. Rather he was a lawyer and aristocrat with familyties to both Germany and the BritishEmpire.SoMoltRe’sopposition to Hitler rested firmlyon the basis ofhis Christian beliefs;it was these beliefs that hehoped would create a new society after the end ofthe war. For him, the key was to use Christianity and a focuson individuals to create a new national community, distinct from traditional nationalism. While Moltke clearly had no wish to create a Christian state, and made references to “‘hu manist’ ethics,” this seems to mask the fact that the state and national community he envi sioned bore more similarities to a theocracy than a democracy.82 Discussion was to be en couraged,but at the sametime, unanimity was expected.63He did not understand that even
13 20 JuLi w’ithinthe national community,differentinterests would comeinto conflict. Thesesame Christian beliefs,however,led Nzloltketo refuseto participate in the proosec1 coup and to strenuouslyobject to the assassinationof Hitler. Noting that “murderis alwaysa crime,” Moltkefeltthat to begina new’erawith a murderwas to reducethe oppositionto the levelof the Nazis.81Rather,Moltkcfeltthat it wasthe duty ofthe civilianoppositionto makeplans for a post-Hitler Germany,whether it cameabout by means ofa coup or through an acci dent.85It is not surprising then, that Moltke consideredit somethingofablessingthat he was arrested in January 1944,before circumstances forced him to activelyjoin the con spiracy.8 Moltke’smajorcontribution to the resistancewas his foundingofthe KrcisauCircle, namedafterthe town inwhich the Moltkefamilyestatewaslocated. Thecompositionofthe membersofthe Circlewas quitevaried;Moltkewas ableto bring these peopletogether and facilitatediscussionsamongthem.87Membersofthe Circlespannedthe politicalspectrum, ranging from Socialiststo National Socialists. On the left, Carlo Mierendorffand Adolf Reichweinwereboth formerSPDmembers,whileFriedrich-DietlofGrafvonderSchulenberg, who remainedcommitted to the NationalSocialistideal to the end, represented the most extremerightwingofthe conspiracy.88 TheidealofKreisauwas to fusesocialistanciconser vativeicieas. ButNloltketended to overestimatethe extent to which diversepeoplecould be macicto agreeonpoliticalissues,whichwasperhapssymptomaticofhisbeliefinunanim itywithinthe nationalcommunity. Despite\Ioltke’s attempts to unite disparatepolitical ideas,the KreisauCircleeventuallydecidedon aprogramthat wasfundamentallyconserva tivein characterand opposedto liberaldemocracy.
Political Plans for Post-Hitler Germany
While the personalpoliticalideasofthe majorconspiratorscertainlywereconservative andtendedtowardoppositionto democracy,the centralissue ofthe debate regardingtheir useby politiciansto legitimizethe federal Republicmust center on their specificpolitical plans. Todothis, it isnecessaryto look at both the socialandpoliticalplansoftheconspira tors,aswellastheirplansforendingthewar. Fromtheseprograms,apictureofthepost-war societyenvisionedby the conspiratorsbeginsto emerge.It is clearthat this societydid not, fundamentally,aspireto democraticideals.
PeaceSettlement Sincethe plans forthe coupw’eretaking placeduringwartime, the issue ofhowto end the warandwhat theternisofpeacewouldbewereofparamountconcern.Duringthe early stagesof the w’ar,‘hen Germanvictoryseemedassured,conservativessuch as Beckand UlrichvonHassell,the formerAmbassadorto Italy,desireda peacethat wouldlegitimate
14 ]cicobPcmlcrton
Germany’s territorial acquisitions in Austria, the Sudctenland, and the Polish Corridor, with the remains of Poland and Czechoslovakia becoming client states of Germany.92 Gocrdeler, meanwhile, envisioned German hegemony in Central Europe with the blessing of the Western Powers.93For the conspirators, this negotiated peace was consistent with their beliefthat war should not beused to achievepoliticalends. Furthermore, they thought such a peace would be acceptable to the Alliesbecause the price would be paid only by the weakstates ofEastern Europe. Butwithout being ableto overthrow Hitler, which,clueto the Setback Theory, was impossible in this early stage ofthe war when Germany was winning victory after victory, the peace plans of the conspirators were all for nothing.95 After the debacle ofthe Munich Pact,Great Britainwas clearlynot willing to negotiate a peace at this stageY6 The changing tide of the war, however, also changed the nature of the calls for peace Stauffenberg, for instance, saw that Hitler was threatening to drag the entire nation down with himinto a defeatoffantasticplt’flo1.9’ Andyet, evenin the faceofimminent defeat, members of the conspiracy continued to insist on terms of peace that were favorable to Germany. Though by 1943Moltke was convinced that Germany would be destroyed, Goerdelerstill pressed forthe restoration ofthe 1914borders alongwith the incorporation of Austria (including South Tyrol) and the Sucletenlanci,as well as the primacyofGermany on the continent.96 Stauffenberg,meanwhile,likewise insisted that Germanyshould iii aintain its great power status after defeat.99 The military solution, meanwhile, as devised in Nlay 1944by Fielci-NiarshalErwin Rommel, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Bin France and nominalmember ofthe conspiracy,was to evacuatealltroops in Western Europebehind the SiegfriedLinein Germany,while continuing to fight on a shortened front in the East.1 The conspirators clung to the belief that the war in the East was justified and that the Western Allieswould support its continuance once Hitler was removed.’°’ The assumptions of the conspirators in regards to the likelihood ofa negotiated peace w’eremistaken in two ways. first, the alliancebetween Great l3ritainand the United States, on one bane!,and the SovietUnion, on the other, was not nearly as weak as they supposed, however unnatural it may have been. In 1944the Western Powers were not interested in turning against their Sovietally. Second, the conspirators severelyunderestimated the de termination of the Alliesto stand by their stated policies, specificallythe Atlantic Charter, Churchill’s policy of absolute silence, and the doctrine of unconditional surrender. The Atlantic Charter, the statement ofAllied war aims, specificallyforbade the changing of na tionalborders without the consent of the people ofthat nation, which meant that the territo rial aspirations of the conspirators were not p1ausihle.It2In addition, the Allieswere corn initted to a military end to the war. In Great Britain,this meant that the distinction between good Germans and Nazis evaporated, and Churchill imposed a policy of absolute silence toward the opposition that effectivelyprevented it from having a voice abroad.’°1 Finally, unconditional surrender was the goal ofthe Alliesafter the Casablanca Conference inJanu
15 20] cci
ary 1943.Afterseveralyearsofhard-foughtbattles, the Allieswere unwillingto makeany concessionsto the resistersthat would potentiallyunderminetheir own interests.°4
Society Onecommonalityamongthe conspiratorswas a desireto transformGermansocietyat its basic level.05As these men saw matters, the failuresofthe Weimar Republic and the crimesofthe Third Reichwereproofpositivethat majorchangewas needed. In fact,many evensawtheThirdReichasthe logicaloLitcome ofthe over-democratizationofWeimar.106A necessarypart of this new societywas an established elite,which all the conspirators as sumed would lead the nation. For the conservativepoliticians in the resistance, such as HassellandDr.JohannesPopitz,the PrussianMinisterofFinance,this elitewas assumedto consist ofthe traditional aristocratic classes.’°TOne ofHassell’sgreatest fearswas that the Nazisweredestroyingtheintellectualandaristocraticclassesin orderto supplant themwith an egalitarian class order.It Schulenberg,likewise, feareda class-based revolutionfrom below and hoped that a successfulcoup would be ableto ward offthis threat.t9 Butthis endorsementofthe aristocraticelitewasnot unopposed,asconsensusopinionin the Kreisau Circle favoredreligious matters over class concerns. The leading members of the Circle, especiallyMoltkeand PeterYorckvonWartenburg, rejectedthe traditional eliteand called instead for an “openelite”based upon Christian spirituality. Characteristically, Moltke hopedthat the unifyingidealsofChristianitywouldwipe awayalldivisionsamonghuman ity and bring mankind together into “oneparty.”° Yet,as dlifferentfromthe aristocratic conspirators as the Kreisaumembersmayhave thought themselvesto be, both embraced socialviewsthat weredecidedlyanti-pluralistand thereforeanti-democratic. Religion,meanwhile,alsoplayed a majorrole in the most vexingsocialproblem that confrontedGermansduringthe periodofthe Third Reich,the fateofJewishGermans.How ever,in the perverseatmosphereofracismthat inundated Germanyduringthe Third Reich, this questionofreligionwas givenpseudo-scientificlegitimacyby recastingit as anissueof race. Afterhis arrest,Bertholcivon Stauffenbergadmitted that he and the other resistershad found Hitler’s concept of race, and by extension his anti-Semitism, to be “healthy and forwarcl-looldng.”1Stauffenberg,forinstance,had written anarticlebeforethe beginningof the Holocaust proposing the revocationof citizenship for,among others,Jews and unre cleemablecriminals.H2Schulenberg,meanwhile,labeledJews as “darkforces,”claimingthat they wereanti-Germanandhad dominatedWeimar, necessitatinga Nazitakeover.3 And Goerdeler,evenafterhisarrest,insistedthatJews wereatleastpartly to blamefortheir fatein the Holocaustbecause they “hadinterfered in our public lifein w’ayslacking any proper restraint.”04 And yet, despite their anti-Semiticbeliefs,most of the membersofthe resistance did draw the line at violence,with the exception of Schulenberg,who was indifferent to the treatmentofJewsontheEasternFront.5 ClausvonStauffenbergapprovedofrestrictionson
16 ]cicobPcmbctton jews, but condemnedpersecution. Berthold,despitehis articleregardingcitizenship,felt that thosewho murdered Jews oughttoheprosecutec1.”ThecrueltiesofKristallnachtandthe Holocaust ‘ere likewisecondemnedin strong terms by most membersof the resistance, especiallyHassdllandYorck, menofrelativelyvariedbackgrounds.”7Butthe abhorrenceat violencedirected at the Jewsdid not pre’ent plans fortheir eventualremovalfromGerman society.TheStauffenbergbrothers,whatevertheirsympathyforvictimsofviolence,stillsaw Jew’sas foreignerswithin the Reichwho had to be controlledantisegregatec1. Goerdeler concurredthatJews were“alien”to Germanyandproposed their resettlement in Canadaor South America,without violence,and with exceptions madebasedon duration ofcitizen ship and militaryservice. The crimesofthe Holocaust did not changehis views. In fact,it hardened them. Hesawmassmurder asevidencethat there would neverbemutual under standing between GermansandJews. Hisideasofdeportation werethus vindicated.”9
FormofGovernment The conspirators,in the post -warsocietytheyimagined,spurnedideasofpluralityand equality. Thegovernmenttheyenvisagedreflectedtheir rejectionoftheseconcepts. Ideasof par1itmenta’ democracywerederidedasbeingobsoleteandWestern, and thus unfit forthe Germannationandits unique psyche.Toalargeextent, the planswerebasedonthe think ingofFrciherrvomSteinand reliedon the conceptofself-governmentat the locallevcl.’2 At the nationallevel,meanwhile,the conspiratorsplanstookpowerfromthe handsofthe people byrelyingheavilyonindirectvoting.Goercielercalledfora Rcichsragelectedhalfbydirectvote and half by indirect vote, while the Kreisauplan called for a Rcichsragelected entirely by indirectvote.12’Despitethe factthat the conspiratorswereinterestedin creatinganew elite, they specificallywanted to avoidcreating a class of professionalpoliticians. Within the Krcisau Circle, especially,political parties were considered to be harmful to the system because they threatened to destroy the national unity necessary for the new society.’22
Goerdeler’splan,meanwhile,furthersubvertedthe powerofthegeneralpopulationbymak - ingthehalf-directlyelectedRciclistcigsubordinateto the HeadofStateanelthe Rcicbsstdndchrnis, thecorporatistupperhouseofparliarnent.’23Likewise,the Kreisauplancalledforthe Rcichstag to be counterbalancedbythe Rdchsrat,appointed mostlyby the Headof State,who was to servea twelve-year term.’24Inboth systemsthe HeadofState,calledthe Regent,was to hold extensivepowers. GeneralBeckwas the nearlyunanimouschoiceto serveas in this posi tion.’25 Under both constitutions, the Regent would haveeffectively governed in aconstant state ofemergency,akinto the powersgranted underArticle48oftheWeimar constitution, with neither Parliamentnorthe Chancellorableto checkhispowers.’26With such a system that concentrated powerin the hands ofa singleman,the dangerofareturn to dictatorship or monarchywas great,especiallygiventhat there were certainlymanymonarchistsamong the older,conservativeconspiratorssuch asGoerdeler,Beck,andHassell.’27
17 2OJuu
Beyondthe officeofthe Regent,the lists proposingthe compositionofthe post coup governmentrevealthe extent to which this governmentwas to be dominatedbyconserva tivesandmilitarymen. Most ofthe lists show Goerdelerasthe Chancellor,with the Social ist WilhelmLeuschnerasVice-Chancellor.Julius Leber,another Socialist,was proposedfor the important post ofMinisterofthe Interior,whileeither Hassellor Friedrich-Wernervon der Schulenberg,both professionaldiplomats,was likelyto becomeForeignNlinister.i2sBut the presenceoftwo Socialistsinprominentpositionsbeliesthe true natureofthe cabinet. By the reckoningofhistorianTerencePrittic,ofthe eighteenmajorpositionsin the government, twelvewere reservedforconservatives.Theremainingsixspots wereto he dividedbetween membersof the former SPDand the Catholic Center Party,with the Socialistsholding a maximum of four positions.’ And though Leuschnerand Leberwere to have held high posts, the state secretary to each would have been Yorckand Friedrich Dietlofvon der Schulenberg,respectively,in order to balanceboth ministrieswith conservatives.Though the conspiratorskept theseplansvagueto avoiddrawingire fromthe Affies,astheyhadclone at the timeofthe SudetenCrisis,the cabinetthey proposedwouldhaveprovidedonlyamere façadeofleft-wing“democraticandreformistrespectability,”with true powerin thehandsof avowedconservatives.’30Despitethe stated desireamongmanyofthe conspiratorsto create anewelite,mostofthosechosento participate in the new’governmentwererepresentatives ofthe old,aristocraticelite.
Conclusion
Whilethe historiansatidpoliticiansofpost-w’arGermanymayhavewanted to embrace theJuly 20 conspiracyas a proto-democratic movementw’hichlegitimized the establish ment of the FederalRepublic,this was possibleonlyby viewinghistory as a repository of heroes,whose untidy flaws and obsoleteideas could simplybe brushed away to form an idealized notion of the past. The conspirators, heroes or not, were anti-Semites,monar chists,unrepentant NationalSocialists,believersin aristocraticprivilege,and foesofdemoc racy. Ibis shouldnot comeasa surprise,ofcourse. Afterall,thesewerethe onlypeoplex’ho wereallowedaccessto theleversofpowerinthe ThirdReichandwerethereforetheonlyones capableof makinga realattempt at overthrowingthe system. Their failurerested at least partiallyonthosesamepoliticalbeliefs,preventingthemfromgainingthe foreignacceptance necessaryfora coupbeforethe outbreak ofwar. Butthe greatest failureofthe resistorswas that theyconsistentlyunderestimatedthe capacityofthe Germanpeopletot democracy.As TheodoreHamerowsuggests,theywould havebeenbewilderedby their status asheroesof the FederalRepublic;hut likewisetheywouldhavebeenequallybewilderedby the veryfact ofthe Republic’s The conspirators \‘ere thereforenot martyrs in the nameof Germandemocracy.Theireffortsdid not create the FederalRepublic;the FederalRepublic
Is JcicobPcmbcrton came to exist in spite of their ctforts. And yet, even if they were not heroes of democracy, perhaps they can still remain as examples of the ability of people to resist even the niost tyrannical ofgovernments, with great courage and without regard for their own lives. That is a lesson which transcends polities.
JcicobPcmhcrtongraduatedin2001fromthcUniversityofCalifornia,SantaCni witha Bachelor ofArts inEwopcanHistory. HcisnowworhingonhisMastcrofArtsinEuropeanHi.sto;yatSan FrcniciscoStatcUnivcrsity.
NOTES
Peter Ho{fmann.IheHiston’ofthcGcrmonRcsistu;cc,19331045 (Cambridge: MIT Press,1977),397 479, passim.
Hans Nlommsen,“TheGermanResistanceagainstHitlerandthe RestorationofPoIitics,Thc]ow’naIofModernHistory 64 (Dec.. 1992): 5119. TheodoreHamerow, OnTheRoadToTheWolfs I_air:GermanResistanceToHi;icr(Cambridge,Nlassachtisetrs:Belknap Press of Harvard Lniversity Press. 1997),361. Hans Roth[c1. ThcGei’manOpposiiia;;ToHitlcr:AnAj4wdiisaI(Hinsdale,Illinois:HenryRegneryCompany,1948), 160 6]. Hamerow, 355. DavidClay Large,“A Beacon in the German Darkness’:The Anti NaEi Resistance Legacyin \Vest German Polities,”Thc]ow’nalofModernHisto;y64 (flee., 1992):5174. DorotheevonNleding,CouragcousHearts:WomcnandtheAntiHiilcrPlorof1944(Proviclcnce,RhodeIsland:Bcrghahn Books,1997),24. Large, $174 $175 Harnerow, 5. Rothtels, 9.
‘‘Ibid.,11. ‘2Hamerow,5 6. ° Ibid., 2 3. Large, $174,$177. IS Ibid., $180, John \Vheeler I3ennett,Nc;ncsisofPo;vc,’:TheGermanAnns’inPolitics,19181945(New York:St.Nlartin’sPress,1951), 689. 0 Hamerow, 19. ‘ \\‘heeler Bennett,690. Nlommsen,“TheGerman Resistance,”5127. 25 Nlecling,84 85. Nlommsen, ‘The German Resistance,”5114. 20 j LILI
Kiemens von Kiemperer, Gci,nunRcsi.stanceAgain.stHitler:TheSearchForAlliesAbioad,19381945(Oxford: Clarenclon Press, 1992), 61. n Hans Mommsen,“Social\‘iews and Constitutional Plans ofthe Resistance” in TheGermanResistancetoHitler,cci., Walter Schmitthcnner mc1Hans Buchheim (London: B.T.Batsford Ltd., 1970),61. RogerManvelland Heinrich Fraenkel, TheMcnU’holriecltoKillHitler(New York:Coward McNlann,Inc..1964),77. Hamerow’,20 21. 26 Ibid., 91. r Manvell, TheMen\\ ‘ho,77. Nloinmsen, Social Views,”61. Nlommsen, “The German Resistance,” 8117. Fabian von Schiabrendorff, TileSecretWarAgainstHitler(London: Hociclerand Stoughton Ltd., 1966),167. Roger Nianvellmc1Heinrich Fraenkel, TheCaiarisConspiracy(New York:DavidMcKayCompany, Inc.,1969),xxi. 32 Peter Hoffmann, Stauffcnbcrg:AFamilyHistory,19051941(New York:Cambridge University Press, 1995),282. Rothfels, 63. PierreGalante with EugeneSilianoff,QperationVcilkyrie:TheGermanGenerals’PlotAgainstHitler(New’York:Harperanci Row, 1981),34. Hamerow, 106. Schiabrendorff, 34. Klemens son Kiemperer, What Is The Law’That Lies Behind These \Vorclsi Antigone’s Question and the German Resistance Against Hitler,” TimeJournalofModernHistom’v64 (Dee., 1992):8109. Nleding, 64. Ibid., 3. 4’ Klemperer, “Antigone’s Question,” S107. Nleding, 64. 11 Rothfels, 67, Schlabrendorff, 22425. Terence Prittie. GennansAgainstHitler(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964),183. Klemperer, “Antigone’s Question,” S104. Ibid., ]$5. Hoifmann, Scatiffcnberg,210. Hnffrnann, Resistance,376. Nleding, 70.
“ Kiemperer, TtmeGermanResistance,106. Ibid. 52 Harnerow, 240, italics added. Ibid.
Kiempcrer,TheGcrmncumResistance,108. Hamerow, 231. Schlabrendorft, 89-90. Klemperer, TheGermammResistance,94 95. Hamerow, 258 59. Kiemperer, TheGermanResistance,87 $8. Hermann Graml, “ResistanceThinlang on Foreign Policy,”in TheGcrmanResistanceioHitier.ed.,Vs’alterSchmitthcnner and Hans Buchheim (London: B.T.BatsforclLtd., 1970), 9 10. Kiemperer,TimeGemwnResistance,97 99. 62 Ibid., 97.
20 ]cicobPcrnbcrton
Hamerow’,285. Nlecling, 190, 201. HoFfman,Stauffcnbcig,30. Hottmann, Rcsistancc,32]. Holfmann, Stauffcnbcrg,33, 37. 8 Nleding, 200. Hoffrnann,Siauffcnbcrg,68. Ibid., 284. ° Meding, 200. 72Haincrow’,2$5. ° Ibid., 312. ° Hoffmann, Statif[cnbcrg,132 33. ° Ibid., 152 55, passim. Galante, 39 40. Hamerow, 41 42. ° Prittie, 47. ° Hoftmann, Rcsistancc,184. ° Nfccling,67 68. Prittie, 225. 02 Ger van Roon, GconunRcsistancctoHitlcr:CountvonMoltkcandthcKrcisauCOvlc(London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 197]), 315.
Nlichaci Balkiurancl]ulian Frisby,HclniuthvonMoltkc:ALcaclcrAgainsHitlcr(london: NlacN4iIlan1_onclonlimited, 1972), 238 39. Ibid., 210. Ibid., 157.
Nlam cli, IhcMciiWho,76. Mcding, 77 78. BaIlout, 158and Mecling, 83, 130 31. Prittic, 226-27. ° Mommsen, “The German Resistance,” S116. Mommsen, ‘SocialView’s,”119. 02 Hamerow’,276 77. ° Grarnl, 13. ° Ibid.. 7. ° Hamerow’,27$ 79. ° Klempcrer, 11wGconanRcsistcmcc,223. Hamerow’, 318. Klcmperer,ThcGci’nianRcsistcuicc,342. Harnerow’,320. Holfmann, Rcsistancc,352-53. Hamerow’, 322. 02 Kiemperer, 11wGcrrnanRcsistancc,230. ‘° Ibid., 218 19. 101 Hamerow’, 33$. N1ommscn,“The German Resistance,” S119. ‘u Ibid., S]i$.
2] 2OJcti
1(17Mommsen, “Social\‘iews,” 98. kN HCum_tow, 286. IN Ivtommsen,“The German Resistance,” SI19. III Mommsen, “SocialView’s,”98 99. Hamerow, 65. 112HoI{mann Swiiffothcrg, 89 90. Hamerow, 69. Ibid., 384. Ibid., 297. “ Hoffmann, Stauffcnbcrg,81,92. 117Hamerow, 224 6. Ill Hoftmann, Rcsistancc,318. “ Ibid., 189 90. 211Mommsen, “SocialViews,” 12325. 121Hoffmann, RcsLstcijicc,186,193. 22 Mommsen, “SocialViews,” 11719. 2; Hoitmann, Rcsistcncc,187, l2 Mnmmsen, “SocialViews,” 122. Hoftmann, Rcsi.ou,ncc,367. 126 Momi’nsen,120 21. 127 Pritrie, 221. 1211Hoflmann, Rcs,sIuHcc,367. 211Prittie, 23$. Hamerow’, 324. il Ibid., 404 05.