2. Alexander Hamilton Versus Thomasjefferson on Popular Rule
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2. Alexander Hamilton Versus Thomas Jefferson on Popular Rule (I 780s—l820s) Presideizt ‘ashiiigtoii S aristocratic and monarchical appearance may have of /nzcled Senator Maclci’, it ho became aJdilower of Thomas Jefferson, bitt it did not disturb Secretary of the Treasur). Hamilton. The youthfi.t1financiei tho)gh born in bumble circumstances; had developed a profound distrust of common people. in contrast, Jefferson, a Virginia planter-aristocrat, championed the common folk. Faith in the informed masses became the cornerstone of Jefferson’s Democratic Republican party; distrust of the masses and the cultivation of special interests be came the cornerstone of Hamilton s Federalist party. Following are the conflicting opinions of the two great leaders over a period ofyears. The initial quotations from HamiltonJbrmed a part ofhisfive-hon r speech before the constitutional convention in Philadelphia (seep. 1 76). To what extent were Hamilton andJefferson both right 2 Who, on balance, was the more sound? Note that in the light of subsequent history Jefferson, particitlarly, was prone to exaggerate, and that some of these observations were written privately and in the heat of bitterpartisan struggles. Hamilton Jefferson All communities divide themselves Those who labor in the earth are into the few and the many. The first are the chosen people of God, if ever he the rich and well born; the other, the had a chosen people, whose breasts he mass of the people. The voice of the has made his peculiar deposit for sub people has been said to be the voice stantial and genuine virtue. (1784) of God; and however generally this Men. are naturally divided into and believed, maxim has been quoted two parties. Those who fear and dis it is not true in fact. The people are tur trust the people... Those who iden they seldom bulent and changing; tify themselves with the people, have Give there judge or determine right. confidence in them, cherish and con perma fore to the first class a distinct, sider them as the most honest and nent share in the government. They safe. depository of the public unsteadiness of the sec will check the interest. (1824) ond; and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore The mass of mankind has not been will ever maintain good government. born with saddles on their backs, nor a Can a democratic assembly, who favored few booted and spurred, ready annually [through annual elections] re to ride them legitimately, by the ace volve in the mass of the people, be of God. (1826) the public supposed steadily to pursue Every government degenerates good? Nothing but a permanent body when trusted to the rulers. alone. of democ can check the imprudence The people themselves are its only safe and uncontrolling racy. Their turbulent depositories. (1787) disposition requires checks. (1787) Take mankind in general, they are I have such reliance on the good vicious—their passions may be oper sense of the body of the people and I am ated upon.. Take mankind as they the honesty of their leaders that are, and what are they governed by? not afraid of their letting things go Their passions. There may be in every wrong to any length in any cause. government a few choice spirits, who (1788) may act from more worthy motives. Hamilton Jefferson One great error is that we suppose Whenever the people are well- mankind more honest than they are. informed, they can be trusted with Our prevailing passions are ambition their own government; whenever and interest; and it will be the duty of a things get so far wrong as to attract wise government to avail itself of those their notice, they may be relied on to passions, in order to make them sub set them to rights. (1789) servient to the public good. (1787) Your people, sir, is a great beast. I am not among those who fear (According to legend, c. 1792) the people. They, and not the rich, are our dependence for continued freedom. (1816) I have an indifferent [low] opinion I have great confidence in the of the honesty of this country, and ill common sense of mankind in general. forebodings as to its future system. (1800) (1783) I said that I was affectionately at My most earnest wish is to see the tached to the republican theory. I republican element of popular control add that I have strong hopes of the pushed to the maximum of its practica success of that theory; but, in candor, I ble exercise. I shall then believe that ought also to add that I am far from our government may be pure and being without doubts. I consider its perpetual. (1816) success as yet a problem. (1792) ojAlexander Hamiltoiz (New York: -Lxcipts found for he most part in S. K. Padover, ed,, The Aiiiici ofAlexaflderHaIlil!1011 (1957): S. K. Padover, ed, Row, 19S8>: P. B. Morris. ed., The Basic Ideas Harper & App1eton-CentU Company, 1939). Thomas Jo//maui? (a? Deniocrac,r (New York and London: D. 3. The Clash over States’ Rights (I 780s—1820s) Hamilton, distrusting and fearing the states, strove to build up a powerful central government at their expense. Jefferson, distrzisting andfearing a potent central gov ernment strove to safeguard states’ rights at its expense. Which of the two men was closer to the truth in the light of subsequent history, particularly in the matter of grassroots supervision ofgovernment? Hamilton Jefferson A firm Union will be of the utmost I am not a friend to a very ener moment to the peace and liberty of the getic government. It is always oppres states, as a barrier against domestic fac sive. It places the governors indeed tion and insurrection. (1 787) more at their ease, at the expense of the people. (1787) A state government will ever be If ever this vast country is brought the rival power of the general govern under a single government, it will be ment. (1787) one of the most extensive corruption. (1822) As to the destruction of state gov Our country is too large to have all ernments, the great and real anxiety is its affairs directed by a single govern to be able to preserve the national ment. Public servants, at such a distance [government] from the too potent and and from under the eye of their con counteracting influence of those gov stituents, must, from the circumstance of ernments. As to the state govern distance, be unable to administer and ments, the prevailing bias of my overlook all the details necessary for judgment is that if they can be circum the good government of the citizens; scribed within bounds consistent with and the same circumstance, by render the preservation of the national gov ing detection impossible to their con ernment, they will prove useful and stituents, will invite the public agents to salutary. corruptinn, plunder, and waste. If the states were all of the size of What an augmentation of the field Connecticut, Maryland, or New Jersey, for jobbing, speculating, plundering, I should decidedly regard the local office-building, and office-hunting governments as both safe and useful. would be produced by an assumption As the thing now is, however, I ac of all the state powers into the hands of knowledge the most serious apprehen the general government. The true the sions that the government of the ory of our Constitution [strict construc United States will not be able to main tion] is surely the wisest and best—that tain itself against their influence. I see the states are independent as to every that influence already penetrating into thing within themselves, and united as the national councils and preventing to everything respecting foreign na their direction. tions. Let the general government be Hence, a disposition on my part reduced to foreign concerns only, and towards a liberal construction of the let our affairs be disentangled from powers of the national government, those of all other nations, except as to and to erect every fence to guard it commerce, which the merchants will from depredations which is, in my manage the better, the more they are opinion, consistent with constitutional left free to manage themselves. And our propriety. As to any combination to general government may he reduced to prostrate the state governments, I dis a very simple organization and a very avow and deny it. (1792) unexpensive one: a few plain duties to he performed by a few servants. (1800) 3See the work.s of Padover and Morris previously cited in note 2, p. 189. 4. The Spectrum of Disagreement (I 780s—1820s) At the rear entrance of Jeffersons imposing Virginia home, Monticello, busts of Hamilton andJefferson stood opposite each other. The guide used to tell tourists that /ej/rson placed them there because the two men had opposed each other in qfe, and they might as well stand opposite each other in death. In the J’ollowing quotations, and how what do they agree on, what a. i-c their most fundamental disagreements. fair are they in assessing each other? Hamilton Jefferson A national debt, if it is not exces No man is more ardently intent sive, will be to us a national blessing. to see the public debt soon and sa (1/81) credly paid off than I am. This exactly marks the difference between Colonel If all the public creditors receive Hamilton’s views and mine, that I their dues one source ... their in from would wish the debt paid tomorrow; terest will be the same. And having the he wishes it never to be paid, but al same interests, they will unite in sup ways to be a thing wherewith to cor arrangements of the port of the fiscal rupt and manage the legislature government, (C.