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Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 11 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach

00 Charlemagne’s Health in ‘Old Age’: Did It Affect Carolingian Military Strategy? 00

11 During the first thirty-three years of his reign as king of the Franks, i.e., prior to his 54 coronation as emperor on Christmas day 800, Charlemagne, scholars generally agree, pursued a successful long-term offensive and expansionist strategy. This strategy was 2020 aimed at conquering large swaths of erstwhile imperial territory in the west and brin- ging under Carolingian rule a wide variety of peoples, who either themselves or their regional predecessors previously had not been subject to Frankish regnum.1 For a very long time, scholars took the position that Charlemagne continued to pursue this expansionist strategy throughout the imperial years, i.e., from his coronation on Christmas Day 800 until his final illness in later January 814. For example, Louis Halphen observed: “comme empereur, Charles poursuit, sans plus, l’oeuvre entamée avant l’an 800.”2 F. L. Ganshof, who also wrote several studies treating Charlemagne’s army, was in lock step with Halphen and observed: “As emperor, Charlemagne pursued the political and military course he had been following before 25 December 800.”3 In a similar vein, Ferdinand Lot made clear that Charlemagne continued his previous expansionist war aims and divided the responsibilities for carrying out his imperial strategy of expansion among his three sons. Lot observed: “Il laisse ce soin à ses fils: Charles, l’ainé, lutte contre les Slaves; Pépin, roi d’Italie, contra les Avars...; Louis bataille dans la Marche d’Espagne. L’empereur gouverne l’État....”4 Philippe Contami- ne, whose La Guerre au Moyen Âge was published in 1980 and replaced Lot’s L’A r t militaire as the basic Francophone treatment of medieval warfare, did not alter the prevailing view of continuity regarding Charlemagne’s military strategy through the imperial period.5 J. F. Verbruggen, in his dissertation, De Krigskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleleeuwen, like his Doctor-Father, F. L. Ganshof, saw no reason to believe that Charlemagne had altered his military strategy after becoming emperor in 800.6 Verbruggen views have remained constant in this regard as demonstrated in the sec ond edition of the English translation of this work published in 1997.7 To summarize the long-held view, medievalists and especially those who did a great deal of work on Charlemagne’s reign as well as in military history, saw basic continuity in the pursuit of an expansionist military strategy from the pre-imperial period until the emperor’s death.8 Some of these scholars, who believed that the Carolingian government continued to pursue a consistent offensive strategy, nevertheless drew the conclusion that during imperial period Charlemagne’s efforts were less successful than had been the case previously.9 It is important to recognize, however, that Charlemagne continued to pursue traditional Carolingian long-term expansionist strategy during the imperial period. Such a strategy, however, proves neither that the judgment, regarding his efforts were, on balance, successful or that these failed. Recognition that Charle- The online edition of this publication is available open access and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution CC-BY 4.0 license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

© 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach https://doi.org/10.3726/med.2019.01.01 12 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 magne was committed to a long-term strategy and the judgment of the relative success of that strategy, however measured, are separate issues.

The Revisionists

In the wake of World War Two, the view emerged that Charlemagne was comparative- ly unsuccessful in maintaining the level of significant accomplishment and especially military accomplishment during the imperial period that had prevailed prior to his coronation.10 These efforts were intended to cut down to size Charlemagne’s larger than life image and to undermine the heroic status he had attained among supposedly romantic and/or nationalist historians during the centuries following his death. The revisionist were driven, in part, by the emperor’s glowing if not exaggerated reputation as the “Father of Europe” (Europae Pater), which had flourished widely for more than a millennium prior to the war.11 This was the case not only in song and story, such as in various versions of the Chanson de Roland, but also among professional historians, who by the second half of the twentieth century came to be considered by many scholars to be Romantics.12 These post-war attacks on the effectiveness of Charlemagne’s rule during the imperial era were, in my view, excessive if not, in fact, hypercritical. At times, some critiques of Charlemagne would seem to have been driven by a dramatic and unjustified overreaction during the immediate post-war era to propaganda efforts that had been launched by the Nazis even before the war. These writers claimed that Charlemagne and his European-wide empire, which was created through the deployment of an expansionist military strategy especially toward the east, were, in fact, a forerunner of Hitler’s efforts. The wide spread condemnation of Hitler throughout Europe in the wake of the German defeat and all for which he stood, is thought to have rubbed off on Charlemagne’s reputation.13 Numerous historians seem to have accepted Hitler’s propaganda at face value regarding Charlemagne’s behavior and used this information to tar the emperor’s reputation. However, quite contrary to Nazi claims and war aims, Charlemagne’s expansionist military strategy overall was focused on recreating a Christian-Roman empire in the West on the model then attributed to Constantine the Great (d. 337).14 The pope’s early reference to Charlemagne as “Novus Constantinus” makes this point clear no later than 778, the traditional date, but this honor could have been developed by the pope perhaps even as early as 774.15 In fact, before the end of 774, Charlemagne was ruler of both the regnum Francorum and the regnum Langobardorum, in a context in which the rule of more than one kingdom was a sine qua non for elevation to the imperial title.16 Another and closely connected example of this Christian-imperial ideology at work was the pope’s vigorous support for Charlemagne’s offensive military strategy in regard to the Iberian peninsula, which the papacy saw as an effort that would free Christians from the yoke of Muslim oppression.17 Charlemagne, in fact, pursued policies that were intended to have the Christian faith infused into all governmental institutions and policies so that his subjects would Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 13 have an increased and over time an increasing opportunity to find salvation.18 In this context, the claim by Johannes Fried that Charlemagne strove for peace, especially during the later years of his reign, is likely accurate.19 However, it should be emphasized that Charlemagne’s vision of peace or at least his on-going strategy for establishing and maintaining peace would appear to have been somewhat more military oriented than the solely church-oriented approach that Fried attributes to the emperor. Charlemagne in seeking peace surely was dedicated to church reform and perhaps more fundamentally to religious reform. He was influenced, fundamentally, by the teaching of St. Augustine, whose City of God, as Einhard made clear, was a favorite of the emperor.20 As Wallace-Hadrill emphasized, in this context, the North African church father averred that peace was the result of victory in a just war.21 Charlemagne, of course, had no doubts about the justice of his wars.22 In this context, it is likely, as well, that Charlemagne was no doubt well acquainted with the De re militari of Vege- tius, Augustine’s contemporary, who unambiguously trumpeted the long-held maxim that those who seek peace must prepare for war, “qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bel- lum.”(bk. III, Prol.)23 In fact, yet another Carolingian copy of Vegetius’ text was produced ca. 800 at the monastery of Fleury, which at this time was under the leadership Theodulf of Orleans, Charlemagne’s close adviser.24 Although Charlemagne sought peace, he undoubtedly treated Saxon rebels harshly on occasion. However, he executed relatively large numbers only when these men had violated their oaths of faithfulness and as perjurers rose in revolt against him. Char- lemagne certainly did not regard the Saxons as Untermenchen who constituted a race with whom Franks were forbidden to have sexual relations. The emperor, himself, had a Saxon concubine and his paternal uncle Bernard had a Saxon wife. Clearly, there was no effort or even intention to have the Saxon gens exterminated. In fact, Char- lemagne never established a genocidal program aimed at the elimination or even at the enslavement of the Saxons as a people. Rather, he labored, some times in a rather heavy handed manner, to convert the Saxons to Christianity, some of whom he found it necessary to resettle beyond the borders of the Saxon region to reduce the negative impact of their frequent military efforts.25 No less important in undermining efforts to find comparisons between Hitler and Charlemagne is the emperor’s treatment of the Jews in his empire. This certainly must be treated as a key point for anyone who would compare the emperor’s policies to those of the Nazi. In fact, Charlemagne pursued a positive policy not only toward those Jews who dwelled within his empire but also in regard to Jews who came as merchants and envoys from beyond the borders. In addition, he protected Jews from some hostile elements among the Frankish clergy, and his efforts, in this regard, were continued with considerable vigor by his son Louis the Pious, much to the chagrin, for example, of Bishop Agobard of Lyons.26 Scholarly efforts in post-War Europe to diminish the effectiveness and even, indeed, the importance of Charlemagne’s reign, as a whole, ineluctably would seem to have seeped into discussion of his military operations during the imperial period.27 This critique, in general, tends to focus on Charlemagne’s supposed military failures while more or less ignoring or trying to explain away the many successes his strategy enjoyed during the imperial period.28 A second important problem, evident in some 14 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 scholarly treatments of the subject, is to blame Charlemagne for the supposed lack of accomplishments of his successor Louis the Pious, who is widely believed to have failed to maintain the offensive momentum that had been generated by his father’s earlier efforts.29 As a result of this unsupported negative treatment of Charlemagne’s military efforts during the imperial period (Louis is of no concern in this study), it has become popular among numerous scholars to believe that after he was crowned emperor on Christ- mas day 800, he altered what had been traditional long-term Carolingian offensive strategy and reoriented his military efforts toward a defense of the empire against the aggression of Vikings, Slavs, and Muslims.30 As Pierre Riché put it in a rather gentle manner: “The final period of Charlemagne’s reign was less a time of conquest than one of attempted consolidation.”31 Donald Bullough was far more stark when he observed in regard to the post-800 period: “organized wars of conquest were certainly a thing of the past”.”32 This view of a post-coronation Carolingian strategy oriented toward defense has even reached Anglophone textbooks and broadly based studies of military history, which have taken up this unsubstantiated and highly negative view of Carolingian military operations during Charlemagne’s imperial years. As Halsall put it in his textbook on early medieval warfare, “Charlemagne’s wars of expansion slowed down after the dramatic conquest of the Avar kingdom and the final grinding down of Saxon resistance by (sic) 802.”33 In 2011, John France, in his broadly based survey of war in the west concluded that “Carolingian expansion had ended by about 800.”34 Finally, in a recent textbook, the chronological limits of supposed Carolingian strategic reor- ientation or, at least, the retrenchment of Charlemagne’s strategy have been expanded, and it is claimed that the emperor oversaw “The tailing-off of wars of conquest in the 790s, and their cessation in the very early 800s....”35 More than a few Germanophone and Francophone scholars have echoed such claims regarding the imperial period.36 As is obvious from the discussion above, the chronology provided by the Revisio- nists regarding Charlemagne’s supposed abandonment of what is recognized to have been traditional Carolingian expansionist military strategy is less than consistent. Some scholars see the process beginning as early as the 790s, others focus on the period following Charlemagne’s acquisition of the imperial title in 800, while still others attribute this change to the period after the final conquest of the Avar and Saxon territories. Halsall, as noted above, decided to place Charlemagne’s putative change in strategy at the end of the Saxon war, which, however, he erroneously dates to 802 rather than 804. It is noteworthy, as well, that Halsall also calls attention to the end of the Avar conquest, but does not date it.37 It is generally agreed that the final major Ca- rolingian campaign of conquest against the Avars dates to 803. But, it is also clear that several additional noteworthy military operations were undertaken into the region during the remainder of Charlemagne’s reign, i.e., in 805, 806, and 811.38 Etienne Renaud argues for 808 as marking the end of Charlemagne’s offensive strategy, i.e., almost two-thirds through the imperial era.39 However, he bases this view on a misuse of several military capitularies issued by the central government during this period.40 Other scholars are rather vague and do not provide a chronology for Charlemagne’s supposed strategic volte-face although placing it some time during the imperial period.41 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 15

The “Old Age” Topos

Among the various arguments that have been put forth to explain Charlemagne’s supposed alteration of Carolingian military strategy from the offense to the defense during the imperial period or at least the latter part of his reign, considerable attention has been given to his old age and to his supposed ill health.42 The state of the question, as noted by Janet Nelson, is to see “Charlemagne himself, old and ill, his bodily decline aptly mirroring the state’s dissolution, as he was no longer able to inspire and run an effective regime.”43 Among those scholars, who assert the “old and ill” cliché identified by Nelson but which she rejects, J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, for example, did not hesitate to exploit the potential explanatory possibilities inherent in this approach to the emperor’s behavior. Thus, he concluded confidently, i.e., without qualification, regarding the supposed abandonment or at least the significant diminution of Carolingian traditional expansionist efforts: “the old man had lost his vigor and was content to stay at home.”44 In a similar manner, the noted German historian Johannes Fried claims in regard to the imperial period, “By this time Charlemagne was approaching his dotage, and would no longer be able to achieve what he had planned.”45 Paul Dutton is a bit more circumspect and suggests that “Old age impaired the peripatetic function.... [as] Charlemagne, for instance, made Aachen his principal palace during the last twenty years of his life....”46 In addition, Dutton believes that Charle- magne altered traditional Carolingian offensive military strategy and that he did so, at least in large part, because of his old age.47 In fact, Dutton claims that Charlemagne made Aachen his “principal palace” and primary residence when he was only just beyond his fiftieth birthday. This, according to Dutton, was the result of the fact that apparently Charlemagne’s health was so impaired “during the last twenty years of his life” that he was unable to maintain his previous peripatetic style.48 It requires empha- sis that such a view of Charlemagne’s travel for military and for other purposes during the last twenty years of his life is firmly contradicted by the numerous narrative and documentary sources that provide information regarding his activities. These texts indicate that Charlemagne maintained an itinerary that was no less arduous during the last two decades of his reign than had been the case during the prior quarter-century.49 Some scholars, e.g., F. L. Ganshof and Heinrich Fichtenau, ventured firmly into the realm of metaphor while pursuing a line of argument that employed the “old age” topos as a cause for the “decomposition” of the empire. They linked the emperor’s old age with what they see to have been the aging and, therefore, the necessary weakness and decline of the empire, itself.50 Ganshof and Fichtenau make a bold effort to tie together, in a neat stylistic package, the idea of human senescence, fundamental to an understanding of physical and perhaps even mental decline among homo sapiens as a species with the use of an organic metaphor for the purpose of examining human institutions, e.g. the empire, in order provide an argument based upon mutually rein- forcing topoi.51 This technique of applying an organic metaphor to institutions, which, of course, are not organic in a physical sense, and the decay of the human body often has been used with significant rhetorical effect, but lacks methodological rigor.52 It is obvious that those who serve as officials, for example, in a particular governmental institution 16 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 are flesh and blood and, therefore, do “decay” as do all humans. However, it was Char- lemagne’s policy to avoid such a decline of governmental institutions by having younger men regularly trained so that older men, who could no longer carry out their tasks, could be replaced. Just as men were trained for service in the church, especially in the royal chapel, other young men were trained in various scholae to serve the government as “civilian administrators” in what profitably can be understood as the secular bureaucracy and still others were trained to serve as military leaders.53

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The burden of this paper is to suggest that during the imperial period and especially during the last years of that period, Charlemagne was neither debilitated by ill health in ‘old age’ nor by the supposed ravages of ‘old age’ itself, as many scholars have claimed. Therefore, the analogy between the emperor’s putative frail health and/or the decline of the empire will be shown to have failed its first test. Consequently, for those scholars who seek to find some cause for a supposed significant alteration in -Ca rolingian military strategy during the imperial period of Charlemagne’s reign, it will be necessary to search for causes other than the emperor’s supposed ill health and/or the supposed ravages of old age, which, as noted above, some scholars have identified as of considerable importance in establishing the state of the question as noted above by Nelson. However, before moving on to a discussion of what various early ninth century authors had to say about Charlemagne’s health and old age, it is important to emphasize that writers at the Carolingian court were guided in a formal sense on this subject by the very well known life cycle paradigm that had been published almost two centuries earlier by Isidore of Seville (d. 635) in his very widely read Etymologies.54 In fact, Hrabanus Maurus, who was a student of Charlemagne’s close adviser, Alcuin (d. 804), at Tours, and later became abbot of Fulda and Archbishop of Mainz, incorporated this paradigm into his own encyclopedia. This effort may be taken as evidence of the importance of Isidore’s paradigm during the first half of the ninth century in the Frankish world.55 When Charlemagne became emperor in December of 800, he was almost two years short of his sixtieth birthday, the mid-point in Isidore’s paradigm of the penultimate life-period known as gravitas, which spanned the chronological segment from fifty to seventy years of age. Old age (senectus), as understood by the emperor’s contemporaries on the basis of Isidore’s teaching, only began with one’s seventieth year. Charle- magne, in fact, was in his seventy-second year when he died on 28 January 814, and, thus, at that time it was obvious to contemporary writers, as will be seen below, that he was old (senex) or in “old age” (senectus).56 With Isidore’s paradigm in mind, it is to be noted that the idea of both human physical and mental decline in senescence not only is a very old topos but also is a well-recognized biological fact.57 Modern research as well as our historical sources, however, make it very clear that the chronology of change among humans, or perhaps more accurately, patterns Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 17 of physical and mental decline, vary considerably among individuals and undoubtedly are closely connected with natural longevity, which, itself, we now understand to have a genetic underpinning.58 Therefore, it is hardly a cause for surprise that during the later eighth and early ninth centuries when several of Charlemagne’s most senior courtiers, themselves, were growing old, some of these men did not ignore the subject of the real or potentially deleterious impact of aging.59 For example, during the later eighth century, Alcuin, who likely was in his early to mid-sixties when he died in 804, wrote with some frequency in regard to his own aging and would seem to have associated this process with what he regarded as his chronic ill health.60 Alcuin’s frequent reference to his own health problems may perhaps have encouraged Theodulf of Orleans, another of Charlemagne’s close advisers, to think of his Anglo-Saxon colleague as a hypochondriac.61 Despite Alcuin’s frequent comments concerning his own ill health, however, he has nothing of importance to say about this topic in regard to Charlemagne. This is quite notable because the emperor was nearing his sixty-second year when Alcuin penned his final letter, and thus well into the period of life during which many men did and do suffer from a range of physical complaints and even significant illnesses. In fact, Alcuin did not even hint in his very numerous private letters to friends and colleagues that Charlemagne was ailing either physically or mentally. Much less did Alcuin leave the impression that old age had in any way a negative impact on the emperor.62 More particularly, in the one letter in which Alcuin takes note of Charlemagne suffering from an illness nothing is said regarding the situation as having some relation to his long-term health or as having a negative impact on the health of the empire.63 In fact, Charlemagne’s ill health in 796, the year to which this illness is dated, did not keep him from undertaking military operations during that campaigning season nor was he kept from the field during the following year.64 Some scholars, however, seem to believe that Alcuin did project the pathology of decline in “old age” onto the world around him, i.e., during the early years of Char- lemagne’s imperial reign.65 There is no doubt, for example, that Alcuin claimed on several occasions that “the times are dangerous” (tempora sunt periculosa).66 The use of this well-worn phrase, however, does not bring into direct focus matters of old age, either for persons or “empires.” Rather, Alcuin’s use of the “dangerous times” topos likely was stimulated, at least, initially by various military successes that “pagans” had enjoyed against Christians in the recent past, and especially by Viking raiders in Britain.67 The fact that attacks were taking place in Alcuin’s homeland undoubtedly played a role here. More generally, however, the rhetorical piling up of military disasters, as some scholars have concluded, is more likely to have been seen by contemporaries as evocative of the coming of the apocalypse rather than of “old age,” itself.68 It would appear that a much more pressing concern for Alcuin in the immediate present was that the Viking raids took place against his homeland, and he perceived these as a terrible scourge.69 This was the case especially with regard to the pagan attack on and the sacking of the monastery at Lindisfarne in 793. Clearly, Alcuin identified with the suffering endured by the monks there. In fact, he wrote a lengthy poem, De clade Lindisfarensis monasterii, passionately lamenting the sack of the monastery.70 His apparent major purpose, among others of lesser import, was to emphasize to those monks, who had survived and might yet be subjected to additional attacks, that history 18 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 is filled with sadness. The suffering of these monks, Alcuin believed, had a greater purpose in God’s plan for faithful Christians.71 In cataloging significant numbers of military disasters to demonstrate this point regarding Christian suffering at the hands of “pagans,” which evoked the “dangerous times” topos, Alcuin calls attention to the successes enjoyed by Christianity’s enemies in Africa, Asia, and Spain. The geographical distribution of these disasters makes clear that the “pagan” successes to which Alcuin is referring are those inflicted by Mus- lims.72 However, just as Alcuin does not apply the topos of physical or mental decline to Charlemagne personally in the context of the aging process, the emperor’s Anglo- Saxon counselor, as the list of areas, cited above, makes clear, exempts the regnum Francorum from the military disasters inflicted by Muslims throughout various other parts of the Christian world. Thus, Alcuin indicates in a somewhat roundabout manner that Charlemagne’s military operations were successful against the “Hagarites.”73 Einhard, like Alcuin, was a very close confident of Charlemagne. The two intellectuals would appear to have been close friends, and Einhard makes it clear that he much admired Alcuin.74 However, unlike his Anglo-Saxon colleague, Einhard outlived the emperor and wrote his famous Vita Karoli not long after Charlemagne’s death.75 In the Vita, Einhard is not at all focused on the matter of the emperor’s aging during the imperial period as a whole. He in no way suggests that Charlemagne’s capacity to rule effectively was impaired by the fact that he was getting older or, for that matter, by any other circumstances, including fevers, perhaps a mild case of malaria, and a limp, which likely was caused by an occasional attack of gout.76 In addition, Einhard does not leave the impression that either the regnum Francorum or the empire, as a whole, was growing old under Charlemagne’s rule and, as a result of such a process, was advancing toward a state of decomposition.77 In fact, Einhard only addresses the subject of Charlemagne’s aging in a direct manner when he observes: “At the very end of his life he was worn down by ill health and old age.”78 How “worn down” Charlemagne may have been, even during the last few months of his life, likely should be understood in relation to what had been his normal pattern of behavior prior to senectus.79 Of course, Einhard, who was very well acquainted with the emperor’s traditional schedule, certainly was well positioned to judge the pattern of his behavior.80 If, for example, we look at the last year of Charlemagne’s life in close detail, it is clear that Charlemagne maintained his traditional very busy schedule, which began at Aachen during the winter of 812–813. It was normally the case during the winter months that the royal or imperial agenda, including plans for forthcoming major military operations, were established.81 However, it was the case that on occasion various military campaigns, in fact, were set in motion while these winter meetings were in the process of being undertaken. This was what happened, for example, in the 776-invasion of Italy.82

Charlemagne’s Last Year

In 812–813, at these winter planning meetings, which following usual procedure continued into the spring, Charlemagne focused on maintaining two important policies that he been set in motion earlier. He sought to continue his offensive military and Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 19 diplomatic strategy in the western Mediterranean and strove to codify many of the religious reforms that he and his advisers had been developing in the longue durée, i.e., even before he became emperor.83 Charlemagne and his court advisers also concluded that it was the proper time to establish the emperor’s only surviving legitimate son, Louis the Pious, as co-emperor. This was to be done at an assembly that was to meet in September 813 at Aachen. Charlemagne would seem to have regarded the establishment in 812 of his grandson Bernard as king of Italy in place of the latter’s recently deceased father, Pippin, as a necessary pre-requisite to Louis’ elevation to the imperial throne as co-emperor.84 With regard to diplomacy, Charlemagne oversaw plans to continue his ongoing efforts that were intended to result in the finalization of negotiations with the east Roman Empire regarding Byzantine recognition of his imperial title.85 Therefore, he arranged to dispatch Bishop Amalhar of Trier and Abbot Peter of Nonantola to Constantinople, and, in addition, he dictated a letter to the emperor on the matter to be conveyed by these envoys to the Byzantine capital.86 There, the Frankish envoys were to follow Charlemagne’s instructions to ratify the agreement with the emperor Michael, that had been worked out in previous negotiations with his predecessor Nikephoros, who recently had been killed in the course of military operations against the Bulgars.87 In military terms, at this time, Charlemagne’s attention also was focused on the Mediterranean, particularly the western reaches of the inland sea. It was his aim to continue naval operations against Muslim fleets that were challenging the Carolingian position in the Balearic Islands. These efforts were intended to maintain his previously developed strategy to continue offensive military operations against Muslim assets in both Spain and Italy.88 In addition, it is clear that during this period, as well, Charle- magne was awaiting further intelligence regarding the complex military and political situation to the northeast of the Frankish kingdom. This intelligence was focused on the behavior of factions in the Danish kingdom that on the one hand were struggling to seize control of the royal throne while at the same time threatening the Frankish controlled Saxon border and Carolingian policy in regard to various Slavic groups.89 During these winter planning sessions at Aachen, Charlemagne also oversaw the arrangements that were necessary for the summoning of five regional church synods to be held within the borders of the regnum Francorum the following spring and summer.90 Documents were drawn up by the central government at Aachen to summon the ecclesiastical magnates who were to attend each of these councils. The scores of attendees, who were summoned to the councils, also were provided with an agenda or program, i.e., admonitio. Thus, the assembled clerics at each gathering would be able to focus their discussions and perhaps enact canons that were appropriate to Charlemagne’s overall policy aims that were focused on continuing various aspects of Carolingian religious reform.91 In addition, it was necessary that at these planning sessions, that were being held in the winter and spring of 813 at Aachen, for appropriate measures to be taken in order to make possible the summoning of a massive assembly of important secular and ecclesiastical magnates that was to meet at the capital early in September.92 Among the items on the agenda for this assembly in September, it is clear that members of the central government were to be called upon to consider the reports that were to be 20 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 produced at the five regional synods, which were to be presented to the court by representatives sent to Aachen by these, above mentioned, councils. These documents were slated to be considered by Charlemagne’s religious advisers for possible governmental action that would be decided upon by the emperor.93 Also, and certainly not as an afterthought, the major aspect of the September assembly in 813 was to be focused on the elevation of Louis the Pious, who was to be crowned as Charlemagne’s co-emperor and presumptive successor as ruler of the entire Carolingian empire. Planning in great detail had to be undertaken that was consistent with the great importance of the event. For example, ceremonies, in the tradition of imitatio imperii had to be planned for the crowning, itself, as well as other events including various church services.94 In this regard it was necessary, for example, to arrange for clearly established seating arrangements according to a well-understood system of protocol for the allotment of places in the royal chapel, which seated some 7,000 people.95 Obviously, the possibility that large numbers of distinguished lay and ecclesiastical magnates with their entourages might be seen to jostle with each other in seeking places in the chapel that they coveted surely had to be avoided.96 In addition, various speeches had to be written. This certainly was the case for Charlemagne’s speech from the throne in the course of which he “instructed” Louis the Pious in some specific detail regarding matters of good government.97 All of these plans along with the relevant “paper work” either was prepared or at least set in motion at Aachen under Charlemagne’s leadership during the winter and early spring of 813. The relatively little that we do know or even can surmise about this “paper work” and the detailed instructions that went with it, of course, likely is only a fraction of what was done as we have only very limited sources regarding these matters in the west at this time. However, the Carolingians were well acquainted with various complex Byzantine ceremonial practices, which required elaborate planning, and many scholars hypothesize that these were utilized as models, at least in part, by Charlemagne’s officials.98 Nevertheless, we do know that in May Charlemagne is reported to have sent the above-mentioned emissaries, Amalhar and Peter, off to Con stantinople with their instructions. The time for their departure would seem to have been based on taking advantage of the mild weather that was regarded as easing the difficulties traditionally associated with long distance travel when undertaken earlier in the year.99 Following the dispatch of his envoys to Constantinople, Charlemagne, likely, also taking advantage of the fair weather, began the first of what would be two separate and lengthy hunting campaigns during the remainder of 813.100 This first campaign saw the royal hunting party depart from Aachen in May.101 This expedition was to last for some five months, i.e., into late August or early September.102 From an organiza- tional perspective and in terms both of its size and complexity, this operation should be considered to have required an effort not greatly dissimilar to that of mobilizing a small army. Traditionally included in such Carolingian expeditions were professional hunters, court officials, servants, and military personnel, i.e., a corps of bodyguards, as well as women.103 This hunt in the spring of 813, unlike the second hunt in the late summer and early autumn, see below, required a journey of a hundred kilometers or so from Aachen into the largely unsettled wilds of the Ardennes forest.104 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 21

Charlemagne continued to enjoy the hunt throughout most of the summer, and is reported to have returned to Aachen only late in August as the result of an attack of the gout.105 It may be conjectured that Charlemagne’s gout was a chronic ailment to which apparently he was prone and the fact that Louis the Pious suffered from this ailment as well, is likely reflected by the fact that this disease has a strong genetic component.106 This attack of gout made it too uncomfortable for Charlemagne to continue the very strenuous and dangerous exercise of hunting large wild animals either on foot or from horseback.107 In fact, the author of the Royal Annals indicates that in light of the sever- ity of the attack, Charlemagne was forced to take to his bed.108 It may be suggested, in this context, that Charlemagne’s limp, to which Einhard calls the attention of his readers, was the result of occasional attacks of the gout.109 This disease, of course, is not caused by old age, but could be exacerbated by a too rich diet, of the type that Charlemagne is known to have preferred.110 It is clear, however, that Charlemagne, whether hampered by gout but otherwise healthy, had to return to Aachen by early September, at the latest. This schedule was established by his decision, made during the winter meetings at Aachen in 813, to summon a large assembly to meet at the capital early in September in order to oversee discussion of the results produced by the clergy at the five regional meetings, noted above, that he had ordered to be undertaken earlier in the year.111 Perhaps even more importantly, at this assembly, Charlemagne was scheduled to preside over the ceremonies by which Louis the Pious was to be elevated to the office of co-emperor in a manner widely understood by modern scholars to be consistent with the firmly held Carolingian “ideology” of imitatio imperii.112 At this great assembly in early September, representatives of those ecclesiastics, who had attended the five synods that had met earlier in the year at Mainz, Rheims, Tours, Chalon-sur-Saône, and Arles, presented to Charlemagne the texts of the five sets of findings that the participants in each meeting had developed.113 These texts then were studied at the court by Charlemagne’s advisers, who were specialists on religious matters, and ultimately the parchments in question were deposited in the royal archives at Aachen for preservation. In fact, they still were to be found in the royal archives at the capital when, several years later, the author of the Royal Annals reported, “in archivo palatii exemplaria illarum habeantur.”114 More importantly, during the period intervening between the presentation of the above mentioned copies of the bishops’ findings to Charlemagne for consideration and the end of the assembly, a response to what was done at these five synods was crafted at the royal court concerning the emperor’s decisions in regard to a broad spectrum of ecclesiastical policies and practices. In fact, Charlemagne is reported in the Moissac Chronicle to have approved the issue of a total of forty-six chapters, that he and his staff had selected from among these materials presented to him and perhaps from other texts, as well. He then is said to have ordered the forty-six chapters codified in the form of a capitulary, “capitula [numero] quadraginta sex des causis necessariae erat ecclesi- ae Dei et populo Christiano,” for distribution throughout the empire.115 However, there may have been an intermediate stage, i.e., a capitulary drafted prior to the forty-six chapter version, with a shorter text encompassing only twenty-six chapters.116 Whichever version is at issue, the empire-wide distribution process likely 22 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 was much simplified, at least in part, because both the ecclesiastical and lay magnates, who attended the assembly, had come from many parts of the empire, and easily could bring a copy of this new capitulary back to their respective home territories. For those areas that were not covered by returning magnates, Charlemagne’s missi dominici very likely were charged to deliver the capitularies and with establishing that the recipients understood what was expected of them in the near future.117 In light of the above, it seems likely it was high on Charlemagne’s agenda to deal with the above mentioned matters of church reform and to provide a rapid response in the form of a capitulary.118 However, from a political or perhaps even what we may even consider a constitutional perspective, the primary work to be done at the assembly was the crowning of Louis the Pious as co-emperor. In light of the importance of this assembly, it seems likely that Charlemagne, despite what would appear to have been the lingering effects of the attack of gout, undertook his traditional “glad handing” efforts by wandering among various of the magnates who attended such gatherings, as this process of personal interaction and “small talk” was described in considerable detail by his cousin and close adviser, Adalhard of Corbie, in his De ordine palatii.119 Charlemagne’s work in regard to this assembly undoubtedly was extensive and may well serve as evidence both for his physical vigor and intellectual attentiveness. Ini- tially, he set in motion the preparations for this large meeting that was to take place in September and it is very likely that ultimately he undertook the responsibility for overseeing the success of the project as a whole. As will be seen below, when the assembly met in September, he presided over various ceremonies and delivered speeches to the attendees in the course of the meeting, itself. Perhaps most importantly, in a constitutional sense, he presented extensive instructions to Louis regarding “good government,” which included the recapitulation of the future emperor’s oath to protect his nephew Bernard, the newly established king of Italy.120 In light of the apparent detail and complexity of these instructions, it seems likely that Charlemagne read this speech to the audience from a text that had been prepared in advance.121 Despite his attention both to matters of religious reform and constitutional innovation, Charlemagne is reported to have recognized that he had additional tasks to carry out at this time. During early September or perhaps a few weeks earlier, while he still was engaged in the hunt, Charlemagne had received important intelligence regarding developments on the border between the Saxon region and Slavic-occupied territory to the northeast.122 In fact, a complicated diplomatic and military situation had been evolving during the previous three years which concerned various Danish hostile in- itiatives. These appear to have been aimed at destabilizing or perhaps even undermining Charlemagne’s strategy by encroaching on territory within the Carolingian regnum, itself.123 Consequently, toward mid-September, while the assembly was still in train, Charlemagne oversaw the making of plans to deal with a potentially dangerous turn of events in the northeast. When these plans were complete and the assembly had ended, he dispatched several Frankish and Saxon nobiles, who are identified as having participated in the meeting at Aachen, discussed above, to return home in order to deploy their assets according to Charlemagne’s instructions to deal with the Danish situation.124 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 23

Charlemagne’s schedule during the September assembly likely was somewhat ti- ring for an “old man”,” who, in the bargain, was still recovering from what is reported to have been a serious attack of the gout.125 In fact, during the course of the meeting Charlemagne would appear still not to have recovered fully from this attack, which initially had forced him to take to his bed.126 Indeed, during the assembly, itself, the remnants of this ailment would appear to have lingered on for a while and made it necessary for him lean for support on his son at various times when they took part in several processions of one or another type or simply took part in some sort of walk- abouts.127 Nevertheless, despite the hard work and the stress of events in September, it is obvious that by the end of the month, Charlemagne had recovered from the attack of gout and departed from Aachen on his second major hunting expedition of the year.128 Charlemagne spent some five or six weeks during the autumn of 813 hunting in the region, perhaps limited to the pagus of Cologne and its environs, where an extensive “game park” already was well established for the emperor’s use when the court was based at the capital.129 In his discussion of these events, Einhard emphasizes that Charlemagne, despite being both old and tired, once again absented himself from the obvious comforts at Aachen in order to take part in the rigors and excitement of the hunt.130 In fact, Charlemagne chose to return to Aachen at the beginning of November when traditionally the autumn hunting season for large game ended and the business of government focused on planning for the next year had to be conducted.131 In completing this account of Charlemagne’s activities during the last months of 813 and the early weeks of 814, various sources point out that following the end of the hunt, the emperor remained busy throughout the remainder of November, December, and at least into mid-January as he celebrated the Christmas holiday at Aachen. The winter of 813–814, like other previous winters, was slated to focus on planning for the forthcoming year. Consequently, after returning to Aachen, Charlemagne received emissaries from various peoples who had come to the capital for an audience with the emperor. Among these envoys very likely were those sent by the new emperor, Leo V, who had approved the previously negotiated pact to recognize Charlemagne’s imperial position.132 In addition to dealing with the various envoys, Charlemagne also likely set in motion the laying of plans to send teams of his missi dominici throughout the empire to ascertain how the church reforms, that had been enacted the previous September, were being treated at the local level.133 Further, the emperor continued to work on the strategy that undergirded military operations in the Mediterranean as considerable new intelligence reached him in a detailed letter from Pope Leo III at this time.134 Finally, Charlemagne is credited with working in concert with “foreign” advisers, i.e., Greeks and Syrians, on the correction of various religious texts, and as suggested, above, these men likely had accompanied the Emperor Leo’s envoys to Charlemagne’s court.135 In fact, it was only toward the beginning of the last week of January 814, when the emperor already was well past his seventy-first birthday, i.e., firmly into the senectus stage of life, that he was taken ill with what came to be seen as a debilitating and ultimately a fatal fever.136 Einhard characterizes this last illness as pleurisy.137 Another contemporary attributes this last illness to a chill that it was believed the emperor had 24 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 acquired after attending the baths.138 As Einhard pointed out in considerable detail, Charlemagne’s baths traditionally were large-scale social affairs that often saw the attendance of many dozens of people. These included contingents from his personal military household, and saw the emperor’s participation in swimming races with much younger men.139 Charlemagne finally died on the twenty-eighth of January after what may be considered both a short illness and an exceptionally busy last few months as would have been the case even for a man who was in the prime of life. It is to be noted that not only had there been no long-term planning preparation for Charlemagne’s death and more particularly his ultimate burial but the illness that turned out to be his last was not in any way regarded by his advisers as life threatening. As Einhard points out, the intention had been for Charlemagne to be buried in the cathedral at Aachen. However, the particular place had not been designated and only after his burial was a gilded arch constructed, a statue of the emperor placed there, and an inscription was cut.140 The evidence provided by Alcuin and Einhard in regard to Charlemagne’s vigorous activities during either the early part of the imperial period or its entirety and the health of the empire, itself, cannot be treated as plain text. Both men were very close to the emperor and, it is safe to say, were not eager to speak ill of him in any way.141 Nor were these courtiers disposed to focus on supposed problems affecting the smooth administration of the empire and to its traditionally effective military operations that supposedly could have been the result either the emperor’s possible ill health or old age, e.g., the diminution of Charlemagne’s physical energy and/or mental alertness.142 The emperor’s schedule pursued in 813, the last year of Charlemagne’s life, though based largely on the Royal Annals and various letters, does not absolve either Alcuin or Einhard from having contributed biased information to our understanding of the imperial period. It is prudent, if not, in fact, necessary to look to other contemporary or near contemporary writers, e.g., Hermoldus Nigellus, Thegan, and the so-called “Astronomer,” who after Charlemagne’s death, wrote biographies of his son and successor, Louis the Pious.143 The general aim pursued by these authors was to defend and, on occasion, even to glorify their principal’s difficult reign or, at least, aspects of it.144 However, it becomes clear that they, like Alcuin and Einhard, were not prone to denigrate Char- lemagne and his accomplishments or to treat his old age in a negative manner even for the purpose of making Louis appear to have been more energetic than his father. These authors do not take the position that Louis was more able to rule the empire, as a whole, than was his father at the time of his elevation to the office of co-emperor in September of 813. These authors do not claim either that the emperor or the empire were suffering serious problems because of ill health or “old age.” They do not focus on such negative matters. In fact, they introduce the theme of Charlemagne’s advance into senectus in a very positive context, which is focused on that part of his reign that saw the coronation of Louis the Pious, their principal. The aim of these authors is to account for Charle- magne’s decision to elevate Louis the Pious to the position of co-emperor, which at the time would appear to have been regarded widely, and especially at the royal court, as a very wise decision. As everyone knew, the emperor himself was old. Therefore, the Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 25 model followed in discussion of the reasons for the coronation was based upon Genesis 27.2, where Isaac makes clear that he is an old man and might die at any time.145 The Astronomer, for example, tells his readers that in 813, Charlemagne, who “was thinking about his decline along the downward course [of life] into old age (senectus),” saw the benefit of firmly establishing the imperial succession so as to avoid any problems that might come to the fore should there be an interregnum.146 It is important to emphasize that this reference to Charlemagne’s old age obviously was an objective statement in the context of Isidore’s well-known paradigm. Therefore, it cannot be treated as some sort of veiled criticism that the emperor was either sick or doing a poor job of ruling the empire because of his old age. It should not be regarded as unreasonable, as the Astronomer makes clear, that important court figures, who were Charlemagne’s close advisers, would appear to have been somewhat anxious that the emperor might die before he had established formally and definitively that rule of the empire, as a whole, would pass directly to Louis the Pious, his only surviving legitimate son.147 Likely, at this time, it was thought that Charlemagne, who, as frequently observed above, had already passed his seventieth birthday, might die at any time simply as a result of old age. If Charlemagne were to die suddenly, as at least some royal advisers would appear to have worried, then the final details of the succession would have been left unfinished. This, of course, might well be a cause of problems to Louis both in regard to a peaceful governmental tran- sition at home as well the pursuit of a consistent foreign policy and military strategy abroad.148 Thegan approaches the last several months of Charlemagne’s reign in a manner very similar to the way that they were treated by the Astronomer. Thegan claims that Charlemagne understood that because he was “very old” (“senuerat...valde”), and, therefore, the “day of his death” could not be far off, which would appear to be a reference to Genesis 27.2.149 As a result, the emperor made clear that he wanted to establish the imperial succession in a firm manner and, consequently, called a special assembly to be held at Aachen early in September 813 for that purpose. In a rather elaborate ce- remony, according to Thegan, Charlemagne saw to it that the magnates of the realm, both lay and ecclesiastical, acclaimed his choice of Louis the Pious as his co-emperor and successor. It is emphasized that the coronation was carried out in a smooth and uncontroversial manner.150 It was obvious to all that Charlemagne’s entry into the phase of life known as senectus likely motivated at least some and perhaps even many of his advisers to suggest that he not delay too long in establishing the imperial succession in a firm manner. Ho- wever, it is important to emphasize that neither the Astronomer nor Thegan claims that the emperor, at this time, was in ill health much less that he was in periculum mortis as the result of some otherwise unmentioned illness. It should be emphasized strongly, in this context, that an attack of gout that had caused him problems late in the summer of 813, though painful, was not considered to be a fatal disease.151 Rather, Charlemagne simply was old, and as the point is made in Genesis, 27.2, which is echoed in these texts, death could occur at any time to an old man, even one who was not ill. It is noteworthy, however, that Genesis 27.2, which is treated in these texts as some thing of a cliché, refers to Isaac as he is “predicting” the future of his various heirs. Of 26 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 course, those men who wrote Louis’ biographies also knew very well that Isaac lived on for quite a while after he is depicted as claiming that he was old and might die at any time. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to delve further into why these writers saw Genesis 27.2 as a useful model in the context of elevating Louis to the office of co-emperor, as they all knew that Charlemagne died about four months after their principal’s coronation and establishment as co-emperor. However, the possibility should not be discounted, a priori, that Charlemagne, himself, had used this allusion to Isaac in his speech from the throne. Were this the case, it might well suggest that he was making it clear to his audience that despite the fact that he was old, he would be around for a long time and continue to rule after he had made Louis his co-emperor.152 Charlemagne’s view of his own situation after Louis’ coronation had been carried out as emphasized by Thegan makes it very clear that the new co-emperor was not instructed by Charlemagne to remain at Aachen in order to take hold of the reins of government in place of his father. In the wake of the coronation, Charlemagne clearly was not planning to retire as a result of either illness or old age.153 Rather, Louis was sent back to Aquitaine to rule his kingdom. It was from this base of operations in the southwest of the regnum Francorum that for a decade and a half or so, Louis had over- seen Charlemagne’s long-term offensive strategy aimed at capturing and occupying Muslim-held territory on the Iberian Peninsula, which in this context also included domination of the Balearic Islands.154 Like both Thegan and the Astronomer, Hermoldus Nigellus also attributes Charle- magne’s decision to establish Louis the Pious as co-emperor to the emperor’s old age. However, Hermoldus, who is well known for inventing speeches to carry the story line that he projects, attributes to Charlemagne an oration to the assembly, which he claims to quote, but, of course, he created many of the details himself. This oration is filled with clichés regarding old age that little relate to Charlemagne specifically and owe something if not a great deal to one or another classical text. For example, Hermoldus has Charlemagne tell his courtiers that he has been weakened by old age and that his blood runs cold (Aeneid, V. 394–395). In addition, Hermoldus claims that Charlemag- ne recognized that his once strong right arm was no longer capable of wielding a sword in combat.155 For two well-known reasons, this latter point has little connection to the reality of Charlemagne’s behavior. First, Charlemagne was not hailed in any source as wielding a sword in battle at any point in his reign either as king or emperor.156 In fact, like most every Roman emperor, Charlemagne did not go into battle. Rather he observed hostilities from a safe distance where he could maintain command and control of his army. Like Scipio Africanus, Charlemagne saw himself as an imperator and not as a bellator.157 In this context, he was, in fact, a great military leader. Secondly, as regards the supposed faltering strength of Charlemagne’s “right arm,” it would appear to have been capable of wielding those deadly weapons that he needed to handle effectively in order to continue to make the hunt an enjoyable sport. During his old age Charlemagne not only participated safely but in a manner that the highly biased sources indicate was worthy of recording as evidence of his continuing good health. This was the case even as the late as the autumn of 813.158 Charlemagne’s activities after the Aachen assembly during the remainder of September, October, Decem- Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 27 ber, and early January, as noted above, provide no reason to believe that his health was declining much less declining rapidly even during the last year of his life.

Charlemagne’s Private Life

Charlemagne’s physical condition during the imperial years is also reflected in his personal life or perhaps what may be considered his private life.159 In this context, the emperor’s sexual activities tend to illustrate a substantial pattern of physical ro- bustness during the post-coronation era.160 During the early Middle Ages considerable attention would seem to have been given to searching out medical means to boost male sexual performance. This would appear to have been the case particularly in regard to the use of the kidneys and testicles of vultures for the purpose of compounding a medication that was intended to sustain the male sex drive.161 Obviously, we cannot rule out the possibility that future bio-chemical research may identify some particular herb or combination of herbs and perhaps even faunal material, e.g., vulture’s testicles, that were known in the Carolingian world and could accomplish then what Viagra and chemically similar medications are capable of making possible for our male contemporaries.162 Nevertheless, either with or without effective medicinal intervention, it is clear that Charlemagne maintained his traditionally active sex life throughout the imperial period. This would seem to permit the inference that he did not suffer from clogged arteries or any serious form of heart disease, which also can sap the energy of a sick man in other than sexual efforts. Charlemagne’s behavior in regard to his exceptional sexual activity was widely known, at least among highly placed contemporaries and members of their entourages.163 In fact, about a decade or so after the emperor’s death, several authors claimed that when Charlemagne died he did not go to Heaven. Rather, according to some clerics, who were close to Louis the Pious’ imperial court, it was bruited about that Charlemagne was sent to Hell where he was made to suffer very serious physical pain with particular focus on his genitals. These organs, the story goes, were being mutilated by the Devil’s helpers because of what the authors regarded as Charlemagne’s greatly excessive sexual escapades.164 The facts are not controversial. Charlemagne’s fourth wife, Liudgard, died in 800, and the emperor subsequently is known to have had at least four long-term concubines, perhaps seriatim, during the next thirteen years as well as at least two other women who were taken to the imperial bed.165 Among these concubines, the first, a woman of Alamannic stock named Madelgard, gave birth to at least one child, a daughter who was named Ruothild. The second, a Saxon woman named Gersvinda, also had a daughter, this one was named Adeltrude. Regina, the third of Charlemagne’s post- coronation concubines, gave birth to at least two children, Drogo and Hugo, while number four, Adalinda produced a son who was named Theodoric.166 Finally, it is generally agreed that during this same period, Charlemagne fathered two additional sons, Richbodus, who subsequently was made abbot of St. Riquier by his half-brother Louis, and Bernard, who was made abbot of Moutier-St-Jean. Unfortunately, neither 28 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 the names nor the ethnic backgrounds of the women who gave birth to these two boys have survived for the record.167 While some modern scholars might not choose to view Charlemagne’s active sex life as prima facie evidence either for his physical stamina or overall good health, there is a plethora of uncontroversial contemporary information available that contradicts an image of Charlemagne’s supposed aging into mental and physical decrepitude during the imperial years. For example, in addition to his energy in the bedroom, Charlemag- ne’s physical stamina is evidenced throughout this period by the fact that he continued to hunt regularly. As emphasized above, this was the case even through the autumn hunting season in 813 and following his recovery from a severe attack of gout. This hunt ended about three months before he was taken by his final illness, which struck only a week or so before his death late in January of 814.168 In light of the matter of Charlemagne’s health it is to be emphasized that hunting with a spear or a sword either on horseback or on foot was a sport that not only is highly demanding in physical terms, but also, in fact, very dangerous.169 This would be the case especially for a supposedly doddering old man, who some modern armchair experts might assume to have suffered from seriously dulled reflexes and/or musc- le weakness as a result of being senex. Charlemagne’s vigorous continuation of his hunting activities, should make it obvious that the emperor also was physically fit to undertake the rigors of a military campaign, at any time that he concluded that his presence among the troops would be useful to boost morale if for no other reason.170 This is exactly what the emperor did during the campaigning season of 810 when he led his army into the field, and in 811, when he undertook an extensive tour of the Channel and North Sea coasts in order to inspect his military assets.171 It seems clear that Charlemagne’s physical condition in old age did not result in an invalid-like condition that kept him confined to his palace at Aachen. Similarly, his mental capacity would appear to have been no less acute than had been the case when he was a younger man. As outlined above, the year 813 saw Charlemagne orchestrate and preside over the institution of major church reforms and the coronation of Louis as co-emperor. In fact, Charlemagne issued numerous capitularies during the early ninth century, i.e., no fewer that fifty-six have survived and some of these were very lengthy.172 These capitularies constitute a very considerable number, by comparison with the quantity of capitularies that apparently were issued prior to the imperial period, and also provide evidence for the hard work being undertaken by the central government at Aachen under Charlemagne’s leadership.173 The capitularies also demonstrate Charlemagne’s strong attention not only to the planning of military operations with special attention to the acquisition of intelligence, but also to the details of both religious and secular reform.174 In addition to paying close attention to the inner workings of government, Char- lemagne consistently held both winter and spring assemblies or placita in a manner similar to what had been his custom throughout the pre-imperial period and he would seem also to have called additional meetings as he regarded them to be useful.175 Fur- ther, he continued to maintain vigorous rounds of diplomatic activity with envoys from a large number of governments and peoples who visited his court from beyond the borders of the regnum Francorum.176 In some cases, as noted above in regard to Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 29 his interactions with envoys from Byzantium, these diplomatic efforts were focused on detailed and ultimately successful negotiations. It is difficult to find any area during the imperial period that Charlemagne neglected in regard to the administration of the empire.

The Capital at Aachen

Charlemagne chose to establish his “capital” at Aachen, where he spent much time between 794 and his death in 814.177 Some scholars have taken this pattern of behavior as evidence, as noted above, that he was worn out and, therefore, stayed close to home. Charlemagne did, in fact, oversee the construction of a great palace and a monumental church at Aachen. In fact, he arranged for the building of a city where previously there had been merely a Roman vicus in the administrative circumscription (civitas) of Cologne.178 However, Charlemagne’s plan to build a capital where he could rule in a supposedly sedentary manner cannot be taken as evidence for the supposed debilitation of old age. Contemporary discussion regarding the construction of a “capital” for Charlemagne’s government likely began sometime between 784 and 787, i.e., when Charlemagne was still in his forties.179 Major building operations were begun at Aachen no later than the early 790s and probably in the late 780s. The palace complex clearly was usable by 794 at the latest. At this time Charlemagne was hardly past his fiftieth birthday, the beginning of the life stage known as gravitas. The celebration of Charlemagne’s elevation to the imperial throne in the west was to occur some six years in the future.180 When Charlemagne decided to have a capital built from which to exercise his regnum, it is hardly likely that he felt or even imagined that very soon he would be over- taken by the supposed ravages of old age, which putatively would curtail his ability in a serious manner to stray far from home.181 Rather than attribute the creation of a capital to supposed undocumented portents of debilitating old age, it is more than obvious that Charlemagne decided to build a great palace and church as part of his ongoing program of imitatio imperii.182 In fact, once these facilities could be effectively exploited, the symbolic significance of which was and remains obvious to all, Charlemagne decided to make Aachen his capital in a manner reflective of Augustus at Rome and Byzantine emperors who dwelled in contemporary Constantinople. In fact, the elaborate nature of Charlemagne’s capital at Aachen became a topic of both gossip and exaggeration throughout the ninth century and had the intended effect of making Charlemagne appear superior to contemporary Byzantine and Muslim rulers.183

Some Conclusions

Charlemagne is known to have suffered from the gout, which, on one occasion, during the imperial period forced him to take to his bed. Also, he may have contracted a very slight case of malaria with a fever that recurred from time to time. On the whole, ho- 30 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 wever, it would seem tendentious to claim that Charlemagne suffered from seriously debilitating bouts of ill health which were reflected in a lack of physical fitness during the imperial period. He frequently took part in the hunt. In fact, he did so on two lengthy occasions during the last year of his life. He also went on military campaigns when he thought it was of importance to do so. Another index of what may be considered Charlemagne’s robust health during the imperial period was his very active sex life. He had at least six concubines, who are noted in the sources, and he fathered at least seven bastards during this same period of time. In fact, Charlemagne’s sex life would appear to have been regarded in some quarters to be so far outside what then was considered the norm that after his death several critics suggested that after his death the emperor went to Hell to suffer for these sins. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that Charlemagne’s mental acuity had been undermined either by disease or by the aging process during the post-800 period. He continued to assume the major role in the making of religious policy. In addition, Char- lemagne also continued to play the leading role in the formulation of Carolingian military strategy throughout the imperial period and this, as seen above, was demonstrated by his activities in 813, alone. Also, Charlemagne maintained an active diplomatic program throughout the imperial period. The central government functioned efficiently with the issue of large numbers of capitularies and their vigorous enforcement by the missi dominici. It is of considerable importance concerning the supposed negative impact of Charlemagne’s old age on the empire that the central government continued to operate in an effective manner. On the whole, it seems to be misleading to suggest that either Charlemagne’s supposed ill health or what may be considered the traditional ravages of old age or even both together resulted during the imperial period in a radical change in his behavior. If, in fact, one might come to believe that Charlemagne altered Carolingian military strategy from the offense to the defense during his reign as emperor in the west, a change, moreover, that often has been asserted but never has been proven, reasons other than energy draining ill health and/or debilitating old age, which are often cited by modern scholars, must be found.

Bernard S. Bachrach Department of History University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota 55105 [email protected]

Endnotes

1 For those scholars interested in the problems inherent in discussing this strategy, in general, and long-term strategy, in particular, with regard to the early medieval era, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire. The Middle Ages. Philadel- phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 1–5. 2 Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l’empire carolingien. Paris: Editions Albin Mitchel, 1949,136, for the quotation. Halphen also had published extensively on Charlemagne’s mi- Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 31

litary operations. See, for example, Id.,”La conquête de la Saxe,” Revue historique CXXX (1919): 252–278, and CXXXII (1919): 257–305, and reprinted in Id., Études critiques sur l’histoire de Charlemagne. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1921. 3 “La fin du règne de Charlemagne, Une décomposition,” Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte 28 (1948): 133–52; and trans. by Janet Sondheimer as “The Last Period of Charlemagne’s Reign: A Study in Decomposition,” Id, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy. London, Longman, 1971, 240–255; here 241 for the quotation. Regarding Gans- hof’s work on Charlemagne’s army, see Id. “L’Armée sous les Carolingiens,” Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto Medioevo, 2 vols. Spoleto: Presso La Sede Del Centro, 1968, I, 109–130; and “Charlemagne’s Army,” Id., Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, trans. Bryce and Mary Lyon. Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1968, 59–68, 151–61. 4 See, for example, Ferdinand Lot, Naissance de la France . Paris: Fayard, 1948 as brought up to date by Jacques Boussard. Paris: Fayard, 1970, 309, for the quotation. It is to be noted that during this period, Lot was widely regarded as France’s leading specialist in medieval military history and his L’Art militaire et les armées au moyen âge, Europe et dans le Proch-Orient, 2 vols. Paris: Payot, 1946, dominated Francophone views on this subject for more than a generation. 5 Philippe Contamine, La guerre au Moyen Age. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980, 98–100, 102–04, 318–19. These views were not altered in the latest edition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999). The English translation by Michael Jones, War in the Middle Ages. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1984, is based on the first French edition. 6 The full title is De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleleeuwen IX tot begin XIVe eeuw, ed. J. F. Verbruggen. Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamase Academie voor Weten- schappen, Letteren en Schnone Kunsten van Belgïe, Klasse der Letteren, 20. Brussels: Palais der Academiën, 1 954; and these views are reprised in greater detail in Id., “L’Armée et la Stratétegie de Charlemagne,” Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 5 vols., ed. W. Braunfels and Helmut Beumann. Düsseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann, 1965, I, 420–36. 7 See J.-F., Verbruggen, The Art of War in Western Europe During the Middle Ages, From the Eighth Century to 1340, trans. Sumner Willard and S.C.M. Southern, 2nd ed. of the translation. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1997, 19–24, 276–325. 8 Of course, non-specialists also took this position. See, for example, Allen Cabaniss, Char- lemagne. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972, 102–141. 9 See, for example, Ganshof, “The Last Period of Charlemagne’s Reign” (see note 3), 240– 255; and Id., “Charlemagne’s Failure” (see note 3), 256–260. 10 The post-war effort to reduce significantly what then was Charlemagne’s glowing reputation, was led by Ganshof in a series of articles: “L’échec de Charlemagne,” pp. 248–254; “La fin du règne de Charlemagne” (see note 3) . 133–152; Id., “Charlemagne,” Speculum XXIV (1949): 520–527; “Charlemagne et le serment,” Mélanges d’histoire de Moyen Age dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen, pref. Charles Edmond Perrin (Paris: Presses Uni- versitaires de France, 1951), 259–290; “Charlemagne et l’usage de l’écrit en matière administrative,” Le Moyen Age, LVII (1951): 1–25. All of these articles have been reprinted and where necessary are to be found in English translation by Janet Sondheimer. See F. L. Ganshof, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy. London: Longman, 1971. These studies by Europe’s leading Carolingianists had a very strong effect on specialists in the reign of Charlemagne. However, a broader general impact was made by two books intended for wider audiences: Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l’empire carolingien. Pa- ris:Ėditions Albin Michel, 1949; and Heinrich Fichtenau, Das Karolingische Imperium. Soziale und geistige Problematik eines Grossreiches. Zürich: Fretz & Wasmuth, 1949. The translation and abridgement of the latter by Peter Munz, The Carolingian Empire. Oxford: 32 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1957, is useful for its historiographical introduction, which helps to provide a broader context for Fichtenau’s effort. Here it is noteworthy that P. D. King, Charlemagne. London: Lancaster Pamphlets, 1986, 45, made a point of declaring that Ganshof’s judgment that Charlemagne’s imperial years were characterized by the “decomposition” of the empire upon which much of the revisionist approach is based, was “mistaken.” 11 Donald Bullough, “Europae Pater: Charlemagne and His Achievement in Light of Recent Scholarship,” English Historical Review LXXV (1970): 59–105, for the lengthy history of Charlemagne as “Father of Europe.” 12 See, Matthias Becher, Charlemagne, trans. David S. Bachrach. New Haven, NJ, and London: Yale University Press, 2003, pp. 135–149, who provides a very useful but brief discussion of the highly favorable views of Charlemagne held by modern scholars prior to World War Two. Of course, this very positive view of Charlemagne goes back all the way into the early Middle Ages. See Matthew Gabrielle, An Empire of Memory: The Legend of Charlemagne, the Franks, and Jerusalem before the First Crusade. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2011; and Susan E. Farrier, The Medieval Charlemagne Legend: An Annotated Bibliography. Garland Medieval Bibliographies, 15. New York: Garland Publishers, 1993. 13 See, for example, Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Viking 1970, 147–148; with the discussion by Roger Collins, Charlemagne. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1998, 171; and Becher, Charlemagne, 149. In fact, even some Frenchmen during World War Two, tended to see the Third Reich as reviving Char- lemagne’s empire and joined the German army to fight the Russian “barbarians” in the east. See, for example, Philippe Carrard, The French Who Fought for Hitler: Memories from the Outcasts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; and Tony le Tessier, SS- Charlemagne: The 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS. Barnsley: United Kingdom, Havertown, Pen and Sword, 2010. Note also is to be taken of Johannes Fried, Karl der Grosse: Gewalt und Glaube: Eine Biographie. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013, 618–623, who discusses the “misuse” of Charlemagne by the Nazis. Donald Bullough, “Europae Pater”; and Alessandro Barbero, Charlemagne: Father of a Continent, trans. Allan Cameron. Ber- keley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2004, take a much more balanced view. 14 Barbero, Charlemagne: Father of a Continent (see note 13), 149, condemns any comparison of Charlemagne to Hitler and emphasizes that the former had a very different perspective. 15 CC, no. 60 (Codex Carolinus, ed. W. Gundlach, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epis- tolarum, III Berlin: Weidemann), 1892, with the bibliography cited in Bachrach, Charle- magne’s Early Campaigns, 575, n. 39. 16 Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Military Responsibilities,” pp. 231–255, with the extensive literature cited there. Moreover, special note should be taken of Percy Ernst Schramm, “Die Anerkennung, Karls des Grossen als Kaiser (bis 800). Ein Kapital aus der Geschichte der mittelalterlichen ‘Staatssymbolik,” Beiträge zur allgemein Geschichte I: von Spätantike bis zum Tode Karls der Grossen (814) (Kaiser, Könige und Päpste. Gesammelte Aufsätz zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, 4 vols. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1968, I, 215–263, 17 CC, no. 61. See the brief but useful discussion by Philippe Sénac, Les Carolingiens et al-An- dalus. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2002, 53–54; and more recently, Achim Thomas Hack, “Karl der Grosse, Hadrian I. und die Muslime in Spanien,” Die Faszination der Papstge- schichte: Neue Zugänge zum frühen und hohen Mittelalter, ed. Wilfried Hartmann and Klaus Herbers. Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau 2008, 29–54; Id., Codex Carolinus: Päpstlich Epistolo- graphie im 8. Jahrhundert, 2 vols. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 2007, 2, 968, no. 37. 18 See, for example, Thomas, F. X. Noble, “From Brigandage to Justice: Charlemagne, 785–795,” Literacy, Politics, and Artistic Innovation in the Early Medieval West. Papers Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 33

Delivered at “A Symposium on Early Medieval Culture” Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, ed. Celia M. Chazelle. New York: University Press of America, 1992, 49–75, at, 67. 19 Fried, Karl der Grosse (see note 13), esp. 497–587. 20 Vita Karoli, ch. 24. 21 As the principle is made clear by Augustine. DCD, XIX, ch 7. See J. M. Wallace Hadrill, Early Medieval History. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975, 23, “war was the price of peace, and the just ruler will not be able to avoid it....” Perhaps an even more clear statement of this view is to be found in Augustine, Epist., no. 189, where he emphasizes to Count Boniface that “war is waged to obtain peace.” For additional observation regarding Augustine and war, see the recent work of Philip Wynn, Augustine and Military Service. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013. 22 Alcuin, who was Charlemagne’s primary adviser on these matters for a lengthy period of time, was very well acquainted with Augustine’s teaching regarding victory and peace and the importance of military strength as pointed out by Paul Kershaw, Peaceful Kings: Pea- ce, Power, and the Early Medieval Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 153, who observes “Alcuin recognized the need for effective military strength, and the be- nefits that accrued from terrifying one’s enemies.” See the rather similar views expressed by Cathwulf Epistolae Karolini Aevi, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Monumenta Germaniae Histo- rica, IV. Berlin: Weidemann, 1895, 501–555, which was written after Charlemagne’s conquest of the Lombard kingdom and are rather similar to those of Alcuin as above. However, cf. Kershew, loc. cit., 139, who complains that there is considerable dissonance between Cathwulf’s views regarding the peaceful king and the fact that “the Carolingian war-ma- chine was constantly engaged.” It seems to me that Cathwulf understood the “justness” of Charlemagne’s war strategy better than Kershaw. See on this point Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis. Medieval Military History Series. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, 98–107. Charlemagne, as seen by men such as Alcuin and Cathwulf, was one of the boni, who, as defined by Augustine, were good men sent by God “to wage wars under divine auspices. “Such men “eschewed the pursuit of power and gloria for their own sakes.” For this view of Augustine’s teaching and the quotations, see Wynn, Augustine on War and Military Service (see note 21), 322. 23 Regarding Vegetius’ tract at Charlemagne’s court, see Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 105–106. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Roman goddess of peace was very similar iconographically to the goddess of victory as pointed out by Wal- lace-Hardrill, Early Medieval History, 20, who relies here on Gina Fasoli, “Pace e guerra nell’alto medioevo,” SSCI, XV, 2 vols. Spoleto: Presso La Sede Del Centro, 1963, I, 15–47. 24 See Bernhard Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne, trans. and edited Michael Gorman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 144. Regarding Theodulf as Charlemagne’s close adviser, see, for example, Thomas F. X. Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians. Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Penn- sylvania Press, 2009. 25 Much ink has been spilled in regard to Charlemagne’s treatment of Saxon rebels, who at one time or another were executed or resettled outside their home region. For a recent discussion of this very controversial matter, which cites a considerable corpus of scholarly literature, see Yitzhak Hen, “Charlemagne’s Jihad,” Viator 37 (2006): 33–51. 26 See Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Medieval Jewish Policy in Western Europe. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, 66–105. Cf. Christof Geisel, Die Juden im Fran- kenreich vom den Merowingern bis zum Tode Ludwigs des Frommen. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996, who holds a “Dark Age” view of the early Middle Ages during which so-called Germanic kings did not pursue policies. For a review of Geisel’s argument, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Francia, 28.1 (2002): 287–290; and the more positive views of Mi- 34 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

chael Toch, The Economic History of European Jews: Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013. 27 See, for example, Ganshof, “The Last Period” (see note 3), 241–243. 28 A good example of this technique is provided by Ganshof, “The Last Period” (see note 3), 242, who notes, “Benevento ...recognized Charlemagne’s authority as supreme, but it was an empty authority....”; “the Bretons of the Armorican peninsula, who ostensibly submit- ted in 799, in fact remained independent....”; “Bohemia was ... considered an integral part of the empire” after the campaigns of 805 and 806, “but” Ganshof asserts, “its dependence remained purely nominal.” Ganshof concludes “All in all, the efforts to extend Charle- magne’s authority in the far south and to west and east produced disappointing results ....” No mention is made by Ganshof, in this context, of Carolingian advances on the Iberian Peninsula or offensive operations in the western Mediterranean. With regard to the latter, see, for example, Collins, Charlemagne (see note 13), 175, who concludes, “The final phase of Charles’ reign saw the Carolingian empire turned into a major maritime power in both the Channel and the western Mediterranean.” Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” Charlemagne’s Heir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814– 840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 391–405; and reprinted in Id., Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet L. Nelson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 251–267, at 252–253, uses the same tactic as Ganshof. However, unlike Ganshof, Reuter (251) begins his study with two dubious assumptions unsupported by research: 1. “It is a commonplace that the expansion of the Carolingian empire slowed down rapidly after 800 and came to a halt under Louis the Pious.” and 2. “It is also well known that both Charles in the last years of his reign and Louis the Pious experienced difficulty in raising armies.” 29 Collins, Charlemagne (see note 13), 174. An alternative approach is supported by Eric Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt,” Speculum 88 (2013), 613–643, at 623, who observes that “Louis came to the throne after the end of the Carolingian military expansion....” and as a result was unable to attain military glory through successful warfare. 30 See, for example, Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion” (see note 28), 391–405; and reprinted in Id., Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet L. Nelson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 251–267, who observed (p. 251): “it is a commonplace that the expansion of the Carolingian empire slowed down rapidly after 800 ....”; Barbero, Charlemagne (see note 14), p. 334, notes, “Militarily speaking, there is no denying that in later years the emperor did not display his previous aggression.”; and also Rosamond McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 135, who claims that Charlemagne’s imperial years are “generally regarded as the process of a transformation of an aggressive military strategy into a concentration of defence....” 31 See, for example, Pierre Riché Les Carolingians: une famille qui fit l’Europe. Paris: Ha- chette, 1983. I quote here from the translation by Michael Idomir Allen, The Carolingians: A Family who Forged Europe, The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Penn- sylvania Press,1997, 94. 32 Donald Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne, 2nd ed. New York: Elek, 1973, 195, for the quotation. 33 Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900. New York: Routledge, 2003, 89, for the quotation. 34 Perilous Glory; The Rise of Western Military Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011, 113, for the quotation. 35 Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innis, and Simon Maclean, The Carolingian World. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 159, for the quotation. This view has been ad- Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 35

opted by Eric Goldberg, “‘The Hunt Belongs to Man’: Some Neglected Treatises Related to Hunting and Falconry from the Court of Louis the German,” Discovery and Distinction in the Early Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John J. Contreni, ed. Cullen J. Chandler and Steven A. Stofferahn. Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan University Press, 2013, 31–56, at 33, puts “the end of Frankish military expansion in the 790s.” 36 Among Germanophones, see for example, Josef Fleckenstein, “Das großfränkische Reich: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Großreichsbildung im Mittelalter,” Historische Zeit- schrift 233 (1981): 265–294; Walter Schlesinger, “Die Auflösung des Karlsreiches,”Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 5 vols. ed. W. Braunfels and Helmut Beumann. Düsseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann, l965 I, 792–857, esp. 792–826; and Herwig Wolfram, “The Creation of the Carolingian Frontier-System c. 800,” The Transformation of Fron- tiers from Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed. Ian Wood and Helmut Reimitz. Leiden: Brill, 2000, 223–245. For a recent French perspective, see Étienne Renaud, “La politique militaire de Charlemagne et la paysannerie franque,” Francia 36 (2009): 1–33. 37 Halsall, Warfare and Society (see note 33), p. 89. 38 Walter Pohl, Die Awaren: Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567–822 n. Chr. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988, 120–122. 39 Renaud, “La politique militaire” (see note 36), 17. 40 Renaud, “La politique militaire” (see note 36). 8–24; and for the demonstration of Re- naud’s methodologically flawed approach to the texts see, Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charle- magne’s Expeditionary Levy: Some Observations Regarding the liberi homines,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance History, ser. 3, 12 (2015): 1–65. 41 See, for example, McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 135; and Barbero, Charlemag- ne, 334. 42 It should be noted that there is some controversy regarding Charlemagne’s age. I follow the traditional view defended by Barbero, Charlemagne (see note 14), 11–12, that Charlemag- ne was in his seventy-second year when he died in late January 814 against the revisionist view by Matthias Becher, “Neue überlegungen zum Geburtsdatum Karls des Grossen,” Francia 19 (1992): 37–60, that holds that Charlemagne was only sixty-six years of age when he died. 43 Janet Nelson, “The Voice of Charlemagne,” Belief and Culture in the Middle Ages: Studies Presented to Henry Mayr-Harting, ed. Richard Gameson and Henrietta Leyser. Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2001, 76–87, at 78–79, for the above quotation by which she characterizes the views of a half-dozen important scholars who take this position. The- se references are listed in note 20 on 78–79. By contrast, Nelson’s own position (79) is the opposite as she argues “That the same evidence [used by Charlemagne’s detractors] can be read differently: I take it to reflect an imperial regime certainly newly ambitious and arguably newly effective.” In addition to these scholars noted by Nelson, who have a negative view of Charlemagne’s efforts as emperor due to his poor health or old age or both, see, for example, Paul Fouracre, “Frankish Gaul to 814,” New Cambridge Medieval History (hereafter cited as NCMH) II, ed. Rosamond McKitterick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 105. He flirts with attributing imperial decline to Charlemagne’s old age when he observes “As Charlemagne grew older, he became less active....”; and Cos- tambeys, Innis, and Maclean, The Carolingian World (see note 35), 157–158, who dwell on Charlemagne’s old age at some length in the context of supposed Carolingian decline during the latter part of his reign. 44 The Barbarian West (A.D. 400–1000): The Early Middle Ages. Hutchinson’s University Library, London: Hutchinson, 1952, 119, for the quotation. 45 Johanned Fried, The Middle Ages, trans. Peter Lewis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universi- ty Press, 2017, 70, for the quotation. The approach of Charlemagne’s “dotage” is dated here 36 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

some time prior to the division of the kingdom in 806. See also Valerie I. Garver, “Old Age and Women in the Carolingian World,” Old Age in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Interdisciplinary Approaches to a Neglected Topic, ed. Albrecht Classen. Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture, 2. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007, 122–141, at 139, who claims that “The most famous example of women caring for an el- derly relative is surely Charlemagne’s daughters who looked after him in his last years.” It is true that these ladies were resident at the royal court but there is no evidence that they “looked after” Charlemagne as an old man who apparently was in need of being looked after. See also Janet L. Nelson, “Women at the Court of Charlemagne: A Case of Monstrous Regiment?” Medieval Queenship, ed. John Carmi Parsons. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, 43–61, where she asks rhetorically: “Did these women wield power behind the throne as Charlemagne suffered increasingly, in his later years from bouts of ill health?” Nelson, as will be shown here, exaggerates Charlemagne’s “ill health” and recognizes that she has no evidence for his daughters wielding any power at all. 46 Paul Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache and other Cultural Clusters of a Dark Age. New York: Palgrave, 2004), 161, for the quotation. 47 Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 162, who, in addition, claims “old Carolingian rulers were reluctant to initiate wars of conquest.” 48 Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 161, for the quotation. 49 Regarding Charlemagne’s travels during the first quarter-century as compared to the last two decades of his life, see J. F. Böhmer and Engelbert Mühlbacher, Regesta Imperii: Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern, 751–918, vol. I. Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner’schen Universitäts Buchhandlung, 1908, 61–225; and Abel and von Simson, Jahrbücher des fränkischer Reichs unter Karl dem Grossen, 2 vols. Leipzig: Verlag von Dunder & Humblot, 1888, I, 23–611, II, 1–531. 50 Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire (see note 10), 187; and Ganshof, “The Last Period” (see note 3), 240–255; and Id., “Charlemagne’s Failure,” 256–260; along with the discussion by Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 153. 51 See, for example, the discussion by Paul Dutton, “Beyond the Topos of Senescence. The Political Problems of Aged Carolingian Rulers,” Aging and the Aged in Medieval Europe: Selected Papers for the Annual Conference of the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, Held 25–26 November 1983, ed. Michael M. Sheehan, CSB. Toronto: Universi- ty of Toronto Press, 1990, 75–94, at 75–76. 52 Randolph Starn, “Meaning-Levels in the Theme of Historical Decline,” Past and Present 52 (1971): 3–22, who provides some useful warnings regarding the organic topos. Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 153, rejects the use of the organic metaphor as a means to analyse the decline of the Carolingian empire, as does Courtney M. Booker, Past Convictions: The Penance of Louis the Pious and the Decline of the Carolingians. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press, 2009, 1–8. 53 See Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff,” The Journal of Military History 66 (2002): 313–357, at 325–326; see also Id., Early Carolingian Warfa- re: Prelude to Empire. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, 71–75. With regard to such training during the Ottonian era, see David S. Bach- rach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012, 102–134. 54 Isidore, Etymologiae, ll.2.1–8, vol. II, ed. Wallace M. Lindsay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911. For an almost complete list of surviving mss. of the Etymologiae, excluding those from Spain, down to the middle of the ninth century, see Charles H. Beeson, Isidorstudien. Munich: Beck, 1913, 19. This distribution of manuscripts indicates not only that the text was very well known throughout the Carolingian world but that it was frequently copied. 55 Rhabanus Maurus, De Universo, 7.1 in Patrologia Latina. 111, col. 179 D. Cf. Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 160, who claims that “little suggests that Isidore’s Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 37

six-fold classification of ages gained currency during the ninth century.” Of course, only the fifth and sixth stages, gravitas and senectus, are at issue here. 56 Some later medieval writers, e.g., Arnoldus of Villanova, extended the period of gravitas to seventy-two years of age after which senectus then began. Thus, one may wonder whether Arnold and others saw the end of Charlemagne’s life just prior to the end of his seventy-second year to mark the beginning of “old age” rather than Isidore’s seventy. It may be noted, in this context, that Einhard’s Vita Karoli, where Charlemagne’s age in noted, was an exceptionally well known book throughout the Middle Ages. Matthias M. Tischler, Einharts Vita Karoli. Studien zur Entstehung, Überlieferung und Rezeption, 2 vols. Hano- ver: Hahn, 2001, 17–77, has identified 123 surviving manuscripts. Regarding the use of the age of seventy-two as the upper limit of gravitas later in the Middle Ages, see Shulamith Shahar, Growing Old in the Middle Ages : ‘Winter clothes us in shadow and pain’, trans. Yael Lotan. London and New York: Routeledge, 1997, 17. See also the contributions to Old Age in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Interdisciplinary Approaches to a Neglected Topic, ed. Albrecht Classen. Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture, 2. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007. 57 See, for example, Georges Minois, History of Old Age: From Antiquity to the Renaissance, trans. Sarah HanburyTenison. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989; and Shahar, Growing Old in the Middle Ages (see note 56). 58 In regard to the longevity of Carolingians kings, see Dutton, “Beyond the topos of Sene- scence,” 91–94; and in greater detail with considerable analysis by Achim Thomas Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft im frühen Mittelatler: Das Beispiel der Karolinger. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 2009, 22–37. 59 Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 153, suggests, in this context, that “group aging” at the royal court was of importance in stimulating what may perhaps be considered a malaise of sorts. 60 See, for example, Alcuin, Epist., nos. 114, 229, 241, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica (hereafter MGH), Epistolae karolini, II, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Berlin: Weidemann 1895, and the discussion by Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 156, who would seem to see Alcuin in “the ever present shadows of anomie.” Concerning Alcuin’s age, see Donald Bullough, “‘Charlemagne’s men of God’: Alcuin, Hildebald, Arn,” Charlemagne, Empire and Society, ed. Johanna Story. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, 136–150, at 136–137. 61 For a selection of Alcuin’s letters in which he complains about his ill-health, see, for example, Epist., nos. 16, 44, 82, 88, 90, 104, 114, 116, 121, 138, 178, 226, 229, 231, 238, 240, See also, Theodulf of Orleans, Carmen, no. 27, lines 30–39, in Monumenta Germaniae His- torica: Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini, vol. I, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Berlin: Weidemann, 1881, regarding Alcuin’s behavior. Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 154, believes that “Theodulf, full of bitter fun, seems to have grown tired of the excuses of the whining dotard of Tours....” 62 This point is made by Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 156; and see also, Douglas Dales, Alcuin: His Life and Legacy. Cambridge: James Clarke and Co, 2012, 79–92. 63 Alcuin, Epist., no. 118. 64 Annales Regni Francorum inde ab a. 741. usque a. 829, hereafter ARF, ann, 796, 797; and Annales qui dicitur Einhardi, ann., 796, 797. Both are published in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores rerum merovingicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi, 6, ed. F. Kurze. Hanover: Hahn, 1907. 65 See, for example, Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 154–156. 66 Alcuin, Epist., nos. 74, 116, 193; and Id., De clade Lindisfarensis monasterii, no. 49, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini, vol. I, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Berlin: Weidemann, 1881, are helpful examples. 38 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

67 Horst Zettel, Das Bild der Normannen und der Normanneneinfälle in westfränkischen, ostfränkischen und angelsächsischen Quellen des 8. bis 11. Jahrhunderts. Munich: Wil- helm Fink Verlag,1977, 195–196, and passim, provides a survey of the texts that is very useful. 68 See, for example, Wolfram Brandes, “Tempora periculosa sunt,” Der Frankfurter Konzil, ed. Reiner Berndt, 2 vols. Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Mittelreinishcen Kirchengen- schichte, 80. Mainz: Selbstverlag der Gesellschaft für Mittelrheinischen Kirchengeschich- te, 1997, I, 44–88. Janet Nelson, “England and the Continent in the Ninth Century: IV, Bo- dies and Minds,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, sixth series, vol. 15 (2005): 1–27, at 9, n. 30, who accepts Brandes’s apocalyptic interpretation of Alcuin’s use of the “dangerous times” cliché, as does Fried, The Middle Ages (see note 45), 67. Cf. Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 154–156, who leaves the impression that Alcuin’s focus is on old age in this context. 69 Alcuin, Epist., nos. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22. 70 Alcuin, De clade Lindisfarensis monasterii, no. 49, ed. Dümmler. 71 Concerning Alcuin’s feelings in regard to the monks of Lindisfarne, see Dutton, Charle- magne’s Mustache (see note 46), 154–155; Dales, Alcuin (see note 62), 45–50; and Johan- na Story, Carolingian Connections: Anglo-Saxon England and Carolingian Francia, c. 750–870. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, 93. 72 Alcuin, De clade Lindisfarensis monasterii, ed. Dümmler, lines 63–70. Although Alcuin does not mention Muslims specifically here, the context makes clear their identity. It is obvious that Alcuin was well informed regarding Muslim operations in the Mediterranean as indicated in various letters (see, for example, Alcuin, Epist. nos. 7 and 184, written in 790 and 799, respectively. In this context of the danger posed by Muslims, it seems likely that Alcuin shared Bede’s view, EH, V, ch. 23, pp. 556–557, n. 5, in Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed. and trans. R. A. B. Mynors and Bertram Colgrave. Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 1969, of the Muslims as a “horrible plague” against whom Charles Martel, Charlemagne’s grandfather, had turned the tide of battle with his victory at Poitiers in 732. See Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 8. 73 I am at a loss to understand the reasoning by Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 156, who asserts that Alcuin “feigned not to recognize the broken and failing world around him.” In pressing this point of view, Dutton cites Archbishop Theodulf of Orelans’ 818-poem “There are many signs that the End [of the empire] is Near” (Carmen, 14, passim in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini, vol. I, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Berlin: Weidemann, 1880, which is a broadly based condemnation of Louis the Pious’ regnum. Whether, in fact, Theodulf was accurate in describing Louis’ regnum as being devoured by old age or merely that he was being vindictive because the emperor had deprived him of his bishopric and sent him into exile is not the main issue here. What is important is that Theodulf’s remarks concerning Louis’ regnum cannot be taken as reflec- ting the poet’s views regarding the state of the empire during Charlemagne’s reign. Contrary to those who have specialized in treating Theodulf’s poetry, as noted below, Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire (see note 10), 184, redated, without comment, the poem “There are many signs that the End [of the empire] is Near” (Carmen, 14) to Charle- magne’s reign and treats it as evidence for the decomposition of the first emperor’s regnum rather than as a lengthy list of problems supposedly to have been faced by Louis the Pious. It seems to me that Fichtenau’s manipulation of this information, here the proper dating of the poem, is but one additional example of his unsound methods, which were bent upon undermining the traditionally high opinion of Charlemagne that had dominated the historiography prior to World War Two. See, for example, Janet Nelson, “Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power,” Challenging the Boundaries of Medieval History: The Legacy of Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 39

Timothy Reuter, ed. Patricia Skinner. Turnhout: Brepols, 2009, 29–50, at 38, who demonstrates that Fichtenau manipulated the text of at least one of Charlemagne’s capitularies by quoting only a part it, which when thusly taken out of context, supported his own negative argument in regard to the effectiveness of the government under Charlemagne. Concerning the state of the question regarding the proper date of Theodulf’s poem, that Fichtenau ignored, see Louis Baunard, Théodulfe évêque d’Orléans et abbé de Fleury- sur-Loire. Paris: C. Douniol, 1860), 316–317; and Charles Cuissard, Théodulfe évêque d’Orléans. Sa vie et ses œuvres. Orléans: H. Herluison, 1892. 98–99. Dutton, Charlemag- ne’s Mustache (see note 46), 156, accepts the traditional date of 818. See also Elisabeth Dahlhaus-Berg, Nova antiquitas et antiqua novitas. Typolog. Exegese u. isidorianisches Geschichtsbild bei Theodulf von Orleans. Cologne and Vienna : Böhlau, 1975. 74 Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 25 (Éiginhard, Vie de Charlemagne, ed. and trans. Louis Hal- phen. Paris: Société d’Ėdition ‘les Belles Lettres”, 1947; and the observations by Dales, Alcuin (see note 62), 69. 75 There is considerable debate regarding when Einhard wrote Vita Karoli, and I accept an early date. See, McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 7–15, with the relevant scholarly literature. 76 It is clear that Einhard (Vita Karoli, ch. 22) dates these illnesses to 810 or perhaps 811. Here, as is often the case, Einhard would seem to have been influenced to mention a fever by Suetonius in his Lives of the Caesars, as noted by Halphen in his edition of the Vita Karoli (see note 74), 67, n. 8. As with Suetonius’s use of this topos, Einhard’s intention is to demonstrate that despite Charlemagne’s supposed illnesses, he carried on very well. If, in fact, Charlemagne did suffer from a recurring fever of some sort, one may wonder whether perhaps he had contracted a mild case of malaria during one of his visits to Italy or the Mediterranean coast. This disease was well known north of the Alps to cause problems for visitors from the Frankish kingdom to Italy. But it can remain dormant for many years and then can occur occasionally, likely when the immune system is working less efficiently than normally. In general, regarding Carolingian rulers and malaria, see Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft (see note 58), 184–222, and esp. 216–218, concerning Charlemagne. Also see Hack, loc cit., 201–205, 216, regarding Charles the Bald whom Janet Nelson, “Le mort de Charles le Chauve,” Médiévales 31 (1996): 53–66, at 54, spe- culates may have contracted malaria during his visit to Italy in 875–876. Of course, most any medical diagnosis, which is based upon some general observations in a contemporary narrative source must remain highly speculative at a remove of some twelve centuries. See, the discussion of this methodological problem by Jerome Kroll and Bernard S. Bachrach, “Justin’s Madness: Weakmindedness or Organic Psychosis?,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 48 (1993): 40–67. 77 Note is to be taken of Vita Karoli, ch. 32, where on the basis of hindsight, Einhard gathers a selection of supposed “portents” of Charlemagne’s death, i.e., eclipses, fires, frequent earth tremors (the entire region of Cologne is prone to earthquakes) and a fall from his horse. However, Einhard attributed none of the omens to the fact that Charlemagne was growing old. This gathering of portents, of course, is, itself, a topos common to the writing of Roman and medieval history. See, the observations by Halphen in Éiginhard, Vie de Charlemagne (see note 74), 88–89, concerning the use of this topos by Suetonius, whose work, as is well established, had an important effect on Einhard’s writing of Vita Karoli. 78 Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30, for the quotation, and note that Einhard’s brief mention (ch. 22) of Charlemagne’s recurring bouts of fever, discussed above, are ignored in this context. Obviously, Einhard’s devotion to Charlemagne may be seen to have limited any criticism of his principal including the ongoing impact of ill health. It is to be emphasized, however, that Einhard wrote after Charlemagne’s death and for Louis the Pious. As a result he had 40 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

no imperative to prevaricate on matters that might be seen by some to have diminished the emperor’s reputation. This is evidenced, for example, by his detailed discussion (ch. 9) of the debacle at Roncevalles. Alcuin, who also was very close to Charlemagne, had no problem (Epist., no. 118) in using a reference to the ruler’s temporary ill health as an excuse to explain or explain away a problem or an apparent problem. 79 Regarding Charlemagne’s travels during the last two decades of his life, see, for example, Böhmer and Mühlbacher, Regesta Imperii, vol. I, 139–225; and Abel and von Simson, Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reichs unter Karl dem Grossen (see note 49), II, 63–531. 80 I am perplexed by the claim made by de Mayke de Jong, The Penitential State: Authority and Atonement in the Age of Louis the Pious, 814–848. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 18, that Charlemagne was ailing in 813 and that it was because of his ill health that he made the decision to crown Louis as co-emperor. Charlemange’s attack of gout in late August 813 (ARF, an. 813 only mss. D and E), can hardly be considered the sort of life endangering illness that might encourage the emperor to undertake a major constitutional innovation, the plans for which, in any case, had to have been made long before he was struck by an attack of gout in late summer. 81 See Bachrach, “Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff” (see note 53), 313–357, regarding the tradition that military as well as non-military planning took place for the forthcoming year during the winter at the royal court. For a more general discussion, see Id., “Charlemagne and Carolingian Military Administration,” Empires & Bureaucracy from Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century: The Challenges of Collaborative Historical Comparison, ed. Peter Crooks and Timothy Parsons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 233–276. 82 Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 473–509. 83 McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 306–311, demonstrates convincingly that Charle- magne was a thinker who planned in the long-term in regard to religious reform. It seems that long-term planning also likely was habitual for the early Carolingians in regard to military matters. See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare (see note 53), 1–50. 84 Regarding the establishment of Bernard as king in Italy, see, ARF, an. 812, and note that Charlemagne sent his cousin Wala from the court at Aachen to advise the new king. See the discussion by Karl-Ferdinand Werner, “Hludovicus Augustus: Gouverner l’empire chrétien--Idées et réalités,” in Charlemagne’s Heir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814–840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1990, 3–123. at 31–32. 85 ARF, an. 813. See, for example, Philip Grierson, “The Carolingian Empire in the Eyes of By- zantium,” Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi (hereafter cited as SSCI) 27, two volumes. Spoleto: Presso La Sede Del Centro 1981, I, 885–916, at 909–910; and Peter Classen, Karl der Grosse, das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Begründung des karolingischen Kaisertums, ed. Horst Fuhrmann and Claudia Märtl. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1985, 100–101. 86 A copy of the letter that Charlemagne, Epist., 37 (556) in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae, III, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Hanover: Hahn,1901, sent to the Byzantine emperor Mi- chael, has survived, and provides additional detail to the report recorded in ARF, an. 813. 87 ARF., ann. 812, 813. The basic facts are provided by George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. Joan Hussey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press , 1957, 173–178. See also the discussion by Grierson, “The Carolingian Empire” (see note 85), 909–910; and Classen, Karl der Grosse (see note 85), 100–101. 88 ARF, an. 813; and the brief observations by Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Medi- terranean Empire,” Mediterranean Identities in the Premodern Era: Entrepôts, Islands, Empires, ed. John Watkins and Kathryn Reyerson. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, 154–172. There is considerable debate regarding Charlemagne’s naval operations, in general. See, Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 41

for example, H. Sproemberg, “Die Seepolitik Karls des Grossen,” H. Sproemberg, Beiträge zur belgisch-niederländerischen Geschichte. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1959, 1–29; Ekkehard Eickhoff, Seekrieg und Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland: das Mittelmeer unter Byzantinischer und Arabischer Hegemonie (650–1040). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966; Id., “Maritime Defence of the Carolingian Empire,” Vikings on the Rhi- ne: Recent Research on Early Medieval Relations between the Rhinelands and Scandina- via, ed. Rudolf Simek and Ulrike Engel. Studia medievalia septentrionalia, 11. Vienna: Fassbender, 2004, 50–64. 89 ARF, ann. 812, 813. 90 ARF, an., 813. 91 Concerning the admonitio, see F. L. Ganshof, “L’Eglise et le pouvoir royal dans la monarchie franque sous Pépin III et Charlemagne,” SSCI VII (1960): 95–141; and transla- ted as “The Church and the Royal Power in the Frankish Monarchy under Pippin III and Charlemagne,” Id., The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy: Studies in Carolingian History, trans. Janet Sondheimer. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1971, 205–239, at 224, n. 36, who cites the texts that call attention to this document. Wilfried Hartmann, Die Synoden der Karolingerzeit im Frankenreich und in Italien. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1989, 128–140, discusses, in retrospect, the canons produced and the nature of the reforms that Charlemagne wanted to be enacted. See also the still useful older work by Carlo de Clercq, La législation religieuse franque de Clovis à Charlemagne. Louvain and Paris: Bureau du Recueil, 1936, 229–249. For a useful introduction to the complexity, especially in logistic terms, involved in the summoning of large ecclesiastical gatherings of this type during the early Middle Ages, see Gregory L. Halfond, The Archaeology of Frankish Church Councils, AD 511–768. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010. 92 ARF. an. 813. For a useful introduction to the complexity involved in the summoning of such large gatherings, see the observations by Michael McCormick, The Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce, A.D. 300–900. Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2001, 665, who puts the figure for such meetings in the 5,000 person range. It is worth noting that Charlemagne’s palace chapel at Aachen could hold some 7,000 people. On this point, see Stuart Airlie, “Palaces of Memory: the Carolingian Court as Political Centre,” Courts and Regions in Medieval Europe, ed. S. Rees Jones, R. Marks, and A. J. Minnis. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2000, 1–20; and reprinted with the same pagination in Id., Power and Its Problems in Carolingian Europe. Farnham, Uni- ted Kingdom: Ashgate, 2012, at 6, with the literature cited there. 93 Ganshof, “The Church and the Royal Power” (see note 91), 208. 94 Eduard Eichmann, Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland, ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des kirchlichen Rechts, der Liturgie und der Kirchenpolitik, 2 vols. Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1942, I, 23–40; Robert Folz, The Coronation of Charlemagne, 25 December 800, trans. J. E. Anderson. London: Edward Arnold, 1994, 143–150; and Janet Nelson, “The Lord’s Anointed and the People’s Choice: Carolingian Royal Ritual,” Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional So- cieties, ed. David Cannadine and Simon Price. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 137–180; reprinted in Ead., The Frankish World, 750–900. London and Rio Grande, OH: The Hambledon Press, 1996, 99–131, at 120–124. 95 Airlie, “Palaces of Memor” (see note 92), 6, for the 7,000 figure. 96 I very much like the observation by Thomas, F.X, Noble, “Secular Sanctity: Forging an Ethos for the Carolingian Nobility,” Lay Intellectuals in the Carolingian World, ed. Pat- rick Wormald and Janet Nelson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 8–36, at 16, who writes: “Carolingian society was hierarchical and elitist. The elite constituted a governing class whose rank and status were plain for all to see.” Concerning exaggerated 42 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

notions of protocol at Charlemagne’s court, see, for example, Notker, Gesta Karoli, bk. II, chs. 8–9 (Notker der Stammler. Taten Kaiser Karls des Grossen, ed. Hans Haefele. Mo- numenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, 12. Berlin: Weidemann, 1962; and regarding the hustle and bustle of royal celebrations, see Ermold, Épîtres au roi Pépin, i. lines 18–32, in Hermold le noir. Poème sur Louis le Pieux et épîtres au roi Pépin, ed. and trans. Edmond Faral. Paris: Societé d’Ėdition “Belles Lettres”, 1932. 97 ARF. an. 813. 98 See, for example, Eichmann, Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland (see note 94), I, 23–40; and Folz, The Coronation of Charlemagne (see note 94), pp. 143–150. 99 ARF, an. 813. See, for example, regarding the impact of seasonal change on travel, McCor- mick, Origins (see note 92), 144–168; and Norbert Ohler, Reisen im Mittelalter. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004, 24–27. 100 ARF, an. 813. Cf. Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt” (see note 29), 625, who ignores Charlemagne’s hunts in 813, and in his Appendix, “Reports of Carolingian Hunts,” p. 642, credits Charlemagne as having undertaken only one hunt in 813. 101 ARF, an. 813. 102 Regarding lengthy hunting excursions lasting several months by Carolingian rulers, including Charlemagne, see Régine Hennebicque, “Espaces suvages et chasses royales dans le nord de la Francie,” Revue du Nord LXII (1980): 35–57. 103 ARF, an. 813. Regarding the size and complexity of major royal hunting expeditions, see, for example, Jean Verdon, “Recherches sur la chasse en Occident durant le haut Moyen- Age,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 56 (1978), 805–829, at 822–824; Nelson, “The Lord’s Anointed” (see note 94), pp. 120–124; Peter Godman, “The Poetic Hunt: From Saint Martin to Charlemagne’s Heir,” Charlemagne’s Heir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814–840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1990, 565–589; and Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 43–68. 104 See Hennebicque (Le Jan), “Espaces sauvages et chasses royales” (see note 102), 35–57; and for detailed discussion of Frankish royal assets in the Ardennes, see Helga Müller-Keh len, Die Ardennen im Frühmittelalter: Untersuchungen zum Königsgut in einem karolingischen Kernland. Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck Institute für Geschichte, 38. Götting- en: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973, and 109–110, for special attention to the hunt. 105 ARF, an. 813 (only mss., D and E). There is little likelihood that the physicians at the royal court misdiagnosed gout, which was as well known a condition in the early medieval west as it had been during the later Roman Empire. In addition to a long tradition of having developed practical treatments for gout in the west, the Carolingians also had available Latin texts such De Podagra by Rufus of Ephesus (Rufus de Podagra, ed. Henning Mørland. Ser. Symbolae Osloensis, 6. Oslo: Osloae, 1938), to guide their efforts. Also see the much more comprehensive collection of texts, Oeuvres de Rufus d’Ephèse: texte collationné sur les mansuscrits, traduit pour le première fois en français, avec une introduction, ed. Charles Daremberg and Ch. Émile Ruelle (orig. 1879). Rpt, Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1963. Of particular importance here is Traité de la Goutte d’aprés une version latine, avec traduc- tion française, 247–290. Regarding medication for gout, see Alexander of Tralles (The Latin Alexander of Tralles: The Text and Transmission of a Late Latin Medical Book, ed. D. R. Langslow. Journal of Roman Studies Monographs, 10.:London: Society for the Pro- motion of Roman Studies, 2006; and the use of the chemical Colchicum autumnale which was also known through the work of Dioscorides regarding whom see John M. Riddle, Dioscorides on Pharmacy and Medicine. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985, 45–46. On the whole, I agree with the views of John M. Riddle, “Theory and Practice in Medieval Medicine,” Viator, 5 (1974): 157–184, at 159, who observes, “No notable division between late Roman and early medieval medicine exists.” Regarding the presence of at least several Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 43

medical personnel at Charlemagne’s court, who likely were able to diagnose gout and treat it, see Alcuin, Carm, 26, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poetae latini aevi carolini, ed. Ernst Dümmler. Berlin: Weidemann, 1881. These men are credited with the ability to bleed patients, make herbal remedies, hot poultices, and potions of various types. 106 See the brief mention of Charlemagne’s gout, Fußgicht, by Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft (see note 58), 94; and 74, for the likelihood that Louis the Pious also suffered from the same disease. In fact, it may have been the case that many of the Carolingians suffered from gout as it is known to have a strong genetic component. 107 There are numerous studies that deal with various aspects of early medieval hunting and especially with the weapons and equipment used. Often, these can help us to understand the exceptional physical efforts expended by hunters. Still useful, in this context, is Kurt Lindner, Die Jagd im frühen Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1940, 237–455, who gathered a large quantity of material dealing with “Die Technik der Jagd”; and Verdon, “Recherches sur la chasse” (see note 103), 815–821. Regarding the Greco-Roman background, see J. Aymard, Essai sur les chasses romaines. Paris: Gilbert Charles-Picard, 1951), 199–293, concerning “instrumenta venatoria”; and J. K. Anderson, Hunting in the Ancient World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, 122–153, in specific regard to the later Roman period. More generally in regard to hunting during the early Middle Ages, see Jorg Jarnut, “Die frühmittelalterliche Jagd unter rechts- und sozial- geschichtlichen Aspekten,” SSCI, 31. Spoleto: Presso La Sede Del Centro, 1985, 2 vols. I: 765–780; and Werner Rösener, “Der König als Jäger. Antike Einflüsse auf die herrschaft- liche Jagd im Mittlealter,” Die Jagd der Eliten in den Erinnerungskulturen von der Antike bis in die Frühe Neuzeit, ed. Wolfram Martini. Formen der Erinnerung, 3. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000, 15–37. Also of interest is Sönke Lorenz, “Der Königsf- orst (forestis) in der Merowinger-und Karolingerzeit. Prolegomena zu einer Geschichte mittelalterlicher Nutzwälder,” Mönchtum-Kireche-Herrschaft, 750–1000, ed. Dieter R. Bauer, Rudolf Hiestand, Brigitte Kasten, and Sönke Lorenz. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1998, 261–285. 108 ARF, an. 813 in mss. D and E. Insofar as I have been able to ascertain this is the only mention of Charlemagne being afflicted by the gout. Carolingian writers could have used Char- lemagne’s gout for propaganda purposes because it was well known that holy men such as Pope Gregory the Great and Bishop Mellitus of London also suffered from the disease. See on this, John D. Hosler, “Gregory the Great’s Gout: Suffering, Penitence, and Diplomacy in the Early Middle Ages,” Where Heaven and Earth Meet: Essays on Medieval Europe in Honor of Daniel F. Callahan, ed. Michael Frassetto, Matthew Gabriele and John D. Hosler. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, 11–32, at 29–30. From another angle, it may be noted here that whatever propaganda value modern scholars may attribute to Charlemagne’s hunting and whatever biases they may see as inherent in the Royal Annals (ARF) attention should be called to the fact that the author of these Annals did not pass over the fact that Charlemagne was required to take to his bed by illness. In a similar vein, the sources note that Charles Martel was so ill in 723 that, as a result, he was unable to undertake military operations. See, Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare (see note 53), 24. Regarding bias in the various Carolingian annals, see Rosamond McKitterick, “The illusion of royal power in the Carolingian annals,” English Historical Review, 115 (2000) 1–20. 109 Vita Karoli, ch. 22. Whether this was, in fact, gout or some sort of arthritis cannot be deter- mined. Halphen, Vie de Charlemagne (see note 74), observes, 67, n. 9, that Suetonius calls attention to the limp of the Emperor Augustus (ch. LXXX). 110 Vita Karoli, ch. 22; and Halphen, Vie de Charlemagne (see note 74), notes 67, n. 9, that Sue- tonius calls attention to the limp of the Emperor Augustus (ch. LXXX). Regarding Charle- magne’s diet, see Loren C. MacKinney, Early Medieval Medicine With Special Reference 44 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

to France and Chartres. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937, 88–90. It seems likely that various Latin texts dealing with diet were available to the Carolingian court. For example, information from Roman sources regarding diet and especially the preference for boiled meat, which was regarded as healthful, was available to the Carolin- gian court from Roman texts, which traditionally are neglected by specialists in early medieval history. Among these texts are Apicius, De re coquinaria and Celsus, De medicina. Concerning the mss. of these texts, see L.D. Reynolds, “Apicius,” and M.D. Reeve, “Cel- sus,” both in Texts and Transmission; A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L. D. Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, xxviii, 1–14, 251, and xxviii, xxx, 46–47, 353, respectively. Bernhard Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne, trans. and ed. Michael Gorman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 143, 150 for Apicius, and cf. 151, regarding Celsus, who, however, Bischoff believes never reached Charlemagne’s court. In the context of ancient advice regarding diet, also of importance are Anthimus (MacKinney, loc.cit., pp. 42–44, 70, 77, 90, 162) and the Latin translations of Oribasius (Bischoff, loc. cit. 144; and MacKinney, loc.cit, 77). It seems likely that, at least, some of these works were available to those physicians who served at Charlemagne’s court as noted by Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 22, who explains that these physicians advised that Charlemagne eat boiled meat, and ch. 30, indictes that Charlemagne apparently followed a rather mild diet when very ill during the last week of his life. Cf. Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft (see note 58), 97, who remains skeptical. 111 Regarding Charlemagne’s active participation in the planning of religious reforms during the imperial period, see, for example, Ganshof, “The Church and the Royal Power” (see note 91), 205–239; and McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 306–311. 112 Regarding Louis’ “coronation,” itself, I follow the consensus, as identified by Ildar H. Ga- ripzanov, The Symbolic Language of authority in the Carolingian World (c. 751–877. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008, 292–293, esp. n. 109, that Louis’ coronation was influenced by late Roman and early Byzantine traditions. I also agree with Garipzanov that there was no obvious “Frankish flavor” to the proceedings as some scholars have claimed. See also Robert Folz, The Concept of empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century, trans. Shelia Ann Ogilvie. London: Edward Arnold, 1969, 25, who emphasizes Byzantine influence and this especially is the case because the pope played no role in Louis’ elevation. See also Eichmann, Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland (see note 94), I, 34–38. 113 ARF, an. 813, claimed that copies of these documents were to be found in the archives in each of the cities where a council was held. These texts or copies of them still survive and are available in Concilia II, no. 34 Arles, no. 35 Rheims, no. 36 Mainz, no. 37 Chalon, and no. 38 Tours; in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum Sectio III, Concilia II, ed. A. Werminghoff. Hanover: Hahn, 1906–1908. Note should also be taken of Dahlhaus-Berg, Nova antiquitas et antiqua novitas (see note 73), 221–235, who provides an “Excurs” that treats “Theodulf von Orléans und die Beschlüsse der synode von Chalons 813.” 114 ARF, an. 813. These particular copies do not seem to have survived into modern times. 115 Chron. Mois., an. 813, p. 310: (Chronicon moissiacensis, ed. G. Pertz, Monumenta Germa- niae Historica. Scriptores, II. Hanover: Hahn 1829), provides this record of what would seem to be the title or more likely part of the title of this capitulary as it was preserved in the monastic archives at Moissac. See the useful discussion by Michael Edward Moore, A Sacred Kingdom: Bishops and the Rise of Frankish Kingship. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011, 279–285. 116 CRF, no. 78 (Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Capitularia, I, Legum Sectio, II, ed. A. Boretius. Hanover: Hahn,1883). See Ganshof, “The Church and the Royal Power” (see note 91) 208, n. 36, for something of a consensus on this point at the time that he wrote. Note also the new findings and interesting observations by Hubert Mordek and Gerhard Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 45

Schmitz, “Neue Kapitularien und Kapitulariensammlungen,” Deutsches Archiv 43 (1987): 361–439, at 374–378, and 414–423, regarding a forty-chapter text. 117 In addition, Charlemagne could, of course, have used his efficient messenger system to distribute capitularies throughout his lands very rapidly, i.e., in good conditions relays of riders could cover in excess of 300 kilometers in a twenty-four hour period. See, Bach- rach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 82), 21–24. Cf. Martin Gravel, Distan- ces, Recontres, Communications: Réaliser l’empire sous Charlemagne et Louis le Pieux. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012, 315–317, who appears to have been unaware of Charlemagne’s messenger system or, at least, the speed at which its riders could operate. As a result Gravel greatly over estimates the time needed to move information throughout the empire. The basic work regarding the missi dominici remains Victor Krause, “Geschichte des In- stituts der missi dominici,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsfor- schung 2 (1890): 193–300; but now see the important observations by McKitterick, Char- lemagne (see note 30), 213–217, 256–266. Regarding the effectiveness of Charlemagne’s missi at the local level see, Carine van Rhijn, “Charlemagne and the Government of the Frankish Countryside,” Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors, ed. Jeroen Duindam, Jill Harries, Caroline Humfress, and Nimrod Hurvitz. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, 157–176; and Martin Gravel, “Du rôle des missi impériaux dans las supervision de las vie chrétienne. Témoignage d’une collection de capitulaires du début du IXe siècle,” Memini. Traveaux Documents 11 (2007): 61–92. 118 See, for example, Fried, Karl der Grosse (see note 13), 583–585. 119 It is important to emphasize that Adalhard’s authorship of the original text of De ordine palatii (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Fontes Iuris Germanici Antiqui in usum scholarum separatim editi, ed. Thomas Gross and Rudolf Schieffe. Hanover: Hahn, 1980, which provides information regarding what is represented as Charlemagne’s normal behavior at these gatherings, was controversial in some quarters for many years, but now is no longer questioned. See, for example, Brigitte Kasten, Adalhard von Corbie. Düsseldorfer Studia Humaniora, Düsseldorfer Studia zu Mittelalter und Renaissance, 3. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986, 72–84; P. Depreux, Prosopographie de l’entourage de Louis le Pieux (781– 840), Instrumenta I. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1997, 76–79; Janet L. Nelson, “Aachen as a Place of Power,” Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Mayke de Jong and Frans Theuws with Carine van Rhijn. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001, 226–232; Ead., “Was Charlemagne’s Court a Courtly Society?,” Court Culture in the Early Middle Ages: The Proceedings of the First Alcuin Conference, ed. Catherine Cubitt. Turnhout: Brepols, 2003, 41; and McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 271. See Bernard S. Bachrach, “Adalhard’s De ordine palatii: Some MethodologicalOobservations Regarding Chapters 29–36,” Cithara 39 (2001): 3–36, esp. 20–21, where a detailed discussion of Charlemagne’s behavior is discussed and passim for the historiography regarding this text. 120 ARF, an. 813. Special attention to Louis’ oath with regard to his later failure to support Bernard was one of the foci of the emperor’s “guilt” in the death of his nephew. See the discussion by de Jong, The Penitential State (see note 80), 238–239. 121 ARF, an, 813. Regarding Louis’s coronation, see Classen, Karl der Grosse (see note 85), 100–101; and Janet Nelson, “The Lord’s Anointed and the People’s Choice: Carolingi- an Royal Ritual,” in Ritual and Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, ed. David Cannadine and Simon Price. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 137–180, and reprinted in Ead., The Frankish World, 750–900. London and Rio Grande, OH: Hambledon Press, 1996, 99–131, at 113–114. If Charlemagne’s speech were written, it likely was written in uncial in light of the general tendency of people in their old age of having difficulty reading small “print.” 122 ARF. an. 813. 46 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

123 ARF. ann. , OH 811, 812. For a useful background account, see Niels Lund, “Scandinavia, 700–1066,” NCMH, ed. McKitterick (see note 43), II, 202–227, at, 206–208. 124 ARF, an. 813. 125 Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30, makes the observation explicitly that Charlemagne was tired out by the assembly. For various accounts of the assembly, see Hermoldus, bk. 2, lines 682–697 (Hermold le noir. Poème sur Louis le Pieux et épîtres au roi Pépin, ed. and trans. Edmond Faral. Paris: Société d’Ėdition ‘les Belles Lettres’, 1932; Thegan, ch. 6, Theganus, Gesta Hludowici imperatoris, ed. Ernst Tremp. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scrip- tores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi, 64. Hanover: Hahn,1995; and Astronomer, ch. 20, Astronomus, Gesta Hludowici imperatoris, ed. Ernst Tremp. Mo- numenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanidarum in usum scholarum separatim editi, 64. Hanover: Hahn,1995. 126 The attack of gout, itself, struck in late August or early September, see ARF, an. 813 mss. D and E, and Charlemagne had to end the hunt. It is clear that the attack was severe. 127 Thegan, ch. 6, for Charlemagne leaning on Louis. Although this observation by Thegan might also be regarded as having symbolic connotations regarding the younger man’s importance, it certainly was convenient for Charlemagne, who, as noted above, recently had suffered a severe attack of gout, to lean on his son. 128 Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30, claims that Charlemagne was much weakened by both the weight of illness and of old age, when he decided to establish Louis as co-emperor. This, obviously, is rather inconsistent with the emperor’s behavior during the spring, summer, and autumn of 813, as indicated above. However, Einhard goes on to make clear that “despite his age” Charlemagne undertook a second hunt in the autumn of 813 after Louis’ coronation. 129 ARF. an. 813. Hennebicque, “Espaces suvages et chasses royales dans le nord de la Francie” (see note 102), 35–57; and Karl Hauk, “Tiergarten im Pfalzbereich,” Deutsche Königspfal zen: Beiträge zur ihrer historischen und archäologischen Erforschung. Veröffentlichun- gen des Max-Planck Insituts für Geschichte, 11.1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963, 30–74, esp. 39–43. For background dealing with game parks, see Aymard, Chasses Romaines (see note 129), 189–196; and with regard to examples of discussion concerning park hunting in Latin sources available to the Carolingians, see Anderson, Hunting in the Ancient World, 79–80, which treats Quintus Curtius concerning Alexander the Great, 101–102, with regard to Suetonius concerning Domition; 125, 171, with regard to Fronto; and 86, 167, for Varro, see Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt” (see note 29), 614, who claims “it was writers like Einhard in the circles around Louis the Pious who first transformed hunting from an elite pastime of little political significance into a central component of kingly representation.” This approach seems to foreshorten Roman imperial hunts as being of importance to the imperial image and also does not give sufficient attention, in this context, to Carolingian dedication to imitatio imperii. Rather, it is clear that Latin sources, for example, the writers noted above, stressed the importance of hunting to the imperial image. Perhaps more importantly, see, in regard to the special attention given to Trajan and especially to Hadrian by Pliny the Younger in regard to hunting in the correct manner for an emperor. This point is stressed by Anderson, Hunting in the Ancient World, 101–103; and treated in greater detail by Andreas Gutsfeld, “Hadrian als Jäger. Jagd als Mittel kaiserliche Selbstdarstellung; and Tobias Kasulke, “Hadrian und die Jagd im Spie- gel der zeitgenössischen Literatur”; both studies are to be found in Die Jagd der Eliten in den Erinnerungskulturen von der Antike bis in die Frühe Neuzeit, ed. Wolfram Martini. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000, 79–99, 102–127, respectively. It is important that Nemasianius’ Cynegetica, a late third century handbook on hunting, was available at Saint Denis, in the suburbs of Paris, where Hincmar read it as a schoolboy. It would seem Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 47

that a copy was made ca. 825 of the text used by Hincmar, also at Saint Denis, perhaps a decade after the future archbishop of Rheims already had finished his basic education. See M. D. Reeve, “Nemasius,” Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L. D. Reynolds and P. K. Marshall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, 246–247; and Nemesianus, “Cynegetica,” edited with a commentary by Rainer Jakobi. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1914, 23–24, 130 Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30. The notion that the hunt was emphasized in various Caro- lingian sources as a means to demonstrate royal vitality in old age has been suggested by Hack, Alter, Krankheit und Herrschaft (see note 58), 147–152 and esp. 150–151, regarding Charlemagne’s participation in hunting expeditions during 813. Such an approach to the use of the hunt might well have substantial propaganda value if appropriately disseminated while a particularly old king was still ruling. However, Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt” (see note 29), 622–625, claims that only one Carolingian author, who wrote while Charlemagne was living, treated what would appear to have been his avid participation in the hunt. All the other accounts of Charlemagne’s participation in the hunt, according to Goldberg, were written after the emperor was dead and, therefore, hardly can be thought to have been intended for propaganda purposes to emphasize his vitality. The one contemporary source, accepted by Goldberg, that treats Charlemagne’s hunting prowess was written ca. 799, and, therefore, hardly can be associated with the argument for a propaganda effort regarding vitality in old age as Charlemagne was in his middle to late fifties at the time. Goldberg, p. 620, limits his focus to the poem written ca. 799 and rejects the information provided by Annales mettenses priores. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scripto- res rerum Germanicarum, vol. 10, ed. B. von Simson. Hanover: Hahn, 1905, concerning Charlemagne’s hunting, by claiming this source was written after Charlemagne’s death. The scholarly consensus, however, is that Annales were written ca. 806. Therefore, if the consensus date is followed then two contemporary sources, in fact, treat Charlemagne’s hunting expeditions. One is mentioned in Annales mettenses priores, an. 803 and a second in an. 805. The fact that these Annales do not treat the hunts that took place in 813, supports the view that they were completed in 806. 131 For the date of Charlemagne’s return to Aachen, see Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30. Regar- ding the normal seasons for hunting and the fact that hunting in the winter was rare, see Verdon, “Recherches sur la chasse” (see note 103), 821–822. 132 ARF, an. 814, indicates that only the Byzantine envoys at Aachen were of interest to Louis at this time and that he sent all of the other envoys, who already were at the capital, back to their homes. The likelihood that the Byzantines arrived during the autumn of 813, i.e., when Charlemagne was still alive and well, is heightened by the fact that the emperor, see below, is noted to have been consulting with various Syrian and Greek theologians during this period. It is also evident that for the Byzantine envoys to have been at Aachen at the time of Louis’ arrival in February, they would have had to have arrived well prior to Charlemagne’s death because of the difficulties of winter travel. Regarding travel, see Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 468–472; and McCormick, Ori- gins (see note 92), 144–168. Concerning the details discussed here, see Classen, Karl der Grosse (see note 85), 95–96, who, however, does not connect the Syrian and Greek theologians at Aachen with this embassy. 133 Hermoldus, bk. 2, lines 824–835, would seem to depict Louis’s actions, which appear to have been taken shortly after he had assumed full control at Aachen, as following up on plans that already had been made by Charlemagne. N.b. Faral, Ermold le Noir, 65–66, n. 3. In addition to the time frame involved, the phrase used by Hermoldus, line 835, that at this time Louis acted “amore patris,” permits the inference that upon arriving at Aachen he put into action plans that his father already had made. 48 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

134 On 11 November 813, Pope Leo III, Epist. no. 8, sent a letter to Charlemagne detailing important intelligence regarding events in both Spain and Italy as well as in various of the islands of the western Mediterranean. This letter very likely reached Aachen no later than early December and was a follow up to the letter sent by the pope to Charlemagne on 26 August, 812 (Leo, Epist., no. 6), which, as noted above, the emperor took into consideration while planning military operations in the Mediterranean during the winter planning session of 812–813 at Aachen concerning which see ARF, an. 813. Also Leo (Epist., no. 7) wrote to Charlemagne on 11 November. These papal letters are to be found in Epistulae X, ed. Karl Hampe. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistulae, V. Hanover: Hahn, 1899. In regard to Charlemagne’s direction of Carolingian strategy during the last months of his life, the pope’s letters make clear that it was believed in Rome that the emperor was active- ly in charge of Carolingian military planning. 135 Charlemagne’s efforts in regard to correcting various religious texts during the winter of 813–814 are noted by Thegan, ch. 6. 136 ARF, an. 814; Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 30; and Thegan, ch. 7. 137 Vita Karoli, ch. 30, “Graeci pleurisn dicunt.” 138 Thegan, ch. 7. See the discussion by Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft (see note 58), 91–97, regarding the nature of Charlemagne’s last illness and cf. the earlier work of MacKinney, Early Medieval Medicine (see note 110), 90, who conflates accounts. 139 Vita Karoli, ch. 22. Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache (see note 46), 156, is certainly correct in noting that Charlemagne “loved to soak in hot springs,” but this hardly does justice to Einhard’s description of the emperor social activities in the baths, which included taking part in “swimming” races. It may be added, as well, that the hot mineral baths at Aachen might well have had a soothing effect on parts of Charlemagne’s foot that from time to time were impacted by gout. See Rufus of Ephesus, De Podagra, chs. 5 and 6, where the baths, with mineral content, are advocated for soothing those suffering with gout. For a likely similar situation see the discussion of the baths at Bath by Audrey Cruse, Roman Medicine. Port Straud, United Kingdom: Tempus, 2004, 137. 140 Vita Karoli, ch. 31. By contrast, it should be noted here that when Carloman, Charlemag- ne’s younger brother, took ill and was thought to be dying efforts were made several months in advance for his burial in the cathedral church at Rheims. See, Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 181–182. 141 See Dales, Alcuin (see note 62), 79–92; concerning Einhard, see the remarks of Hermold, lines 680–97, who considered Einhard to be “best loved” by Charlemagne, and “a man of wise judgment and exceptional goodness.” 142 Note, for example, the inclination of Dutton, Charlemagne Mustache (see note 46), 155 and 156, to regard Alcuin as “feigning not to recognize the broken and failing world around him” and Einhard’s supposed “myopia,” mentioned above, presumably for failing to focus sufficient attention on Charlemagne’s putative debilitation in old age. However, Dutton does call his reader’s attention to Vita Karoli, ch. 32, where Einhard gathers a selection of supposed “portents,” discussed above, that do not demonstrate that these were due to Char- lemagne’s old age or had some sort of a negative impact either on the governance of the empire or on the operations of its military forces. As pointed out by Halphen, in his edition of Vita Karoli (see note 74), 88–89, Einhard in ch. 32, echoed topoi that, by and large, had been used by Suetonius in various of the imperial lives that he authored. 143 For very useful and easily available introductions to the works of these men with a helpful guide to the scholarly literature, see Thomas F.X. Noble, Charlemagne and Louis the Pi- ous: Lives by Einhard, Notker, Ermoldus, Thegan and the Astronomer. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009) 119–127, 187–194, 219–226, respectively. Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 49

144 See, for example, de Jong, The Penitential State (see note 80), 72–79, 79–89, and 89–95, regarding Thegan, the Astronomer, and Hermoldus, respectively. 145 Regarding the treatment of the old age theme by Louis’s biographers, see Hermold, bk. 2, lines 704–709; Thegan, ch. 6; Astronomer, ch. 20. Cf. de Jong, The Penitential State (see note 80), 18, who asserts that Louis was not regarded highly either by Charlemagne and/or by some influential members of the imperial court. Her reasoning would seem to be based upon the assumption that the emperor “hesitated” to have Louis crowned immediately after the death of his brother, Charles the Younger, on 4 December 811. De Jong’s view seems to stem from the belief that there was some constitutional imperative, as yet undocumented, that required Louis’ elevation to the office of co-emperor to be executed immediately or at least rapidly upon the death of his last surviving legitimate brother. If there were hesitation by Charlemagne, it may perhaps have been founded in the first instance on the emperor’s personal view that he was healthy and had no reason to disturb the constitutional status quo in the immediate wake of Charles the Younger’s death and particularly before he had established his own grandson Bernard as king of Italy which took place in 812. In general, Charlemagne would seem to have adhered to Augustus’ famous advice, “festina lente.” As to matters at court, Hermoldus, bk. 2, lines 680–697, notes that Charlemagne, on the advice of his courtiers and particularly on that of Einhard, decided to have Louis made co-emperor. This decision certainly was made no later than the winter of 812–813, i.e., about fifteen months after Charles the Younger’s death, when the assembly was planned for September 813, where Louis’s elevation was to take place. In the context of arranging for Louis’s elevation, it should be noted that important military operations and diplomatic negotiations in the western Mediterranean were in train during the year or so prior to the imperial coronation. In fact, Louis, following his attack on Huesca, had been delegated to negotiate a treaty with the Muslim ruler in the northeast, Amrûs ibn Yûsuf (Abulez of ARF, an. 812) aimed at stabilizing the status quo in the northeast during the period 812–813. Charlemagne’s longer term strategy in this context was to encourage Amrûs ibn Yûsuf’s plan to revolt against the Caliph in Cordoba, while Carolingian military strategy at the time was focused on combined land and naval operations further to the east and north. For useful background here, see Philippe Senac, Les Carolingiens et al-Andalus (VIIIe-IXe siècle). Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002, 73–76. 146 Astronomer, ch. 20. 147 Astronomer, ch. 20. 148 See, for example, Astronomer, ch. 20, regarding worries at court, in general, and also Her- moldus, 2, lines 682–697. 149 Thegan, ch. 6. 150 Thegan, ch. 6. There is some confusion in the sources regarding the exact order of the ceremonies as well as the crowning, itself. The approach taken by de Jong, The Penitential State (see note 80), 18, seems to make sense. 151 While gout could be exceptionally debilitating in its most severe form and those who suffered from it might believe that death was preferable, it was not regarded as a fatal disease. See W. S. C. Copeman, A short History of Gout and the Rheumatic Diseases. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964, 1–20, who unfortunately does not treat early medieval Europe. Rather, see Hosler, “Gregory the Great’s Gout” (see note 108), 11–32, provides useful background regarding the understanding of gout in the early Middle Ages. See also the discussion by Achim Thomas Hack, Gregor der Grosse und die Krankheit. Ser. Päpste und Papstum, 41, Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 2012, 59–72, from which it is very clear that Gregory the Great’s attacks of gout were much more severe than those suffered by Charlemagne and much more frequent. 50 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

152 One should never underestimate either Charlemagne’s intelligence or his learning, and if either of these should have fallen short in a particular instance he had numerous highly educated and intelligent advisers to provide proper insight. See, for example, the highly positive treatment of this matter by Fried, Karl der Grosse (see note 13), 319–342; and in particular for Charlemagne’s relations with Alcuin, see Luitpold Wallach, Alcuin and Charlemagne: Studies in Carolingian History and Literature. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- sity Press), 1959, and with regard to Theodulf of Orleans, see Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians (see note 24). 153 Thegan, ch. 6. 154 For a brief examination of this strategy, see Bernard S. Bachrach, “Military Organization in Aquitaine under the Early Carolingians,” Speculum 49 (1974): 1–33. Reprinted with the same pagination in Id., Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West. London: Ashga- te,1993, 1–33. 155 Hermoldus, 2, lines 658–681. 156 McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 98, makes clear that there is no reason to believe that Charlemagne was a “great warrior.” 157 Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 101–103. 158 Lindner, Die Jagd im frühen Mittelalter (see note 107), 237–455, provides considerable information regarding the rigors of the hunt and the equipment used as does Verdon, “Re- cherches sur la chasse” (see note 103), 815–821. 159 There is much discussion with regard to ideas concerning matters that more recent scholars tend to discuss in terms such as private life or personal life. See the very useful discussion by Janet L. Nelson, “The Problematic in the Private,” Social History 15 (1990): 355–365; and Ead, “Did Charlemagne have a Private Life?” Writing Medieval Biography, 750–1250: Essays in Honour of Professor Frank Barlow, ed. David Bates, Julia Krick, and Sarah Hamilton. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006, 15–28. 160 However accessible Charlemagne’s sleeping quarters may have been to various members of his court, I strongly doubt that he often copulated with one or another woman before an audience, invited or not. Regarding the royal apartments at Aachen, see Myke de Jong, “Charlemagne’s Balcony: The Solarium in Ninth Century Narratives,” The Long Morning of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early Medieval Studies, ed. Jennifer R. Davis and Michael McCormick. Aldershot, United Kingdom: The Boydell Press, 2008, 277–289, at 288, who wonders, “Did they pass through the solarium on their way to the imperial bed- chamber? Were they followed by many eyes as they did so?” 161 Loren C. MacKinney, “An Unpublished Treatise on Medicine and Magic for the Age of Charlemagne,” Speculum 18 (1943): 494–496; and the discussion by Peregrine Horden, “What’s Wrong with Early Medieval Medicine?” Social History of Medicine 24 (2009): 5–25, at 7–8; and Id., “Medieval Medicine,” The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medi- cine, ed. Mark Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 40–59, at 52. 162 Although it would seem that there has been some bio-chemical research for the purpose of examining medieval recipes (Horden, “What’s Wrong with Early Medieval Medicine?” (see note 161), 5–6), I have been unable to find published experiments in regard to medications that might enhance male sexual prowess. Note should be taken of the possibility that if Charlemagne did, if fact, take some sort of otherwise ineffective medication he may perhaps have benefited from a placebo effect. However, some useful observations regarding medications taken to improve male sexual performance are to be found in Minois, History of Old Age (see note 57), 85, 175–176; Shahar, Growing Old in the Middle Ages, 40, 64, 77–82; and Luke Demaitre, “The Care and Extension of Old Age in Medieval Medicine,” in Aging and the Aged in Medieval Europe: Selected Papers for the Annual Conference of the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, held 25–26 November 1983, ed. Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 51

Michael M. Sheehan, CSB. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990, 3–22, 19–22, who calls attention to “medicines with occult efficacy.” 163 See, for example, Michael Richter, “Karl der Grosse und seine Ehefrauen. Zu einigen dunkleren Seiten Karls des Grossen Anhang von Quellen des ausgehenden achten und beginnenden neunten Jahrhunderts,” Karl der Grosse und das Erbe der Kulturen, ed. Franz-Reiner Erkens. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, 17–24; cf. Janet Nelson, “Charle- magne the Man,” Charlemagne, Empire and Society, ed. Joanna Story. Manchester: Man- chester University Press, 2005, 22–37. An exceptionally helpful group of essays regarding Charlemagne’s family is provided by Janet Nelson, “La famille de Charlemagne,” Byzan- tion 61 (1991): 194–212, and reprinted with the same pagination in Ead., Rulers and Ru- ling Families in Early Medieval Europe: Alfred, Charles the Bald, and Others. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999; Ead., “La cour impériale de Charlemagne,” La royauté et les élites dans l’Europe carolingienne (début IX aux evirons de 920, ed. Régine le Jan. Lille: Villeneuve d’Arcq, Centre d’histoire de l’Europe du Nord Ouest, 1998, 177–191; and reprinted with the same pagination in Ead, Rulers and Ruling Families in Early Medieval Europe. Aldershot: The Boydell Press, 1999; Ead., “Charlemagne—pater optimus?,” Kaiser Krönung: Das Epos ‘Karolus Magnus et Leo papa’ und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn 799, ed. Peter Godman, Jörg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek. Paderborn: Akademie Verlag, 2002, 269–281 and reprinted with the same pagination in Ead., Courts, Elites, and Gendered Power in the Early Middle Ages. Aldershot: The Boydell Press, 2007. 164 Evidence for three separate, but related texts, have survived. Concerning these sources, see Richard Kay, “Charlemagne in Hell,” Law as Profession and Practice in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of James A. Brundage, ed. Kenneth Pennington and Melodie Harris Eich- bauer. Farnham Ashgate, 2011, 293–325, at p. 293, n. 2. The most famous of these attacks on Charlemagne, the Visio Wettini, was written ca. 824 by the foremost scholar and teacher then at the school in the famous monastic house at Reichenau. It is well established that Wetti’s friends and relatives were close supporters of Louis the Pious. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Wetti’s claim concerning Charlemagne’s descent into hell and a dramatic description of his fate there, was pressed forward by the scholar’s relative Hetti. The latter, who had been made archbishop of Trier by Louis ca. 819, provided an edited version of the original Visio for further dissemination. In addition, Wetti’s favorite student, Walahfrid Strabo, wrote a verse version of the Visio, which even more vigorously emphasized Charlemagne’s bad behavior in sexual matters. Walahfrid dedicated his verse version of the Visio to a certain Grimald, who was a son of Archbishop Hetti and served as a priest in Louis’s chapel. It is generally agreed that Walahfrid was seeking Grimald’s support in order secure his own advancement at the imperial court. The Visio in the original and in its subsequent incarnations pressed values dear to Louis’s presumed “puritanical” orientation in regard to sexual matters, which, it is widely agreed, were not shared by Charlemagne. Cf. Rachel Stone, Morality and Masculinity in the Carolingian Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 56, 156–157, 282–283, who downplays Charlemagne’s sexual behavior and does not engage with Richter, “Karl der Grosse und seine Ehefrauen” (see note 163), 17–24, who places the emperor’s sex life in a dark light. 165 See, for example, Nelson, “La famille de Charlemagne” (see note 163), 194–212. 166 See Einhard, Vita Karoli, ch. 18; and discussion by Nelson, “La famille de Charlemag- ne” (see note 163), 194–212; Ead., “La cour impériale de Charlemagne” (see note 163), 177–191; and Ead, “Charlemagne—pater optimus?” (see note 163), 269–281. 167 See the discussion by Barbero, Charlemagne (see note 14), 138–139. 168 Barbero, Charlemagne (see note 14), 334–336, regarding the hunt; and in more detail, see Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt” (see note 29), 613–643, where the popularization of Louis as a hunter is seen to have been in imitation of Charlemagne’s prowess. Regarding Charlemagne in this regard, see Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 203. 52 Mediaevistik 32 . 2019

169 Hack, Alter, Krankheit, Tod und Herrschaft (see note 58), 398–399, concludes that hunting was more dangerous to the health and well-being of the Carolingian royal family than war. 170 The claim by Janet Nelson, “The Last Years of Louis the Pious,” Charlemagne’s Heir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814–840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 147–159, at 157, that Charlemagne retired from participating in warfare “later in life,” i.e., at about sixty-two years of age, has no basis in the sources. De Jong, The Penitential State (see note 80), 52, follows Nelson and claims that Charlemagne retired as a “warrior.” Goldberg, “Louis the Pious and the Hunt” (see note 29), 624, is far off the mark when, without evidence, he claims “the Frankish nobles demanded (my ital.) that their ruler embody the bravery and martial skill on which they prided themselves.” In regard to comparisons between war and hunting, a conundrum of sorts is faced by Goldberg, “‘The Hunt Belongs to Man’” (see note 35), 32, where he takes note of Franz Irsigler, “On the Aristocratic Character of Early Frankish Society,” The Medieval Nobility: Studies on the Ruling Classes of France and Germany from the Sixth to the Twelfth Century, trans. Timothy Reuter. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Com- pany, 1979, 105–136, at 119, who avers “Hunting, even more than fighting, must rank as a genuine sign of a way of life appropriate to nobility in Francia.” More to the point, it is to be emphasized that Charlemagne was not a “warrior” but a commander in the Roman tradition as a fundamental aspect of his long-term adherence to notions of imitatio imperii. See, Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns” (see note 22), 101–107. 171 ARF., ann. 810 and 811. 172 Janet L. Nelson, “The Voice of Charlemagne,” Belief and Culture in the Middle Ages: Stu- dies Presented to Henry Mayr-Harting, ed. R. Gameson and H. Leyser. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 76–81; and reprinted with the same pagination in Ead., Courts, Elites, and Gendered Power in the Early Middle Ages. Aldershot:Ashgate, 2007, provides the latest count and in n. 13, cites the relevant scholarly literature in detail. 173 Such an observation is strengthened by the fact that only thirteen capitularies have survived from the previous thirty-five years of Charlemagne’s reign, when supposedly he was far more active, physically strong, and mentally alert than during the imperial era. See, Nelson, “The Voice of Charlemagne” (see note 172), 77, who provides the relevant data and n. 13, gives an excellent account of the relevant scholarly literature. 174 A good introduction is provided by McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), 214–291; and for a selection of Charlemagne’s military capitularies issued during the later part of the imperial period, see CRF, nos. 34, 44, 48, 49, 50, 74, 86, 99. See, also Christiana Pössel, “Authors and Recipients of Carolingian Capitularies, 779–829,” Texts and Identities in the Early Middle Ages, ed. R. Corradini, R. Meens, C. Pössel, and P. Shaw ( Verlag de Österreichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ser. Denkschrift, Österreichen Akademie der Wissenschaft, Philosoph-Historische Klasse, 344. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006, 253–274; and Gravel, Distances, Recontres, Communications (see note 117), who provides interesting insights regarding the administration of the Carolingi- an empire, especially in regard to Aquitaine during the reign of Louis the Pious. However, Gravel would seem to overestimate some of these difficulties, as, for example, in regard to the speed of communication ( 315–317). His work would have been on more solid ground had he done some comparisons with how the problems of dealing with an often distant emperor were treated by the Romans. In this context, Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977, is of exceptional value. 175 Regarding Charlemagne’s long-term practice of calling assemblies and attending them, see, for example, ARF, passim. For further discussion of these assemblies with regard to military planning, see Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns (see note 22), 29–30, along with the literature cited there. Mediaevistik 32 . 2019 53

176 A monographic study of Carolingian diplomacy is needed, but until one is written, a useful introduction is provided by F.L. Ganshof, “Les relations exterieures de la monarchie franque sous les prémiers souverains carolingiens,” Annali di Storia del Diritte, Rasseg- na Internationale, V-VI (1961–1962, appeared 1964): 1–53; and in translation as “The Frankish monarchy and its external relations, in Id.., The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy, studies in Carolingian History, trans. Janet Sondheimer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971, 162–204. This study provides ample information to conclude that Charlemagne was kept very busy by diplomatic matters during the imperial period. 177 See de Jong, “Charlemagne’s Balcony” (see note 160), 275–289, who observes ( 280) that “Charles resided frequently [at Aachen] after the winter of 794/95, and semi-permanently from 800 until his death.” 178 See McKitterick, Charlemagne (see note 30), pp. 157–171, for a useful introduction in regard to Aachen. 179 See the discussion by Eugen Ewig, “Résidence et capitale pedant le haut moyen âge,” Re- vue historique, 230 (1963): 25–72; and reprinted in Spätantikes und frankisches Gallien: Gesammelte Schriften (1952–1973), 2 vols. ed. Hartmut Atsma. Zürich and Munich: Arte- mis, 1976, 1979, I, 362–408, at 392–393. 180 Donald Bullough, “Aula renovata: the Carolingian Court before the Aachen Palace,” Id., Carolingian Renewal: Sources and heritage. Manchester: Manchester University Press1991, 123–160, at 142, argues that “the foundations had been laid, literally and meta- phorically, in the years 789/94.” See the extensive literature cited in note 60. However, this time frame would seem far too short in light of the order of magnitude of construction at Aachen. See de Jong, “Charlemagne’s Balcony,” 275–289, regarding the availability of the palace for use by 794. 181 See ARF, passim, regarding Charlemagne’s active life at this time. 182 Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne (see note 32), 149–150, 189–190, provides some helpful introductory observations. See also Janet Nelson, “Aachen as a Place of Power,” Topogra- phies of Power in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Mayke de Jong and Frans Theuws with Carine van Rhijn. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2001, 269–281. 183 See, for example, Notker, Gesta Karoli, bk. II, chs. 8–9.