applyparastyle “fig//caption/p[1]” parastyle “FigCapt” Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 11 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach 00 Charlemagne’s Health in ‘Old Age’: Did It Affect Carolingian Military Strategy? 00 11 During the first thirty-three years of his reign as king of the Franks, i.e., prior to his 54 coronation as emperor on Christmas day 800, Charlemagne, scholars generally agree, pursued a successful long-term offensive and expansionist strategy. This strategy was 2020 aimed at conquering large swaths of erstwhile imperial territory in the west and brin- ging under Carolingian rule a wide variety of peoples, who either themselves or their regional predecessors previously had not been subject to Frankish regnum.1 For a very long time, scholars took the position that Charlemagne continued to pursue this expan- sionist strategy throughout the imperial years, i.e., from his coronation on Christmas Day 800 until his final illness in later January 814. For example, Louis Halphen obser- ved: “comme empereur, Charles poursuit, sans plus, l’oeuvre entamée avant l’an 800.”2 F. L. Ganshof, who also wrote several studies treating Charlemagne’s army, was in lock step with Halphen and observed: “As emperor, Charlemagne pursued the political and military course he had been following before 25 December 800.”3 In a similar vein, Ferdinand Lot made clear that Charlemagne continued his previ- ous expansionist war aims and divided the responsibilities for carrying out his impe- rial strategy of expansion among his three sons. Lot observed: “Il laisse ce soin à ses fils: Charles, l’ainé, lutte contre les Slaves; Pépin, roi d’Italie, contra les Avars...; Louis bataille dans la Marche d’Espagne. L’empereur gouverne l’État....”4 Philippe Contami- ne, whose La Guerre au Moyen Âge was published in 1980 and replaced Lot’s L’A r t militaire as the basic Francophone treatment of medieval warfare, did not alter the prevailing view of continuity regarding Charlemagne’s military strategy through the imperial period.5 J. F. Verbruggen, in his dissertation, De Krigskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleleeuwen, like his Doctor-Father, F. L. Ganshof, saw no reason to believe that Charlemagne had altered his military strategy after becoming emperor in 800.6 Verbruggen views have remained constant in this regard as demonstrated in the sec- ond edition of the English translation of this work published in 1997.7 To summarize the long-held view, medievalists and especially those who did a great deal of work on Charlemagne’s reign as well as in military history, saw basic conti- nuity in the pursuit of an expansionist military strategy from the pre-imperial period until the emperor’s death.8 Some of these scholars, who believed that the Carolingian government continued to pursue a consistent offensive strategy, nevertheless drew the conclusion that during imperial period Charlemagne’s efforts were less successful than had been the case previously.9 It is important to recognize, however, that Charlemagne continued to pursue traditional Carolingian long-term expansionist strategy during the imperial period. Such a strategy, however, proves neither that the judgment, regarding his efforts were, on balance, successful or that these failed. Recognition that Charle- The online edition of this publication is available open access and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution CC-BY 4.0 license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach https://doi.org/10.3726/med.2019.01.01 12 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 magne was committed to a long-term strategy and the judgment of the relative success of that strategy, however measured, are separate issues. The Revisionists In the wake of World War Two, the view emerged that Charlemagne was comparative- ly unsuccessful in maintaining the level of significant accomplishment and especially military accomplishment during the imperial period that had prevailed prior to his coronation.10 These efforts were intended to cut down to size Charlemagne’s larger than life image and to undermine the heroic status he had attained among supposedly romantic and/or nationalist historians during the centuries following his death. The revisionist were driven, in part, by the emperor’s glowing if not exaggerated reputation as the “Father of Europe” (Europae Pater), which had flourished widely for more than a millennium prior to the war.11 This was the case not only in song and story, such as in various versions of the Chanson de Roland, but also among professional historians, who by the second half of the twentieth century came to be considered by many scho- lars to be Romantics.12 These post-war attacks on the effectiveness of Charlemagne’s rule during the im- perial era were, in my view, excessive if not, in fact, hypercritical. At times, some cri- tiques of Charlemagne would seem to have been driven by a dramatic and unjustified overreaction during the immediate post-war era to propaganda efforts that had been launched by the Nazis even before the war. These writers claimed that Charlemagne and his European-wide empire, which was created through the deployment of an ex- pansionist military strategy especially toward the east, were, in fact, a forerunner of Hitler’s efforts. The wide spread condemnation of Hitler throughout Europe in the wake of the German defeat and all for which he stood, is thought to have rubbed off on Charlemagne’s reputation.13 Numerous historians seem to have accepted Hitler’s propaganda at face value re- garding Charlemagne’s behavior and used this information to tar the emperor’s repu- tation. However, quite contrary to Nazi claims and war aims, Charlemagne’s expan- sionist military strategy overall was focused on recreating a Christian-Roman empire in the West on the model then attributed to Constantine the Great (d. 337).14 The pope’s early reference to Charlemagne as “Novus Constantinus” makes this point clear no later than 778, the traditional date, but this honor could have been developed by the pope perhaps even as early as 774.15 In fact, before the end of 774, Charlemagne was ruler of both the regnum Francorum and the regnum Langobardorum, in a context in which the rule of more than one kingdom was a sine qua non for elevation to the impe- rial title.16 Another and closely connected example of this Christian-imperial ideology at work was the pope’s vigorous support for Charlemagne’s offensive military strategy in regard to the Iberian peninsula, which the papacy saw as an effort that would free Christians from the yoke of Muslim oppression.17 Charlemagne, in fact, pursued policies that were intended to have the Christian faith infused into all governmental institutions and policies so that his subjects would Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 13 have an increased and over time an increasing opportunity to find salvation.18 In this context, the claim by Johannes Fried that Charlemagne strove for peace, especially du- ring the later years of his reign, is likely accurate.19 However, it should be emphasized that Charlemagne’s vision of peace or at least his on-going strategy for establishing and maintaining peace would appear to have been somewhat more military oriented than the solely church-oriented approach that Fried attributes to the emperor. Charlemagne in seeking peace surely was dedicated to church reform and perhaps more fundamentally to religious reform. He was influenced, fundamentally, by the teaching of St. Augustine, whose City of God, as Einhard made clear, was a favorite of the emperor.20 As Wallace-Hadrill emphasized, in this context, the North African church father averred that peace was the result of victory in a just war.21 Charlemagne, of course, had no doubts about the justice of his wars.22 In this context, it is likely, as well, that Charlemagne was no doubt well acquainted with the De re militari of Vege- tius, Augustine’s contemporary, who unambiguously trumpeted the long-held maxim that those who seek peace must prepare for war, “qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bel- lum.”(bk. III, Prol.)23 In fact, yet another Carolingian copy of Vegetius’ text was pro- duced ca. 800 at the monastery of Fleury, which at this time was under the leadership Theodulf of Orleans, Charlemagne’s close adviser.24 Although Charlemagne sought peace, he undoubtedly treated Saxon rebels harshly on occasion. However, he executed relatively large numbers only when these men had violated their oaths of faithfulness and as perjurers rose in revolt against him. Char- lemagne certainly did not regard the Saxons as Untermenchen who constituted a race with whom Franks were forbidden to have sexual relations. The emperor, himself, had a Saxon concubine and his paternal uncle Bernard had a Saxon wife. Clearly, there was no effort or even intention to have the Saxon gens exterminated. In fact, Char- lemagne never established a genocidal program aimed at the elimination or even at the enslavement of the Saxons as a people. Rather, he labored, some times in a rather heavy handed manner, to convert the Saxons to Christianity, some of whom he found it necessary to resettle beyond the borders of the Saxon region to reduce the negative impact of their frequent military efforts.25 No less important in undermining efforts to find comparisons between Hitler and Charlemagne is the emperor’s treatment of the Jews in his empire. This certainly must be treated as a key point for anyone who would compare the emperor’s policies to those of the Nazi. In fact, Charlemagne pursued a positive policy not only toward those Jews who dwelled within his empire but also in regard to Jews who came as merchants and envoys from beyond the borders.